

	<b>Zoellick speech (September 2005)</b>	<b>White House report on approach to China (May 2020)</b>
<b>Approach and assessment</b>	<p>United States welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China, one that appreciates that its growth and development depends on constructive connections with the rest of the world.</p> <p>Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United States – and others as well – to hedge relations with China. Many countries hope China will pursue a "Peaceful Rise," but none will bet their future on it.</p> <p>If the Cold War analogy does not apply, neither does the distant balance-of-power politics of 19th Century Europe. The global economy of the 21st Century is a tightly woven fabric. We are too interconnected to try to hold China at arm's length, hoping to promote other powers in Asia at its expense.</p> <p>For fifty years, our policy was to fence in the Soviet Union while its own internal contradictions undermined it. For thirty years, our policy has been to draw out the People's Republic of China. As a result, the China of today is simply not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s.</p> <p>Our policy has succeeded remarkably well: the dragon emerged and joined the world.</p>	<p>To respond to Beijing's challenge, the Administration has adopted a competitive approach to the PRC, based on a clear-eyed assessment of the CCP's intentions and actions, a reappraisal of the United States' many strategic advantages and shortfalls, and a tolerance of greater bilateral friction.</p> <p>The CCP's expanding use of economic, political, and military power to compel acquiescence from nation states harms vital American interests and undermines the sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world.</p> <p>Prevailing in strategic competition with the PRC requires cooperative engagement with multiple stakeholders, and the Administration is committed to building partnerships to protect our shared interests and values. The Administration also recognizes the steps allies and partners have taken to develop more clear-eyed and robust approaches toward the PRC.</p> <p>Guided by a return to principled realism, the United States is responding to the CCP's direct challenge by acknowledging that we are in a strategic competition and protecting our interests appropriately.</p>
<b>Values</b>	<p>[China] does not seek to spread radical, anti-American ideologies. While not yet democratic, it does not see itself in a twilight conflict against democracy around the globe.</p> <p>Clearly, there are many common interests and opportunities for cooperation. But some say America's commitment to democracy</p>	<p>The CCP promotes globally a value proposition that challenges the bedrock American belief in the unalienable right of every person to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness....Beijing is clear that it sees itself as engaged in an ideological competition with the West.</p> <p>[China's political] system is rooted in Beijing's interpretation of</p>

	<p>will preclude long-term cooperation with China. Let me suggest why this need not be so.</p> <p>We have many common interests with China. But relationships built only on a coincidence of interests have shallow roots. Relationships built on shared interests and shared values are deep and lasting. We can cooperate with the emerging China of today, even as we work for the democratic China of tomorrow.</p> <p>Closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society. It is simply not sustainable – as economic growth continues, better-off Chinese will want a greater say in their future, and pressure builds for political reform</p>	<p>Marxist-Leninist ideology and combines a nationalistic, singleparty dictatorship; a state-directed economy; deployment of science and technology in the service of the state; and the subordination of individual rights to serve CCP ends. This runs counter to principles shared by the United States and many likeminded countries of representative government, free enterprise, and the inherent dignity and worth of every individual.</p>
<b>Economics</b>	<p>China has gained much from its membership in an open, rules-based international economic system, and the U.S. market is particularly important for China's development strategy. Many gain from this trade, including millions of U.S. farmers and workers who produce the commodities, components, and capital goods that China is so voraciously consuming.</p> <p>China has been more open than many developing countries, but there are increasing signs of mercantilism, with policies that seek to direct markets rather than opening them. The United States will not be able to sustain an open international economic system – or domestic U.S. support for such a system – without greater cooperation from China, as a stakeholder that shares responsibility on international economic issues.</p> <p>China needs to fully live up to its commitments to markets where America has a strong competitive advantage, such as in services, agriculture, and certain manufactured goods.</p>	<p>Beijing did not internalize the norms and practices of competition-based trade and investment, and instead exploited the benefits of WTO membership to become the world's largest exporter, while systematically protecting its domestic markets.</p> <p>Beijing's poor record of following through on economic reform commitments and its extensive use of state-driven protectionist policies and practices harm United States companies and workers, distort global markets, violate international norms, and pollute the environment.</p> <p>Given Beijing's increasing use of economic leverage to extract political concessions from or exact retribution against other countries, the United States judges that Beijing will attempt to convert OBOR projects into undue political influence and military access.</p>
<b>Security</b>	<p>China's rapid military modernization and increases in capabilities raise questions about the purposes of this buildup and China's lack of transparency.</p>	<p>As China has grown in strength, so has the willingness and capacity of the CCP to employ intimidation and coercion in its attempts to eliminate perceived threats to its interests and advance its strategic objectives globally.</p>

		<p>Beijing's actions belie Chinese leaders' proclamations that they oppose the threat or use of force, do not intervene in other countries' internal affairs, or are committed to resolving disputes through peaceful dialogue.</p> <p>Beijing's military buildup threatens United States and allied national security interests and poses complex challenges for global commerce and supply chains.</p> <p>The PRC's attempts to dominate the global information and communications technology industry through unfair practices...creat[es] security vulnerabilities for foreign countries and enterprises utilizing Chinese vendors' equipment and services.</p>
<b>International order and role</b>	<p>Seven U.S. presidents of both parties recognized this strategic shift and worked to integrate China as a full member of the international system. Today, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, from agreements on ozone depletion to pacts on nuclear weapons, China is a player at the table.</p> <p>[The US] now need[s] to encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. As a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member – it would work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.</p> <p>China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success. In doing so, China could... “transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge.”</p> <p>China does not believe that its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of the international system. In fact, quite the reverse: Chinese leaders have decided that their success depends on being networked with the modern world.</p>	<p>The PRC's rapid economic development and increased engagement with the world did not lead to convergence with the citizen-centric, free and open order as the United States had hoped. The CCP has chosen instead to exploit the free and open rules based order and attempt to reshape the international system in its favor. Beijing openly acknowledges that it seeks to transform the international order to align with CCP interests and ideology. The CCP's expanding use of economic, political, and military power to compel acquiescence from nation states harms vital American interests and undermines the sovereignty and dignity of countries and individuals around the world.</p> <p>Internationally, the CCP promotes General Secretary Xi's vision for global governance under the banner of “building a community of common destiny for mankind.” Beijing's efforts to compel ideological conformity at home, however, present an unsettling picture of what a CCP-led “community” looks like in practice</p>

	<p>[W]e hope to intensify work with a China that not only adjusts to the international rules developed over the last century, but also joins us and others to address the challenges of the new century.</p>	
<p><b>Managing differences</b></p>	<p>[M]anagement [of differences] can take place within a larger framework where the parties recognize a shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems that provide common benefits.</p> <p>You hear the voices that perceive China solely through the lens of fear. But America succeeds when we look to the future as an opportunity, not when we fear what the future might bring.</p>	<p>Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not offer compromises in response to American displays of goodwill, and that its actions are not constrained by its prior commitments to respect our interests. As such, the United States responds to the PRC's actions rather than its stated commitments. Moreover, we do not cater to Beijing's demands to create a proper "atmosphere" or "conditions" for dialogue.</p> <p>As the [tenets] of our approach imply, competition necessarily includes engagement with the PRC, but our engagements are selective and results-oriented, with each advancing our national interests.</p>
<p><b>Asia</b></p>	<p>In Asia, China is already playing a larger role. The United States respects China's interests in the region, and recognizes the useful role of multilateral diplomacy in Asia. But concerns will grow if China seeks to maneuver toward a predominance of power. Instead, we should work together [in regional forums].</p>	<p>The United States is also building cooperative partnerships and developing positive alternatives with foreign allies, partners, and international organizations to support the shared principles of a free and open order. Specific to the Indo-Pacific region, ...[t]he United States is working in concert with mutually aligned visions and approaches such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Japan's free and open Indo-Pacific vision, India's Security and Growth for All in the Region policy, Australia's Indo-Pacific concept, the Republic of Korea's New Southern Policy, and Taiwan's New Southbound Policy.</p>