

Jury Nullification and the Wesley Shifflett Trial: A Firsthand Account

In a previous lecture we briefly touched on jury nullification in class, the concept immediately stood out to me as an important and controversial aspect of the legal system. When I had the opportunity to attend the two-week trial of Wesley Shifflett, a former Fairfax County police officer charged with involuntary manslaughter and reckless use of a firearm, I decided to explore this case through the lens of jury nullification. Seeing the trial unfold firsthand allowed me to witness how jurors may choose to disregard legal definitions in favor of their own perceptions of justice—particularly in cases involving law enforcement.

Shifflett shot and killed Timothy Johnson, an unarmed Black man suspected of stealing sunglasses. Despite clear evidence—including Shifflett’s own admission that he intentionally fired his weapon—the jury convicted him only on the reckless firearm charge while acquitting him of manslaughter. As I observed the trial, it became increasingly apparent that jury instructions, legal framing, and implicit biases shaped the jury’s decision, ultimately allowing them to avoid holding Shifflett fully accountable for Johnson’s death.

This case serves as a compelling example of how jury nullification can influence legal outcomes, even when the evidence overwhelmingly supports a conviction. In this essay, I will analyze how the jury instructions, the defense’s argument about intent, and broader societal attitudes toward police officers may have contributed to the verdict. Additionally, I will compare this case to other high-profile instances of jury nullification in police trials, examine the historical role of jury nullification, and assess the broader implications of this legal phenomenon.

Understanding the Charges

1. Manslaughter: The Role of Intent in the Defense Strategy

In Virginia, manslaughter is divided into two categories:

- Voluntary Manslaughter – A killing that occurs in the heat of passion, often provoked by circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to lose self-control.
- Involuntary Manslaughter – A killing that results from reckless or criminally negligent behavior but without intent to kill.

Shifflett was charged with involuntary manslaughter, meaning the prosecution had to prove that:

1. His actions were reckless or grossly negligent.
2. His actions directly caused Johnson’s death.
3. He did not intend to kill Johnson, but his recklessness led to the killing.

Initially, this seemed like a clear-cut case for the prosecution. Shifflett shot an unarmed man in the back as he fled. However, when the defense took the stand, their strategy became clear:

- They didn't argue that the shooting was justified. Instead, they argued that the charge itself was flawed.
- Since Shifflett admitted under oath that he intentionally fired his gun, the defense claimed that he could not legally be convicted of involuntary manslaughter, which requires a lack of intent to kill.

This argument shifted the jury's focus from the broader question—Was this an unlawful killing?—to a technical legal debate: Could they legally convict him of manslaughter given his admission of intent?

From my seat in the courtroom, I could see some jurors shifting in their chairs, absorbing this argument, making me wonder if the defense strategy was working?

2. Reckless Use of a Firearm (Virginia Code §18.2-56.1(A1))

The prosecution also charged Shifflett with reckless use of a firearm, which required proving:

1. He handled a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, showing reckless disregard for human life.
2. His actions caused serious bodily harm, leading to Johnson's death.
3. His actions were the proximate cause of Johnson's death.

Unlike manslaughter, this charge did not require the jury to consider intent—only whether the shooting itself was reckless. Because of this, the jury ultimately convicted Shifflett on this charge while acquitting him of manslaughter, which raises the question: Did jury instructions influence this decision?

Legal Precedents on Reckless Firearm Use

Virginia courts have ruled that reckless firearm handling includes any conduct that endangers others, even if the shooter did not intend harm. Cases such as *Jones v. Commonwealth* (2003) and *Turner v. Commonwealth* (2012) establish that recklessness can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a firearm discharge.

By this standard, Shifflett firing at an unarmed, fleeing suspect in a public area met the threshold for reckless handling. However, juries in police trials often favor lesser charges, particularly when intent is debated (Stinson et al., 2021).

Why Was Shifflett Convicted of This Charge but Not Manslaughter?

Research from the Police Integrity Research Group found that less than 50% of police officers charged with homicide-related offenses are convicted. Instead, juries favor lesser firearm-related charges. The reasoning behind this trend lies in jury reluctance to criminalize police actions and the influence of legal defenses rooted in Supreme Court cases like *Graham v. Connor* (1989).

In police trials similar, officers accused of unjustified shootings were often convicted only of firearm-related charges, such as in the cases of:

- Jason Van Dyke (Chicago, IL, 2018) – Convicted of 16 counts of aggravated firearm discharge but only second-degree murder, avoiding a first-degree conviction.

- Philip Brailsford (Mesa, AZ, 2016) – Acquitted of manslaughter but later convicted of reckless endangerment in civil proceedings.

These cases illustrate a pattern where officers face lesser consequences than civilians for reckless firearm use that results in death.

The Impact of Jury Instructions on the Verdict

Throughout the trial, both the prosecution and the defense discussed what they believed should be included in the jury instructions, recognizing that the wording and emphasis of these guidelines would significantly impact the jury's deliberations. However, while the prosecution focused on the legal definitions of recklessness and proximate cause, the defense devoted substantial time to the concept of intent—a strategy that would ultimately shape the jury's decision.

One of the most significant moments in the trial came when the judge delivered the final jury instructions, which were taken directly from Virginia law and outlined in *Commonwealth v. Wesley Shifflett*, Case No. FE-2023-812 (Fairfax County Circuit Court, 2023). These instructions defined proximate cause as:

- A cause that, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces the accident, injury, or damage.
- A cause without which the accident, injury, or damage would not have occurred.

As I sat in the courtroom listening to the judge read these instructions (Fairfax County Circuit Court, 2023, p. 5), it seemed undeniable that this definition should have guided the jury toward a manslaughter conviction. Based on these instructions, the prosecution's argument appeared solid: if Shifflett had not fired his weapon, Johnson would not have died. Under this legal standard, Shifflett's reckless action was the direct cause of Johnson's death, seemingly satisfying the requirements for involuntary manslaughter.

However, despite the clarity of the proximate cause standard, the defense's strategic emphasis on intent created a legal loophole that jurors could use to justify an acquittal on the manslaughter charge. By repeatedly highlighting that Shifflett admitted he intentionally shot Johnson, the defense framed the legal question in a way that encouraged jurors to believe intent negated recklessness. This shifted the jury's focus away from whether Shifflett's actions were reckless and unlawful and instead placed their attention on whether an intentional shooting could be considered involuntary manslaughter.

This defense strategy effectively created a legal gray area that complicated the jury's ability to convict on the more serious charge. Even though intentional acts can still be reckless under Virginia law, the defense's framing suggested otherwise. The argument focused on intent as a decisive factor, subtly leading jurors to believe that because Shifflett admitted he intended to fire

his weapon, he could not be guilty of involuntary manslaughter, which is typically associated with unintentional killings due to reckless conduct.

This tactic is not unique to Shifflett's trial. Defense attorneys have historically used intent as a legal shield in both police trials and self-defense cases, creating ambiguity around when a defendant's actions should be classified as reckless homicide versus an intentional but legally justified act.

A relevant comparison can be found in *People v. Sanchez* (2015, California), where the defendant admitted to intentionally swinging a knife during an altercation, resulting in another person's death. The defense argued that since the act was intentional, it could not be reckless, leading to an acquittal on involuntary manslaughter charges. However, legal scholars later criticized the verdict, arguing that the law allows for recklessness even in intentional acts if the behavior demonstrates a gross disregard for human life.

A similar legal strategy was employed in *State v. Yanez* (2017, Minnesota), the trial of Officer Jeronimo Yanez, who shot and killed Philando Castile during a traffic stop. Yanez's defense focused heavily on intent, arguing that because the officer intended to fire and perceived a threat, he could not be guilty of manslaughter, which typically involves reckless but unintentional acts. The jury, confused by the distinction, acquitted Yanez of manslaughter despite clear evidence that his reckless use of force caused Castile's death.

In Shifflett's case, the defense successfully replicated this strategy—by hammering the idea that intent and recklessness are mutually exclusive, they introduced a legal ambiguity that the jury struggled to reconcile. Since the jury instructions did not explicitly state that an intentional act can also be reckless, jurors were left without clear legal guidance, giving them room to interpret the law in a way that favored acquittal on manslaughter.

This case highlights a broader pattern seen in police trials and self-defense cases, where defense attorneys strategically frame intent as a shield against recklessness, despite legal precedent allowing for both elements to coexist. This approach not only confuses juries but also reduces the likelihood of convictions on more serious charges, which often explains why law enforcement officers receive lesser convictions or are acquitted altogether.

In cases where ambiguity exists in jury instructions, jurors often default to the lesser charge or even acquittal rather than risk over-convicting a defendant. This phenomenon is particularly common in police shooting cases, where juries are often reluctant to convict law enforcement officers of serious crimes. According to research from the Police Integrity Research Group, fewer than half of police officers charged with homicide-related offenses are convicted, with many juries opting for lesser firearm charges instead (Stinson et al., 2021).

Sitting in the courtroom, I realized that this was not just a legal technicality—it was jury nullification at work. The jurors likely believed Shifflett was guilty of wrongdoing, yet the **way** the defense framed intent, combined with the lack of explicit guidance in the jury instructions, gave them an easy legal rationale to convict only on the reckless firearm charge while acquitting on manslaughter. This moment, more than any other in the trial, underscored how jury

instructions—and how they are interpreted—can shape the outcome of a case, especially when law enforcement is involved.

Conclusion: A Broken System?

Attending this trial firsthand, I saw how jury instructions, legal loopholes, and societal biases shape courtroom outcomes. This wasn't a case where the jury believed Shifflett was completely innocent—it was a case where they found a way to justify an acquittal on the most serious charge.

This is the reality of jury nullification in police trials. Even when an officer admits to pulling the trigger, the legal system provides jurors with multiple ways to avoid delivering a full measure of justice. Whether through ambiguous jury instructions, the defense's framing of intent, or societal biases favoring law enforcement, jurors often find a way to justify lesser convictions or outright acquittals in cases involving police violence.

The Shifflett trial is yet another example of this pattern. By convicting him only of reckless firearm use, the jury acknowledged that his actions were wrong but stopped short of fully holding him accountable for Timothy Johnson's death. This decision mirrors other police trials where jurors struggled to convict officers on more serious charges, reinforcing the double standard in the justice system.

Had Shifflett been a civilian, it is likely he would have faced a harsher charge and a stronger conviction. Instead, the jury's verdict reflects the unspoken trust in law enforcement that makes it exceedingly difficult to hold officers criminally responsible for fatal shootings. This reluctance to convict not only denies justice to victims and their families but also sets a dangerous precedent that police officers can act recklessly without facing full consequences.

As long as jury nullification continues to shape police trials, the legal system will remain unequal, inconsistent, and incapable of ensuring true accountability. How many more cases like this will it take before real change occurs?

References

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