

MDH, War Outline

The most recent comprehensive exam has two virtually identical questions on war. This outline will seek to address both questions.

Certain modern political philosophers regard peace as the highest moral imperative. Discuss the role of war and peace in three of the following: Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant, Schmitt, or Walzer. To what extent do they regard peace as a virtue?

“War is a continuation of politics by other means,” Clausewitz famously declared. Some political theorists seem to hold an inverted view: political life is a more-or-less mediated sort of warfare. Others have seen political life as fundamentally conditioned by the threat of war. Discuss the role of war – both international and civil – in shaping the view of politics articulated by any two of Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, or Schmitt. Address how each thinker sees war or the threat of war, foreign or domestic, as defining or dictating the features of political society; and how far each believes that human beings can escape from war by political means.

Overarching Argument

Question 1 TL;DR:

Hobbes and Schmitt see war as inevitable, an enduring phenomenon of human society punctuated by various times of peace. While Schmitt and Hobbes inarguably consider peace some good—Hobbes especially seeing it as more or less the ultimate good—concern for war constitutes the animating principle for both of their thought.

Question 2 TL;DR:

Hobbes and Schmitt both understand human society to essentially be an enduring state of war punctuated by periods of peace. Authoritarian regimes generate some political stability and peace, and thus constitute a legitimate good in curtailing the negative effects of war. However, both Hobbes and Schmitt express cynicism about the ability for humans to overcoming the warring proclivities, advocating authoritarian politics to prevent a polis from falling prey to the inevitabilities of war.

Machiavelli

Role of War

1. *Major argument: in the Prince, Machiavelli provides instructions for maintaining stability in a regime. Staying in power, and thus keeping the principality together and stable, constitutes the major goal for Machiavelli's recipient. Machiavelli's recommendation consists in virtù, a reinterpretation of ancient virtue that appears to indicate an ability to adapt to one's circumstances. In this sense, peace and stability represents the ultimate good, the goal. However, Machiavelli notes that war may be used virtuously, that it can be used to ensure the stability of the regime. Thus, Machiavelli has some similarities with Hobbes and Schmitt in that he centers an autocratic authority who seeks to provide stability for a regime. He similarly sees threats to war all around, and he sees war as a sometimes-useful instrument for generating stability. This last point kinda reminds me of Schmitt's friend-enemy distinction.*
2. Stability
 - a. Machiavelli writes to a prince trying to stay in power. The goal, in that sense, is relatively simple: how to keep a stable regime. In practice, this presents a very difficult problem, in part because threats to stability come from all over.
 - b. Relationship between stability and war/warmaking
 - i. "We have said above that it is necessary for a prince to have good foundations for himself; otherwise he must of necessity be ruined. The principal foundations that all states have, new ones as well as old or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And because there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms, and where there are good arms there must be good laws, I shall leave out the reasoning on laws and shall speak

of arms” (48, 12). ***This is crucial in showing how stability is dependent upon arms.***¹

- ii. “In conclude, thus, that without its own arms no principality is secure; indeed it is wholly obliged to fortune since it does not have virtue to defend itself in adversary” (57, 13). To be clear, M here discusses raising a military from one’s own citizens or mercenaries. But the point can be reasonably extrapolated, that arms are necessary to defend oneself.
- iii. “a prince should have no other object, nor any other thought, nor take anything else as his art but that of war and its orders and discipline... And it is of such virtue that not only does it maintain those who have been born princes but many times it enables men of private fortune to rise to that rank; and on the contrary, one sees that when princes have thought more of amenities than of arms, they have lost their states” (14, 58).
- iv. “Thus, you must know that there are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the other with force. The first is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first is often not enough, one must have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to know well how to use the beast and the man” (69, 18).
- v. “Thus, since a prince is compelled of necessity to know well how to use the beast, he should pick the fox and the lion, because the lion does not defend itself from snares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves” (69, 18).

c. International & Civil?

- i. “For a prince should have two fears: one within, on account of his subjects; the other outside, on account of external powers. From the latter one is defended with good arms and good friends; and if one has good arms, one will always have good friends. And things inside will always remain steady, if things outside are steady, unless indeed they are disturbed by conspiracy...” (72, 19).
 - ii. “Therefore, he who does not recognize evils when they arise in a principality is not truly wise, and this is given to few” (57, 13).
- d. In either case, war, or instability, represents a threat to the prince’s reign, and peace, or stability, represents the highest good for the prince.

3. Impact on Political Society?

- a. The nature of *the Prince* leads to a bit of a different approach to this. Rather than describing political developments, Machiavelli’s offering insight to the prince. Machiavelli’s major insight is how he reinterprets virtue. I have already demonstrated how he considers peace and war relevant to establishing a

¹ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince: Second Edition*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, 2nd edition (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

principality, but the prince must rule with virtue to know when and how to employ this.

- i. “Thus, the Romans, seeing inconveniences from afar, always found remedies for them and never allowed them to continue so as to escape a war, because they knew that war may not be avoided but is deferred to the advantage of [13] others.... Nor did that saying ever please them which is every day in the mouths of the wise men of our times—to enjoy the benefit of time—but rather, they enjoyed the benefit of their virtue and prudence” (12-3, 3). Here virtue and warmaking are inextricably linked. This would be a great contrast to tease out in Machiavelli, Hobbes, etc. Virtue is warmaking, rather than peace being a virtue. Though, to a certain extent, in terms of always being prepared for war in order to create stability, Machiavelli would probs agree with at least Schmitt.
- ii. “his crimes were accompanied with such virtue” (34, 8). The claim that virtue and crime go together is a novel twist.
- iii. “Yet one cannot call it virtue to kill one’s citizens, betray one’s friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes can enable one to acquire empire, but not glory” (35, 8).
- iv. “... many others have not been able to maintain their states through cruelty even in peaceful times, not to mention uncertain times of war” (37, 8).

Role of Peace

1. Attainability of Peace?
 - a. War represents a recurring threat; there will be no perpetual peace. Moreover, peace, like war, represents only an opportunity for virtu.
 - b. Peace affords some opportunity to learn warcraft.
 - i. “Therefore, he should never lift his thoughts from the exercise of war, and in peace he should exercise it more than in war” (14, 59)
 - c. The prince might have a vested interest in disturbing peace, or fomenting war, to actually secure his position.
 - i. “Therefore many judge that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity for it, should astutely nourish some enmity so that when he has crushed it, his greatness emerges the more from it” (85, 20). **THIS IS LITERALLY SCHMITT TO A T!**
2. Thus, Machiavelli considers war and peace ultimately mere tools for maintaining political stability, especially maintaining the position of the ruler. While in certain cases peace and stability and war and instability may overlap, Machiavelli sees virtu as the crucial factor enabling the prince to understand when and how to use war and peace to maintain control over his principality.

- a. I think the language I want to use is that “war and peace are *orthogonal* to instability and stability, which constitute Machiavelli’s main concern in *the Prince*.” (Tbh Idk if that’s right.)
3. It seems important to have some discussion separating war/peace from instability/stability. The latter is really more important for Machiavelli and while there’s some obvious overlap between the terms, they are *not* the same as my above point on “fomenting war” indicates.

Hobbes

1. Major argument: civil war, and related political disorder, constitute the fundamental concern for Thomas Hobbes, driving his political theory almost entirely. He believes that peace can be secured via strong, absolute power, and he propounds civil guidance accordingly. Specifically, he becomes a *de facto* theorist, one who supports any sufficiently powerful regime. Hobbes thus considers internal peace to be of utmost importance and securable only through an incredibly strong central government.

Role of War

1. International?
 - a. While Hobbes may show *some* concern for international war, his focus is primarily domestic. *Leviathan* demonstrates this, obviously, but even *De Cive* and *Behemoth* testify to Hobbes’ central concern.
 - b. “But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men” (78, 1.13.12). This could probably be connected to the pink-highlighted text about “invaders” below.²
 - c. This quote is also used elsewhere in the outline, but it touches on the international: “The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another... is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will, which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person” (2.17.13).

2. Civil?

² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, ed. Edwin Curley, Underlined, Notations edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994).

- a. Hobbes found himself situated amidst the British civil war. *Behemoth* especially addresses the situation as it details the historical development and passing of British power back and forth between numerous parties. It illustrates the tumult of the time.
- b. *Leviathan* Book 1.13 introduces the centrality of civil war most forcefully.
- i. “Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is no so considerable that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of the body, the weakest has the strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself” (74, 1.13.1).
 - ii. “From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore, if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy or to subdue one another” (75, 1.13.3).
 - iii. **“Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to over-awe them” (75, 1.13.5). A great text to link happiness with war/peace.**
 - iv. “in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; secondly, difference; thirdly, glory” (76, 1.13.6). Helps establish the natural-ness of war.
 1. This is also spelled out in a bunch more text in the preceding paragraphs. Some of it I’ve quoted above, but not in the structure of which Hobbes is making his argument.
 2. “The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation” (76, 1.13.7).
 3. There might be something worth revisiting re: the use of “invade” for the international component of this question. It doesn’t, on the surface, seem like there’s anything necessary domestic about the descriptions he’s given. The solution, however, seems domestically focused.
 - a. Civil war is mentioned by name at the end of the 77th page.
 - v. “Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man. For WAR

consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known” (76, 1.13.8.).

1. This is crucial for defining war.

3. Impact on Political Society?

a. Leads Hobbes to endorse a fairly authoritarian perspective. (This has/somewhat will be demonstrated naturally. I likely just need to make this point explicit based on the evidence provided.)

i. Cf. the inability of the sovereign to do injustice

ii. Sovereignty and choosing doctrines:

1. From my paper: Kraynak makes this conclusion interestingly apparent, and this particular direction opens the possibility of Hobbes the liberal: “In place of authoritative definitions imposed by vainglorious intellectuals, Hobbes calls for arbitrary definitions, which everyone knows to be arbitrary and accepts as arbitrary, out of fear of violent death.”³ Rather than disputing over the true nature of just rule and so coming to civil war, Hobbes underscores the arbitrariness of words and their power. People “vastly overestimate the power of speech to uncover the truth and to secure agreement;”⁴ they must first recognize words’ arbitrariness, that they receive persuasiveness and are “created and exploited by ambitious intellectuals solely for the purpose of displaying their wisdom and learning.”⁵ This movement enables people to grasp that, instead of disputation, only “the force and arms of men can secure agreement and peace.”⁶

a. I really don’t need most of this, but it gives a decent sense of Hobbes’ philosophy.

2. “It is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people, and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published” (Leviathan 113, 2.17.9).

b. Similarly leads Hobbes’ political allegiances to waffle a bit as he supports *de facto* power basically unequivocally.

i. Hoekstra on *de facto* power: Hoekstra summarizes the *de facto* rule theory as “the ideas that sovereign right follows from the actual possession of power, and that there is a mutual relation between protection and

³ Kraynak, “Hobbes’s ‘Behemoth’ and the Argument for Absolutism,” 845, emphasis added.

⁴ Kraynak, “Hobbes’s ‘Behemoth’ and the Argument for Absolutism,” 844.

⁵ Kraynak, “Hobbes’s ‘Behemoth’ and the Argument for Absolutism,” 838.

⁶ Kraynak, “Hobbes’s ‘Behemoth’ and the Argument for Absolutism,” 844.

obedience.”⁷ This sentence comes from my paper. He adds that people implicitly consent to the rule, so therefore it’s a confluence of de facto and consent theory.

- ii. Hobbes demonstrated pro-Stuart sympathies by more or less employing royalist propaganda throughout his work. From my paper: “He makes his point shortly but persuasively, referencing two short metaphors in which Hobbes derides the Scots viz-a-viz Charles I, once casting the Scots as Judas to Charles’ Jesus... [these images] “were part of a larger social phenomenon with echoes throughout [Hobbes’] works. They coincided with the reactions of many others in 1640 and again after the regicide who knew nothing of his philosophy and who were not motivated by eirencisim.”” The citation is from Hamilton, “Hobbes the Royalist, Hobbes the Republican,” 430.

iii. My summary of *Behemoth*’s monarchist theorization: “But Hobbes engages parliamentary thought and action in *Behemoth*, endlessly deriding and ridiculing parliament, making them the antagonist to the story’s hero, Charles II. He harangues at great length Parliament’s abusive power in Book Two. Seeking to raise its power over the king, parliament limited the king’s attempts to raise a military, thus controlling rather than merely counselling the king’s actions. A, the interlocutor more closely associated with Hobbes’ personage, quips that parliament “would give him none, but with a condition he should cut off the heads of whom they pleased... And if he would have sacrificed all his friends to their ambition, yet they would have found other excuses for denying him subsidies.”⁸ Hobbes continues to lambast the more democratic political iterations in Book IV. Remarking that even an oligarchy be one person if it has one voice, Hobbes sarcastically remarks that it “might govern well enough, if they had honesty and wit enough.”⁹ This comment precedes Hobbes’ delineation of the British parliament’s many failures.”

c. Theorization of Justice:

- i. **The sovereign cannot be unjust:** “Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions, and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is author; and therefore ought not

⁷ Hoekstra, “the de Facto Turn in Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 49.

⁸ Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth: the History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England, and of the counsels and artifices by which they were carried on from the year 1640 to the year 1660*, in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, vol VI, (London: John Bohn, 1840), 83.

⁹ Hobbes, *Behemoth*, 359.

to accuse any man but himself; no nor himself of injury; because to do injury to one's self, is impossible. It is true that they that have sovereign power, may commit iniquity; but not injustice, or injury in the proper signification" (Leviathan 112, 2.18.6)

- ii. "To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice" (78, 1.13.13).
- iii. "But when a covenant is made, then to break it is *unjust*; and the definition of INJUSTICE is no other than *the not performance of a covenant*" (89, 1.15.2). **This inextricably ties together peace and justice.**

Role of Peace

1. Importance of Peace:

- a. "A LAW OF NATURE (*lex naturalis*) is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do tht which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved" (79, 1.14.3).
- b. **The condition of war (cited previously) leads to a desirability of peace. This is really unsurprising: "consequently it is a precept, or general rule, of reason *that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.* The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature, which is *to seek peace, and follow it.* The second, the sum of the right of nature, which is *by all means we can, to defend ourselves*" (80, 1.14.4).**
 - i. **It is therefore the law of nature to seek peace!**

2. Attainability of Peace?

- a. Peace is attained through the social contract.
- b. "For as long as every man holdeth this right of doing anything he liketh, so long are all men in the condition of war" (80, 1.14.5).
- c. "Right is laid aside either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it to another... By TRANSFERRING, when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person or persons" (81, 1.14.7).
- d. "the motive and end for which this renouncing and transferring of right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life and in the means of preserving life as not to be weary of it" (82, 1.14.8).
- e. "The mutual transferring of right is that which men call CONTRACT" (82, 1.14.9).

- f. “The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another... is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will, which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person” (2.17.13).
- g. The commonwealth can be weakened, however:
 - i. “*that a man, to obtain a kingdom, is sometimes content with less power than to the peace and defence of the commonwealth is necessarily required*” (211, 3.29.3). Basically, the ruler isn’t authoritarian enough.
 - ii. “*That every private man is judge of good and evil actions...* From this false doctrine men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the commonwealth, and afterwards to obey or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall think fit” (212, 3.29.6).
 - iii. There are a bunch, and I’m not going to cover them all. Will only include one more: “A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth is this: *That he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws*” (213, 3.29.9).
 - iv. I should be able to basically just list a few to illustrate the point that it can be weakened.

Schmitt

Role of War

1. ***Major argument: whereas Hobbes sees war as fundamental, Schmitt sees war as the machination or consequence of a more fundamental dialectic: the political. Like the antithesis between good and evil, Schmitt considers a dialectic between friend and enemy to be inescapable, fundamental to natural, human political life. Because of this, war naturally occurs, both internally and externally. Peace can be secured by a strong sovereign, but believing in an eternal international peace is a fool’s errand, according to Schmitt. His theories lead to a robustly autocratic position, like Hobbes, and a cynicism about the inevitability of, and thus the necessity of preparation for, war.***
2. The fundamental divide is not peace and war but friend and enemy. This is the main constitutive criterion of “the political.”
 - a. “The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (CP, 26).¹⁰
 - i. “Insofar as it is not derived from other criteria, the antithesis of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other

¹⁰ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).

antithesis: good and evil in the moral sense, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on” (CP, 26).

- b. “The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible” (CP, 27).
3. War!
- a. Really, for Schmitt, war is simply one manifestation of the political. It’s inescapable, like Hobbes, it’s not that life is a perpetual state of ongoing military conflict. The friend-enemy distinction always persists; war will come and go, but states should more or less always be ready for war, given the endurance of the friend-enemy dialectic.
 - b. International?
 - i. The dialectic plays itself out in both international and domestic politics.
 - ii. “To the state as an essentially political entity belongs the *jus belli*, ie., the real possibility of deciding in a concrete situation upon the enemy and the ability to fight him with the power emanating from the entity. As long as a politically united people is prepared [46] to fight for its existence, independence, and freedom on the basis of a decision emanating from the political entity, this specifically political question has primacy over the technical means by which the battle will be waged, the nature of the army’s organization, and what the prospects are for winning the war” (CP, 45-46).
 - iii. "That justice does not belong to the concept of war has been generally recognized since Grotius. The notions which postulate a just war usually serve a political purpose" (CP, 49). This quote pretty naturally applies more to interstate war than it does civil war, I think?
 - c. Civil?
 - i. “The *jus belli* contains such a disposition. It implies a double possibility: the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill enemies. The endeavor of a normal state consists above all in assuring total peace *within the state and its territory*” (CP, 46, emphasis added). This illustrates how Schmitt conflates the friend-enemy dialectic with an assumed theory of the state. His theory here implicitly casts the friend-enemy dialectic onto state v. state conflict. ***This also serves as a natural turning point from the international to the civil!***
 - ii. Again with Schmitt, the focus is domestic politics. *PT*, for example, mostly focuses on internal sovereignty, looking at its meaning, etc. This doesn’t mean that there are not international concerns, or that there can’t

be extensions to the international realm; on the contrary, especially in the *Concept of the Political*, there can be a natural and easy extension. But his focus mostly reflects domestic concerns about sovereignty.

- iii. “Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict” (*CP*, 27).
- iv. “An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity” (*CP*, 28).
- v. “Above all, it has to be explained why human beings should have to form a governmental association in addition to the religious, cultural, economic, and other associations, and what would be its specific political meaning” (*CP*, 45).
 - 1. “In reality there exists no political society or association but only one political entity—one political community. The ever present possibility of a friend-and-enemy grouping suffices to forge a decisive entity which transcends the mere societal-associational groupings” (*CP*, 45).

4. Impact on Political Society?

- a. “which social entity (if I am permitted to use here the imprecise liberal concept of “social”) decides the extreme case and determines the decisive friend-and-enemy grouping?” (*CP*, 43). ***This is an incredibly natural touch-point with the PT quotes below under Impact on Political Society.***
- b. Authoritarian position:
 - i. “the authority to suspend valid law – be it in general or in a specific case – is so much the actual mark of sovereignty” (*Political Theology*, 9).¹¹
 - ii. “sovereignty (and thus the state itself) resides in deciding this controversy, that is, in determining definitively what constitutes public order and security, in determining when they are disturbed, and so on” (*PT*, 9).
 - iii. “For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists” (*PT*, 13).
- c. The pessimism toward peace highlights another impact on society, namely, opposing disarmament, etc. The implications are pretty obvious, but would need to be spelled out in a paper.

Role of Peace

1. Attainability of Peace?

¹¹ Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

- a. Peace is generally preceded by the word “internal” in *CP*. Along these lines, Schmitt considers domestic peace attainable given a strong, unified state.
 - i. Even within this, however, there will still be domestic enemies. “As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy. Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy” (*CP*, 46).
- b. “And it is self-deluding to believe that the termination of modern war would lead to world peace—thus setting forth the idyllic goal of complete and final depoliticization—simply because a war between the great powers today may easily turn into a world war” (*CP*, 54).
- c. “There always are human groupings in the name of justice, humanity, order, or peace. When being reproached for immorality and cynicism, the spectator of political phenomena can always recognize in such reproaches a political weapon used in actual combat” (*CP*, 67).
- d. Most importantly, the fundamental dialectic will not vanish: “Furthermore, it would be a mistake to believe that a nation could eliminate the distinction of friend and enemy by declaring its friendship for the entire world [52] or by voluntarily disarming itself. The world will not thereby become depoliticized, and it will not be transplanted into a condition of pure morality, pure justice, or pure economics” (*CP*, 51-52).