

# **Overview**

<b>Regional Bodies</b>	<b>2</b>
African Union	2
Regional Economic Communities (RECs)	4
Southern African Development Community (SADC)	4
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (CMESA)	5
East African Community (EAC)	5
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	5
Economic Community of Central African States	5
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	6
Arab Maghreb Union	6
<b>International Bodies</b>	<b>7</b>
International Criminal Court	7
World Bank	8
Structural Adjustment Good	9
Structural Adjustment Bad	9
Resource Extraction	10
<b>Geopolitical Events</b>	<b>14</b>
South Africa	14
South Sudanese Civil War	17
Ethiopia-Tigray Crisis	18
Somalia's Presidential Crisis	21
<b>Development Aid</b>	<b>22</b>

## Regional Bodies

### African Union

- The AU comprises all 55 sovereign nations within Africa and represents more than 1.3 billion people
- The most powerful organ within the AU is the Assembly of the African Union; member states are represented in the Assembly by their head-of-state. The AU Assembly has final authority on most legislative and executive matters
- The Pan-African Parliament is the legislative branch of the AU. Every country sends 5 representatives to the PAP, at least one of which must be a woman; representatives are elected by national legislatures, rather than through direct elections
- The AU maintains a peacekeeping force, known as the African Standby Force, which is composed of military contributions from AU member states. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) supplement the African Standby Force. The AU's Peace and Security Council is responsible for managing and deploying the Standby Force
  - The AU's first military intervention in a member state was the May 2003 deployment of a peacekeeping force of soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi to oversee the implementation of the various agreements. AU troops were also deployed in Sudan for peacekeeping during the Darfur Conflict, before the mission was handed over to the United Nations on 1 January 2008 via UNAMID. The AU has also sent a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, consisting of troops from Uganda and Burundi
- *\*\*Motion Outline: THBT the AU should abandon plans for a single, common currency*
  - GOV: (1) Nations are disinclined to stay in the AU if staying in the AU requires them to lose control over their own monetary policy. This is likely to result in nations leaving the AU, reducing the geopolitical viability of the organization. (2) A centralized, common currency would undermine the ability of different AU nations to pursue selective monetary policies that align with their own particular needs. This means you get monolithic monetary policy in a way that makes it harder for different nations to selectively appreciate/depreciate their currency or adjust interest rates. (3) When recessions are regionalized within the AU, it's now much harder for individual nations to respond since they've forfeited their control over their currency. (4) The value of this currency is likely to collapse because (1) the legacy of the eurozone debt crisis has left many investors skeptical of large-scale monetary/currency unions, and (2) many foreign investors are racist and won't invest heavily into an African currency. The consequence is that almost immediately, you induce debt crises across Africa as the value of the currency used plummets, making internationally-denominated debts harder to service. (5) This makes the likelihood of sovereign debt crises higher: it's more likely that less

credit-worthy nations can borrow at lower rates when the currency is tacitly seen as being propped up by more powerful nations like South Africa, which makes it more likely that you get Greece-style sovereign debt crises under their side

- OPP: (1) Currency integration within the AU reduces foreign exchange risk, thereby eliminating fluctuations in the exchange rate. This makes nations trade more with each other, which increases economic integration, reduces the probability of conflict, etc. (2) This disincentivizes the race-to-the-bottom effect whereby nations compete against each other to artificially devalue their currencies to gain a competitive edge in global export markets. (3) When nations can't use monetary policies to offset their poor fiscal decisions, there's an impetus for fiscal responsibility, making economies healthier and less prone to recession. (4) It's easier for the AU as a whole to negotiate better terms on things like deals with the WTO when the entire continent uses a relatively consistent and stable currency. (5) The flow of remittances between different African nations becomes more prosperous when transaction costs are eliminated. (6) Countries can take out sovereign debt more cheaply, facilitating growth and enabling infrastructure development and construction in the long term
- *Motion Outline: THBT member states of the AU should leave the ICC and form an African alternative*
  - GOV: (1) The ICC is highly racist (e.g. has not yet prosecuted even a single white person or person from the West), which means that an African court for war crimes/genocide would be less likely to apply colonial and racist bias to these criminal cases. (2) The ICC lacks buy-in from many nations, which means that even when the ICC prosecutes the right criminals, there's little will to extradite those criminals to the Hague. That's better with an African court that already has or can gain widespread support
  - OPP: (1) CP: Don't withdraw from the ICC, just establish an alternative! The ICC can only act when no other court is qualified or capable of acting. If African nations have a viable supranational mechanism which exists as an alternative to the ICC, we can get all of GOV's benefits without any of the harms. (2) There's likely to be substantial retaliation and backlash against the AU from neocolonial foreign Western powers if they leave the ICC. (3) Even though the ICC is racist/harmful, this impact can be mitigated by the fact that the ICC needs to court buy-in from African nations to ensure that criminals are extradited, giving the ICC an incentive to be better in the future. (4) The ICC is likely to be better-resourced, making it better qualified to stage large-scale investigations into crimes against humanity and war crimes
- *Motion Outline: TH, as the AU, would create a standing army*
  - GOV: (1) This enables a more rapid response to military crises and political conflicts than the ASF, which has to be mobilized in a more drawn-out and

bureaucratic manner by the AU's PSC. (2) A standing army increases the credibility of negotiations because the AU has more of a capacity to force counterparties to come to the negotiating table and hammer out peace deals. (3) A standing army is preferable to the alternative of drawn-out civil wars or Western interventions that prop up bad actors (e.g. dictatorships) or create novel state regimes that lack large-scale buy-in, inviting power vacuums and populist insurgencies. (4) This increases buy-in to the AU: now, it's more feasible for nations to rely upon the AU's standing army rather than developing a stronger military force of their own. (5) This actually decreases intra-regional arms races: now, there's less of a need for nations to militarize when the prospect of an AU standing armed force can act as a protecting force. (6) This creates a deterrent effect against conflict

- OPP: (1) This standing army is likely to internally fragment the AU politically, in the sense that nations will likely view this standing army as a possible infringement upon their sovereignty and as potentially implicating all AU nations in conflicts they don't have stakes in. Thus, this is likely to result in an increased push to withdraw from the AU! (2) This standing army is likely to exacerbate conflicts by increasing the presence of foreign militaries within territorial disputes and protracting otherwise-short conflicts. (3) Powerful nations within the AU will likely wield disproportionate influence over how and when this standing army is deployed

## Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

- Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are regional groupings of African states. The RECs have developed individually and have differing roles and structures. Generally, the purpose of the RECs is to facilitate regional economic integration between members of the individual regions and through the wider African Economic Community (AEC). The RECS are increasingly involved in coordinating AU Member States' interests in wider areas such as peace and security, development and governance.
- The RECs are closely integrated with the AU's work and serve as its building blocks. The relationship between the AU and the RECs is mandated by the Abuja Treaty and the AU Constitutive Act

## Southern African Development Community (SADC)

- Relatively weak in terms of authority and influence. Member states include: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe

- The SADC Free Trade Area was established in August 2008 and includes Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Seychelles

## Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

- COMESA was formed in December 1994, replacing a Preferential Trade Area which had existed since 1981. Nine of the member states formed a free trade area in 2000 (Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe), with Rwanda and Burundi joining the FTA in 2004, the Comoros and Libya in 2006, Seychelles in 2009 and Tunisia and Somalia in 2018
- In 2008, COMESA agreed to an expanded free-trade zone including members of two other African trade blocs, the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). COMESA is also considering a common visa scheme to boost tourism

## East African Community (EAC)

- Composed of seven countries in the African Great Lakes region in East Africa: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda
- In 2008, after negotiations with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the EAC agreed to an expanded free trade area including the member states of all three organizations

## Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

- ECOWAS represents fifteen West African nations: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo
- The goal of ECOWAS is full, collective self-sufficiency and complete economic integration through a trading union. The Treaty of Lagos founds the legal basis of ECOWAS
- The ECOWAS also serves as a peacekeeping force in the region, with member states occasionally sending joint military forces to intervene in the bloc's member countries at times of political instability and unrest

## Economic Community of Central African States

- Per its mission, ECCAS “aims to achieve collective autonomy, raise the standard of living of its populations and maintain economic stability through harmonious cooperation.” Member states consist of: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African

Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe

- Is an organization of states of Central Africa established by Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to promote economic integration among countries that share a common currency, the **CFA franc** (goals of establishing a common market)

## Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

- Eight-country trade bloc in Africa, consisting of the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda

## Arab Maghreb Union

- Least active and least economically integrated of all of the major African RECs. Has not had a high level meeting since July of 2008
- Member states consist of: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia
- Has been unable to achieve tangible progress on its goals due to deep economic and political disagreements between Morocco and Algeria regarding the issue of Western Sahara's territorial disputes

REC	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population	GDP (\$)		Member states
			(millions)	(per capita)	
<b>EAC</b>	2,440,409	169 million	411,813	2,429	6
<b>ECOWAS</b>	5,112,903	349 million	1,322,452	3,788	15
<b>IGAD</b>	5,233,604	187 million	225,049	1,197	7
<b>AMU</b>	6,046,441	102 million	1,299,173	12,628	5
<b>ECCAS</b>	6,667,421	121 million	175,928	1,451	11

<b>SADC</b>	9,882,959	233 million	737,392	3,152	15
<b>COMESA</b>	12,873,957	406 million	735,599	1,811	20

Credit: Wikipedia!!

## International Bodies

### International Criminal Court

- The International Criminal Court, or ICC, is an international court. This differs in the sense that most courts are national, and operate within constrained geographic boundaries. At a fundamental level, the ICC is distinct from these other courts – national courts, state courts, etc. – in the sense that it is international in nature! The ICC prosecutes crimes committed in different nations, even though it, itself, is not a “national court.”
- Compared to traditional courts, the ICC is different in a few important regards:
  - 1) The ICC only has the jurisdiction to prosecute particular types of crimes. Most judicial systems have defined parameters (e.g. criminal courts investigate criminal matters, civil courts involve civil disputes, etc.), which allow them to investigate and punish lots of different types of infractions, violations, and crimes. In this sense, most court systems (i.e. regular courts) are far more expansive than the ICC
  - 2) The ICC can get involved in four types of crimes: (1) Crimes against humanity, (2) war crimes, (3) aggression crimes/crimes of aggression, and (4) genocide. In totality, these three types of crimes are generally known as “atrocity crimes”
  - 3) The ICC has limited jurisdiction. This is true of all courts, of course. For instance, if I commit a crime in Argentina, obviously a court in Poland can’t have any say in the outcome of my criminal case! The reason for this is that the Polish court doesn’t have jurisdiction over the crime committed in Argentina. Therefore, it can’t play a role in prosecuting me. At a fundamental level, the ICC is technically just an international organization. Nations (e.g. the US, Russia, Kazakhstan, South Africa, etc.) have the choice of joining the ICC as a “member state.” Think of this like signing an agreement with the ICC – when a nation joins the ICC as “member state,” it’s basically saying that it’s willing to be a part of what the ICC does
  - 4) The ICC can have cases referred to it in three different ways
    - 1) A ICC-member state can refer a matter to the ICC for investigation, e.g. Canada tells the ICC to investigate war crimes in a different country

- 2) The United Nations Security Council can suggest measures to the ICC for investigation
  - 3) The head ICC prosecutor can unilaterally decide to investigate situations
- 5) The ICC is only capable of launching criminal investigations into individual people: it cannot punish governments as a whole. It cannot punish corporations as a whole. It only has the jurisdiction and power to launch criminal charges against individuals, e.g. the heads of governments, members of corporations, etc.
- Problems with the ICC:
  - 1) Racism: the ICC is widely accused of being a neo-colonial body used by powerful Western nations to subjugate the global south. This is reflected in the fact that the ICC has only ever prosecuted/convicted members of the African community
  - 2) Ineffectiveness: despite having spent over a billion dollars, the ICC has convicted just 4 people (Lubanga, Katanga, Bemba, and al-Mahdi), and has only summoned a total of 9 individual
  - 3) Selectiveness: the ICC, per the Rome Statute, is only able to investigate crimes in member states. This means that the ICC has extremely limited jurisdiction and isn't able to prosecute war crimes in a large number of instances — for example, that's why US war criminals can never and will never be prosecuted by the ICC!
  - 4) Lack of buy-in, particularly from African nations: many countries very legitimately view the ICC as a neo-colonial and racist body with incentives to subjugate Black-majority nations. This means that in lots of instances, even when countries are technically under the legal jurisdiction of the ICC, there's limited willingness to comply with ICC demands, e.g. Omar al-Bashir of Sudan not being extradited to the ICC

## World Bank

- Focuses on providing grants and loans to poor nations to allow for economic growth and poverty alleviation. The World Bank's currently stated goal is reducing global poverty. Main criticisms of the World Bank include: attaching conditions, like structural adjustment, to loans; acting in Western interests, especially since the US has veto power against World Bank projects; and the fact that the World Bank operates with "sovereign immunity" which shields it from lawsuits in the countries it operates in.
- Austerity & Structural Adjustment: what do these sorts of "structural adjustments" entail? Most commonly, institutions like the IMF require countries to implement "austerity measures." These are measures that are intended to reduce the likelihood that a country economically fails in the future. This generally means that governments are forced to raise taxes and reduce government spending, most commonly on social services like welfare and healthcare. A prime example of what this looks like is Greece after it



accepted a series of bailouts offered by the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund: the Greek government was facing a looming sovereign debt crisis (TL;DR they owed money and couldn't pay it back) and in order to get the funds to get themselves out of the crisis, they had to significantly increase their tax revenues while cutting government expenditures. Beyond austerity measures, SAPs (structural adjustment programs) often entail economic liberalization measures. This includes things like requiring governments to stop subsidizing domestic industries, forcing nations to privatize their state-run firms (also known as "SOEs" or "state owned enterprises"), reducing tariffs and other protectionist barriers to trade, and opening up their economy

- Structural Adjustment Good

- SAPs help to prevent nations from economically collapsing in the future. Austerity may be unpopular, but it's also necessary for governments to achieve fiscal responsibility – or, in other words, not spending money irresponsibly or in too large quantities. Governments don't do this organically: not only does it look politically controversial to raise taxes or lower spending, it's also not in the interest of short-termist governments with interest to secure their immediate bids for re-election to be seen as taking steps towards fiscal and financial responsibility.
- SAPs are necessary to get international powers like the US to provide funding to organizations like the IMF. Groups like the World Bank, the European Central Bank, or the International Monetary Fund work by getting funds from member states, who expect money to be paid back – in other words, the IMF doesn't just give countries money, it expects those countries to eventually pay those loans back. SAPs perceptually make it easier for nations to justify giving money to organizations like the IMF – in the counterfactual, it's a politically hard sell for nations to fund groups like the IMF without a guarantee that the nations receiving bailouts are forced to liberalize their economies in the pursuit of fiscal discipline.
- Conditions must be imposed on bailout funds since governments have structurally bad incentives (eg short termism, majoritarian incentives, desire to spend money corruptly, etc

- Structural Adjustment Bad

- Nations lose the capacity to choose for themselves what economic agenda to pursue, and are instead forced to comply with neo-colonial, Western-dominated international financial organizations.
- States face dramatic increases in unemployment as established foreign producers out-compete emerging, nascent domestic industries no longer protected by tariffs that allow them to grow. Domestic firms in poor, developing countries often need things like subsidies and tariffs to keep them alive in the face of a viciously competitive global market.

- Countries suffer from lower wages and decreased bargaining power in the labor market, since the need to compete on an international stage generates a race-to-the-bottom effect that generates a downward pull on labor conditions and wages.
- Nations are plunged into deep and painful recessions as a result of austerity measures: as government spending goes down at the same time that taxes are forced to go up, aggregate demand plummets, causing a devastating, depressive cycle.
- These protocols often force countries to reduce spending on vitally important and widely popular services, such as the provision of welfare and infrastructure construction. The absence of these services engenders political volatility and the potential for violence, which in turn decreases investor confidence and causes foreign investment to drop.
- International financial organizations are often dominated by and perceived as being highly Western-centric. Legacies of colonialism, slavery, and imperialism mean that many developing nations – for good reason! – have institutional distrust of the West, which means that when governments in these countries are seen as changing their economic policies based on the demands of Western bodies like the IMF or WTO (World Trade Organization), there's substantial political upheaval and retaliation against the existing government since people see it as bending to neo-colonial Western powers. This is especially bad in the midst of an economic crisis, when buy-in to the government is more important than ever
- Resource Extraction
  - The World Bank finances lots of natural resources extraction projects in Africa. For instance, in May 2021, the World Bank gave \$65 million to Guinea to finance mining projects
  - International development institutions should finance natural resource extraction projects in corrupt states:
    - Why are resource-oriented economies good? (1) Many developing economies still suffer from the legacy of colonialism, which stripped nations of comparative advantages in the production of other goods and services, which means that the extractive institutions imposed by imperial powers provide developing nations with a primary advantage in natural resources, as opposed to any other industry or field. Therefore, the best shot that poor nations have of being able to succeed in globalized trade is to base their economies around resource extraction, since they likely *\*cannot\** compete with other nations in any other field. (2) Poor nations don't have readily-available cash to invest into other

sectors of their economy in order to diversify since tax bases are limited and issuing bonds is expensive given foreign investors' pessimistic attitudes towards these countries. As a consequence, the only way that governments can do things like subsidize emerging industries or provide tax breaks to multinational firms in order to attract investment from abroad is to prioritize their natural resource industries; this provides a revenue stream from which governments can invest into other sectors of their economy, thus allowing for long-term diversification. This is within the incentives of the government because they want to consolidate power in the long run and reduce the vulnerability of their economy to economic shocks, like the 1973 or 1979 oil crisis. (3) It's often the case that petroleum-based sovereign wealth funds are the best way for developing countries to finance expensive social welfare programs. For instance, much of Norway's funding for social services comes from its \$1.4 trillion oil-based sovereign wealth fund. When governments make surplus money off of the natural resource trade, they can use those revenues to fund sovereign wealth funds through oil revenues, and then distribute the returns from those wealth funds back to citizens of their country (which governments have the incentive to do in order to increase their political popularity and in order to reduce the likelihood of protests or riots against government mismanagement). Note the most common/frequent comparative is simply that these governments are often structurally locked out of being able to fund these social programs (because they are often poor and impoverished) which contributes to political and economic instability when populists can capitalize upon people's sense of desperation to win elections. (4) When nations have massive reserves of natural resources and can sell those resources to get quick streams of cash, investors are more inclined to provide sovereign debt to those nations at lower interest rates. This is because investors (1) can demand access to lucrative resource commodities as collateral, which allows investors to lower the interest rates they demand since they know a default will still be profitable for them since they'll be able to access valuable natural resources, and (2) investors know that governments can pay off debts, even in times of economic crisis, by increasing their extraction of profitable natural resources (e.g. copper, oil, coal, etc.), so investors feel like lending to resource-based economies is safer and therefore lower the interest

rates they charge to reflect their confidence in the ability of resource-centered economies to pay back their debts. (5) When developing countries base their export-sectors around natural resources, they gain leverage over powerful Western nations that depend upon natural resource imports (e.g. oil) to fuel their service sectors. This leverage gives developing economies the ability to bargain for better treatment from the West, like better conditions imposed upon them by Western-dominated international organizations like the IMF or preferential terms on global free trade agreements with foreign nations. (6) Even if the Dutch disease phenomenon is correct and currency values appreciate in resource-based economies, this is good in three ways: First, stronger currencies allow developing countries to import goods at cheaper prices. This is important because most developing nations need to import things like technology and medicine in particular, so making those goods less expensive makes them more financially accessible for the poor. Second, stronger currencies make it easier for poor nations to pay back dollarized international debt obligations (i.e. sovereign debt denominated in foreign currencies like the dollar, euro, yen, or renminbi) because the exchange rate shifts in a favorable direction that allows poor nations to acquire greater quantities of foreign currencies for smaller quantities of domestic currencies, which makes it comparatively cheaper for developing governments to service their international debts and avoid the prospect of sovereign debt default

- Why are the alternatives worse? The most likely alternative to the World Bank is Chinese investment through the BRI. This is worse: (1) China utilizes debt-trapped diplomacy to further its power and leverage over other countries. (2) China often imports domestic Chinese laborers when working on foreign projects in natural resource extraction. (3) SOEs managing Chinese-run projects are often bloated and extremely corrupt
- International development institutions should not finance natural resource extraction projects in corrupt states:
  - Why are resource economies bad? (1) Dutch disease – the strong international demand for resource commodities causes your currency to appreciate, thus decreasing the competitiveness of other, nascent export industries. (2) Incentivizes corruption – resource economies incentivize corruption by (a) providing short-term influxes of money that allow governments to pay off

patronage networks and maintain support from oligarchs and (b) allowing for bloated state-run companies to manage extraction projects, where you can appoint people based on their loyalties. (3) Volatile – the prices of resource commodities fluctuate significantly because (a) resources are often heavily traded in the futures market which means prices are heavily subject to financial speculation, and (b) supply and demand for things like oil are dictated by an infinite series of global, rather than national, factors. (4) Unviable long term – these resources are exhaustible, so it's better for nations to invest into other, diversified sectors of their economy that are more stable long-term. (5) Encourage poor political decision-making – when oil revenues are high, governments are incentivized to implement short-term measures like cash handouts in order to gain short-term electoral popularity, even at the expense of more prudent measures like maintaining fiscal responsibility or paying off debts. In the long run, this engenders fears of sovereign debt crises

- Why are alternative sources of funding, like Chinese investment, preferable? International development institutions, e.g. the World Bank, are bad: (1) Structural adjustment programs push developing nations to privatize state-owned enterprises which is bad since private-sector firms are more likely to act upon their profit interest, thus causing harm to workers (e.g. lower wages) and consumers (e.g. price gouging). (2) These institutions often push for economic liberalization, e.g. the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, which destroys emerging industries that can't compete on the international market. This also generates a race-to-the-bottom effect, i.e. nations compete against each other by lowering their working standards to attract foreign investment when they can't rely upon protectionism. They also lose out on revenue from tariffs which makes government stimulus and funding of social services harder. (3) Bodies like the IMF often push for currency devaluation which makes sovereign debt servicing more expensive and decreases the purchasing power of the citizenry. (4) Western-imposed austerity measures create cyclical poverty and fierce anti-Western sentiment, creating resistance to liberalization of the economy. Comparatively, why is Chinese investment better? (1) China invests into the provision of infrastructure, e.g. building ports and electrifying poor nations, since it has the incentive to trade with the nations that it invests into. (2) China has more funds

available to manage resource extraction projects well since most of its banks are state-run. Comparatively, international development institutions rely upon the good-will of Western nations for funding.

(3) China actively competes with Western programs like the EU's Global Gateway, so China's incentive is to offer fewer conditions on loans and lower interest rates. Maybe this means your port gets seized as collateral, but that's better than going into a debt crisis!

- Why, in the counterfactual, can development institutions focus on more important priorities? Institutions like the World Bank have a constitutive duty to reduce poverty and promote long-term growth, and face scrutiny from activists to provide services to poor and impoverished economies. Given that these groups have limited funds, on our side, development institutions are likely to invest into the provision of otherwise-unprovided services, like building schools, creating physical infrastructure, and investing into healthcare facilities. This is particularly important because these countries are corrupt and therefore self interested, so if international development institutions prioritize resource extraction projects at the direct expense of other humanitarian priorities

## Geopolitical Events

### South Africa

- **History**

- South Africa was colonized first by the Dutch and then by the British; during the colonial era, white settlers from Europe moved into South Africa, and anti-Black policies were codified and enforced through law (like the pass laws, a form of internal passport system designed to segregate the population).
  - **Afrikaners** are white South Africans descended from Dutch settlers; they primarily live in segregated areas, like Orania, a city in the Northern Cape of South Africa. They speak Afrikaans, a language of European descent, and are generally wealthier and richer than Black communities. Freedom Front Plus, the party exclusively representing Afrikaner interests, currently has four seats in the national parliament. The ANC, however, maintains a significant majority of 249 seats
- In 1948, the National Party was elected to power. It strengthened the racial segregation begun under Dutch and British colonial rule. The nationalist government classified all people into three races and developed rights and limitations for each. The white minority (less than 20% of the population) controlled the vastly larger Black majority. While white South Africans enjoyed

the highest standard of living in all of Africa, the black majority remained disadvantaged by almost every standard, including income, education, housing, and life expectancy

- The international community first took note of the brutal apartheid regime in South Africa in 1960, when several white South African police opened fire on unarmed black protesters in the town of Sharpeville, killing 69 people and wounding 186 others. The UN called for sanctions, but the US and European allies suppressed the calls for sanctions, fearful of losing their economic and political allies in the region. Subsequently, throughout the '70s and '80s, grassroots movements put pressure on the international community to impose harsh sanctions against the South African government. The 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act passed by the US imposed sanctions, and pressure on companies led to many firms divesting from South Africa. Moreover, much of the US support for the regime in Pretoria had come from the fact that South Africa had been framed as a bulwark against communism (especially given that South Africa illegally occupied parts of Namibia under the pretense of halting the spread of Soviet-style communism), which became rhetorically unpersuasive as the Cold War came to a close. By 1989, the National Party had lost faith in South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha, leading to his resignation and the rise of F.W. de Klerk. Klerk announced he was lifting the ban on the ANC and other black liberation parties, allowing freedom of the press, and releasing political prisoners. Shortly thereafter, Mandela was released from prison (having spent 27 years behind bars)
- After Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990, the ANC, behind his leadership, pushed heavily for the end of apartheid. In 1992, South Africa held a national, white-only referendum that strongly (68% voted "yes") supported eliminating the apartheid regime. The first universal elections (in which Black people were allowed to vote) were held in 1994. The African National Congress won in a landslide, and has won every election since (although the rise of smaller political parties and corruption scandals within the ANC have diminished the margins of ANC electoral victories)
  - The United States lifted sanctions and increased foreign aid, and many of the foreign companies who disinvested in the 1980s returned with new investments to South Africa
- South Africa held a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Victims and perpetrators of violence and oppression were encouraged to share their stories, and in exchange, they were granted amnesty from prosecution.
- Negotiations
  - The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I and later CODESSA II) featured negotiations between the South African government (i.e. the National Party) and the ANC, as well as other political parties within South Africa. The

left-leaning Pan-African Congress and the right-leaning Conservative Party boycotted the negotiations. In the period between CODESA I and CODESA II in early 1992, the National Party lost three by-elections to the Conservative Party

- During the negotiations, the National Party white-only government pushed for a two-phase transition with an appointed transitional government with a rotating presidency, whereas Mandela's ANC pushed for a transition in a single stage into majority rule. Other sticking points included minority rights, decisions on a unitary or federal state, property rights, and indemnity from prosecution for politically motivated crimes
- In June 1992, the Boipatong massacre took place; the ANC accused the National Party of being complicit in the violence, which was largely perpetrated by members of the Zulu ethnic tribe within parts of South Africa. The ANC subsequently boycotted the second round of CODESA negotiations, and called upon Black South Africans to take to the streets in a protest known as "rolling mass action"
- Subsequently, the National Party and the ANC engaged in bilateral negotiations; the smaller scale of the negotiations allowed for the principal diplomats from both sides to establish strong bonds with each other. These negotiations eventually resulted in the passage of the Record of Understanding, which laid the foundations for the universal suffrage that would be granted throughout the country
- **Contemporary political/economic situation**
  - The ANC is still politically dominant, but their margins of electoral victories have become smaller recently due to a variety of factors:
    - 1) Corruption has flourished within all levels of the ANC: the dominance the party has enjoyed has led to complacency and the rise of mismanagement
    - 2) While, politically, apartheid has ended, economic discrimination remains extremely high: South Africa is statistically the most unequal country in the world. 10% of people (largely the white population) own 85% of the country's wealth. The richest 3500 people in the nation own more than the poorest 32 million people in the country, and the Black unemployment rate exceeds 30%
    - 3) There's substantial xenophobia within South Africa, particularly against foreign migrants (including from other African nations) and foreign nationals. In 2008, for example, 62 people died and 100,000 were displaced in xenophobic attacks that targeted African migrants and foreign-owned shops
    - 4) Jacob Zuma, the former President of South Africa and President of the ANC, faced a total of *five* votes of no confidence and eventually resigned



(and then was hit with a 15-month prison sentence) due to allegations of corruption and violating his constitutional oath of duty

## South Sudanese Civil War

- Since 2011, South Sudan has been an independent, sovereign nation dominated by ethnic and sectarian violence. The nation is home to 64 different ethnic tribes: the Dinka tribe represents 35% of the population and the Nuer tribe represents 16% of the population. Tensions between these groups have manifested in intense violence for decades, often over territorial and nomadic disputes
- In the initially formed democratic government, Salva Kiir of the Dinka tribe and a former revolutionary who'd fought for South Sudan's independence, assumed the presidency. In December 2013, Kiir accused his former Vice President, Riek Machar of the Nuer tribe, of attempting to seize power through an illegitimate coup d'état. Machar denied these accusations, and abandoned the government to lead the SPLM-IO, an opposition political and militant organization. Fighting broke out between the government-backed Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Machar's SPLM-In-Opposition, triggering a full-fledged civil war
- The UN deployed peacekeepers through the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). IGAD, along with the AU, UN, EU, and China, US, UK, and Norway, helped to facilitate peace talks, which ultimately culminated in a "Compromise Peace Agreement," which was signed in August 2015. Under the agreement, Machar was re-appointed Vice President and returned to Juba, the capital of South Sudan. However, when fighting reignited, Kiir replaced Machar with a different member of the opposition, Taban Deng Gai, which resulted in substantial fragmentation within the anti-SPLM movement. As a consequence, infighting between rebel forces grew particularly intense. Additionally, Dinka political factions in Juba splintered support for Kiir; for instance, Paul Malong Awan, a former military general, courted significant support from members of the Dinka ethnic majority. Thus, the conflict became fragmented both within the rebel factions and the government factions
- In August 2018, another peace deal was struck, which allowed for power sharing between the rival ethnic and socio-political factions. Kiir and Machar formed a tentative political coalition by February of 2020. However, a variety of factors make this peace tentative:
  - 1) Kiir and Machar are still more divided than they are united, and given that they were the primary instigators of the SPLM vs SPLM-IO conflict that originated in 2013 and ended in 2018, it's likely that they could resort to violence again in the future
  - 2) A new round of elections are scheduled for early 2023, and it's likely that violence could erupt along ethnic or political lines prior

- 3) In the southern parts of South Sudan, Thomas Cirillo is leading the National Salvation Front, an armed insurgency that threatens the fragile peace process that's still ongoing in South Sudan

## Ethiopia-Tigray Crisis

- Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, Ethiopia was governed by a brutally repressive, authoritarian dictatorship. After years of fighting, in 1991, a coalition of leftist rebel groups known as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front ("EPRDF") overthrew the military junta that had previously ruled over the country. For centuries, the northernmost portion of Ethiopia has been home to the Tigrayan people, a minority ethnic group that represents approximately six percent of Ethiopia's population
- After the overthrow of the Ethiopian dictatorship, a group of Tigrayans, known as the Tigray People's Liberation Front ("TPLF"), became the leaders of the EPRDF, and as the EPRDF constructed a new government for the Ethiopian people, the TPLF pushed strongly for a federal system of government, under which regional territories – such as Tigray – would be granted significant autonomy and sovereignty. From 1991 until recently, this diverse coalition led by the TPLF governed over Ethiopia. In 2018, however, a series of anti-government protests broke out across the nation, ushering in a new administration – one that was explicitly oppositional towards the Tigray minority population
- When Abiy Ahmed became the Prime Minister of the nation, he systematically removed Tigrays from positions of power within the government, arrested dozens of journalists, substantially limited the freedoms of the Tigrayan people, and implemented harsh security crackdowns on the region of Tigray. Subsequently, tensions between the Tigrayan people and the federal government grew enormously, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, which possessed regional control over the Tigray region, became increasingly antagonistic towards Ahmed's federal government. Tensions worsen even further in late 2020, when a mandate from the federal government required all territories within Ethiopia to delay annual elections due to the coronavirus pandemic; Tigray held its elections as per the normal, and in doing so, further inflamed the relationship between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF
- In early November 2020, these tensions escalated to violence when hundreds of people in a southwest zone in the region of Tigray were killed by the Ethiopian military. Amnesty International – as well as dozens of other international organizations and nations – verified that Prime Minister Ahmed ordered such military activity. The Ahmed administration has claimed that its use of violence was a response to a Tigrayan attack on the Ethiopian military. In the past year, violence has intensified, and all parties involved have been accused of committing war crimes. The Ethiopian military has used airstrikes and bombing attacks to target parts of the Tigray region, prompting further retaliatory violence. The Ethiopian government has shut down all forms of digital communication

within the country and has barred international observers from entering its borders for monitoring purposes. Violence has spilled over into neighboring Sudan and Somalia. Peace talks have been held by the African Union, but little has come from them.

**\*\*EXAMPLE MOTION:** This House, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, would provide funding and support to Tigray People's Liberation Front and encourage their aggression against the Ethiopian federal government

Inspired by LSE A (Hamza & Ana) in [Oxford IV 2020 Open Quarters](#)

**First, how does Saudi Arabian military aid to the TPLF improve regional security outcomes that are in line with Saudi interests?**

Why, in the absence of Saudi backing, is this conflict likely to be long and protracted?

One, even though the TPLF constitutes approximately 6% of the Ethiopian population, they've been in power for north of thirty years and thus have substantial military power and the know-how to rebut military advances

Two, the fact that the TPLF can engage in guerilla forms of warfare means that this conflict is likely to be long and protracted, given that the Ethiopian military cannot simply bulldoze over the Tigray region

Why, counterintuitively, does Saudi military backing limit the duration and intensity of conflict?

One, the amplified military power provided to Tigray rebels makes the Ethiopian government more likely to halt their aggression; presently, the Ethiopian military can justify aggression against the Tigray rebels by pointing to the fact that Tigray constitutes a fractionally small percentage of the Ethiopian population, but when a powerful regional hegemon like Saudi Arabia becomes involved in the conflict, it's more costly – both in terms of lives and dollars – for Ethiopia to continue its war, which makes it more likely that Ethiopia preemptively comes to the negotiating table, rather than suffer from the costs of a protracted civil insurgency

Two, it's outright possible that by providing advanced weaponry, equipment, funding, strategic advice, and direct support to the TPLF, Saudi Arabia can ensure that the Tigray rebels win the civil war ongoing within Ethiopia, thus putting an end to the conflict. Note this might happen anyway, but it's just accelerated on our side due to the greater military might possessed by the TPLF

Three, when Saudi Arabia's role in the conflict becomes more intense, Ethiopia is more inclined to back down or come to the negotiating table because Saudi Arabia has military and political allies in the region – most notably Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt and other Sunni-majority nations – that can militarily increase their pressure on Ethiopia. The threat of an Islamic military coalition joint intervention into Ethiopia is likely enough to deter Ethiopia from continued aggression

Four, it's very easy for Saudi Arabia to provide backing to the TPLF: Eritrea is a Saudi ally, and Eritrea borders the Tigray province, which makes the process of transporting military support to Tigray rebels particularly easy

Why is limiting the duration and intensity of the TPLF-Ethiopia conflict in Saudi interests?

One, prolonged conflict exacerbates the existing refugee crisis, and given Saudi Arabia's close proximity to the Tigray province, it's in Saudi Arabia's interest to see the conflict come to an end

Two, by backing the TPLF, the Saudi government has more leverage over one faction of the conflict, which thus gives the Saudi government more influence at the negotiating table should both sides jointly decide to arrive at a diplomatic solution

Three, refugee outflows from Ethiopia burdens Saudi allies in the region like Egypt and Sudan, which is already reeling from an internal political crisis caused by October's coup

Four, prolonged conflict makes those who are desperate more inclined to radicalism and extremism, which undermines regional stability and provides increased membership fuel for terrorist organizations in the region, including those financed and backed by Saudi Arabia's main geopolitical adversary, Iran

## **Second, how does this serve Saudi Arabia's regional and strategic interests?**

First, this bolsters Saudi Arabia's political alliance with Eritrea, which immediately borders Ethiopia and is the most likely to suffer from spillover of the conflict and the refugee crisis. Saudi backing of the TPLF demonstrates solidarity with Eritrean interests not only by bringing the conflict to an end sooner, but also by signaling that Saudi Arabia is willing to intervene in military conflicts to prop up and protect its allies. This is important for three reasons

One, Eritrea's largest trading partner is Saudi Arabia, so it's actively good for Saudi Arabia's economic interests to maintain a strong geopolitical bond with Eritrea

Two, Eritrea's fifteen-hundred kilometers worth of coastline are directly adjacent to Yemen, so bolstering Saudi Arabia's ties with Eritrea gives the Saudi military a vitally strategic landing ground to conduct military operations out of in Saudi Arabia's proxy war with Iran.

Three, Saudi Arabia's partnership with Eritrea is crucial for Saudi Arabian oil tankers to pass through the Persian Gulf, which is an additional economic consideration for the Saudi government

Second, gaining a foothold and leverage within northern Ethiopia gives Saudi Arabia a geographically critical territory. Saudi interests in winning the proxy war in Yemen, in which Houthi rebels are clashing with the Saudi-backed Yemeni government, are furthered when Saudi Arabia can demand that the TPLF provide territories to the Saudi military to launch airstrikes and coordinate military attacks out of. This is important given Ethiopia's close geographic proximity to the conflict in Yemen

Third, limiting the power of Abiy Ahmed, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, is vitally important for Saudi Arabian regional interests. Two reasons:

One, Ahmed has increased Ethiopia's political connections with Iran, Turkey, and Qatar, all of which – particularly Iran – are politically oppositional to Saudi Arabia. Increasing the likelihood that the Tigray people can topple the Ethiopian federal government, or, at a bare minimum, extract favorable concessions from his administration at the negotiating table, is directly advantageous for Saudi Arabia since it's problematic to have a political nemesis so directly proximate to Saudi Arabia's borders

Two, Ahmed's administration has greenlighted and worked tremendously on a dam on the Nile River to increase Ethiopian energy supply. This poses a direct threat to the water supply in Sudan and Egypt, which both depend heavily on access to the Nile. Gaining leverage over Ethiopia via direct conflict escalation and negotiation gives Saudi Arabia the ability to halt or at least delay the dam's construction, thus benefiting Saudi Arabian allies in the region and protecting regional security prospects

## Somalia's Presidential Crisis

- For years, Somalia has been gripped by violence, particularly in rural areas where the Islamic militant organization Al-Shabaab holds significant geographic influence, but Somalia's history of political elections, too, has been tumultuous. From 1976 to 1991, Somalia was ruled by a one-party Marxist-Leninist government. After a prolonged period of civil war and insurgent violence, in 2017, Somalia held its first round of contested elections since 1984. However, the elections were plagued by issues of bribery, corruption, and vote-buying, and were parliamentary elections, which meant that parliamentarians, rather than voters directly, voted for the next president. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known in Somalia as Farmaajo, won the presidential elections, and was sworn in as the Somali President in February 2017. Farmaajo, while on the campaign trail, had promised to implement direct elections in the future; he signed legislation guaranteeing this right in February 2020
- However, with Farmaajo's term as President due to expire in February of 2021, his government made repeated attempts to delay upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, sparking mass pushback from opposition parties. Farmaajo declared a two-year extension to his presidency, promising to hold elections in the future. In response, in April 2021, factions of the Somali military – which are split between support for and opposition to Farmaajo's regime – surged into Somalia's capital city of Mogadishu and swarmed the Presidential building, known as Villa Somalia. More recently, Somali opposition to Farmaajo have claimed that the system used to elect Somali presidents – based on a complex system of nominations by local, regional clan leaders – is rigged in favor of Farmaajo. This has contributed to a political crisis, further worsened by a crackdown on the media by Farmaajo's order
- On December 27th, 2021, Farmaajo announced the suspension of Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, the main political opponent to Farmaajo and one of the strongest advocates for a one-person, one-vote system within Somalia, ostensibly for

issues of corruption and stealing of land from the Somali military. International democracy activists as well as domestic opposition movements within Somalia have decried the move as a de facto coup by President Farmaajo.

## Development Aid

- Development aid comes in two forms: (1) **Bilateral** — when one country gives development aid to another country. (2) **Multilateral** — when an international organization e.g. the World Bank e.g. the UN gives development aid to another country
- ~80% of all international development aid is given by governments; the remaining ~20% comes from individual philanthropists, businesses, and NGOs like Oxfam. Of international development aid (known as “ODA” or “Official Development Assistance”), ~70% is bilateral and ~30% is multilateral
- Development aid typically entails low-interest loans or grants (which don’t have to be paid back) to poor(er) nations to develop their economies long-term
- During the 2010s, the largest **recipients** of development aid were Afghanistan (\$37.6 billion), India (\$18.1 billion), Ethiopia (\$17.6 billion), Vietnam (\$17.4 billion), Pakistan (\$15.8 billion), the DRC (\$15.6 billion), and Iraq (\$14.7 billion)
- During the 2010s, the largest **donors** of development aid were the US (\$323 billion), Germany (\$188 billion), the United Kingdom (\$171 billion), France (\$115 billion), and Japan (\$107 billion). China contributed just \$38 billion in international development aid in that same window of time. As a percentage of gross national income (a reflection of economic strength), Norway and Sweden rank as the top two nations in terms of percentage of aid provided out of their total GNI
- **USAID** is a federally funded \$20 billion international development agency that accounts for the majority of US government spending on foreign aid and development assistance. Though funded by the government, USAID operates as an independent organization that has authority to allocate its own spending however it deems best for achieving its humanitarian goals. The US has recently increased USAID commitments to countries like Venezuela and Fiji amidst the pandemic, and in general operates in over 120 typically lower-income countries around the world. Examples of former aid recipients are Chile, Costa Rica, South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil, who are also some of America’s largest trading partners. Though making up less than 1% of the federal budget, USAID offers comprehensive assistance by providing food, medicine, water, sanitation, and crisis response, in addition to on-the-ground assistance working to do things like build schools and work with non-governmental aid organizations, local private-sector companies, and the government with the goal of self-sufficient development, democracy, and peace
- Development aid does more harm than good:
  - **1) Development aid is economically harmful for recipient nations**
    - 1) The giving of international development aid fosters unhealthy economic dependence. Nations become reliant on the aid provided by foreign

powers, which reduces the incentive for regional governments to implement policies that guarantee long-term economic growth since they, as well as domestic political populations, come to anticipate the flow of foreign dollars. This dependence and resultant decreased political incentive to create independent means of financing government policies is harmful:

- 1) Aid is eventually likely to stop flowing into these nations because political affiliations change and the willingness and capacity of foreign nations to act as powerful donors changes
  - 2) In times of recession, foreign powers e.g. the US don't have the excess money nor political will to provide foreign aid, which means that the economies of these nations plummet
  - 3) When developing economies become dependent upon aid yet fail to progress in terms of development, populists can weaponize public anger about these programs (e.g. "these nations can't even sustain themselves, they're just leaching off of us!") in order to win elections and gain social and political capital
  - 4) When governments can rely on foreign development aid, they're less inclined to internally reform issues of corruption. This is because in the counterfactual, when they can't as easily rely on aid, governments have to finance state-run programs by issuing bonds since tax revenues are small given rampant poverty amongst the citizenry; this matters because institutional investors are disinclined to lend to corrupt regimes for fear of not being paid back due to a lack of transparency and poor governmental incentives
- 2) Development aid displaces local industries, like local food producers, because domestic producers simply can't compete with the free or heavily-subsidized products or services that are provided through international aid. This destroys local jobs and decreases aggregate economic growth
  - 3) It's often the case that aid money is spent corruptly and there's an incentive for the recipients of aid to spend money in a way that is not conducive to meaningful development: (1) Especially in novel state regimes, patronage networks are highly influential because politicians need to curry and maintain favor from powerful individuals within society. (2) The fact that politicians are often quite undercompensated means they're likely to use foreign aid in corrupt, economically self-serving ways. Maybe aid can be earmarked for specific purposes, but these are

often highly complex, multifaceted projects which means that there's ample opportunity for money to be correctly siphoned off

- 4) It's often the case that international donors have a poor understanding of the on-the-ground conditions that result in poverty and a lack of economic development. This is because donor nations and foreign international aid organizations hold explicitly or subconsciously racist attitudes towards the countries they're providing aid to, which means they often have a poor cultural, geographical, and social understanding of the context of these nations. It's also often the case that foreign aid organizations are geographically far removed from the consequences of their actions, which thus means aid is often distributed in ineffective and harmful ways due to information asymmetries
- 5) Foreign aid reduces government accountability, not only because of the bond market mechanism, but also because when governments rely on foreign dollars rather than tax revenue to fund social/economic programs, individual citizens have less direct influence over the government, which is particularly problematic in countries with nascent or emerging democratic infrastructure
- 6) Foreign aid causes increased capital inflows which induces currency appreciation, thus causing the Dutch disease phenomenon which reduces the viability of these nations' export sectors
- 7) Aid is often only provided to nations in exchange for certain economic conditions, e.g. structural adjustment, austerity, etc, being implemented; this is structurally likely because multilateral aid donors have to court continued donations from around the world, e.g. from member nations or private donors, so they have to impose economic restrictions on the recipients of aid. This is bad for the economies of these nations
- 8) Aid can often be stolen by paramilitary groups especially in less-secure states while in transport
- **2) Development aid is politically harmful for recipient nations**
  - 1) Aid is often a political weapon given by nations to their political allies or regionally important nations. However, when nations receive foreign aid from abroad, they become politically dependent upon the donor nations: since vitally important projects like infrastructure construction is financed through foreign dollars, governments suffer from a chilling effect whereby they're scared to implement policies that might anger or provoke retaliation from foreign aid donors (e.g. nationalizing industries despite receiving aid from explicitly pro-capitalist, pro-austerity Western countries or imposing tariffs on foreign goods despite relying heavily on aid coming from pro-WTO/pro-IMF nations) and donors can always threaten to



withdraw aid, which creates political subservience that restricts the autonomy of these governments. This is harmful because these governments are directly accountable to their own constituents and have a better on-the-ground understanding of what sorts of policies are needed, so reducing their ability to act independent of foreign political interests is harmful

- 2) Foreign aid undermines the perceptual credibility of domestic governments and increases radicalization because (1) people come to expect services from foreign, often-Western governments rather than their own local governments which reduces peoples' faith in local democratic infrastructure, and (2) the West is often hated in many parts of the developing world due to the legacy of colonialism, which thus taints the perceptual legitimacy and credibility of novel state regimes
- Development aid does more good than harm:
  - **1) Development aid is preferable to the likely alternative which is China.**  
Why will nations turn to China instead? (1) They still need funding, and when they can't get that funding from major foreign aid donors, the most plausible counterfactual is to turn to a different major power, e.g. the rise of China. (2) China's Belt and Road Initiative means that now more than ever before, China is actively engaging in outreach efforts to provide investment into poor nations, e.g. Sri Lanka, that are in need of things like physical infrastructure (Cf Montenegro's highway project through the BRI). Why is this worse? (1) China debt-traps nations through the BRI by saddling impoverished countries with unpayable debt burdens, then seizes physical collateral when nations face sovereign debt default. (2) China has a terrible track record on human rights, e.g. the abuse of Uighurs in Xinjiang, so increased Chinese influence is, on the margins, likely to be harmful to the protection of human rights
  - **2) Development aid is independently good**
    - 1) These recipient nations are often quite poor so they don't have the money to do things like build schools, hospitals, or roads on their own
    - 2) Educational facilities are often provided through foreign aid which helps increase the long-term ability of nations' economies to grow since improving human capital attracts foreign investment, acts as a de facto subsidization of worker training costs thus spurring business growth, and equips people with the skills they need to do things like create new startups or earn higher wages
    - 3) Healthcare infrastructure is vitally important yet can't always be financed/funded by cash-strapped governments. Foreign aid fixes that, allowing for faster responses to pandemics and reducing the spread of preventable yet highly damaging illness

- 4) Infrastructure projects can often be built through foreign aid financed endeavors; that is good because (1) this enables the uplifting of the rural poor by interconnecting urban and rural areas, and (2) this generates long-term economic growth when internal transportation costs are lower and economic interconnectedness is higher
- **3) Development aid is the best way that nations can exert their will over foreign allies or geopolitically important nations**
  - If the other side is right and foreign aid is politically weaponizable, the underlying incentives for governments to exert political influence over other nations doesn't go away when they cease giving foreign aid. Rather, this manifests in other more nefarious ways that yield less of a benefit directly to the people, e.g. military interventions, targeted sanctions, forced implementation of austerity through international organizations, etc

**\*\*Common motion about development aid: Assuming feasibility, THBT all foreign developmental aid should be given in the form of direct transfers to individuals**

#### **GOV**

1—Individual people know their own needs the best, whereas governments are bureaucratic and aren't likely to make the best decisions when it comes to allocating resources

2—Governments are often structurally corrupt, so there's an incentive, when aid is provided to governments, for that aid money to be mismanaged and spent corruptly because politicians are paid low wages, thus incentivizing them to siphon off funds for personal gains, because politicians are beholden to corporate donors, and because patronage networks are often highly entrenched within the ranks of governments

Earmarking funds doesn't work to solve this because (1) aid is often given unconditionally, e.g. by China, and (2) the mass complexity of things like infrastructure projects enables large-scale corruption to go undetected

Moreover, even when governments don't outright spend money corruptly, they're likely to use international aid money to fund bloated and corrupt SOEs due to social corruption and nepotism

3—When aid is provided to governments, this is often used by donor nations to exert influence over recipient nations in harmful ways, e.g. the World Bank imposing austerity/structural adjustment measures upon recipient nations, e.g. China debt-trapping nations through the provision of development/foreign aid

#### **OPP**

#### **FRAMING**

First, the comparative we defend on OPP is that development aid will be given to institutions rather than individuals. This looks like providing money to governments to build schools or providing funding to NGOs to strengthen local democratic institutions

Second, preempting any PROP claim on why governments will use this money in a corrupt way. A few responses:

First, the donors of development aid have incentives to conditionalize and earmark the provision of development aid on successful implementation of specific policies; this looks like USAID only providing aid to governments

Second, there's often heavy scrutiny on how governments use foreign aid, especially since the governments **\*\*giving\*\*** development aid need to prove the efficacy of that aid to fiscally-conservative and socially-regressive voters back home who are skeptical of the effectiveness of these programs. This not only means that donor nations are likely to inspect how recipient nations use development aid, it also generates a preemptive deterrent against corrupt mismanagement of funds

Third, in the **\*\*worst cases\*\*** that PROP identifies, where authoritarian governments are actively corrupt, the outcome in these contexts is likely to be symmetric since governments can do things like intimidate individuals into providing their development aid money to the government. This means that there's **\*\*only\*\*** a delta in this debate in countries where governments are not tantalizingly corrupt

Fourth, note that under our side, we can give individual aid in specific contexts since the motion requires PROP to give "all" aid to individuals. Importantly, we give **\*\*better\*\*** types of aid under our side because we give aid donors greater flexibility when it comes to the **\*\*type\*\*** of aid they're providing. This is especially important because it bifurcates this debate: in cases where governments are extremely corrupt and abusive, donors likely have the incentive under our side to provide targeted aid to individuals or NGOs since there's no benefit but optical backlash to funding corrupt governments. Those cases are symmetric. The second half of the debate is when governments have reasonably good incentives or aren't entirely corrupt: that's where our benefits will kick in

Fifth, governments have incentives to not be corrupt: (1) they want to showcase on the international stage that they are reliable recipients of foreign aid so that they can get **\*\*more\*\*** development aid in the future, and (2) politicians often face wide-scale scrutiny from the media, and given that being corrupt is a highly politically damaging look, there's an incentive for governments to avoid spending this money corruptly

Sixth, internal regulatory agencies within governments can often act as watchdogs against corruption. Moreover, the fear of whistleblowers coming forward with accusations of corruption gives countries an incentive to **\*\*not\*\*** be corrupt

### **FIRST ARGUMENT: Providing development aid to governments is more effective than providing development aid to individuals**

First, we uniquely empower the creation of infrastructure under our side of the house. This looks like development aid being used to build roads, invest into local schools, or improve hospitals. Why can you **\*\*only\*\*** get infrastructure development under our side?

One, under their side, the total amount of foreign aid has to be heavily sub-divided to be given to millions of different individual people on the ground, whereas on our side, large lump sums can be given to the government. This is important because under our side, the **\*\*capacity\*\*** for governments to do things like build transportation infrastructure or develop healthcare infrastructure because the fixed costs of infrastructure projects are very high, so you need to centralize developmental funding into a single institution, like a government agency or an NGO, to get effective infrastructure development

Two, **\*\*even if\*\*** individual people having money through development aid allowed them to do things like invest into infrastructure projects, individuals lack the **\*\*incentive\*\*** to do things like build infrastructure because there's a collective action problem: no one wants to be the first person to use their money to, for instance, build a bridge, since they're the only one to front the cost but everyone benefits. Comparatively, under their side, governments have incentives to invest into infrastructure because (1) they want to court buy-in from voters, so it's optically good to build schools or invest into hospitals, and (2) governments want to continue receiving foreign aid in the future and therefore have incentives to spend this money well. Thus, we get far more infrastructure development under our side

Three, it's quite literally just the case that individual people — and even individual communities — can't do things like construct bridges or build schools. Only governments have the resource and the know-how to complete these infrastructure projects; thus, it's better to give funding to organizations like NGOs or governments rather than to individual people

**\*\*The end conclusion here is that we get far greater infrastructure development under our side when aid can be given to institutions rather than to governments.\*\*** In terms of weighing, why is the creation of infrastructure the biggest and largest impact in this debate and why does this argument on infrastructure outweigh all of PROP's benefits?

One, note that people having money only matters if that money can do something meaningful for them. If you are sick, you might now have money on their side, but if there's not a hospital for you to go to, nothing changes. If you are in need of a job, you might have a temporary influx of cash on their side, but still no employer to find long-term employment. If you want an education, you have the money to afford school on their side, but no school to go to under their side. Creating infrastructure is therefore the **\*\*prerequisite\*\*** for most of PROP's benefits, especially in the least well of countries

Two, creating infrastructure creates meaningful long-term opportunities that allow for the mass upliftment of the poor. Giving people a one-time cash handout doesn't do anything to solve the **\*\*underlying causes\*\*** of structural poverty. Under our side, we fix that when you give people schools that allow them to up-skill and when you build the roads that allow for the connecting of rich and poor provinces. Thus, our argument on infrastructure outweighs PROP on consideration of the fact that we create a longer-term benefit

Three, our benefit affects more people: note that the benefits of infrastructure creation are multiplicative. When you build a road, that allows businesses to grow,

hire more workers, and sell more products. When you create a school, that results in an entire generation of smarter, more economically productive workers to attract foreign capital. On their side, the only people who benefit are the people who receive individual development aid. Thus, we outweigh PROP because our benefits on infrastructure development affect more people

Four, we get far more foreign direct investment into these impoverished nations under our side: companies are more likely to do things like build factories when there's transportation infrastructure and when there's a well-educated labor force. This means that we solve the largest issue these nations often face, which is the poverty trap and a lack of liquid capital

Five, the problem with individual aid on their side is that individual people eventually become dependent on foreign aid; this creates an unhealthy dependence within developing nations on neo-colonial foreign powers like the US. Comparatively on our side, we're more likely to have nations develop stably into the long run and generate internal economic resilience, which means they're less likely to require constant inflows of development aid into the long term

Second, individuals are structurally less likely to use development aid well relative to governments. To be clear: the thesis of this argument is **\*\*not\*\*** that individuals on the ground are stupid or incompetent, but rather that they have poor incentives when it comes to spending this money. Why is that the case?

One, people, as a consequence of decades of colonialism, are often not able to access education, which means they're often lacking in financial literacy skills. This means that people aren't likely to know what the optimal way to spend this money is

Two, people have structurally short-term incentives since humans have biological instincts to primarily focus on the immediate world around them in the short term

Three, in many instances, when people are given a huge sum of money — more than they've ever had in their life, in some cases — they often go on spending sprees motivated by irrationality. That's why people that win the lottery blow through their savings without spending that money properly: the adrenaline rush of having so much money all at once galvanizes people to spend improperly without adequately considering the best use of that money

This proves that individuals aren't likely to spend money in optimal ways, so most of PROP's benefits are marginal. Comparatively, why do governments receiving aid have better incentives?

One, government officials often receive input from technocrats and educated exports with experience managing government budgets, which means governments can more wisely consider where to spend this money

Two, development aid is often earmarked for specifically good purposes; this looks like the USAID program building schools in Fiji or the World Bank providing electricity to the Maldives

Three, governments have longer-term incentives because political parties want to maintain power into the long term

Third, when development aid is distributed to individuals, not everyone can be the recipient of aid. This means that when **\*\*some\*\*** people don't get aid, they feel left behind. This can often (1) result in inter-communal violence when people feel unjustly wronged by the denial of aid, and (2) this can fuel populist movements when demagogues can capitalize upon public notions of anger and frustration

## **SECOND ARGUMENT: We get a far greater amount of development aid provided in general under our side**

The thesis of this argument is that the **\*\*total sum\*\*** of money that's created under our side is far higher. The way we're going to prove this is to analyze the political interests of **\*\*donor\*\*** nations and explain why it's easier to justify giving development aid to governments than to individuals. This is for three reasons:

One, it's very easy to cherry-pick examples of specific individuals using developmental aid money for bad purposes; even if ninety percent of people on their side use this money responsibly, the ten percent that don't get blown out of proportion due to the media's incentives to sensationalize and exaggerate their coverage of these programs. This is similar to how conservative media rails against welfare programs as "handouts"

Two, governments often provide development aid to other governments for geopolitical, regional, and strategic purposes. PROP might say that's bad, but it's not: under their side, money can only be given to individuals on the ground, but under our side, political interests mean that governments have incentives to provide **\*\*more\*\*** aid to increase their direct political alliances with foreign governments. This means we get more schools to be built, more communities to flourish, and more hospitals to be constructed

Three, it's much easier to justify the giving of development aid when you as a donor nation can point to the tangible programs or policies that will be implemented through that aid, like the schools that will be built. Under their side, the benefits are far more nebulous, so voters are far less likely to support pro-development-aid candidates

In terms of weighing, this argument wins us the round: individual-targeted development aid and government-targeted development aid are both good, in all probability. The **\*\*biggest\*\*** delta in the debate, then, is not over "which type of aid is best" but rather "on which side do you get **\*\*more\*\*** aid." We get more aid on our side, and thus take the debate

## **THIRD ARGUMENT: Our style of development aid has additional pragmatic benefits**

First, our form of development aid is substantially better for the economic well-being of these nations. Three reasons this happens uniquely under our side:

One, on their side, by directly putting tons of money into circulation, inflation occurs as the money supply goes up. This doesn't happen on our side, since money is used for **\*\*projects\*\*** like building roads, rather than for direct consumption. This means that prices go up disproportionately on their side. That heavily mitigates all of PROP's benefits

Two, currency appreciation occurs on their side: under our side, development donors can give aid in international currencies like the dollar or the euro because governments often do business in those currencies, but under their side, currencies have to be exchanged for local currencies used by people on the ground. This means that currencies within developing nations appreciate on their side, which makes exports less competitive and causes the Dutch disease effect to occur, thus harming the economic well-being of the nation

Three, on their side, individual people become dependent on foreign inflows of capital, which makes them less likely to demand the provision of goods and services from their own government. This decreases political accountability in the long run

Second, there are active political benefits of providing aid to governments. There are three reasons for this:

First, it's actively good for poor nations to get direct aid transfers from donors because they can provide for services and create politically-valuable infrastructure. This increases buy-in to nascent, emerging government regions since people value the act of their own governments providing infrastructure to them

Second, this puts greater scrutiny on governments within the developing world to provide services using this foreign capital more efficiently. Comparatively on their side, people come to expect revenue not from their own government, but from aid donors

Third, if PROP is right and state-run firms awarded development-aid-financed projects are bloated and corrupt, then there's increased international scrutiny over these companies to internally crackdown on corruption and mismanagement, which subsequently means that we're more likely to get the efficient provision of public and social services through SOEs under our side, given that these nationalized enterprises exist on both sides but are likely to be more accountable and more efficient under our side

Third, PROP might say that development aid is conditionalized for harmful political purposes. On their side, these incentives of neocolonial Western nations to control the global south still exist, but just manifest in more harmful ways, like outright military interventions. The counterfactual of government-targeted aid is preferable