Title:German was guilt re-examined; the victorious allies blamed Germany for starting the First World War. Were they right?

Modern History Review

Graham Goodlad. 16.4 (April 2005): p.28(4). (2715 words) From General OneFile.

Key concept

causation

Before you read this

Check your notes on the Treaty of Versailles: on what grounds did the Allies draw up the War Guilt clause? This article covers the build-up to the July crisis, but go over the events of 1914 to make sure you are clear on the precise details of Germany's role in the short term as well.

Key points

* Many historians have been influenced by the arguments of Fritz Fischer, that Germany actively planned a war of conquest prior to 1914.

* Germany was a highly militarised country, headed by the ambitious and unstable Kaiser Wilhelm II.

* Germany's provocative foreign policy and naval arms build-up caused neighbouring states to adopt a more defensive posture.

* German military planning was based on the Schlieffen Plan, which involved preparations for action against both France and Russia.

* Germany gave strong support to Austria-Hungary against Serbia in the crisis caused by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914.

* There is reason to believe that Germany preferred to fight in 1914, before its main rival, Russia, was able to complete its rearmament.

* Nonetheless the role of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the 1914 crisis should be given close attention.

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The argument that Germany was primarily responsible for the First World War dates back to the Treaty of Versailles, which was imposed by the victorious powers in 1919. Article 231 of the treaty identified 'the aggression of Germany and her allies' as the main cause of the war. This view became less fashionable in the interwar years as the diplomatic records of many of the countries involved in the war were published, creating the impression that responsibility had been shared. The catastrophe was widely attributed to

mistakes made by the great powers, to the dominance of military elites over civilian governments in more than one country, or to the tightly-knit alliances between them. The war came to be seen as the outcome of accident rather than design. The former British prime minister, Lloyd George, popularised this interpretation with his claim that 'the nations in 1914 slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war'.

In the 1960s, attention was once again focused on the role of Germany. A controversial German historian, Fritz Fischer, argued that the regime of Kaiser Wilhelm II had extensive territorial ambitions and that it planned a war of aggression in pursuit of these aims. Fischer drew attention to the so-called 'war council', held in December 1912. At this meeting between the kaiser and key military and naval leaders, the notion of a 'preventive war' against Russia was discussed. Fischer also argued that civilian leaders, such as yon Bethmann-Hollweg, chancellor from 1909 to 1917, were just as guilty as important military figures. The German leadership saw an expansionist foreign policy as a response to domestic difficulties arising from the growth of democracy, which was challenging the dominance of the traditional aristocratic elite. These representatives of the old order were particularly worried by the rise of the Social Democratic Party, which formed the largest element in the Reichstag (German parliament) by 1912. The quest for world power would be an effective way of defusing the threat posed by these new and unwelcome forces.

Many conservative German historians rejected Fischer's assumption that there was a similarity between the external policies of the kaiser's regime and those of Nazi Germany. Others accepted Fischer's view that there was a deliberate will to war on the part of imperial Germany, although there was dispute over the extent to which it had planned for such an event in advance.

A desire for world power

There seems no doubt that, under Kaiser Wilhelm II, German foreign policy from the 1890s became increasingly assertive. Although the kaiser did not enjoy unrestricted power, his erratic character and personal priorities had an important influence on the evolution of policy towards other states. The political system gave him considerable influence, both as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and as the person to whom the chancellor and other ministers were responsible. Imperial Germany was a highly militaristic society, in which the army was not subject to normal civilian political control, its leaders enjoying direct access to the kaiser.

Under Wilhelm, Germany followed a policy known as Weltpolitik (world policy), in an effort to enhance its power both on the continent of Europe and as part of a quest for overseas colonies. Although this does not mean that Germany actually sought war prior to 1914, its effect was to increase other powers' suspicions of its motives and to cause them to draw more closely together for defensive purposes. Particularly important in this respect was the 1905-06 Morocco crisis, when the kaiser directly challenged French colonial interests in north Africa in the hope of weakening their recently concluded Entente Cordiale (agreement) with Britain. Instead, his aggressive diplomacy brought about a tightening of Anglo-French links. This in turn added to Germany's sense of insecurity, prompting the belief in government circles that it was being 'encircled' by a potentially hostile alignment of neighbouring powers.

Another feature of German policy, the attempt to build a battle fleet to rival the Royal Navy, had equally damaging diplomatic consequences. The kaiser and the secretary of state for the Imperial Navy, Admiral Tirpitz, aimed to construct a sufficiently large navy so that Britain, the world's leading maritime power, would be deterred from challenging Germany at sea and would accept its rise to world power status. The German plan overlooked the possibility that Britain, alarmed by the potential threat to its security, would in turn accelerate its own naval building programme. Britain also concluded agreements with France (1904) and Russia (1907) that enabled it to concentrate its naval forces in the North Sea. The naval building competition had effectively ended by 1912, when Germany decided to focus instead on its army, but it had the effect of worsening Anglo-German relations.

On the continent, by the second decade of the twentieth century, German policy was based on the assumption that it would conceivably have to face a simultaneous conflict with France and Russia. Political leaders accepted the Schlieffen Plan, a military plan drawn up by the former chief of general staff. It meant that if war broke out with Russia, German forces would also invade France, crossing neutral Belgium in order to achieve their objective. The possibility that this might draw Britain into a continental war in support of Belgium was not considered an important factor. In effect, political considerations were being subordinated to military and organisational priorities.

Germany and the July crisis

None of this meant, however, that Germany was bound to play the role that it did in the July 1914 crisis, which preceded the outbreak of the First World War. Germany's decision to support Austria-Hungary in its quarrel with Serbia, following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was of decisive importance. Its 1879 alliance with Austria-Hungary was a defensive arrangement, which certainly did not commit Germany to military action in the circumstances of 1914. Indeed, the evidence surrounding Germany's role in the events of that summer is controversial. Although historians have written of Germany giving Austria a 'blank cheque' for a showdown on 5-6 July, the Serbian government's conciliatory reply to the Austrian ultimatum was described by the kaiser as '... a splendid victory. With this every reason for war disappears.' He did, however, add that Austria should occupy the Serbian capital until there was evidence that its demands were being met.

It may be that Germany aimed to disrupt the entente between Russia, France and Britain, and to strengthen its own bonds with Austria, without resorting to war. There is strong evidence that, by 1914, Germany was increasingly concerned by the growth of Russian power and the corresponding weakness of Austria. The main gainers from the 1912-13 Balkan Wars had been Russia and its client states in the region, primarily Serbia. It was also important for Germany to support Austria--its only reliable ally--against Serbia in order to avoid the perils of diplomatic isolation. It might be that the Russian tsar's shock over the murder of royalty, and his awareness that his country's rearmament was not complete, would enable Serbia to be punished without Russian intervention.

On the other hand, it seems that Germany was prepared to face the risk of war if Russia did choose to fight in support of Serbia. The work of Niall Ferguson and other historians suggests that the German leadership believed that it stood a better chance of winning in 1914 than in a few years' time. By then the continued growth of the Russian and French armies, and the completion of Russia's strategic railway building programme in Poland, would have tipped the balance of forces against Germany. It was becoming increasingly difficult to finance German military expansion in a way that was politically acceptable at home. It may have been that a military confrontation in 1914 was preferable to a long and ultimately unsuccessful competition with Germany's potential enemies to raise the necessary resources. Moreover, a war in which Russia was perceived as the aggressor would unite all sections of German society, even the Social Democrats.

Sole responsibility?

It should, however, be noted that other powers played important parts in the unfolding events of 1914. As historian Hew Strachan reminds us in his recent study of the First World War, it was Austria-Hungary that initiated the quarrel with Serbia after the archduke's murder. Austria delivered its ultimatum to Serbia, in spite of the fact that it could not prove that Serbia's government was implicated in the assassination, and opened hostilities, even though Serbia had accepted all but one of its demands. Austria faced considerable difficulties in holding together its multi-racial empire in southeastern Europe, and was disturbed by the growth of Russian and Serbian power following the wars of 1912-13. It was determined to crush Serbia, which it feared as the potential leader of a Balkan federation linked to Russia.

Russia has not escaped blame, since it ordered its armed forces to assemble in anticipation of conflict with Austria and Germany. Its partial mobilisation on 24-25 July can be seen as a defensive move. On 30 July, however, it increased its military commitment for essentially technical reasons. Had its partial mobilisation provoked a German military response, it would then have been difficult to move to full mobilisation with the necessary speed. This consideration led the Russians to decide on full mobilisation without further delay. Underlying these decisions was the Russian leadership's belief that Serbia could not be left to face Austrian aggression on its own. Russian passivity in earlier crises--in the 1908-09 Bosnia crisis and again in 1912-13--made action all the more important in 1914. Russia could not afford to see the Balkans dominated by an Austro-German combination, and it saw military preparations as a vital support to diplomatic pressure.

Most historians agree that the responsibility of France and Britain was less important. France believed that it had to support Russia in order to preserve the alliance which had become so vital to its foreign policy over the previous two decades. Neither France nor Britain was prepared to see German military domination of the continent. In their different ways both countries feared that, if they stood aside from a European conflict, their credibility in the eyes of their partners and their status as great powers would be placed in jeopardy.

Conclusion

It seems unfair to ascribe sole responsibility to Germany. It is unlikely that the kaiser's government planned for war over a long period, and there is evidence of considerable uncertainty within the German power elite in 1914. Nonetheless, Germany's contribution to the outbreak of war was of a different order from that of the other powers. Its approach to the idea of military conflict was less defensive, and much more positive. German leaders viewed war as a legitimate way of furthering their ambitions, of dealing with Russia before it gained still more strength, and of arresting the decline of their ally, Austria-Hungary. Even if they did not work actively towards it, they willingly accepted the risk of war in 1914.

chancellor: head of the German government, equivalent to a prime minister.

Social Democratic Party: party, favouring a transfer of wealth from rich to poor, and seen as a threat by the old land-owning class in Germany.

militaristic: supporting the values of the army and the spread of their influence within civil society.

assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand: heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, murdered on 28 June 1914 by a member of a Serbian terrorist group, the Black Hand, during a visit to Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia. The assassination was used by Austria as a pretext for quarrel with Serbia.

Austrian ultimatum: Austria responded to the assassination by presenting a series of humiliating demands to Serbia. Serbia accepted all of these demands except one, that Austrian officials be given access to Serbia in order to investigate the murder.

1912-13 Balkan Wars: in the first war a group of Balkan states, Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro, defeated the Turkish empire. The second war was caused by disagreements between Serbia and Bulgaria. As a result, Serbia emerged as the strongest state in southeast Europe.

mobilisation: preparing a country's armed forces for war: recalling reservists, moving into defensive positions. Usually a sign either that a country is expecting to be attacked or that it is preparing to go on the offensive.

1908-09 Bosnia crisis: Austria-Hungary annexed (formally took over) the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which technically belonged to Turkey but which had been occupied by Austria since 1878. Russia opposed Austria but ultimately took no action.

Theodore von Bethmann-Hollweg

(1856-1921)

1905-07 Took responsibility first for

Prussia's internal administration

then became secretary of state for

the German interior.

1909 Became chancellor of Germany,

in succession to yon Bulow.

Inexperienced in international

affairs, he nevertheless sought

diplomatic success (such as an

Anglo-German agreement) or

victory in a short war, in order to

win the collaboration of the kaiser

and the military high command for

modernisation of the German

constitution. In the event, his

diplomatic inexperience

exacerbated already sensitive

international situations.

July 1917 Resigned as chancellor.

Timeline

1882 Triple Alliance between Germany,

Austria-Hungary and Italy.

1894 Franco-Russian alliance.

1898 Start of German naval expansion

programme.

1904 France and Britain conclude the

Entente Cordiale, a resolution of

their differences on colonial issues.

1905 Morocco crisis: Kaiser Wilhelm II

intervenes in Morocco in a bid to

drive Britain and France apart.

1907 Britain and Russia reach agreement.

1908 Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1912-13 Balkan Wars.

The 1914 crisis

28 June Assassination of Archduke Franz

Ferdinand.

5 July Germany gives Austria assurance

of support in action against

Serbia.

23 July Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

25 July Serbia accepts all but one item in

the Austrian ultimatum.

28 July Austria declares war on Serbia.

30 July Russia begins general mobilisation.

1 August Germany declares war on Russia.

3 August Germany declares war on France

and invades Belgium.

4 August Britain declares war on Germany.

Questions

* How important is it to blame one power for the outbreak of war in 1914?

* In the context of the period, is there a difference between planning for world power and planning for war?

* How important is the role of the kaiser in reaching a judgement about Germany's role in causing the war?

* How accurate is it to claim that, without Germany, the July crisis would not have led to a European war? Could the same thing be said of Russia?

* Has this article proved that it is unfair to place sole blame for the war on Germany?

Further study

Bridge, F.R. (1988) 1914: The Coming of the First World War, Historical Association.

Evans, R. J. and Pogge von Strandmann, H. (eds) (1988) The Coming of the First World War, Oxford University Press.

Ferguson, N. (1998) The Pity of War, Penguin. Henig, R. (2002 edn) The Origins of the First World War, Routledge Lancaster Pamphlets.

Strachan, H. (2001) The First World War, Volume I, To Arms, Oxford University Press

Dr Graham Goodlad is Director of Sixth Form at St John's College, Southsea. His study of Gladstone in the Flagship History Makers series was published by HarperCollins in 2004.

Source Citation

Goodlad, Graham. "German was guilt re-examined; the victorious allies blamed Germany for starting the First World War. Were they right?" Modern History Review 16.4 (2005): 28+. General OneFile. Web. 10 Oct. 2010.

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