Iran Legislation in Congress: January 2023
The following is an overview of the main legislation on human rights in Iran that have been introduced or progressed in U.S. Congress since Mahsa Amini’s death on September 16, 2022.[1] It includes their important details of their introduction and sponsorship, an overview of their provisions, and an analysis of what their effect will be and how any impact differs from that of existing legislation.
Introduction and Sponsorship
Representative Jim Banks (R-IN-3) introduced the Mahsa Amini Human rights and Security Accountability Act (“MAHSA Act”) on Oct. 21, 2022. It is co-sponsored by 33 representatives, all of whom except one (Representative Josh Gottheimer) is Republican. The full list of co-sponsors is as follows:
The Bill was referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, on the Judiciary, on Financial Services, and on Ways and Means on October 21, 2022. There have been no actions since.
Provisions
The Bill requires that within 90 days of its enactment, the President review a list of five sanctions authorities and determine whether they apply to “each person and entity” in five listed groups. The five sanctions authorities are as follows:
The five listed groups are as follows:
If the President finds that sanctions do apply to any person or entity, he must then “impose all applicable such sanctions with respect to each such person and entity.” Additionally, the chairman or ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate can submit a request to the President about the final group of individuals/entities, and within 60 days of receiving the request the President must determine if they meet the criteria for one of the sanctions designations and submit a report to the requesting party with the decision of whether to designate them.
Effects
The Bill’s main effect relates to the mandatory review of each individual in the listed groups, but its impact is dependent on how well this is able to be implemented in practice.
First, the Bill would change a few logistical considerations. While Section 501(c), like the MAHSA Act, puts the responsibility on the President to develop a list of perpetrators for Congress, the EOs task the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State and for EO 13224, the Attorney General to make determinations, and Section 7031(c) tasks the Secretary of State with making the determinations.[7] Further, because the MAHSA Act requires that the President must “impost all applicable such sanctions” for “each such person or entity,” it mandates double-listing where appropriate, including under Global Magnitsky sanctions. Generally, the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) only designates Iranian perpetrators under Iran-specific regimes; for example, only two Iran-based designees are listed under the Global Magnitsky regime despite overlapping criteria with EO 13553.[8] While this would have minimal practical effect, Section 7031(c) designations are not always public and so it is possible there are individuals privately designated under Section 7031(c) who, if double-listed due to the MAHSA Act, would be publicly designated for the first time.[9]
Regarding the more substantial effects, the MAHSA Act should theoretically have limited impact on individuals complicit in human rights violations in Iran. Section 105(c) mandates that the President submit to certain congressional committees “a list of persons who are officials of the Government of Iran or persons acting on behalf of that Government […] that the President determines, based on credible evidence, are responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against citizens of Iran or their family members on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran.”[10] However, this requirement is significantly narrower than that of the MAHSA Act—it does not require that the President review each person within the broader categories nor that he sanction all who qualify for sanctions. The MAHSA Act should serve to find anyone who may have been overlooked or passed over. The Section 105(c) criteria sufficiently overlap with those under EOs 13553 and 13818 and under Section 7031(c) such that any Iranian individuals under Section 105(c) should be designated under them as well.[11]
Additionally, there are several categories of perpetrators not covered by Section 105(c) that are covered by EOs 13553, 13224, and 13818 and by Section 7031(c). Because these instruments do not mandate any reviews or list creation, individuals and entities falling under those categories are more likely to be reviewed for the first time under the MAHSA Act and so may be more strongly impacted. Namely, Section 105(c) does not provide for acts of corruption (which are included in EO 13818 and Section 7031(c)), acts of terrorism (which are included in EO 13224), designations of entities (which are included in all three EOs), and modes of liability such as materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing support (which are included in all three EOs).[12]
Introduction and Sponsorship
Representative Adam B. Schiff (D-CA-28) introduced the Support for Iranian Political Prisoners Act on September 29, 2022. It is co-sponsored by 21 representatives, all of whom are Democrats. The full list of co-sponsors is as follows:
The Bill was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on September 29, 2022, and then again to the Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and Global Terrorism the same day. There have been no actions since. However, the text of the Bill was then included in the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (“NDAA 2023”) which became law on December 23, 2022, as Section 5592, “Secretary of State Assistance for Prisoners of Iran.”
Provisions
Under the NDAA 2023, the “Findings” section of the Support for Iranian Political Prisoners Act was deleted, but the rest of the text remains largely the same. The only material difference appears to be that that the NDAA 2023 provisions do not cover arbitrarily detained individuals, and instead limit the focus to prisoners of conscience and political prisoners.
Section 5592 of the NDAA 2023 authorizes the Secretary of State “to continue to provide assistance to civil society organizations that support prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” This specifically includes organizations that are working to release these prisoners; document human rights violations of these prisoners; support international advocacy to raise awareness of relevant issues; support the physical and mental health of these prisoners; and provide post-incarceration assistance, including “forms of reparation.” The statement of policy also includes demands of what the Islamic Republic of Iran “should” do, and mandates that “all diplomatic tools of the United States should be invoked” and that complicit officials “should be held to account” through tools such as Global Magnitsky targeted human rights sanctions.
Effects
The language of the Act does not appear strong enough to have any significant effects. While “assistance” presumably refers to financial aid, it is not defined in the text of Section 5592 nor does Representative Schiff’s media specify any details.[13] Based on the fact that the Secretary of State is only “authorized” to continue to provide assistance, and that the assistance is continued rather than new, it does not seem likely that it will introduce new measures. Likewise, the recommendations that the US “should” use diplomatic tools and that complicit officials “should be held to account” do not seem strong enough or specific enough to have actual impact.
Introduction and Sponsorship
Senator Patrick Toomey (R-PA) originally introduced the Masih Alinejad Harassment and Unlawful Targeting Act of 2021 (“Masih Alinejad HUNT Act of 2021”) on December 8, 2021.[14] It had ten bipartisan co-sponsors (six Democrats and four Republicans), four of whom joined on September 21, 2022—a few days after Mahsa Amini’s death. However, there were no actions past its introduction. The full list of co-sponsors is as follows:
Senator Patrick Leahy then introduced the text as the Masih Alinejad Harassment and Unlawful Targeting Act of 2022 (“Masih Alinejad HUNT Act of 2022”) to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (“Omnibus Spending Bill”) as part of Senate Amendment 6552 of December 19, 2022, which was introduced on December 20, 2022, and was agreed upon on December 22, 2022.[15] The Bill passed and became law on December 29, 2022. The Masih Alinejad HUNT Act of 2022 is included in Division AA, Title II.
Provisions
While the Omnibus Spending Bill did edit the text of Masih Alinejad HUNT Act of 2021, the main provisions are the same.[16] Namely, the Masih Alinejad HUNT Act of 2022 requires two reports and two sanctions regimes—one “with respect to persons who are responsible for or complicit in abuses toward dissidents on behalf of the Government of Iran,” and one “with respect to financial institutions conducting significant transactions” with such individuals.
The first report requires information on the state of human rights and rule of law in Iran, including the treatment of marginalized individuals and communities and actions taken by the Government of Iran to target and silence dissidents inside and outside Iran, along with the methods used to do so, the means through which this is financed, and the amount of financing. It also requires the identification of foreign persons working as part of or on behalf of the Government of Iran and its proxies “that are involved in harassment and surveillance and that the Secretary of State may also, as appropriate, determine, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, are knowingly responsible for, complicit in, or involved in ordering, conspiring, planning, or implementing the surveillance, harassment, kidnapping, illegal extradition, imprisonment, torture, killing, or assassination, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, of citizens of Iran (including citizens of Iran of dual nationality) or citizens of the United States, inside or outside Iran,” who seek either to expose illegal or corrupt activities of Iranian officials or to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote human rights. The President “shall” then impose sanctions on those identified, including blocking property and denying and/or revoking visas.
The second report requires the identification of any foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct a significant transaction with a person identified in the first report. The Secretary of the Treasury “may” then prohibit the opening or impose “strict conditions on the maintaining” of a correspondent account or a payable-through account in the US.
Effects
While many individuals and entities who could be sanctioned under this Act could also be sanctioned under other regimes, the sanctions under this Act allow for designations for actions that would otherwise not be considered sufficiently severe to be subject to targeted human rights sanctions.
First, because the Act is tailored to harassment, case files requesting designations for the relevant perpetrators can be more easily compiled and argued. For example, rather than establishing that an official kidnapped a human rights defender and laying out how that constitutes a serious violation of human rights, as would be required to request a Global Magnitsky designation, the case file would only need to establish that each element occurred.[17] Further, torture, killing, and assassination would generally overlap with EOs 13818 (regarding Global Magnitsky sanctions) and 13443 (regarding sanctions for human rights violations in Iran), the other actions included in this Act may not fall under those EOs. Both EOs 13818 and 13443 require there to have been “serious” violations of human rights, which generally require “corporeal violence against victims.”[18] Actions like surveillance and harassment would have to be framed in relation to a violent action, which would be significantly harder to prove especially if no violence was ultimately attempted. Finally, while EOs 13818 and 13443 include provisions to sanction those who materially finance the relevant crimes, this Act instead looks for “significant transactions” with anyone named in the former report and provides specifically tailored restrictions—creating a more easily proven standard.
PUNISH Act of 2022 (H.R. 8947 and S.4924)
Introduction and Sponsorship
Representative Michael Waltz (R-FL-6) introduced the Preventing Underhanded and Nefarious Iranian Supported Homicides Act of 2022 (“Punish Act of 2022”) on September 21, 2022, and Senator Joni Ernst (R-IA) introduced it to the Senate on September 22, 2022. Both are exclusively co-sponsored by Republicans—29 in the House and 27 in the Senate.[19] In the House, the Bill was referred to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, on the Judiciary, on Financial Services, on Oversight and Reform, and on Ways and Means on September 21, 2022. The Committee on the Judiciary then referred it to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship on November 1, 2022, and there have been no actions since. In the Senate, it was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, with no actions since.
Provisions
There is no difference between the language of the Bill in the Senate and that in the House. The Bill has three main functions: continuing certain EOs and designations; prohibiting or limiting certain sanctions relief; and making determinations on assassinations and assassination attempts by the Iranian government.
The first function requires the continuation and prohibits the modification of certain EOs and designations until 30 days after the date on which the President submits to Congress the certification described in section 401(a) of CISADA. This certification confirms that the Government of Iran has ceased providing support for terrorism and the pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missile launch technology.[20] The EOs and designations which must be continued are:
The second function prohibits the President from exercising authority to waive the imposition of sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian financial institutions under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 or to issue a license to authorize the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran unless it has been determined that Iran has not attempted certain assassinations during a 5-year period. Likewise, the President may not “waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of sanctions imposed pursuant to any covered provision of law” unless that determination is made.[25]
Finally, within 180 days of enactment and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury must submit to certain congressional committees a report on whether “the Government of Iran or any foreign person […] has directly or indirectly ordered, controlled, directed, or otherwise supported (including through the use of Iranian agents or affiliates of the Government of Iran […])” either:
Effects
The effects of the PUNISH Act appear to be mostly limited to the prohibition on modifications and sanctions relief.
For the first function, none of the extended instruments appear to have a sunset clause, and so the extensions do not appear to have any immediate effect.[26] However, the prohibition on modification and removal of designations may be at odds with defendants’ rights. For example, the Secretary of State “may revoke a designation” under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act “at any time,” and under 31 CFR § 501.807, “[a] person may seek administrative reconsideration” of a designation on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.[27] OFAC notes that delisting is important to maintain sanctions as a tool for behavioral change.[28] While the criteria listed to allow for modification and/or termination (five years without terrorism or illegal weapons activity) would likely implicate many of those designated, some are likely listed for other reasons and any defectors would be negatively impacted.
The second function would also have a significant effect by prohibiting the waiving, suspending, reducing, providing relief from, or otherwise limiting the application of certain sanctions. This may also have downstream humanitarian effects. For example, this would presumably include licenses, such as those like General License on Executive Order 13902 from January 10, 2020, which allows transactions for the provisions of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran.[29] Similar measures to those in the PUNISH Act have previously been introduced for Iran and Russia, but do not seem to have ever passed.
SEVER Act of 2022 (H.R. 8869)
Introduction and Sponsorship
Representative Claudia Tenney (R-NY-22) introduced the Strengthening Entry Visa Enforcement and Restrictions Act of 2022 (“SEVER Act of 2022”) on September 15, 2022. While this was a day before Amini’s death, it was in response to President Ebrahim Raisi’s arrival in the US ahead of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly meeting and referenced Amini in subsequent communications.[30] It was co-sponsored by five representatives on September 20, 2022.[31] It was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on September 15, 2022, and then to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship on November 1, 2022. It has not had any action since.
Provisions
This Bill amends Section 407(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, which allows the President to use his authority to deny an individual’s admission to the US as a UN representative if they have been found to engage in espionage or terrorist activity directed against the US or its allies and may pose a threat to US national security interests.[32] The SEVER Act of 2022 would allow the President to also deny such an individual admission to the US as a UN representative if they were subject to sanctions under EO 13876 as in effect on September 15, 2022, and may pose a threat to US national security interests. EO 13876, “Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Iran,” allows for the designation of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the OSL; state officials of Iran, heads of entities in Iran, or heads of entities owned or controlled by entities in Iran who have been appointed by the Supreme Leader or OSL; and other associated parties, such as those materially assisting these individuals.[33]
Effects
This Bill would have a strong effect. It would bar 36 individuals from entry as of January 11, 2023, including President Raisi.[34] As President Raisi did come to the US for the UN General Assembly meeting, it seems plausible that he and others covered by EO 13876 would return to the UN General Assembly at some point in the future. However, it seems like it may run afoul of Section 13 of the UN Headquarters Agreement, which mandates that “[l]aws and regulations in force in the United States regarding the entry of aliens shall not be applied in such manner as to interfere with the privileges referred to in Section 11.”[35] Section 407(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, refers to “the authorities contained in section 6 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement Act” as contributing to the President’s authority to deny visas, but section 6 appears to refer to a potential UN postal service.[36]
INFO Act of 2022 (H.R. 9397, H.R. 7776)
Introduction and Sponsorship
Representative Abigail Davis Spanberger (D-VA-7) introduced the Internet Freedom and Operations Act of 2022 (“INFO Act of 2022”) on December 1, 2022. It has two original co-sponsors: Representatives Chris Stewart (R-UT-2) and William R. Keating (D-MA-9). It was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on December 1, 2022 and has not had any actions since. However, it was then included under the NDAA 2023, which became law on December 23, 2022, as Section 9707, “Global Internet Freedom.”
Provisions
Under the NDAA 2023, the findings included in the INFO Act were deleted, but the text otherwise remains largely the same. The INFO Act has five main operative functions: coordination with other programs, authorization of appropriations, regulation of the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM)’s activities, reporting, and auditing.
The first function requires that programming under the Act be coordinated with other US foreign assistance programs in promoting internet freedom; seeks to assist efforts to promote internet freedoms; and is incorporated into country assistance and democracy promotion, as appropriate. The second dedicates $75 million to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and $49 million to USAGM for internet freedom-related activities. Additionally, $2.5 million is authorized to be appropriated “to support internet freedom programs in closed societies.” The third function requires that USAGM’s CEO, the President of the Open Technology Fund (OTF), and others certify every year that they have evaluated new tools and established safeguards to minimize risks. The Secretary of State must, in turn, share relevant research with relevant federal departments and agencies. Finally, the CEO of USAGM and the President of OTF are required to engage in certain programming and proposal solicitations and, notably, “support internet circumvention tools and techniques for audiences in countries that are strategic priorities for the OTF.” The fourth function, reporting, requires two reports—one from the CEO of USAGM and one jointly from the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID—on their activities related to internet freedom. The final function, auditing, mandates that any technologies supported under the bill must first be audited.
Effects
The INFO Act has a few clearly effective provisions. Most notably, it provides for $126.5 million in funding. Additionally, the audits and reporting, and the required USAGM certification, mandate concrete work products. However, the only operative language that appears to require actions that will lead to positive results for internet freedom in Iran is the requirement that USAGM and OTF work to “support internet circumvention tools and techniques for audiences in countries that are strategic priorities for the OTF”—however, there is no information on concrete steps or results. Requirements for coordination, while they set out specific areas of focus (e.g., “to continue the development of technologies that provide or enhance access to the internet”), lack teeth on enforcement and merely require that programming under the section “shall coordinate” with other assistance programs, “seek to assist efforts,” and “shall be incorporated into country assistance and democracy promotion strategies, as appropriate.”
REGIME Act of 2022 (H.R. 9606)
Introduction and Sponsorship
Representative Joe Wilson (R-SC-2) introduced the Revoking Entry Granted to Iranian Mullahs and Elites Act of 2022 (“REGIME Act of 2022”) on December 15, 2022. It has three original co-sponsors: Representatives Josh Gottheimer (D-NJ-5), Claudia Tenney (R-NY-22), and Vicente Gonzalez (D-TX-15). It was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on December 15, 2022, and has not had any actions since.
Provisions
This Bill requires the Secretary of State to review individuals in six categories and determine if any are “ineligible for entry” under either Section 7031(c) or Section 105(c).[37] If so and the individual has a visa, it must be revoked. The six categories of “covered individuals” are:
The Bill also includes a waiver for any individuals coming to the UN headquarters, pursuant to the Headquarters Agreement.
Effects
As with the MAHSA Act, the REGIME Act’s main impact relates to the mandatory review.
First, similar to the MAHSA Act, the REGIME Act shifts responsibility by requiring the Secretary of State to actively review the individuals in the listed categories. Currently, Section 7031(c) requires action against individuals “about whom the Secretary of State has credible information,” and the Section 105(c) requires that the President regularly update a list of certain individuals based on credible evidence.[38] Section 105(c) is implemented by EO 13553, which requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with or at the recommendation of the Secretary of State, to make the determinations but does not require them to seek out information about any group of people.[39]
Also as with the MAHSA Act, many individuals may have been reviewed under Section 105(c), but the mandatory review will cover any who were not and who are eligible for designation. Additionally, Section 7031(c) includes the immediate family members of the relevant officials, which Section 105(c) does not, and Section 7031(c) includes “significant corruption,” which Section 105 does not.[40]
[1] Note that this memo does not include resolutions, and only includes legislation relevant for Iranian human rights. It also does not include the Iran Hostages Congressional Gold Medal Act (S. 2607), which only addresses events of the 1979-1981 Iran Hostage Crisis, nor the Protecting America from IRGC Terrorists Act (H.R. 8420), which was introduced in July 2022 and for which the only action since was the Committee on the Judiciary’s referral to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship on November 11, 2022. Of the 50 bills related to Iran that have reported action between September 16, 2022 and January 10, 2023 (per a search of Congress.gov on “Iran,” sorted by latest action and limited to bills in the 117th and 118th Congress) this leaves seven bills or provisions.
[2] P.L. 111-195 (H.R. 2194, § 105(c)), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ195/PLAW-111publ195.pdf.
[3] Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13553.pdf.
[4] Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13224.pdf.
[5] Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017 Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_eo.pdf.
[6] P.L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865, pp. 331-334), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/7031c-of-PL-116-94-Anticorruption-and-GVHR-Visa-Sanctions-508.pdf.
[7] P.L. 111-195 (H.R. 2194, § 105(c)), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ195/PLAW-111publ195.pdf; Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13553.pdf; Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13224.pdf; Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017 Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_eo.pdf; .L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865, pp. 331-334), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/7031c-of-PL-116-94-Anticorruption-and-GVHR-Visa-Sanctions-508.pdf.
[8] Sanctions Search List, Office of Foreign Asset Control, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/; Multilateral Magnitsky Sanctions at Five Years, Human Rights First, Open Society Foundation, Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, REDRESS, November 2022, p. 10, https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Multilateral-Magnitsky-Sanctions-at-Five-Years_November-2022.pdf; Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13553.pdf; Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017 Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_eo.pdf.
[9] P.L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865, pp. 331-334), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/7031c-of-PL-116-94-Anticorruption-and-GVHR-Visa-Sanctions-508.pdf; “Global Magnitsky Frequently Asked Questions,” Human Rights First, July 2020, p. 2, https://humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Global-Magnitsky-FAQs.pdf.
[10] P.L. 111-195 (H.R. 2194, § 105(b)), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ195/PLAW-111publ195.pdf.
[11] Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13553.pdf; Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017 Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_eo.pdf; P.L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865, pp. 331-334), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/7031c-of-PL-116-94-Anticorruption-and-GVHR-Visa-Sanctions-508.pdf; “Global Magnitsky Frequently Asked Questions,” Human Rights First, July 2020, pp. 7-8, https://humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Global-Magnitsky-FAQs.pdf (noting the US government uses the “credible information” threshold for other regimes as well).
[12] P.L. 111-195 (H.R. 2194, § 105(c)), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ195/PLAW-111publ195.pdf; Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13553.pdf; Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13224.pdf; Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017 Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_eo.pdf; .L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865, pp. 331-334), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/7031c-of-PL-116-94-Anticorruption-and-GVHR-Visa-Sanctions-508.pdf.
[13] “Congressman Schiff Introduces Legislation to End Iran’s Human Rights Violations against Political Prisoners,” Adam Schiff, September 29, 2022, https://schiff.house.gov/news/press-releases/congressman-schiff-introduces-legislation-to-end-irans-human-rights-violations-against-political-prisoners#:~:text=introduced%20the%20Support%20for%20Iranian,prisoners%2C%20and%20prisoners%20of%20conscience.
[14] S.3347 – Masih Alinejad HUNT Act of 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/3347.
[15] December 19, 2022 – Issue: Vol. 168, No. 197 – Daily Edition, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-168/issue-197/senate-section/article/S7328-1.
[16] Most of the edits were fairly minor, for example correcting a mistake in a finding, adding several committees to the list of “appropriate congressional committees” receiving the required reports, and revising deadlines. The Omnibus Spending Bill also includes more general terminology around “marginalizing individuals and communities” as opposed to specifying certain groups as examples. Additionally, the 2021 version required the President to apply Global Magnitsky sanctions as a default, and to apply the sanctions described in the Act only if the person did not meet the Global Magnitsky criteria. The 2022 version only allows for the sanctions provided for in the Act, and also eliminates the language allowing for the termination of designations.
[17] Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017 Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_eo.pdf.
[18] Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017 Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_eo.pdf; Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13553.pdf; “Global Magnitsky Frequently Asked Questions,” Human Rights First, July 2020, p. 5, https://humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Global-Magnitsky-FAQs.pdf.
[19] The full list of co-sponsors is as follows: For the House, Representatives Carlos A. Gimenez (R-FL-26), Doug Lamborn (R-CO-5), Brian J. Mast (R-FL-27), Maria Elvira Salazar (R-FL-27), Mike Garcia (R-CA-25), Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY-11), Van Taylor (R-TX-3), Jake Ellzey (R-TX-6), Kat Cammak (R-FL-3), Joe Wilson (R-SC-2), Elise M. Stefanik (R-NY-21), Randy K. Weber, Sr. (R-TX-14), David Rouzer (R-NC-7), Ronny Jackson (R-TX-13), Dan Crenshaw (R-TX-2), Mike Bost (R-IL-12), Ted Budd (R-NC-13), Guy Reschenthaler (R-PA14), Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA-2), Lisa C. McClain (R-MI-10), John H. Rutherford (R-FL-4), Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL-25), C. Scott Franklin (R-FL-15), Michael Guest (R-MS-3), Jake LaTurner (R-KS-2), Pat Falloon (R-TX-4), Andrew Garbarino (R-NY-2), W. Gregory Steube (R-FL-17), David Kustoff (R-TN-8). For the Senate, Senators Lindsay Graham (R-SC), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), James E. Risch (R-ID), James M. Inhofe (R-OK), Marco Rubio (R-FL), Roger F. Wicker (R-MS), Bill Haggerty (R-TN), Ted Cruz (R-TX), John Thune (R-SD), John Cornyn (R-TX), Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Rick Scott (R-FL), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Thomas Tillis (R-NC), Steve Daines (R-MT), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-MS), John Hoeven (R-ND), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Tommy Tuberville (R-AL), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Mike Braun (R-IN), Roger Marshall (R-KS), Dan Sullivan (R-AK), Roy Blunt (R-MO), Ben Sasse (R-NE), Todd Young (R-IN), John Boozman (R-AR).
[20] “Waltz, Ernst Introduce PUNISH Act to Sanction Iran, Punish Open Assassination Plots Against Americans,” Mike Waltz, September 21, 2022, https://waltz.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=643; P.L. 111-195 (H.R. 2194, § 401(a)), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ195/PLAW-111publ195.pdf.
[21] Presumably, this means those who were subject to sanctions on January 1, 2021, as no individuals appear to have been added to the list on January 1, 2021. Executive Order 13871 of May 8, 2019 Imposing Sanctions With Respect to the Iron, Steel, Aluminum, and Copper Sectors of Iran, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13871.pdf; Executive Order 13876 of June 24, 2019 Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Iran, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13876.pdf; Executive Order 13902 of January 10, 2020 Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13902.pdf; Executive Order 13949 of September 21, 2020 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to the Conventional Arms Activities of Iran, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/23/2020-21160/blocking-property-of-certain-persons-with-respect-to-the-conventional-arms-activities-of-iran.
[22] Executive Order 12170--Blocking Iranian Government property, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12170.html; Executive Order 12957 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1995-03-20/pdf/WCPD-1995-03-20-Pg424.pdf.
[23] Executive Order 13224, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/.
[24] Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/.
[25] “Covered provision of law” is defined as the PUNISH Act, each “covered Executive order” (i.e., Executive Orders 13871, 13876, 13902, and 13949), the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, CISADA, Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
[26] Executive Order 13871 of May 8, 2019 Imposing Sanctions With Respect to the Iron, Steel, Aluminum, and Copper Sectors of Iran, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13871.pdf; Executive Order 13876 of June 24, 2019 Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Iran, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13876.pdf; Executive Order 13902 of January 10, 2020 Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13902.pdf; Executive Order 13949 of September 21, 2020 Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to the Conventional Arms Activities of Iran, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/23/2020-21160/blocking-property-of-certain-persons-with-respect-to-the-conventional-arms-activities-of-iran; Executive Order 12170--Blocking Iranian Government property, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12170.html; Executive Order 12957 Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1995-03-20/pdf/WCPD-1995-03-20-Pg424.pdf; Executive Order 13224, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/executive-order-13224/; Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/.
[27] Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/; 31 CFR § 501.807 - Procedures governing delisting from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/501.807.
[28] “Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designated-nationals-list-sdn-list/filing-a-petition-for-removal-from-an-ofac-list.
[29] General License L, Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Iranian Financial Institutions Blocked Pursuant to Executive Order 13902, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/iran_gll.pdf.
[30] “Congresswoman Tenney Introduces SEVER Act to Keep Dangerous Iran Regime Officials Out of US,” United States Representative Claudia Tenney, September 16, 2022, https://tenney.house.gov/media/press-releases/congresswoman-tenney-introduces-sever-act-keep-dangerous-iran-regime-officials; “Tenney, Cruz Op-Ed in Newsweek Calls Out Biden Admin for Welcoming Iran’s Brutal Leader to America,” United States Representative Claudia Tenney, September 22, 2022, https://tenney.house.gov/media/press-releases/tenney-cruz-op-ed-newsweek-calls-out-biden-admin-welcoming-irans-brutal-leader.
[31] The co-sponsors are Representatives Joe Wilson (R-SC-2), Maria Elvira Salazar (R-FL-27), Guy Reschenthaler (R-PA-14), Ronny Jackson (R-TX-13), and Michael Guest (R-MS-3).
[32] P.L. 101–246; 8 U.S.C. 1102 note, http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:8%20section:1102%20edition:prelim).
[33] Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Iran, Executive Order 13876 of June 24, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/13876.pdf.
[34] Sanctions Search List, Office of Foreign Asset Control, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/.
[35] The Biden administration has indicated that it was obligated under the Treaty to admit President Raisi, but noted that the US has denied visas in the past. Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success, on 26 June 1947, and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, on 31 October 1947, with an Exchange of Notes, dated 21 November 1947, bringing this Agreement into effect, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2011/volume-11-I-147-English.pdf; Steve Herman, “US Facing Pressure to Deny Iran’s President Visa for UN Visit,” VOA, August 25, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-facing-pressure-to-deny-iran-s-president-visa-for-un-visit-/6717453.html.
[36] 8 U.S.C. § 1102 note, http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:8%20section:1102%20edition:prelim); 22 U.S.C. § 287 note, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/287.
[37] P.L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865, pp. 331-334), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/7031c-of-PL-116-94-Anticorruption-and-GVHR-Visa-Sanctions-508.pdf; P.L. 111-195 (H.R. 2194, § 105(c)), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ195/PLAW-111publ195.pdf.
[38] P.L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865, pp. 331-334), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/7031c-of-PL-116-94-Anticorruption-and-GVHR-Visa-Sanctions-508.pdf; P.L. 111-195 (H.R. 2194, § 105), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ195/PLAW-111publ195.pdf.
[39] “Iran Sanctions,” Congressional Research Service, Updated February 2, 2022, p. 35, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf.
[40] However, Section 7031(c) has a higher standard (“gross human rights”) as compared to Section 105(c) (“serious human rights”). P.L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865, pp. 331-334), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/7031c-of-PL-116-94-Anticorruption-and-GVHR-Visa-Sanctions-508.pdf; P.L. 111-195 (H.R. 2194, § 105), https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ195/PLAW-111publ195.pdf; “Global Magnitsky Frequently Asked Questions,” Human Rights First, July 2020, p. 2, https://humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Global-Magnitsky-FAQs.pdf.