China and Turkey:

Sand in The Gears of a Sino-Turkish Strategic partnership

Connor Esterwood

International Studies

The University of North Carolina at Asheville

Abstract

Turkey and China though not bordering one another border central Asia and as a result must deal with each other’s presence and competition over the region. The history of Sino-Turkish relations is one of neglect and then hostility. In recent years however there has been a strengthening of this relationship and even talks of a strategic partnership. China and Turkey have much to gain from a partnership. Economically cooperation between the two could create a better trade environment fostering economic prosperity for Turkey and a broader trade base for China. Both Turkey and China would spread their influences as well, though China more than Turkey. Turkey would gain potential foreign direct investment and cooperation between the two on large projects could host all kinds of benefits. (Colakoglu 2010)^[1]. Turkey and China have many obstacles dividing them however. Turkey’s allegiance to the west causes a palpable tension between the two countries (Dilek 2013)^[2] Turkey’s role in NATO being a prime example as well as the UN’s recent involvement concerning Syria. (Kaya 2013). The Geopolitical issues surrounding their relationship especially Iran create tension as well. Xinjiang and it’s ethnically Turkic population of Uighurs is another great dividing line between the two nations. To say the least Xinjiang is “a sensitive topic in bilateral relations” and Turkey’s stance on the “Xinjiang problem greatly influences its relations with China” (Kaya 2013). Will China and Turkey overcome their differences and enter into a stronger relationship or will their relationship stagnate or even fall. I hypothesize that it will stagnate due to the immovable obstacles that divide the two nations.

Introduction:

Turkey and China are two commonly heard names in the modern World in which we live today. Most of the time they are seen as two very separate entities. These two entities however in recent years have been growing close to one another.Certainly areas of Sino-Turkish relations have reached new highs and there is potential for the relationship between the two to become a strategic partnership however even more recent events have put this at risk. It is hard to tell as a result whether the Turks and the Chinese will grow to be friends or to be enemies.

Literature Review:

Turkey and China both have much to gain from their emerging relationship. Economic incentives along with potential improvement of political relations for both China and Turkey are large incentives for cooperation. This potential would not exist however without the collapse of the USSR(The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The collapse allowed Turkey to interact in central asia in a way that it had not been able to prior. Turkey began to focus it’s foreign policy in this region and the public became emotionally engrossed in the state of turkic muslim groups living in non-independent parts of China and Russia. At this point Chinese and Turkish relations were cold. The Turkish investment in central asia changed however when Tukey fell short on several economic and political developments.  Turkey began to approach central asia more cautiously and in doing so warmed it’s previously cold relationships with China.Tukey did so due to the vision of a potential trade partnership with China and also in part due to a political isolation. The political isolation from the west in 1997 pushed Turkey to seek new allies and partnerships. China at this period was not only willing to make economic deals but also was willing to support Turkish initiatives in foreign policy and serve as a balancing role in international political affairs. Beijing also wanted to gain a share of Turkey’s developing defense market, while Ankar considered Beijing as a potential source for defense technology (umit Enginsoy burak ege bekdil, “Uighur crisis sours Turkey on chinese arms” defense news, 20 july 2009)^[3].

        Turkey may have been simply looking to improve trade but China had a more diverse interest in Turkey. Firstly China saw Turkey as a means of expanding their influence into West Asia and the Middle East. This would allow China to extend its influence and engage in the region. The second reason that China was interested in better relations with Turkey is because of it’s own ethnic issues with the Uighur People of Xinjiang. Turkey currently has the largest and most active East Turkestan Republic (1944-1949) diaspora in the world. This is largely due to their similarities in language and religious affinities. Turkey’s East Turkistan loyalists who wish for Xinjiang to be an independent entity have formed a strong pro-independence campaign for the turkish public. (Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Dogun Turkistan Davasi, Istanbul, Seha Nesriyat, 1992,s.261). China wishes to balance the situation by creating a pro-Chinese campaign on the issue via providing international political support and some economic benefits to turkey (Reuters,”China seeks Turkish help against muslim separatism”MSNBC,18 April 2002). This move by the Chinese was seen as successful. Evidence of it’s success can be seen in the circular letter that “banned Turkish ministers and bureaucrats from attending any kind of activities organized by the Eastern Turkistan institutions in Turkey” (Colakoglu 2010). Additionally on April 18-21st, of 2000 at a summit in Turkey, Turkey’s president Suleyman Demirel signed many deals with China and frequently stated Turkey’s support for the “compromise of fighting against international terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious extremism” (hurriyet,”Basbakanliktan Gizli Dogu Turkistan Genelgesi”,4Subat 1999). This view was in direct relation to Xinjiang and the separatist movements contained within it’s borders. It guaranteed a position of non-interference from turkey surrounding the Uigher People. This weakened severely the separatist movements in Xinjiang by removing any kind of potential assistance from their supporters in Turkey.

        In recent years China seems to have gained the economic and political advantage over Turkey.China had a large trade surplus with Turkey to the amount of 15.5 billion dollars in 2008 while Chinese investment in Turkey remained at a mere 60 million dollars. Politically China has been shifting its weight around in the relationship between the two countries. In 2001 the Varyag case insulted Turkish politicians by China lying about their intentions and falling short on an agreement concerning the movement of a soviet aircraft carrier through the Turkish straits. This also directly violated the convention limiting military activity in the Black Sea (Colakoglu 2010).

 In addition to the Varyag case cooperation between Turkey and China have developed conflict surrounding Turkey’s neighbors. This can be seen concerning Iraq in 2003 where China began growing close to the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government). This relationship was at a time where Turkish and KRG conflict was growing due to the influx of PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) in the region and infiltration by the PKK on to Turkish soil. In 2007 when Turkey moved into Iraq to push the PKK out of the north China formally objected to the move. China also at the time refused to comment on whether they  classify the PKK as a terrorist organization. Overall this and other cases have increased suspicion of China’s intentions regarding Turkey’s neighboring regions.

The trade imbalance was addressed in 2009 by President Abdullah Gul in his visit to China. Turkey made demands to be compensated for the bilateral trade imbalance through an increase in Chinese investments in Turkey, greater inbound tourism from China, joint-ventures in other countries and more opening of china’s markets to Turkish products. In exchange for this Abdullah Gul reinforced Turkey’s support of the “One China” policy.

Two views begin to form at this point on the topic of Sino-Turkish relations. The first view is that the economic and political ties that bring the countries close together are strong enough that the two countries will remain stable partners for a sizable amount of time. The second view is that given the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang and the historical stance of China surrounding Turkey’s neighbors that the two nations are headed toward a divide between each other.

The first view justifies itself by bringing into account the many advantages Turkey and China have if they pursue a greater relationship as potential strategic partners. Overall if China fixes the trade imbalances then Turkey will make gains economically and this could win over the general public and many who are concerned over China’s treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang. Turkey currently has a weak presence in Eastern Asia. Looking at trade Turkey is doing pretty well in China, Japan, and South Korea however politically they are far from the top. A closer political connection with China could potentially expand foreign policy in Eastern Asia for the Turks.China also has potential to make direct foreign investment in Turkey. This would even further the economical advantage of cooperation while boosting Chinese popularity in Turkey. Turkish and Chinese business firms could also easily be seen making joint ventures in other countries that would make money for both countries. China benefits from this relationship via improved relationships with the middle east. In recent years Chinese production and exports have become intertwined with middle eastern energy resources and the importing of middle eastern oil through the indian ocean to the south china sea. Much of Chinese exports are transported as well through the same route. This creates a risky trade situation where all of China’s trade is in the same place along one general route. This dependence on only one western transfer rode can be potentially eliminated through a project dubbed the “contemporary silk road”. This “contemporary silk road” would be a northern land based route starting from China to Turkey through central Asia and the Caucasus. If this concept became a reality then China would want Turkey to be on friendly terms allowing for smoother transit of Chinese resources.

        The view that China and Turkey are not destined to be close allies justifies itself by bringing into account much of the bad history and ethnic tensions between the two countries. In addition to this there is also the fact that in recent years China has directly voted against Turkish interests in the middle east. “In the mid-20th century, Cold War conditions made it difficult for the two countries to establish diplomatic relations. by the late 1940’s china and Turkey had grown apart, with China standing with the communist block and Turkey standing with the West” (Turkey and China Unlikely Strategic Partners).  This period of cold relations ended only when the United States of America’s policy toward China changed. At this point China and Turkey began to build new relationships. This patch of bad blood however still is present in the Turkish and Chinese public today, especially surrounding the Korean War where Turks and the Chinese fought against each other directly.

The larger causes for tension between the two countries however revolves around China’s treatment of the ethnically turkic Uighurs in Xinjiang, China’s westernmost province, and the rising amount of geopolitical issues surrounding the middle east. The Uigher conflict is the most direct conflict between China and Turkey. The history of Xinjiang is ripe with examples of violence both from the Chinese and the local people. Turkey has in it’s history supported the nationalists in Xinjiang and offered sanctuary to separatists. Since the 1950s Turkey has provided political asylum to thousands of East Turkestan refugees ("Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations" 2009)^[4].  Concerning the events of the 2009 crackdown by the Chinese on Uighurs where conflict broke out resulting in bloodshed the Turkish Prime Minister, Erdogan called the actions of the Chinese government “Almost Genocide”. This spread great resentment for the Chinese among the Turkish public. Both smoothed things over soon after but the remark and mentality remains.

The geopolitical issues revolving primarily around the Arab Spring and specifically Syria also damage relationships between the two. China’s current support for the Assad regime in Syria and their history with Iran has caused trouble and security concerns in Turkey. The Chinese veto in the UN to intervene in Syria leaves Turkey alone in dealing with much of the issues resulting from the conflict. Economically “Turkey’s material well being is contingent on countries such as Russia and Iran that squarely disagrees with some dimensions of Turkey’s identity” (Dilek 2013). On the security front when considering Iran there is a constant security concern due to the fact that Turkey hosts NATO’s early warning radar systems. Iranian officials have threatened to make Turkey their first target in the event of an attack on Iran. China’s support of Iran as a result even furthers this tension between the two nations.

Overall though there is potential for a positive relationship between Turkey and China there is much initiative that must be made on China’s part. Turkey is also growing closer with the west as the years move forward and this brings them further away from a strong relationship with China. If a strategic partnership were to happen it would need to happen soon and China would have to be the one to extend the olive branch.

I hypothesize that there is greater potential for Turkey to fall out with China then become closer. I will analyze Sino-Turkish relations by looking at three case studies. The first study is zooming in on the impact of the Arab Spring on the relationship between Turkey and China. the second study will focus on the Uighurs living in Xinjiang and how Chinese rule over this populace has and indeed still is affecting Sino-Turkish relations. The third will be looking at trade and economics between Turkey, China, and the West. I will look at specific reports and interactions concerning the stance on certain political issues between China and Turkey and also focus in on how the general Turkish public has reacted to much of these decisions.

Case Study I, Geopolitical Issues and the Arab Spring:

The Arab Spring was and is indeed still a period in the middle east where many countries encountered and are encountering large changes in their government. Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya are three such countries that are perceived as being near the end of their governmental revolutions. Syria is one that is seen as still changing and it’s revolution has been particularly bloody . Syria is known mostly through the United States due to the initiative by President Obama to potentially strike the country’s pro-government forces. This kind of action has been proposed in the United Nations and has been heavily opposed by Russia and China. This opposition to a movement largely supported by many leaders in the west has damaged Chinese Relations with many western powers. Turkey is especially in a position to be upset by this stance of non-action from China and Russia. Turkey borders Syria to the south and certainly has had no shortage of conflict rolling over onto it’s borders from the conflict. Turkey has had to deal with this conflict largely without the support of any “eastern” assistance. If China has done anything it has worked against Turkish interests in Syria.

This interaction between China and Turkey mirrors their disagreements surrounding Iran. China and Turkey have a long history of disagreement over Iran. Turkey is concerned over Iran seeing it as a security threat and China has a vested interest in the country’s current regime for its own strategic and economic reasons. China and Turkey are as a result not at all similar in their foreign policy toward Iran. Tukey's geographical position as a land bridge for potential shipments of Oil to the west while bypassing Russia and Iran is yet another reason for Sino-Turkish relations to be at risk due to China being a strong ally to both Iran and Russia (Kima et al. 2013). This in combination with the stance of China on Syria has lead to disagreements and public opinion shifts by the Turkish public towards being generally skeptical of China. The goals of the Chinese in investing in Turkey so as to boost public relations is at stake every time that China makes an unpopular geopolitical decision.

Case Study II, The Uighur Conflict:

When looking at the long history of conflict surrounding what China refers to as Xinjiang and what Uigher separatists refer to as East Turkistan we find a very rocky relationship between Turkey and China. Turkey currently houses the largest number of Uighurs outside Xinjiang itself. This diaspora contains much of the leadership of the anti-Chinese pro-independence movement. China was quick to applaud Turkey’s reinforcement of the “One China Policy” and Turkey’s opposition to terrorist movements. Soon after this statement Turkey banned political participation of its ministers from engaging in separatist movements against the People Republic of China. In addition to this a conference entitled “The Past and Present State of the Uyghur Turks” was cancelled. This kind of disownership of the Uigher separatist movement is significant but the history of Turkish support for the separatists is hard to wash away. In 1995 the mayor of Istanbul at the time named a section of the Sultan Ahmet Park after a major leader in the separatist movement against China ("Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations" 2009). Turkey has in its past had been considered not only a source of nationalist inspiration but also a safe place out of which the separatist movement could operate. For over One Hundred years Turkey provided shelter for Uigher migrants and a model for Uigher  nationalism. Many Uigher refuge organizations are based out of Turkey.

This long standing support of the Uighurs living in Xinjiang has as a result had plenty of time to sink in with the majority of the Turkish public. This is evident in the almost annual publication of newspaper articles surrounding the “Plight of the Uigher living in the Xinjiang autonomous Region of western China”. The view that Xinjiang’s Uighurs are “the obvious obstacle to the geopolitical opportunity in Sino-Turkish relation” (Dellios and Yilmaz 2008: 29) is shared by many observers of Sino-Turkish relations. On April 3, 2008, East Turkestan organizations held a demonstration in Istanbul during the Beijing Olympics torch relay ceremony. This demonstration had over one thousand Turkish and Uigher attendees even though there was attempts by Turkish policy makers to block the demonstrators using heavy security measures. As relations between China and Turkey have become improved lately the media has, though grudgingly welcomed the new relationship:

“however the fact that our kinsmen in East Turkestan are living under threat of racism creates a sour situation. Ankara has to follow a “fine tuned” policy, one which is neither provocative nor in neglect of the situation our kinsmen are coping with. ...We must remember our kinsmen in Eastern Turkestan.” (Uluengin 2000)^[5]

China and Turkey have certainly made great strides towards economic cooperation but the overall social issues that have divided them in the past have been approached and left unsolved. The general public in Turkey based on the media’s output and social movements have a negative view overall on China. In recent years this has been amplified by what we saw in the prior case study. China has lots of public relations work to do in Turkey but the economic advantages keep the Turkish public content though not un-skeptical.

Case III, Turkish alliances to the West:

Turkey has a long history of siding quite strongly with the west on many issues throughout history. Turkey has many economic deals with Europe and has a government model very similar to that of most western societies. Many Turks consider themselves to be European in a certain respect and there is a large number of those inside Turkey that wish to one day see turkey as a member of the European Union.   In addition to this the Korean War and integration into the US-led western defense alliances, most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has lead to close strategic ties with the west. Turkey in housing NATO’s early warning systems for nuclear missile launches has a great deal of value to NATO as well. This value brings Turkey and the west closer together. There is a sizable amount of western opposition in Turkey however and it should be said that this element of the public does exist and has found ground recently in the political sphere of influence.

Turkey recently has begun to consider heavily a shift from focusing it’s allegiances towards the east instead of it’s historical partners in the west. For Turkey it seems to be one or the other. There is little good blood between what is considered the west and Russia, China, and other eastern powers. As a result any interaction with one often anger the other. Turkey’s potential change in allegiance I hypothesize will have stalled after the interaction of China and Russia in Arab Spring. The recent veto made by China of the resolution in the United Nations against intervention in Syria is just one of many political hurdles that has stifled Turkey’s potential change in focus. This veto has “provoked fierce international criticism. Labeled as “responsible for Syria’s genocide”(Sun 2012)^[6] this has lead to Beijing’s international image “reaching a new low”(Sun 2012)  All in all there is a strong history of cooperation between Turkey and the West and recently there has been more support from western powers than from the east. This support pushes Turkey further from China and as a result I hypothesize that this interaction has stalled further the potential for an exceptional partnership between China and Turkey.

Conclusion:

In summary I have found a strong case for the stagnation of positive developments in sino-Turkish relations. The geopolitical interactions lately concerning Iran, Syria, and other middle eastern countries near to Turkey from China appears to be a dividing factor in China’s relationship to Turkey. The Chinese interactions with the Uighurs living in Xinjiang concern the general public but the large economic incentives offered by China have put these issues on the back burner. Xinjiang is not as important to many Turks as the benefits of a good economic relationship with China is. Lastly the allegiance of Turkey towards the west has long been a dividing factor between China and Turkey. Though Turkey has hinted that it may refocus it’s policy eastward it has yet to do so and due to recent political and international factors such as China and Russia’s differing views on geopolitical issues near Turkey it seems unlikely.  Overall Turkey is in no place to straight out refuse a potential partnership with China but Turkey is skeptical and any partnership would be undertaken with great caution. There would also have to be sacrifices made on China’s end surrounding Xinjiang, Middle Eastern Policy, and Turkish Trade and this is unlikely. China and Turkey have potential to be friends but a strategic partnership at this time I find to be most doubtful.

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