Learning From Disaster Survivors to Improve Resilience

National Academy of Sciences

Gulf Coast Resiliency Program

West Street Recovery: Ana Barrios, Doris Brown, Ben Hirsch

Spring 2021

1. Introduction:

The city of Houston and Harris County have been hit by an unrelenting series of disasters over the last 20 years: Tropical Storm Alison (2001) Hurricane Ike (2008), the Memorial Day (2015) and Tax Day Floods (2016) Hurricane Harvey (2017) Tropical Storm Imelda (2019) the COVID 19 (2020 and ongoing) pandemic, Tropical Storm Beta  (2020) and winter storm Uri (2021)^[1]. The cumulative impact of the disasters calls into question the typical conceptions of disaster recovery as a process with a distinct start date, a storm or other cataclysm, and the process of putting a life back together to a prestrom condition, and problematizes the idea of resilience.

West Street Recovery was formed in 2017 in response to Hurricane Harvey. Since the storm WSR has walked alongside community members, accompanied survivors as they navigated recovery bureaucracies, rebuilt homes, organized with community members and advocated for a more just recovery. As the organization and its member-clients strove to recover from Harvey, subsequent disasters both derailed recovery efforts and built knowledge about how community driven organizations can rapidly respond and recovery that counter the most inhumane and ineffective tendencies of the recovery process as it is executed by actors in the governmental charitable and profitable sectors.

One of the reasons that disaster recovery is so ineffective and amplifies inequity to such a degree is that marginalized people, particularly Back and Indigenous people of color and low income people are not given power to shape recovery programs or processes. Furthermore, there are few avenues for impacted communities to share lessons learned with each other. This report is based on research that aims to close this gap.

Between February and April of 2021, WSR conducted three focus groups made up of community members who have faced disaster in quick succession. As if to underline the frequency of disruption, the most recent disaster, Winter Storm Uri took place between the second and third groups. Each group had a slightly different composition which was intended to reveal the different ways in which people facing similar circumstances can interpret disasters and preparedness. The first focus group was composed of residents who are actively engaged in community organizing with the Northeast Action Collective and the Harvey Forgotten Survivors Caucus, the second was conducted in spanish and was made up of immigrant women of varied legal status, and the third group was made up of community members WSR met during the immediate aftermath of Uri. The focus groups were facilitated by Doris Brown, Ben Hirsch, and Ana Barrios, who are members of the WSR staff, and Jade Flores, a former staff member and immigrant rights organizer. The script for the focus group was jointly developed with WSR staff and Resilient America Program/Gulf Research Program staff.

This report draws on the knowledge and experience of the people and communities WSR has worked with to:

 1) Illustrate the impacts of flooding and other disasters on marginalized communities.

2) Explain strategies that individuals, households and communities can use to improve preparedness and resilience

3) Outlines an advocacy agenda for organizers, policy analysts and others who can pressure governments to improve disaster preparedness and response.

Impacts of Flooding and Disasters:

“It has flooded in my neighborhood for years, since I was a little girl. Harvey was on a totally different level. I’m still dealing with the effects right now. It affected my skin, i go to different doctors and use special creams. It takes a toll on a person, mentally and physically^[2].”

        While each of the disasters has a distinct impact the first two focus groups conducted highlighted the effects of Harvey and Imelda, the two most recent flooding events, and the Covid 19 Pandemic. The third group focused on Winter storm Uri as well, because it was conducted in its immediate aftermath. The focus groups  examined the way in which stress, trauma and damage from each disaster had compounding negative effects on physical and mental health and family finances while also eroding trust in governments and civil society.

        The most extreme impact of Harvey for members in our focus groups was death. Two seperate participants^[3] who were related both described having 6 family members die crossing Greens bayou during Harvey. Two other participants had mothers pass since August of 2017 and both cited the conditions of their homes as a major stressor to their health. In one case her mother died from COVID 19, which she said was made worse by living in mold and from the disruption caused by flooding. This is a deadly example of the way in which disasters’ impacts compound. Tragically one member of our first focus group died in march after suffering a stroke during winter storm Uri.

        When asked to describe the impacts of the storm, most respondents first focused on the effects flooding had on housing. Of the 17 participants all had homes that were unlivable after Hurricane Harvey. One member of our second focus group, composed of immigrant women explained that “The water flowed through my Trailer like a river;” and in the first focus group members remember that water levels were over four feet inside their home when they finally left. Damages ranged from having to remove most of the drywall to having trailers totally destroyed past the point at which repairs were possible, to having an electrical fire that burnt large portions of the home. At least two participants who had traditional framed homes in our focus groups have not fully repaired their homes to pre-storm conditions. Some respondents who lived in trailers never returned to their pre-storm houses due to damage, or they have relocated because they were scared to flood again.  

        Respondents say that mental health impacts of storms are more severe than is understood. For most, stress, trauma and depression have shaped the years since Harvey. One Latinx mother told a harrowing story of holding her two children's hands as they walked across the road through fast moving flood water, fearing almost losing them. Although she held on and they survived she is struggling to deal with the memory. For another the repeated flooding of Harvey and Imelda, and the governments inadequate defense in the face of covid was deeply disheartening. She summarized the mental health impacts bluntly, “the effects are long lasting, and some of us will never recover.”

It is critical to note that the impacts we call “mental health”  are the result of structural injustice. Participants listed causes including being denied by FEMA for reasons they didn't understand or disagreed with, rejected by insurance companies despite paying into policies for years, and ignored by case workers who were assigned to help them as they sought to recover. One participant explained how emotionally taxing applying for aid can be, this time focusing on government assistance,

“When people try to get help from the government, they don’t get help. It becomes so overbearing, they give up. It’s bad. It's bad when you put people in positions where they think they don't mean anything to anyone.”

Although the impacts are emotional and unique for each survivor, it seems misguided to address the issues individually when structural changes to government programs, insurance policies and agency staffing decisions could eliminate the suffering more efficiently.

        Along with loss of housing, physical health ailments, death, and mental health challenges people also are struggling to recover financially. This is especially true because of how frequent disasters seem to be occurring. Latinx participants still struggling to recover from Harvey and Imelda lost jobs from COVID-19 and many had to stay home because their children were sick. For migrants this was even harder because their work situations are more precarious.Several mentioned having bosses that were extremely demanding and one lost her job because she was experiencing “long covid.”  Participants who were not experienced organizers did say that repeated disasters had a mixed impact. In the third group one woman remarked “ I think I'm getting better at it, but it’s not something I should have to get better at, it makes me feel like I'm in a third world country.” Residents who were engaged in organizing were more unequivocal, while there are lessons learned and deep bonds formed through recovery, these pale in comparison to the continued stress, health impacts and financial hardship.

Disaster Preparedness and Planning for Response

To increase a community's “resilience,” the “ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events^[4].” It is essential to reduce the impacts that disasters have through preparedness and to improve systems that help families recover. After surviving many storms, participants say that resilience interventions should happen at three scales and in three ways:  1) Individuals and households should prepare to leave home safely and prepare themselves to navigate recovery systems before storms hit. 2) Communities should be ready to respond for and with each other, autonomously, and 3) Communities should advocate for governments to improve preparedness. None of these approaches are sufficient alone. Taken together these strategies can improve the resilience of neighborhoods and the entire gulf coast region.

Preparing as Individuals or Households

In the second focus group a participant said, “disasters will come” implying that Houstonians need to be prepared at all times. WSR and most of our focus group participants believe that individuals alone cannot prepare for disasters in a way that is sufficient, but that individual level preparations can mitigate the worst impacts and help with feelings of security and confidence.

A key part of preparation as an individual is understanding the risk that your home faces from flooding and other events. Floodplain maps are inaccurate and development and climate change are increasing risk, but participants did say that neighbors will understand risk, and that if your family has lived in one place for a long time they can be a source of information as well. Before deciding to evacuate it is good for families to have reached out to relatives or friends that live in higher parts of the city or out of town and made arrangements of where to go in advance. This may be more difficult for people who are recent immigrants or have limited mobility; immigrants without status may feel at greater risk away from home, low income people might not have cars, and people with disabilities may not be physically capable of moving. Another concern about evacuation was toxicity and disease risk in flood waters if you need to wade through. Households should try and learn what facilities like dumps, train yards are in their vicinity and how to mitigate risk against these exposures. Finally on an individual level, the organizers who participated in the first focus group recommended preparing a go bag, with a set of items that are good for any evacuee, plus medications, and personal effects that will be key to emotional health. In the same vein, residents recommended storing food and water for a few days, and if a family member relies on medical equipment to secure alternative power supply or batteries.

WSR Go-Bag content list

One key strategy for households is to understand the documents required to access assistance before disasters strike, and to keep electronic records of the documents (similarly some people suggested keeping the documents waterproofed). Securing documents before disasters will help residents more rapidly identify which programs they should spend time applying for.  For FEMA and many charitable programs, proof of income, government benefits, home ownership or rental agreements, and property tax status documentation are key papers that residents should take care to protect. In addition residents may need proof of insurance,their mortgage, and past disasters they have suffered. Both WSR as disaster recovery professionals and residents express that all of this document sharing feels unnecessary and potentially violates privacy but that getting ready to share these documents is a key step towards preparedenss. It is also important to acknowledge that many people truly are not eligible for FEMA assistance, and will, despite claims of inclusion and equity made by charitable organizations, struggle to access aid. Understanding eligibility requirements or the geography of exposure risk does not make you eligible for recovery assistance or safe in a flood, however it can help households make the best choices in a very difficult situation. Both planning a survival or evacuation plan and preparing to apply for assistance following a storm require specific knowledge. But it’s unreasonable to expect individuals surviving oppression, environmental injustice and economic stress while maintaining sanity to have all this knowledge as households units. That is one way that communities, activating collectively can help prepare their neighborhoods and reduce risk.

Community Preparedness

As a group, communities can share knowledge and experiences that will help each other prepare for disasters. People who have navigated FEMA and insurance applications can walk friends through these processes and neighbors can help each other with mucking and gutting which limit damage that mold can cause. These mutual aid activities^[5] are key to improving preparedness and response. Through responding to multiple disasters WSR has learned that the groups that will carry our mutual aid rapid response cannot be formed in the aftermath of disasters, instead they should be nurtured slowly overtime in situations where it is easier to build trust and bonds of friendship. From this foundation this collective care work can be scaled up and intensified.

The organizers in our focus groups emphasized the role that community groups could play in prioritizing preparedness. When asked what community groups could do, one participant said, “We can organize, get the community together, we can tell people what they need to do! Before one hits we can do a couple things, we can teach early!^[6]” Neighbors know who is at high risk, who is sick or disabled and who will need extra help. They suggested that community groups could provide supplies like generators and go bags but must begin with the people at highest risk.^[7] The immigrants in our second group complemented this idea by recalling how LaUnidad11, a community group who many of them work with, advised them to take pictures after flooding, and how to navigate FEMA applications as mixed status families. This “soft infrastructure” is a key part of community preparedness and residents suggested creating phone trees, community support lines for mental health crises, WhatsApp group chats for collective problem solving and even calling each other for advice on when to leave. After disasters organizers explained that being part of community groups can help residents avoid scams, and identify opportunities for aid.

Some participants argued that after disasters local workers should be employed to repair homes. In the first focus group one member explained that this would generate needed business in their communities, not just for the workers, but for restaurants and stores where local workers would spend money. Some believed that having local workers would also increase trust which is in short supply after disasters. While this respondent focused on construction, in other research projects participants have said that intake workers from FEMA and NGOs should be from the community. If this does not exist, organizers say that community leaders should provide assistance to neighbors to make sure they are not overlooked or misunderstood because of cultural differences. It is true that not all neighborhoods have established leaders that are formally named and titled, WSR has learned that many friendly residents identify themselves as community figures and have extensive knowledge on who needs help and what their specific barriers to recovery are. The entire preparedness system should leverage this expertise to better target preparations.

In Houston many LMI and BIPOC communities have open ditch drainage that is susceptible to clogging from trash moved by water and from dumping by bad actors. In all three focus groups cleaning up the drains and taking care of your neighborhood was named as a small scale mitigation and preparedness strategy. Organizers seemed to feel that this was a community level solution, but others saw this as more of an individual responsibility.

Since Hurricane Harvey WSR has seen Flood survivors share tips on mucking and gutting, applications, insurance appeals, self care, and mold remediation on an adhoc basis with friends and neighbors. This is a critical part of the preparedness and recovery system, but should not be overly romanticized. All three focus groups felt that while community self help was important, organizations with more power and resources, such as government agencies and national level NGOs should do much more to prepare for and respond to disasters. They also doubt that these actors will ever appear and do protect communities without serious political engagement and pressure for the community.

Advocacy for a Just Recovery and Preparedness:

To improve resilience, we need to create processes of what Doris Brown, co-author and Harvey survivor calls “institutional accountability.” Accountability towards the societal goal towards improving resilience demands that governments and agencies change application processes to be more accessible.  One organizer said that eligibility standards needed to be more “disaster aware” because documents are lost or can't be located after disasters and that bizarrely the government already has most of the information it asks residents for. They say that the government should not ask for documents like proof of home ownership,or tax returns, which are held by other government agencies and could be retrieved without any work required of survivors trying to put their lives back together. Furthermore residents say much more people power is needed in the application process. Agencies should have much higher staffing levels for intake and navigation jobs. For non english speakers, governments need to hire more bilingual staff and invest more energy into cultural competence. Overall in terms of recovery, participants argued that we should advocate to cut red tape and expedite home repair programs. The focus group also demonstrated the myriad of reasons that survivors have to distrust governments. Across all focus groups participants expressed that honesty and follow-through was needed before residents could rely on governments to get back on their feet after disasters.

Participants also emphasized flood mitigation and protection from disasters.  Following Winter storm Uri, members of the third focus group pointed out that “it was all preventable.” They called on the state of Texas to take the climate crisis seriously and do things like insulate supply lines and improve flood control. They also called on the city and county to have better evacuation plans, better disaster warning systems and to take the risk of toxic exposure more seriously.

        In all three groups there was a consensus that communities needed to build relationships with politicians and build political power. One participant explained,

“Inactivity is getting us nowhere. We need the force of many, not going to take one politician. Be active within the community, this is where you live and it will affect you. Vote, but also work in your community.”

There is a feeling that governments only care when they might get voted out. This is a worrying dynamic for undocumented people who cannot vote, and for the thousands of Houstonians who are disenfranchised in other ways. Another key strategy in terms of political power was “calling out” politicians who do not deliver on promises. Residents, especially those who were organizers, recommended working with figures in the media or holding rallies to hold politicians accountable. This strategy seemed particularly important at the time of writing as Harris County had promised to spend $2.5 billion of flood mitigation money financed with a 2018 bond in a way that used SVI to ensure equity, but the County budget office revealed in March that watersheds in Northeast Houston have much bigger funding gaps than watersheds in wealthier areas of the city.

One programmatic solution that residents demanded was relocation or what are often called “buy-outs.” To date, despite the severity of flooding no one in Houston has been bought out after Harvey. WSR works with one resident in Harris county who has flooded four times in five years and even she does not seem to be in buy out plans. Taking climate change seriously may mean that governments have to spend much more on elevating homes and relocating people. Clearly these steps should be taken before disasters and not afterwards.

Conclusion

        Conducting three focus groups with Harvey survivors complemented over three years of WSR’s work on disaster preparedness and recovery. Interventions to increase preparedness and improve recovery systems are needed within the household, at the scale of the neighborhood or community and by governments. Although families are increasingly experienced at getting through disasters (in other words they repeatedly show their “resilience”), the compounding stress, trauma, health impacts, and financial costs outweigh any advantage gained through lessons learned.  While political action is not typically what comes to mind when we hear “resilience” our research suggests that, while community networks and individual planning is important, we must address the vulnerabilities, disproportionate exposure to risk, and barriers to recovery that lead to repeated catastrophe. This work requires political and cultural transformation.

        Participants expressed that governments must take action to both improve recovery and prevent disasters, but they also had serious concerns that the government would ever protect their communities. This tension calls on community organizations to step up both to provide services directly and to advocate to government actors. In terms of preparedness WSR has been shocked by the poor levels of readiness displayed during the winter storm and more recent flooding in Spring of 2021. But residents want major infrastructure improvements like detention ponds, and local evacuation centers prepared to deal with survivors during a pandemic. From our perspective that is something small groups of committed people simply cannot deliver.

        Residents, who have lived in marginalized communities and repeatedly flooded are realistic; they say we should continue to push for state action but plan as if it will not occur. For that reason our focus group members are most reliant on and confident in community organizations and each other to prepare for, survive during and recover from disasters.