

A Course in Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor

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Lecture 1. Preliminary Concepts and Terminology

Introduction

A number of basic concepts and terms employed in discussions of metaphor will first be explained. The framework used is Max Black's (1979/1993) interaction theory, which will be complemented by other relevant studies. After the introduction of the pertinent concepts, they will be applied to some de-contextualized pictures in order to demonstrate how Black's theory can be made productive for non-verbal metaphors.

The interaction theory of metaphor is primarily associated with the work of I.A. Richards (1935/1965), Max Black (1962, 1979), and Paul Ricoeur (1977). A variant of the interaction theory underlies much current work on metaphor, including Lakoff and Johnson's influential *Metaphors we live by* (1980) and the Cognitivist Linguistics approach to metaphor that was anticipated by this study. Since Black's formulation of the interaction theory is the most lucid and applicable, his approach will provide the starting point for this course. A more detailed analysis of Black's model can be found in Forceville (1996: chapter 2; see also Forceville 1995); here I will omit the niceties and concentrate on the essentials. Where pertinent I will replace Black's (1979) terms by terminology which nowadays has gained greater currency. I should emphasize that while I see the following elaborations as being in the spirit of Black's ideas, they necessarily go beyond what Black could envisage 25 years ago. Hence the full responsibility for my interpretation of Black's approach resides with me.

The interaction theory: target and source, target domain and source domain

A metaphor consists of two elements. One of these terms is that about which something else is said. It is the "topic" or "tenor" (Richards 1936/1965), the "primary subject" (Black 1962, 1979), or the "target" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) of the metaphor. Since the term "target" is now commonly used, that will be the word generally employed here as well.

The other term is the "something else" used to convey something about the target. It is the "vehicle" (Richards 1936/1965), the "subsidiary subject" (Black, 1962), the "secondary subject" (Black, 1979) or the "source" (Lakoff and Johnson

1980). I will use the term “source” here. Thus, in

(1.1) Love is a battlefield

(the title of an eighties' Pat Benatar song), "love" is the target and "battlefield" the source.

Both target and source, however, are part of a whole network of related meanings, meanings that can usually be conveyed by words. Black labeled this network the “system of associated commonplaces” (Black 1962) and the “im-plicative complex” (Black 1979/1993); Kittay called it a “semantic field” (Kittay 1987). “Love” is part of a network that includes concepts such as “lovers,” “pas-sion,” “sex,” “marriage,” “respect,” “sacrifice,” “roses,” etc. Such a network, of course, can be infinitely extended. Some of the extensions are connected to “love” in a fairly accepted, conventional way. The conventionality of the connections can be gauged from the likelihood that these words will or could occur in the same textual passage or context in which “love” appears. Connections to other concepts are less self-evident and hence less conventional. Most people probably judge the link between “love” and “happiness” to be closer than that between “love” and “pain.” But recall Catullus' famous love poem that begins “Odi et amo” (“I hate and I love”) or, for that matter, the Nazareth classic “Love hurts,” and you remember it’s not all roses there.

The source, “battlefield,” is similarly part of a network of concepts. This network includes “soldiers,” “victims,” “wounds,” “pain,” “sorrow,” “victories,” “defeats,” etc. But the networks consist of more than mere words or concepts and their denotations (roughly: objective meanings, as they are found in a dictionary); they also cover these words' connotations (roughly: personal or conventional overtones and emotions associated with the word) and attitudes toward them. Love can be a source of inspiration to a lover, but also a reason for revenge, insecurity, depression, creativity; it can cause a divorce, a war (the Trojan war, for instance, was a result of Paris' infatuation with Helena), or the conception of a child. Similar reasoning holds for battlefield. The network of which target and source of a metaphor are part, then, cannot be adequately described exclusively in terms of denotations; it also requires taking into account connotations and pragmatic considerations. The network is thus a category, and as Lakoff 1987 (elaborating the work of Eleanor Rosch) shows, categories are anything but stable, closed, and objective units. A network embodies a wealth of related concepts, attitudes, cultural values, beliefs, potential actions, etc. The two metaphorical terms, target and source, then, are part of networks that will be referred to as the “target do-main” and the “source domain” respectively. Since conceptual domains are conventionally indicated by SMALL CAPITALS to distinguish them from their verbal instantiations (Lakoff and Johnson [1980] initiated this usage), we can say: in the metaphor “Love is a battlefield,” “love” is the target, which is part of the target domain LOVE; “battlefield” is the source, which is part of the source domain WAR.

We should not forget, however, that there is no natural or exclusive link between a target and a target domain, or between a source and a source domain. Although it may sound sensible and uncontroversial to say that "love" is part of the domain LOVE, one could also say that it belongs to the domain PASSION. Similarly, "battlefield" could also be said to belong to the domain BATTLE. There is no objectivity here, and it is all the more important to realize this since the label chosen for the domain to which a target or source is seen to belong may have consequences for the further interpretation of the metaphor. The formulation LOVE IS A BATTLEFIELD focuses primarily on source domain elements such as casualties, fighting strategies, trenches etc., whereas the more encompassing LOVE IS WAR is likely to cue more abstract source domain elements such as politics, powerplay, ally-seeking etc.

Interpreting a metaphor

What happens in a metaphor is that at least one feature typically associated with the source (and therefore coming from the source domain) is projected (Black) or mapped (Lakoff and Johnson) onto the target. It is important to note that in order to make a metaphor possible in the first place, there must be some sort of resemblance between the target and the source; it is this similarity that is the basis on which the *difference* between the two can become productive. For instance, in "Love is a battlefield," a minimal resemblance between the two domains is that in both two parties are engaged in a type of relationship with one another.

In "Love is a battlefield" we could postulate that "the goal to hurt and kill the enemy" is a feature mapped from "battlefield" to "love." Other features that qualify for mapping are "making victims," "being costly in terms of lives and material," "being a cause of misery and bitterness." In this fairly simple metaphor, only a few features are mapped. It is to be noted that these features are not isolated, but linked to one another. Just as on the *battlefield soldiers fight the enemy*, often at considerable personal and material *cost*, in order to *kill* or *hurt* him, thereby causing *victims*; just so a *person quarrels* with her *lover*, often causing *grief* to herself, intending to *hurt* him, thereby causing *unhappiness*. There is thus usually a structural relationship between a number of elements in the source domain and corresponding elements in the target domain, which enable the mapping of features from source to target. It is often the structural character of the mapping which makes metaphors interesting, insightful and persuasive. But unless the context in which a metaphor appears provides us with details about the features that are to be mapped (which it usually does), the interpreter of the metaphor must decide for herself which of the features are to be mapped. For instance, if I say about somebody "He's a real George Bush," it is not at all clear what feature(s) I intend you to map from Bush to the person I am referring to – partly because it is not clear in which context I utter this metaphor, and partly because you do not

know how I feel about Mr. Bush.

We can draw a few important conclusions from these observations:

- (1) By definition, not all features or characteristics of a source are mappable. In fact, usually only a few are, while the vast majority are not. For instance, the fact that modern battles are fought with guns and tanks has no immediate counterpart in the target domain of love. Which features are to be mapped depends on many circumstances. Often the surrounding text of a metaphor gives clues which features should be mapped. In addition, an audience that has specialized knowledge of a metaphorical source domain, or a certain attitude toward it, may come up with mappings unavailable to a general audience. To give an example: Guy Cook, discussing various interpretations of Hopkins' complex poem "The windhover" (a dialect word meaning "kestrel"), points out that one interpretation of the poem, among various others, depends on the metaphor CHRIST IS WINDHOVER. After a more general interpretation, Cook adds a number of relevant aspects of the domain (in Cook's terminology: "schemata"), concluding, "the availability of this is, however, far less widespread than the other schemata [= "relevant features in the source domain" ChF] I have suggested, as it will only be present in those observers with ornithological knowledge" (Cook 1994: 246).
- (2) Neither the decision which features from the source are to be mapped, nor how these features are to be labeled, nor the features in the target with which they are to be matched, are necessarily self-evident. In this sense, the interpretation of each metaphor requires work from its interpreter. Sometimes the context in which a metaphor appears gives the interpreter clues as to which features are to be mapped, but often this is not the case, and it will depend on the interpreter (and her personal experiences, her knowledge, her culture) how far she will go in deciding on the mappable features. The textual genre in which a metaphor occurs, too, plays an important role. A metaphor in a poem will probably motivate a reader to a larger degree to search for possible mappings than a metaphor in a journalist's news report (for an empirical investigation of a similar hypothesis, see Steen 1994: chapter 6). But since mappable features are not always made explicit, different interpreters may infer (partly) different features, while the interpretation process is open-ended (see Sperber and Wilson 1995/1986; Forceville 1996: chapter 5). This is what makes metaphors both suggestive and risky ways of communication.
- (3) Sometimes a metaphor suggests the mapping of a single feature. When you call your boss an ass, it is very likely that the only feature you intend your interlocutor to map from the source domain ASS to the target domain BOSS is "stupidity." (If the boss happens to have protruding teeth, often wears grey suits, and/or has a hee-haw laugh, all these aspects may echo as part and parcel

of the metaphor – and make the metaphor, perhaps, extra appropriate.)

But in more interesting metaphors, it is not isolated features or properties that are mapped, but a number of features, along with the structural relationships that exists between them in the source domain. In *As You Like It* (II: 7) the character Jacques famously says:

(1.2) All the world's a stage

Shakespeare himself provides a (partial) explanation of the metaphor by elaborating on the metaphor: "And all the men and women merely players;/ They have their exits and their entrances;/ And one man in his time plays many parts." The source STAGE has in its domain such explicitly given elements as "players," "exits," "entrances," "many parts" (= roles). In interpreting the metaphor we begin by matching these elements with their corresponding elements in the target domain WORLD: "players" matches with "men and women"; "exits" matches with "moments during which people are not in the centre of attention" or "people's deaths"; "entrances" matches with "people's births" or, perhaps, "moments in their lives during which people attract much attention"; "many parts" matches with "behaving (very) differently according to the situation in which people find themselves at a particular moment". In addition, what we match are the relations that connect these elements. That is: the metaphor gains in richness depending on the extent to which the *structural* relations that exist between a stage, a play, players, parts, entrances and exits are retained in the mapping onto the target domain WORLD. Notice that to retain the structural relationships in the mapping from source to target domain once we decide that "exits" matches with "deaths," we will have to match "entrances" with "births"; whereas if we match "exits" with "moments during which people are not in the centre of attention," we will have to match "entrances" with "moments in their lives during which people attract much attention." We cannot "use" exits in two different senses simultaneously.

- (4) Metaphors can provide a new or alternative view of a given target domain by linking it with an "unexpected" source domain, or by mapping unexplored features from a familiar source domain to the target. This happens because the chosen source domain, which has a certain structure, highlights a similar, often latent structure, in the target domain. Different source domains highlight different structures in the target domain. The target domain structure resulting from "The world is a stage" is a very different one from that which emanates from "The world is a battlefield." Each source domain "highlights" certain features in the target domain and "hides" others (see also Lakoff and Johnson 1980: chapter 3).

Thus, the Dutch poet Jan van Nijlen wrote a wonderful sonnet called "De cactus," from which the metaphor THE POET IS A CACTUS can be construed.

Whereas we probably readily map the feature “prickliness” from CACTUS to POET (with due adaptation of a literal prickliness to a figurative one) van Nijlen builds up an entire source domain around CACTUS in the course of his poem, including the notion of the cactus having been transplanted from its natural habitat, the sunny prairies, to the drabness of Dutch window sills and, most pointedly, the fact that a cactus flowers only once every so many years. The correspondent features built up in the target domain are, presumably, that the poet, too, feels “alien” in his everyday surroundings, and derives his sense of joy (or the justification of his existence?) from the rare poem that he manages to produce.

Inasmuch as rich source domains can provide elaborate structure to target domains, the resulting metaphors may amount to ideological frameworks for individuals or for communities. Gareth Morgan (1986) wrote an insightful book on how companies often (unconsciously) operate according to a specific metaphor. In his book he traces several of such metaphors, like AN ORGANIZATION IS A MACHINE, AN ORGANIZATION IS AN ORGANISM, and amply discusses how these various source domains structure the target domain ORGANIZATION, and how the resulting metaphors enforce or encourage certain actions while discouraging or forbidding other actions. Here each metaphor functions as a model of a company culture, and the different models partly conflict. Such an incompatibility often becomes visible in the case of a merger between two companies. One can imagine how behaviours that are consistent with A COMPANY IS A MACHINE cannot be simply translated into behaviours that are consistent with A COMPANY IS AN ORGANISM. Machines consist of parts, and parts are replaceable. In an organism one cannot so easily isolate a single part and substitute another part for it, for organisms are living tissue.

New insights or angles on a target domain need not only arise from an unexpected coupling of domains; they may also be a consequence of mapping ignored features of a familiar domain. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) give some examples in the course of the discussion of the structural metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. Some elements from the BUILDING domain are so frequently used as to have become clichés – indeed, the very fact of their having become clichés proves how deeply entrenched the metaphor has become in our folk theory of THEORIES. Examples are: “the theory needs more *support*”; “so far we have put together only the *framework* of the theory”; “we need to *buttress* the theory with *solid* arguments.” But the fact that we have the THEORIES ARE BUILDING metaphor integrated in our conceptualization of the world, also allows us, Lakoff and Johnson point out, to interpret novel extensions of this metaphor, such as “his theory has *thousands of little rooms and long, winding corridors*” and “he prefers massive Gothic theories covered with gargoyles” (1980: 52)

(5) An interesting phenomenon, and in fact a source of creativity, is that a well-

chosen metaphor results in the highlighting of features that are not salient in either the target or the source domain. Gineste, Indurkha, and Scart (2000) showed that participants in the experiment, when confronted with, for example, “her gaze, a flash of diamond” (exemplifying the metaphor GAZE IS DIAMOND’S REFLECTION) suggested mapped features that each of the two terms separately did *not* elicit. When, in this example, the target was presented in isolation, it evoked such features as “view” and “deep”; when the source was presented in isolation, it evoked such features as “wealth” and “brilliant”; but when the target and source were metaphorically coupled, the resulting metaphor yielded new features, such as “seduction” and “sharp.” Metaphors thus can elicit what Gineste et al. call "emergent properties." Even more exciting is that if the target domain has little or no structure, a metaphorical coupling of this target with a richly-structured source domain can even import or impose structure on the target (Indurkha 1991; see also Gick and Holyoak, 1980, Schön 1979).

Black’s (1979) “Stars of David”

Black elucidated his view of verbal metaphor (with hints toward cognitive metaphor) by some brilliantly simple observations on visual representations of the "Star of David." Have a look at the “neutral” version in [figure 1](#).




Fig. 1

One can think of this star as a single, monolithic “gestalt,” but it is also possible to “see” the star in different ways. Probably the alternative conceptualization coming to mind most easily is that of two superimposed triangles ([figure 1a](#)). Try to think of yet other conceptualizations. (Here are some examples, but the series is by no means exhaustive: [figure 1b](#), [figure 1c](#), [figure 1d](#), [figure 1e](#), after Black 1979: 32-34). The surface structure is the same in each case but the way we “see” the star is influenced by how we conceive it. Black’s illustration of “seeing-as” (e.g. seeing a star as two superimposed triangles) is particularly appropriate for present purposes, since it nicely demonstrates that perception (like reading) is concept-driven. Ana-logical to the different perceptions-cum-conceptualizations

of the star, Black argued, a target domain "changes" in various ways depending on the source domain with which it is metaphorically coupled.




Fig. 1a




Fig. 1b



Fig. 1c




Fig. 1d




Fig. 1e

Denotations and connotations of depicted objects

A concept or object can be represented via a word, but in many cases also via a picture. Think of the concept SWORD. Now let us inventory some of the meanings that attach to it; that is, let us build up its semantic-pragmatic domain. A SWORD is a potentially lethal stabbing weapon associated with pre-modern times, in Western Europe primarily with medieval knights. Because of this, it has “noble” connotations. It has a certain (cruciformal) form, weight, and texture; it is worn on the body, in some sort of sheath; it is used in man-to-man combat. The connotations do not stop here: in some situations it is an indispensable element in a ceremonial outfit; in a Freudian context, it has phallic overtones, etc.

In principle all these connotations could be evoked not only by the word “sword” but also by the picture of a sword – although the connotations will probably not be exactly the same for any two people. However, a picture cannot but depict a *specific* sword, and that specific sword, even if it is decontextualized, does not only share connotations with other decontextualized swords but also has connotations differing from them.

Look at [figure 2a](#). This, I propose, comes very close to what, in the Western world (but not necessarily elsewhere), is considered a prototypical sword. Note that there is only a minimal context in the form of an unspecified dark blue background, but already this minimal context begins to bestow, or strengthen some latent connotations on the sword – of value, of grandeur, of visual pleasure, perhaps of something museum-collection-ish. (Notice that street-wise fleamarket vendors often display their wares in a similar fashion for precisely this reason!) Compare this to [figure 2b](#). Again, this looks like a rather prototypical sword. But the very fact that this is not a photograph but a drawn picture of a sword means that the connotations that, I proposed, cling to the sword in 2a do not adhere to the sword in 2b. A more prominent connotation here is arguably that it is an item in a list or catalogue.




Fig 2a



Fig 2b

Certainly any aesthetic qualities a sword may have are downplayed here. But in comparison with the sword in 2a, the sword in 2b also looks less lethal, probably because in 2a the metal, enhanced by the reflection, evokes this quality more strongly than the sketched sword in 2b. While we should be careful not to attribute the presence or absence of these connotations to the difference between a photograph or a picture *per se*, the difference in medium affects us in a manner that should alert us to its potential effect on the activation of connotations – or its failure to do so.

The next representation of a sword, [figure 2c](#), is similar to that in 2a in being once more a photographic representation, but different in the sense that it is a different kind of sword. Indeed, such a curved sword is usually called a sabre. Although it is as beautiful and lethal as the sword in 2a, it has a more oriental look. Moreover, while we expect the sword in 2a in Crusaders' hands, we tend to associate this sword more strongly with pirates. While these latter connotations are by and large conveyed by the sabre in [figure 2d](#), too, the connotation “lethality” is here reduced because we recognize that this is a child’s toy, made of foam rather than metal. So “childishness,” “cuteness,” as well as “colourfulness” are among the potential associations activated here.



Fig. 2c




Fig. 2d

Finally, take a look at [figure 2e](#). Here we see two objects that only *Star Wars* watchers recognize as swords, namely laser swords. One of them is green, and the *aficionados* know that it must be the sword of one of the heroes, Luke Skywalker. Hence connotations here comprise, thanks to the metonymic link,



Fig. 2e

Luke himself, but by extension the whole *Star War* universe. Moreover, the representation of the swords is neither a photograph nor a plain drawing: it is a computer-generated image. This mode of representation itself potentially adduces connotations to the represented swords – for instance of artificiality or futuristicness.

Here is another example: a series of visual representations of FEATHERS. While feathers prototypically connote birds (that is what they metonymically refer to) and softness, individual feathers may elicit specific associations. The feather in [figure 3a](#) strikes the viewer as very ordinary – but note that “ordinariness” is in itself a potential connotation. In addition, it is a drawn feather and, more than the other feathers, it can be said to connote writing, since it seems to be the kind of feather one could sharpen and dip in ink. [Figure 3b](#) shows a feather that is less straight, and connotes fluffiness and possibly whiteness; most certainly the “writing” dimension here is non-existent.



Fig. 3a



Fig. 3b

The most eye-catching characteristics of the feathers in [figure 3c](#) is that they are coloured. Possibly “artificiality” is a connotation that adheres to it for many people. The feather in [figure 3d](#), finally, is familiar to most viewers as belonging to a peacock. Conventionally, the feature “beauty” is attributed to (male) peacocks’ feathers. Note, however that although it is far less salient, the feature of “incompleteness” can also be detected in this representation. In a specific context this feature can be made relevant and hence salient.



Fig. 3c



Fig. 3d

A first approximation of “pictorial metaphor”

In the previous section I have briefly discussed two concepts, sword and feather, and some pictorial manifestations of each of them. While the denotation in the various sword-pictures and feather-pictures remains fairly stable (the denotation being the meaning that dictionaries give, say, “a weapon with a long blade, and a handle at one end” and “one of the very light things that form the covering on a bird’s body; a feather consists of lots of sort or smooth hairs on each side of a thin stiff centre,” respectively – both from the *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary*, 1987), the connotations, as we have seen above, to some extent vary from one representation to another. Since it is often connotations rather than denotations that are mapped from a source to a target domain in a metaphor, it can matter a lot what representation of a sword or feather one chooses as source domain in a pictorial or multimodal metaphor. Thus “ornateness” and “lethality” are strong connotations of the sword in [figure 2a](#), but not of the one in [figure 2d](#); while “beauty” conventionally attaches to the feather in [figure 3d](#), it is not a connotation of the one in [figure 3a](#).

Now with five swords and four feathers we could start making metaphors although, because of the absence of a context, they would necessarily be highly unnatural, artificial ones. Even without a context, it is to be noted, there is a similarity between swords and feathers that serves as basis for a metaphor – we have seen, after all, that metaphorical *tension* between target and source can arise only thanks to some degree of similarity between the two. The similarity here is the more or less elongated form of both swords and feathers.

Let us say we put the sword in [figure 2a](#) in the “target” slot, and the feather in [figure 3b](#) in the “source” slot so as to construe the metaphor SWORD 2A IS FEATHER 3B. The fluffiness of feather 3b being a salient feature, the metaphor could be interpreted to mean something like “the sword is ineffective/blunt/cute ... as a feather.” If we were to construe the metaphor SWORD 2A IS FEATHER 3D, by contrast, the interpretation would more likely be “the sword is beautiful (in the manner that a peacock’s feather is beautiful).”

We can also construe a metaphor with a feather in target position and a sword in source position. We could reverse the metaphor discussed above into FEATHER 3D IS SWORD 2A. Now the “lethality” is mapped onto the (beautiful) feather, for instance if the feather-as-sword appeared on the hat of a lady wearing the hat to intimidate her rivals at a party – where of course the notion of literal “lethality” has to be somewhat adapted for the target domain, since the feather is not literally but figuratively meant to “kill” (think of the expression “dressed to kill”). In the case of FEATHER 3D IS SWORD 2D, on the other hand, the childishness, playfulness or perhaps ridiculousness is mapped from source to target.

Of course what we have been doing in the two preceding paragraphs is like practicing swimming movements out of the water. We will not get a sense of

the real thing until we perform the movements in the proper context. We will very seldom come across the kind of decontextualized examples discussed above in “real life” (an exception may be scientific test environments: e.g., Kogan et al. [1980] used pairs of pictures to test children’s abilities to see literal and metaphorical resemblance). As a consequence, while examples such as the above are interesting in situations where creativity is an issue – such as in games of the kind “try to think of a context in which the metaphor X IS Y makes sense” – in real-life situations metaphorical source domains occur in a specific, given context, and the metaphors are chosen by their makers to serve a specific goal arising in this context (Forceville 1995).

As discussed with reference to Gineste et al (2000) above, there is no “natural” way in which features from both domains are to be matched. Which features can be matched will depend on the context in which the metaphor occurs. Thus, the feature “ridiculousness” of the sword in [figure 2d](#) may remain latent until the sword is used in a FEATHER 3D IS SWORD 2D metaphor in a context where a lady has a hat with a feather which instead of intimidating her rivals at the party appears rather as ridiculous to them. This example also shows that, depending on the source domain (the sword in [figure 2a](#) or the sword in [figure 2d](#)) with which a given target domain (the feather in [figure 3d](#)) is metaphorically coupled, different features in that target domain are activated – and hence a different perception-cum-cognition of the target domain arises. Conversely, the same source domain (e.g., the sword in figure 2d) can activate different features in different target domains: for instance “cuteness” in the feather of figure 3b and “ridiculousness” in the feather of figure 3d. The point is that different combinations will lead to different “emergent properties” – and here lies an important clue to describing creativity.

Summary

Metaphors, in whatever medium, consist of two elements, a target (the topic or subject of the metaphor) and a source (the concept that is used to predicate something about the target). Both the target and the source are part of, in principle, infinitely expanding networks of (true or untrue) facts, connoted meanings, metonymic extensions, attitudes, emotions, etc. For this reason, it is common usage to talk about target and source domains. In each metaphor at least one, but often more than one, feature from the source domain is mapped onto a corresponding feature in the target domain. In structural metaphors such as TIME IS MONEY (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 7-9) the relationship has become conventionalized, and the metaphorical nature of the coupling is often no longer realized. In more creative metaphors, the metaphorical coupling of domains

(temporarily) transforms the perspective on the target domain. We are invited (or forced) to see, and think of, a target A in terms of a source B. Construing a metaphor requires, firstly, identifying the two pertinent domains involved and, secondly, their slotting as target and source domain, respectively. Thirdly, interpretation of the metaphor entails the identification of one or more features in the source domain that can be mapped onto the target domain. Since metaphors are deliberately conceived as parts of goal-directed (argumentative, persuasive, instructional) representations, the identification of relevant mappable features is usually guided by the local context in which the metaphor occurs as well as by the genre of the representation and, more broadly, the intentions of the author. However, if mappable features are not explicitly mentioned, various factors can influence their selection by members of the audience, such as an individual's personal knowledge of and attitudes towards a source domain. Moreover, source domains may have very different salient connotations from one (sub)culture to another. This means both that different individuals may interpret the same metaphor slightly or vastly differently, and that metaphors can be understood slightly or vastly differently from how they were intended by their makers. Metaphors are central instruments in cognition, and do not only manifest themselves in language but also in pictures and sounds. What constitutes a metaphor, however, is partly affected by the medium in which it occurs. In the case of metaphors involving one or two domains that are pictorially represented, such (a) domain(s) is/are inevitably rendered in highly concrete ways, involving specific forms, textures, and colours, all of which may play a role in the mapping. In addition, the manner of representation and the material used (see Kress & Van Leeuwen 1996: chapter 7; Forceville 1999 is a critical discussion of this important book) to render it may influence the construal of the metaphor as well as its interpretation.

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A Course in Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor

Charles Forceville

Lecture 2. When is something a pictorial metaphor?

Introduction

In lecture 1 we have seen how, basically, a metaphor works. It was shown how, mainly due to its connotations, a visually represented object can be used as the source domain of a pictorial metaphor. In lecture 2 we will have a closer look at what forms a pictorial metaphor can take. While the idea that a pictorial metaphor is typically a hybrid or combination of two heterogeneous visual entities is tempting, we will see that this by no means exhausts the possibilities. Not every visual hybrid is a metaphor; just as a pictorial metaphor need not manifest itself as a visual hybrid. A second aspect of pictorial metaphor that will be considered in this lecture is that the construal of a pictorial metaphor is not only invited or forced by text-internal cues; certain extra-textual information plays a role here as well. The discussion in this lecture will pertain exclusively to static, non-moving images; metaphors in films will be amply discussed in lectures 4 and 5.

Formal manifestations of pictorial metaphors

In Forceville (1996), four types of pictorial metaphors were distinguished. More recently (Forceville 2002a), I adapted not only the names of the four categories, but also proposed that the fourth type, verbo-pictorial metaphor, strictly speaking no longer belonged exclusively within the realm of the visual, and is better regarded as a subtype of a superordinate category, to be labeled “multimodal metaphor.” I will return at length to multimodal metaphor in later lectures; here I will focus on the other three types, and in addition propose a new subcategory of pictorial metaphor, the integrated metaphor.

The first three categories are “contextual” metaphor (old term: “MP1”); “hybrid metaphor” (“MP2”); and “simile” (already so named). These types can be characterized as follows:

Hybrid type of pictorial metaphor: A phenomenon that is experienced as a unified object or gestalt consists of two different parts that are usually considered as belonging to different domains, and not as parts of a single whole. The interpretation of this hybrid depends on understanding one of the two parts in terms of the other. An example is COMPUTER COMPONENTS ARE NOTES IN A

MUSICAL COMPOSITION [Figure 2.1] The musical score depicted has sets of notes, connected by strokes, consisting of miniature elements of linked PC equipment.




Fig. 2.1

Given that the advertiser is Intel (and that the advertisement occurs in the magazine *PC Magazine*) the target of the metaphor is the computer components. The source is the notes, whose strokes are depicted. The heading, "make it all come together, Maestro," addresses the would-be user of the system as the conductor of an orchestra (for more discussion, and other examples of metaphors in computer ads, see Forceville 1999).

Contextual type of pictorial metaphor: A phenomenon that is experienced as a unified object or gestalt is understood as being something else due to the visual context in which it is depicted. An example is LUCKY STRIKE IS BAR OF SOAP. [Figure 2.2] The product advertised, Lucky Strike cigarettes, is the metaphor's target. It is a unified "gestalt," easily detachable from its surroundings. The source domain, a bar of soap, is not depicted but forcefully suggested by the pictorial context – the soap dish, the drops on the packet, the bathroom tiles, the naked leg below the soap dish. Possible mappings include the need to have the bar/cigarettes within easy reach and "something you want when you are taking a bath."



Fig 2.2

Pictorial simile: A phenomenon that is experienced as a unified object is juxtaposed with a unified object belonging to a different category in such a manner that the first is understood in terms of the second. An example is DOMMELSCH BEER IS (LIKE) LEANING TOWER OF PISA [Figure 2.3] Dommelsch beer is the target; the Leaning Tower of Pisa juxtaposed to it is the source. The feature mapped from source to target is something like “reason for national pride.”



Fig. 2.3

Integrated metaphor: A phenomenon that is experienced as a unified object or gestalt is represented in its entirety in such a manner that it resembles another object or gestalt even without contextual cues. An example is SENSEO COFFEE MACHINE IS SERVANT (example thanks to Paul Hekkert) [Figure 2.4] Due to its bent form and cup-bearing plateau, the Senseo coffee machine (made by Philips) is strongly reminiscent of a servant, or a waiter, or even a butler (see Forceville, Hekkert & Tan, forthcoming, for more discussion of this example).



Fig. 2.4

As with many categorizations, there are cases where it is difficult to decide which type a pictorial metaphor exemplifies, but prototypical specimens of the four categories distinguished are robustly different (for an explanation of “prototype theory,” see Lakoff 1987, particularly Chapter 6). Let me briefly dwell on these differences.

The hybrid and integrated types both consist of single gestalts, but they differ in that the hybrid consists of an “impossible” gestalt. Noel Carroll calls this “noncompossible homospatiality” (see Carroll 1996: 213 *et passim*), by which he means that the two phenomena simultaneously occupy the same space in a manner

which, given physical laws, is impossible. (Incidentally, Carroll considers this hybrid type the quintessential variant of pictorial metaphor – which he calls “visual metaphor.” My disagreement with privileging this type should be apparent from this Lecture, but is recorded in more detail in Forceville 2002b.) In a hybrid metaphor, then, one term (the target) *is simultaneously* another thing (the source). The integrated metaphor, by contrast, has a target that is represented in a physically possible way, such that it *resembles* another thing (the source).

The contextual metaphor represents one term, usually the target, in its entirety. It differs from the simile as follows: the contextual metaphor triggers identification of the metaphorical source by depicting the target in a visual context which strongly, or even necessarily, *evokes* the source. The simile, by contrast, *depicts* the source itself. (Note that Kaplan (1992) also distinguishes pictorial similes as a separate category, although in other respects his subdivision in types diverges from the one proposed here.) Scheme 2.1 lists the four types.

STATUS OF TARGET AND SOURCE	NAME
Target & source homospatial + compossible	□integrated metaphor
Target & source homospatial + noncompossible	□hybrid metaphor
Target & source non-homospatial, both depicted	□pictorial simile
Target & source non-homospatial, source suggested	□contextual metaphor

Scheme 2.1 Typology of pictorial metaphors

Non-metaphorical hybrids

The fact that two phenomena are depicted in any of the four ways outlined above does not in itself, however, guarantee that we must identify a metaphor. What else is necessary before we feel inclined or forced to do so? One good reason to try and construe two phenomena in a picture as a metaphor is that when taken at face value (in language we would say: “when taken literally”), their merging constitutes an anomaly. Such an anomaly is most noticeable in the case of a hybrid, that is, a physical merger of two different “things.” But hybrids do not *necessarily* allow for construal of one thing in terms of another; they may be a mere mixture of two things. An amphibian car is simultaneously a car and a boat, but it is not, arguably, a car *as* a boat, or a boat *as* a car: it is simply a multifunctional vehicle. Similarly, the proverbial Swiss pocketknife is a hybrid of many things.

Thus, not every visual hybrid is, or can be construed as, a pictorial metaphor. Here are some examples of non-metaphorical hybrids. As an example, let us consider a 1985 release of the French agricultural ministry warning against forest fires [Figure 2.5]. The depicted hybrid is a tree at one end, and a matchstick at the other. Clearly, the fact that both consists of wood, and that the

one causes the destruction of the other, is what metonymically links the two, but neither a metaphor TREE IS MATCHSTICK, nor MATCHSTICK IS TREE is in order.



Fig. 2.5

Intentionality and genre

While an apparent anomaly in the identity-relation between two heterogeneous things often is a signal that a metaphor must be construed, this anomaly is usually balanced by some sort of similarity between the two things, as the examples in 2.1—2.4 indicate. I will come back to the concept of similarity at greater length in Lecture 3. For the time being, it must be emphasized that the combined anomaly- cum-similarity are themselves manifestations of something far more important: the intentions of the producer of the representation in which the would-be metaphor occurs.

Formal identity or resemblance between two heterogeneous phenomena in a representation usually mean little if we do not believe that we are meant to notice them. That is, mostly we construe a pictorial metaphor (indeed, any type of metaphor) *if and because we think that the producer of the representation intends us to do so*. In this respect, pictorial metaphors are no different from any other type of visual communication – indeed from any other type of communication *tout court*. Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (see Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson and Sperber 2004) depends on the idea that any act of communication comes with the presumption of optimal relevance to the envisaged addressee (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 156 *et passim*). Similarly, Gibbs maintains that “many aspects of how we understand spoken language, interpret written texts, and make sense of artworks, is to a significant extent influenced by the search for communicative intentions” (1999: 4). In short, viewers of a picture, familiar with its origin and provenance, confronted with a hybrid or a salient similarity between two phenomena X and Y, will ask themselves whether the producer of the image has *meant* them to construe a metaphor.

The qualification “familiar with [the picture’s] origin and provenance” is an important one. In order for viewers to construe a metaphor in a picture, they must know something about who made it, and why. Since most pictures in contemporary Western society are made for mass— rather than individual consumption (children’s drawings made for dad or auntie Emily are the exception rather than the rule), addressees’ estimates of the origins of a picture are made predominantly on the basis of genre attributions, not on the basis of individual authorship. We recognize a picture as an advertisement, an art poster, a book illustration, an illustration in a manual, an artistic drawing, etc. Usually the provenance of the picture comes with the context in which we encounter it: a magazine, a public announcement, a children’s book, the manual, a museum. On the basis of the genre attribution, we have certain expectations about what kind of messages about what kind of things we are likely to encounter, and these help steer and constrain interpretations (Goffman 1974), including anything that might be a metaphor.

One important exception to the transparency of metaphors is the realm of artistic communication. While here, too, the majority of metaphors has been envisaged and explicitly cued by their producers, it is possible that an individual art appreciator (or a group of them) discerns a metaphor where none may have been (consciously) intended by the artist. Artistic representations, according to Siegfried Schmidt (e.g., Schmidt 1991) are governed by the “aesthetic convention” rather than by the “fact convention”: we read, watch, hear art not primarily to be informed about facts in the world (as for instance when we watch the news, read journalistic reports on the front page, skim through a manual) but to experience textual echoes and layers of meaning that move and delight us intrinsically, without being necessarily true of states in the world. Corresponding to the aesthetic convention Schmidt postulates the existence of the polyvalence convention (contrasting with the monovalence convention), which exhorts the art appreciator to look for, and celebrate plural interpretations and ambiguities of a text. A dimension of this search for rich aesthetic meanings, I propose, is an open eye (or other organ of perception) for phenomena that *can* be construed as metaphors. As with many elements in artistic representations, if an art appreciator construes a metaphor in such a way that it can be made to fit other elements of the work’s perceived meaning, there is no reason to discard such a metaphor – even if it could somehow be proven that the artist herself did not intend this metaphoric construal.

Summary

A pictorial metaphor in a static representation can take different forms, giving rise to at least the following subcategories: *hybrid metaphor*, *contextual metaphor*, *simile*, and *integrated metaphor*. Cues that two phenomena in a picture are to be construed as the target and source of a metaphor usually involve an awareness of both their incongruity and their similarity. Since in pictures there is no equivalent to the verbal “is” or “is like,” it may be a matter for debate whether

a picture features a metaphor. Sometimes such a conclusion is virtually inescapable; sometimes only some viewers will “see” a metaphor. For this reason, it makes sense to say that a picture strongly or weakly invites a viewer to *construe* a metaphor, rather than to say that a picture *contains* a metaphor. An analysis and interpretation of a metaphor cannot be undertaken without an awareness of the intentions of its producer. Anticipating a more detailed discussion in later lectures: The metaphor’s producer may choose to present salient cues for the similarity, more or less forcing the audience to perceive it and hence construe the metaphor, or alternatively give subtle hints, giving the audience more freedom to construe it. The importance of such intentions, in turn, is to a considerable extent governed by the genre to which the representation exemplifying the metaphor belongs.

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Lecture 3. From pictorial to multimodal metaphor

In this lecture, we will ponder some of the opportunities and limitations of the four pictorial metaphor subtypes distinguished in Lecture 2: contextual metaphor; hybrid metaphor, simile, and integrated metaphor. Moreover, in order to anticipate the analyses of multimodal metaphor in Lecture 4, the concept of multimodality in general and of multimodal metaphor specifically will be discussed.

Reflections on the various types of pictorial metaphor

Contextual metaphor. Of the four types, metaphors of the contextual variety come closest to the idea of a collage. A certain visually represented thing is placed in an unexpected visual context, namely in a context which strongly cues something else instead. Typically, the representation results in a metaphorical statement about the first thing in terms of the latter. Thus the visually *represented* thing is the target of the metaphor and the visually *suggested* thing its source. It is the visual context that allows the spectator to infer the identity of the source. That it is the target of the metaphor that is visually represented and the source that is suggested rather than vice versa makes good sense in the case of advertising metaphors. Usually, when an advertisement deploys a pictorial metaphor, the target is (metonymically related to) the product promoted, and advertisers obviously want to show this product. The one attested example I have come across of a contextual metaphor in which it is the source, not the target, that is represented is an ad for Dunlop tyres ([figure 3.1](#)), with the metaphor TYRES ARE LIFEBUOYS (discussed in Forceville 1996: 122). The advertisement is rather daring for precisely this reason: the advertiser has chosen to dispense with depicting the product. The reason why he has done so, I speculate, is that from a visual point of view, tyres are not very spectacular products, and there is no huge difference between the visual appearance of Dunlop tyres and those of other brands. The decision not to represent the Dunlop tyres visually therefore hardly results in a loss of pertinent product qualities.

It is to be emphasized that the use of a contextual metaphor requires that the advertisement promotes a commodity that is literally, or metonymically, depictable. Here are two more examples. [Figure 3.2](#) is a Dutch ad for Chiquita bananas. The visual context not only personifies the banana (via the gondola and the position of the pole vis-à-vis the banana) but also shows the banana-gondolier in an exotic context (the palm tree and the incredibly blue water). To be sure, while target (BANANA) and source (GONDOLIER) are identifiable from the visual context alone, the mapped feature might still be rather puzzling. The verbal heading, which can be translated as “you recognize a Chiquita banana because of her natural beauty,” makes clear that it is not just “exoticness” that is

being projected, but presumably also “natural beauty” (and also verbally reinforces the personification via “her”). In [figure 3.3](#) the position of the Siemens mobile phone and the chain on the woman’s neck suffice to cue the contextual metaphor *SIEMENS MOBILE PHONE IS NECKLACE*. Connotations that can be mapped from the source include “is beautiful,” “is dear to its owner,” and “reflects personal taste.”

Clearly, if an advertiser wants to promote a service or idea, and there is not a depictable object that is uniquely or strongly associated with this service or idea, it is impossible to make use of a purely contextual metaphor.

Hybrid metaphor. A hybrid is by definition an “impossible” entity in the world within which it occurs. In fantasy worlds such as those of Aesop, de la Fontaine, and Disney, we most of the time don’t understand mice, foxes, rabbits, ducks etc. as people, even though the characters in it are clear mixtures of animals and humans. Such worlds are populated so ubiquitously by these hybrids that we accept them, by virtue of Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief,” as “literal” creatures in their own right. We have to make an effort to remind ourselves that underlying these hybrids, as in all fables, is the metaphor *ANIMALS ARE PEOPLE*. We simply forget that this is a metaphor, because within the fable world it is a “metaphor we live by” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

It is partly generic context that determines whether man- animal hybrids are understood metaphorically. Outside of a fable context, we are more likely to construe metaphors. Think of Max Ernst’s disturbing collages with human-animal compositions in *Une Semaine de Bonté* (1934, discussed in Forceville 1988). Here we see creatures that are part-human, part-animal, which in Carroll’s (1994, 1996) terminology are “noncompossible homospatial” ([figure 3.4](#), [figure 3.5](#), [figure 3.6](#)). The fact that the visual context of these creatures cues both animal and human elements makes it impossible to tip the balance in favour of the dominance of either, and this undoubtedly contributes strongly to their disquieting nature.

We can contrast these Ernst collages with, for instance, the pictures by Grandville (e.g. [figure 3.7](#); for more examples, see <http://www.la-fontaine-ch-thierry.net/fables.htm>). Not only is there consistency in the depiction of the animals-as-humans, the metaphors are moreover of the contextual and integrated rather than the hybrid kind: the animals are dressed like humans, and assume human postures, but they have not been physically merged with humans. We can mentally strip off their clothes, and imagine them resuming their “animal” postures – something that is impossible with the physical hybrids in Ernst’s work.

Looking briefly ahead to metaphors in moving images, we can see similar things in horror and science fiction movies. It is telling, for instance, that if we construe metaphors in *Batman Returns* (Tim Burton, USA 1992), the good guy Batman (Michael Keaton) and the naughty but basically sympathetic Catwoman (Michelle Pfeiffer) exemplify contextual metaphors (they can don their “bat” and “cat” dresses and masks, but also remove them; in fact they both live double lives), while the bad guy Danny the Vito character is a hybrid between a human and a penguin: he cannot get rid of his beak-like nose and his flippery hands (figure 3.8; I owe the example to Michael Minneboo.)

Given that a hybrid is an “impossible” entity, one would expect this type of metaphor to be not very popular with advertisers inasmuch as these supposedly are averse to promoting a product (which is, as we have seen, usually the metaphor’s target in ads) as if it were physically merged with something alien to it. After all, it might seem that the product is mutilated or damaged in some way. Let us look back with the wisdom of hindsight at the five metaphors identified as hybrids (or, as I called them earlier, MP2s) in Forceville (1996) and the six in Forceville (2000). In the book I was not yet aware of this aspect of hybrids, and in the *Hermes* article I had restricted myself to a specific corpus, so they were not selected with specific considerations in mind – even though no representativeness can of course be claimed for these examples.

Let us first consider the examples in the book. One of them (figure 6.11, Forceville 1996: 128) is a Dutch Government ad showing the earth as a burning candle, warning against abuse of energy (“we extract energy from the earth as if it is inexhaustible”). The second one, for Philips (figure 6.12), shows the competitor’s earphones-as-heavy-bricks. The third one, for Air France (figure 6.13), displays an Air France airline ticket as an Indian headdress (“exoticness” being the pertinent feature here) – but the headdress is recognizable as such because parts have been *added* to the (depiction of the) folded ticket. The fourth one, for the morning paper *De Volkskrant* features a bunch of keys, one of which ends in a nib instead of a bit (figure 6.14). The nib symbolizes rather than represents the product here – and moreover a nib is detachable from a pen. The fifth one, for the London Underground (figure 6.16), again vilifies its competitor, the car, by hybridizing a parking meter and a skeleton.

The six hybrid computer metaphors identified in the *Hermes* article are the following:

- (1) A cartoon computer is personified by stretching a human arm and having a thought bubble (figure 3.9; Forceville 2000: 35, ad no. 3). But here it is not the computer that is advertised, but a backup system (in the bottom half, incidentally, there is a contextual metaphor that could be verbalized as CD-ROM IS PANCAKE).
- (2) The portability of a printer is suggested by equipping it with a handle and

by the heading “Any more portable and it would carry itself” (figure 3.10, detail: Forceville 2000: 38, ad no. 7), resulting in the metaphor

BRIEFCASE. The handle is *added* to the printer, which is thus not in any way deformed.

- (3) The notes in a musical score turn out to have heads made of tiny computer equipment items (figure 3.11; Forceville 2000: 38, ad no. 8) – already mentioned in Lecture 2. As in (1), however, it is a *system* that is advertised (“Intel LANdesk product family. Helping you take control of mixed environments”), not equipment itself.
- (4) Whatever is supposed to be the meaning of the DISK IS SAWBLADE metaphor in figure 3.12 (Forceville 2000: 40, ad no. 10), the target of the metaphor does not refer to the product promoted – a notebook computer.
- (5) The PC card drive advertised in figure 3.13 (Forceville 2000: 42, ad no 15) is made (?) to resemble the metal part of a seatbelt, while its surface looks a bit like car upholstery. If the card drive is manipulated at all, this is invisible to a layman like me. In fact, the categorization of this card drive as primarily hybrid seems in retrospect questionable: surely it is the visual and textual context, as well as the name of the product (“Clik!”) that help cue the source as much or more than any hybridization.
- (6) The metaphor VIRTUAL HELPDESK IS GROUP OF PEOPLE (figure 3.14; Forceville 2000: 47, ad no 26), if experienced as metaphor in the first place, again proffers a source domain for an abstract service (“virtual helpdesk”) rather than for a concrete, tangible product.

In short, a reconsideration of the 11 specimens suggests that hybrid metaphors in ads are used only when (a) the product advertised is not the target of the metaphor;

(b) the product advertised is a service or abstract idea, rather than a tangible commodity; (c) or the manipulation of the product-as-target is (almost) invisible. In the last case, the qualification “hybrid” becomes questionable.

Simile. Similes in language explicitly announce their metaphorical nature via various linguistic cues, “is like” and “as” being typical examples. In this respect they are more explicit than metaphors, with their bare “is.” The pictorial subtype I baptized “simile” (Forceville 1996: 136-45), by contrast, invites the metaphor’s “seeing-A-as-B” in a way that is *less* explicit than those of the contextual, and even more the hybrid variety of metaphor. Hybrids infringe the physical integrity of at least one of the two terms involved, and contextual metaphors require a careful, usually highly artificial construction of separate elements in a single *gestalt*. By contrast, unobtrusively juxtaposing two “similar” entities in their entirety in a background can be done in a quasi-naturalistic manner. Consider figure 3.15, a car advertisement for the then new Renault model. The juxtaposition of car and horse, located next to one another and going in the same direction, suggests the construal of

the simile CAR IS LIKE HORSE or, more specifically, RENAULT DRIVING IS LIKE HORSE-RIDING – an invitation that is enhanced by the

heading, which can be translated as “a typical feeling of wind-in-your-hair.” While the scene has clearly been staged for the purpose of promoting the car, the scene looks “natural” enough to be believable in real life. Hence, the juxtaposition *invites* rather than *forces* us to construe a simile. But of course the producer of a metaphor may have reason to signal the simile very emphatically. In [figure 3.16](#) (from the same series as [fig. 6.18](#), Forceville 1996: 139), the metaphorical comparison is inescapable because nothing in the background detracts from the visual similarity (flatness, position) between watch and fish. Another way of saying the same thing is that the similarity is not “naturalized,” as it was in [figure 3.15](#)). (See also [figure 2.3](#) in Lecture 2, where the artifice of the metaphorical comparison is further stressed because the two objects occur in different frames.)

Integrated metaphor. This type of metaphor, not yet distinguished as such in Forceville (1996), is inspired by Thomas Van Rompay’s research. Van Rompay studies product design, and emphasizes that “products are not just ‘practical’ or ‘convenient’ objects, but also a source of pleasurable or meaningful experience” (Van Rompay 2005: 16). He claims that humans have (possibly universal) preferences for certain designs over others because of their embodied understanding of the products in question – a view he derives from Lakoff and Johnson (1980). In some cases, this leads to a product design that strongly evokes something different, that is, the design constitutes a metaphor. We already saw an example of such a product in Lecture 2 (the coffee machine-as-butler). Here is another example: the lamp on my desk at home ([figure 3.17](#)). One is invited to see or experience this lamp as a bird. This experience is enhanced by the fact that the lamp can pivot both where the main frame is connected to the two thin supports at the bottom (the “legs”) and at the top (the “head”), that is, the “bird” can bend forward, and it can move its head.

The integrated metaphor-type is characterized by the fact that target and source are perceived in a single gestalt, as in the hybrid type, but without the “noncompossible” conflation typical of the latter. The target has been designed or manipulated in a way that strongly evokes in perceivers (or: in some perceivers) the experience of something else, but there is no sense of the target’s identity having been violated. Architecture also yields examples of integrated metaphors. Gerry Cupchik discusses Paul Hekkert’s commentary on the building of the “Institute de Monde Arabe” in Paris ([figure 3.18](#)), designed by Jean Nouvel: “the overall view of the building appears as a carefully designed composition that makes a reference to carpets we know from Islamic cultures” (Cupchik 2003: 26), inviting the metaphor BUILDING IS CARPET. Another example is the hotel in Lara, Turkey: BUILDING IS CONCORDE PLANE ([figure 3.19](#)). Presumably the experience of the buildings’ metaphorical quality is “embodied” inasmuch as we are familiar with their sources (carpets, Concorde planes) from visual perception; but notice that the mappings from source to target are mostly culturally determined: it is the cultural value attached to these carpets that matters rather than, say, their texture

or colour; and it is the elements of high-technology and Frenchness that are presumably mapped.

The realms of product design and architecture provide specimens of integrated metaphor in three dimensions, but the type can also be found in two dimensions.

Materials that can be easily bent, folded, cut, stretched or otherwise moulded lend themselves well to this type of metaphor. And a “material” that can of course be endlessly reshaped is the human body itself: A person can briefly adopt a posture, or display a certain behaviour, strongly cuing a source domain.

Clearly, the four types constitute no hard-and-fast categories: a pictorial metaphor may well display features of more than one type – and in fact often do so.

Monomodality and multimodality

The metaphors discussed in Lecture 1 are verbal metaphors; those in Lecture 2, and those in the previous section, are pictorial ones. In both situations, that is, target and source of the metaphor are presented in the same mode: language and pictures, respectively. A phenomenon that is to serve as a metaphorical target or source domain can, however, be signaled in yet other modes: by music, for instance, or sound, or even by smell, touch, or taste.

In order to be able to use the concept “mode” for metaphors, it will first be necessary to characterize it more precisely. The instantiations of “mode” just given (pictures, language, music, sound, smell, touch) all pertain to the senses. A convenient strategy would therefore be to equate modes and senses, yielding the pictorial, the sonic, the olfactory, the tactile, and the gustatory mode. However, this would mean lumping together sources of information that are habitually distinguished: while we smell smells, taste tastes, and touch surfaces, we *see* both written language and pictures, while we *hear* spoken language, music, and sounds. For one thing, this means that language can be both perceived visually and aurally. I propose there is good reason to do justice to the important differences between these two manners of perception by giving the status of a different mode to “written language” and “spoken language.” After all, oral and written text rely on very different conditions of understanding. Illiterate, blind, and deaf people can easily understand one, but not the other; a medium such as radio heavily relies on spoken language – and sound, and music – but excludes pictures (if these are present it has stopped being radio). Similarly, Western society distinguishes between speech, music, and other types of sound. The circumstances under which we listen to them, and the purposes – if any – we see them as having, differ vastly. We expect typically to be entertained and aesthetically pleased by music, informed by speech, while non-verbal sound elicits other reactions: a sense of

potential danger, for instance, or irritation. Non-verbal sounds are usually made less purposely than music or speech. Machines and tools make noises as a by-effect of the tasks they are supposed to perform, while even non-verbal sounds made by humans (laughing, crying, sighing, burping, farting, coughing, swallowing, wheezing ...) tend to be coincidental rather than strived-for effects.

For present purposes I therefore propose to distinguish between the following modes: spoken language; written language; pictures; music, non-verbal sound; smell; taste; and touch. Since the representations under discussion in this Course are mainly of the two-dimensional, mass-medial type, smell, taste and touch will not play a role here, but there is nothing that would argue against their use in metaphors as such: whenever a percept is deliberately used by its producer to evoke specific meaning, it is a sign, and can hence be used in a metaphor.

But even the five modes adhered to here could arguably be further subdivided. The concept of “picture,” for instance, is very broad indeed, comprising static as well as moving images, photographs as well as drawings and paintings, pictograms as well as diagrams, and indeed gestures. Spoken language allows for distinctions pertaining to gender, pitch, accent, dialect, etc. To what extent it will be fruitful to subdivide the modes identified here, and bestow the status of “mode” on these subcategories as well, is an issue that cannot be resolved until a substantial number of multimodal representations have been analyzed, and hence further reflection on this topic will have to be postponed.

We can now characterize multimodality, and by extension, multimodal metaphor, by contrasting it to monomodality and monomodal metaphor. Monomodal messages are, by definition, exclusively rendered in a single mode. Most books for adults are – possibly with the exception of their covers – representations of the verbal variant of monomodality. Books for young children, which are rarely without illustrations, by the same token are multimodal, containing the modes of written text and pictures. A radio interview consisting entirely of spoken language is monomodal as well, while a song-with-lyrics played on the radio is multimodal. These examples already suggest that talking about modes cannot be separated from talking about the material carrier of the message – that is, about medium. Radio by definition cannot make use of pictures, while TV and film can (and usually do); TV cannot (yet) make use of smell or touch, and neither can film. And finally, if the creator of a message has control over the location in which it is conveyed, yet other modes can be activated. The situation in museums comes to mind: exhibits or installations may produce a smell. For instance, the walls and ceiling of Wolfgang Laib’s “Wachsraum” (1992), a space in museum De Pont (Tilburg, The Netherlands, see [figure 3.20 http://www.depont.nl/en/menu/ind-col.htm](http://www.depont.nl/en/menu/ind-col.htm)) are entirely covered by a sweet-smelling bee wax. We may also be reminded of a short-lived experiment in theatres where odours were added to film. “In 1958, ‘AromoRama’ and ‘Smell-O-Vision’ appeared, to largely negative

response” (Thompson and Bordwell 1994: 380), whereas 1970s’ experiments with “sensurround sound” come close to enabling the “touch” mode. And of course smells need not be deliberately conveyed by the representation’s makers in order to have an impact on audiences: one can imagine that watching a film noir film such as *The Maltese Falcon* (John Huston, USA 1941) in a small theatre full with cigarette smokers adds a functional, if unintended, mode to the spectators’ viewing experience.

Monomodality typically characterizes verbal texts – the medium *par excellence* via which facts and knowledge have for ages been transmitted to new generations. But we also come across it in untitled paintings and many varieties of music. Nowadays, however, numerous messages combine language and pictures, or language, pictures, and sound and/or music and are thus multimodal.

After this brief characterization of monomodality and multimodality, let us return to metaphor. When is a metaphor multimodal? My proposal is to consider a metaphor multimodal if its target and source are rendered exclusively or predominantly in two different modes. One of the most frequent varieties of multimodal metaphors is no doubt the type combining a pictorial and a written term. In Forceville (1996: 148-61) I called this type a verbo-pictorial metaphor, and considered it a subtype of pictorial metaphor. Now I would opt for the nomenclature of “multimodal metaphor of the verbo-pictorial variety.” Another variety would be the combination of a picture or a written text and a sound or musical theme (or all of them together). Notice that a consequence of the choice for the modes adopted here is that a combination of a written text and an oral speech could also result in a multimodal metaphor.

The provisional definition of multimodal metaphor presented in the previous paragraph states that the target and source occur “exclusively or predominantly in two different modes.” This qualification is necessary because often a metaphorical term (target or source) is conveyed in more than one mode simultaneously. “Predominantly” then can be formalized as follows: to the extent that the metaphor becomes unidentifiable as such if modes other than the two different modes deemed most important are (mentally) deleted, it counts as multimodal. As holds for any metaphor, a multimodal metaphor can only function if the perceived source domain (a word or phrase, an image or image sequence; a sound, a musical theme, a smell, a taste, a touched surface) (1) is recognized; and (2) evokes one or more connotations. Subsequently, these connotations are to be matched – in Blackian fashion (see Lecture 1) to elements in the target domain. Here are some examples of sonic connotations:

- (a) *a singing teakettle* (possible connotations: “tea-making”; “homeliness”; “an alert to something deserving immediate attention” ...);
- (b) *a police car siren* (possible connotations: “immanent help from armed authorities”; “immanent danger from armed authorities”; “generic

- danger”; “an alert to something deserving very urgent attention” ...);
- (c) *a key in a lock* (possible connotations: “happiness/excitement/fear because husband/wife/father returns”; “an attempt to penetrate an ordinarily inaccessible space”);
 - (d) *a dangling ring of keys* (possible connotations: “imprisonment”; “power over others”; “guarding” ...);
 - (e) *the rattling keys of a keyboard* (possible connotations: “office work”; “data transfer”: “text creation” ...);
 - (f) *rain against the window pane* (possible connotations: “melancholia”; “fertility”; “freshness” ...).

Similarly, musical themes can have many connotations: a national anthem evokes the country of which it is the national anthem, a rock song may bring to mind its title, the words of the song, the genre to which it belongs, the “freedom,” (rock and roll), “anarchy” (punk) or other value attached to the genre ... (A particular subtle and malevolent use by Michael Moore in *Fahrenheit 9/11* is a sequence about George W. Bush’s past, where a few bars of the J.J. Cale song “Cocaine” are audible – suggesting Bush used this drug during his student days. Notice that in order for Moore’s rhetorical strategy to be effective, the audience must first recognize the theme, and then realize what its title is – consciously or subconsciously.)

Smells, of course, also may activate connotations. Think of freshly mown grass; roses; shit; sweat; salty sea air; smoke, etc. Tastes and touched surfaces also trigger associations – although these are (hitherto) less amenable to being part in mass-communicative contexts.

It is important to remember that which of a range of potential connotations is pertinent will depend heavily on the discourse context, and can moreover differ among individuals in the audience.

Finally, I speculate that our fast-growing “visually literacy” makes us increasingly alert to how images are (ab)used to influence our interpretations and evaluations of the world around us, but that the meanings of sound, smell, taste, and touch are less consciously interpreted – so that these modes constitute more subtle modes of rhetorical manipulation.

In Lecture 4 we will take a closer look at a number of multimodal metaphors in advertising commercials to test the theoretical assumptions presented here in more detail. Since Lecture 4 is still under construction, readers eager to know more about the type are referred to Forceville (forthcoming).

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A Course in Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor

Charles Forceville

Lecture 4. Pictorial and multimodal metaphors in commercials

Introduction

A necessary condition (though not a sufficient one) for the construal of metaphor is some form of resemblance or similarity between two phenomena that, in the given context, belong to different categories. Given this premise, it will transpire that when the representations in which metaphors are studied are moving images rather than static ones, the opportunities for creating metaphor proliferate. Let us first consider what changes for pictorial metaphors in moving, as opposed to static, images. As in Lecture 2 and Lecture 3, the focus will be on the genre of advertising.

Pictorial metaphors in commercials

1. *Whereas in printed advertisements and billboards the target and the source of a pictorial metaphor must be visually represented or suggested simultaneously, in filmed footage this is not necessary: they can be represented one after another.* When a metaphor's target and source are not simultaneously represented or suggested, this means that such a metaphor cannot be captured in a single frame. Put differently, in such a case it would be impossible to take a screen shot in which both terms can be identified. In reality, however, the situation is often more complex, since a film or film fragment may first represent target and source one after the other, and subsequently together, so that in the later stage they *are* simultaneously visible. But even then, the awareness that a metaphor is at stake is a developing one. Since metaphor construal requires a perception of *two* disparate things and the postulation of an identity relationship between them, the need for such construal becomes clear only gradually (of course in commercials "gradually" frequently pertains to a time-span of mere seconds).

2. *Cinematography has more ways to cue the metaphorical coupling of two disparate things than photography or drawing.* Whereas both dynamic and static representation can deploy the entire *mise-en-scène* repertoire to depict resemblance (colour, texture, position, posture, facial expression, etc. For more on cinematic *mise-en-scène*, see Bordwell & Thompson 1997; chapter 6), the film camera in addition has other identity-enhancing tricks at its disposal: it can suggest

resemblance between two things by filming them with the same unusual camera or lens movement. What is unusual partly depends on context. Some

movements are relatively rare in cinematography *tout court*: a circular movement, a Z-shaped movement, a quick zoom-in. But in a film consisting almost entirely of pans (the camera swivelling along the horizontal axis), two tilts (the camera swivelling along the vertical axis), while not intrinsically extraordinary, would stand out as unusual. (This is nothing else but the notion of “foregrounding” long familiar from literary stylistics.) Any unusual movement, in both these senses, will do: As long as the unusual movement is exclusively reserved for the representation of the two things, and thereby draws attention to itself, the similarity is salient, and could therefore be the basis of a metaphor. By extension, similarity can be created by framing. Imagine there are only two extreme close-ups in an entire film. These draw attention as being similar, and could serve as target and source of a metaphor – even if they occur an hour apart in screen time.

But the *montage* of two shots, too, can be unusual. The standard transition between two shots being the “cut,” there are in fact many other possibilities, most of them seldom used in mainstream film nowadays (videoclips are more adventurous in this respect), and usually having no labels in mainstream parlance (“dissolves” and “wipes” are among the better known exceptions). An unusual shot transition used to present a shot, repeated once, makes them “similar” in a way that could be exploited metaphorically. Notice that while salient framing and shot-transitions might seem to be specifically cinematographic devices, variants of them can in principle also be used in static images. Imagine an image that consists of many smaller-sized images. If all of these smaller images were photographed in long shot (that is, from a long distance), except for two which are in extreme close-up, then the same mechanism as above applies. And if we abstract from the montage principle, stating that montage pertains generically to how separate units are “collated” or “collaged” together, then we could identify a static image counterpart. If within the said series of smaller-sized images two of them had boundaries (as in paintings’ frames) depicted in a manner different from the rest, the result would again be salient similarity.

Finally, for completeness’ sake, it is to be observed that – in cinematographic as well as in static images – similarity can be created, or enhanced, even in post-production. A colour filter – or any other technique from the toolbox of “special effects” in a software programme – can be locally applied to two phenomena to make them look similar; and thus can create the condition for metaphoric construal.

The lesson to be learned is that the list of devices that can be used to mark two things as visually similar is endless, but that moving images have more ways of establishing it than static ones. Moreover, we should never forget that similarity between two phenomena, irrespective of the manner in which it has been created, is never in itself sufficient for establishing that a metaphor needs to be construed.

Multimodal metaphors in commercials

Apart from movement, film has another device not available to static representations to create similarity; it has (in most cases) sound, which can be subdivided into spoken language, non-verbal sound, and music. Together with visuals and written language, that is, film has five channels via which information can be conveyed. These channels are here called “modes.” One way of characterizing a certain medium (here defined as a carrier and transmitter of information) is to specify via which modes it can communicate. Since film often uses all five modes simultaneously, it is a highly multimodal medium. (Radio, and old-style, pre-mobile telephone, by contrast, can deploy only the three sonic modes, lacking visuals and written language.)

The concept of *mode* is a slippery one. On the one hand, the five modes currently identified do not constitute an exhaustive list, since smell and taste can be information-carrying channels as well – though not (yet) in film. On the other hand, it may be sensible to further subdivide the visual mode to account for similarity pertaining to forms, sizes, colours, framings, etc. Moreover, there are arguably good reasons to confer mode-status to “gesturing” (David McNeill even claims “that evolution selected the ability to *combine* speech and gesture under a meaning, and that speech and gesture emerged in evolution together,” McNeill 2005: 20-21, emphasis in original; see also Mittelberg & Waugh forthcoming), but if we were to do so, should it rank under “visuals”? These are important questions, but they cannot at present be satisfactorily answered. For the genre at hand, commercials, it suffices to discuss the five modes of visuals, written language, spoken language, non-verbal sound, and music (for more discussion of “mode,” see Forceville 2006).

Whereas two phenomena represented in the same mode can resemble one another, it is generally speaking impossible to claim this for phenomena rendered in different modes. (One possible exception is synaesthesia; another one conventional correlations, such as between light colours and high musical tones. Both of these will for present purposes be left out of consideration.) The primary mechanism that becomes operative for the construal of similarity between phenomena rendered in different modes shifts from resemblance between two disparate phenomena (the central mechanism in monomodal metaphors, for instance those of the pictorial variety discussed in Lectures 2 and 3) to their co-referentiality or their simultaneous cueing. Co-referential cues involving language are deixis and names: “this woman,” Nelson Mandela, “African elephants” would normally be co-referential with pictures showing a woman, Nelson Mandela, and elephants, respectively. “Captions” accompanying visuals conventionally cue co-referentiality between the two modes.

A multimodal metaphor, then, will here be defined as a metaphor whose target and source are entirely or largely rendered in two different communication channels, or

modes. The qualification “entirely or largely” is necessary because, as we will see, a metaphorical term can be cued in more than one mode simultaneously. Let

us now consider three metaphors in commercials in light of the above considerations.

Case study 1 Commercial screened on Dutch television for Rexona deodorants [CREATE LINK]

Description: Accompanied by an upbeat tune, we see several sequences of busy street scenes, featuring not only human beings, but also buffaloes, seals, and various monkeys. The animals dominate the scenes, hindering traffic and being loudly present (particularly the monkeys). These sequences are cross-cut with a shot of a man, a flag painted on his face and spraying his armpits in front of the bathroom mirror, who transforms into a dangerous-looking gorilla. This shot clearly cues the issue of “football” – which would be foremost in people’s minds anyway, since this commercial was broadcast during the football craze of the 2006 World Championship. Other shots triggering the football domain are an orang-utan hanging triumphantly out of a taxi, a flag fluttering from the window; a journalist reporting while a super says “futbol 24” accompanied by a football logo, a crowd of ecstatic chimpanzees cheering in the background; and monkeys dancing and shouting in front of a TV screen showing football. Given that now the domain of football is firmly established, the viewer is likely to interpret other shots as related to it: when we see a herd of seals eagerly awaiting an underground train, and a number of hyenas impatient to get out of one, we take them as planning to go and see a football match (live or with friends on TV). The commercial ends with a voice-over saying “Laat het beest in je los!” (“Release the animal in you!”). This text is also presented in a super, followed by “Rexona for *men sport* offers you the right protection. ... Rexona, you can rely on it.”

Creation of pictorial similarity. The similarity between humans and animals is cued in various ways. The street scenes show animals walking and behaving like humans, the juxtaposition with real human beings reinforcing this resemblance. In the case of the man in front of the mirror, who suddenly appears to have become a gorilla, the gorilla has not only literally taken the place of the man (cf. Carroll’s 1994, 1996 “noncompossible homospatiality”; see also Lecture 2), but the resemblance is reinforced by the fact that the colours of the flag painted on the man’s face are the same as the colours on the monkey’s snout. In short, even without any sound or (spoken or written) text, most viewers will be aware that monkeys and people are equated.

Construal as metaphor. As indicated, similarity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for metaphoric processing. A further requirement is the ability to distinguish between target and source, and to find at least one feature that is mappable from source to target. Clearly, the fact that this piece of film belongs to the genre of “commercials,” and that the commercial is one for Rexona (which is largely made

clear via text) considerably helps viewers in their awareness that here humans are presented in terms of animals rather than the other way round,

suggesting HUMANS ARE ANIMALS. The feature that is presumably to be mapped, “instinctiveness” or “naturalness,” will for many people be reinforced, not created, by the line “release the animal in you!” After all, the commercial plays with clichés such as that watching football releases primordial, usually pent-up (at least in Northern Europe) emotions, or even instincts. It is this cliché that for most people will refine the metaphor to MEN ARE ANIMALS even before the textual reference to males (“men sport”), since the male before the mirror could otherwise have been interpreted as representative of generically “human.”

Pictorial or Multimodal Metaphor? Given that both target and source of the metaphor are presented primarily by visual means, we could call this a pictorial metaphor. Presumably, a manipulated version of this commercial that leaves out all sound and all spoken and written text would for most viewers still suffice to conclude that humans and animals are equated – and moreover that humans (rather than animals) are the target of something that is to be construed as a metaphor, so that we could call this a monomodal metaphor of the pictorial variety (Forceville 2006). But the fact that the human viewer is addressed, via an imperative, at the end of the commercial (“Release the animal in you!”) means that the target domain is also cued verbally, albeit via indirect means (the “you” addressed is a human, more specifically a man). Moreover, the most important mappable feature – say, “natural, instinctive behaviour” – is also reinforced by the animal sounds. That this feature is here something basically *good* is triggered by the advertising convention that something positive is always claimed for the product – and apparently it is a reason for rejoicing that the Rexona deodorant, apart from supposedly protecting you from smelling, helps release natural instincts in you, with possibly sexual overtones as well. Animality, of course, can also be something bad when applied to humans. Consider a very different commercial that also deploys the metaphor HUMANS ARE ANIMALS, more specifically HUMANS ARE MONKEYS. In two American commercials for Careerbuilder to which I

was alerted by Gunnar Eggertsson (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YR71GnQ4CU4&mode=related&search>) it is a desperate employee’s colleagues and bosses that are portrayed as monkeys. Here, clearly, the “natural instinctive behaviour” of monkeys is something bad: the commercial ends with the question “Want a job?” and the advice to contact Careerbuilders.

Case Study 2 Commercial screened on Dutch television for Cif cleaning spray [CREATE LINK]

Description. A sad-looking girl puts her hand against what seems to be a large glass window; a ragged woman at the other side of the glass responds by putting her hand against the girl’s hand, only the glass intervening. The girl anxiously asks, “When are you gonna get out of here?” The woman replies, “In a while”

and then turning away from the girl, "I gotta get back." The first long shot after the close-ups and medium close ups of the girl and the woman, reveals that the

woman is in fact cleaning the bath. The girl anxiously cries out, “I love you mama!”, to which the woman answers, with a sob, “I love you too, baby!” A female voice-over now says something in Dutch that can be translated as “Thorough cleaning does not need to be a punishment. For Cif introduces Cif Power Cream Sprays.”

Creation of pictorial similarity. Through a number of cues, two scenarios are presented as similar: being imprisoned and cleaning a bath tub – although the latter scenario is initially disguised. The former is triggered by a number of signals that the viewer is assumed to recognize from numerous visits-to-people-in-prison scenes in American films and TV series. These include the orange dress of prisoners and the cliché substitute for physical contact by putting up hands against the unbreakable glass window separating prisoner and visitor. Once it is clear that the woman is cleaning the bath, viewers realize that they have been misled in mistaking the orange blouse for a prison dress and the transparent water-shield for the glass separating prisoner and visitor.

Construal as metaphor. The salient similarity between being in prison and cleaning the bath only makes sense as a metaphor, CLEANING THE BATH IS BEING IN PRISON. Notice that a Dutch viewer, accustomed to subtitled Hollywood films, the very fact that the dialogue is in (American) English and is subtitled further activates the “American prison” scenario. Once the metaphor is identified, other elements in the source qualify for adaptation to fit the target: the daughter’s anxiety that she will not see her mother for a while because she is imprisoned presumably transforms, tongue-in-cheek, into the anxiety that she will not see her mother for a while because her mother will be too busy cleaning.

Pictorial or Multimodal Metaphor? As in case study 1, the metaphor is strictly speaking a pictorial metaphor, since both target and source are visually represented (or suggested). But sound (in the form of the American-English dialogue, the mother and daughter’s audible anxiety, and the ominous music) undoubtedly facilitates identification of the metaphor, while one salient mapping, “punishment,” is explicitly verbalized in the voice-over text.

Case study 3 Commercial screened on Dutch television for Calgon washing powder [CREATE LINK]

Description. A neatly dressed woman sits on a bench in a corridor, her facial expression suggesting that she is fretting over something. When a man in a blue overall-like dress comes out of a room, she jumps up and asks “And, could you still do anything about it?” (“En, kon u er nog iets aan doen?”), to which the man replies, “No, alas, too late.” The man and the woman now enter the room, walking towards a washing machine. The woman comments that it still looks as if new, but

the man replies that it has been completely “calcified.” The message is that using Calgon washing powder is far better for the machine.

Creation of pictorial similarity . As in case study 2, the repairman and customer scenario is made to resemble a different scenario: that of a doctor and the anxious relative of a patient. The room in which the washing machine is located, and where the repairman has his tools, looks like an operating room, also because of the dominance of blue-green colours. Moreover, he uses a mini-camera on a flexible tube, inserted in the machine. We then have a view of the machine's innards that strongly resembles footage familiar from many medical programmes on Dutch TV showing patients' intestines etc. In one of the last shots, the woman vows that henceforward she will use Calgon. Significantly she is now dressed entirely in white – as if she is a nurse.

Construal as metaphor. If the similarity between the two scenarios is perceived, the viewer cannot but understand it as a metaphor and allot target status to the domain to which the product belongs. Thus the metaphor could be verbalized as WASHING MACHINE IS PATIENT. Since the commercial is not for washing machines (although the repairman tells the woman that Calgon is endorsed by “major washing machine producers,” whose logos are briefly displayed) but for washing powder, a more appropriate verbalization may be CALGON WASHING POWDER IS MEDICINE.

Pictorial or Multimodal Metaphor? Basically, the same principle applies as in case studies 1 and 2: The two domains are identifiable on the basis of visual information alone; and even without any dialogue, the voice-over, and the written supers at the end, I suspect viewers familiar with the genre of advertising would be able to guess correctly what is target and what source domain. But again, of course, verbal information *does* help. Particularly the first sentence uttered by the woman, “And, could you still do anything about it?” helps trigger the hospital scenario. Indeed, this ominous question suggests that she was waiting not just outside any operating room, but outside an intensive care unit, where life or death itself is at stake – a suggestion that is confirmed by the repairman's reply, which makes clear that his “operation” has not been able to save the washing machine's life.

Discussion

On the basis of the three case studies discussed above, in combination with other pictorial/multimodal metaphors in commercials analysed (Forceville 2003, 2007, forthcoming), it is possible to identify a number of parameters that are pertinent in the study of multimodal metaphor as well as to present tendencies that require further examination in more case studies and/or empirical testing (see Forceville et al. in preparation).

(1) *Order in which target and source are cued*. The three case studies discussed are typical in cueing target and source one *after* another rather than

simultaneously. They appear also to be typical in presenting the source first. Note that this is different from standard *verbal* metaphors of the NOUN A IS NOUN B variety, in which the target A is signalled before the source B. In TV commercials the revised order makes sense, I propose, in creating and hopefully (that is, for the advertiser) holding, viewer interest. By first cueing something that turns out to be the source rather than the target (which usually is, or is metonymically related to, the product), the viewer will supposedly be intrigued by the function of this “something” – and thereby may be kept from zapping away in order to solve this mini-puzzle.

(2) *Mode(s) in which target and source are cued.* As we have seen, both target and source can be cued in more than one mode simultaneously. Since a target often coincides with the product advertised (or, antonymically, with the to-be-disparaged product of competitors), it is often signalled visually. If target coincides with product advertised, at some stage or other – but at the very last in the final shot of the commercial – it will also be labelled verbally. (Usually the product’s logo, which hovers between being a verbal and a visual sign, will also be shown.) If one of the domains is exclusively cued visually, and the other exclusively verbally, it tends to be the target that is visually, and the source that is verbally cued (as in the verbo-pictorial metaphors discussed in Forceville 1996; but consider the Shell commercial in Forceville 2007 for a counterexample). Non-verbal sound and music, when playing an identifying role in metaphor, cue the source rather than the target. Many more case studies, however, need to be done to confirm (or disconfirm) these preliminary findings.

(3) *Mappable features are partly rendered non-verbally.* In the Rexona commercial, the spoken and written verbal information “release the animal in you” helps cue “following instinct” as the central mappable feature. But the visuals provide a lot of information about the animals’ behaviour that a viewer could (sub)consciously map, such as their authority-defying behaviour (specifically of the monkeys), and the sense of belonging to a group. Similarly, while the Cif commercial mentions the keyword “punishment” as the mappable feature from the domain of imprisonment to the domain of using a competitor’s cleaning spray, the nature of this punishment is presented visually as that of being locked up in an American prison. The drama inherent in this event, as well as the suggestion of the length of the prison sentence, is suggested largely by the visuals. And the Calgon commercial nowhere verbalizes words that unambiguously refer to the domain of illness or hospitals. That the room is an operating room, that the repair man is a surgeon, that the camera-inspection of the machine is the examination of a patient’s intestines, and that the washing powder is the “correct” medicine – all this is, again, largely conveyed by pictorial means.

The fact that the sources are suggested visually rather than by explicit verbal means has at least the following consequences: (1) viewers can pride themselves on being

visually literate enough to recognize the source domain, which enables them to solve the mini-puzzle these commercials pose, and thus gives them,

possibly, a good feeling about the product; (2) an explicit verbal spelling out of the metaphor's mappable features would have sounded ridiculous and unbelievable. It is the viewer who, at his own responsibility, construes the metaphor (in Sperber and Wilson's Relevance-theoretical terms, the mapped features would be "weak implicatures"; see Sperber and Wilson 1996, Wilson & Sperber 2004; for applications in the realm of advertising and popular culture, see Forceville 1996: chapter 5; 2005) and makers can always deny they deliberately intended a metaphorical interpretation. In some cases this allows them to get away with things that, if verbalized, might have been socially unacceptable or even illegal.

(4) *Processing time of metaphors.* The psychologist Raymond Gibbs, discussing verbal metaphors, warns that humanities scholars tend to conflate the various stages of metaphor uptake, ranging from comprehension, via recognition and interpretation, to appreciation (Gibbs 1993, 1994: 114-18). The time span involved in these stages varies from milliseconds in the comprehension stage to, I would suggest, potentially decades in situations where a poetic metaphor is not properly appreciated until many years after it was first encountered. If, as seems appropriate in a genre such as advertising, we stick to the shorter end of the continuum, it is pertinent to investigate what the various modes contribute to (the speed of) identification and interpretation of the metaphor. This requires experimental work in the laboratory, involving suppression of one mode or another. Suppressing spoken speech, non-verbal sound, and music is technically easier, of course, than manipulating away visuals and written language, so it makes sense to start with the using the sound track as a variable, but with current developments in audio-visual software it should not be too difficult to create different experimental conditions in the visuals as well.

(5) *"Range" and "scope" of metaphors.* The fact that in commercials metaphorical targets so often coincide with products means that it should be possible to categorize metaphors according to particular product categories. For instance, one could investigate the metaphorical source domains used to promote alcoholic beverages, or even more specifically beers, and chart whether anything systematic can be said about the choice of source domain. This question pertains to what Kövecses calls metaphors' "range": the set of source domains used to metaphorize a particular target domain (2005: 70). Conversely, one could select a certain domain (e.g., "woman," "man," "wine," "jewellery," "animals") and inventory where and how it is used as a metaphorical source domain. Kövecses calls this the metaphor's scope: "the set of target domains to which a particular source domain can apply" (Kövecses 2005: 72). Are there patterns detectable in the feature(s) selected for mapping to the target? Are there correlations between specific source domains and specific (types) of products? (see Forceville 2000; Moulin 2004). Of course, such examinations may well yield cross-cultural differences.

(6) *Familiarity of source domain and selection of mappable source domain features.* As with metaphors in any mode and medium, they will fail straightaway

if the source domain is not recognized. Somebody totally unfamiliar with representations of (American) detention systems, for instance, will presumably be completely baffled by the Cif commercial discussed above. In order for the metaphor to be interpreted in more or less the way envisaged by the makers, the audience must in addition select the “appropriate” features to be mapped from source to target. What is appropriate is largely governed by the genre’s conventions (i.e., it makes a positive claim about a product, brand, or service), but this in turn depends on the values and opinions prevailing in a community – what Black, borrowing from Aristotle, called *endoxa* (Black 1979: 29). Clearly, different communities (national, ethnic, gendered, professional, etc.) may have different *endoxa*, and this may lead to involuntary misinterpretation as well as wilful “reading against the grain.” Reception research involving different (sub)cultural communities is required here (for some examples of potential cross-cultural (mis)interpretation of pictorial metaphors, see Maalej 2001).

(7) *Verbalization of the metaphor.* In order to be discussable in academic writing, a multimodal metaphor must be verbalized in A is B format. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have continuously discussed surface manifestations of metaphors and their relation to a conceptual root. However, their examples, impressive both in variety and quantity, have somewhat disguised that even within the realm of language there is usually no “natural” way to verbalize the conceptual level of the metaphor. And it is highly doubtful that humans’ conceptual “language” is the same as their verbal language. If in online communication, metaphor uptake does not result in conscious verbalization of the conceptual metaphor of which it is a manifestation, the whole matter of verbalization becomes a rather tricky business. After all, once a certain, plausible, verbalization has been put forward, this verbalization tends to govern the search for mappable features (for angles on this discussion, see Caballero 2006; Forceville 2006; Bartsch 2002).

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A Course in Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor

Charles Forceville

Lecture 5. Pictorial and multimodal metaphor in fiction film

Introduction

Advertising is characterized by straightforward intentions (all variants of "buy me!"), which explains the relative ease with which its metaphors can be interpreted. But pictorial and multimodal metaphor can also occur in artistic texts. In this lecture, fragments from narrative films claimed to contain a pictorial or multimodal metaphor will be discussed and analyzed. This discussion leads to some cautious generalizations.

Multimodal metaphor in fiction films

It is surely the artists of the famous Russian *Montage* cinema of the 1920s and 1930s (see Bordwell 1985: chapter 11), Sergei Eisenstein their *primus inter pares*, who must be credited with discovering how to create metaphors in film. The cut from a police officer ordering a massacre of the workers to a butcher slaughtering an animal (see Thompson & Bordwell 1994: 145; Rohdin forthcoming) in *Strike* (USSR 1925) is a an often-cited example. An instance from Hollywood cinema occurs in Fritz Lang's *Fury* (1936), when a cut from babbling housewives to clucking hens is obviously to be construed as a metaphor (Bordwell & Thompson 1997: 304). The technical dimensions of pictorial and multimodal metaphor in post-silent fiction film do not fundamentally differ from those in commercials, so a discussion of metaphors in film needs to focus specifically on generic distinctions. Here are some central differences:

1. Most films have a duration that is considerably longer than the 20-60" of the typical commercial, which means that target and source can be cued minutes, or even hours (e.g., in a multi-instalment TV series). We have seen in Lecture 4 that there are many ways for a director to cue similarity in salient ways, and provided the viewer recognizes the similarity between two persons, objects, or events, it can be exploited to create a metaphor.

2. The longer duration of a film also entails that a metaphor is more open to *development*: a director can gradually present new potential mappings from source to target, thereby enriching or qualifying the metaphor.
3. Artistic films have a different purpose than commercials (or even documentary films, which often have rhetorical goals). Let us say they want to entertain and move their audiences, and perhaps make them reflect on issues and problems. A consequence of this is that metaphors in feature films allow for more freedom than metaphors in commercials. While we have seen in preceding lectures that although advertising metaphors allow for a degree of “customized” interpretation, this freedom is constrained by the genre’s convention that advertising always makes a positive claim about the product, service, or brand promoted. In artistic films the only constraint, arguably, is that a construal-as-metaphor of two phenomena must tie in with, or at least not contradict, the film’s narrative demands, such as its plot and the plausible depiction of characters. Of course there is the risk of endless interpretive battles between viewers and critics about the need or possibility to even construe a metaphor – let alone interpret it. For one thing, I certainly would not want to interfere with viewers’ freedom to construe metaphors that no one else would accept as such, since art’s ability to trigger private emotions and associations is undoubtedly one of its most important powers. But in the interest of intersubjectivity, I will here (like Whittock 1990: 50; for more discussion of Whittock’s book, see Forceville 1996: 60-64) discuss only examples that, I hope, are relatively uncontroversial.

In the next section I will analyze a number of instances of what I propose are pictorial or multimodal metaphors in films, and indicate what circumstances trigger and constrain their construal and possible interpretations. Several of these are also discussed in Forceville (2005, 2008), but are here analyzed in more detail.

Case studies

Case study 1. *The Showdown* (Garlatti Costa, UK 2000)

In this 3’ gem, which contains no spoken language whatsoever, two musclemen in a workout try to outbid each other with their physical prowess. There is an atmosphere of tension, and the other fitnessers, feeling uncomfortable, leave the place one by one – with the exception of a skinny loser-type, who is blissfully unaware of what is going on. The musclemen’s mutual intimidation ends under the shower, where the entrance of the skinny man makes for a surprise ending.



Fig. 5.1 The “duellists,” with in the background the skinny man (still from *The Showdown*).

What makes the film interesting is that the visuals, the music, and the soundtrack all cue the domain of the Western: among other things, we hear a gun shot, clapping hooves, whinnying, a rattlesnake sound, a languorous whistle, the wind blowing, and a typical “Western” musical accompaniment (mouth organ, trumpet, piano, guitar); we see a plastic bag blowing past as if it were a rolling prairie bush, and under the shower the men hold their shampoo flacons as if they were guns. For good measure there is at the end of the film an extradiegetic – and in my view unnecessary – insert of a colt being fired. In short, the film’s success hinges on the apperception of the metaphor BEHAVIOUR IN A GYM IS A SHOWDOWN/SHOOTOUT .

As always, the construal and interpretation of the metaphor depends on recognition of, and familiarity with, the source domain – which in turn presupposes the awareness that the Western-domain is to be understood as the source domain of a metaphor in which “behaviour in a gym” is the target. Somebody who would be totally unfamiliar with the Western genre, and would not even know what a showdown is, would presumably be puzzled by the soundtrack, and some of the visuals, and be incapable of construing the metaphor.

The metaphor is truly multimodal. Of course the title is a strong verbal cue (the only one) for the source domain. Music and sound contribute substantially as well, and so do various behaviours, movements, and other forms of body language on the visual track. Once the metaphor is cued by the viewer, aesthetic pleasure consists in finding as many mappings as possible, in all the modalities drawn upon. Even framing choices help trigger the source domain of the metaphor: the various extreme close-ups of the men’s eyes will be recognized by connoisseurs as references to the showdowns in such Sergei Leone Westerns as *Once Upon a Time in the West* (USA 1968, <http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=jQ4bNTU965E>), *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly* (USA 1966, <http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=awskKWzjlk&NR=1>), *For a Few Dollars More* (USA, 1965, <http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=b214IKz3m7c&feature=related>), including the famous scores by Ennio Morricone.

Case study 2. *American Psycho* (Mary Harron, USA 2000)

In one of the best-known scenes from *American Psycho*, the eponymous hero Patrick Bateman and his fellow businessmen outbid one another with the stylishness of their business cards (<http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=923xrzsb3hI>). We see one of the men giving his card to another with an outstretched arm, accompanied by a “swoosh” sound; a close up shows a shiny cardholder flicking open with a distinctive click, and when at the end of the scene Patrick is presented with the all-surpassing business card of “Paul Allen,” it falls from his hands on the table, his eyes glazing over, while the man sitting next to him says, “Something wrong? Patrick? You’re sweating!”




Fig. 5.2 Patrick Bateman’s card: “That’s bone. And the lettering is something called ‘Silian Rail’” (still from *American Psycho*).



Fig. 5.3 Patrick Bateman (Christian Bale) takes “Paul Allen’s card” (Still from *American Psycho*).

I propose (following a suggestion by Anton Kanis) that a metaphor can be construed here: BUSINESS CARD IS KNIFE OR COMPARING BUSINESS CARDS IS A KNIFING DUEL. It is noteworthy that such a metaphor nicely sums up the ruthless working atmosphere in the firm where the men are employed, and thus reinforces a central narrative theme.

Let us briefly consider what affords the construal of the metaphor. Note that there is nothing in the visual, verbal, or sound track in the scene that is not realistically motivated. There is not, for instance, a cut to an extradiegetic source domain (“knife duel”), as in the case of the Eisenstein, Lang, and Garlatti Costa examples discussed above, nor is the word “knife” mentioned at any moment in the scene. The source domain is thus nowhere cued explicitly, and hence there is no cue that *forces* a metaphoric construal. I propose that two conditions must be minimally

fulfilled to construe the metaphor as formulated above: in the first place we must somehow be strongly reminded of the source domain, say, knifing duels as we know them from Westerns, gangster or “hood” movies. If this is what happens, it is presumably certain postures and facial expressions we recognize, such as the outstretched arm and the “wounded” Patrick dropping Paul Allen’s card. Moreover, the silver-coloured card holder springs open – and sounds! – like a stiletto. If and when *any* single of these cues is picked by a viewer, s/he can start seeing and hearing other cues that exemplify the metaphor, particularly on a repeated viewing, galvanizing the metaphor.

The second, related, condition to be fulfilled for construing the metaphor is the presumption that every communicator tries to be optimally relevant to his or her audience (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995; Wilson & Sperber 2004). In the present case, this means that the filmmakers want their viewers to get as much aesthetic pleasure from the scene as possible, and one way to achieve this is by suggesting the businessmen metaphorically engage in a knifing duel.

Since no metaphor *need* be construed, much of the fun and aesthetic pleasure evoked by the scene is still there for viewers who do not construe the metaphor. That being said, it may well be the case that a viewer, subconsciously (?) aware of the underlying aggressiveness of the men’s card-exchanging behavior, understands the metaphor on a more abstract level, say, as EXCHANGING BUSINESS CARDS IS A BATTLE, without the specification of a battle-with-knives.

Indeed, it is possible to activate a different metaphorical source here, one compatible with the BATTLE domain: that of a card game (Antonio Barcelona, Rosario Caballero, personal communication). In that case, different aspects of the target domain are cued than in the KNIFING DUEL scenario: the fact that business cards have the same rectangular form as playing cards; that they are called “cards” too; and that the cards are thrown on the table in a certain manner.

And there is another type of battle domain, also commensurate with the target domain, leading to yet another metaphor: COMPARING BUSINESS CARDS IS COMPARING WILLIES ... I am sure that many viewers upon seeing the scene have thought of this young boys’ bravura act and found this childish behavior pertinent to their interpretation.

Let me end the discussion of this scene with some general observations: (1) the three different metaphorical construals (and there may be more) are possible because there are no cues that explicitly cue the source domain (as happens in the “colt-shooting” shot in *The Showdown*); (2) the fact that the scene occurs in an artistic film, unlike, for instance, in an advertising commercial or an instruction film, means that we need not *choose* between the metaphors – they can exist side by side, and if we are alert and receptive enough to see/hear all three of them, this only enhances our aesthetic pleasure; (3) the identification of the three metaphors, and their ensuing interpretations, depends on conferring salience on different aspects of the scene, with

the card-showing as the stable factor. For the *KNIFE DUEL* metaphor the silver cardholders, and their clicking open, is presumably the key. For the card game version, the emphatic showing of the cards themselves, and the self-congratulatory c.q. intimidated expressions on the men's faces while doing so is crucial. And in the *COMPARING WILLIES* version it is perhaps the general bragging, largely conveyed verbally, that steers the interpretation.

Case study 3. *Singing Teacher* (Anatoly Petrov, USSR 1968)

This 3' animation shows a man who is surprised to open his front door to an ungainly hippopotamus who unceremoniously strolls inside. The man, a music pedagogue, tries to teach the hippopotamus to sing, but grows ever more impatient and desperate when the beast keeps repeating the inelegant bray that comes to him naturally. But then the hippopotamus swallows the singing teacher, and suddenly he (or rather: the singing teacher from within his innards) is capable of performing beautiful songs. <http://nl.youtube.com/watch?v=57V61gm1euM>



Figure 3.4. The teacher tries, in vain, to teach the hippopotamus to sing (still from *The Singing Teacher*).

As in the *American Psycho* scene, there is no *need* to construe a metaphor. It is perfectly possible to enjoy the bizarre story of a hippopotamus wanting to sing, and only succeeding after having swallowed his teacher – and probably this is the level at which most children will appreciate the tale. But a culturally sophisticated audience might want to go beyond this literal level and detect a metaphor. For instance, one could interpret the film as suggesting that in order to truly learn something, one needs to “internalize” one’s teacher (Dirk Geeraerts, personal communication) – either as an act of tribute, or as a necessary act of destruction. The metaphor would then be formulated as something like *LEARNING IS EATING ONE’S TEACHER*.

However, a contemporary Russian audience is likely to have construed a different metaphor. The text in the booklet accompanying the DVD (*Masters of Russian Animation*, volume 1) says about the film, “Soviet audiences ... knew well about bureaucrats who ‘swallowed’ the ideas of others for their own benefit.” In this construal, the metaphor would be verbalized as, say, BUREAUCRATS ARE ART/ARTIST-DEVOURING HIPPOPOTAMI. In this latter situation, the target is not rendered in the text itself; it has to be adduced from one’s knowledge of relevant circumstances of the time and place of production. Without the text in the DVD booklet presumably many Western viewers would have been unable to construe this metaphor. Uptake of the metaphor thus requires what Vandaele (2008) calls “invisible framing”: in order to understand crucial elements in a text, one may require essential information that is not formulated explicitly in that text itself. The latter may have various reasons: one possible reason is that something was considered so self-evident to the audience at which a text was directed that explicitness was deemed superfluous; another is that censorship forbade such explicitness. The latter is the most likely scenario in this case.

Case study 4. *Mountain of Dinosaurs* (Rasa Strautmane, USSR 1967).

Another Russian animation film from pre-1989 Russia that invites a metaphorical interpretation is *Mountain of Dinosaurs* (*Masters of Russian animation 1*). The story is as follows: For millions of years, dinosaurs put their eggs on the top of a high mountain, where the warm rays of the sun ensured they would be hatched. But when the climate became structurally colder, the egg shells grew extra layers. A dinosaur baby wanting to be born is now unable to break out of the shell. It asks the shell to release him, but the shell keeps repeating in a mechanical voice: “I have to protect you.” The baby dinosaur begs, “I have to see the sun. Even a cold sun. Please let me out. I can adapt. I swear!” but the egg keeps uttering its mantra, only adding “I must fulfill my duty.” The voice-over concludes “Duty was fulfilled,” and when monkeyish creatures much later find and hack open the shells they find them empty, and they understand that the dinosaurs are extinct.

As in example 3, the story can be taken at face value, but undoubtedly a discerning audience adopted a metaphor scenario to make sense of it. The baby dinosaur had to be mapped onto the Russian people; the thickening shell to the Party bosses; and the cold climate presumably to dangerous foreign influences. Again, the metaphor’s target has to be inferred extratextually, and again, the strategy chosen was clearly meant to mislead the censors.

REFRIGERATOR IS MONSTER




Figure 5.5 Endearing dinosaur (still from *Mountain of Dinosaurs*).

I propose that construal of the metaphor depends on knowledge of the socio-cultural environment of Cold War Russia. But there are other factors that play a role. For one thing, the story is arguably rather weak on its own terms, lacking a twist or punch. For another, the music both at the beginning credits and the end of the 10' film is loud and slightly cacaphonic. Moreover, the story clearly creates empathy with the dinosaurs (mapped to the Russian people): they are depicted as endearing (see figure 5.5) and said to be “peaceful,” and the babies are wide-eyed cuddly creatures.

Case study 5. *Requiem for a Dream* (Darren Aronofsky, USA 2000).

Aranofsky’s disturbing film portrays four characters whose respective addictions inexorably lead them to physical and spiritual wreckage. One of them, Sara Goldfarb, takes diet pills in order to slim down, but she is nonetheless sorely tempted by the prospect of eating. In the course of the film, the refrigerator, a metonym for the food it contains, takes on ever more ominous features in her feverish mind. At one moment, it seems to leap forward to her. In the last of the fridge scenes, where other events make clear that Sara is severely hallucinating under the influence of her pills (see figure 5.6), the refrigerator leaps forward again, and splits open horizontally at the top, revealing a terrifying, red-lit maulish aperture, while at the same time a menacing growl is audible. The metaphor, cued by the visuals as well as the sound, and reinforced by the lighting in the scene, is something like

OF REFRIGERATOR IS AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL.



Figure 5.6 Sara Goldfarb (Ellen Burstyn), addicted to diet pills (*Requiem for a Dream*).

Several points can be made with reference to this multimodal metaphor. In the first place, the metaphor *develops* in the course of the film. Initially, the refrigerator is simply saliently framed, as an object that Sara is increasingly obsessed by, but it is only when it starts to move toward her that it acquires metaphorical overtones. At this stage the metaphor would not go beyond alarming personification (REFRIGERATOR IS MENACING CREATURE). Not until the very end, when the fridge splits open, the personification is fine-tuned to AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL OR MONSTER. A second observation follows from this: since it is Sara who experiences the fridge as a wild animal, the metaphor reveals her (distorted) point of view. Strictly speaking, we might have to say that while the *viewer* understands the fridge-animal identity in terms of metaphor, Sara may well not have this distance, and believe that the fridge has *literally* transformed into an animal. In other words, multimodal metaphors can occur at different narrative levels, ranging from endorsement by an external narrator to a highly colored focalization by an unreliable character (see Bal 1997, chapter 1, section 5 and Branigan 1992: chapter 4 for more discussion of the narrative status of information). Finally, the metaphor can by and large be characterized as a visual hybrid: the refrigerator and the wild animal form a single gestalt that cannot occur in the real world. Visual hybrid metaphors can therefore only occur in films which depict the otherworldly – horror films, fables, science fiction – and as focalized in otherworldly circumstances (hallucinations, dreams, drunken misperceptions).

Case study 6. *Black Robe* (Bruce Beresford, Canada/Australia 1991).

Black Robe, a film based on a novel by Brian Moore – who also wrote the screenplay – tells the story of a young priest in 17th century Quebec, who has come to the jungle because he is intent on converting the Indians to Christianity. In one scene (almost 40' into the film), the priest wanders through the woods, looking up (figure 5.7) at

TREES ARE CHURCH

the tall trees (figure 5.8) in a circular tracking movement. The scene is intercut by a four-second shot with the same circular movement featuring church columns (figure 5.9). The viewer recognizes the columns as part of the church where the priest made his decision to depart for Quebec to go on his mission (figure 5.10). Hence the similarity between the trees and the columns, reinforced by the low angle and the camera movement, can be explained by construing a metaphor:

COLUMNS or, by extension, WOOD IS CHURCH, OR EVEN CONVERTING INDIANS IN THE CANADIAN JUNGLE IS PREACHING IN CHURCH. The “church” concept is further cued when the priest, afraid he has lost his way in the wood, begins to pray.



Figure 5.7 The priest looks up in the wood



Figure 5.8 ... and sees the trees




Figure 5.9 ... which remind him of the columns



Figure 5.10 ... where he first understood that he

Christianity (stills from *Black Robe*).

The metaphor “scenario” (Musolff 2006) can be further fleshed out: the priest hopes to transform the wood into a church, with the Indians (“savages”) as the believers. The shot of the church is thus extradiegetic relative to the scene in the wood itself,

but diegetically motivated as triggering a flashback of the priest – a flashback that the viewer understands as such because of the earlier scene in the church (figure 5.10).

The metaphor is apt, since it succinctly captures the goal, or quest (see Forceville 2006a) of the film’s protagonist. That this goal is totally alien to the Indians themselves is played out nicely in the sequel to this scene. The priest, temporarily lost in the woods, is to his great relief found by his Indian companions. One of them asks scornfully how he could ever get lost here: “Did you forget to look at the trees?” To the Indians, the trees are orientation marks; to the priest they are the target domain of a metaphor – a fine way of underscoring the vast cultural differences between the “black robes” and the Indians that are central to the film’s theme.

Case study 7. *Gracious Curves/Naisenkaari* (Kiti Luostarinen, Finland 1997).

To the extent that a film is argumentative rather than narrative (following Chatman [1990], who distinguishes “descriptive” as a third possible goal of discourse), a metaphor occurring in a documentary film differs from one in a fiction film. Defining documentary, particularly in contradistinction to fiction film, is notoriously difficult (for attempts at characterizing documentary, see Nichols (2001), but in the face of the numerous difficulties hampering adequate definition as well as the existence of so many hybrids, I nonetheless fully endorse Carroll’s (1996) view that it is crucial to maintain and monitor the distinction between fiction and non-fiction in film (and other media). Without further delving in this thorny issue, let me say that whereas feature films aim for pleasurable polyvalence and/or audiovisual spectacle, documentaries want to persuade us of the correctness or at least validity of a more or less specific view of a person, a community, or a state of affairs, and adduce some sort of audiovisual evidence to support that view.




Figure 5.11 weight scales, accompanied by the sound of a roulette ball (still from *Gracious Curves*).

Luostarinen's disturbing documentary is a poetic reflection on the pressures women feel on how their bodies are supposed to look, and on what activities others, or they themselves, believe they could or should undertake to conform to this ideal. In one shot, the pointer in the window of a weight-scale is shown moving until it settles on a number. During this shot we hear the sound of a spinning roulette ball. The striking incongruity between visuals and sound invite metaphoric construal. Given the theme of the film, it makes more sense to construe WEIGHT-WATCHING IS PLAYING ROULETTE than PLAYING ROULETTE IS WEIGHT-WATCHING. The presumption of relevance then further encourages us to find one or more properties of "playing roulette" that can be mapped onto "weight-watching." One salient property of playing roulette is that it is a game of chance rather than skill or competence, suggesting that so is the process of weight-watching. But other mappings are possible: the element of frustration or excitement are pertinent as well – and which of these mappings is actually processed depends partly on the specific viewer's own attitudes to weight, and partly on how s/he interprets the film's valuations of this issue. A few shots later, the viewer is presented with a close-up of a young girl rope-skipping. Every time the rope touches the ground we hear the cracking of a whip. Again, given the film's topic, a metaphor can be construed: ROPE-SKIPPING IS WHIPPING (ONESELF), with "self-torture" as the mapped feature.

Both these examples are multimodal metaphors of the pictorial-sonic kind. As always, the ability to construe the metaphor requires first of all recognition of the source domain. It is to be noted that when the sound's origin and provenance is not, or no longer recognized, the metaphor stops being interpretable. Somebody unfamiliar with the sound of a roulette table (say, a country child with no access to TV or film) or a whip (say, a city child with no access to TV or film) will be barred from construing and interpreting the metaphor. Moreover, while some sounds have become obsolete, others have only recently entered history: think of the tray of a CD or DVD- player sliding open, or the rolling of suitcases-with-wheels being dragged over a pavement. In short, just like language and visuals (and gestures, tastes, and smells), sounds have a (sub)cultural and historical dimension, and this has an impact on our apperception of any multimodal metaphors that draw on them.

One other dimension of the use of multimodal metaphors of the pictorial-sonic kind in a film or TV programme must be mentioned: if the person sitting next to you in the cinema, or on the couch, happens just to be crunching popcorn or biscuits during the scene, you may miss the metaphor.

Some conclusions

A few case studies cannot, of course, allow for sweeping generalizations, but on the basis of the analyses made here (and some more in Forceville 2005, 2008, Rohdin forthcoming), at least the contours of the dimensions to be taken into account when researching multimodal metaphor begin to transpire. Since *technical* implications of the medium (“moving images”) for metaphor have been discussed in Lecture 4, I will here summarize any characteristics that pertain to the *genre* under consideration here: fiction film.

In the first place, *the degree of emphasis with which a metaphor is presented presumably covers a greater range in feature films than in advertising, while this emphasis may moreover change in the course of the film.* Perhaps some viewers of *The Showdown* simply do not initially notice the oddness of the soundtrack of the film, and – perhaps not knowing the meaning of the title – do not construe the metaphor until they are confronted with the extradiegetic shot of the colt being fired. Conversely, certain viewers may already at the very first shot of the saliently framed refrigerator in *Requiem for a Dream* have been reminded of a monster. In *Black Robe*, it is possible that cinematically sensitive viewers construe the metaphor trees are church columns in the split second before the insert of the shot of these columns, that is, on the basis of the circular camera movement alone.

Second, *metaphorical targets may not be conveyed text-internally and may have to be supplied by the viewer on the basis of relevance and socio-cultural knowledge.* We have seen in the two Russian animation films that one reason for presenting a metaphor in this way is to circumvent censorship. Incidentally, to pass censors it is presumably always necessary for a film (or a different work of art) to afford a plausible non-metaphorical or an innocent-metaphorical reading. I note in passing that in *advertising*, metaphors with text-internal targets are presumably very rare, given that in this genre metaphors have the product or service promoted as their target.

Third, *any stylistic choice that strongly or uniquely connotes a semantic domain, irrespective of the modality in which it is conveyed, can serve to cue that domain as a source in a metaphor.* The stiletto-click of the cardholder in *American Psycho*, the “Leonic” extreme close-up of the eyes in *The Showdown*, the sounds of the roulette ball and the whip in *Gracious Curves* – they all evoke a fairly specific source domain. This knowledge may, of course, be (sub)culturally determined.

Fourth, as we have seen in earlier lectures in this course, *verbalizations of metaphors are never innocent.* Whether a given verbalization reflects our thinking or the other way round remains a vexed issue, but I submit that once a certain verbalization is accepted, certain interpretations are activated that may differ from those evoked by a different verbalization. The three possible metaphors discussed with reference to the *American Psycho* scene are a case in point. This last example

alerts us to another point: viewers who see in it the general EXCHANGING BUSINESS CARDS IS BATTLE metaphor surely miss out on much of the aesthetic pleasure that viewers experience who see one or all of the more specific metaphors embodied in the scene. This is a healthy reminder that while the NOUN A IS NOUN B verbalizations that Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) favours are important to tap the conceptual level of metaphor uptake, it is at the more specific, “basic” level (Lakoff 1987: 3ff.) that a metaphor provides the greatest array of potential mappings.

Fifth, *in the realm of moving images metaphors are almost always multimodal*. Of course claiming this presupposes that it is possible to define mode/modality. This is a very difficult issue (see Forceville 2006b for more discussion), but even if we were only to accept a crude mode-division into language, visuals, and non-verbal sound, most of the metaphors discussed draw on more than one mode – if not necessarily for the identification of target and source, then for the cueing of mappable features, and thus the metaphor’s interpretation. It would be interesting to speculate whether art films tend to rely on different combinations of modes than commercials. Perhaps commercials may want to reinforce metaphors verbally to a larger extent.

Six, *the less conventionally narrative a film is, the more scope there is for a viewer to construe a metaphor*. In abstract films, the sky is the limit, particularly if it is not even necessary, as demonstrated, that a metaphor’s target is rendered within the film itself. And if the aim is playful morphing, perhaps to activate creative thinking as a goal in itself, a lot is possible, too (see: <http://neurokids.nl/speel/aap-noot-mies/aap-noot-mies-morphmaker/>).

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A Course in Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor

Charles Forceville

Lecture 6. Metaphor, hybrids, and blending theory

Introduction

A relatively recent development in cognitive linguistics that is rooted in metaphor theory is "blending theory," an approach primarily connected with the names of Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (e.g., Turner and Fauconnier 1995, Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 2000, 2002). In this lecture, blending theory will be briefly explained, and its potential uses for the analysis of visual and multimodal metaphor (see Forceville and Urios-Aparisi 2009) and hybrids in static images will be examined.

Blending Theory

Blending Theory was fathered by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, and its most complete version hitherto appeared in these authors' monograph *The Way We Think* (2002). There is both promise and problems in the theory (Forceville 2004; Câmara Pereira 2007), and my mixed feelings will transpire in this Lecture. But let me begin by introducing the theory (which is indebted to Arthur Koestler's 1969 notion of "bisociation") as I understand it. Basically, Blending Theory (BT) offers a way to model representations that are, in one way or another, hybrids consisting of at least two entities, so-called "input spaces." Input spaces are mental spaces that differ from what in metaphor theory are called "domains." Whereas domains label very general, abstract concepts, input spaces constitute ad-hoc, specific instantiations of domains. The specificity of an input space is due to various contextual constraints that derive from the communicative situation in which it is used.

To facilitate the discussion, the following example will be used. In a famous experiment at Columbia University, under the supervision of Herbert Terrace, chimpanzees' ability to learn language was investigated. One of the language-learning apes was called "Nim Chimpsky."

The hybrid representation “Nim Chimpsky” is the “blend” that results from integrating selected elements of the input spaces in an appropriate manner. The

two input spaces in our example are the name of the renowned linguist “Noam Chomsky” and the word “chimpanzee” combined with the “typical” ape name “Nim.” In order to allow for a felicitous integration, the input spaces must share some conceptual structure to start with. What the input spaces share includes such characteristics as “being primates” and “being creatures living in groups.” These shared characteristics are represented in the so- called “generic space.” But the blend also contains characteristics that it inherits from only one of the input spaces. Indeed, each of the two (or more) input spaces needs to bestow at least one property to the blended space that the other input space(s) does/do not – otherwise there is no need for the input space in the first place. What the “Chomsky” space bestows to the blend, or blended space, is something that could be rendered as “being the founder of Generative Linguistics, and proponent of the view that the ability to use language is innate.” The chimpanzee input space bestows simply “being a chimpanzee.” The blend labels a specific chimpanzee that, supposedly, uses (sign) language. It is important to note that while it is two *concepts* that are combined in the blend, the blend only works due to the fortuitous combinability of the name “Noam Chomsky” and the word “chimpanzee.” Note that the blend would be less felicitous than, say, “Nim Lakoffsky,” not only because George Lakoff is less famous than his one-time teacher Chomsky, but also because there is hardly any *formal* resemblance between his name and the combination of “Nim” and the word “chimpanzee.”

In the simplified BT diagram (see figure 1), this is how “Nim Chimpsky” would be represented: The uninterrupted line between the dots in the two input spaces, and the interrupted lines between these same dots and the dots in the generic space and the blend, indicate shared properties. In addition, there will always be one or more lines going from each of the input spaces to the blend but not to each other or to the generic space, since these lines symbolize the unique properties that an input space lends to the blend. (The open circles in the blend presumably specify properties that are derived from neither input space; it is not clear to me where they are supposed to come from.)




Figure 1. Adapted from: Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 46).

A few comments are in order. “Nim Chimpsky,” here modeled as a blend, surely is a metaphor: the language-using chimpanzee is metaphorically compared to the linguist Noam Chomsky. The punning *form* in which this is done is spectacular – somewhat reminiscent of the “sigh-tempests” in John Donne’s “A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning”(1633) – but what happens conceptually conforms to what happens in metaphors, as theorized in this Course. All this is no surprise, since metaphors are one of the subtypes of blends (Grady et al. 1999). Other subtypes are counterfactuals such as “if I were you ...” and hybrid genres, such as “tragic-comedies.”

I have problems, however, with BT’s claim that it is superior to metaphor theory in that it can better deal with “emergent structure” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: Chapter 15). Admittedly, Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) focuses on deeply entrenched structural metaphors, while its attempts to account for creative metaphors (Lakoff and Turner 1989) are not entirely satisfactory (for some discussion, see Forceville 2006; Forceville et al. 2006). But one of the great predecessors of CMT, Max Black’s (1979) “interaction theory,” undoubtedly deals with emergent structure. Implicitly, Black made use of a Blending Theory model in his analysis of metaphor. In the Pascal example “Man is a thinking reed” he discusses, the generic space contains the attribute “being organic phenomena” – and perhaps, “having a vertical orientation” – while the input space “man” contributes the property “(capable of) thinking” and the input space “reed” contributes the property, say, “being vulnerable to the forces of nature.” (Pascal’s original phrase “L’homme [...] est un roseau pensant” arguably adds the property “beauty” to the blend.) The same mechanism can be recruited for “marriage is a zero-sum game,” where the blend is the fighting-type of marriage in which the benefits of one partner are understood as complementary to those of the other partner (Black 1979: 30; for more discussion see Forceville 1996: chapter 2; Lecture 2 of this Course). As in any creative metaphor, or metaphorical blend, the result is more than the sum of the parts – and this is what is meant by “emergent structure.” Black himself was acutely aware of this meaning-creating dimension: “the meaning of an interesting metaphor is typically new or “creative,” not inferable from the standard lexicon. A major task for theorists of metaphor, then, is to explain how such an outcome – striking for all its familiarity – is brought about” (Black 1979: 23). (Experimental work on the basis of Black’s theory can be found in Gineste et al. 2000.)

Another point worth discussing is that blends appear to have fewer constraints with respect to the directionality of mapping than metaphors. As has continually been emphasized throughout this Course, each metaphor has a target and a source, and the mappings go from source to target, not vice versa. Calling a “creative metaphor” a “metaphorical blend” does not change this. With

reference to creative metaphor, BT offers no more and no less than a way to visualize what happens; starting from the blend one determines which input spaces have contributed to it, and how. As such, it thus does not provide insight, since we backtrack from the result (for suggestions how to optimize the opportunities for BT to become a theory of creativity, see Veale et al. in prep., Forceville in prep., submitted).

Finally, what I miss in BT is an explicit discussion of the pragmatic dimension of blends. Blends are hybrid structures used in communication, and are therefore deployed for a specific purpose. Precisely because blends are contextualized ad-hoc structures, it is necessary to discuss them as intentional, discursive chunks of information in a communicative situation, since the context in which the blend is used may well determine which are the unique properties that each of the input spaces contributes to the blend. A crucial aspect of this context is the “activity type” (Goffman 1974) in which the user of a blend is involved. “Genre” is a central factor here: if we do not know, or can guess, in what discursive genre a blend is used, we will have difficulties understanding it. All of this fits the Relevance Theory model (Pateman 1983, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson and Sperber 2004), upon which I will not elaborate here (for applications to multimodal discourse, see Forceville 1996: Chapter 5; 2005, 2009a; Yus 2008).

Perhaps one can sum up the weaknesses of BT in the conclusion that “there seems to be no specific set of rules for analyzing a blend other than intuition” (Camara Pereira 2007: 67). This being said, I think BT has strengths as well; here is a brief, non-exhaustive catalogue.

One of the insights BT provides is that many conceptual structures are in fact combinations or hybrids of two or more other concepts, and that this is what metaphors, counterfactuals, hybrids and a host of other phenomena share with each other.

A second strength is that the blending template encourages a search for *patterns*. Is each creative blend radically unique or are there generalizations to be made? Fauconnier and Turner propose that many blends tap into one of a limited number of “vital relations.” One of these is “telescoping time”: in a substantial number of blends we map internal relations between moments in a long stretch of time (e.g., a lifetime, a year) onto a shorter stretch of time. A multimodal example of this is the documentary film genre of the “city symphony” – dating back to the 1920s but still a productive genre. The central idea is the portrayal of “a day in the life of a city,” typically beginning early in the morning and ending late at night. Examples of these

are *Rien Que les Heures* (Alberto Cavalcanti, 1926), *Berlin: die Sinfonie der Großstadt* (Walther Ruttmann, 1927), *A Propos de*

Nice (Jean Vigo, 1930), *Historia de un Dia* (Rosana Matecki, 2009). Here the 24 hours of a day are compressed into a film of one, two hours. Clearly, “telescoping time” and other vital relations must be explored in far greater detail to assess their viability.

A third potential strength, somewhat neglected in Fauconnier and Turner (2002), is that blends can draw on *more* than two input spaces simultaneously. If and where this is appropriate, BT could handle some kinds of representations that metaphor theory could not, or not as easily deal with, since the latter always has only two domains (one way of getting round this is to postulate a nested metaphor structure: the metaphor B IS C leads to a “transformed” domain which we can call B2, which can in turn become the source in a new metaphor A IS B2).

A fourth strength is that BT can conveniently model input spaces exemplifying information in different modalities, for instance the verbal and the visual modality.

A fifth strength is that because the basic model is suitably rigorous, it can serve as a starting point for the development of creative computer programs (Câmara Pereira 2007).

To conclude this section, my view is that BT can help model creative metaphors in a manner that formalizes Black’s interaction theory of metaphor, but that it does not have, at this stage of its development (see also Fauconnier and Turner 2008) much to contribute to metaphor theory. That being said, let me now discuss a number of “hybrid” images from a BT perspective. If it were to be objected that this is much like having a hammer (the BT model) and looking for nails (applications), I plead guilty. I believe, however, that this is a good way to aid reflection on what the model can and cannot do, and help pave the way for either improving the model or finding alternatives for it where applying it to visual hybrids is either unproductive or impossible.

Case 1: Figure-ground hybrids

One could argue that the well-known figures providing different representations if one reverses the figure-ground relation (figures 1, 2, and 3) are examples of blends. Since there is nothing that privileges either the rabbit or the duck, the faces or the vase, the young lady or the old lady, it makes no sense to treat them as pictorial metaphors: each of the input spaces contributes on the same hierarchical level to the blended space. Moreover, both input spaces are necessary for the blend. However, if these count as a blends, they are very

unusual ones, since we cannot see the two input space at the same time. Another problem is that, however intriguing, the hybrids' success depends *only* on formal properties; there is no conceptual gain, or exterior purpose for their creation. Our response is typically, “how clever!” or “amazing how such simple pictures can play games with our perception!”




Figure 1. Rabbit-Duck.




Figure 2. Faces-Vase.



Figure 3. Old-young lady.

Case 2: Artistic hybrids

Related to the examples in figures 1-3 are hybrids such as those by Salvador Dalí (figure 4) and René Magritte (figure 5), which are based on the same “now you see the one, now you see the other” principle. The fantastically simple hybrid by Picasso (figure 6) is materially different from these not only in being a sculpture, but also in creatively *juxtaposing* two different things, a bicycle saddle and a bicycle steer, to suggest a bull's head. What makes figures 4-6 similar to figures 1-3 is that the visually spectacular nature of the hybrids depends on form. What makes them different, I would argue, is that, if for no other reason that they belong to the genre of art and have been created by legendary artists, we are invited to expend mental energy on deriving inferences triggered by these blends. Thus the Dalí painting might make us wonder whether we would ever be tricked in real life by such a *trompe-l'oeuil*, while the Magritte painting might be taken to suggest that for a (heterosexual) man, each woman's face evokes sexual associations, or that faces are as intimate as bare torsos. The Picasso sculpture perhaps triggers admiration for the fact that both elements come from the same object (a bicycle), and may remind us that the bull is an icon in the painter's native Spain.



Figure 4. Salvador Dalí, “Paranoiac Face” (1930s).



Figure 5. René Magritte, “Le Viol” (1934).



Figure 6. Pablo Picasso, “Bull's Head” (1943).

I disagree with Noel Carroll, who argues, partly on the basis of Surrealist art such as discussed here, that visual/pictorial metaphors differ from verbal ones in being more often reversible (for more discussion about my views on Carroll's (1994, 1996) theory of metaphor, see Forceville 2002). These are non-metaphoric blends.



Figures 7a-f. Wim Sonneveld creatively transforms a lampshade into various head dresses and a collar. Source: Henk van der Meyden, *De Mens Wim Sonneveld Zoals U Hem Niet Kende*. Amsterdam: Teleboek, 1975, p. 63.

Now consider figure 7. The Dutch *chansonnier*, actor and entertainer Wim Sonneveld (1917-1974) spots a lampshade's affordances to create four different types of head dress and a collar. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the five novel applications indeed really deploy the original lampshade that Sonneveld looks at in figure 7a. Its uses in figures 7b-7f could be modeled drawing on the BT model with in each case the "lampshade" as one of the input spaces. Apart from the attributes "aesthetically filtering the piercing light of a lamp's bulb" and "giving a certain colour to a lamp's light," this particular lampshade also provides the material attribute "displaying a regular pattern of folds/foldable in a certain manner." It is this material attribute, foldability, that we also find in the other input space in 7b-7f, and which hence would also be represented in the generic space.

A few things are to be noticed. In the first place, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to capture with precision in words in what respects the "foldability" differs in each of the new head dress (and one collar) input spaces for 7b-f. This shows, once again, that different modes have different "affordances" – that is, manners of conveying pertinent information.

A second observation is that ideally we are supposed to recruit a third, only virtually present input space, namely that of the actual headdress that Sonneveld simulates. Thus 7a, 7b, and 7f may be supposed to remind us of images such as 8, 9, and 10.



Figure 8. "The Milkmaid" (Jan Vermeer ± 1658).



Figure 9. A traditional Chinese

Figure 10. A hat.

Dutch farmer's



wife's head dress.

A related, point is that these "virtual head dress input spaces" can only be activated by those familiar with them. This, in turn, requires socio-historical knowledge. Thus I estimate that the head dress depicted in figure 7f, showing a classic Dutch farmer's wife cap, will be more easily accessible to Dutch people than to non-Dutch people – and to older Dutch people than to youngsters.

Fourthly, it should not be underestimated to what extent Sonneveld's facial expressions and gestures (and in 7b the prop of the jug) help identify the folded

contraptions as specific types of hats/a collar. With a different gesture and expression figure 7c could have been a Mexican instead of a Chinese hat. Indeed, it would be doubtful whether we would recognize the contraptions as hats/a collar at all if we were presented with them in isolation (i.e. without Sonneveld’s face).

Finally, I would argue that it would be inappropriate to construe metaphors here. Surely, we would describe the situations as something like: “Wim Sonneveld jokingly shows how one could turn a lampshade into various types of hat” – not as HEAD DRESS IS LAMPSHADE. This again has much to do with the fact that only visual/material similarities are created between the lampshade and the head dresses, no conceptual ones. The lampshade itself as depicted in figure 7a is an added, but not indispensable element for enjoying Sonneveld’s playfulness in the other panels. One could argue that the lampshade is a quasi-realistic motivation for the lampooning more than anything else.

Case 3: Furniture hybrids

Mundane examples blends can be found in multiple purpose furniture design (figures 11 and 12). Since the hybrids can function equally well as tables and as chairs, the two input spaces (table and chair) are on the same hierarchical level, and thus do not invite construal as metaphors. Figure 13 – a sofa designed by Dalí – is an interesting case. One of the input spaces is “sofa” and the other is “(Mae West’s) lips.” To me, this is a clever blending of formal properties of the two input spaces, and while the hybrid invites the joke of an “ass-kissing sofa,” I would construe this as a three-dimensional visual pun rather than as a metaphor.



Figure 11. “Switch table
“Tona chair” (Diego
chair” (Ellen Ectors).
King).



Figure 12.
Gonzalez



Figure 13. “Mae West Lips” sofa (Salvador Dalí,
1938).

Case 4: Hybrids in public space

Figures 14 and 15 are two of the photos I am in the habit of making of objects, texts, and other phenomena in public spaces that, for one reason or another, I

find striking. Here, both scenes depicted irrepressibly reminded me of tombs in a graveyard. Let us suppose that you can share my apperception of visual similarity between both scenes and that of a graveyard (e.g., figure 16).

In the BT model, elements from figures 14 and 15 that occur in both input spaces (and therefore also in the generic space) are, say, “vertical and (sometimes) horizontal slabs of stone in a relatively green space containing few or no other man-made objects.” These elements, moreover, are retained in the blended space. But the blended space must in addition contain unique features of each input space. I submit that in figure 14 and 15 these probably include the objects’ denotation: “electricity site,” and “building site,” respectively, and for some people perhaps connotations such as “eyesores in public space.” The denotation of figure 16 is “tombstones” or “graveyard,” while connotations pertaining to death and burial are ready for activation. The blend mixes some of these.



Figure 14. Electricity site in public space, Zierikzee, NL (photo by Charles Forceville, 2007).



Figure 15. Building site, Middelburg, NL (photo by Charles Forceville, 2009).



Figure 16. Graveyard with tombstones.

A few remarks are in order. First, figure 16 is just an *example* of a graveyard – not the precise picture I had necessarily in mind when taking the photos in figures 14 and 15. It thus consists of an example of a typical, but virtual “intertext,” just as in the cases of the original head dresses/collar in figure 7.

This is important in light of the question how we know which features end up in the blend. Well, in fact we cannot know this without further knowledge. For one thing, all three figures can trigger other connotations. In the spirit of Max Black’s Star of David, discussed in Lecture 1, we could assess that figure 14 exemplifies “yellow-and-brown -and-grey-and-green-ness,” “circularity, squareness, and verticality,” as well as “stoniness.” Figure 15 similarly suggests “verticality” and “stoniness” and, more so than figure 14, “patterned design.” What about figure 16? As indicated, it is just an illustration of a graveyard with tombstones, an exemplification of the abstract “graveyard” model I had in mind.

But it is typical enough to exemplify tombstones' connotations of "patterned layout in space," and "rectangularity."

Up till now, I have left out of the discussion the crucial dimension of the purpose of the blend. A hybrid, of whatever modality or combination of modalities, only makes sense as a blend if it is somehow the outcome of a purposive activity. So what is the purpose of the “municipal-electricity/building site-as-graveyard” (or “rectangular-stone-pattern-as-tombstones”) blend? Well, there wasn’t one, really I can only tell you that the reason I made each of the photographs is that I saw a striking resemblance between both sites and a graveyard, and I thought that I might one day do something with this. And I was right: I have found a purpose for exploiting the resemblance, namely discussing BT with you right now. Up till now, resemblance was latently present, but not until it could be recruited in some form of communication could this potentiality materialize. Only as part of a specific act of communication can a blend be sensibly analyzed. Again, this reveals the pertinence of Relevance Theory. Please note that it is not very difficult to imagine contexts in which figures 14 and 15 could be used for *other* communicative purposes. Figure 14 could be deployed as a protest by angry civilians against municipal policies to unaesthetically place electricity sites in public space, while figure 15 could similarly be exploited in a newsletter by a local action committee agitating against the building of a block of houses.

In the scenario where I simply took the picture because I was struck by the similarity between the input spaces, the blend is a visual pun. In the more purposive situations I imagined, the blend is a metaphorical one: ELECTRICITY PATCH/BUILDING SITE IS GRAVEYARD , and thus perfectly analyzable in terms of Black’s interaction theory. It would moreover be difficult to reverse target and source and think of a context where they made sense. In fact, I suspect that constraints on reversibility – non-reversibility being a hallmark of metaphor – hold true for quite a few non-metaphorical blends, too. In counterfactuals such as “If I were you ...,” the statement is about “you” in terms of “me” – and not the other way round. It will be fruitful to systematically distinguish blends that can be reformulated as metaphors from those that cannot. An example of the latter is Duncker’s “riddle of the monk,” made famous in Koestler (1969) and often discussed in the BT literature (e.g. in Fauconnier and Turner 2002: Chapter 3); another is the “child doctors” advertisement (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 65-70).

Here is another example of an ad-hoc hybrid in public space. Please excuse the feeble joke – not very original in its kind at all – in figure 17. It is a photograph I took of a statue of the god Hermes/Mercurius, while behind it smoke emitted from a factory chimney is visible.



Figure 17. Hermes statue, Château Neercanne, Maastricht, NL (photo by Charles Forceville, 2009).

The “Hermes” input space contains, I submit, among others the attributes “human being,” “nakedness,” “exhibiting classic beauty and proportions,” and crucially, “capable of breaking wind”; the “factory” input contains “producing goods,” “consisting of buildings,” and, crucially, “having chimneys exuding smoke.” The blended space has “Hermes breaking wind.” Although the example does not deserve extended discussion, a few observations can be made. The moment at, and the angle from, which the photograph is taken are crucial for the joke (in fact I took a few photos to “get it right”). Furthermore, both the fact that the statue represented a naked person rather than a clothed one and that it is a classic, “high culture” statue are pertinent. Stretching the issue, perhaps, one could point to the frictive similarity residing in the “verticality” of the column of smoke and the staff Hermes holds in his right hand. This parallelism (which I had not aimed for or realized when taking the photograph) arguably contributes to the humorous tension arising from combining high culture and puerile bawdiness.

Again, I would discuss the blend in terms of a highly expendable visual pun, where the interpretation “Hermes farts” exhausts the hybrid. Of course, in a situation where Hermes were to be metonymically linked to something else, say to a company that refers to Hermes in its logo, or that is called “Hermes,” the present photograph could be used, or abused, to ridicule that company metaphorically.

Case 5: Hybrids in visual communication

The two final examples I want to discuss hail from yet another genre: that of illustrations accompanying articles in newspapers and magazines. Figure 18 shows a vertically depicted, half-open red purse with coins in it. That we are to “read” more into this picture may not be immediately obvious, but undoubtedly the theme of the article that it accompanies will help. The article discusses the growing economic power of women in The Netherlands. We are to understand the purse, then, not just as a purse but also as female genitalia – another virtual image we are to recruit from world knowledge. Once we understand the blend, thanks to the context of the article, the input spaces can retrospectively be rendered as “economic power” and “femaleness.” We would have to say that the purse/genitalia blend is verbally “anchored” in Barthes’ (1986/1964) sense. It seems contrived to consider this hybrid a metaphor, that is, as something like FEMALE GENITALIA ARE PURSES, although it is not impossible to do so. The blend, whose success depends on the striking similarity (including the purse’s form, colour, and furriness) that exists *in this particular image* between the two input spaces, is more appropriately labeled a visual pun. In a different context, incidentally, this visual pun could have cued “prostitution,” for instance.

The last example I want to discuss in this Lecture is figure 19 (the text in the upper left corner translates as “issue”). Although it may not be immediately clear, its salient objects are crumpled paper tissues. The illustration accompanies an article titled “Dagdroom, dag depressie” (“Daydream, bye depression”) in which it is argued that regular fantasizing may help keep a depression at bay. (The cover of the magazine has a variant of this picture, and the superimposed text “Droom uw depressie weg: praten en pillen zijn niet genoeg,” i.e., “Dream your depression away: talking and pills are not enough.”) Would it make sense to discuss this ingenious visual puzzle in terms of a blend? Clearly, the viewer is to activate certain specific connotations: the crumpled tissues metonymically cue “crying here” here, specifically the crying that one (supposedly) does as a result of a depression, or even more specifically, perhaps, the crying that one does when discussing one’s depression with a therapist. The clouds in this situation are metonyms for daydreaming. I submit that the birds on the one hand help us recognize the blue background as “clouds,” and on the other as “flying/moving/going away.” Clearly, this construal would not have been possible without anchoring text.

It is not useful to analyse this collage in terms of three input spaces, if only because it would be difficult to find shared elements for the generic space (although we could see similarity of fluffy form and whiteness between clouds and crumpled

tissues). Rather, the three visual elements are metonyms (see Forceville 2009b) for events that are causally related to one another: “If you

have a *depression*, you should *daydream and fantasize*, and then your depression might *go away*.” The striking nature of this rebus-like image thus appears to reside in the designer’s creativity in finding good metonyms for the central concepts of the article’s title, and thinking of a form in which they quasi-realistically co-occur. If this makes sense, this alerts us to the necessity to think beyond metaphors and blends for modeling visually emergent structure.



Figure 18. *Vrij Nederland*, illustration accompanying article on growing economic power of women (27 February 2010, p. 89 by Liesbeth Maliepaard and Tirza Laan).



Figure 19. *Vrij Nederland*, illustration accompanying article “Dagdroom, dag depressie” (13 February 2010, p. 40, by Anouk Kruithof).

Some conclusions

In this lecture, I have argued that BT provides a way to model metaphors in a way that formalizes, but does not add to, the insights of Black (1979). For present purposes, its promise resides in its ability to model other, non-metaphorical, hybrids, both visual and multimodal ones, and multi-space as well as double-space varieties. The analyses of various cases revealed that a pragmatic dimension is indispensable for discussing blends of whatever type. In fact, pragmatic factors may turn a visual pun into a pictorial/visual metaphor. One of the two input spaces in a blend may be visually absent, having to be evoked from memory; this latter means that socio-historical knowledge is often indispensable to cue an input space. While the analysis of some “figures of depiction” (Tversky 2001) may benefit from BT, the last example (figure 19) suggests that in its current state BT cannot account for all forms of visual creativity. It will have to be seen whether BT is a good theory for modeling visual hybrids (for another approach, see Shen 2010).

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Links:

<http://marktuner.org/blending.html#ARTICLES> Bibliography of Blending Theory studies [last accessed 3 March 2010]

http://eshopafrika.com/acatalog/Ga_Coffins.html Creative African designs blending two input spaces. One series blends coffins with a range of other objects [last accessed 3 March 2010].

A Course in Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor

Charles Forceville

Lecture 7. Structural pictorial and multimodal metaphor

Introduction

In the previous Lectures of this course, the metaphors investigated were all more or less novel ones: the metaphorical relation between target and source was created for the situation at hand rather than already-existing (see also Forceville *forthc.*). Of course there are degrees of creativity; and some creative metaphors strike us as more innovative than others. But even though we need to think of creative versus structural metaphors in terms of a continuum rather than a dichotomy, the distinction remains important.

The great merit of Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) was its demonstration that metaphors are typically not creative one-offs, but pervade language and thought. To recall: they claim that our language use reveals that one of the ways in which human beings make sense of their lives is by systematically coupling abstract and complex concepts with concrete ones in a metaphorical ABSTRACT A IS CONCRETE B format. (Other central cognitive principles are metonymy, prototype theory, and folk models.) Simply formulated, abstract and complex phenomena are not immediately accessible to the senses, whereas concrete phenomena are. "Concrete" here thus means "pertaining to typical actions the human body performs": perceiving and moving. We know things primarily by what we see, hear, touch, smell, taste – and by moving. We exploit our physical affordances to structure and conceptualize the abstract. Since we cannot see, hear, touch, smell, or taste concepts such as time, democracy, ideals, and emotions, we have developed systems of metaphors to come to grips with them. It is this central idea that underlies CMT catch-phrases such as "experientialism," "embodied cognition," and "embodiment," as well as the "super-metaphor" MIND IS BODY (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 248).

Language has always been the primary source of data to support the central CMT insight that we think metaphorically; that the metaphors "we live by" do not constitute random catalogues but are systematically related to each other by drawing on a limited number of source domains; and that these

source domains are typically “embodied.” Of course embodiment is not all there is to metaphor. Building on embodiment (“nature”), culture (“nurture”) in numerous ways qualifies and refines the embodied ways in which people deploy metaphors (e.g., Emanatian 1995, Yu 1998, Gibbs and Steen 1999, Kövecses 2005, 2010). Put differently, “a single, embodied correspondence between target and source is enough to trigger a wide range of further ‘cultural’ correspondences between target and source, and hence of inferences about the target” (Forceville et al. 2006: 107).

The many studies focusing on language have contributed enormously to insights pertaining to metaphor theory as well as illuminated how systematic research into entrenched metaphors can help reveal ideological and culturally determined structures (e.g., Charteris-Black 2004, Kövecses 2005). But CMT’s dependence on linguistic evidence also makes it vulnerable to criticism. Skeptics (e.g., Haser 2005) argue that the conceptual A is B metaphors are just verbal metaphors written with small capitals, and reject the distinction between the surface manifestations of metaphors and the conceptual level of which they supposedly are the expressions. Critics may agree that CMT has done much to illuminate that many metaphors can be expressed verbally in numerous different ways, but still refute the conclusion that this is a reflection of metaphorical *thinking*. Verena Haser, for instance, claims that “an accurate analysis of metaphors and metonyms should relate to linguistic expressions, rather than putative metaphorical or metonymical concepts” (Haser 2005: 1-2).

For this reason it is essential to test the claims about embodied metaphors in non-verbal and not-purely-verbal discourse types. One important field within CMT studies that concerns itself with such research is the young discipline of gesture studies. Not only can gestures in combination with spoken language convey metaphors; they often do so systematically. A very interesting aspect of gesturing, moreover, is that people are usually unaware that they are doing it. Any demonstration that gestures partake in metaphors therefore further supports the claim that metaphor need not be restricted to the verbal realm, but is tied to the non-verbal or even pre-verbal, and thus to the conceptual realm. Gesture studies, including metaphorical dimensions, are a rapidly growing sub-discipline in the humanities, but fall outside the scope of the present author’s expertise (for discussion and references, see Cienki 1998, Mittelberg and Waugh 2009, Müller 2008, Müller and Cienki 2009).

In this Lecture the issue, then, is whether the audiovisual realm can be shown to manifest structural metaphors (as contrasted with the creative metaphors discussed in Lecture 6). A persuasive demonstration that this is

indeed the case would thus support the plausibility of CMT's claim that we think, not just talk or write, metaphorically; and conversely, an inability to show this would challenge the claim. In short, investigating the sense or nonsense of postulating pictorial and multimodal *conceptual* metaphors contributes essentially to CMT, and by extension to insight into cognition and evolutionary approaches to art and storytelling (see Boyd 2009).

Two conceptual metaphors will be addressed in this Lecture:
PURPOSIVE ACTIVITY IS MOVEMENT and EMOTIONS ARE FORCES.

PURPOSIVE ACTIVITY IS MOVEMENT or LIFE IS A JOURNEY

Given the kind of bodies we have, our physical survival as a species depends on our ability to move. We have always had to move from where we are located at a given moment to somewhere else (decimeters or thousands of kilometers away) to acquire food and drink, to find protection against dangerous animals, or to build shelters against heat or cold – that is, to ensure physical survival. It thus makes sense that movement from A to B across a path – the embodied activity *par excellence* – is one of the richest source domains available for conceptualizing all manner of purposive activities: having a more or less successful relationship; getting a scholarship or a prize or a promotion; making a scientific discovery; finding your identity. The starting point of the journey maps “naturally” on the situation where the desired goal has been formulated but not yet realized; its end point maps onto the situation where the goal has been achieved. Anything that facilitates (or blocks) the journey from the starting point to the destination maps onto whatever helps (or hinders) the achievement of the goal. The passing of time is central to both. Just as it takes time to reach your destination, so it takes time to realize your goal. All this can be formulated as the metaphor PURPOSIVE ACTIVITY IS MOVEMENT.

An important type of purposive activity we humans indulge in is story-telling. Hence a good story, too, is a journey. In every successful story, whether artistic or not, there is a beginning, a middle, and an end (though not, as *Nouvelle Vague* film director Jean-Luc Godard famously quipped, necessarily in that order). But stories are a very special type of purposive activity, since most (all?) stories focus on persons or characters that, hopefully, arouse our interest because we care for (or abhor) their purposive activities – which I will call “quests.” Stories, that is, are purposive activities inasmuch they promise to lead an audience toward a resolution for problems facing the protagonist(s), and it is the narrator's job to so in a manner that is

gratifying to the audience. Stories thus pertain to quests in two ways: they are about persons and characters that are on some sort of quest; and they have to satisfy certain aesthetic expectations in how they present the protagonist's quest, or the conflicting quests of different protagonists. This latter criterion of satisfying an audience becomes particularly important when the story is not of the "telling your day" type people routinely share with their spouses or friends, but have artistic claims. For in this latter case, they must be worthwhile for audiences that expect to be entertained, or at least to be informed in an interesting way. In such a situation the stories are to be crafted more thoughtfully than in the expendable stories of the former type.

What is mapped from what Johnson (1987, 1993) calls the journey – but is perhaps more correctly labeled "movement" – to any type of purposive activity, is the source-path-goal schema. This source-path-goal (SPG) schema is an embodied knowledge structure we possess thanks to our typical manner and direction of movement: standing up on two legs; and forward in the horizontal plane.

As a movement-based and thus also time-based art, the medium film ("the *movies*") is well-suited to exploit the SPG schema in metaphors such as A STORY IS A JOURNEY and A QUEST IS A JOURNEY. Where such metaphors are particularly pertinent is in the subgenre of the *road movie* (see Cohan and Hark 1997): the hero moves from A to B (JOURNEY) to achieve a goal (QUEST), an enterprise that is presented in the form of a story. In Forceville (2006, in press) I discuss autobiographical documentary "road movies" to demonstrate that the structuring principle in all of them is the literal and metaphorical journey – rooted in the SPG schema. The documentaries' interpretations are on the one hand constrained by this schema, while the "natural" correspondences between movement, quest, and story on the other hand bestow on the films their aesthetically pleasing ambiguities. All five films discussed, however, are heavily dependent on language; more specifically on the voice-overs of their respective artist-directors. Thus, although the visuals and, sometimes, sound and music in all cases crucially contribute to the establishment of the conceptual metaphors – making them *multimodal* metaphors in the broad sense (see Eggertsson and Forceville 2009: 430 -431) – language remains indispensable for the construal of the metaphor. Critics might therefore still object that these analyses do not prove that conceptual metaphors can be conveyed in non-verbal ways – and it is precisely such proofs that are needed to validate the claim that metaphorical *thinking* does not require language. For this reason, Marloes Jeulink and I (Forceville and Jeulink forthc.) decided to analyse the journey metaphor in

three short animation films whose interpretation does not rely on language: language is not, or hardly used in the films, and where it is used, such as in the titles, it is dispensable. Analysing animation films offers other interesting perspectives: since animation does not record a pre-existing reality in the manner that live-action film does, everything in animation is “man-made/selected,” including its sounds. On the one hand, inasmuch as animation films tell a story they need to convey pertinent narrative information by tapping into their audience’s knowledge about the world; on the other hand, animation can, and usually does, take liberties with reality as we know it by visually and aurally exaggerating, simplifying, transforming, metaphorizing, etc. to convey information deploying techniques that are not open to other media. Moreover, most animation is short, which allows for more completeness in discussions of metaphor (or any other thematic or stylistic aspect, for that matter) than feature films.

All these circumstances make the medium particularly suitable for investigating conceptual metaphors. In the next paragraphs I will briefly analyse three short animation films in light of the “journey” metaphor.

***Droga/The Road* (Miroslaw Kijowicz, Poland 1971, 4’23”)**

<http://www.animacjapolska.pl/film,7790,,Droga--.html>

A man, seen from the back, walks steadily forward on a straight, hilly road, until he arrives at a Y-crossing (figure 7.1). He hesitates, wondering whether he will go left or right. He begins going left, but quickly retraces his steps to turn right, then hesitates again. Then the man splits (is split?) into two, his left half taking the left road, his right half taking the right road. The film follows his right half. After a while his right half arrives at another Y-crossing. At first he decides to go right, but then realizes that by going left there is a chance that he will meet his left half again (figure 7.2) if he goes left. And indeed, he does. However, it turns out that his left half has grown taller than his right half. Nonetheless, the two unequal halves merge into a somewhat awkward whole again, and the man pursues his way.




Figure 7.1. A man arriving at a Y-crossing hesitates whether he will take the left or the right road (*Droga*, Kijowicz, Poland).




Figure 7.2. At the second Y-crossing the right-half man thinks he might meet with his left half again if he turns left (*Droga*, Kijowicz, Poland).

The animation's style is very sober: apart from the man, the hilly road, and the signpost, there are no visual elements in the scene. The man himself has very few characteristics – we never see his face, only the back of his head. This contributes to perceiving him not as a specific character, but rather as a kind of “Everyman.” Moreover, the audience is given no clue about the destination of the journey. This enhances the significance of the TIME IS SPACE metaphor: not only the man's destination is ahead of him; his unknown *future* is. In the absence of any spatial information about either his place of departure or his destination, the temporal dimensions of the man's journey thus gain prominence: his is a journey through time. This is important, since if we only, or primarily, saw the road as a literal “path,” there would not be much of a problem when the man is confronted with the Y-crossing: if he then should have realized he had taken the wrong road, he would simply have had to turn back and take the other road. But if the road is “temporal,” he has no such option. Time's arrow relentlessly goes one way only – and inexorably will end in death. Therefore, the decision which road to take is final, and cannot be undone. Indeed, *Droga* here is reminiscent of Robert Frost's famous “The road not taken”:

Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
 And sorry I could not travel both
 And be one traveler, long I stood
 And looked down one as far as I could
 To where it bent in the undergrowth;

Then took the other ...

Whereas Frost's literary protagonist has to choose one road, Kijowicz' animated one initially seems to have the luxury to travel both roads at once. But the choice is only apparent: the viewer understands the splitting into two not literally, but symbolically: the man has to cut his identity into two halves, and he is no longer a psychologically whole "single" person (here another embodied metaphor makes itself felt, which could be rendered as NORMAL IS BALANCED/SYMMETRICAL). And when his two halves meet and merge again, something has changed: time has left its mark on the two halves of the man's identity. The experiences of the two halves of his identity have been different, and even though he is whole again these different pasts will remain with him from now on. Interestingly, it is up to the viewer to decide whether the ending is a happy or an unhappy one. One could argue that failing to wholeheartedly choosing one future, simultaneously living another one, has caused him to become a mentally disfigured, handicapped person, who, however, will have to live with his choices. Alternatively, we could see him as courageously (?) having pursued two futures, which, though it has resulted in a form of disfigurement, has made him a more broad-minded person.

Since this is a story, the viewer expects some sort of resolution or "closure" (Bordwell and Thompson 1997: 477) at the end of the storytelling journey. Most viewers will presumably guess that the two halves are bound to meet again, particularly given the right-half man's thought balloon (figure 7.2) when he chooses the left road at the second crossing. A story needs to be structurally coherent, and there must be some sort of link between its beginning and its end. A somehow "circular" structure is always gratifying (it is strongly present in the three animation films discussed in Forceville and Jeulink forthc.), but such circularity should nevertheless never be perfect. Of course by definition it never is: even when a protagonist is in exactly the same situation as when the story began, time has passed and s/he has become older, thus diminishing the opportunities to achieve any goals in whatever of his/her life remains. But *short* stories may have to disrupt a perfect circular structure more strongly than that to be aesthetically satisfactory: viewers (or readers) will, paradoxically, expect to be rewarded with something unexpected at the end. In *Droga* we would be disappointed, I propose, if at the end of the journey the two halves would simply have seamlessly merged again. In short stories that are presented as aesthetically pleasing, therefore, the end (the "goal" in the SPG schema) is not supposed to be entirely predictable. It is for this reason that the "quest" and the "story" levels cannot be conflated. While in normal life the achievement of a goal

pursued is the reward itself, in short stories we somehow expect some *deviation* of that simplex goal. (I thank professor Alina Kwiatkowska for presenting me with the DVD containing this film.)

***Lalilonska Kula/The Tower of Lalilon* (Rastko Ćirić, Yugoslavia 1987, 4'22") <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ES7hoavNfzE>**

A man dressed in green pants only is seen in the process of falling from a tower – a descent that will last the entire film, and is continuously accompanied by a wheezing sound to remind us of this fact. A trowel is seen falling next to him. Perhaps he is a bricklayer working on the tower, and he fell off. His posture, though, is not one of desperation – rather of calm resignation – he hums softly to himself, twiddles his thumbs, and several times looks at the viewer while shrugging his shoulders (figure 7.3). We see other people falling along with him. He is not surprised, so this is apparently a normal event. He shows us a series of connected pictures (a *leporello*) of a great-great-grandfather, a great-grandfather ..., just as the man himself all depicted as falling from a tower, until we arrive at the picture of a man on whom the camera zooms in. The man meets a woman (also: falling down). There is a brief slowing down of the downward movement. They marry and get a son – and this son is the protagonist, which we infer from the fact that the boy also wears green pants (figure 7.4). The boy's parents grow older, and first his mother dies, and then his father (the father earlier has thrown away a trowel, suggesting he, too, was a bricklayer). The protagonist himself then sees a woman and tries to “brake” in mid-air, presumably to meet her – but in vain. He nonetheless appears to meet the woman and to have a child with her– but both are depicted in shadowy form and then disappear, which might suggest this is a fantasy. When he looks downward he sees what seems to be a shadow of himself approaching – he is nearing the ground. But instead of crashing, he falls into a creased cloth which, after a freeze frame, trampolines him back upwards. But then both he and the frame mysteriously turn over 180 degrees , so that he again falls downward.




Figure 7.3 The protagonist falls down, looking at the viewer in a posture of resignation (*Lalilonska Kula* Ćirić, Yugoslavia).




Figure 7.4 The protagonist holds a picture featuring his parents and himself as a baby (*Lalilonska Kula* Ćirić, Yugoslavia).

Perhaps the idea of the film came from the belief that people who are about to die see their entire lives flash past. As in *Droga*, the movement of the protagonist here is a movement in time. Unusually, however, the progress of time is not delineated in the horizontal, but in the vertical plane. The past is above the various protagonists, and the future is beneath them. This orientation is retained in the *leporello*: the older generations are depicted above the younger ones. The slower speed at some moments suggests that these are significant moments in the protagonists' lives: the meeting of the parents, their death, the instant the son spots the woman who might become his wife.

It is not only the direction of movement that is significant in *Lalilonska Kula*, but also its manner. The protagonist falls down. Unlike climbing down, or hang-gliding down, or parachuting down, falling down connotes total lack of control. This lack of control is further reinforced by the fact that the protagonist tumbles over repeatedly in mid-air and in vain tries to slow down his descent by "braking."

The ending is enigmatic: contrary to expectations, the protagonist does not die, but is bounced back, seemingly defying "time's arrow" and miraculously surviving. Interestingly, the bouncing back is again something that happens to the protagonist despite himself, and is not something he can somehow claim having achieved himself. But with the turning around of the frame, the brief upwards movement quickly reverts to a downward one. However the double surprise at the end – a bounce rather than a crash, and then the reversal of the frame (a reprieve from seemingly certain death?) – is to be interpreted, it pivots on a reversal of the direction of movement, and thus invites an evaluation in the handling of time.

***The Life* (Jun-ki Kim, South Korea 2003, 9'45'')**

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=faArmZxwtT0>

A man is seen climbing a very tall totem pole-like tower, carrying a baby and a chest. The ascent is heavy, and the father has to fight fatigue as well as rain and snow. In one shot we see similar towers to his left and right: apparently other people are engaged in negotiating their own tower. During the journey upwards we see the baby growing into a young boy, now climbing on his own (figure 7.5), then into a young man. The two men take regular breaks during their long and strenuous journey (figure 7.6). The father ages and at one stage is too old to climb further. He remains behind, presumably to die. The young man turns into an adult, and is himself an old man by the time he reaches the top of the tower. He opens the chest, gets a neatly carved stone from it, which he carefully fits, like a piece from a jigsaw puzzle, into an open space on the top of the tower: he and his father have made their own little contribution to the tower whose building, we infer, is the achievement of generations – and which is never completed.




Figure 7.5 The son climbs the totem-tower, following his father (*The Life*, Jun-ki Kim, South Korea).



Figure 7.6 Father and son, both grown older take a break during their climb (*The Life*, Jun-ki Kim, South Korea).

As in *Lalilonska Kula*, the movement takes place vertically, but this time the orientation of the time line goes upwards. That is, here the past is down, below the protagonists, and the future is up, above them. The manner of moving is climbing, and the kind of problems father and son have to negotiate are, say, finding protrusions all the time for their feet to stand on and for their hands to grip. Moreover, the two have burdens to carry – food, presumably, and the chest with the mysterious contents. Initially, moreover, the father has to carry his baby son, and there is sometimes heavy weather. All this requires physical energy and continuous alertness. These are all features that can potentially mapped onto father and son's quest – and they

differ from those that can be mapped in *Lalilonska Kula*. The protagonist of the latter had it easy, simply having to surrender to gravity. What was primarily mappable in that film was complete lack of control – an issue that is not the problem in *The Life*. Though difficult, the two protagonists have it in their power to determine and ensure their progress. Another difference is that the father and his son have a *goal* – to reach the top. Unlike the viewer, who does not learn until the very last moment of the film, they moreover know why they want to reach the top. Their quest is clear, while the falling bricklayer simply falls toward his death – the destination of his “journey,” but hardly a *goal*.

In *The Life*, as in the previous two films, the expectation of a twist at the end is fulfilled, although it is a minor one. The son, now an old man, places a stone, carried all this time upwards, first by his father and later by himself, to add another segment to the tower. This is interesting in itself: the metaphor PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY IS A JOURNEY merges with PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY IS MAKING SOMETHING.

LIFE IS A JOURNEY: some concluding remarks

The journey metaphor (itself as old as story-telling itself; cf. Campbell 2008) in animation deserves further research. Since what matters is which elements on the movement level can be metaphorically mapped onto the quest, time, and story levels, it is these that need to be first inventoried. Here is a provisional and non-exhaustive checklist that can aid extended explorations of the journey metaphor:

Where in screen space is the movement’s starting point and where is its destination?

In what direction is moved (right/left, up/down, back-front [or vice versa], in a circle, a zigzag pattern ...)?

What means of transport is/are used (legs, bike, horse, camel, car, train, plane, stilts, toboggan ...)?

What kind of obstacles/facilities does the path present (mountains, storms, lakes, snow, swamps, smooth flat roads, bridges, tunnels ...), as well as those travelling on it (helpers/antagonists)?

If the protagonist is an animal or a humanoid rather than human, how does its body affect movement?

How does manner of movement, specifically BALANCE, play a role in motion?

How does sound cue spatially relevant effects?

Are musical segments repeated? Does their key or tempo vary to reinforce, or contradict, visual information pertaining to movement? Does the type of material (drawn cels, cutouts, clay, sand ...) chosen for the animation affect type and manner of motion?

Subsequently, it is to be assessed if, and if so, how, these aspects of literal movement are exploited to structure QUEST and STORY (adapted from Forceville and Jeulink forthc.).

It is furthermore worthwhile to see which other domains besides that of the journey are systematically exploited to give structure to purposive activity. In *The Life* the journey metaphor was combined with the building metaphor (PURPOSIVE ACTIVITY IS MAKING A BUILDING). (I suspect that the building (or more generally: “making”) domain is also used independently of the journey metaphor, and although I have not yet systematically looked into this, I suspect that it is also often used in animation.) But other combinations of metaphors are possible. In an analysis of a Chinese state commercial promoting the economic future of China, Yu (2009) shows how the journey domain is combined with the “stage” domain to present purposive activity metaphorically.

A third arena for further research is that of the live-action road movie. A former student of mine investigated the question whether an European road movie is not a *contradictio in terminis* (Vissers 2003), and another researched the journey dimension in Westerns (Beerman 2008).

But inasmuch as solving puzzles also constitutes a journey toward a resolution, it is unsurprising that many computer games also lend themselves to analysis of the journey-cum-quest domain (Kromhout 2010).

EMOTIONS ARE PHYSICAL FORCES: the representation of emotions in comics

Another complex domain that has attracted sustained attention of CMT scholars is that of the emotions, the pioneer being Zoltán Kövecses (Kövecses 1986, 2000, 2008). On the basis of verbal expressions pertaining to various emotions, sampled from thesauri, Kövecses developed prototypical scenarios for these emotions. For “anger” – which has become the paradigmatic emotion for research within CMT – the following five stages can be distinguished: (1) offending event; (2) anger; (3) attempt at control; (4) loss of control; (5) act of retribution (Kövecses 1986: 28-29).

Kövecses goes on to propose a limited number of structural metaphors to which the manifold expressions pertaining to emotions can be traced. The primary metaphor Kövecses finds is ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER. The anger here is metaphorically compared to a fluid substance in a pot that slowly heats up, resulting in rising levels, steam, pressure on the pot and its lid. This leads to anger expressions such as “he is flipping his lid,” “the steam was coming out of his ears,” and “she nearly exploded.” Kövecses also finds evidence for other structural metaphors, such as ANGER IS INSANITY, ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL, and ANGER IS AN OPPONENT.

Scholars in other languages have taken up Kövecses’ model and tested it in their own cultures (for an overview see Kövecses 2005: 193-200). As in the case of the journey metaphor, however, it is imperative that the data analysed are not restricted to language. Let me here summarize my own research in this area, review some work subsequently done (partly done by students of mine), and end with questions for further investigation.

Forceville (2002, 2005, 2011)

The task I set myself in Forceville (2005, expanding on Forceville 2002) was to inventory all the *visual* information that, within each panel of the Asterix album *La Zizanie [The Roman Agent]* (Gosciny and Uderzo 1970) alerts the viewer that a certain character is angry. Two types of information were distinguished: (1) facial expressions & bodily postures; and (2) pictorial runes (Kennedy 1982). In the former category, the following “pictorial markers” (Eerden 2009) were identified: (i) “bulging eyes” and their counterpart (ii) “tightly closed eyes”; (iii) “wide mouth” and its counterpart (iv) “tightly closed mouth”; (v) “pink/red face”; (vi) “arm/hand position”; and (vii) “shaking.” These were considered as (exaggerated) indexical signs since we recognize them as symptoms accompanying anger from our everyday experience. In the latter category, I distinguished the following: (i) “spirals”; (ii) “ex-mouth”; (iii) “smoke”; (iv) “bold face”; and (v) “jagged line” (see figures 7.7-7.8, first discussed in Forceville 2005). These runes, if perhaps not metaphorical in the strict sense, exemplify a visual “trope” in the sense that they do not literally occur in real life. If CMT is correct, it is plausible that runes are somehow rooted in “embodied” scenarios.

In order to avoid circular reasoning, two independent “anger” cues were used to decide that a specific character was angry: the verbal and narrative context (specifically the contents of the language in the text

balloons) and the green colour of many text balloons – a convention adopted by Goscinny and Uderzo specifically for this Asterix album (cf. figure 7.8).



Figure 7.7 Gaul. Anger signs: (tightly closed eyes; tightly closed mouth; spirals; red face; jagged line (*La Zizanie*)).



Figure 7.8. Roman senator. Anger signs: bulging eyes; wide mouth (emphasized by a red tongue); arm/hand position; spirals; bold face (*La Zizanie*).



Figure 7.9 Roman centurion. Anger signs: tightly closed eyes; arm/hand position; shaking; bold face (*La Zizanie*).

Looking back on this research project, a number of observations can be made. First, a rune or indexical sign is seldom used on its own: usually a *cluster* of them conveys anger. Second, no exhaustiveness can be claimed for either list: there may be both more indexical signs and more runes that help show anger. Moreover, I would now consider only the “spirals” and the “ex-mouth” *pictorial runes*. The other three cues originally discussed under this rubric are also non-literal cues, but I would label “smoke” a pictogram, and discuss “bold face” and “jagged line” (referring to the font in the balloon and the form of the balloon’s tail, respectively) separately as *balloonic* features contributing to the representation of emotion (see Forceville et al. 2010, for more discussion). Fourthly, while I still endorse the claim that both the findings cued by faces & body postures and those cued by the pictorial runes “are at least commensurate with Kövecses’ anger ICMs, particularly with the one he finds most prevalent in linguistic expressions:

FLUID IN A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER” (Forceville 2005: 80) I would stress that one could invoke other anger metaphors identified by Kövecses to account for some anger markers, such as ANGER IS FIRE, ANGRY BEHAVIOUR IS AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR (Kövecses 1986: 19, 24). That is, I have become more doubtful about the extent to which given visual manifestations of anger can be unambiguously attributed to a specific conceptual metaphor. That being said, it appears that the

metaphor (see Kövecses 2008) captures most of the instances analyzed.

Partly because of these doubts, I decided in Forceville (2011) not to take the supposedly metaphorical character of the representation of emotions in comics as the leading thesis. Instead I made an inventory of all the pictorial runes in a single comics album, Hergé's *Tintin and the Picaros* (1976), with as the primary goal the assessment of the context -independent meaning (if any) of the runes. Several provisional conclusions were drawn:

(1) even though runes are almost always used in combination with other information (both visual and verbal), they appear to have more or less specific meanings; (2) the meaning of runes is determined by three dimensions: their form, their location, and their orientation; (3) runes are used for two purposes: (i) to convey motion; (ii) to convey emotion and other mental states. Indeed the “twirl” (see table 7.1) is used both to indicate that a character literally moves, and to signal dizziness, confusion, or drunkenness. This is very interesting, since it suggests the metaphor EMOTION IS MOTION – which is an alternative formulation for Kövecses’ generic metaphor EMOTIONS ARE PHYSICAL FORCES.







Pictorial rune	Name for rune	Typical location and orientation
	Speed lines	Behind or parallel to a person or object, often indicating direction.
	Three types of movement lines	In various orientations around or parallel to a body part or other object.
	Droplets	In multiples in halo-like fashion around a person's head.
	Spikes	In multiples in halo-like fashion around a person's head or other object.
	Spiral	Usually in multiples in halo-like fashion around a person's head, sometimes singly, parallel to a body part.
	Twirl	Usually single, appearing more or less horizontally behind an agent or vertically above a person's head.

Table 7.1. Stylized examples of pictorial runes used in *Tintin and the Picaros* (Forceville 2011).

Eerden (2004, 2009)

In Eerden (2009), building on Eerden (2004), the author expands the representation of emotions in comics in various ways. He analyzed two other Asterix albums, *Asterix Légionnaire* and *Asterix et Latraviata*, proffering two additional body postures for anger: “upright” and “stretching forward.” Moreover, Eerden finds support for Forceville’s and his own analyses in comics and animation handbooks that instruct budding artists how to signal certain emotions. Handbooks, too, insist on the importance of eyes to convey emotions, for instance, and sometimes differentiate between runes that can independently signal a certain emotion and runes that can do so only in combination with other cues.

In addition, Eerden takes a close look at another medium, namely animated (*Asterix*) movies. To what extent do animated movies draw on runes just as comics do? And does animation have other, medium-specific ways of conveying emotions? One of Eerden’s conclusions is that the *Asterix* animation films analyzed draw less on runes than the comics albums. This makes sense: while comics can deploy only two modalities to convey emotion (static visuals and language), the medium of animation can use moving images, spoken language, sound, and music as well, so it needs to rely less on runes. Conversely, body positions such as “upright” (figure 7.10) and “stretched forward” (figure 7.11) work better in animation than in comics. Other anger signs found in comics do appear in animation as well, but with some differences that, again, are due to the affordances of the medium. A novel cue is the typically cinematic devices of a “low camera angle” (figure 7.12, figures from Eerden 2009) to represent an angry character. But despite the differences, “the ‘eyes’ and ‘mouth’ signs, followed by ‘arm/hand’ are omnipresent in both comics and animated films” (2009: 258).



Figure 7.10. “Upright” as anger marker, *Asterix et la Surprise de César* (animation, original in colour).



Figure 7.11. “Stretched forward” as anger marker, *Asterix et la Surprise de César*.



Figure 7.12. “Low angle” as anger marker, *Asterix et la Surprise de César*.

In Eerden (2004) another emotion is considered in light of Kövecses (1986) prototype model, namely that of romantic love (figs 7.13-7.15; figures from Eerden 2004). An important finding is that anger and love to a considerable extent make use of the same runes, while the facial and postural information tends to differ (although a “red head” can cue both anger and infatuation).




Fig. 7.13. Markers for love include arm/hand position, red head, and smoke puffs around head (*Asterix and Latraviata*).



Fig. 7.14. Markers for love include arm/hand position, half-closed eyes, heart pictograms around head (*Asterix and Latraviata*).




Fig. 7.15. Markers for love include arm/hand position, feet (against each other) and shaking (*Asterix and Latraviata*).

Van Eunen (2007)

In his MA thesis (written in Dutch), Van Eunen expands the research in the young representation-of-emotions-in-comics tradition in two ways. In the first place he adds two “new” emotions, namely fear and pride, to those of anger and love already researched by Forceville and Eerden – again taking Kövecses’ language-based blueprint of these emotions as a starting point. Secondly, he investigates not just *Asterix*, but also takes into account a different comics series: *Donald Duck* (as drawn by Carl Barker). This extension is an important new step. After all, if the claim that pictorial runes have a core meaning is correct, their depiction should not depend on the specific style of a particular artist. Moreover, it is possible that the fact that the characters in *Donald Duck* are animals rather than humans affects the way in which emotions are cued.

In addition, Van Eunen discusses information about the representation of emotion in comics from another source, Scott McCloud (2006), who in turn relies on Ekman and Friesen’s (1975) claim that there are six universal, and universally recognized, basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise.



Fig. 7.16. Fear markers include wide-open eyes, open mouth, white face, arm/hand position, “ex-mouth” (*Asterix and the Normans*).



Fig. 7.17. Fear markers include wide-open eyes, open mouth, white face, shaking, droplets (*Asterix and the Normans*).



Fig. 7.18. Fear markers include wide-open eyes, white face, arm/hand position, positions legs/ feet, droplets (*Asterix and the Normans*).

Van Eunen finds that “droplets” are the most often occurring marker (in 51 out of 62 cases, 82%) for fear – probably as hyperbolic versions of “sweat.” Other markers that are used often are “white face” (58%) and a salient arm/hand position (56%).

Investigating the representation of “pride” in *Asterix*, Van Eunen concludes that several markers found for other emotions (e.g., “closed eyes,” leg/feet position, arm-hand position) also occur in the depiction of pride. But postures such as protruded chest, upward head, and a mouth which curls downwards are specific for this emotion. The only *runes* identified for pride are elongated droplets, and a “golden explosion” (occurring once).



Fig. 7.19. Pride markers include closed eyes, protruding chest, upward head, arm-hand position (*Asterix in Spain*).



Fig. 7.20. Pride markers include closed eyes, downward-curling mouth, upward head, arm-hand position; legs- feet position (*Asterix in Spain*).



Fig. 7.21. Pride markers include closed eyes, upward head, protruding chest, arm-hand position (*Asterix in Spain*).

Van Eunen concludes that there are fewer markers for pride than for instance anger. For pride, “closed eyes” (87% out of 55 proud characters display this feature), upward head (75%), arm-hand position (73%) and protruding chest (60%) are the most often occurring ones.

	EMOTION	Anger	Love	Fear	Pride
PICTORIAL MARKER					
Eyes wide open		46%	39%	19%	-
Eyes tightly shut		37%	16%	5%	87%
Mouth wide open		40%	12%	32%	-
Mouth tightly shut		13%	-	16%	-
Upward head		13%	-	-	75%
Red head/white head		17%	13%	58%	-
Position arm-hand (total)		50%	79%	56%	73%
Index finger pointing		25%	-	10%	13%
Clenched fist		13%	-	-	11%
Stretched arm		-	13%	5%	5%
Containing		16%	27%	-	16%
Slack		-	38%	2%	-
Positions legs-feet		-	-	19%	7%
Jumping/shaking		5%	14%	39%	-
Feathers (on helmets)		-	31%	-	7%
Ex-mouth		12%	-	3%	-
Lines/spirals emanating from head		44%	-	11%	9%
Explosion around character		-	5%	-	2%
Smoke		1%	8%	-	-
Letters text balloons		38%	13%	35%	-
Jagged line balloons		31%	32%	26%	-

Table 7.2. Markers and their frequency for the emotions anger (based on 103 angry characters), love (77 characters in love), fear (62 fearing characters) and pride (55 proud characters) as found in a selection of *Asterix* albums. The percentages indicate in how many of the panels in which a character affected by a specific emotion occurs (e.g. in 87% of all the appearances of a proud character, that character is depicted with tightly closed eyes). Moreover, Van Eunen has chosen to accommodate in the table only those markers that appeared in at least two emotions.

Taking into account the findings of Forceville (2002, 2005) and Eerden (2004), Van Eunen summarizes the markers (bodily postures &

facial expressions as well as pictorial runes and balloonic features) for the various emotions in *Asterix* in table 7.2. (Please note that due to reasons of space I cannot discuss the nature and significance of all markers; interested readers are referred to the original publications. Translations and minor adaptations in the descriptions are mine, ChF]. Van Eunen concludes that no less than ten markers are used for three of the four emotions investigated. Clearly, several markers have to be *combined* to reliably cue a specific emotion rather than another one. The fact that different emotions draw to a considerable extent on the same repertoire of markers is commensurate with Kövecses claim that the overarching metaphor is EMOTIONS ARE PHYSICAL FORCES.



Fig. 7.22. Anger markers include wide-open eyes, tightly closed mouth/beak, arm-hand position, droplets, capital letters in balloon (*Goede Voornemens*).



Fig. 7.23. Anger markers include wide-open eyes, wide-open mouth/beak, runes from head, capital letters in balloon (*De Kinderpsycholoog*).



Fig. 7.24. Anger markers include tightly closed eyes, tightly closed mouth/beak, red head, arm-hand position, runes from head, capital letters in balloon (*De Kinderpsycholoog*).

Van Eunen goes on to study a few stories from a different comics series, namely (the black-and -white) *Donald Duck*, as drawn by its most famous illustrator, Carl Barks, focusing on two emotions: anger and fear (he found love and pride to occur rather seldom). Without going into the details of the findings, it is worth reporting that about half of the markers found for both anger and fear occur both in *Asterix* and in *Donald Duck*. Perhaps the large percentage of non-shared features would disappear with a different (sub)categorization, but this is not the whole story. Van Eunen finds that *Asterix* is richer in emotion cues than *Donald Duck*. An interesting explanation for this Van Eunen proffers is that in *Donald Duck* the entire body is less often visible than in *Asterix*. He also observes that a *white* face (an important marker of fear in *Asterix*) is by definition impossible in black-and -white comics. Finally, he makes the point that the *Donald Duck* stories are considerably shorter than the *Asterix* stories. Barker has to portray actions, and their accompanying emotions, very quickly (i.e., in few panels),

and this may affect both the number and the complexity of the emotion cues. Apart from that, there are clearly artist-specific choices for the depiction of an emotion (e.g., “nail-biting” helps cue fear in *Asterix*, but not in *Donald Duck*). One of Van Eunen’s most striking overall conclusions is that there is not a single marker that is used in both *Asterix* and *Donald Duck* for every emotion, but that the eye-position and the arm-hand position are the most often used markers for the expression of emotions.



Fig. 7.25. Fear markers include: arm-hand position; droplets (*Het Geheim van het Oude Kasteel*).



Fig. 7.26. Fear markers include: wide-open eyes; wide-open mouth; straight hair; arm-hand position; droplets, shaking, capitals in balloon (*De Schrik van de Rivier*).



Fig. 7.27. Fear markers include: wide-open eyes; straight hair; arm-hand position; droplets, shaking, capitals in balloon, form of balloon (*De Schrik van de Rivier*).

Shinohara and Matsunaka (2009)

Shinohara and Matsunaka (2009), who previously had applied Kövecses’ theory to Japanese to check how the “embodied” dimension of emotion-discourse is complemented by cultural factors (2003), here turn to Japanese manga to see how well Forceville’s (2005) model works for comics in a very different cultural tradition. Considering various emotions in present-day popular manga created by different authors, they conclude that by and large the same runes are used in manga as in *Asterix*, but they also find culturally-specific expressions of emotions. One rune widely used to convey anger in manga is the Y-shaped “popped-up vein” (see figures 7.28 and 7.29 – all figures in this section from Shinohara and Matsunaka 2009); another is the pervasive use of weather conditions to cue a character’s emotional state. While this feature is sometimes used in Western comics as well, it appears to be far more common in manga – a circumstance Shinohara and Matsunaka ascribe to deep-rooted cultural usage, for instance in traditional Japanese *waka* poems.

Shinohara and Matsunaka note that not only anger, but also love, happiness, surprise, disappointment and anxiety can be conveyed “meteorologically” and through natural backgrounds more generally (fig. 7.30.)



Figure 7.28. Various anger signals, incl. eye position, shaking, and the Y-shaped vein on cheek and forehead (Azuma, *Yotsubato* vol. 5).



Figure 7.29. Various anger signals, incl. the boy’s arm position, steam/clouds above his head, and the Y-shaped vein on his forehead (Usui, *Crayon Shinchan* vol. 3).



Figure 7.30. “Stormy” background to indicate the girl’s anger (Azuma, *Yotsubato* vol. 5). Please note that the scene takes place indoors.

Moes (2010)

Moes (2010) takes the next step in the budding field of the visual representation of emotion in comics by investigating an emotion hitherto untheorized within CMT: disgust. This is an interesting expansion, since disgust is considered to be a universal emotion (Ekman and Friesen 1975). After compiling a corpus of more than 5500 messages containing the word “disgust” or any of a series of synonyms on Twitter, Moes develops a prototype scenario of disgust in the spirit of Kövecses (1986, 2000), which he subsequently applies to a substantial sample of *Calvin and Hobbes* cartoons (Bill Watterson).

In line with findings by Eerden and Van Eunen, Moes discovers that several pictorial markers are used both for anger and for disgust (the latter, incidentally, occurring far less often in his data than the former). This holds for instance for “bulging eyes” – which is “the most found marker denoting disgust” (Moes 2010: 60); but again, tightly closed eyes also often help express both anger and disgust. A wide-open mouth or, by contrast, a tightly closed one, frequently helps cue both anger and disgust (figs. 7.31 and 7.32). This reinforces earlier findings that both eyes and mouths are heavily

deployed by comics artists to signal characters' emotions. However, in the case of disgust, as opposed to anger, there is often a tongue hanging out of the mouth, as if to indicate an inclination to vomit. Arm-hand position, too, is significant, but for anger there are nuances not reported with reference to *Asterix* or *Donald Duck*. For instance, Moes finds that sometimes Calvin holds an object in front of him while pursuing the person he is angry with. Moreover, an angry Calvin often has his hands on his hips. With regard to the arm- hand position of disgust, Moes observes that most arms/hands are "in front of a body part (eyes, nose, chest, stomach) as if to protect the body from the disgusting event (eyes, nose), or keeping the welled up disgust inside the body (chest, stomach)" (Moes 2010: 64) . Averting the body from the source of unpleasantness appears to be typical for disgust (fig. 7.33; all figures in this section from Moes 2010).



Fig 7.31. Anger markers include a V-shaped brow and a wide-open mouth (Watterson, *The Complete Calvin and Hobbes*).



Fig. 7.32. Disgust markers include open mouth with tongue hanging out, arm-hand position, bulging eyes, averting, shaking (Watterson, *The Complete Calvin and Hobbes*).



Fig 7.33. Disgust markers include wide-open mouth with tongue hanging out, arm-hand position, tightly closed eyes, bold, shaking (Watterson, *The Complete Calvin and Hobbes*).

EMOTIONS ARE FORCES: some concluding remarks

The research into the depiction of emotions in comics reported above is no more than a modest beginning, and it continues. Schempp (2011) implicitly confirms Van Eunen's findings by showing that in the *Scott Pilgrim* comic she analyzes "pride" involves expansion of the body. She moreover proposes the notion of a symmetric arrangement of characters for "romantic love," which could be seen as a rendering of Kövecses' LOVE IS UNITY. Abbott and

Forceville (submitted) discuss the loss of hands (sic) as denoting loss of emotional control (specifically anger) in Azuma's *Azumanga Daioh*. Let me cautiously end with some general conclusions and also make some suggestions for things to bear in mind in further research.

In the first place, it makes methodological sense to distinguish at least the following categories of visual information pertaining to the expression of emotions (and other relevant narrative information) in comics:

- (1) *Iconic information arising from facial expressions and body postures.* This is presumably hyperbolic information we recognize from “real life” (and perhaps some of this knowledge has over time become “frozen” in comics conventions). It is clear, though, that even this supposedly universally embodied source of information allows different artists to explore their own favourite ways of depiction (e.g. nail-biting versus white face for *fear*). Another consideration to be borne in mind here is that most comics discussed here are series, with the same recurring characters. In *Tintin*, for instance, the irascible Haddock is often angry, and so is the eponymous Donald Duck. It may be that the depiction of a specific emotion is to some extent reserved for a specific character. The “nature” of the character also may favour certain expressions of emotion over others. Donald Duck has a beak, not a mouth, and *Asterix*' male Gauls invariable have moustaches, hiding their mouths. Clearly such circumstances constitute both affordances and limitations to depict emotions.
- (2) *Pictorial runes.* Questions that need to be answered with regard to pictorial runes include: (a) Do runes constitute a closed set? (b) to what extent is there an artist/period/movement-independent catalogue of runes? (c) Are runes indicative of “emotion” in general, or are there emotion-specific runes – or does this depend on the artist studied? Ojha and Forceville (in prep.) are conducting experiments to help answer this latter question, but extensive historical research is called for as well.
- (3) *Balloonic features.* Text and thought balloons can convey narratively salient information, including information pertaining to emotions, for instance by their form or the use of colour. Texts fonts used in balloons are also often used expressively (e.g., bold print for shouting). For more details, see Forceville et al. (2010).
- (4) *Pictograms.* Pictograms can be distinguished from runes by having a degree of context-independent meaning (e.g., skulls, hearts, thunder).

While usually occurring outside balloons, they may also appear within them.

- (5) *Panel-form and lay-out*. Elements of form and colour that may inform balloons can also be used to enhance the narrative information of panels. But there are also elements that are specific for this central stylistic tool in comics, such as the order in which they are to be read, as well as nesting structures. We could perhaps see “camera angles” as used in animation films as belonging in this category, too.

Returning to facial expressions & body postures, it is clear that eyes, mouths, and arm-hand positions are strongly expressive of emotions. It will be important to check systematically to what extent this is commensurate with Kövecses’ findings of emotion-expressions in language. Kövecses does not pay much attention to gestures. Whether this is because he has “missed” verbal emotion expressions pertaining to gestures or because language as a medium has less opportunities to exploit arm-hand positions and gestures (but cf. Yu 2000, 2003) than the medium of comics (see Abbott and Forceville submitted) is an open question. In any case, it is obvious that it is the *combination* of pictorial markers and runes in comics that unequivocally suggests one emotion rather than another. (Interestingly, this need for more than one signal to cue an emotion unambiguously might reflect the fact that an emotion is associated with more than one facial muscle in real life: “often the combination of more than one muscle movement is necessary to signal a single emotion” (Ekman 1992: 551)). The detail with which emotions are expressed, incidentally, appears to vary from artist to artist, but may also have something to do with the length (i.e., number of panels) available to an artist to tell his/her story. However this may be, Hergé and Uderzo appear to use more cues to express the emotional state of a character than Barker and Watterson. Another issue for sustained research is to investigate how pictorial markers and runes used to express emotions are similar to, or different from, those of those to express pain.

An important question for the further theorization of CMT is to what extent individual expressions of emotions in comics’ characters can be unequivocally attributed to metaphors of the A IS B type favoured by Kövecses (1986, 2000). It sometimes seems strained to categorize visual expressions of anger as exemplifying one conceptual metaphor rather than another. Probably Kövecses is right to claim, though, that the overarching metaphor is EMOTIONS ARE FORCES (Kövecses 2008: 385), which would also cover, for instance, LOVE IS FIRE in the Chinese comic *Old Master Q* (Chang and Li 2006).

Whether all this is enough to convince CMT skeptics remains to be seen. How can we be sure that a certain phenomenon is best explicable by construing it as a conceptual metaphor without postulating that conceptual metaphor in the first place? The problem is that if indeed these metaphors are so deeply rooted in human beings' thinking as CMT claims they are, it is difficult to test the hypothesis, since there is no rival model to explain the patterns in human thinking that CMT demonstrates via conceptual metaphors. If that makes the claims at present unfalsifiable – so be it. For the time being CMT enthusiasts will have to live with that weakness. The burden is on the skeptics to come up with a better model to explain the systematicity in verbal and non-verbal expressions and phenomena that structure abstract semantic domains. In the mean time, CMT advocates need to be as explicit as possible about what they are doing, and thus hopefully come closer to making claims that *are* falsifiable.

General concluding remarks

In this lecture, two conceptual metaphors have been analyzed in (audio)visual media: PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY IS A JOURNEY and EMOTIONS ARE (PHYSICAL) FORCES. But these are only two, albeit important metaphors. Work in this area is now burgeoning. Comics, cartoons, and animation are excellent media for analysing multimodal conceptual metaphor (and for analysing multimodality in general). Bounegru and Forceville (forthc.) show that political newspaper cartoons satirizing the financial crisis that overwhelmed the world in October 2008 are rooted in a limited number of conceptual metaphors. Ying-Yu Lin and Chiang (2010) show how conceptual metaphors such AS TIME IS MOTION, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, LIFE IS A STAGE, and POLITICS IS A GAME inform ideological issues in political cartoons taking a stance vis-à-vis controversial US beef imports in Taiwan.

If CMT is right in its central claims, it should also be possible to demonstrate conceptual, or at least structural, metaphors in live-action film and other types of moving images. Forceville (1999) showed how the structural metaphor COLIN IS A CHILD is conveyed audiovisually in Paul Schrader's film *The Comfort of Strangers*. Rook et al. (2010) discuss the recurring multimodal metaphor PSYCHOANALYSIS IS OPENING DOORS in Hitchcock's *Spellbound*. Tag et al. (2010) demonstrate the multimodal expressions of the conceptual metaphors MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN, SUCCESS IS UP and FAILURE IS DOWN, and HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN in a German news programme on the financial crisis.

Fahlenbrach (2007, 2010) discusses emotion metaphors in live-action films (e.g., *Blade Runner* and *Das Boot*), which she sees as a primarily visual medium, and in TV programmes (advertising and news), which she considers a more sound-and-spoken-language- oriented medium. Renckens (2010) convincingly shows that lightness and darkness are used metaphorically, and often in a quite sophisticated manner, in live- action films (*Apocalypse Now*, *Bram Stoker's Dracula*, *Insomnia*, *The Lord of the Rings*, among others) to suggest GOOD IS LIGHT and BAD IS DARK, and more specific metaphors such as HOPE/LIFE/POSITIVE AFFECTIVE STATE IS LIGHT; DESPAIR/DEATH/NEGATIVE AFFECTIVE STATE IS DARK.

Let me end by stating that I expect the most illuminating work in the area of multimodal conceptual metaphor – and of multimodal discourse in general – to come from approaches that investigate data that belong to the same medium (e.g., comics, animation, photography, live-action film, painting ...) *and* the same genre (e.g., art, advertising, political cartoons, DVD manuals ...) *and* display the same combination of modalities (e.g., language + visuals; visuals + sound; “visuals + music + sound” ...). The rationale behind this is that each medium, genre, and modality (and combination of modalities) has its own affordances and limitations. We will learn most if we initially restrict ourselves to highly comparable data. Whether or not CMT's central tenets are eventually proven or disproven remains to be seen; but the focus on metaphor throughout this Course has forced me to be highly specific in deciding what relevant narrative or persuasive information is rendered in what modality, and how modalities interact in conveying the overall story or message. In this way, work on multimodal metaphor can contribute significantly to the more encompassing discipline of multimodal discourse.

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A Course in Pictorial and Multimodal Metaphor

Charles Forceville

Lecture 8. Concluding observations and further research

Introduction

In this last lecture of the course, I will offer some further thoughts on the topic at hand, sketch some recent developments, and outline how I envisage the further theorization and applicability of pictorial and multimodal metaphor.

Multimodal metaphor

In this course, the emphasis has been on the role of the visual modality in multimodal metaphor. As we have seen, however, even if a metaphor appears as a visual/pictorial monomodal metaphor, it appears almost always within a discourse in which one or more other modalities occur as well. Even if these are not part of the metaphor itself, they usually play a role in the interpretation of the discourse in which the metaphor appears. This should serve as a reminder that in virtually every (segment of) metaphorical discourse more is going on than the metaphor alone. Verbal metaphors both in poetry and advertising may increase their impact by coupling their conceptual content with a striking form. Benczes (2013) convincingly argues that alliteration and rhyme enhance the potential impact and memorability of metaphoric and metonymic expressions such as “brain gain,” “cuddle puddle,” and “street spam.” It can be added that verbal form can aid successful and memorable creative metaphors in yet other ways: surely difficult-to -pinpoint aspects of “rhythm” as well as pleasurable alliteration, assonance, and the repetition of consonants put flesh on the bare-bone conceptual metaphor RELIGIOUS LADIES ARE BRONTOSAURI in the following literary passage:

Mrs Poulteney was to dine at Lady Cotton's that evening; and the usual hour had been put **forward for what was always** in essence, if not **appearance, a thunderous clash** of two **brontosauri**; with **bláck vélvet** taking the **place** of íron **cártilage**, and **quotátion** from the Bible the **ángry ráging tééth**; but no **less dóur** and **reléntless** a **báttle**. (*The French Lieutenant's Woman*, John Fowles, Triad/Granada 1980, p. 88, my emphases, ChF)

It is thus a mistake to say that a (stretch of) verbal discourse “is” a metaphor; even if its overall meaning depends primarily on it; we should say that it “contains” a metaphor, or that it is to a considerable extent “structured” by a metaphor. I would want to make the same claim for other modalities. Rhythms, repetitions, and “rhymes” in visuals (and in music, sound, and gestures) can marvelously support (or if badly deployed: cringingly detract from) the conceptual content of a trope. Indeed, in genres such as advertising, a spectacular form may actually divert attention from what, in fact, is rather meagre content.

As discussed in Forceville (2007a, 2009a), music and sound may moreover play a substantial role in the cueing (single-handedly or in combination with other modes) of target, source, and/or mappable features in a multimodal metaphor. I suspect that laymen as well as experts (the latter often trained as linguists) are often insufficiently sensitive to the contribution of music and sound to the overall meaning of a metaphor. There is thus a lot of theoretical and applied work to be done in this area (for leads, see Cook 1998, Johnson and Larson 2003, Thorau 2003, Spitzer 2004, Zbikowski 2009, Górska 2010), whereas the role of touch and olfaction in metaphors constitutes virtually unexplored territory. By contrast, the study of metaphorical gesture, which is usually considered a modality in its own right, has by now developed a high degree of sophistication (e.g., McNeill 1992, Cienki 1998, Cienki and Müller 2008, Müller 2008, Müller and Cienki 2009, Mittelberg and Waugh 2009). More generally, metaphor scholars need to consider more systematically in what combination of modes metaphors can surface. The various modes can occur in all kinds of permutations. Each of the modes considered as such in this course (written language, spoken language, visuals, music, sound, gestures, olfaction, taste, touch) can in principle (help) identify a target, a source, and/or one or more mappable features. Since a metaphor may draw on more than two modes simultaneously for each of these tasks, and since each of them can constitute either the metaphor’s target and its source, the *theoretical* number of

possibilities is quite daunting. Which combinations surface in actual practice is simply a matter of trial and error to find out.

Metaphor and other tropes

Gibbs (1993), Barcelona (2000), and Dirven and Pörings (2002) were among the first to remind CMT scholars that although metaphor may be the queen of tropes, not all non-literal language should be labeled metaphoric. Metaphors need to be distinguished not just from metonyms, but also from tropes such as symbolism, hyperbole, oxymoron. The goal here is to demonstrate both where the similarities (if any) and the differences between these tropes reside. Classical lists of verbal tropes, such as those suggested by Aristotle and Quintillian, and by and large adopted in the modern era (e.g., Chapters 8-10 in Leech 1969), can serve as starting points, but need to be critically examined, as many tropes are often imprecisely defined, and thus not well distinguishable from each other (see Kennedy 1982, and critical discussion in Forceville 1996, chapter 3). Moreover, they may co-occur: ironical utterances, for instance, may draw on metaphors or hyperboles (Burgers et al. 2012; see also Burgers et al. 2013).

These questions are no less pertinent for other modalities – to begin with the ubiquitous visual one. Some work has been done here (Forceville 2009b, Urios-Aparisi 2010 on metonymy, Teng and Sun 2002, Teng 2009, and Gregersen submitted on visual oxymoron; Scott 2004, Lagerwerf 2007, Andersen 2013 on irony), but this is only a modest beginning. Part of the difficulty is that if we indeed have a “poetic mind” (Gibbs 1994), charting the ways in which it deploys various tropes visually (or in other non-verbal modes) requires that the *essence* of each trope is extracted from its (relatively speaking: best-defined) verbal manifestation, in such a way that its possible manifestations can be delineated in other modes – which is what I have attempted to do for metaphor in this Course. It is important to bear in mind that as far as we know there is no Divinity that has proclaimed that there *must* be a visual (or sonic, or olfactory) equivalent for each of the classic tropes – and conversely, that it may be the case that non-verbal modalities display systematic behaviours absent in language that we might nonetheless want to label a “trope.” Possibly, “transformation/metamorphosis” is a candidate for such tropical status. Animation films, as Wells (1998: 69-76) points out, often feature elements that transform into other elements. While such a metamorphosis *may* be a way of cueing a metaphor (or another classical trope, for that matter), this need not be the case. Perhaps we should call it a “scheme” rather than a “trope.” (Leech

defines schemes as “foregrounded repetitions of expression” and tropes as “foregrounded irregularities of content,” Leech 1969: 74).

Metaphor and Creativity

By and large until Ortony (1979) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) – at least in Anglo-Saxon scholarship (see Jäkel 1999) – metaphor was considered as a manifestation of creativity *par excellence*, something typically encountered in poetry, fiction and, increasingly, advertising. After that, the emphasis shifted toward the way in which metaphors that were called structural, primary, or conceptual, revealed deeply-rooted, sometimes embodied cognitive processes. Lakoff and Turner (1989) reinforced the idea that almost all creative metaphors could be traced to underlying conceptual metaphors. True, they acknowledged that there are exceptions (called “image metaphors” – an unfortunate label, since this suggested that creativity in metaphor somehow has a privileged link to the visual modality), but they are supposedly rare. One of these is André Breton’s famous “My wife’s waist is an hourglass.” But surely, this metaphor can be analysed as a surface manifestation of the conceptual metaphors PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS. Similarly, on one level the Fowles metaphor discussed above could be rendered as PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, but while not wrong this phrasing does not reveal how this specific manifestation of the metaphor is original.

In my view, Lakoff and Turner’s monograph has unintentionally but unhappily contributed to the downplaying and neglect of the creative dimension of metaphor. Let me outline a few potentially problematic dimensions of the overly exclusive link between metaphor and “embodied thought.”

In the first place, the emphasis on the ABSTRACT A IS CONCRETE B has caused a blind spot for manifestations of the CONCRETE A IS CONCRETE B variety. In fact, almost all examples of pictorial metaphor (not, significantly, of *verbo*-pictorial metaphor!) discussed in Forceville (1996) are of this latter type: the target domain here is a depicted product (or an element metonymically related to this product, as in the case of three airline tickets that are metonymically related to the service or brand advertised, the airline company that issues them, see Forceville 1996: pp. 118-120, 127) that is metaphorically to be understood in terms of another depicted, or visually suggested, entity.

Incidentally, even a liberal understanding of the A IS B formula has the unfortunate consequence of suggesting that metaphors are static rather than dynamic phenomena. Metaphors are often exhortations to consider *activities*

that can be done to or with source domain entities, or evaluations applicable to them, as mappable to the target, rather than a mere mapping of *characteristics* or *features*. Therefore it may be better to discuss metaphors in terms of A-ING IS B-ING (Forceville & Urios-Aparisi 2009a: 11). Cameron et al., in a paper focusing on how (verbal) metaphor can be used “as a tool to uncover people’s ideas, attitudes and values” (2009: 64), similarly advocate the importance of focusing on the dynamic nature of metaphorizing:

A complexity/dynamic systems perspective highlights change and connectedness in social and cognitive systems, and, when applied to the social sciences, identifies complex dynamic systems at all scales from the cultural to the individual. The perspective also changes how we see metaphor: it is no longer a static, fixed mapping, but a temporary stability emerging from the activity of interconnecting systems of socially-situated language use and cognitive activity. This dynamic perspective on metaphor raises new possibilities for investigating metaphor in discourse and thereby contributing to social sciences research (Cameron et al. 2009: 64; see also note 4 on p. 67).

A second problem with Lakoff and Turner’s views, as indicated above, is that a metaphor may strike us as “creative” because of its formal rather than because of its conceptual qualities. Alexander Pope’s famous definition of “true wit” is “nature to advantage dress’d:/ what oft was thought/ but ne’er so well express’d.” The creativity of such “wit” thus resides not in the novelty of the idea, but in the novelty of its formulation. This aspect can most easily be attested within monomodal metaphors of the verbal variety – lyrical poetry perhaps being the best genre to look for examples. But the choice of mode to cue a target or source can be creative in a way that a verbal rendering of the underlying metaphor is absolutely not (see Forceville 2012, 2013a for examples).

A brief remark on Blending Theory: while I certainly see its potential to model the often creative hybrids that are ubiquitous in pictorial, verbal, as well as multimodal discourse (see Forceville 2012, 2013b), I sometimes think that the dominance of CMT has made metaphor scholars oblivious to the strongly creative dimension of metaphors proposed by Richards (1936) and Black (1962, 1979). That being said, Veale et al. (2013) contains a number of papers that draw on the Blending Theory model to say something non-trivial about modeling creativity.

Where I see further uses for the Blending model are its opportunities to have more than two “input spaces.” A good example is Górska (2010),

discussing musician Daniel Barenboim's conceptual metaphor LIFE IS MUSIC both in verbal and musico-verbal manifestations. A metaphor by definition always has no less and no more than two elements: a target and a source. But as we have seen in this Course both of them can be cued in more than one modality. If pertinent information about a target and source is modeled in input spaces (perhaps as "satellite" spaces to target and source), this helps visualize the modalities that play a role in the construal and interpretation of a multimodal metaphor. More generally, inasmuch as most (all?) tropes involve two elements that occur in a tensive relation of some sort or another, Blending Theory may be helpful in modeling similarities and differences between tropes, irrespective of modality.

Recent work on pictorial and multimodal metaphor

Forceville and Urios-Aparisi (2009b) is a collection presenting work on multimodal metaphor in a variety of genres and media, including advertising, film, comics, gestures, and music. The Adventures in Multimodality blog (<http://muldisc.wordpress.com/>) contains some reviews of the book. Of interest is also McQuarrie and Philips (2008), a collection which focuses on verbal and visual tropes from a communication studies perspective.

Coëgnaerts and Kravanja have written a series of papers (some in Dutch) in which they focus on various dimensions of metaphor in film (e.g., Coëgnaerts and Kravanja 2012a, 2012b). Ortiz (2011) demonstrates how various conceptual metaphors can be fleshed out cinematically. Kappelhoff and Müller (2012) discuss how multimodal metaphor in both film and co-speech gestures unfold and develop dynamically and trigger emotion responses. Koetsier and Forceville (forthc.) proposes the metaphor DEVIANT IDENTITY IS TRANSFORMED BODY in Werewolf films, while Forceville and Renckens (forthc.) analyse another conceptual metaphor in film: GOOD IS LIGHT and BAD IS DARK. Forceville (2011a, forthc. a) continues my own earlier work on the JOURNEY metaphor in animation film. These studies help bridge CMT and cognitivist film studies. Kromhout and Forceville (2013) argue for the centrality of the JOURNEY metaphor in three videogames. Van Mulken et al (2010) report the result of an experiment in which car advertisements containing metaphors of three different kinds (contextual, hybrid, and simile) are understood and evaluated. Hopefully the next decade will see more empirical research on visual and multimodal metaphor when more scholars with a background in linguistics are entering the discipline of visual and multimodal metaphor and metonymy, and their interaction (e.g., Sobrino

2013). Increasingly, the awareness that metaphors and other tropes do often behave differently in different genres (Forceville 2008: 478) is taken seriously (El Refaie 2003, 2009, Caballero 2006, Burgers et al 2012).

Visual/pictorial and multimodal metaphors also have very practical applications in other fields than advertising and education. Erwin (2013) shows how a focus on metaphor is one of various strategies in business contexts to help “communicate the new,” while Cila (2013) demonstrates how an understanding of visual metaphors can be deployed in good product design. Indurkya (2013) and Indurkya and Ojha (2013) present theoretical ideas for, and a partial implementation of, a computer programme (FISH, Fast Image Search in Huge database) that can search online visuals with the aim of revealing visual similarity – with metaphoric potential.

From multimodal metaphor to multimodal discourse

My work on multimodal metaphor has given me many ideas about how to study multimodal discourse more generally. Multimodality research is usually associated with the Hallidayan “Systemic Functional Linguistics” (SFL) and “social semiotics” paradigms. Whereas I see exciting developments in this paradigm, I also have problems with the way many of its practitioners approach multimodality (Forceville 1999, 2007b, 2009c, 2010, 2011b). In my view the best of the SFL and social semiotics models need to be married with the best of various cognitivist models; for some ideas, see Forceville (2013a, forthc. a) and Pinar Sanz (2013), a collection of papers applying cognitive linguistics to multimodal discourse.

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