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The Trend, Impacts, and Post-COVID19 Challenges:

France

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College of Humanities (Department of Philosophy)

Seoul National University

CADINOT Coralie (cadinotcoralie@gmail.com, regular student at Sciences Po Paris)

This work is sponsored by the Asia Regional Information Center, SNU Asia Center.

I] Background and Response to COVID-19 in France

Current Situation at date 2020.08.01
Former French Experiences with Viruses
COVID-19 Trend and French Government Response

Figures about COVID-19

COVID-19 pandemic evolution
Economic and financial impacts
Educational and Cultural Impacts

French government response

Confinement
Government remedies to economic and financial impacts
Other means

II] Challenges faced during COVID-19 Outbreak

France-related challenges
European Response

III] Looking Elsewhere

South Korean and French Governments responses Compared
Looking ahead: what will happen in France?

A Violent Paradigm Shift; how COVID-19 might actually be a great Opportunity

SOURCES

I] Background and Response to COVID-19 in France

Current Situation at date 2020.08.01

For any country, it can be a hard task to get back to what is called to be the “patient” or “agent 0”, meaning the very first case that then lead to the contamination of the many. In France, some suspicious cases were discovered around November 2019. However, the first official positive case, discovered retrospectively, goes back to December 02 2020. Since that day, time has passed, and we can already tell COVID-19 first wave happened, despite a possible second wave of infected patients to come, and already beginning. Indeed, if we take a look at recent figures related to COVID-19, it seems like there has been an average of around 1,060 new cases a day since July 22, up from 560 in early July.

Since May 11 2020, the confinement has been ceased, and French citizens were allowed to wander the streets without any interdiction or justification. On May 28th 2020, the French Prime Minister Edouard Philippe makes the announcement of the second confinement phase, giving the green light for bars and restaurants to get back to normal.

Speaking about getting back to normal, bars and restaurants have to limit the number of people gathered around a table to ten people, and make sure each table is well-spaced of one meter. Wearing a mask has been something progressively normalized. From today, August 1, masks are made mandatory in any place. This policy was announced by the president himself on July 14.

If we carry out informal surveys in shops, bars and restaurants, we can’t ignore the weight given to COVID-19. Overall the pandemic left a lasting impression in French restorers’ and customers’ minds that the world won’t ever be the same.

Also, we can’t produce a report without mentioning the very observable fact that COVID-19 is the first virus that lead the French government to take drastic decisions of this extent. In the meanwhile, and more related to the current political stance (institutions, governors) of the country, COVID-19 played the role of catalyst, and unveiled further incoherencies in the highest French political spheres, leading, with no doubts, to more social upheavals.

Former French Experiences with Viruses

It is clear that no virus before COVID-19 had needed such a stay-at-home policy, nor such a systematized confinement. Indeed, regarding the matter of confinement, it is clear that

The last pandemic France faced was in 2009, with what was called the A Virus (H1N1). The latter originated from xx and expended all over Europe. France was not that stroke by the virus, which makes COVID-19 the biggest and most recent health crisis French government faced. However, deaths related to this virus have nothing in common with the dimension of COVID-19 cases. The Graph. 1 shows the confirmed deaths following an A Virus infection, as well as non-official deaths with due to the A Virus pandemic. Hence, from the 29th week of 2009 till the 14th week of 2010, the deaths pic happened on the week 48 of 2009, with a deaths toll of around 30 official deaths, to 34 unofficial deaths.

Graph 1. Weekly Evolution of the total number of deaths related to an A Virus (H1N1) infection in mainland France

(Statista, 2020)

COVID-19 trend and French response

Figures about COVID-19

COVID-19 pandemic evolution

The Graph 2. represents the number of cases declared each day till March 20 2020, or the day where the trend began to get downward.

Graph 2. Daily number of new people infected with the COVID-19, February 20 to March 20

(Statista, 2020)

On March 16 2020, France was totalizing 6,633 cases with around 150 deaths. At that time, and this wil bring us to our argument about French response to COVID-19, the Minister of Health Olivier Veran, was not hiding that while the pandemic was evolving, the government was able to take decisions accordingly. From March 01 to June 09 2020, France has had 29,296 due to COVID-19. As of June 11 2020, the number of cases confirmed reached 156,813.

Economic and financial impacts

According to the INSEE (French Statistics Institute), the GDP previous for 2020 and 2021 have abruptly shifted, as showed on Graph. 3. The original GDP growth of 0.9% for the Y2020 is now a negative number of -0.3%. As for the Y2021, the growth rate of GDP was supposed to be 1.4%, and the INSEE is now forecasting a small evolution of 0.2%.

Graph 3. Reassessment of GDP growth following the COVID-19 outbreak, from 2020 to 2021

(Statista, 2020)

As for financial spheres, the bank Société Générale (SG) has shown dramatic shifts on the stock exchange. This was not only due to COVID-19, but also to poor results from part of the SG. The financial statement of 2019 didn’t show positive results at all, but a proportion to take further risky decisions leading to several financial systemic threats. In other words, the rise of the pandemic, lead to amplification of some decision-making processes from part of several French companies. As for Renault, its sales collapsed by 79% in Europe for April, threatening the manufacturer of a liquidity crisis. The Graph. 4 shows the top 15 French enterprises that were widely impacted on the stock market exchange by the pandemic.

Graph 4. Ranking of the most significant decreases among the CAC 40, as of June 03, 2020

(Statista, 2020)

The CAC 40 French financial index showed a tremendous trend downward as showed in the Graph 5, from February 14 2020 to 18 March 2020.

Graph 5. Price variation of the CAC 40 in France, between January 24 and June 03 2020

(Statista, 2020)

Educational, Cultural and Political Impacts

While financial and economic spheres are the first spheres to be considered when tackling a crisis such as COVID-19, many other aspects of society actually shifted. Education all over the country was stopped. For France, this sudden change was a harsh move as many French universities don’t have the adapted technology to provide courses online. However, very rapidly, Zoom has been used. Moreover, all over France, academic year beginning was postponed of two weeks, sometimes one month.

The number of student that passed the exam of the Baccalaureate increased sharply. From a total of 745,900 candidates, 96% passed it. This is 7.6 points more than in 2019. The exam of the Baccalaureate gives any student the formal authorization to follow secondary schooling. This radical shift in the number of admission was criticized, and the certificate of the Baccalaureate is now seen as something that was kind of given to students.

Related to culture, we have been witnessing an importation of social and political debates from the USA. Indeed, strictly related to the Black Lives Matter movement and the death of George Floyd, French media has been globally facing turmoil.

Also, politically speaking, COVID-19 has accelerated the process towards a government official’s shift. Indeed, on July 6 a cabinet reshuffle took place. This reshuffle was completed by the end of July.

French government response

Confinement

On March 16 2020, Emmanuel Macron, which is rare, is broadcast on TV to address a set of official policies to face COVID-19 outbreak. After weeks, searching for a way out, through the use of masks and tests that were at that time not available, French government decided to confine the whole population. On March 17 2020, at 12pm the whole country’s activity was stopped.

Because of the confinement, the government decided that any French person that had to go out of his or her home, had to justify it, by filling an appropriate documents. Two kinds of certificate were available during the confinement. The first one dedicated to strict movements and entitled “derogatory travel certificate” and a second one for international trips “derogatory international travel certificate”. In the case of the derogatory travel certificate, everyone could justify its trip through a set of reasons as followed: medical cares to be received and that can’t be provided at home nor postponed, work that can’t be done from home, trip for the purchase of basic and necessary goods, trip for family matters, judiciary or administrative notification, judiciary-imposed works and finally trip within the scope of 1km around the house, related to sport activities alone or with the members of the family or individuals with whom we were confined. During any of their trip, French citizens had to provide themselves with the official documents, and their identity card. If they were to be arrested by French authorities without the appropriate justification, they could receive a fine of EUR 135. In the case of a trip for the purchase of necessary goods, French authorities had the right to check the real necessity of such purchases.

Government remedies to economic and financial impacts

The government took a set of decisions in order to soften the impacts of COVID-19 in both the fields of Economics and Finance. Rents, gas, water and electric fines were suspended for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that were widely exposed to immediate bankruptcies. By the end of March, the government also decided to put in place a Solidarity Fund in order to accompany SMEs during the whole outbreak. Overall, more than 3 million grants were made accounting for EUR 4.5 million of financial support. The Solidarity Fund was directed to SMEs having very strict characteristics: 10 employees or less, with an annual turnover of less than EUR 1 million. Also these SEMs must have been closed to the public or have to justify a loss of 50% of income in 2020, compared to the previous year turnover.

More recently, French government decided to provide bigger French companies with the necessary liquidity in order for them to be solvable and maintain their activity. As the automobile park has suffered a lot through the crisis, Renault had a loan guaranteed by the State (PGE) of EUR 5 billion, which financial support was recognized by the European Commission to be an exceptional public support. Even if Renault still had EUR 10.3 billion in liquidity available at the end of March, the company lost around EUR 5.5 billion in the first quarter and was about to lose more. It’s the third time the French government saves Renault, after 1980 and 2008. Some French newspaper and scholars have also been talking about a potential nationalization of the company. The aeronautic industry has been also widely impacted. On June 09 2020 the Minister of Economy declared the industry to be in a state of emergency. A financial support plan was unveiled. A recovery plan of total EUR 15 billion is under process in order to save 200,000 jobs. Which plan is made of EUR 1.5 billion for a system of expert guarantees and EUR 2 billion dedicated to the purchase of new Airbus planes.

Other means

After March 16 2020, a set of other decisions are being taken. Schengen Zone frontiers are being closed immediately, French people being abroad are called back by the Ministry of Europe and foreign Affairs. The second turn of municipal elections is postponed, as well as any political reform being suspended. On March 23 2020, the government unveiled its decree “Prescribing the general measures necessary to deal with COVID-19 epidemic in the context of the state of health emergency” (No. 2020-293).

Concerning the distribution of masks, these latter are dedicated to the ‘first rank’ actors of French society meaning all the medical teams. These teams were widely mobilized, and systems were developed for them to fully enhance their functions. Hence, a system of day-care center was put in place in order for their children to be kept and hotels nearby hospitals were also dedicated to host any medical worker.

A for the follow-up of education, courses were mainly provided online, and parents called to assists their children in this new educative process.

The municipal elections second turn was also postponed to July 26 2020.

II] Challenges faced during COVID-19 Outbreak

France-related challenges

The challenges faced by the French government while responding to the pandemic can be articulated in many ways. Firstly, the understanding of the organization and legal history of French health care system can help to better assess the efficiency of the government. Secondly, the government mismanagement lead to contradictions while the pandemic was running. Thirdly, the role of media was truly of a challenge during COVID-19.

A brief history of French health care system; modern challenges of a centralized administration

Before January 2020, France health care system was not ready to react to an event of the size of a pandemic. Therefore, obstacles faced during COVID-19 crisis were directly and deeply linked to a weak health system. France is really known for its welfare state, which is totally legitimate as the health care system is universal, and take into accounts many social and economic ladders of French society. However, such a universalization and facility to access cares, is not linked to the real capacity a hospital has in taking care of a certain number of patients. French health system history has clearly showed a slow but settled path towards a generalized nationalization and administration of its structure. We can only acknowledge the great fluidity and economical plans the sciences of administration has been enabling any government to implement. However, some processes part of this sciences like a strict budget allocation, or strict provision of services according to a defined and prospected demand can, when applied to fields like health, lead to the collapse of the system. At least, in the case of France, re-processing the whole administration of the health system lead to an undeniable lack of efficiency.

From 1851 to 1941, French hospitals were fully independent, monitoring their own budget, and answering back to individual demands. Around the 30’s, this system got to change progressively, with the apparition of health mutualized systems, where individuals and families with low income, were financially being supported when receiving cares. The rise of such mutual programs lead to a notion of ‘Universalized Health’. This means that health was not a service anymore, but a right, encrypted within the Law. In 1941, it’s the first time for French administration to use the terminology of ‘right to health cares’. However, the HPST (reorganization plan) law of January 26, 2016, for example, had concluded a new way of approaching French health system. Indeed, the health system shifted from a logic of health supply to a logic that aimed at responding to health needs, following the very basic economic formula ‘supply = demand’.

This was the rise of what some French scholars called the ‘hospital planning’ that notably lead to the progressive reduction of the hospital beds number, each year till nowadays. The law of December 29 1979 (No. 79-1140) established the abolition of beds on the Health Minister demand. The corrigendum law (No. 91-7480) of July 31 1991 settled objectives for the health system, such as the hospital beds number reduction. At that time, hospital costs were considered to be high, and therefore reduced. Below you’ll find some statistics about the decrease in the total amount of hospital bed available in the French health system (Tab 1.) and the stance of such decrease (Graph 6.). We decided to take the hospital bed number as a standard to define what might be a well-prepared health system, as this figure reflects the capacity of health establishments for full hospitalization.

Tab 1. Evolution of the French hospital bed number in both public and private sectors (1998-2018)

(Insee, 2016)

Graph 6. Evolution of the French hospital bed number in both public and private sectors (1998-2018)

Note: computed from Tab 1.

Despite what the former Minister of Health said when she was in office, the French health system was not well prepared. Within 10 years, French health system had to face a decrease of total 93,000 hospital beds. Knowing that hospitals had to face a terrible lack in patients’ reception during COVID-19, such a decrease take total different turn. Nevertheless, in 2003, a habilitation law was voted with regard to diverse public health institutions. Only regional and university hospital centers were allowed to remain active. As for local hospitals they had to close, leading to the disappearing of many needed health departments and further centralization. This centralization lead the heal insecurity of households, often located outside of megalopolis where hospitals are located. Hospitals have now a lot of different status: municipal, inter-municipal, departmental, regional, inter-regional and national. Such a centralization also caused the specialization of a few hospitals so that patients refer to city names, like Toulouse and Marseille, specialized in neurosurgery. Overall, the health expense represent 11 to 12% of total GDP in 2018, against 9.5% in 2000.

Finally, the stance in this field of society has been to favor revenues over expenses, in other words, to favor results over resources. Throughout legislative developments health matters have all been, to varying degrees, contributing to the control of social protection expenditure necessary to maintain the major balances of the national economy (Stingre, 2018).

Mismanagement issues during while COVID-19 was ongoing

While the first cases in China and Asia as a whole came public, French government was both undermining the real situation of its wealth system if it ever had to face a pandemic crisis, and undermining the spread probability of COVID-19. On January 23 2020, the air craft between Wuhan and France was suspended, as the country had a direct connection with the city.

Following this date, a set of unappropriated decisions were taken. On March the 1rst 2020, the very famous French Salon of Agriculture was still maintained. Each year, this salon welcome around 480,000 visitors and 1,000 exhibitors. Nevertheless, on March 11 2020 a soccer game between Paris-Saint Germain team and Borussia Dortmund team was maintained, gathering thousands of supporters. Knowing that COVID-19 was at that moment highly affecting China, that France always had a direct connection flight with Wuhan, and that its French borders were still opened, it is hard to understand such a decision. The first round of the municipal elections was also maintained. Also, on March 17 2020 after the announcement of the national lockdown by the president on March 16, more than one million of persons left the region of Paris, leading to huge and sudden displacements with higher risks for further contaminations. This is for the management of gatherings and trips.

Concerning the direct provision with masks and tests, French government didn’t take a clear decision at the beginning of March. While the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended to any country to test all the travelers arriving at the airports, France didn’t do so. For a while, someone wearing the mask was seen as contaminated and hence told to go home, instead of seeing this person as careful for its health.

French government failed to provide its people with masks, hand sanitizers and tests at the right time. Incoherencies appeared among the heads of state when talking about the arrival of masks, sanitizers and tests. The French multinational corporation LVMH, had to produce sanitizers and we saw in Paris the formation of individual initiatives to create sanitizers as well. On January 30 2020, the DGS (General Direction of Health) asked the SPF (French Public Health Agency) to acquire as soon as possible 1,1 million masks of FFP2 norms. On February 07 2020, another demand is made by the DGS to the SPF for the acquisition of 28,4 million masks, through an accelerated purchase process. At that time, the need for masks was of 40 million per week for the personal health. On February 12 2020, the SPF received 500,000 out the 28,4 million masks that were ordered. This desperate management when providing masks were widely contested. Rapidly complaints directed to some government officials were made.

The role of media, a challenge in itself

In general, people’s perception of the crisis was widely influenced by the role of media. Many debates appeared on TV, but also many questioning about certain official behaviors.

Indeed, we can’t ignore the need for accountability and a deep sense of responsibility in politics. The former Minister for Health, Agnès Buzin, had an article published in the newspaper Le Monde, where she openly says that she knew about the seriousness of COVID-19 health matter since the first day, while she didn’t make sure France had the necessary masks stock, sending the latter to China and especially Wuhan. Nonetheless, she left the office on February 17 2020, to run for municipal elections in Paris, which was widely seen as a lack of professionalism.

The spokesperson of the French government also had infantilizing words indirectly directed to French citizens, talking about masks. Indeed, Sibeth Ndiaye repeated many times that wearing a masks was a too technical process. This remark was interpreted as an insult to French citizens.

Finally, many other debates took place concerning the most appropriate way to treat patients positive to COVID-19. On May 26 2020, the use of hydroxychloroquine was prohibited in France. This ban came after months of debate opposing journalists and doctors to the professor Didier Raoult. The latter treated patients at the hospital of Marseille with hydroxichloroquine coupled with another medicine. On May 22 2020, an article was published in The Lancet, entitled “Hydroxychloroquine or chloroquine with or without a macrolide for treatment of COVID-19: a multinational registry analysis” that pointed out the absence of clear benefits for COVID-19 patients to use the medicine. Two weeks after, the article was retracted.

These many debates, and the flow of news reinforced by the used of Twitter, lead the media to have very important role during this crisis, so much that they were of a challenge. The Graph 7 shows a survey about what French people have been mostly doing during COVID-19. 57% were watching television, and 44% being on the Internet.

As a proof that media were challenging during this crisis, French Government even had to create a temporarily media to “reestablish the truth” about COVID-19 management.

Graph 7. Survey: What activities do you engage in during this confinement period?

(Statista, 2020)

2. European response to COVID-19 outbreak

Europe, depending on the reader’s ideas, might look like a great regional association of country; Europe is not yet a federation of the kind, and its already contested functioning was seriously put at stake. We won’t develop too much about Europe because this is not the matter of this paper. However, we mustn’t forget that France is part of a broader association of countries, the European Union (E.U.), which in this situation was not able, in the first place, to manage the pandemic. This was notably due to opinion differences when it came to think about solutions and take a decision.

A preliminary observation to the reaction of E.U. member states during the pandemic is the immediate closing of borders, when the situation got worse. This shows that any union can’t really stand when an issue the size of a pandemic arises. The first worries were exacerbated with Italy, where COVID-19 cases rose dramatically.

Asian countries might look at us with envy when it comes to the cultural aspect of such a union, or also the facility it gives to travel from a country to another. However, a crisis such as COVID-19 showed immediate consequences on financial and economic spheres, especially in the context of a union such as the E.U. Indeed, the original issues of the E.U. have been exacerbated all along the sanitary crisis. To understand how those issues were widely put forward, and even more, we have to admit that a sanitary crisis such as COVID-19 got to be shifted in a financial and soon economic crisis.

Originally, and according to my view, two notable issues from which Europe is suffering a lot have been widely emphasized during the crisis. The first is linked to trade; the E.U. has put a limit to the number of main partners with which it trades, leading to a single-market-economy. The second is related to monetary policy.

We can’t ignore that the E.U. is actually a single market where a small amount of countries are inclined to trade with each other, only. Such a union leads to a progressive and historical delocalization of production means towards foreign territories. The difference between a sovereign state and member state was one of the main debate of this crisis, at least all over Europe and especially in the case of France. Due to this single market operation, there has been an evident lack of national entrepreneurship, leading, hence, to an absence of medical devices stocks. A bit too lately, unfortunately, individuals started to open their own sanitizer’s productions. LVMH, a French franchise; meaning an old company that found its way out through the French market till today, was meant to create sanitizers in quantity. In the meanwhile new SMEs like R-PUR were created. The latter is meant to create masks made of very specific material, all of it created in France. Naturally, with time passing, many European countries had to rely on foreign support. This is the case for China, despite the country was helped in the first place. Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) Project is actually fully in line with COVID-19, for several reasons. First, the OBOR Project has adopted a very particular sanitary orientation over time. Second, China, through the ramifications of its OBOR project but also its sanitary diplomacy, nourished its projects through several interventions all across Europe. The most notable one that was also widely criticized in the French press is for sure, the intervention of a medical team in Italy. A paper has been written regarding China’s interventionism throughout Europe. The report entitled “Covid-19 and Europe-China Relations; A country-level analysis” is divided in several part, each treating a specific aspect of the Chinese cooperation in Europe while the crisis was running. The introduction’s title of the report “China as partner, competitor and rival amid COVID-19” depicts very well the ambiguity of the numerous Chinese interventions. In March 2019, the European Commission even produce a report about E.U.-China collaboration. In the latter, the E.U. defines a set of 10 actions for the European Council to endorse when developing any of its projects and especially with China. What is mostly interesting through this report is the way China is addressed; a mix of friend and enemy, a frenemy.

Part of the E.U., but more specifically of the so-called Euro Zone, the Euro is not only a currency but the origin of the maintenance of artificial exchange rate among countries that have nothing in common. The 19th members of the Eurozone have always been experiencing a fixed exchange rate that is not representative of the intrinsic value of all member states’ goods. In the case of countries like Italy or Spain, such a monetary functioning can make it harder for them to adapt to the crisis. Therefore, the E.U. faced troubles in determining the settings of its monetary policies, and realizing them. Hence, we saw flourishing at the beginning of April, the project of the Corona Bonds, which is actually the creation of a common debt in order to tackle the COVID-19 outbreak and consequences. Germany was the first country to go against such a monetary policy. Indeed, the German court of Justice showed a wide disagreement, as in the German Constitution, it is not possible to accept policies engaging the country in such a way, that it would threaten its financial stability, without voting. Germany is more specifically fearing inflation, as its demography wouldn’t allow any price variation. Since the EURO crisis that took place in 2012, many monetary tools were created in order to print or buy the debt of countries back. For example, a Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) was created in 2016, aiming at buying back sovereign debt. However, the ability to buy this debt was limited to 33% of its total, while the most recent repurchase agreement idea the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) implemented by the European Central Bank (ECB) makes it possible to overcome the 33% limit. For Germany who’s strictly opposed to inflation, this PEPP is a big issue. On the page dedicated to this programme we can read what follows “On 4 June 2020 the Governing Council decided to increase the €750 billion envelope for the PEPP by €600 billion to a total of €1,350 billion.” First, this plan can look very problematical, second it is problematical as the quantity repurchased tend to be bigger.

The last agreement concluded among European countries took place in July. EUR 750 billion are to be injected on financial markets. Though, four member states were mainly opposed to this project that are Holland, Austria, Denmark and Sweden, the Frugal Four. Money will be printed and given all along 2021, 2022, and 2023. The repayment of the principal and the interest is currently set to be in 2058.However, it appears that this money being printed will mainly be used to deal with past debt: new loans to pay off old ones.

Despite issues related to trade, or China’s intervention symbolizing the lack of European cohesion as well as states’ sovereignty but also issues related to monetary policies, a certain single and common move towards cooperation is to be noted. In order, maybe, not to forget the positive aspects of the E.U., and that the union was of a useful use all along the crisis, a European Solidarity Tracker was create. The latter gathers a very broad list of actions undertaken to face COVID-19. On the trackers, we can find five types of solidarity. Purple for medical support, red for economic support, yellow for ‘people-level’ help, green for ‘declared’ help linked to supportive speech and public declaration, and finally the blue color related to any other kind of support in front of COVID-19.

II] Looking Elsewhere

South Korean and French Governments responses Compared

The only similarity we can mention while looking at French and South Korean governments when tackling COVID-19, is the way the virus propagated in the country. As it happened with Daegu, there was a religious gathering in the city of Mulhouse, at the Christian Open Door Church. From 2,000 to 2,500 people met there, for an entire week of fasting and religious ceremonies. As in South Korea, such a gathering made the COVID-19 situation suddenly getting worse, causing the two major epidemic outbreaks in both regions of Haut-Rhin and Grand Est, located near by the frontier with Germany. Concerning the reaction to COVID-19, the common point of both governments is, but this is not exceptional, the financial support to SMEs. Otherwise, the countries highly differ in their approach to the pandemic. France was less precautious, which was not the case of South Korea.

Originally, France saw a decrease in its number of bed hospitals, while South Korea has been forcefully increasing its hospital beds, as we can see it on the Graph 8. We have to keep in mind that both countries have 14 billion citizens of difference. We can say and see that South Korea has been better at anticipating an event such as a pandemic, than France.

Graph 8. Evolution of hospital beds number in both France and South Korea

Note: computed from data, OECD.Stat (n.d.)

Another interesting feature of both nations, is that South Korea has always been seeing mask as a tool in every day’s life. In the case of France, confinement could have been avoided if French government would have adopted a more responsible approach to their health system, and a more realistic assessment when looking at the current international health situation. South Korean government was smarter and didn’t choose the path of a total confinement which avoided bigger losses for enterprises.

Nonetheless, if French government would have done things in a different way from its country’s culture, there’s no doubt about the fact that economically and financially speaking, France would have been better off.

Looking ahead: what will happen in France?

During the COVID-19 crisis, French citizens got to face several issues that harmed their integrity, and the trust of the whole nation. Despite a real trust crisis, the whole French nation showed a surprising sense of adaptation, which was at the beginning of the sanitary crisis the hidden fear of most of the political class. Meanwhile French citizens were extremely attentive and obeying to any government’s announcements, the latter was unable to provide its people with the adequate political decisions and adapted consideration.

As we showed it before, French government response to COVID-19 was surprisingly too slow, for many reasons. From a pure historical perspective, French health system was originally unable to respond to a health crisis such as COVID-19. But also, French government had a reckless social behavior towards its people, and this is according to me a bigger issue, deeply linked to an overall deliquescence of French politics. But still, what hooked me during this crisis is not the slowness of upper spheres of administration, but the way French citizens were unfortunately the eye-witnesses of a range of political mistakes that were almost taking unbelievable dimensions, and sometimes humiliating them. More than 63 complaints were made for having put into a great danger the lives of French people. The previous Health Minister and current Prime Minister received several complaints. The same happened for the current Health Minister.

From an economic perspective, the MEDEF is already explaining to French worker that they’ll have to work longer in order to help the country to recover. French deficit in 2020 might reach 11,4% of GDP. Bank of France also predicts an unemployment rate of 11,4% in 2021.

On June 14 2020, President Macron had his fourth speech since the beginning of the crisis. He announced the opening of every bar, restaurant… He launched the third phase of his mandate. But while COVID-19 seems to be a former chapter of French history, it is still impossible to organize gatherings of more than 100 people.

Many other questions may arise from such an episode. Will some companies like Renault or Airbus will be really saved? Macron talked about bankruptcy in his speech on June 14. Concerning the E.U., is a Frexit possible? For sure, some Southern European countries are thinking about exiting the E.U.!

A Violent Paradigm Shift; how COVID-19 might actually be a great Opportunity

Despite all the deaths worldwide, mismanagements, and uprisings in the aftermath of such crisis, COVID-19 might actually be a huge opportunity. Indeed, there is no doubt students of my generation have from now on the incredible chance to begin a new chapter of human kind. A brand new era has just started, where codes, and values but also new administrative and politic plans have to be redefined. I won’t make any mistake here in writing that for France, a new generation of civil servants has to take the lead and redefine French political landscape. In other words, COVID-19 unveiled some of the deepest French system failures, but also international ones! This crisis also unveiled and is still putting light on the intentions of French government leaders. As France is also a European country, by its location but also by an associative choice, the COVID-19 was the perfect moment to be realistic about the functioning of the E.U. Despite the historicity of the union, the symbolism behind it and all the very good optimism, the role of the E.U. was overall limited to the creation of common debt and the transportation of some positive cases to less occupied German hospitals.

Finally, and to the eyes of other scholars, and especially to my mind, I would like to say that we should more often look to the Eastern side of the globe. At the beginning of March 2020, I was called back by my home university, while beginning my second semester at SNU. I have been observing from the start till now the management of both French and South Korean government regarding the pandemic. We can always argue on regime types, on the democratic aspects of a government, on financial and economic growth, on notions like ‘advanced’ or ‘non-advanced’; still reality showed to the whole world, to the French citizen and European individual I am, that the legacy the Western world has been creating for centuries is now over. Asia did and is doing better. In the case of France, we should even look at South Korea in the way it manages its industry.

These will be my last words and I won’t be really original in quoting the South Korean president Moon Jae-in during a speech he gave on May 10 2020. He said, what I thought a Korean leader would say one day:

“Countries that we wanted to follow have started learning from us. We have set a standard and become a world-class nation. People have now begun to talk about the Republic of Korea’s greatness.”

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Table of Contents

A Violent Paradigm Shift; how COVID-19 might actually be a great Opportunity