MONTANA DISTRICT COURT

FOR

GRIZZLY PEAKS

JUDGEMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

03 April 2022

JASON BOARD

for the plaintiff.

JASON LEE, CHRIS WINTERS, ROSS LEE, PETER CLARK, JACKSON BLACK and

KELVIN LEVINGTON

for the defence.

Before TOM NAJAIL, District Court Judge.

1. BACKGROUND

On the 8th March 2022, troopers of the Montana State Police executed a search and seizure warrant issued by this court two days prior. The troopers seized numerous items from the location and submitted the return warrant to this court.

Nugget was brought before the court on 9th March 2022, charged with Class 1 Controlled Substance Possession, Possession of a Class 2 Firearm, Possession of a Class 3 Firearm, Possession of Illegal Magazines and Possession of Contraband. Represented by a state public defender, a motion to suppress the evidence obtained under the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine based upon the warrant having expired. The court accepted the motion and dismissed the case. The plaintiff then filed this suit and both parties have conceded that all causes of action, bar infliction of emotional damage,  hinge on whether the warrant was valid at the time of execution. As for IIED, parties stipulate the legal question as to whether or not the MSP was justified in pointing weapons at the plaintiffs based on the fact that the warrant was not labelled ‘armed and dangerous is the only question needed to satisfy a claim of said IIED.

2. DISCUSSION

Search warrants are governed by the Fourth Amendment which protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The primary protection for this right is afforded by the Amendment's requirement that a search warrant may issue only "upon probable cause." The Montana Legislature passed the Warrant Standards Act of 2022, and in this Court’s opinion, in doing so ensured the presence of the protective shield of probable cause at the time a warrant is executed by imposing that “standing probable cause to search shall exist for 7 days.” Warrant Standards Act of 2022 III,  §30002(b)

To explain further, the legislature certainly understood that the probable cause that must support a search warrant will, by its nature, have a limited shelf life. Unlike arrest warrants that are authorized based on completed past events, search warrants are based on events that are ongoing, and therefore changeable, as of the time the warrant is issued. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210, 53 S.Ct. 138, 77 L.Ed. 260 (1932). The information underlying the warrant may grow stale with time as the activity upon which the warrant was based ceases or moves to another location. Although law enforcement officers must be given reasonable latitude in deciding when to execute a search warrant, the warrant must be executed with some promptness "in order to lessen the possibility that the facts upon which probable cause was initially based do not become dissipated." United States v. Nepstead, 424 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1970). In the Warrant Standards Act of 2022 III,  §30002(b), our legislature answers this problem of dissipating probable cause by presuming that probable cause no longer exists after seven days.

This is all well and good, however, as the defence, in this case, points out the warrant in question was only approved with 45.5 hours on the clock leading this Court to wonder if the legislature has the power to set a minimum time for standing probable cause to last but this thought is quickly quashed as there is nothing to suggest that the Warrant Standards Act of 2022 is unconstitutional on a state or federal level. The law clearly states that probable cause shall exist for seven days, no more, no less and in doing so, bind the judiciary to approve a warrant for that amount of time something which the judiciary erred in this instance. The irony is not lost on myself, particularly as the presiding judge in the criminal case, which now stands to be appealed.

This Court must also analyze the legal question as to whether or not the MSP was justified in pointing weapons at the plaintiffs based on the fact that the warrant was not labelled “armed and dangerous”. This question is not one any court will have encountered before, it is not common practice to disregard a law enforcement officer’s judgement on how a warrant shall be executed in favour of that of a judicial officer. Simply, this court believes it is not, and can never be reasonable to enforce such measures in such dynamic situations and nothing actually forbids an officer from conducting a warrant with their weapons drawn in the Warrant Standards Act of 2022. In turn, there is no cause to grant the invitation that the MSP’s actions would arise to that of IIED based on the plaintiff’s argument.

3. CONCLUSION

This Court finds that the plaintiff’s cause of action is unfounded based on the law and finds in favour of the defence.