1 Appendix

1.1 Geographical Outreach of the 2021 and 2024 Main Survey - Frequency by Province

Figure 6.1: Percentages of Respondents by Province, 2021 Survey



Figure 6.2: Percentages of Respondents by Province, 2024 Survey



Figure 6.3: Population Percentages by Province, 2020 Census



Figure 6.4: Prefectures Covered by 2021 Survey (covered prefectures are in orange)



Figure 6.5: Prefectures Covered by 2024 Survey (covered prefectures are in purple)



1.2 Randomization Protocol

The randomization protocol applies to both the pilot experiment (September, 2021) and the main survey experiment (August, 2024).

To ensure that each treatment group (including the control group) was as nationally representative as possible, we adopted the following randomization protocol.

1. Multiply the demographic quota by the treatment group size (sub-sample size) to calculate the number of questionnaires needed in each demographic "slot."

   For example, if the treatment group consists of 1,000 people and requires 500 men and 500 women, then a "slot" of 500 men and a "slot" of 500 women are created based on the demographic quota. For more details on the exact quotas, please refer to the next sub-section of the Appendix.

2. Distribute the questionnaire to a first round of potential respondents, randomly assigning them to a treatment group.

3. If an individual slot is filled, the system will filter out respondents who satisfy the criterion of this slot. They will be shown a message that says "Thanks for your participation, but you do not satisfy the conditions of this survey," and they will then exit the survey.

4. If there are still unfilled slots after the first round, the survey firm will distribute the questionnaire for a second round to new potential respondents.

5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 until all quotas are filled.

1.3 Quotas Imposed

Table 5: Quota Scheme for the Main Survey, 2024 (N=2,000)

Variable	Quotas
Gender	50% male
	50% female
Age	Between 18 and 35 years old (including 35 years old): 40%
	Between 35 and 50 years old (including 50 years old): 40%
	Over 50 years old: 20%
Region	North China: 12%
	Northeast China: 7%
	East China: 30%
	Central China: 16%
	South China: 13%
	Southwest China: 15%
	Northwest China: 7%
Migrant Status	Migrant Status: 30%
	Non-Migrant Status: 70%
Usual Residence	Urban/Peri-urban residence: 64%
	Rural residence: 36%
Income	Gross personal income up to 50,000 per year (including those with no income): 50% Gross personal income of 50,000 to 100,000 per year (including 100,000): 30%
	Gross personal income of 100,000 or more per year: 20%
Education	Junior high school degree and below: 60%
	High school education and below, junior high school education and above: 20%
	College/College-level vocational school degree and above: 20%

Notes: Quotas for age, region, migrant status, education and usual residence are based on the Seventh National Population Census of the People's Republic of China (the 2020 Chinese Census). The same quota was applied to the 2021 pilot survey experiment.
Quotas for income are based on income data from the World Inequality Database. Region is defined as one's current place of residence.
Migrant status: If one's household registration (*hukou*) does not match her current place of residence, we consider that person a migrant.

Table 6: Quota Scheme for the Supplementary Survey, 2022 (N=360)

Variable	Quotas
Gender	50% male
	50% female
Region	North China: 12%
	Northeast China: 7%
	East China: 30%
	Central China: 16%
	South China: 13%
	Southwest China: 15%
	Northwest China: 7%
Income	Gross personal income up to 50,000 per year (including those with no income): 50% Gross personal income of 50,000 to 100,000 per year (including 100,000): 30%
	Gross personal income of 100,000 or more per year: 20%
Education	Junior high school degree and below: 60%
	High school education and below, junior high school education and above: 20%
	College/College-level vocational school degree and above: 20%

Notes: Compared to the quotas imposed on the main survey (N=2,500), for the supplementary survey we only imposed quotas on the dimensions related to gender, region, income and education.

1.4 Baseline Characteristics of Respondents of the Main Survey, 2021 and 2024

Table 7: Baseline Characteristics in 2021 and 2024- Compared with the Latest National Figures

	(1) 2021	(2) 2024	(3) National Average
Female	0.500	0.500	0.5124
Median Age	38	38	38.4
College Educated	0.094	0.119	0.154
Total Personal Income (Last Year)	50000	50000	46,749 (2019 - WID)
Migrant: Not living in Household Registration Place	0.300	0.300	0.345
Household Size	3.364	3.334	2.62
Urban Resident	0.640	0.640	0.6389
Years of Education	10.566	9.995	9.91
CCP Member	0.054	0.071	0.067
Public Sector Employee	0.156	0.100	NA
Observations	2500	2000	

Notes: Data source for national figures excluding income: The 2020 Chinese Census. Data source for income: World Inequality Database. We did not obtain a precise figure on the share of public sector employers at the national level, hence we did not impose any quota in the survey and cannot make concrete comparison between our survey and the country-level statistic.

1.5 Balance Tables of the Treatment and Control Groups' Characteristics (2021 and 2024 Waves)

Table 8: Mean of Demographic Variables for Control and Treatment Group and t-test of Their Differences, 2021

	(1) Control		(2) Treatment		(3) Mean Difference	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	t
Female	0.500	0.501	0.500	0.501	0.000	(0.000)
Age	39.163	11.906	38.228	11.733	0.935	(0.923)
CCP Member	0.053	0.225	0.072	0.259	-0.019	(-0.904)
Resid: Large City	0.243	0.430	0.324	0.469	-0.081*	(-2.103)
Resid: Suburban	0.113	0.318	0.092	0.290	0.021	(0.816)
Resid: Medium City	0.103	0.305	0.096	0.295	0.007	(0.285)
Resid: Small City/Town	0.180	0.385	0.128	0.335	0.052	(1.673)
Resid: Rural	0.360	0.481	0.360	0.481	0.000	(0.000)
Self-Assessed Social Status (1-10)	4.970	2.035	4.924	2.043	0.046	(0.263)
Self-Assessed Income Level (1-10)	4.740	1.985	4.736	2.001	0.004	(0.023)
Total Personal Income (Last Year)	6.130	2.440	6.188	2.472	-0.058	(-0.276)
Total Household Income (Last Year)	7.683	1.965	7.572	2.207	0.111	(0.625)
Highest Education Level	3.563	1.145	3.592	1.233	-0.029	(-0.282)
Father's Education Level	3.110	1.485	3.116	1.428	-0.006	(-0.048)
Foreign Travel Experience	0.107	0.309	0.100	0.301	0.007	(0.255)
Public Sector Employee	0.117	0.322	0.136	0.343	-0.019	(-0.681)
Amount Would Share (Dictator Game)	1687.400	1464.749	1739.676	1625.556	-52.276	(-0.396)
City Tier Classification	2.603	1.066	2.556	1.071	0.047	(0.517)
Household Size	3.390	0.753	3.368	0.712	0.022	(0.350)
Own >1 Property	0.097	0.296	0.096	0.295	0.001	(0.026)
Interest in Politics (1-4)	2.930	0.726	2.916	0.692	0.014	(0.230)
Device: Android	0.700	0.459	0.684	0.466	0.016	(0.404)
Device: iPhone	0.077	0.267	0.064	0.245	0.013	(0.575)
Device: Tablet	0.007	0.082	0.000	0.000	0.007	(1.293)
Device: PC	0.217	0.413	0.252	0.435	-0.035	(-0.975)
Observations	300		250		550	

Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table 9: Mean of Demographic Variables for Control and Treatment Groups and t-test of Their Differences, 2024

	(1) Control		(2) Treatment		(3) Mean Difference	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	t
Female	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.000	(0.000)
Age	40.097	11.049	40.040	11.387	0.057	(0.114)
CCP Member	0.053	0.224	0.089	0.285	-0.036**	(-3.141)
Resid: Large City	0.232	0.422	0.278	0.448	-0.046*	(-2.362)
Resid: Suburban	0.081	0.273	0.078	0.268	0.003	(0.248)
Resid: Medium City	0.111	0.314	0.129	0.335	-0.018	(-1.238)
Resid: Small City/Town	0.216	0.412	0.155	0.362	0.061***	(3.518)
Resid: Rural	0.360	0.480	0.360	0.480	0.000	(0.000)
Rural Land Contracting Right	0.621	0.485	0.617	0.486	0.004	(0.184)
Self-Assessed Social Status (1-10)	5.376	1.940	5.036	1.922	0.340***	(3.937)
Self-Assessed Income Level (1-10)	5.160	1.860	5.002	1.833	0.158	(1.913)
Total Personal Income (Last Year)	6.275	2.256	6.288	2.357	-0.013	(-0.126)
Total Household Income (Last Year)	8.122	2.131	8.318	2.168	-0.196*	(-2.039)
Highest Education Level	3.391	1.277	3.434	1.463	-0.043	(-0.700)
Father's Education Level	3.315	1.584	3.147	1.434	0.168*	(2.486)
Foreign Travel Experience	0.092	0.289	0.082	0.275	0.010	(0.793)
Public Sector Employee	0.095	0.293	0.101	0.301	-0.006	(-0.451)
Amount Would Share (Dictator Game)	1785.807	1664.323	1871.655	1757.502	-85.848	(-1.122)
City Tier Classification	2.653	1.024	2.632	1.066	0.021	(0.449)
Household Size	3.320	0.700	3.348	0.697	-0.028	(-0.897)
Own >1 Property	0.046	0.210	0.075	0.264	-0.029**	(-2.724)
Interest in Politics (1-4)	2.954	0.739	2.924	0.715	0.030	(0.923)
Device: Android	0.742	0.438	0.696	0.460	0.046*	(2.290)
Device: iPhone	0.044	0.205	0.041	0.198	0.003	(0.332)
Device: Tablet	0.004	0.063	0.004	0.063	0.000	(0.000)
Device: PC	0.210	0.408	0.259	0.438	-0.049**	(-2.589)
Observations	1000		1000		2000	

Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

1.6 Normalized Mean Differences of Treated and Control Group Respondents, 2024

Table 10: Normalized Mean Differences Between Treatment and Control Groups, 2024

	Normalized Mean Difference
Female	0.000
Resid: Rural Areas	0.000
Device: Other	0.000
Pension: Landless Farmers	0.000
Age	-0.005
Personal Income	0.006
Land Contract Rights	-0.008
Pension: Urban Resident	-0.010
Pension: Commercial	0.010
Resid: Urban Areas	-0.011
Device: iPhone	-0.015
Health Insurance: Rural Cooperative	-0.019
City Tier Level	-0.020
Public Sector Employee	0.020
Health Insurance: Urban Employee	0.021
Pension: Urban Employee	0.023
Education Level	0.031
Foreign Travel Experience	-0.035
Health Insurance: Urban Resident	-0.039
Household Size	0.040
Interest in Social/Political Issues	-0.041
No Health Insurance	-0.044
Amount Would Share (Dictator Game)	0.050
Resid: Towns/Villages	0.055
Pension: Rural	-0.065
Feel Secure (1–10)	-0.068
No Pension Coverage	0.074
Self-Reported Income Category	-0.086
Household Income	0.091
Economic Pressure (1–10)	0.094
Health Insurance: Unknown	-0.095
Device: Android	-0.102
Resid: City Center	0.106
Father Education	-0.111
Device: PC	0.116
Own >1 Property	0.122
Life Satisfaction (1–10)	-0.124
CCP Member	0.140
Resid: Small City/Town	-0.157

Self-Assessed Social Status (1–10)	-0.176
Health Insurance: Commercial	0.199

1.7 Oster Bounds for Treatment Effect Estimates

Table 11: Oster Bounds for the Treatment Effect Estimates, 2024

	(1) All Policies	(2) Gov. Duty Index	(3) Tax Rich Index (All)	(4) Tax Rich Index (Without Housing)	(5) Help Poor Index (All)	(6) Help Poor Index (Without Housing)
Treatment=1	-0.0790***	-0.171***	-0.0697***	-0.0826***	-0.0271	-0.0639**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
$\beta\,(\delta = 1)$	-0.15	-0.36	-0.33	-0.38	-0.14	-0.14
$\beta\,(\delta = -1)$	-0.05	-0.12	-0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.05
Obs	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000

Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. We assume R_max=1

1.8 Subjective Economic Pressure, Life Satisfaction and Feeling Secure - 2021 and 2024

Figure 6.6: Distribution of Subjective Assessment of Economic Pressure, Life Satisfac- tion and Feeling Secure, 2021 and 2024



Notes: This figure reports the distribution of answers to life satisfaction questions in the 2021 and 2024 waves of survey. The complete questions are: "Are you satisfied with your life level right now? Choose 1 for completely dissatisfied and 10 for completely satisfied"; "Is your family feeling a lot of economic pressure? Choose 1 for no pressure at all and 10 for a lot of pressure." and "Do you feel that your life is secure? Choose 1 for no security at all and I will be doomed if something happens, and choose 10 for completely secure and not worried about a sudden job loss or sickness."

1.9 Full Set of Controls Used in Main Treatment Effect Regressions - 2021 and 2024

The following variables are used as controls in the main and heterogeneous treatment effect analysis.

- Gender (male or female)
- Age
- Self-reported CCP membership
- Place of residence (factor): Large cities, suburbs or outskirts of large cities, small cities or countryside.
- (Only for 2024) Whether the respondent has land contracting right. This variable is a proxy for whether the respondent has rural status after the era of household registration system.
- (Only for 2021) Migrant, meaning that the respondent does not reside where his or her household registration is.
- Subjective perception of relative socio-economic status in the current Chinese society: On a scale of 1-10, where would the respondent place him/herself, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest.
- Subjective perception of relative income position in the current Chinese society : On a scale of 1-10, where would the respondent place him/herself, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest.
- Job category (factor): Agriculture, service, independent artisan or merchant, head of private enterprise, white collar clerical work, government cadre, management, army/police, other professionals, blue collar workers and others.
- Self-reported personal income category (factor): No income, under 10k RMB, 10k to 20k, 20k to 30k, 30k to 40k, 40k to 50k, 50k to 80k, 80k to 100k, 100k to 150k, 150k to 200k, above 200k.

- Self-reported household income category (factor): Under 10k, 10k to 20k, 20k to 40k, 40k to 50k, 50k to 80k, 80k to 100k, 100k to 150k, 150k to 200k, above 200k.
- Education level (factor): Less than primary, primary, junior high (9 years of education), senior high (12 years of education), technial college, four-year college, postgraduate degrees.
- Father education level (factor): Less than primary, primary, junior high (9 years of education), senior high (12 years of education), technial college, four-year col- lege, postgraduate degrees.
- Foreign travel experience
- Work in public sector
- Hypothetical test of how much one would share in a dictator game out of 10k RMB
- City tiers (factor): Tier 1 cities are larger, richer and more central than tier 2 cities, and so on. Tier 1 cities refer to Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, etc. Tier 2 cities commonly refer to provincial capitals or large, rich cities (e.g. Wenzhou) that are not provincial capitals. Tier 3 cities refer to other cities in a province that has certain amount of influence and wealth. Tier 4 cities and below are often in Western, poorer provinces.
- Household size
- Property count (factors): One property, two properties, three-five properties and more.
- Level of interest for social and political affairs: 1 for not interested at all, 4 for very interested.
- Type of device used to answer the survey (iPhone, Android, tablet or PC)
- Type of health insurance (factor): Urban employee medical insurance, urban res- ident medical insurance, rural cooperative medical insurance, commercial health insurance, other health insurance (e.g. University), no health insurance, does not

know.

- Type of pension insurance (factor): Urban employee basic pension scheme, ur- ban resident pension scheme, commercial pension scheme, landless farmers pen- sion scheme, new rural social pension scheme, other pension schemes, no pen- sion scheme and do not know.
- Subjective life satisfaction (1-10)
- Subjective economic pressure (1-10)
- Subjective feeling of security (1-10)
- Province fixed effects

1.10 Definition and Descriptive Statistics of the Dummies Used for Heterogeneity Analysis

Table 12: Dummy Variables for Treatment Effect Heterogeneity Analysis in Figure 3.2

	(1) 2021 mean	(2) 2024 mean
Large Cities (Residence = Large City or its Suburb)	0.40	0.33
White Collar/Professionals	0.26	0.28
Work in SOE/Public	0.17	0.13
Income Above Median	0.50	0.50
Own >1 Property	0.09	0.06
High Econ Pressure (Larger than Median)	0.50	0.50
Upward Mobility (No Mobility = 0, Downward = NA)	0.48	0.46
Downward Mobility (No Mobility = 0, Upward = NA)	0.16	0.15
Observations	2500	2000

1.11 Representative Vignettes of Wealth Acquisition (Treatment)

- **Wealth Acquisition via Reform Windfall**

Since the reform and opening up, China has seen a significant increase in national wealth. Some people have become rich through various means. For example, please read the following three stories.

1. Wang is the owner of a medium-sized enterprise located in a city of the Zhejiang Province. Since 2000, he has been a member of a local real estate hunting group, where he has been buying real estate around the country for investment purposes. The group's practice of purchasing together makes bargaining with developers easier, and Wang has turned his initial invest- ment of 1.1 million into 10 million in just a few years.

2. Li's family resides in a city in Jiangsu Province. His parents started a suc- cessful family business and have gained considerable wealth in their home- town after many years of operation. Li struggled academically as a child and was sent to study abroad by his parents. After obtaining his college de- gree and returning to China, he joined the family business and now serves as the Vice CEO. Liu, who is the same age as Li, graduated from a pres- tigious university and joined the company as a sales manager, earning an annual salary of 120,000 yuan. Both Li and Liu work tirelessly, but Li earns 30 times more than Liu.

3. The Zhang family purchased a small property in the urban village of Shen- zhen in 2000, measuring approximately 120 square meters, for a price of some 100,000 yuan. In 2019, demolition finally took place, and the compen- sation standard was set at 100,000 yuan per square meter. With the compen- sation of 12 million yuan, the Zhang family became instant millionaires.

1.12 Outcomes of Interest Detailed

- **Policies pertaining to taxing the rich**

1. Wealth Tax (tax on the super rich): The rich should pay an annual asset tax if their total assets exceed a certain limit.

2. Audit Top 0.1% Income Earners: The top 0.1% of the ultra-high income group (1.4 million people) should be subject to annual state audits and dis- closure of their income sources.

3. Tax on 2+ Properties: Real estate taxes should be imposed on people who own two or more real estate properties

4. Maximum Income Limit: No one should be able to have an annual income above a ceiling for any reason.

5. Restrict Asset Transfers Abroad: We should strictly restrict rich people from transferring assets overseas.

6. New Sent-Down Movement: Urban residents in developed areas should be obliged to go to poor areas for a year of compulsory rural work and poverty alleviation before the age of 30, in the form of a new sent-down movement.

- **Policies pertaining to helping the poor**

1. Reserved University Quotas for the Poor: Students from poor families or underdeveloped areas should have reserved quota in key universities and key high schools.[30]

2. Free Chronic/Major Illness Care for the Poor: Low-income families would be reimbursed for most treatment costs for serious chronic and major ill-

[30]By key universities (Zhòng Dia˘n Dà Xué in Chinese), we refer to those universities that are included in the "Project 211" ad "Project 985". These two projects were established in the late 1990s to improve education quality and raise research standards in China. Announced in 1995 and 1998 respectively, both programs expired in 2014 but the labels attached to universities remain. Both 985 and 211 universities are considered elite universities by the general public in China, with the 985 universities being even more elitist. There are 154 universities in these two categories. Key high schools (Zhòng Dia˘n Ga¯o Zho¯ ng in Chinese), also known as "model high schools," refer to national exemplary ordinary senior high schools that have been evaluated and recognized by the State Education Commission and the Ministry of Education. Approximately 1,000 such schools exist nationwide in China.

nesses.

3. Raise Minimum Wage: A uniform national minimum wage should be set and the amount of the minimum wage should be further increased com- pared to the existing minimum wages in some regions of China.

4. Expand Urban Affordable Housing: Urban affordable housing should be further expanded, mainly for young working people and those whose par- ents do not own urban housing.

5. Double Minimum Social Protection: The minimum living assistance pro- gram (*Dibao*) should be expanded to more than twice its current coverage and the amount of benefits increased.

6. Increase Income Tax Starting Point: The starting point of personal income tax should be further increased (currently the starting point is $5,000).

- **Statements pertaining to government duty**

1. Reduce Rich-Poor Gap: Our government should take strong action to re- duce the gap between the rich and the poor.

2. Unify Exams/Admissions for Higher Ed: The government should use uni- form test questions and admissions standards to allow everyone to compete fairly for higher education admissions.

3. Provide Jobs: Our government has a responsibility to provide appropriate jobs for everyone who wants to work.

4. Gov Redistribution is Just: It is just to let the government regulate the dis- tribution of wealth and income.

1.13 Experimental Design of the Pilot Survey Experiment (2021)

An overview of our pilot experiment design with all treatment arms can be found in Figure 6.7. Our first set of treatments aimed to test whether the reform windfall is perceived to be a fair source of inequality and to parse out the effect of low tax salience. We adopt a two-stage randomization design here. In the first stage, we presented a somewhat non-meritocratic income generating process from two dimensions: One was acquiring wealth, and the other was staying poor. In the wealth-acquisition arm, we provided three short vignettes that represent typical ways of acquiring wealth from the market transition process.

In the staying-poor arm, we provided three short vignettes of people staying poor due to involuntary unemployment, illness, and divorce. All these scenarios are com- monplace in contemporary China. Since our outcome questions also fall along the rich and poor dimensions ("taxing the rich" policies and "helping the poor" policies), we wanted to see if perturbing a single dimension of the income generating process would alter policy preferences along that dimension without affecting the other.

In the second stage, we wanted to see if seeing information that increases tax salience would alter redistributive support. We divided the sub-samples shown vignettes about acquiring wealth and staying poor into two halves. One half of each group was provided with tax-salience information. In the tax-salience arm, we initially told respondents how much income tax representative individuals need to pay across the income distribution in China, which is very progressive. We then provided informa- tion on how much Value-Added Tax (VAT) these representative individuals might pay based on their daily consumption. Due to the flat rate of VAT in China and the fact that the poor spend a larger proportion of their total income on consumption than the rich, the updated tax burden is effectively more regressive. In total, we had four treat- ment arms in the two-stage design: Becoming-rich, becoming-rich with tax salience, staying-poor, and staying-poor with tax salience.

To test whether growth and the distributive implications of growth shape redistribu- tive support, we used a treatment priming the progress and rationale of China's eco- nomic reforms from a historical perspective (the growth treatment). We reminded

Figure 6.7: Experimental Design by Treatment Arm



respondents that China began with widespread poverty and little inequality. Inequal- ity soared after the economy took off, but even the poorest saw significant income growth after 1978. We further reminded respondents of the official "common prosper- ity" narrative, which argues that redistribution follows only after a reasonable level of economic development. Finally, we explained that the central government chose Zhejiang Province as China's "Common Prosperity Demonstration Zone" in 2021 be- cause it is one of China's most economically advanced provinces. A potential concern here is that a short piece of information does not update anything since growth is very salient in the Chinese context. We argue that the belief that everybody in China has become richer while inequality rises is not necessarily widely held. So what we update is how economic growth empowers individuals, including those who are the least ad- vantaged, rather than China's economic growth *per se*. These implications are more fundamental in shaping fairness views and redistributive preferences than the mere fact of growth itself.

We used two treatments that employ different framings when introducing a hypothet- ical redistributive policy—the initiation of real estate taxation—to eliminate concerns regarding preference falsification. In the macro-narrative treatment, we used a tone

similar to government propaganda, featuring convoluted political terms and explain- ing how this new tax affects the entire country. In the micro-narrative treatment, we introduced real estate tax using plain language and provided information about how much real estate tax representative households owning varying numbers of properties would pay. If preference falsification were at play, we would expect respondents to re- veal more "fundamental" preferences when primed to think about an issue at a more micro level that pertains more closely to their personal interests.

Finally, we used an income position and mobility updating treatment to see whether misinformation about relative income positions or mobility affects redistributive sup- port in China. We let respondents guess their relative income positions by asking "what percentage of the population do you think are poorer than you?" and then revealed income distribution data in China by showing where representative indi- viduals' income percentile falls based on their annual incomes.[31] We also asked re- spondents to guess the probabilities of intergenerational social mobility and then re- vealed the actual probabilities calculated from China General Social Survey (CGSS) data. Specifically, we asked respondents to estimate top- and bottom-income occupa- tion persistence, contextualized by the probabilities of a son with a father working as a senior white-collar worker also working as a senior white-collar worker, and the son of a farmer or low-skilled worker also working as a farmer or low-skilled worker. The definitions of top- and bottom-income occupations are provided in detail in Appendix Section 6.14.

[31]Data source: World Inequality Database (http://wid.world).

1.14 Protocol for Inter-generational Occupation Mobility Calculation

China General Social Surveys (CGSS) We use the pooled sample of the China Gen- eral Social Survey (CGSS) in the 2010s, including the following four waves: 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017. The CGSS contains the respondents' and their fathers' occupations coded following the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). We take the ISCO code at first-digit level, and coded the occupational status accordingly in the following way:

- **High-Income Occupation**: Managers and Professionals (ISCO one-digit code 0, 1 or 2)
- **Medium-Top Occupation**: Technicians, Clerks and Employees in the Service In- dustry (ISCO one-digit code 3, 4, 5)
- **Medium-Low Occupation**: Lower-Skilled Workers (ISCO one-digit code 7 or 8)
- **Low-Income Occupation**: Farmers and Unskilled Workers (ISCO one-digit code 6 and 9)

Using this categorization, the persistence figures of high and low socio-economic sta- tuses are respectively 28% and 50%; that is to say, for someone born to a father with a high-income occupation, the chance that he or she also stays in this occuaptional category is 28%. The full results are reported in Table 13.

Our Survey Given the structure of our questions, we are unable to ask our respon- dents' occupations in the same detail as that in the CGSS; We coded our respondents' and their fathers' socio-economic statuses in the following way:

- **High-Income Occupation**: Private Enterprise Owners, Party and Government Officials, Management and Professionals (inclusive of teachers, doctors, lawyers, etc)
- **Medium-Income Occupation**: Clerks, Workers in the Service Sector and Skilled Workers
- **Low-Income Occupation**: Farmers and Unskilled Workers

The coding of socio-economic status in our survey is slightly different from the CGSS coding at the top. In the CGSS, we only code high-income managerial and professional jobs as high socio-economic status, whereas in our survey the standard is slightly re- laxed to include professionals at a lower level. Meanwhile, the coding for the proxy of low socio-economic status (farmers and low-skilled workers) is the same.

Using this coding methodology, we observe that the persistence of high and low socio-economic status are respectively 38% and 47%; The statistic for the bottom-occupation category is very similar to the one obtained from the CGSS, while the figure for the top-occupation category is larger. This is somewhat expected as the bottom-occupation definition are the same while our definition of top-income occupation is also broader.

Table 13: Socio-Economic Status and Social Mobility Indexes from the CGSS (2011- 2017)

	Children's Socio-Economic Status (SES)				
	Low-Income	Mid-Low	Mid-High	High-Income	Total
Father's SES	Obs/pct	Obs/pct	Obs/pct	Obs/pct	Obs/pct
Low-Income	12811	4457	5003	2099	24370
	50%	19%	22%	9%	100%
Mid-Low	574	1129	1596	633	3932
	14%	28%	41%	17%	100%
Mid-High	573	686	1691	790	3740
	14%	17%	46%	23%	100%
High-Income	581	449	1157	827	3014
	19%	14%	39%	**28%**	100%
Total	14539	6721	9447	4349	35056
	39%	19%	28%	13%	100%

Table 14: Socio-Economic Status and Social Mobility Indexes - Our Survey

	Children's Socio-Economic Status (SES)			
	Low-Income	Medium-Income	High-Income	Total
Father's SES	Obs/pct	Obs/pct	Obs/pct	Obs/pct
Low-Income	657	681	53	1391
	47.23%	48.96%	3.81%	100%
Medium-Income	71	486	116	673
	10.55%	72.21%	17.24%	100%
High-Income	18	124	87	229
	7.86%	54.15%	**37.99%**	100%
Total	746	1291	256	2293
	32.53%	56.30%	11.16%	100%

1.15 Additional Results

Figure 6.8: Estimated Treatment Effects on Redistributive Indices, 2021 and 2024

Notes: We report confidence intervals at the 90% and 95% levels. The full set of control variables includes province fixed effects, demographic characteristics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status, life satisfaction, access to welfare, and the type of device used to complete the survey.

Figure 6.9: Estimated Treatment Effects on Redistributive Indices, 2024 - Without Affordable Housing Policy



Notes: We report confidence intervals at the 90% and 95% levels. The full set of control variables includes province fixed effects, demographic characteristics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status, life satisfaction, access to welfare, and the type of device used to complete the survey.

Figure 6.10: Estimated Treatment Effects on Redistributive Indices, 2021 and 2024 - Without Affordable Housing Policy

Notes: We report confidence intervals at the 90% and 95% levels. The full set of control variables includes province fixed effects, demographic characteristics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status, life satisfaction, access to welfare, and the type of device used to complete the survey.

Figure 6.11: Estimated Treatment Effect on Individual Government Duty Outcomes, 2021 and 2024

Notes: We report confidence intervals at the 90% and 95% levels. The full set of control variables includes province fixed effects, demographic characteristics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status, life satisfaction, access to welfare, and the type of device used to complete the survey.

Figure 6.12: Estimated Treatment Effect on Individual Tax-the-Rich Outcomes, 2021 and 2024



Notes: We report confidence intervals at the 90% and 95% levels. The full set of control variables includes province fixed effects, demographic characteristics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status, life satisfaction, access to welfare, and the type of device used to complete the survey.

Figure 6.13: Estimated Treatment Effect on Individual Help-the-Poor Outcomes, 2021 and 2024

Notes: We report confidence intervals at the 90% and 95% levels. The full set of control variables includes province fixed effects, demographic characteristics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status, life satisfaction, access to welfare, and the type of device used to complete the survey.

Figure 6.14: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Support for Redistribution (Help- the-Poor Index), 2024



Notes: This graph reports regression coefficients for the interaction term between the treatment effect and a dummy variable for the selected socio-economic characteristic. The outcome variable is the help-the-poor index. The dummies' definition and summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table 12. The confidence intervals are at the 90% and 95% levels. We control for province fixed effects, demographics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status and life satisfaction, and the type of device used to complete the survey. See Appendix Section 6.9 for the full list of controls.

Figure 6.15: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Support for Redistribution (Tax-the- Rich Index), 2024



Notes: This graph reports regression coefficients for the interaction term between the treatment effect and a dummy variable for the selected socio-economic characteristic. The outcome variable is the tax-the-rich index. The dummies' definition and summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table 12. The confidence intervals are at the 90% and 95% levels. We control for province fixed effects, demographics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status and life satisfaction, and the type of device used to complete the survey. See Appendix Section 6.9 for the full list of controls.

Figure 6.16: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Support for Redistribution (Govern- ment Duty Index), 2024



Notes: This graph reports regression coefficients for the interaction term between the treatment effect and a dummy variable for the selected socio-economic characteristic. The outcome variable is the government duty index. The dummies' definition and summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table 12. The confidence intervals are at the 90% and 95% levels. We control for province fixed effects, demographics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status and life satisfaction, and the type of device used to complete the survey. See Appendix Section 6.9 for the full list of controls.

Figure 6.17: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Support for Redistribution (Overall Index), 2021



Notes: This graph reports regression coefficients for the interaction term between the treatment effect and a dummy variable for the selected socio-economic characteristic. The outcome variable is the overall index (including all 16 outcomes, 12 policy outcomes and 4 government duty outcomes). The dummies' definition and summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table 12. The confidence intervals are at the 90% and 95% levels. We control for province fixed effects, demographics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status and life satisfaction, and the type of device used to complete the survey. See Appendix Section 6.9 for the full list of controls.

Figure 6.18: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Support for Redistribution (Help- the-Poor Index), 2021



Notes: This graph reports regression coefficients for the interaction term between the treatment effect and a dummy variable for the selected socio-economic characteristic. The outcome variable is the help-the-poor index. The dummies' definition and summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table 12. The confidence intervals are at the 90% and 95% levels. We control for province fixed effects, demographics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status and life satisfaction, and the type of device used to complete the survey. See Appendix Section 6.9 for the full list of controls.

Figure 6.19: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Support for Redistribution (Tax-the- Rich Index), 2021



Notes: This graph reports regression coefficients for the interaction term between the treatment effect and a dummy variable for the selected socio-economic characteristic. The outcome variable is the tax-the-rich index. The dummies' definition and summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table 12. The confidence intervals are at the 90% and 95% levels. We control for province fixed effects, demographics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status and life satisfaction, and the type of device used to complete the survey. See Appendix Section 6.9 for the full list of controls.

Figure 6.20: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Support for Redistribution (Govern- ment Duty Index), 2021



Notes: This graph reports regression coefficients for the interaction term between the treatment effect and a dummy variable for the selected socio-economic characteristic. The outcome variable is the government duty index. The dummies' definition and summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table 12. The confidence intervals are at the 90% and 95% levels. We control for province fixed effects, demographics, job and income categories, access to welfare, subjective socio-economic status and life satisfaction, and the type of device used to complete the survey. See Appendix Section 6.9 for the full list of controls.

Table 15: Determinants of Economic Pressure, 2021 vs 2024, Outcome = Binary Eco- nomic Pressure

	(1) 2021		(2) 2024	
Female	-0.0110	(0.0200)	0.0264	(0.0228)
Age	0.00147	(0.00106)	0.00165	(0.00113)
Resid: Suburban	0.0357	(0.0368)	-0.0144	(0.0458)
Resid: Medium City	-0.0611	(0.0391)	0.00382	(0.0416)
Resid: Small City/Town	-0.0189	(0.0427)	-0.106***	(0.0395)
Resid: Rural	-0.0165	(0.0335)	-0.00207	(0.0392)
Self-Assessed Social Status (1-10)	-0.0226**	(0.0110)	0.00851	(0.00769)
Self-Assessed Income Level (1-10)	-0.00677	(0.0109)	-0.000736	(0.00825)
Total Personal Income	-0.000320	(0.00843)	-0.00924	(0.0111)
Total Household Income	-0.0412***	(0.0102)	-0.0290**	(0.0119)
Highest Education Level	-0.0132	(0.0123)	0.0333***	(0.0111)
Father's Education Level	0.00990	(0.00958)	0.0274***	(0.00941)
Foreign Travel Experience	0.0243	(0.0331)	-0.144***	(0.0382)
Public Sector Employee	0.0372	(0.0295)	0.0881**	(0.0358)
City Tier Classification	-0.121***	(0.0138)	-0.0184	(0.0147)
Own >1 Property	-0.0113	(0.0353)	-0.0480	(0.0502)
Interest in Politics (1-4)	0.0330**	(0.0150)	-0.0410***	(0.0154)
Constant	1.144***	(0.0940)	0.673***	(0.100)
Mean DV	0.50		0.50	
St. Dev. DV	0.50		0.50	
N	2500		2000	
Adj. R^2	0.08		0.06	

Notes: Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 6.21: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Index of Reform Perceptions, 2024



Notes: This graph reports regression coefficients as well as confidence intervals at the 90% and 95% levels. The dependent variable used is an index calculated as the average of the Z-scores of respondents' answers to the three reform perception questions ("benefited everyone", "benefited the previously disadvantaged", "benefited particularly me and my family"). The coefficients reported here are the coefficients on the treatment dummy as well as the coefficients on the interaction term of each selected variable and the treatment dummy. We control for province fixed effects, demographics, job and income categories, subjective socio-economic status and life satisfaction, access to welfare, as well as type of device used to answer the survey.

1.16 Acquiescence Bias

Figure 6.22: Distribution of Reported Agreement to Attitude Statements Framed in Opposite Directions, 2024



Notes: This figure reports the distribution of answers to questions posed at the end of the 2024 survey questionnaires for the control group only. We designed two versions of each question—reversing the direction of the statement—and the direction of the question that a respondent is shown is randomized. 1 represents "Completely Disagree" while 10 represents "Completely Agree"; these histograms show that the respondents tend to respond very positively to the questions regardless of the content and the direction of the question. We report only the control group since this set of questions come after treatment.

1.17 Wealth Acquisition Vignettes in the Supplementary Survey (2022)

Below is a list of the 13 representative scenarios of people becoming wealthy in China during the reform and opening-up era which we used in our supplementary survey (N = 360), conducted in April 2022.

1. **Lottery**: Mr. A won ten million in a lottery.

2. **Demolition Compensation**: Mr. A's family owns an old house in the city center of a major city. During the government's demolition process, he received ten million yuan in compensation.

3. **Housing Arbitrage**: Mr. A invested in real estate across the country, earning ten million yuan through strategies like group speculation in housing and negotiat- ing collectively with developers (housing arbitrage).

4. **Factory Inheritance**: Mr. A's parents founded a construction materials company. After graduating from college, he took over the business from his parents and has now earned ten million yuan.

5. **Parental Government Connections**: Mr. A's parents are leaders in government departments. He operates a local architectural design company and has gained an advantage in numerous project bidding processes through his parents' con- nections. The company has grown larger over time and earned ten million yuan.

6. **Regional Sales Monopoly**: Mr. A is the exclusive distributor of a famous brand in a certain location and made a profit of ten million yuan due to monopolizing the sales channels.

7. **Self-Made Factory**: Mr. A established a hardware processing factory and earned ten million yuan through its operation.

8. **Influencer Online Sales**: Mr. A is a somewhat popular internet influencer who earned ten million yuan through live-streaming sales.

9. **Political Corruption**: Mr. A holds significant power in the local government and handles a large portion of procurement and bidding projects. He made ten

million yuan in kickbacks by favoring specific bidding companies.

10. **State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Subsidized Housing Profit**: Mr. A worked in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and purchased a unit of housing at a significantly lower price than the market value in the 1990s. After the rise in property prices, he made a net profit of ten million yuan.

11. **Policy-Favored Factory**: Mr. A owns a small factory that produces solar panels. With the government's promotion of renewable energy, his demand skyrocketed, and he made a fortune, earning ten million yuan.

12. **Cadre Turned Businessman**: Mr. A used to work as a government official in the late 1990s but later ventured into business. Leveraging his previously established connections, he thrived in the business world, making ten million yuan.

13. **State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Cadre**: Mr. A used to work in a government agency and later transitioned to a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) in the re- form process. He also became an executive in the SOE, enjoying a lucrative salary, and has already earned ten million yuan.

Figure 6.23: Attribution of Wealth Acquisition Scenarios to Effort, 2022



Notes: The figure reports the mean and 95% confidence intervals of the perceived importance of the effort in wealth acquisition (ranging from 0, the least important, to 10, the most important) across var- ious scenarios of wealth acquisition, as assessed in the 2022 supplementary survey. The full text of the scenarios is reported in Appendix Section 6.17. The mean importance of effort for the three treatment vignettes from the main survey is highlighted in blue.

Figure 6.24: Attribution of Wealth Acquisition Scenarios to Ability, 2022



Notes: The figure reports the mean and 95% confidence intervals of the perceived importance of ability in wealth acquisition (ranging from 0, the least important, to 10, the most important) across various scenarios of wealth acquisition, as assessed in the 2022 supplementary survey. The full text of the scenarios is reported in Appendix Section 6.17. The mean importance of ability for the three treatment vignettes from the main survey is highlighted in blue.

Figure 6.25: Attribution of Wealth Acquisition Scenarios to Luck, 2022



Notes: The figure reports the mean and 95% confidence intervals of the perceived importance of luck in wealth acquisition (ranging from 0, the least important, to 10, the most important) across various scenarios of wealth acquisition, as assessed in the 2022 supplementary survey. The full text of the scenarios is reported in Appendix Section 6.17. The mean importance of luck for the three treatment vignettes from the main survey is highlighted in blue.

Figure 6.26: Attribution of Wealth Acquisition Scenarios to the Political System, 2022



Notes: The figure reports the mean and 95% confidence intervals of the perceived importance of the political system in wealth acquisition (ranging from 0, the least important, to 10, the most important) across various scenarios of wealth acquisition, as assessed in the 2022 supplementary survey. The full text of the scenarios is reported in Appendix Section 6.17. The mean importance of system for the three treatment vignettes from the main survey is highlighted in blue.