INDIA & BURMA
WO 172/30 L OF C PRO COY MALAYA SEPT-DEC 1941
BISTADAI CAMP PT 5 FORMATION OF L OF C PRO COY. LT MORGAN, CSM BASTER,
CQMS SAVAGE, SGT’S DUSER, BEAL, BALL, HEALEY.
SEPT 6 13 OTHER RANKS OF LOYAL REGT DEPARTED. 15 OTHER RANKS EAST SURREY REGT ARRIVE.
SEPT 8 13 OTHER RANKS MANCHESTER REGT PROBATIONERS.
SEPT 22 COY MOVE TO BRADDEL ROAD HUTMENTS. 9 OTHER RANKS SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS COMPLETE ESTABLISHMENT. TRAINING AND ISSUE OF MOTOR TRANSPORT.
DEC 13 TWO SECTIONS UNDER THE OC PROCEEDED TO BAUYAN CAMP AND DISARM THE HYDERABAD REGT WHO THEN ENTRAINED.
DEC 12 2 JAPANESE POW’S TAKEN OVER TO KUALA LUMPUR STATION, PROCEEDING TO SINGAPORE UNDER ESCORT AND HANDED OVER TO DPM.
DEC 20 CAPT MORGAN OC APPOINTED DAPM.
WO 172/36 3 INDIAN CORPS PRO COY JUNE-SEPT 1941
SINGAPORE KITWOOD CAMP. CAPT RUTTOCK.
JUNE MILITARY POLICE COURSE OF INSTRUCTION DURING MONTH. POSTED IN 1 VCO, 39 IOR’S (INDIAN OTHER RANKS). 18 NON-COMBATANTS (ENROLLED). CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN EQUIPPING COMPANY.
JUL CONTINUED MP INSTRUCTION COURSE.
JUL 25 COMPANY LESS 1 BRITISH SECTION MOVE TO KUALA LUMPUR, CORONATION CAMP.
JUL 27 ONE BRITISH SECTION TO PENANG, TOOK OVER DUTIES FROM SINGAPORE FORTRESS PRO COY.
AUG COMPANY TOOK OVER DUTIES IN KUALA LUMPUR, 1 BRITISH SECTION TO SUNGEI PATANI, 1 BRITISH SECTION TO IPOH.
SEPT COMPANY STILL IN KUALA LUMPUR. 1 BRITISH SECTION RETURNS FROM IPOH.
OCT KUALA LUMPUR.
WO 172/62 1 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT OCT 1940 JAN-DEC 1941
OCT 1940 BOMBAY. CAPT HOLMES-JOHNSON.
OCT 27 EMBARK BOMBAY
NOV 12 DISEMBARK SINGAPORE.
DEC 1 CAMP AT BIDADARI.
JAN 16 1941 TO KUALA LUMPUR.
MAY UNIT NOW 11 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT.
JUNE 23 CAPT P G KENDALL REPORTS FOR DUTY AND ASSUMES COMMAND VICE CAPT HOLMES-JOHNSON.
WO 172/84 18 DIVISION PRO COY SEPT 1941-JAN 1942.
SEP 30 CAPT J C BIRTS RAC POSTED TO CMP DEPOT ASH VALE. CAPT W A ENGLISH RA ASSUMES COMMAND.OCT 31 LT D HUNT RA POSTED IN FROM 108 PRO COY. 2ND LT P M EDIS, LINCOLNSHIRE REGT POSTED IN FROM 102 PRO COY.
OCT 25 LT HUNT AND 4 SECTIONS EMBARK AT BRISTOL FOR UNKNOWN DESTINATION. REMAINDER OF COY ENTRAIN FOR GOUROCK.
OCT 26 ARRIVE GOUROCK, EMBARK ON THE DUCHESS OF ATHOLL.
OCT 30 SAILED FROM GOUROCK FOR UNKNOWN DESTINATION.
DEC 9 ARRIVE CAPE TOWN. 7689016 L/CPL S WAGER TO VICTORIA COTTAGE HOSPITAL, WYNBERG, SOUTH AFRICA.
DEC 25 ARRIVE MOMBASSA. SAILED 30 DEC 1941.
JAN 13 ARRIVE SINGAPORE.
JAN 19 BUKIT TIMAR. 2655418 CPL FAIRHEAD AND 2 L/CPL’S COMMENCE DUTIES ON THE CAUSEWAY WHERE THEY REMAINED UNTIL IT WAS DESTROYED.
JAN 21 2656702 L/CPL VEALE KILLED DURING AN AIR RAID ON SINGAPORE.
JAN 22 2656702 L/CPL VEALE WAS BURIED AT BIDADARI CEMETERY.
JAN 23 7687721 CPL SHIEFF AND 6 L/CPL’S TOOK OVER DUTIES ON AMMO DUMP, 24 HOUR DUTY.
JAN 29 BUKIT TIMAH. ALL AVAILABLE NCO’S OF THE COMPANY CARRIED OUT TC DUTIES DURING THE EVACUATION OF JOHORE. LT HUNT AND REMAINING NCO’S OF COY DISEMBARKED AT SINGAPORE. THESE NCO’S WERE GIVEN ACCOMMODATION IN THE NAVAL BASE WHERE THEY REMAINED FOR 2 DAYS.
WO 172/160 SINGAPORE FORTRESS PRO COY MAR-OCT 1941
KITWOOD CAMP. CAPT BOXALL. NO OTHER INFORMATION.
WO 172/435 APM HQ 15 INDIAN CORPS JULY-AUG NOV 1942
AUG 14 COY RAISED AT RANCHI.
AUG 10 INTERVIEWED CAPT HODGES, CAPT MARONA, 5 MADRAS REGT FOR DAPM COURSE.
AUG 13 INTERVIEWED CAPT HEALEY LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS AND 2/LT WELDON, JATS, INDIAN ARMY.
AUG 14 INTERVIEWED NCO’S AND MEN OFO 1 WARWICKSHIRE REGT TO SELECT CORPS HQ AND SECTIONS.
NOV 5 LT SMITH RIASC ATTACHED FOR TRAINING.
NOV 6 MOTOR CYCLES ARRIVE FROM CALCUTTA.
NOV 7 3 TON LORRY ARRIVES FROM DELHI.
NOV 8 COMPANY MOVES TO BILLETS IN RANCHI.
NOV 17 EXERCISE NO.7, WHOLE CORPS HQ IN THE FIELD. CAPT SAMPSON OC COY ARRIVES.
DEC 5 10 IOR (INDIAN OTHER RANKS TO HOSPITAL INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT.
WO 172/446 33 INDIAN CORP PRO UNIT AUG-DEC 1942
AUG 17 BANGALORE.
AUG 22 CAPT MORGAN AND L/CPL HARRISON STARTED TOUR. SWEEPER KALAPPA DIED IN IN INDIAN MILITARY HOSPITAL. AT 22.00HRS
AUG 23 FUNERAL OF SWEEPER KALAPPA (HINDU). No details found of grave in cwgc roll)
AUG 24 CPL WILKINSON AND WILLIAMS STARTED TOUR WITH DPM. LC/PL HARRISON RE-JOINED FROM TOUR.
SEP 4 CAPT ARMOUR AND L/CPL GALLANT OUT ON RECCE.
SEP 7 EXERCISE JOVE, BANGALORE. ACCIDENT AT 57 MILE STONE. KASHIR SINGH KILLED (NO DETAILS FOUND IN CWGC ROLL) AND ANSU RAM AND NACHI DETAINED IN HOSPITAL
SEP 15 RETURNED FROM EX JOVE. ACCIDENT THE FOLLOWING TO HOSPITAL: MEHRABAN KHAN, PARITHI SING, DHUYA DITTA, MOHD ALLUM, MIRZA KHAN, GHUNSAR SINGH, SHAH BAZ.
SEP 26 CQMS TIERNEY TO BANGALORE PRO UNIT.
OCT 8 4 BRITISH OTHER RANKS AND 4 INDIAN OTHER RANKS REPORT FOR PROVOST DUTY.
OCT 14 CAPT J J WILDE REPORTS FOR INSTRUCTION.
OCT 30 RSM R T JOYCE SIB ARRIVED FROM BOMBAY PRO COY.
NOV 3 CAPT MORGAN AND DUTIES CALLED TO CANTONMENT RAILWAY STATION CONCERNING TROUBLE THERE. ONE RAMC CAPT (72898 CAPT THOMAS MILES. RAMC) DIED OF GUNSHOT WOUNDS.
DEC 7 UNIT MOVE TO PURDUR.
DEC 17 UNIT MOVE BACK TO BANGALORE.
DEC 27 CAPT L W MORGAN RELINQUISHED COMMAND, CAPT C ARMOUR NEW OC WITH CAPT J T WILDE AS 2 1/C.
WO 172/461 2 DIVISION PRO COY MAY-DEC 1942
MAY 1 TO 3 HMT K3, FREETOWN SOUTH AFRICA. CAPT G N LILLEY WARWICKSHIRE YEOMANRY OC.
MAY 15 CAPE TOWN
MAY 16-18 2 SECTIONS UNDER LT G G SHEATH DESPATCHED FOR GUARDS AND PICKETS AT POLDMOUR CAMP, CAPE PROVINCE.
JUN 7 BOMBAY TO POONA.
JUN 26 DECIDED THAT DIVISIONAL SIGN TO BE WORN ON RIGHT SIDE OF TOPEE. (SIGN WHITE CROSSED KEYS ON BLACK SQUARE, SIGNS NORMALLY WORN ON LEFT SIDE OF HELMET).
JUN 30 5 NCO’S IN HOSPITAL IN JUNE WITH DIARRHOEA.
JUL 10 COY PERSONNEL HAD LEFT AND RIGHT THUMB IMPRESSIONS PLACED ON INSIDE FRONT COVER OF THEIR AB 64 PART I.
JUL 25 RESPIRATORS TO BE WORN EVERY TUESDAY MORNING FROM 09.30HRS TO 10.00HRS.
NOV 27 CAPT L ATKINSON ROYAL NORFOLK REGT NEW OC. LT G G SHEATH NORTH STAFFS AND LT C G BUNKER GEN LIST.
DEC 25 CONGRESS INCIDENT 22.30HRS. BOMB EXPLOSION AT SAIOSH CINEMA, 19 BOR’S INJURED, 2 ON DANGEROUSLY ILL LIST, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.
DEC 28 CONGRESS INCIDENT, HOMEMADE TYPE BOMB THROWN AT POLICE STATION SUDAR BAZAAR.
WO 172/474 14 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT MAY-DEC 1942
MAY 3 STAND TO ALARM GIVEN BY DIV HQ. UNIT ISSUED WITH RIFLES WHICH ARE TO BE RETAINED.
SEP 2 INDIAN ARMY ORDER 1875 RECEIVED REGARDING FORMATION OF CMP (I) DEPOT.
NOV 1 CHITTAGONG, COX BAZAAR.
NOV 2 3 PRISONERS SENT BY L/CPL ALLEN FROM HANDPUR.
NOV 3 73 L OF C PRO UNIT ARRIVE IN COX BAZAAR. ALL ROADS IMPASSABLE EXCEPT FOR PACK TRANSPORT.
NOV 7 CHITTAGONG. DAPM CAPT BORNFIELD SOMERSET LIGHT INF ARRIVES.
WO 172/481 17 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT MAR-DEC 1942.
MAR 5 SEPOY PAHLEWAN KHAN WOUNDED ON ROAD WHICH WAS CUT BY ENEMY.
MAR 7 MOVED FROM HLEGIN TO CROSS ROADS, RANGOON, PROME, PEGU ROADS. ROAD BLOCK AT 24 PROME ROAD. SEVERE BOMBING AND CONGESTION OF TRAFFIC DEPLORABLE. ROAD CLEARED AND DIV MOVED. 15 CWT TRUCKS ABANDONED, SEVERAL DAMAGED.
MAR 15 COLLECTED 14 CIVILIAN CARS, HANDED OVER TO AQ.
MAR 16 COMPLAINT OF UNSUITABILITY OF BRITISH SECTION COMPOSED OF KOYLI FOR PROVOST WORK.
MAR 18 DESPATCHED KOYLI DET. BACK TO BATTALION, REPLACED BY DUKE OF WELLINGTON’S REGT.
APR 2 FALL OF PROME. CAPT HEALEY OC.
MAY 31 21.00 HRS SEPOY GHAZI KHAN DIED IN HOSPITAL AT IMPHAL (ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL 23/5/1942).
JUN 20 FGCM HELD AT DIV HQ. 5054404 PTE VICTOR BROAD. 1 NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT AT 17 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT. 1ST CHARGE, WHEN ON ACTIVE SERVICE DESERTED HIS MAJESTY’S SERVICE. 2ND CHARGE, CONDUCT PREJUDICE TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE. FINDING ON 1ST CHARGE, NOT GUILTY OF DESERTION BUT ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE. 2ND CHARGE GUILTY. 1 YEARS DETENTION. DIARY CONTAINS LOTS OF ABSENTEES & DESERTERS AND ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITAL.
AUG 1 IMPHAL.
AUG 30 LT E A W BONNY ATTACHED.
SEP 1 UNIT TITLE ON DIARY 17 LIGHT INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT.
SEP 30 CSM RODGERS ACTING RSM WEF 1/9/1942.
OCT 7 RSM STUBB GLOUCESTERSHIRE REGT NEW RSM.
NOV 2 CAPT V S IRVING.
WO 172/500 20 INDIAN DIVISION PRO UNIT JUN-OCT 1942
JUL 17 COY RAISED. OC CAPT J D CAMPBELL. 1 WOII AND 22 BRITISH OTHER RANKS FROM DEVONSHIRE AND NORTHAMPTONSHIRE REGIMENT.
SEP 3 MATUGAMA.
WO 172/536 39 INDIAN DIVISION PRO UNIT DEC 1942
DEC 1 SHILLONG. FEW NOTES ON TRAINING ONLY.
WO 172/681 12 ARMY PROVOST UNIT JULY-DEC 1945
JUL 15 LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN ARRIVED IN RANGOON BY AIR.
AUG 14 RIOT SQUADS FORMED AND SENT TO RANGOON TO DEAL WITH VJ DAY CELEBRATIONS. CAPT A BEAN RA OC 14/9/1945.
WO 172/1482 34 INDIAN DIVISION PRO UNIT MAR-JUNE 1942
MAR 21 COLOMBO, CEYLON. TOOK OVER AS OC 34 DIV PRO UNIT FROM CAPT DARRAGH WHO RETURNED TO HIS REGIMENT 11 ROYAL INNISKILLING FUSILIERS. FIND UNIT IN A HOPELESS MUDDLE, DISORGANIZED AND DISCONTENTED. NO DUTY ROSTERS, LACK OF ADMIN BY PREVIOUS OC. NO DISCIPLINE AMONG NCO’S. STRENGTH OF UNIT IN COLOMBO, 17 BRITISH OTHER RANKS AND 34 INDIAN OTHER RANKS. EVIDENCE HAS SHOWN INDIAN OTHER RANKS ARE MOST UNSUITABLE AS MILITARY POLICE.
MAR 22 RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM SINGAPORE LT EDES, CMP (HE MUST HAVE ESCAPED BEFORE THE SURRENDER OF SINGAPORE).
MAY 31 KANDY. NEW QUARTERS IN TRINITY COLLEGE.
JUN 5 THE INDIAN OTHER RANKS OF THIS UNIT CANNOT BE RELIED UPON TO CARRY OUT ANYTHING BUT THE SIMPLEST TASKS. THEY ARE MORE A LIABILITY THAN AN ASSET.
WO 172/1872 DPM SOUTHERN ARMY INDIA JAN-DEC 1943
JAN 9 BANGALORE. LT COL G R POUNCEY, DPM SOUTHERN ARMY INDIA.
JAN 11 GHQ LETTER 2254/2/AGI DATED 11/1/1943 AUTHORISING INCREASE OF 19 AND 25 INDIAN DIV PRO UNITS TO 2 BRITISH AND 4 INDIAN SECTIONS.
JAN 15 INDIAN ARMY ORDER 110/43 DATED 15/1/1943 AUTHORISING DAPM’S OF DIVISIONS TO BE UPGRADED TO APM’S (MAJOR) FROM DATE OF ORDER.
JAN 29 MAJ BURROWS, APM 2 DIV APPOINTED APM 33 CORPS.
APRIL 18 DPM SOUTHERN ARMY PRO INSTRUCTION ON.5
THE ARMY COMMANDER HAS RECENTLY HAD OCCASION TO ADDRESS FORMATION COMMANDERS ON THE SUBJECT OF EXCESSIVE DRINKING (AS OPPOSED TO DRUNKENNESS) BY OFFICERS.
HE HAS ORDERED THAT THIS IS TO BE DISCOURAGED ANYWHERE AND PARTICULARLY THAT UNDESIRABLE PLACES WHERE EXCESSIVE DRINKING TAKES PLACE ARE PUT OUT OF BOUNDS. HE DEMAND UNQUESTIONING CO-OPERATION IN THIS MATTER.
PROVOST OFFICERS WILL KEEP A CAREFUL WATCH ON HOTELS, RESTAURANTS, BARS ETC WHERE OFFICERS CONGREGATE. THEY WILL DO WHAT THEY CAN TO DISCOURAGE “BINGES” BY TIMELY ADVICE SO THAT
MORE STRINGENT ACTION REMAINS UNNECESSARY. BUT SHOULD SUCH MEASURES FAIL APM OR DAPM CONCERNED WILL REPORT THE OFFENDING ESTABLISHMENT OR UNIT CONCERNED TO THE SUB AREA COMMANDER FOR HIS ORDERS. IN PARTICULAR WATCH SHOULD BE KEPT AT RAILWAY STATION REFRESHMENT ROOMS WHICH SHOULD NORMALLY BE OUT OF BOUNDS TO OTHER THAN BONA FIDE TRAVELLERS AND FOR RESORTS WHICH SECRETLY SELL DRINKS AFTER ANY PRESCRIBED CLOSING HOUR.
APR STANDING ORDER FOR PROVOST UNITS ISSUED BY DPM SOUTHERN ARMY. THESE ORDERS ARE ISSUED FOR GUIDANCE OF OC OF ALL PRO UNIT IN SOUTHERN ARMY. UNIT COMMANDERS WILL ISSUE THEIR OWN STANDING ORDERS IN AMPLIFICATION OF THESE ORDERS.
CONTENTS. DUTIES OF UNIT STAFFS, CHAPTER I, UNIT ADMINISTRATION CHAPTER II, DISCIPLINE CHAPTER III, POLICE DUTIES CHAPTER IV, TRAINING CHAPTER V, LIST OF FILES APPENDIX A, REPORT BOOK APPENDIX B. THERE ARE 12 PAGES OF THE ORDER.
WO 172/1903 APM 15 INDIAN CORPS JAN-DEC 1943
JAN 23 CHINESE MISSION ESCORTED TO TAMGARH.
JAN 25 CHINESE MISSION ESCORTED TO RANCH.
VARIOUS EXERCISES AND VISITS
OCT 1 APM TO BARKAKANA EN ROUTE FOR CHITTAGONG.
WO 172/1918 33 INDIAN CORPS PRO UNIT JAN 1943
JAN 1 BANGALORE PURDUR CAMP, HQ 22 CORPS. CAPT ARMOUR AND CAPT WILD.
CRASC PARK BANGALORE HANDED OVER TO BANGALORE PRO UNIT.
JAN 17 PURDUR, WATER CARRIER BUNDU TO HOSPITAL, SMALLPOX. ALL NOT VACCINATED CONFINED TO CAMP
WO 172/1934 2 DIVISION PRO COY JAN-DEC 1943
JAN AHMEDNAGAR. CAPT L ATKINSON, ROYAL NORFOLK REGT. LT T SHEATH, NORTH STAFFS REGT. LT I ROBERTSON A & SH. RSM BAX, LT CAMPBELL CAMERON HIGHLANDERS.
JAN 13 LT T SHEATH TO 228 L OF C PRO UNIT.
JAN 26 MAJ BURROWS APM TO 33 CORPS, NEW APM JAJ W STEWART. NEW RSM NEWMAN, RSM BAX BECAME 282786 LT ROYAL NORFOLK REGT. (LG 36132 PAGE 3640, 13/8/42). LT C BUNKER GEN LIST ARRIVES.
MAY 21 TUNISIA DAY, COY FOUND MEN FOR PARADE AND SALUTING BASE ETC.
FEB 6 RSM BAX, SGT WARD, L/CPL’S WOOD , AND MACLAREN INTERVIEWED BY GOC RE EMERGENCY COMMISSIONS.
LT D ROBERTSON YORK & LANCASTER AND LT C BUNKER GENERAL LIST JOIN UNIT.
15 SEPT RSM NEWMAN NEW RSM.
29 SEPT APM & OC COMPANY PRESENTED BY GOC 2 DIVISION TO THE GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY.
OCT 3 CAPT W A BOWCOCK (324499) DLI POSTED IN. LT H MCLEAN RWF ATTACHED FOR PROVOST TRAINING.
OCT 5 CAPT L ATKINSON OC/DAPM TO 117 SIS, HQ SOUTHERN ARMY.
OCT 16 BRIGADIER FORBES, PROVOST MARSHAL AND LT COL POWNCEY DPM VISIT.
NOV APPENDIX A TO WAR DIARY. EXERCISE SWORDFISH.
HAVING EMBARKED TROOPS ON THE 2 NOV 1943 TROOPS AND TRANSPORT SHIPS LAY OFF BOMBAY UNTIL COMMENCING THE APPROACH TO THE BEACHES ON THE EVENING OF THE 5TH. DURING THIS TIME ALL RANKS WERE RIGOROUSLY PRACTISED IN ROUTES TO BOAT STATIONS AND WHILST OFF BOMBAY IN THE USE OF SCRAMBLING NETS AND RIGID IRON LADDERS ON THE SHIP’S SIDES. CAPT J H NICHOLSON (OC COY) AND LT
MCLEAN (2 I/C) TRAVELLED ON THE STANDBY S.N.O.L. SHIP. OTHERS OF THE COMPANY TRAVELLED IN OTHER SHIPS. THE LANDING WERE MADE IN THE AREA OF RATNIGIRI ON THE MORNING OF THE 6TH. OC COY AND 2 I/C BEING ON A LATE SERIAL (AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE CAPTURE OF THE BEACH ON WHICH DIV HQ WAS TO LAND , WAS DELAYED) EVENTUALLY LANDED AT ABOUT 15.30HRS THAT AFTERNOON.
COY HQ WAS SET UP JUST IN REAR OF DIV HQ AND NORMAL SECURITY AND TRAFFIC CONTROL DUTIES WERE PERFORMED. A P.O.W CAGE WAS
ALSO ESTABLISHED. AT THE CLOSE OF THE EXERCISE, AT APPROX. 15.00HRS ON THE 7TH PERSONNEL ASSISTED IN DISPERSAL OF DIV
TROOPS TO RE-EMBARKATION BEACHES. TRANSPORT RETURNED BY ROAD. IT WAS FOUND THAT (CHIEFLY OWING TO THE FACT THAT THE EXERCISE DID NOT VISUALISE THE MOVE OF DIV HQ) THE COMPANY WAS TOO CLOSELY SANDWICHED BETWEEN DIV HQ AND BMA. AND CALLS WERE CONSEQUENTLY AND FREQUENTLY MADE ON THE COMPANY IN EXCESS OF ITS PROPER ROLE. THE SHIPS WEIGHED ANCHOR ON THE 8TH AND TIED UP IN BOMBAY THE EVENING OF THE 9TH. SHORE LEAVE WAS GRANTED AND ALSO ON THE MORNING OF THE 10TH. CAPT NICHOLSON REMAINED IN BOMBAY TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE, WHITE LT MCLEAN RETURNED TO AHMEDNAGAR BY THE SPECIAL TRAIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE 10TH AND ARRIVED ON THE EVENING OF THE FOLLOWING DAY. CAPT NICHOLSON RETURNED AT ABOUT 11.00HRS ON THE 12TH.
A MESSAGE FROM THE GOC (MAJ GEN GROVER) CONGRATULATED ALL RANKS ON THEIR TURNOUT AND THE WAY IN WHICH THEY WORKED.
WO 172/1959 14 INDIAN DIVISION PRO UNIT JAN-APR 1943
JAN 1 UKHIA. CAPT G H D WILLIAMS 9 JAT REGT.
JAN 4 CSM AND ADVANCE PARTY TO MAUNGDAW. SEVEN SUSPECTS SENT UNDER ESCORT FROM MAUNGDAW TO COX BAZAAR. (MOVE ORDERS).
JAN 5 ARRIVE MAUNGDAW, HQ ESTABLISHED 12.00HRS.
JAN 7 TOOK OVER MAUNGDAW AND BUTHIDAUNG TRAFFIC CONTROL. SUBMITTED PROVOST DUTIES TO “A” BRANCH. NO.2 SUBSECTION SENT TO REINFORCE OTHER SUBSECTION AT TUNNELS FOR NIGHT DUTY.
JAN 8 MAHRATTA SECTION AT TUNNELS ARMED WITH ONE LMG AND SIX RIFLES. INTERVIEWED LT COL PHELIPS (MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR) REFERENCE SHOOTING OF PERSONS SENTENCED TO DEATH BY CIVIL AUTHORITIES. URGENT MESSAGE SENT TO 10 LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS FOR 5 BOR REPLACEMENTS FOR PROVOST PERSONNEL IN HOSPITAL ETC.
JAN 10 VISIT TO MAUNGDAW OF H E FIELD MARSHALL SIR A WAVELL - RETURNED TO CHITTAGONG 17.00HRS. WHOLE UNIT ON ROAD CONTROL. ONE BOR AND ONE IOR ACT AS MOTORCYCLE ESCORT.
JAN 11 OC PRO UNIT (CAPT G H D WILLIAMS) AND BATMAN PTE. ONSLOW (6086483) LEAVE TO RECCE ROAD MAUNGDAW/INDIN. PART OF ROAD IS ALONG BEACH; WHILST DRIVING ON BEACH THE STATION WAGON, IN WHICH THEY WERE , WAS ATTACKED AND MACHINE-GUNNED FROM THE AIR BY A JAP AIRCRAFT, OTHER VEHICLES NOT ATTACKED AT ALL. THREE BURST WERE FIRED AT THE WAGON, ONE WHEN OCCUPANTS WERE SEEKING COVER. AS A RESULT OF THIS CAPT WILLIAMS WAS HIT NUMEROUS TIMES IN THE SIDE AND RIGHT THIGH AND PTE ONSLOW IN
THE ARM AND SIDE. BOTH EVACUATED TO ADS WITH 47 BDE HQ AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO CCS MAUNGDAW. STATION WAGON RECOVERED BY CSM ON RECEIVING REPORT OF INCIDENT. DAPM REPORTS BACK FROM HOSPITAL.
JAN 12 CAPT WILLIAMS AND PTE ONSLOW EVACUATED FROM MAUNGDAW BY HOSPITAL SHIP. DAPM TAKES OVER A/OC OF UNIT.
JAN 13 CAPT WILLIAMS PLACED ON DANGEROUSLY ILL LIST.
JAN 15 CAPT WILLIAMS TAKEN OFF D.I. LIST AT 62 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL (COMB).
JAN 16 MAHRATTA SECTION VISITED AT TUNNELS.
JAN 17 TEN CIVILIAN SUSPECTS RECEIVED FROM FORWARD AREAS FOR INTERROGATION - THEY ARE FED AND HOUSED BY DIV PROVOST. LT COL PHELIPS (MA) AND DSP MAUNGDAW AGAIN INTERVIEWED REGARDING SHOOTING OF PERSONS CONDEMNED BY CIVIL AUTHORITIES.
JAN 18 VISIT OF H E SIR ALAN HARLEY (DEPUTY C IN C) WHOLE UNIT ON TRAFFIC DUTIES FROM 11.00 HRS TO 17.00 HRS. CPOL HOLMWOOD (6086187) AND HAVILDAR SARDAR KHAN (8020) ACTED AS MOTORCYCLE ESCORT.
JAN 19 PUNJAB AND MAHRATTA SECTIONS EXCHANGE DUTIES AT TUNNEL AREA - MAHRATTA SECTION TO HQ. FIRING PARTY PROVIDED BY BRITISH OTHER RANKS OF UNIT TO CARRY OUT DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED BY MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR ON SIX CIVILIAN CRIMINALS. MAUNGDAW BOMBED 20.30HRS.
JAN 20 ESCORT OF 1 BOR AND 1 IOR PROVIDED TO TAKE THREE CIVILIAN SUSPECTS BACK TO CHITTAGONG TO HAND OVER TO SPECIAL INTERROGATION DEPT. SEVEN OTHER SUSPECTS HANDED OVER TO
MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR MAUNGDAW.
JAN 23 POW CAGE MAUNGDAW COMPLETED. PERSONNEL ON JETTY DUTY DOUBLED AND NIGHT SHIFT INCLUDED. GUIDES PROVIDED FOR CARRIER PLATOON OF FORWARD BATTALION.
JAN 27 NIGHT TCP’S ESTABLISHED ON MAUNGDAY/BUTHINDAUNG ROAD - CLOSED 18.00 HRS - 08.00 HRS DAILY FOR BRIDGE WIDENING. JETTY DUTIES REVERTED TO NORMAL.
FEB 1 MAUNGDAY/BUTHIDAUNG AND ROADS SOUTH OPENED.
FEB 4 INLAND ROAD TO INDIN OPEN FROM 06.00HRS. ESCORT SENT TO INDIN TO COLLECT 3 POW FROM MDS. ONE DIED FROM WOUNDS, ONE TOO ILL TO MOVE, ONE BROUGHT BACK FOR INTERROGATION AND PLACED IN CCS WITH GUARD.
FEB 5 SECOND PRISONER BROUGHT BACK TO CCS.
FEB 6 FIRST PRISONER SENT BACK TO NO.2 MOBILE SECTION.
FEB 7 MAUNGDAW/BUTHIDAUNG ROAD CLOSED AT NIGHT FOR REPAIRS. NIGHT TCP’S ESTABLISHED AT NEW FSD AREA.
FEB 12 ONE UNIT TRUCK STRAFED FROM AIR DURING AIR RAID. L/CPL KELLY (6087102) ADMITTED TO CCS WITH WOUNDS IN ARM AND SIDE.
MAR 5 FERRY DUTY. 1 SGT, 1 HAV, 3 BOR’S, 9 IORS (KINDAUNG, KYAUKBYINZEIK AND HTIZWE.
PTE ONSLOW F BATTLE CASUALTY RETURNED.
MAR 6 SUB SECTION RETURNED FROM FORWARD AREA. STRAGGLERS POST RETURNED. L/CPL KELLY (BATTLE CASUALTY) RETURNED. STRAGGLERS CONCENTRATED SOUTH OF FERRY. APM, OC UNIT AND ALL AVAILABLE MEN TO BUTHIDAUNG. OPENED UP TEMPORARY HQ AT BUTHIDAUNG.
MAR 7 STRAGGLERS POST ORGANIZED AT BUTHIDAUNG. SGT SEDDON, L/CPL JOHNSON AND 3 IOR’S RETURNED FROM KINDAUNG FERRY. SGT SEDDON REPORTED THAT 2 BOR’S AND 7 IOR’S MISSING (HAVING BEEN CUT OFF BY JAPANESE). ANOTHER DETACHMENT OF 2 BOR’S AND 4 IOR’S SENT TO KINDAUNG TO REORGANIZE TRAFFIC ETC.
MAR 8 ALL STRAGGLERS ORDERED TO REJOIN THEIR UNITS. MISSING BOR’S AND IOR’S RETURNED, HAVING WORKED THEIR WAY THROUGH THE HILLS. (ONE TRUCK AND MOST OF THEIR KIT LEFT BEHIND).
APR 1 STRAGGLERS POST TRACK SOUTH OF BUTHIDAUNG.
APR 3 MAJOR BARNFIELD APM AND 3 BOR’S ATTACHED FROM INNISKILLING FUSILIERS CUT OFF FROM HOP FORCE HQ BY JAP
INFILTRATION ONTO ROAD NORTH OF INDIN. OC TO SGT SEDDON AND PARTY - UNABLE TO CONTACT APM. ESCORT AND STRAGGLERS FROM
DOHAZARI. 1 CPL AND 3 BOR’S GUARD FOR JAP PRISONER IN CCS.
APR 4 CSM TO GYINDAW, STILL UNABLE TO CONTACT APM. L/NAIK REHMAT KHAN WOUNDED DURING BOMBING OF BUTHINDAUNG.
APR 5 VISITED BUTHIDAUNG - INSPECTED DAMAGE CAUSED BY BOMBING PREVIOUS DAY. SAW JAP PRISONERS 15 CCS, MAUNGDAY SAW SGT SEDFDON AND PARTY AT GYINDAW - UNABLE TO CONTACT APM.
APR 6 APM REPORTS TO HOP FORCE HQ.
APR 8 ADVANCE PARTY OF 26 DIV ARRIVED - GYINDAW DETACHMENT WITHDRAWN, 3 MILES BECOMES A DIRECTING POST.
APR 9 GYINDAW DET FURTHER WITHDRAWN TO LUMBAGUNA.
APR 10 OC TO MAUNGDAW - MAUNGDAW DUTIES TAKEN OVER BY 26 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT.
APR 13 1 SGT AND 3 BOR’S, 1 HAVILDAR AND 3 INDIAN OR’S TO BUTHIDAUNG CHECKING AND DIRECTING STRAGGLERS FROM SOUTH COLUMN.
APR 14 DUTIES IN MAUNGDAW CUT DOWN OWING TO LACK OF PERSONNEL.
APR 15 FERRY DUTY, 1 SGT, 1 HAV, 3 BOR’S, 9 IOR’S (KINDAUNG, KYAUKBYINGZEIK, AND HTIZWE).
APR 16 SUB SECTION RETURNED FROM FORWARD AREA. STRAGGLERS POST RETURNED. L/CPL KELLY (BATTLE CASUALTY RETURNED. STRAGGLERS CONCENTRATED SOUTH OF FERRY. APM AND OC UNIT AND
ALL AVAILABLE MEN TO BUTHIDAUNG, OPENED UP TEMPORARY HQ AT BUTHIDAUNG.
APR 17 STRAGGLERS POST ORGANIZED AT BUTHIDAUNG. SGT SEDDON, L/CPL JOHNSON AND 3 IOR’S RETURNED FROM KINDAUNG FERRY. SGT SEDDON REPORTED THAT 2 BOR’S AND 7 IOR’S MISSING (HAVING BEEN CUT OFF BY JAPANESE). ANOTHER DETACHMENT OF 2 BOR’S AND 4 IOR’S SENT TO KINDAUNG TO REORGANIZE TRAFFIC ETC.
APR 18 ALL STRAGGLERS ORDERED TO REJOIN THEIR UNITS. MISSING BOR’S AND IOR’S RETURNED, HAVING WORKED THEIR WAY THROUGH THE HILLS. (ONE TRUCK AND MOST OF THEIR KIT LEFT BEHIND).
APR 19 ARRIVED CALCUTTA DOCKS. LEFT BY TRAIN FOR DESTINATION 24.00 HRS.
APR 20 RANCHI.
APRIL 21 MT PARTY ARRIVED RANCHI. 2 NEW SECTIONS (1 BRITISH AND 1 INDIAN) WAITING AT TANCHI TO JOIN UNIT.
APR 26 ACCIDENT, UNIT 15 CWT OVERTURNED (I KILLED, 2 INJURED) POST MORTEM ON DECEASED L/NAIK JAGIR SINGH.
APR 29 CSM TO CALCUTTA TO COLLECT NEW SECTION. HAV MARUTI CHAVAN AND CPL POOLE TO FYZABAD, (SPECIAL PROVOST COURSE).
WO 172/1970 17 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1943
JAN 1 IMPHAL. TIDDING ROAD CAPT E A W BOND OC RAJPUT REGT. CAPT U S IMRIE GLOUCESTERSHIRE REGT. CQMS BELL.
JUN 13 CPL HORNER DIED OF CEREBRAL MALARIA AT 64 FIELD AMBULANCE. INFANTRY ATTACHED TO UNIT DUKE OF WELLINGTON’S REGT AND NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT.
SEP 13 12 JEEPS ALLOTTED TO UNIT.
SEP 27 NEW REVISED SCALE FOR TRANSPORT, WEAPONS AND AMMO RECOMMENDED BY DIV HQ TO GHQ AND ALLOCATED IN LINE OF WE/1/18/3 AUGUST 1943. TRANSPORT, 1 EXTRA JEEP PER SECTION IN PLACE OF A MOTORCYCLES. 77 STEN GUNS IN PLACE OF PISTOLS. AMMO IN ACCORDANCE WITH WEAPON ALLOTMENT.
OCT 24 APM MAJ PRATT FROM HQ EASTERN ARMY.
NOV 5 LT G T HAIMES ARRIVES.
WO 172/2019 26 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT APRIL-DEC 1943
APR 1 TOLLYGUNCE. CAPT A HEALY 10 LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS.
CAPT R HARRISON 9 ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGT.
APR 3 MAJ BARNFIELD APM AND 8 BOR’S ATTACHED FROM THE ROYAL INNISKILLING FUSILIERS CUT OFF FROM HOPFORCE HQ BY JAP INFILTRATION ON TO ROAD NORTH OF INDIN. OC TO SGT SEDDON AND PARTY - UNABLE TO CONTACT APM. ESCORT AND STRAGGLERS FROM DOHAZARI. 1 CPL AND 3 BOR’S GUARD FOR JAP PRISONER IN CCS.
APR 4 CSM TO GYINDAW, STILL UNABLE TO CONTACT APM. L/NAIK REHMAT KHAN WOUNDED DURING BOMBING OF BUTHIDAUNG.
APR 5 VISITED MUTHIDAUNG - INSPECTED DAMAGE CAUSED BY BOMBING PREVIOUS DAY. SAW JAP PRISONER 15 CCS. MAUNGDAW.
APR 6 CHITTAGONG. APM REPORTED TO HOPFORCE HQ.
APR 8 MAUNGDAW RELIEVED 14 INDIAN DIVISION. ADVANCE PARTY OF 26 INDIAN DIV ARRIVED. APM MAJ COOKE.
JUL 11 CAPT G G SHEATH N. STAFFS NEW OC. CAPT HEALEY TO CALCUTTA.
AUG 18 83 L OF C PRO UNIT TAKES OVER TRAFFIC CONTROL ON ROADS.
COX, RAMU, TUMBRU GHAT AND CHITTAGONG.
NOV 4 CAPT J SEERS NEW APM ARRIVES.
WO 172/2037 39 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-MAR 1943
JAN 1 SHILLONG. CAPT G BEVERIDGE. CAPT GRIFFITH.
MAR 10 MOVE TO LONERDAGA AREA.
WO 172/3695 61 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1943
JAN 1 DIAMAPUR, ASSAM. CAPT J REID 5 ROYAL GURKHA RIFLES. CAPT J D PITTS POSTED TO 81 L OF C PRO UNIT 23/3/1943.
JAN 16 COPY OF LETTER NO. 33031/23/AG4 (b) DATED 19/12/1942. RECEIVED THROUGH FORMATIONS REGARDING RETURN REQUIRED OF PERSONNEL WHO HAVE COMPLETED 6 OR MORE YEARS CONTINUOUS SERVICE BY THE 31/12/1942 BY TRADES. FIGURES SUBMITTED BOR’S 91, 1 TRADESMAN.
LETTER RECEIVED FROM HQ 253 SUB AREA REGARDING A LOCAL DEFENCE SCHEME. AS MANY MEN AS POSSIBLE IN THE UNIT SHOULD BE FORMED INTO A MOBILE RESERVE TO DEAL WITH PARACHUTISTS AND TO PREVENT SABOTAGE BY ENEMY AGENTS.
JAN 21 UNIT LOCAL DEFENCE SCHEME ISSUED.
MAR 31 UNIT VEHICLES: 26 X NORTON MOTORCYCLES, 9 X ½ TON RECCE CARS. 2 X WEAPON CARRIERS, 1 X 15CWT TRUCK, 1 X 4 SEATER CAR.
APR 27 11.30 HRS CPL DOGGART SHOT IN LEG. CAPT PHILLIPS
E LANCASHIRE REGT OC, CAPT J BURR 9 GURKHA RIFLES, RSM CATLING.
WO 172/3696 81 L OC C PRO UNIT DEC 1943
DEC 1 IMPHAL ROAD. CAPT H BROWN RAC OC. CAPT L R WARD ROYAL BERKSHIRES. CAPT STABBACK DAPM. TCP’S SITUATED AT MILESTONES
9, 19, 28,37, 46, 57, 66, 82, 88, 105, 10?. UNIT HQ AT MILESTONE 66 MAC.
SUB SECTIONS OF PROVOST PERSONNEL AT MS 9, 19, 28, 37, 46, 82, 88, & 118. TEN BOR REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE FROM 24 REINFORCEMENT CAMP KOHIMA FOR TELEPHONE OPERATOR DUTIES AT TCP’S.
DEC 2 24 HOURLY ROAD PATROLS IMPHAL ROAD MS. 9 TO 124 INC.
DEC 4 L OC C VEHICLE (NORTH BOUND) ACCIDENT AT MS 67 ½. ONE BRITISH OFFICER AND ONE INDIAN OFFICER KILLED, FIVE OTHER OFFICERS INJURED AND THREE IOR’S INJURED (ONE SINCE DIED FROM INJURIES RECEIVED). ALL AVAILABLE PROVOST PERSONNEL ON DUTY AT SCENE OF ACCIDENT. LAST BODY RECOVERED FROM KHUD; 250 FEET DOWN.
OC 323 GPT COY RIASC VISITS PRO HQ REGARDING ACCIDENT MENTIONED ABOVE.
DEC 7 TEN BOR TELEPHONE OPERATORS RECALLED TO 24 REINFORCEMENT CAMP. 24 HOURLY ROAD PATROLS IMPAHL ROAD MS 9 TO 124 INC.
DEC 8 SUBEDAR & JEMEDAR OF 6/5 MAHRATTA REGT CALL TO COLLECT KIT OF LATE CAPT BARRAT KILLED IN ACCIDENT ON 5/12/1943 BUT WERE UNABLE TO RECOGNISE ITEMS.
6 DEC TCP 6 REPORTS THAT BRIDGE AT MS51 IS NOW TWO WAY TRAFFIC.
7 DEC 24 HOURLY ROAD PATROLS IMPHAL, ROAD MS 9 TO MS 124 INC.
DEC 8 TEN BOR TELEPHONE OPERATORS RECALLED TO 24 REINFORCEMENT CAMP.
DEC 9 PERSONS SUSPECTED OF MESSAGE SENDING FROM HILL CLOSE BY UNIT HQ. ADMIN COMMANDANT KOHIMA INFORMED AND A PATROL WAS EVENTUALLY SENT OUT BY THE ASSAM RIFLES. ASSAM RIFLES PATROL RETURNS, APPARENTLY NOTHING TO REPORT.
DEC 10 CAPT L WARD TO KOHIMA TO ARRANGE FOR UNLOADING OF LOADED TANK TRANSPORTERS AT THE BRIDGE AT MS 46.
DEC 11 CONVOY OF LOADED TANK TRANSPORTERS HANDED OVER TO 4 CORPS AREA PRO PERSONNEL AT MS 124.
DEC 22 81 L OF C PRO UNIT RAISED NEW COY 119 L OF C PRO UNIT.
WO 172/3697 82 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1943
JAN 11 LEDO. UNIT RAISED. NO MEN AND NO KIT. RAIN RAIN RAIN. CAPT R A PETERS D OF WELLINGTON’S REGT., CAPT HODGES. RECCE BY OC TO SELECT CAMP SITE, CRE 111 CONTACTED REF BUILDING OF CAMP.
JAN 14 RECCE MARGHERITA TO LEKHAMPANI ROAD, ROAD IN TERRIBLE STATE, TRANSPORT SCARCE.
JAN 23 RAIN STARTED, NO TRANSPORT, UNABLE TO ROADS ROADS.
JAN 25 ALL ROADS IMPASSABLE.
FEB 4 UNIT MOVED TO DIBRUGARTH.
MAR 13 1 Q5 CWT TRUCK AND 3 MOTORCYCLES COLLECTED FROM GAUHATI.
MAR 23 COLLECTED 1 VCO AND 57 INDIAN OTHER RANKS FROM CALCUTTA.
APR 10 CQMS LEES REPORTED FOR DUTY. LADY WAVELL VISITS AREA FOR 4 DAYS. ESCORT PROVIDED.
APR 21 RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO RECCE AREA WITH AA & QMG & APM 202 L OF C AREA. TRANSPORT FACILITIES VERY BAD, TRAINING OF SECTION TRUCK DRIVERS AND MOTOR CYCLISTS AND RECCE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE.
APR 24 ESCORT DESPATCHED TO JORHAT (pow). REQUESTED AA & QMG TO FIVE THIS UNIT SPECIAL ATTENTION IN ALLOCATION OF TRANSPORT, AS UNIT IMMOBILIZED, 1 TRUCK UNDER REPAIR. 2BD ESCIRT DESOATCGE TI HIRGAT (pow).
MAY 19 SIGNPOSTING ASSAM TRUNK ROAD CHANGED TO ALLOW DEVIATION TO BE USED AS ROAD ARE IN A TERRIBLE CONDITION.
MAY 27 TRAFFIC CHECK COMMENCED ON ALL AMERICAN AND BRITISH VEHICLES. ROADS ALMOST IMPASSABLE.
JUNE 16 SECTION TO DIGBOI.
JUNE 26 CAMP UNDER WATER , AGAIN CANNOT GET IN OR OUT OF HQ WITH VEHICLES.
JULY 1 NORMAL DUTIES BEING PERFORMED WITH AMERICAN MP WHO SEEM VERY SHOT OF PERSONNEL. CONTACTED APM US MP COOPERATING WELL.
JULY 3 TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES AGAIN EVIDENT AND IMPEDING WORK SERIOUSLY.
JULY 9 INVESTIGATIONS WITH CAPT WATSON APM US MP.
JULY 14 6 NEW TRUCKS ISSUED, THIS HAS ENABLE UNIT TO WORK 100% MORE EFFICIENTLY. STILL RAINING.
AUG 8 INDIAN OTHER RANKS BEING TAUGHT SIMPLE ENGLISH.
SEPT 6 CAPT PETERS RA ARRIVES.
OCT 1 JEEP PATROLS START WITH US MP.
OCT 9 CAPT PETERS CALLED OUT TO INVESTIGATE CASE OF DEAD INDIAN OR FOUND IN A WELL.
OCT 17 CAPT PETERS CALLED OUT TO INVESTIGATE SHOOTING AFFAIR, LT COL DALRYMPLE-HAY DEAD, WIFE INJURED.
OCT 18 SEVERAL MILITARY VEHICLE STOLEN LATELY, INVESTIGATIONS PROCEEDING.
OCT 26 MOVED INTO NEW BILLETS.
OCT 31 COOPERATION WITH US MP NOW VERY CLOSE, ALL RANKS FRATERNISE OFF DUTY.
NOV 25 EPIDEMIC OF CHOLERA SUBSIDES.
NOV 27 DETACHMENTS AT SIBSAGAR, JORHAT AND NUMALIGARH VISITED. LARGE AMOUNT OF ABSENTEES STILL BEING APPREHENDED.
DEC 1 DETACHMENTS AT DIGBOI, TINSUKIA VISITED.
DEC 12 LT COL WATERS DPM 11 ARMY GROUP VISITS.
DEC 20 VPP SECTIONS ARRIVE. 1 SECT TINSUKIA, 1 SECT GAUHATI.
DEC 24 INDIAN OR’S COMPLAIN OF BEING COLD.
WO 172/3698 83 L OF C PRO UNIT AUG-DEC 1943
AUG 11 CHITTAGONG CAPT W WOOD.
AUG 12 HQ RAMU.
NOV 16 RAMU HQ ESTABLISHED IN NEW LOCATION. ACCIDENT AT B GATE, JEMADAR KILLED.
DIARY CONTAINS LOTS OF ROAD CONVOYS AND LOTS OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS.
WO 172/3699 91 L OF C PRO UNIT AUG-NOV 1943
AUG 13 FYZABAD HQ DEPOT CMP (I).
WO 172/3700 92 (BEACH MAINT) L OF C PRO UNIT JUN-DEC 1943
AUG 10 FYZABAD. CAPT G D WILLIAMS WELCH REGT OC.
AUG 13 BOMBAY REPORT TO APM IEF MAJ D L HUNT. ORDERED TO KURLA NORTH, NO.2 BEACH GROUP.
AUG 21 AHMEDNAGER AREA, SCHEME THRUST, HQ & SIGNALS EXERCISE DRY SHOD. IMAGINARY LANDING ON HOSTILE SHORE OF 2 BRITISH DIV AND NO.2 BEACH GROUP. BEACH GROUP WAS TO MAINTAIN 2 DIV FOR 14 DAYS FROM THE BEACHES: OBJECT TO LAND 600 TONS OF STORES A DAY. THIS WAS THE FIRST EXERCISE FOR THE UNIT AS A BEACH PRO UNIT.
IT SOON BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE NUMEROUS TASKS REQUIRED OF THE UNIT COULD NOT BE EFFICIENTLY PERFORMED BY SUCH A SMALL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL. DUTIES INCLUDED SIGNING THE BEACH GROUP AREA, SIGNING AND POLICING ROUTES THROUGH THE AREA, THE MT DISPERSAL PARK, THE PERSONNEL ASSEMBLY AREA, FORMING A POW CAGE AND STRAGGLERS POST IN THE BMA AND NUMEROUS OTHER NORMAL PRO DUTIES. IN THIS SCHEME THE LANDING WAS OPPOSED AND IT WAS
OBVIOUS THAT WITHOUT PROVOST ON THE BEACHES EARLY MT WOULD PILE UP NOSE TO TAIL AND CHAOS WOULD ENSUE. WITH AN EFFICIENT AIR FORCE OPPOSING US ON SUCH A LANDING, CASUALTIES IN VEHICLES WOULD BE ENORMOUS. PROVOST MUST DEFINITELY BE LANDED IN EARLY STAGES AND IN AS LARGE NUMBERS AS POSSIBLE.
AUG 16 BOR’S UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE CSM LEFT CAMP FOR “SHIPS TRAINING” ON BOARD HMS LLANSTEPHAN. TRAINING CONSISTED OF, GETTING TO KNOW THE SHIP AND VARIOUS PARTS, SCRAMBLING UP AND DOWN NETS OVER SHIP’S SIDE. CONFIDENCE IN LIFEBELTS IE FLOATING IN WATER WITH THEM ON, AND LANDING FROM CRAFT. LECTURES BY SHIPS OFFICERS.
SEP DREW TWO JEEPS FROM FORIVLI ORD DEPOT, BOMBAY. 1ST OF UNIT VEHICLES.
JEMADAR AND 16 INDIAN OTHER RANKS ATTENDED SAME SHIPS TRAINING AS BRITISH OTHER RANKS, SAILED ON THE HMS BARPETTA.
IT HAS BEEN FOUND OUT THAT A W.E.T (WAR EQUIPMENT TABLE) FOR A BASIC PRO UNIT IS NOT ADEQUATE FOR BEACH PRO UNITS AND SUGGESTED W.E.T. HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO GHQ. MOTORCYCLES ARE DEFINITELY USELESS IN SUCH LARGE NUMBERS AS SUGGESTED SCALE “B” AND MORE FOUR WHEELED VEHICLES HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED. THE EQUIPMENT WHICH IS ARRIVING VERY SLOWLY IS BASIC PRO UNITS AND WILL HAVE TO BE CHANGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEW W.E.T’S EXPECTED. AN INCREASE IN SIZE OF UNITS ALSO NEEDED.
ALSO IN DIARY: APPENDIX TO “HOTSPOT”. “HOTSPOT WAS A BATTLE INOCULATION FOR THE BEACH GROUP AND WAS AN IMAGINARY LANDING. THE OBJECT WAS TO TEST THE BEACH GROUP UNDER FIRE AND TO TRAIN THE BEACH GROUP IN ITS OWN DEFENCE. THE FIRE EFFECT WAS
PRODUCED BY A BTY, 25 POUNDERS, 1 TROOP HOWITZERS, 1 AA TROOP (BOFORS) AND 1 COY MMG’S. THE PROVOST TASKS WERE, SIGNING THE MAIN ROUTE THROUGH THE BMA, POLICING IT, KEEPING THE VEHICLES MOVING AROUND THIS CIRCUIT, FORMING A POW CAGE AND PROVIDING AN A.M.L.O’S PRO PART ON THE BEACHES. ALL THESE DUTIES MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY RELIEFS WITH SUCH A SMALL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL. WITH EXTRA DUTIES NOW TO BE PERFORMED BY PROVOST ON THE BEACHES, (STRAGGLERS POST AND MT PARKS) THE JOB IS BECOMING MUCH TOO LARGE FOR SUCH A SMALL COY. IN THIS EXERCISE RELIEFS DID NOT MATTER PARTICULARLY AS IT ONLY LASTED FOURTEEN HOURS, BUT IN ACTUAL OPS WHERE THE BEACHES WILL OPERATE FOR FOURTEEN DAYS AT LEAST AT SIMILAR PRESSURE, RELIEFS WILL BE ESSENTIAL, AND WITH THE NUMBER OF MEN AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE UNIT, WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE. TWO MORE SECTIONS ARE BEING ASKED FOR BY ALL UNITS TO ELIMINATE THIS DIFFICULTY. ONE OFFICER IS
DEFINITELY INSUFFICIENT FOR ALL THESE VARIOUS TASKS, ALL OF WHICH HE IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR.
SEP 8 KURLA NORTH. 2617237 SGT K HYMAS HAS DIED IN PRISON CAMP HOSPITAL AT BAIRAGARH ON 17/8/1943 FROM TYPHOID FEVER.
SEP 9 OC & S/NCO’S ATTENDED A DEMONSTRATION OF THE D.U.K.W, (U.S. AMPHIBIOUS LORRY) RODE IN IT ON LAND AND WATER.
SEPT 29 INFORMED THAT NO. 53343380 CQMS VAUGHAN G A TO REPORT TO BOMBAY EMBARKATION FOR REPATRIATION ON LONG SERVICE GROUNDS. (10 YEARS IN INDIA). NO. 6098821 CPL GREGOR C W TOOK OVER FROM CQMS TEMPORARILY. HAS DONE THE JOB BEFORE. LETTER TO DEPOT ASKING CAN HE BE PROMOTED TO CQMS.
OCT 2 RECEIVED ORDERS FOR EXERCISE “OTTER” FIRST LARGE SCALE COMBINED OPERATIONS OF UNIT.
OCT 11 SHORT EXERCISE, WORKING OUT INITIAL RECCE OF A BEACH MAINTENANCE AREA, DAA & QMG DECIDES ON ROUTES AND AREAS FOR VARIOUS ARMS. OC PRO UNIT AND 6 OR’S TO SIGN AS DAA & QMG MAKES HIS DECISIONS, VITAL TRAFFIC FORNERS POINTMEN POSTED. LEARNED AND PRACTISED AS A DRILL BY ALL RANKS.
NOV 9 OC UNIT AND 19 BOR’S PROCEEDED TO PORT OF EMBARKATION FOR SCHEME “OTTER” TO SAIL ON SHIP L.2.
OCT 10 CSM, VCO AND REMAINDER O COY PROCEEDED TO PORT OF EMBARKATION FOR SAME SCHEME TO SAIL ON SHIP P.2. “SCHEME OTTER” COMMENCED.
OCT 17/18 RETURNED TO CAMP.
OCT 26 RECEIVED NEW DODGE WEAPON CARRIER 15 CWT.
OCT 27 OC AND BRITISH SECTION PROCEEDED TO POONA AS ADVANCE PARTY FOR NEW CAMP. VERY GOOD CAMP SITE. OC RETURNED TO KURLA HAVING ARRANGED ACCOMMODATION FOR BOR’S
OCT 30 MAIN BODY OF UNIT MOVED TO POONA, NEW CAMP.
NOV 1 COY UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE CSM LEFT TO POLICE THE ROUTE POONA - RATNIGIRI FOR EXERCISE SWORDFISH. TCP’S FORMED AT KATRAJ TUNNEL, SATARA, KHOLAPUR AND AMBA GHATS.
NOV 11 SGT, 14 BRITISH NCO’S AND 2 INDIAN NCO’S LEFT FOR EXERCISE VIKING III.
DEC 4-6 ROAD MOVE OF BEACH GROUP FROM CHATTERSING CAMP TO RATNAGIRI.
DEC 15 EXERCISE “HUMP” THE BEACH GROUP TO MAINTAIN A BRIGADE FOR 14 DAYS. THE BEACH GROUP WERE TRAINED TO RECEIVE AND DISTRIBUTE UP TO 1200 TONS OF STORES A DAY. THE EXERCISE LASTED FOR TWO AND A HALF DAYS AND TWO NIGHTS NON-STOP. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE BEACH GROUP HAVE HAD STORES LANDED AND ALSO HAVING BRIGADE VEHICLES CALLING FOR STORES AT THE SAME TIME. THE BEACH GROUP WERE A SUCCESS. THE UNIT FOR THE FIRST TIME HAD VEHICLES LANDED, 2 JEEPS AND TWO MOTORCYCLES.
DEC 20-22 ROAD MOVE OF BEACH GROUP FROM RATNAGIRI - CHATTERSING CAMP.
DEC 23 LT G S STONE 7 WORCESTERSHIRE REGT POSTED INTO TO 31 INDIAN BEACH GROUP.
THE INFORMATION BELOW FOR 94 L OF C (BM) PRO UNIT WAS FOUND IN THE ABOVE DIARY FOR 92 L OF C (BM) PRO UNIT.
CAPT RENFREW TAYLOR (172146) DEVONSHIRE REGIMENT.
OCT 1 NO. 4388245 L/CPL MOSELEY REPATRIATED.
OCT 3 APM’S CONFERENCE, HQ 33 CORPS.
OCT 5 ONE COMPOSITE SECTION OF BOR’S AND IOR’S LEFT FOR RATNAGIRI TO PARTICIPATE IN SCHEME “OTTER”.
OCT 10 APM’S CONFERENCE HQ 33 CORPS.
OCT 13 PROVOST MARSHAL (INDIA) AND DPM SOUTHERN ARMY VISIT UNIT.
OCT 17 APM’S CONFERENCE, HQ 33 CORPS.
OCT 18 SUSPECTED “JIFC” ARRESTED IN BHIWANDI CAMP AND HANDED OVER TO FSS 33 CORPS.
OCT 20 COMPOSITE SECTION OF BOR’S AND IOR’S RETURNED FROM SCHEME “OTTER”.
OCT 21 RECCE OF CTC TRAINING AREA WITH 41 INDIAN BEACH GROUP COMMANDER.
OCT 25 APM’S CONFERENCE, 33 CORPS.
OCT 31 BRITISH SECTION OF 2 CPL’S AND 10 L/CPL’S SENT TO 91 L OF C (BM) PRO UNIT FOR SCHEME “SWORDFISH”.
NOV 1 OC LEFT TO UMPIRE EXERCISE SWORDFISH.
NOV 8 RECEIVED 5 MOTORCYCLES.
NOV 9 OC RETURNED FROM EXERCISE SWORDFISH.NOV 10 BOR SECTION RETURNED FROM SWORDFISH.
NOV 12 NO. 5107964 L/CPL DAVIS REPATRIATED. FORMATION (41 iNDIAN BEACH GROUP) BEGAN MOVE TO COMBINED TRAINING CENTRE.
NOV 13 UNIT MOVED TO CTC FORMATION MOVE COMPLETED.
NOV 15-30 CTC TRAINING.
NOV 20 DPM 11 ARMY VISITED UNIT.
DEC 4 CONFERENCE FOR EXERCISE WEBFOOT.
DEC 5 EXERCISE WEBFOOT.
DEC 7 CONFERENCE FOR EXERCISE DUCKBILL.
DEC 8 EXERCISE DUCKBILL.
DEC 12-13 EXERCISE CHARCOAL.
DEC 14 ADVANCE PARTY MOVE TO KURLA NORTH.
DEC 16 UNIT MOVE TO KURLA NORTH.
DEC 27 CSM WARD REPATRIATED.
DEC 28 ADVANCE PARTY MOVED TO RATNAGIRI.
DEC 29 UNIT COMMENCED MOVE TO RATNAGIRI.
DEC 31 UNIT ARRIVED AT RATNAGIRI
WO 172/3701 228 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-APRIL 1943
JAN 1 MAO CAPT G G SHEATH OC 24/1/43.
JAN 13 12.45HRS L/CPL JOHNSTON DIED WHILST UNDERGOING AN OPERATION IN 53 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, KOHIMA
JUL 14 11.00HRS L/CPL JOHNSTON BURIED AT KOHIMA.
MANIPUR ROAD. CAPT PLATT DAPM.
JAN 19 GHQ LETTER RECEIVED DISBANDING 228 L OC C PRO UNIT AND FORMING 81, 82, 83, 84 & 90 L OF C PRO UNITS.
JAN 24 OC VISITS POSTS 3,4,5, & 6.
JAN 25 OC VISITS POSTS 7/8/9/10 & 11.
FEB 22 CSM PULLMAN POSTED TO OTS BELGAU.
FEB 22 RSM RICHARDSON AND SGT WILSON POSTED IN.
FEB 24 NO. 119686 L/CPL COATES ARRESTED INDIAN TRANSPORT DVR. BHOLA SHAIKH FOR MURDEROUS ASSAULT ON ANOTHER ITA DRIVER DVR JOHN CRESTIAN.
MAY 1 COMPANY DISBANDED AND DISPERSED. FORMED 81, 82, 83, 84 & 90 L OF C PRO UNITS.
WO 172/3997 APM 11 EAST AFRICAN DIV PRO UNI JUN-DEC 1943
JUN 1 MOSHI EAST AFRICA, MAJ HENN APM, CAPT J C RHODES EAST AFRICAN CMP OC.
JUN 5 ARRIVE BURA
JUN 14 MOMBASA SAILED ON HT LANCASHIRE.
JUN 28 ARRIVE COLOMBO CEYLON. LIEUT COL WHITELAW APM CEYLON COMMAND.
JUN 30 PRO COY ON HT CITY OF PARIS TO COLOMBO, LIEUT J H JOHNSTON TO UNIT.
WO 172/4062 APM 81 WEST AFRICAN DIV PRO UNIT NOV 1943
NOV 4 NASIK ROAD CAMP, DEOLALI. MAJ G S B BRAMWELL APM.
WO 172/4180 14 ARMY PROVOST UNIT AUG-DEC 1944
In the Field
14 AUG 44 FATAL ACCIDENT ON HYMIN ROAD, AN INDIAN WAS KNOCKED DOWN BY A 3 TON LORRY.
22 AUG 44 MT L/CPL VISITED AGARLALA DET TO INSPECT TRANSPORT.
23 AUG 44 CAPT SHEATH (DAPM) VISITED AND INSPECTED UNIT LINES.
24 AUG 44 VERY HEAVY RAIN CLOSED ROADS OUT OF COMILLA.
25 AUG 44 TWO CASES OF LARCENY OCCURRED DURING THE NIGHT, ONE AT NO1 AND THE OTHER AT NO3 MESSES.
26 AUG 44 ANOTHER CASE OF LARCENY OCCURRED AT NOT 7 MESS.
28 AUG 44 BOR’S AND IOR’S OF THIS UNIT COMMENCED WEARING GREEN BATTLEDRESS TODAY.
28 AUG 44 400 GALLONS OF KEROSENE OIL WHICH HAD BEEN STOLEN FROM FSD WAS RECOVERED BY TWO NCO’S OF THIS UNIT.
16 SEPT 44 RSM WHITFIELD LEFT THIS UNIT FOR CMP(I) DEPOT, RSM SWINBURN NEW RS.
39 SEPT 44 ENOUGH GREEN BATTLE-DRESS HAS ARRIVED TO ENABLE EACH MAN TO HAVE TWO SETS.
29 SEPT 44 COMMENCED DYING ALL UNIT EQUIPMENT OLIVE GREEN.
28 SEPT 44 SOME VERY IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS LOST BY A COLONEL IN THIS AREA WERE FOUND BY POLICE FROM THIS UNIT.
6 OCT 44 OC AND SGT THOMAS LEFT BY AIR FOR IMPHAL TO RECCE NEW LOCATION.
7 OCT 44 RSM SWINBURN ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL ON SPECIAL SICK REPORT. CAPT OSBORNE NEW 2 1/C.
1 NOV 44 NEW WET RECEIVED BY THIS UNIT.
2 NOV 44 FIRE BROKE OUT AT FIELD POST OFFICE AT 12.30 HRS.
3 NOV 44 BEER RATION ISSUED TO BOR’S, (3 BOTTLES PER MAN).
5 NOV 44 BOR ON MOTORCYCLE INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT WITH AMERICAN JEEP.
7 NOV 44 TWO 15 CWT TRUCKS LEFT THIS HQ FOR NEW LOCATION.
10 NOV 44 CQMS MOTTRAM AND L/CPL STONE BOTH OF THIS UNIT LEFT TO RETURN TO THE UK ON REPATRIATION.
11 NOV 44 OC RETURNS BY AIR FROM IMPHAL.
12 NOV 44 A DODGE 4 X 4 TRUCK ON A JOURNEY FROM THIS HQ TO IMPHAL WAS DRIVEN OFF THE ROAD AT MILESTONE 63 ON THE MANIPUR ROAD AND FELL 500 FEET DOWN HILLSIDE, PERSONAL INJURIES SLIGHT, TRUCK U/S.
14 NOV 44 TWO IOR MOTORCYCLISTS LEFT WITH CONVOY OF HQ 14 ARMY TRANSPORT FOR IMPHAL.
15 NOV 44 LT COL THORNTON DPM VISITED UNIT LINES.
16 NOV 44 CAPT RICHARDSON DAPM 404 AREA VISITED THIS UNIT.
18 NOV 44 SGT THOMAS LEFT THIS HQ WITH 2 TRUCKS, ONE JEEP AND 1 MOTORCYCLE FOR NEW LOCATION.
19 NOV 44 2 I/C VISITED DETACHMENT AT AGARLALA.
1 DEC 44 DAPM 452 L OF C SUB AREA ARRIVES TO TAKE OVER ALL DUTIES, ACCOMMODATION FROM THIS UNIT.
3/12/44 UNIT LEFT BY ROAD FOR IMPHAL, 10 TRUCKS, 10 JEEPS, 17 MOTORCYCLES.
3 DEC 44 COMPLETE UNIT ARRIVES AT AGARTALA.
4 DEC 44 UNIT ARRIVES AT SYLKET AND STAYED OVERNIGHT.
9 DEC 44 UNIT ARRIVES AT HQ 14 ARMY.
24 DEC 44 INFO FROM DPM THAT THIS UNIT IS NOW A 9 SECTION UNIT.
26 DEC 44 DREW TELEPHONES ETC FROM AOD DIMAPUR.
27 DEC 44 LEFT BY ROAD FOR NEW LOCATION AT ?
28 DEC 44 END OF 2 DAYS JOURNEY, HALTED AT ZAGILL FOR NIGHT.
29 DEC 44 THIS UNIT TOOK OVER 28 TCP FROM 4 CORPS PRO COY.
WO 172/4202 4 INDIAN CORPS PRO UNI DEC 1944
DEC 13 CAPT BEVINGTON OC, CAPT BARTON 2 1/C.
DEC 14 CAPT MUMTAZ ALI LEFT.
DEC 19 CAPT HUNTSMAN NEW OC VICE CAPT BEVINGTON.
DEC 28 IN DAINGGYI MR SHEET 04, I 6174. TO MANIPUR RIVER CROSSING, REG HQ AND 5 TCP'S ESTABLISHED.
WO 172/4221 APM 15 INDIAN CORPS JAN-DEC 1944
4 JAN 44 HQ 1 MILE SOUTH OF SABAIGON.
1 FEB 44 NYGDAUK PASS.
(POOR DETAIL, LOTS OF VISITS).
WO 172/4222 15 INDIAN CORPS PRO UNIT AUG-DEC 1944
CAPT MILLER DAPM, CAPT RUSHMAN.
22 AUG 44 NEW OC CAPT MCKAY, 2 I/C LIEUT MUDDEMAN.
12SEPT 44 SGT FALLOWS SIB REPORTS TO HQ RE CASE OF MURDER. INFO FROM 119 L OF C PRO UNIT RE IOR OF 2/13 FFR FOUND SHOT AT MILESTONE 100/4 ON ARAKAN ROAD DURING NIGHT OF 19/9TH.
19 OCT 44 LIEUT BANKS ARRIVES
30 OCT 44 HAVILDAR MOHD AKBAR ARRIVES.
WO 172/4242 33 INDIAN CORPS PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1944
JAN 1 NIRA, POONA. LIEUT A G BAX ACTING OC, FORMER RSM.
UNIT REORGANIZED HQ AND 3 BOR SECTIONS AND 3 IOR SECTIONS.
JAN 3 2 MOTOR CYCLES HANDED OVER TO ROYAL MARINE PROVOST SECTION, POONA.
JAN 7 BOR COOKHOUSE MADE FLY PROOF.
JAN 20 CAPT F W JONES WELCH REGT NEW 2 I/C.
JAN 31 CSM FISH ARRIVES.
APR 1/7 MAIN BODY OF UNIT HQ EN ROUTE FOR 8 DAYS BY TRAIN TO INDO-BURMESE BORDER. COY ARRIVES AT JORHAT, BILLETED ON JORHAT GOLF COURSE.
PERSONNEL FROM COY HQ STRENGTH TCP'S ON THE DIMAPUR KOHIMA ROAD. TCP BEING ALREADY CONTROLLED BY THE ADVANCE PARTY WHO LEFT ON THE 16TH. TCP'S MANNED AND CONTROLLED BY UNIT PERSONNEL AT MS 9, MS 18 AND MS 32.
OC VISITED PERSONNEL FROM TCP'S FROM MS 9 TO MS 32 AND FOUND PERSONNEL MORALE HIGH, BUT RATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED AND THUS IT WAS DECIDED THAT ALL TCP'S WOULD BE RATIONED FROM UNIT HQ.
APR 16 JORHAT. NO. 5124504 L/CPL STEADMAN J ACCIDENTALLY SHOT HIMSELF WITH A 9MM STEN GUN WHILST PREPARING FOR GUARD AT 17.55 HRS, CONVEYED TO 45 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL.
APR 17 NO. 5124504 L/CPL STEADMAN DIED AT 45 INDIAN GEN HOSPITAL FROM STOMACH WOUNDS RECEIVED IN AN ACCIDENT 16/6/44.
APR 18 L/CPL STEADMAN BURIED IN MILITARY CEMETERY JORHAT.
APR 19 UNIT PERSONNEL MAN ROADBLOCKS ON JORHAT -NUMALIGARTH ROAD AND TITABAR - GOLAGHAT ROAD TO PREVENT ALL VEHICLES MOVING FROM EAST TO WEST ALONG THESE ROADS - REASON SUSPECTED ENEMY ACTION WEST OF GOLAGHAT.
APR 20 ROAD BLOCKED BY UNIT PERSONNEL ON THE 19TH RE OPENED AT 10.00 HRS. 4 STRAGGLERS OF 1ST ASSAM REGIMENT TAKEN OVER ALSO TWO SUSPECTED JIFF. 8 STRAGGLERS OF 1 ASSAM REGIMENT
DESPATCHED TO THEIR UNIT - TWO SUSPECTED JIFFS SENT UNDER ARMED ESCORT TO NO. 2 FIC, MANIPUR.
APR 21 COURT OF INQUIRY HELD ON NO. 5124504 L/CPL STEADMAN J.
APR 22 CSM DOBSON NEW CQMS POSTED IN.
APR 24 UNIT HQ NICHUGUARD.
Apr 25 OC VISITED PERSONNEL OF TCP’S FROM MILESTONE 9 TO MILESTONE 32 AND FOUND PERSONNEL MORAL HIGH, BUT RATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED ON THIS IT WAS DECIDED THAT ALL TCP’S WOULD BE RATIONED FROM UNIT HQ.
APR 27 APM VISITED TCP 4 AT MS 36 THIS TCP IS NOW MANNED BY THIS UNIT PERSONNEL. 2962 L/NAIK FATEH KHAN OF THIS UNIT RECEIVED BULLET WOUNDS THROUGH ENEMY ACTION AT MILESTONE 34, DIMAPUR-KOHIMA ROAD, WHILST ACTING AS ESCORT TO JAP POW'S.
APR 28 TCP NO4 SHELLED AND BOMBED, NO CASUALTIES.
APR 29 RSM PRESCOTT POSTED IN.
APR 30 UNIT PREPARE TWO 15CWT TRUCKS FOR THE CONVEYANCE OF POW FROM TCP4 TO TCP 1 AND FROM THENCE TO L OF C SUB AREA POW CAGE. STRONG FINE MESH WIRE NETTING WAS USED TO CONSTRUCT THESE MOBILE POW CAGES.. MAJ BURROWS APM.
MAY 5 OC & CQMS PROCEED TO ALL TCP’S TO PAY PERSONNEL. NO4 TCP AT MS36 BOMBED AND MACHINE GUNNED BY 6 ENEMY PLANES (ZERO’S), NO CASUALTIES SUSTAINED BY TC PERSONNEL, TIME 15.15 HRS.
MAY 6 RSM PRESCOTT PROCEEDED TO MILESTONE 13 WITH A WORKING PARTY TO CLEAR SMALL LANDSLIDE.
MAY 10 SGT NELSON OF THIS UNIT PROCEEDED TO JORHAT WITH ESCORT TO COLLECT 9 INA (INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY), JIFFS (INDIANS FIGHTING WITH JAPANESE).
MAY 13 1 JAP POW TAKEN OVER BY UNIT HQ FROM TCP 4 AND CONVEYED TO CORPS HQ FOR INTERROGATION, THEN TO POW CAGE AT AREA.
MAY 14 NO. 4 TCP AT MILESTONE 36 DIMAPUR - KOHIMA ROAD, BOMBED AND SHELLED BY 12 ENEMY PLANES (ZERO’S) AT 10.45 HRS, NO CASUALTIES.
MAY 16 MOBILE POW CAGE TO JORHAT TO COLLECT TWO INA JIFS.
MAY 21 UNIT ON DUTY AT VERA LYNN’S CONCERT IN GARRISON THEATRE.
MAY 25 INCLEMENT WEATHER, HEAVY RAIN FOR 24 HOURS, PATROLS ON DIMAPUR KOHIMA ROAD TO KEEP A GOOD LOOK OUT FOR LANDSLIDES.
MAY 28 1 WOUNDED JAP POW TAKEN OVER FROM 2 DIV, NECESSARY ESCORT LAID ON WHILST IN HOSPITAL.
JUN 5 ZUBA, NEW LOCATION.
JUN 15 2 ADDITIONAL POW CAGES (MOBILE) TO BE MADE ON 3 TON VEHICLES. 161 LAD TO CARRY OUT WORK.
JUN 16/17 LANDSLIDES AT MILESTONE 25, ONE WAY TRAFFIC FOR 48 HOURS.
JUN 18 CORPS HQ TO MILESTONE 54 ½.
JUN 19 PHESAMA NEW LOCATION FOR UNIT HQ.
JUL 16 IMPHAL. LT J B TAYLOR RA AND SIX GUNNERS FROM 100TH ANTI-TANK REGIMENT, RA ATTACHED TO UNIT FOR DUTIES WITH JAP POW’S.
17 JUL TEN JAP POW AND 20 JUFFS EVACUATED TO MANIPUR ROAD BASE (DIMAPUR). ESCORT SUPPLIED FROM THIS UNIT. UNIT MOBILE POW CAGE USED FOR JAP POW. 3 TON TRUCK FOR JIFFS.
JUL 19 FIVE WOUNDED JAP POW EVACUATED TO DIMAPUR BY AMBULANCE AND ESCORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL.
JUL 20 26 JIFFS EVACUATED TO DIMAPUR - ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR TCP 4 ON THE UKHRUL ROAD. GREAT DIFFICULTY EXPERIENCED IN TRAFFIC MOVEMENT OWING TO ROAD SURFACE - 4 X 4 WHEELED VEHICLES BELOW 15 CWT ONLY CAN USE THIS ROAD ABOVE TCP 4, MILESTONE 22.
JUL 21 TEN WOUNDED AND ONE UNWOUNDED JAP POW EVACUATED TO DIMAPUR.
JUL 23 19 WOUNDED AND 2 UNWOUNDED JAP POW EVACUATED TO DIMAPUR. TCP’S 1,2 & 3 ON UKHRUL ROAD TAKEN OVER BY 2 DIV PRO COY. PERSONNEL RETURNED TO UNIT HQ. ESCORTS TO UNWOUNDED AND WOUNDED JAPANESE POW'S. QUITE A FEW UN-WOUNDED.JUN 23 UNIT NOW MANS ROAD FROM TCP 5, MILESTONE 46 TO TCP MILESTONE 66.
JUL 26 MILESTONE 51 LANDSLIDE, ROAD CLOSED FOR 24 HOURS.
JUL 4 IMPHAL.
SEP 7 FATAL ACCIDENT AT MILE STONE 49 TAMU ROAD, 8 KILLED. MILITARY POLICE ACTION AT SCENE COMMENDED BY OC BATTERY, LIEUT MINAHU.
OCT 10 IMPHAL. EXTRA DUTIES FOR ENSA SHOW.
OCT 12 TAMU ROAD TAKEN OVER BY 119 L OF C PRO UNIT. UNIT TCP’S CLOSED DOWN - PERSONNEL MOVED TO NEW CAMP SITE PENDING ARRIVAL OF CORPS. ENSA DUTIES AS REQUIRED.
OCT 13 CAPT M J MINAHAN UP TAMU ROAD REFERENCE NEW POW CAGE, RSM FORWARDED PLANS TO APM.
OCT 15 SGT NELSON AND 14 MEN TO ESTABLISH TCP’S ON TAMU-KALEWA TRACK. TCP 1. MS 1, TCP 2, MS 5, TCP’S MS 10. RESPONSIBILITY TAMYU MS 17 ½ INCLUSIVE, CONDITION OF POOR. 4 X 4 VEHICLES INCLUDING JEEPS GETTING STUCK - 17 ½ MILES SAID TO BE ONE DAY’S MARCH.
OCT 16 DUTIES FOR THIS MOVE FOR CORPS TO MILESTONE 65-70 MANU ROAD. UNIT ADVANCE PARTY LEFT TODAY FOR RECEPTION PURPOSES AT NEW SITE. POLICE DUTIES AS REQUIRED WITH CORPS ADVANCE PARTY. UNIT SITE MILESTONE 71. UNIT OFFICE CLOSED AT 18.00 HRS TODAY.
ENSA DUTIES TAKEN OVER BY L OF C PROVOST UNIT.
OCT 17 UNIT MOVED TODAY TO MS 71, TAMU ROAD. TWO 3 TON 4 X 4 VEHICLES ADDITIONALLY ALLOTTED FOR MOVE. CQMS DOBSON BROKE HIS WRIST. SUBSECTION POLICE UNDER ORDERS OF CAMP COMMANDANT, 33 CORPS - TRAFFIC DUTIES. 2 L/CPL’S BEING LEFT IN REAR PARTY FOR TC DUTIES I.E WITH AQ SERVICED MOVING ON THE 16TH. OFFICE RE OPENED AT 17.00 HRS TO-DAY. NO DUTIES OTHER THAN CORPS TRAFFIC.
OCT 18 APM INSTRUCTS DIVERSION MILESTONE 60-61 1/2 TAMU ROAD WILL BE POLICED BY THIS UNIT - DUTIES SENT OUT AS REQUIRED. POW (JAP) BROUGHT IN FROM 11 DIV.
OCT 19 OC CAPT BAX A G RETURNED FROM LEAVE - DUTIES OF OC HANDED OVER TO CAPT M J MINAHAN. 1 SUBSECTION IOR’S DETAILED FOR DUTY WITH SGT NELSON ON TAMU ROAD TCP’S. CONVOY OF FIELD ARTILLERY TAKEN 36 HOURS TO COVER 7 MILES OF ROAD BETWEEN TCP 1, MILESTONE 1 AND MILESTONE 7.
OCT 20 MESSAGE RECEIVED JAP PATROLS RAIDING CONVOYS 25 MILES AWAY, UNIT DEFENCE BEING DETAILED TO NIGHT. FIELD ARTILLERY CONVOY REPORTED TO HAVE REACHED MILESTONE 12.
OCT 21 ALL PERSONNEL OF UNIT EMPLOYED ON DEFENCES IE DIGGING OF TRENCHES ETC, DEFENCE OF CAMP TO BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN IOR’S AND BOR’S. EXTRA GUARDS DETAILED. FIELD ARTILLERY CONVOY ADVANCE PARTY REACHED MILESTONE 15. KALEWA TRACK CLOSED TO ALL VEHICLES EXCEPT RE’S, SIGS, RAF AND AMBULANCES.
OCT 22 DEFENCE OF UNIT CAMP COMPLETE. ORDERS IN FULL ON COMPANY NOTICE BOARD, FIELD ARTILLERY CONVOY NOT YET FULL CLEAR AT MILESTONE 17 ½ TAMU KALAWA TRACK/
OCT 23 PARTY DESPATCHES TO MILESTONE 121 ROAD DIMAPUR - IMPHAL TO COLLECT 4 4 X 4 ¼ TON JEEPS.
DEC 18 HQ MOVES TO KAING.
DEC 23 JAP PLANES RAIN CHIN.
DEC 25 ALL AVAILABLE MEN CALLED IN FROM TCP’S FOR XMAS FESTIVITIES.
DEC 26 CORPS HQ MOVE TO KAING.
WO 172/4260 2 DIVISION PRO COY JAN-DEC 1944
JAN 1 AHMEDNAGAR, CAPT J H NICHOLSON DLI OC, LIEUT H MCLEAN RWF, LIEUT W BOWCOCK (253356) DLI, RSM NEWMAN.
JAN 21-23 VISIT OF SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN, OUTRIDERS, TRAFFIC CONTROL AND SECURITY PROVIDED.
JAN 28 COMPANY PARADED AT DB FOR INSPECTION BY CORPS COMMANDER.
JAN 30 MR RYAN BBC REPORTER VISITS DIVISION.
MARCH 1 BELSAUM.
MARCH 2 ANNAPUR
APRIL 1 BIAORO.
APRIL 2 SHIUPURI.
APRIL 3 JHANSI.
APRIL 5 ALLAHBAD - BENARES.
APRIL 9 ASANOSO.
APRIL 11 CALCUTTA.
APRIL 14 CHITTAGONG.
APRIL 27 MILESTONE 43.
MAY 1 JOTSOMA ROAD IN THE FIELD. TCP’S MANNED, SECURITY DIV HQ AND ROAD PATROLS.
MAY 8 CAPT NICHOLSON PROMOTED MAJ, APM 2 DIVISION.
LIEUT MCCLEAN (149230) OC COY, LIEUT BOWCOCK 2 I/C, LIEUT JENNINGS (253135) RASC MTO.
MAY 11 L/CPL LOWCOCK WOUNDED AND EVACUATED TO HOSPITAL.
JUN 8 COY FROM MILESTONE 44 TO KIGWEMA.
JUN 9 COY FROM KIGWEMA TO MILESTONE 55 ½, BRIDGE & TCP DUTIES.
JUN 22 HQ TO KARONE.
JUN 23 KARLONG, DURING THE DAY 2 JAPS KILLED BY COY PERSONNEL.
JUN 24 KANGPOKI. DURING THE DAY 2 JAPS KILLED BY COY PERSONNEL.
JULY 7 CAPT H MCLEAN TO 41 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, MALARIA.
JULY 22 SGT V TOZER AWARDED MM BY 61 BRIGADE.
AUG 6 MILESTONE 82 ½, CAPT H MCLEAN, RSM NEWMAN AND SGT NAYLOR PARADED AT THE DIV MT PARK AND WERE INTRODUCED TO GENERAL SIR GEORGE GIFFARD GCB,DSO, ADC C IN C, 11 ARMY GROUP.
AUG 8 H.E. THE VICEROY OF INDIA VISITED THE DIVISION AND HELD AN INVESTITURE, SGT TOZER VV WAS PRESENTED WITH THE MILITARY MEDAL.
SEPT 29 RSM NEWMAN AND CQMS HAWKINS INFORMED BY APM THEY HAD BEEN GRANTED COMMISSIONS IN GRAVE REGISTRATION UNITS.
OCT 5 2 DIVISION TAKE OVER CONTROL OF IMPHAL - KOHIMA ROAD FROM MILESTONE 80 TO 82 ½.
OCT 24 ACCIDENT AT MILESTONE 84 A LORRY WENT OVER HILLSIDE WITH LOSS OF DRIVERS LIFE. OF INTEREST TO PRO IN AS MUCH AS QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR REMOVING DEAD BODY FROM AREA.
OCT 27 MAJ LILLEY APM 19 DIV VISITS COY HQ. SMALL SIGNALS EXERCISE CARRIED OUT BY 2 I/C WITH 16 MEN TRAINED AS SIGNALLERS TO BE ATTACHED TO THIS UNIT FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS. LINE LAYING FAIRLY GOOD, W/T SETS NO.18 NOT VERY RELIABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF COUNTRY, NO.22 SETS FITTED TO JEEPS WOULD BE IDEAL FOR CONVOY CONTROL.
NOV 1 LT GEN SLIM, GOC IN C 14 ARMY VISITS
NOV 2 EX SWORDFISH
DEC 17 COY ARRIVE AT SHWEGYING. RSM JACKSON NEW RSM.
DEC 30 COY TO WAINGGYA.
WO 172/4277 SPECIAL FORCES PRO COY 'A' LATER SPECIAL FORCES 3 INDIAN DIVISION PRO UNIT (CHINDITS) OCT-DEC 1944
OCT 1 BANGALORE, CAPT R OLIVER GEN LIST 3/5/44.
LT J E B RIPPINGALE Y & L.
WAR ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIT :WE X1/500/1D/2 FEB 44.
STRENGTH OFFICERS X 3, BOR'S X 111, HOLDINGS OFFICERS X 2, BOR'S X 102. TRANSPORT 15 CWT TRUCKS X 14, JEEPS X 13, MOTOR CYCLES X 27, HOLDINGS 15 CWT TRUCKS X 14, JEEPS X 13, MOTOR CYCLES 29.
DIARY CONTAINS A NOMINAL ROLL OF THE UNIT.
APM SPECIAL FORCES MAJ CATFORD, DAPM CAPT BUNKER AND LIEUT J PANTLAND RAC 1/12/44.
WO169/4289 5 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1944
JAN 18 BURMA, CAPT J GLOVER 11 SIKH REGT. EC817 CAPT D D L MOORE 18 R GARAWAL RIFLES 2 I/C OF UNIT ACCOMPANIED BY 4533225 SGT W SMITH AND 454451 SGT LEAVER PROCEEDED TO MAUNGDAW ON A RECCE IN UNIT TRANSPORT AND WERE FIRED ON BY JAP MORTARS AT MR 335414. NO CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE. 4612800 RSM G W BELL.
FEB 1 POLICE/STRAGGLERS POSTS OPENED AT MR 362480, MR 360448 AND MR 349439.
FEB 4 CAPT D D L MOORE, 18 GARW. RIF, 2ND I/C UNIT WAS IN 34 IRS (CANTEEN), BAWLI BAZAAR, MAKING PURCHASES FOR UNIT PERSONNEL WHEN AREA WAS BOMBED AND MACHINE GUNNED BY JAP FIGHTER-BOMBERS. 5 IND DIV AREA WAS ALSO BOMBED AND MACHINE GUNNED. NO CASUALTIES TO UNIT PERSONNEL. DUE TO JAP INFILTRATION INTO TAUNG BAZAAR AREA, CIVILIAN REFUGEES WERE COMING WEST OF MAJU RANGE THROUGH GNAKYEDAUK PASS IN LARGE NUMBERS WHEN THIS BECAME KNOWN, REFUGEES WERE COLLECTED BY PROVOST UNIT WEST END OF THE PASS – VETTED BY FSS & BIC STAFF, AND DISPERSED ABOUT 3 MILES NORTH OF 5 IND DIV AREA.
FEB 5 03.00HRS A JAP RAIDING PARTY ATTACKED A GPT COY OF 5 INDIAN DIV, SITUATED 3 MILES NORTH OF OUR LOCATION. A GENERAL ALARM WAS RAISED AND ALL PERSONNEL OF THIS UNIT HQ STOOD TO AND TOOK UP DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN OUR AREA FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE HOURS OF DARKNESS AND STOOD DOWN AT 06.30HRS.
FEB 6 THE POLICE POSTS REFERRED TO ON 1 FEB 44 CLOSED DOWN AND ALL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RETURNED TO UNIT HQ. CIVILIAN REFUGEES AND STRAGGLERS FROM 7 INDIAN DIV CONTINUED TO PASS THROUGH OUR HANDS ALL DAY AND WERE DEALT WITH BY FSP.
13.00HRS GNAKEDAUK PASS DECLARED CLOSED TO ALL TRAFFIC DUE TO ENEMY INFILTRATION IN THE AREA. 1 SUBADAR & 22 IOR’S AND 1 BOR OF 7 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT BEING CUT OFF FROM THEIR UNIT REPORTED TO THIS UNIT AND WERE DETAINED. ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY SPASMODIC OVER THE DIV AREA THROUGHOUT THE DAY.
FEB 9 JAP AIR ACTIVITY OVER DIV AREA IN THE MORNING. A FEW BOMBS WERE DROPPED IN AREA OF POLICE POST AT MR345535 AND AREA WAS MACHINE GUNNED FROM THE AIR. THERE WERE A FEW CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, WHO WERE REMOVED TO HOSPITAL BY PROVOST PERSONNEL FROM THE POST. 4612800 RSM G W BELL CMP (I) JOINED UNIT FROM 245 INDIAN TANK BDE PRO UNIT.
FEB 15 MAP REF SHEET BURMA INDIA 85 D/5/& D/1 06.00HRS MP/2667 L/NAIK RAMJI LAL WHILE ON SENTRY DUTY ACCIDENTALLY DISCHARGED HIS STEN GUN AND SHOT HIMSELF THROUGH THE CHEST AND DIED AS A RESULT OF HIS WOUND SHORTLY AFTERWARDS. HIS BODY WAS
CREMATED LATE ON IN THE DAY ACCORDING TO THE RITES OF HIS RELIGION. (NAMED ON THE IMPHAL CREMATION MEMORIAL COLUMN 36.) COURT OF ENQUIRY WILL BE HELD. (HELD 18 FEB 44).
FEB 17 TOOK CUSTODY OF 3 JAP POW’S, CURFEW WITHIN DIV AREA FROM SUNSET TO SUNRISE, DESPATCHED 3 JAP POW’S TO FIC UNDER ESCORT.
MAR 6 01.00HRS PARTY OF JAPANESE AND JIFFS (JIFS WERE INDIAN ARMY FIGHTING FOR JAPANESE) ESTIMATED STRENGTH 24 ATTACKED GUN POSITIONS IN NAWRANDAUNG VILLAGE AND KWELA BINGA. CPL STEWART VACATES TCP IN NAWRANDAUNG AND REPORTS THE ATTACK TO HQ. L/CPL PINDER AND 4 IOR'S REPORTED MISSING AFTER ENEMY ATTACK. L/CPL PINDER AND 4 IOR'S REPORT SAFELY TO UNIT HQ.
MAR 44 NEW WATER POINT OPENED AND CONTROLLED BY CMP – ONE JIF 7ENT TAKEN OVER AND HANDED TO FSS FOR INTERROGATION. VILLAGE OF NAWRANDAUNG SHELLED BY ENEMY. TCP MOVE OWING TO DANGER OF ENEMY ATTACK TO MR 362477. STRENGTH OF TCP 6 OR'S.
MAR 11 CPL PRENTICE REPORTS LARGE QUANTITY OF AMMUNITION ON LOWER JETTY AT KAPPAGAUNG, IF NOT MOVED IT WILL BE SUBMERGED. OC REPORTS THIS TO STAFF CAPT Q.
MAR 27 L/NAIK RAZA MOHD HAD A MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT AT MILE STONE 39, AITTED TO SYLET HOSPITAL.
APR 1 UNIT MOVE FROM NOWGONG FOR NUMALIGARH, 87 MILES.
APR 744 4261655 L/CPL PARADINE F ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL, WOUNDED LEFT FOREARM FROM SHELL FRAGMENTS AT IMPHAL.
APR 16 FITTER HAQ DAD KHAN HAD GONE SLIGHTLY MENTAL, KEPT UNDER OBSERVATION
APR 17 FITTER HAQ DAD KHAN ADMITTED TO 66 IGH.
APR 30 UNIT TO SIBGAGAR, 124 M, NO ACCIDENTS. MAJ KAY APM
JUN 1 SUBADAR K S RAWAT, 113 INDIAN MOBILE WORKSHOPS REPORTED CASE OF PILFERING OF PETROL IN SIBSAGAR AREA, L/CPL MACDONALD MM AND L/CPL ELLIOTT ARREST SEPOY BELA RAM AT 21.30HRS AND 1 CIVILIAN WHO WAS PLACED IN CIVILIAN JAIL. STATEMENTS OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED.
JUN1/2 DETAILS REGARDING L/CPL'S MACDONALD AND BREEZE MM'S.
JUL 17 5439735 L/CPL HICKS J DIED OF TYPHUS FEVER IN 88 IGH. (BURIED IN IMPHAL WAR CEMETERY GRAVE 1.C.21.)
AUG 23 ONE JAP UNARMED SURRENDERED TO LIEUT MACKENZIE NEAR MILESTONE 51, HE WAS TAKEN TO I BRANCH AND LATER SENT TO CORPS PW CAGE UNDER MP ESCORT.
JUL 26 CAPT MOORE AND L/NAIK MOHM ROSHAN PROCEED TO MILE STONE 187 (MANIPUR RIVER CROSSING) TO TAKE CHARGE OF TCP FOR CONTROLLING MOVE OF DIV UNITS OVER RIVER.
OCT 3 04.00HRS UNIT HQ CROSSED THE MANIPUR RIVER AND PROCEEDED TO NEW LOCATION AT MILESTONE 136.
OCT 5 CQMS SALT ACTING RSM VICE RSM BELL.
OCT 30 SALT REVERTS TO CQMS NEW RSM GREGORY
NOV 21 UNIT MOVES TO KALEMYO.
WO 172/4298 7 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JULY-DEC 1944
JUL 1 IMPHAL, CAPT D W WATNEY OC. HQ 114 BRIGADE REPORTS LOSS OF A FIELD TREASURE CHEST WITH DOCS AND RUPEES 7000.
SIB CALLED IN. MAJ D N WATNEY NEW APM VICE MAJ W C BOYLE.
WO169/4308 17 INDIAN LIGHT DIV PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1944
JAN TIDDIM, CAPT E A W BONNY, CAPT G J HAINES, RSM SIMPSON.
JAN 28 NEW DYED BD BLOUSE (CELLULAR) AND TROUSERS ISSUED.
FEB 1 TIDDIM ROAD TO KENNEDY PEAK CLOSED TO ALL TRAFFIC 30 JAN TO 2 FEB OWING TO BAD STATE DUE TO RAIN. 3 JEEPS AWAITING NEW ENGINES, 2 JEEPS AWAITING 1ST LINE REPAIRS, LEAVING 5 JEEPS FOR ALL DUTIES. MOTOR CYCLES ARE UNSUITABLE ON ROADS HERE AND THE 15 CWT TRUCK IS NOT ALLOWED ON CERTAIN PARTS OF ROAD. TRANSPORT SITUATION IS SERIOUS IF PROVOST ARE TO CARRY OUT THEIR JOB EFFICIENTLY. APM MAJ PLATT.
COY HQ TIDDIM, 1 BOR SECTION, 1 GURKHA SECTION AT DIMLO, 4 BOR’S AND 5 GOR’S AT SAIZANG.
FEB 16 LOCATION MILESTONE 144. ALL AMMUNITION TAKEN FROM NON COMBATANTS AND GIVEN TO FIGHTING TROOPS. ROAD BLOCK AT MILESTONE 132 CLEARED OF ENEMY.
FEB 17 REFUGEES COLLECTED AND TRANSPORTED IN 3 TONNERS.
49 BRIGADE, AIR DROPS, MAJORITY COLLECTED.
MAR 10 TIDDIM 45947 L/NAIK KABIRMAN (45947 KUBIR MAN MAGAR) DIED FROM MULTIPLE SHELL INJURY (ENEMY FIRED). (NAMED ON THE RANGOON MEMORIAL FACE 94)
CAPT G I HAINES ARRIVES.
MAR 15 FIRING BEGAN INSIDE PERIMETER BOX 1 RISING TO A GREAT INTENSITY, PERSONNEL FIRING IN ALL DIRECTIONS. MANY ATTEMPTS MADE TO CEASE FIRE, BUT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE. JAPS OR JIFFS SUSPECTED CAUSE OF TROUBLE. SEVERAL PERSONS KILLED AND INJURED.
MARCH 19 LOCATION MILESTONE 127, MANIPUR ROAD. 2 AIRDROPS, CAGE ERECTED. JAPS ON HIGH FEATURE OVERLOOKING BOX, ONLY SMALL PARTY. ENEMY REPORTED AT MILESTONE 100 AND 109. JIFS BELIEVED TO BE IN VICINITY BUT NO FIRING IN PERIMETER.
MARCH 20 SEAC NEWSPAPER DROPPED BY AIR, APPRECIATED BY ALL.
MAR 22 FIRST JAPANESE POW TAKEN BY HAVILDAR OF 1/10 GURKHA
RIFLES, PRISONER HAD SLIGHT WOUNDS AND SUFFERING FROM EXHAUSTION.
MAR 23 2 AIR DROPS.
MAR 25 CAMP SHELLED BY 75 MM GUNS, NO CASUALTIES.
MARCH 26 LOCATION MILESTONE 109 TIDDIM IMPHAL ROAD. ONE IOR FOUND, HANDS TIED BEHIND HIM AND BAYONETED AND BURNT. ALSO PRISONER ON ROAD TO MILESTONE 100 IN MUTILATED CONDITION.
MAR 27 HURRICANE BOMBER CRASHED NEAR TCP, PILOT UNABLE TO BAIL OUT. PILOT BEING BURIED UNIDENTIFIED.
MARCH 28 WARNING ORDER TO MOVE TO MILESTONE 82.
MARCH 29 MILESTONE 106 TO 102 CONSIDERABLE SHELL FIRE AT TOP AND BOTTOM OF ROAD.
MARCH 31 DIVISIONAL BOX SHELLED FROM CLOSE RANGE. CASUALTIES VERY SLIGHT. CASUALTIES TRANSPORTED BY AIR FROM AIR STRIP.
APR 1 LOCATION MILESTONE 82 TIDDIM IMPHAL ROAD. JAPS HAVE ESTABLISHED A POSITION, CUTTING THE ROAD AT MILESTONE 72, CASUALTIES WILL BE EVACUATED AS SOON AS ROAD REPORTED CLEAR.
MILESTONE 82 JAP PLANE DESTROYED BY AA FIRE. MORE WOUNDED FROM AIR STRIP, CASUALTIES DEPART 08.30 HRS, STORES AND EQUIPMENT 10.45 HRS, RECCE PARTY 11.30 HRS, 129 FIELD REGT 16.00 HRS, NON TACTICAL VEHICLES 16.30 HRS, MARCHING TROOPS DEPART 18.00 HRS. MT COLUMN EXTREMLY SLOW, 14 HOURS FROM MILESTONE 82 TO 41.
APR 1 LOCATION CATFISH BOX, MR SHEET 83H, BURMAN & INDIAN RK3568. 48 BRIGADE MOVED FROM SENGMAI TO WANSING, PRO ACCOMPANIED MOVE.
APR 6 TCP’S ESTABLISHED TCP A CORPS CROSS ROADS DIMAPUR ROAD, B MILESTONE 9 ½ TIDDIM ROAD, TCP C, MILESTONE 13 ¼ KEINOU (TIDDIM ROAD), TCP D MILESTONE 15 TIDDIM ROAD.
APR 10 ADVANCE PARTY MAIN DIV MOVED 10.00 HRS TO MILESTONE 9 ½
APR 11 MAIN DIV MOVED TO MILESTONE 9 ½ . REAR DIV REMAINED AT CATFISH BOX.
APR 12 TCP E MOVED TO SHUGANU, 2 BOR’S, 2 GOR’S , 1 JEEP, RSM J SIMPSON ACCOMPANIED AND RETURNED LATER
APR 14 L/CPL'S KELVEY AND COOPER RECOMMENDED FOR MID FOR OPERATION PUMPKIN.
APR 22 TCP E UNDER SMALL ARMS AND SHELL FIRE. TCP F CUT OFF FROM DIV BY JAP ROAD BLOCK, PHONE OUT.
APR 25 MAJ LITTLEBOY ARRIVED BY AIR FROM CALCUTTA TO ASSUME APPOINTMENT OF APM.
MAY 4 48 BRIGADE CROSSED MANIPURE RIVER AT SHUGANU AND MOVED WEST AND ESTABLISHED ROAD BLOCK AT MILESTONE 32 TIDDIM ROAD.
MAY15/16 100 JAPS REPORTED MOVING FROM HILLS ON WEST OF
TIDDIM ROAD TO BURI BAZAAR, MILESTONE 10 - DIV HQ STAND TO ALL NIGHT. TCP C AT KEINOU TAKEN AWAY OWING TO ISOLATED POSITION IN
VIEW OF JAP NIGHT MOVEMENTS IN VICINITY. TCP’S RE ESTABLISHED B AT MILESTONE 9, C AT MILESTONE 10, D AT MILESTONE 15.
MAY 20/21 MAIN DIV BOX ATTACKED BY 300 JAPS, REPULSED AND ENEMY TOOK UP POSITION IN VILLAGE ¾ MILE FROM DIV. LINE TO TCP D CUT GY ENEMY. JAPS STILL IN VILLAGE. 2 CULVERTS FOUND TO BE BLOWN AND ANTI TANK MINES LAID ON ROAD.
JUNE 1 LOCATION REAR DIV CATFISH BOX, TCP B MS 10 TIDDIM ROAD, TCP C MS 10 MAIN DIV, TCP D MS 15.JUNE 2 CPL BRIGGS AND 1 L/CPL AND 2 GOR’S MOVED TO MILESTONE 13 (KEINOU) AND ATTACHED TO 50 (P) BDE.
JUNE 5 REAR DIV (CATFISH BOX) MOVED TO NEW LOCATION AT MILESTONE 1 SAGONTONGBA ROAD, IMPHAL.
JUNE 8 L/CPL’S BIGNAL, FULLER, HOLBROOK AND HUGHES FLOWN IN FROM DIMAPUR AND REJOINED UNIT.
JUNE 17 NK BHARHEJ TRIED BY SCM AND AWARDED REDUCTION TO RANKS & 2 MONTHS, I) ABSENCE FROM LINES II) IN OUT OF BOUNDS AREA, III) IMPROPER POSSESSION OF GOVT PROPERTY. NK GAGANDSCM AND AWARDED 28 DAYS R I OFFENCES: I) DRINKING LOCAL RUM, ii UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRINK AND STRIKING A CIVILIAN.
JUNE 21 VISIT OF MR NOEL COWARD TO REAR DIV HQ.
JUNE 22 TCP E UNDER SMALL ARMS AND SHELL FIRE. TCP F CUT OFF FROM DIV BY JAP ROAD BLOCK, PHONE OUT.
JUNE 22 IMPHAL - DIMAPUR ROAD OPENED 21 JUNE AND 1ST CONVOY ARRIVED IN.
JUNE 25 ISSUE OF 1 BOTTLE OF BEER PER BOR.
AUG 14 GENERAL SLIM 14 ARMY COMMANDER VISITED MAIN DIV HQ AND PRESENTED AWARDS FOR RECENT OPERATIONS/
AUG 16/17 MAJ LITTLEBOY APM 17 DIV PROCEEDS TO HQ Q BATTERY 82 LAA/TANK REGT RA WHICH IS BEING DISBANDED, APPROX 50 BOR'S INTERVIEWED FOR TRANSFER TO CMP(I). 18 SELECTED.
ENSA CONCERT FOR BOR’S - RARE SUCCESS OWING TO 7 WOMEN CASTE.
AUG 22 ADVANCE PARTY TO RANCHI.
AUG 27 WARNING ORDER INSTRUCTION MOVE HQ 17 DIV & PRO COY WILL MOVE EX IMPHAL 1 SEPT TO RANCHI BY ROAD/RAIL.
SEPT 3 DEPART MANIPUR ROAD TO RANCHI. MOVE COMPLETED IN 5 DAYS.
OCT 1 LOCATION AND STRENGTH: BHIPOTALI CAMP, RANCHI, HQ, 2 BOR SECTION, 4 IOR/GOR SECTION, RANCHI 63 BRIGADE 4 BOR’S 2 GOR’S, NAMKOM CAMP RANCHI 48 BRIGADE 4 BOR’S, 4 GOR’S
OCT 16 EARL MUNSTER VISITED ALL DIVISIONAL CANTEENS. DETACHMENT OF PRO - 3 BOR’S, 3 PM’S - ATTACHED TO 99 BRIGADE.
OCT 31 RANCHI, NEW W E (WAR ESTABLISHMENT) FOR DIV PRO UNIT - TRANSPORT NEW JEEPS & TRAILERS 35, MOTORCYCLES 21, AND SIGNAL EQUIPMENT AUTHORISED.
NOV 25 NO. 4202186 L/CPL WILLIAM W PROCEEDED TO UK ON REPATRIATION (LONG CONTINUOUS SERVICE ABROAD).
DEC 17 GEN SIR OLIVER LEESE C IN C, A I F, S E A, INSPECTED DIVISION. PROVOST UNIT WERE COMPLIMENTED.
DEC 27 8 BOR’S ATTENDING SIGNAL COURSE WITH DIV SIGNS AS W E NOW INCLUDES SIGNAL EQUIPMENT
DEC 30 RANCHI. ADVANCE PARTY SGT SANDS & 2 BOR’S, 3 GOR’S LEFT FOR NEW AREA.
WO 172/4329 20 INDIAN DIVISION PRO UNIT AUG-DEC 1944
AUG 7 44 THOUBAL. HE THE VICEROY OF INDIA INSPECTED 20 INDIAN DIVISION AND UNITS IN THE THOUBAL AREA. ALL TRAFFIC ARRANGEMENTS MILESTONE 31 ½ TO23 PALEL IMPHAL ROAD CARRIED OUT BY THIS UNIT.
AUG 9 DAILY OCCURRENCE BOOK OPENED.
AUG 14 MAJ LAXTON CMP(I) DEPOT VISITS.
AUG 18 OWING TO 40 GALLON DRUMS OF PETROL DRAWN FROM DIV POL POINT CONTAINING WATER, SEVERAL VEHICLES ON ROAD FAILED WITH WATER IN THE SYSTEMS.
AUG 21 148234 CAPT BIRCH NEW OC, 204160 LIEUT H A EDKINS 2 1/C.
SEPT 15 L/CPL KERSEY KNOCKED DOWN BY A VEHICLE AT MAIN GATE, CONVEYED TO 59 FIELD AMBULANCE.
OCT 12 LT EDKIN TO 25 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT.
NOV 27 MOVE TO NEW AREA, KHAMPAR.
WO 172/4337 21 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT APR-JUNE 1944
FORMED IN ASSAM FROM DISBANDED 44 INDIAN ARMD DIV, BECAME 44 INDIAN AIRBORNE DIV IN JUNE 44.
APR 24 SECUNDERABAD. UNIT ENTRAINED FOR UNKNOWN DESTINATION. STRENGTH - 2 BO’S, 1 VCO, 1 WO, 9 BOR’S, 35 IOR’S, 11 NCE’S
APR 29 CALCUTTA. ARRIVED HOWRAH STATION, CALCUTTA. WO AND DRIVERS PROCEED TO TRANSIT CAMP TO COLLECT VEHICLES. OC AND CQMS WITH REMAINING IOR’S PROCEED BY TRAIN.
APR 29 NEW VEHICLES TAKEN OVER FROM VDD CALCUTTA. 5 DODGE 15 CWT’S 9 CHEV 15 CWT’S, 13 JEEPS, 1 CHEV 3 TONNER.
APR 30 OC AND PARTY ARRIVE BHRAMAPOUTRA RIVER, EMBARK ON FERRY.
MAY 6 VEHICLES UNLOADED FROM METRE GAUGE RAILWAY, DRIVEN 19 MILES TO FERRY, CROSS BHRAMAPUTRA RIVER. ARRIVE FIRST STAGING CAMP, 19.00 HRS.
DEPART FOR DIMAPUR, HQ 33 INDIAN CORPS.
MAY 9 ARRIVE CINNAMARA LESS 1 3 TONNER IMMOBILISED BY STEERING TROUBLE.
MAY 11 MAJ WALKER, APM 44 IND ARMD DIV DEPARTS BY PLANE FROM JORHAUT TO TAKE UP NEW APPOINTMENT OF APM 15 INDIAN CORPS. ORDERS RECEIVED FOR DET OF PRO TO PROCEED DIMAPUR WITH DIV TAC HQ.
MAY 12 CAPT C FULLERTON MM, OFFICIATING APM 44 IND ARMD DIV.
MAY 14 DESIGNATION OF DIV CHANGED TO 31 INDIAN DIVISION.
MAY 19 MAJ BURROWS, APM, 33 IND CORPS ARRIVES TO DISCUSS WITH OC ESCORTING JIFS AND POW’S TO CORPS CAGE FROM MOKOCHUNG.
16 JIFS TAKEN OVER FROM ADV BASE LRPG. LODGED IN JORHAUT POLICE STATION UNDER PRO GUARD.
MAY 21 ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY OC 21 IND DIV PRO UNIT TO HELP 33 CORPS PRO UNIT IN EVACUATION OF POW FROM 23 INF BDE LRPG, VIA MOKOCHUNG. ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH ADOS 21 IND DIV TO MAKE WIRE CAGES ON TWO JEEPS AND ONE 15 CWT.
MAY 22 OC WITH DAQMG 21 IND DIV PROCEED FD PARK RE, JORHAUT WITH TWO JEEPS AND ONE 15 CWT TO BE CONVERTED INTO CAGES FOR POW. OC AND DAQMG CONTACT DISTRICT SUPT OF POLICE JORHAUT, REF ACCOMMODATION AND ESCORTING O JIFS. OC CONTACTS CAPT ROCK, OC ADV BASE AIR STRIP RED RAF EVACUATION OF POW FROM MOKOCHUNG.
MAY 24 MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM HQ 21 IND DIV FOR DET OF PRO TO PROCEED KOHIMA TO SUPPLEMENT PRO 268 BDE.
MAY 25 OC, 1 SUB SECTION BOR’S, 1 SECT IOR’S PROCEED KOHIMA VEHICLES 3 X 15 CWT TRUCKS, 4 JEEPS AND 2 MOTORCYCLES. PARTY ARRIVE 268 BDE KOHIMA AND TAKE OVER TC FROM GARRISON HILL TO JAIL HILL ON JEEP TRACK.
MAY 26 TRAFFIC CONTROL ON JEEP TRACK INSTITUTED. INTERMITTENT SHELLING OF ENEMY POSITION ON MANGAS VILLAGE HILL ALL DAY.
MAY 27 TRAFFIC SYSTEM RUNNING WELL. BOR SUB SECT AND IOR SECT LEFT UNDER COMMAND OF BDE MAJ. 268 BDE. MORAL OF MEN EXCELLENT. OC AND RSM RETURN TO JORHAUT.
MAY 29 CQMS AND ONE BOR PROCEED MOKOCHUNG FOR JAP POW.
MAY 30 CQMS ARRIVES RV MAIANI WITH JAP POW TRANSFERRED TO 15 CORPS CAGE AND PROCEEDED TO CORPS HQ.
JUN 1 JORHAUT, 2 BOR’S WITH TWO JAP POW RETURNING FROM MOKOCHUNG, RAN OFF TRACK AND FELL APPROX. 100 FEET. BOR’S AND POW’S UNINJURED. PROCEED RV MARIANI IN RE JEEP CONVOY.
MARIANI. PWO TRANSFERRED TO 15 CWT CAGE. PROCEED TO CORP HQ DEMAPUR.
JUN 2 OC, RSM AND TWO BOR’S ACCOMPANIED BY CIEME, 21 IND DIV PROCEED TO SCENE OF ACCIDENT. ARRANGEMENT MADE FOR RECOVERY OF JEEP. TELEPHONE MESSAGE FRO ADV BASE AIR STRIP, TWO POW
READY FOR COLLECTION AT MOKOCHUNG.
JUN 3 CQMS, 1 BOR AND DET FROM WORKSHOPS PROCEED MOKOCUNG TRACK TO RECOVER JEEP. 2 BOR’S PROCEED MOKOCHUNG, FOR TWO POW. ONE WOUNDED POW COLLECTED FROM ADV BASE AIR STRIP, JORHAUT, HAVING BEEN EVACUATED BY AIR FROM MOKOCHUNG.
JUN 8 INFO RECEIVED FROM HQ 21 IND DIV THAT 118 L OF C PRO UNIT WOULD TAKE OVER 21 IND DIV PRO UNIT’S COMMITMENTS IN KOHUIMA, WEF 12/7/44.
JULY 8 KOHIMA. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM HQ 21 INDIAN DIV THAT 119 L OF C PRO UNIT WOULD TAKE OVER 21 IND DIV PRO UNITS COMMITMENTS IN KOHIMA WEF 12/7/44.
JULY 9 WIRELESS MESSAGE TO ALL TCP’S JESSAMI TRACK. “ALL RETURNING EMPTY JEEPS TO HELP IN EVACUATION OF ADS AT MILESTONE 12 ½. WIRELESS MESSAGE TO ALL TCP’S TO SEARCH ALL JEEPS FOR AN AMERICAN TYPE CARBINE REPORTED STOLEN AT MILESTONE 14. 8 JIFS AND ESCORT ARRIVE AT UNIT HQ.
JULY 10 JESSAMI TRACK REPORTED CLEAR, UP TO MILESTONE 43. OC AND RSM INTERVIEWED SUPT ASSAM POLICE, KOHIMA, REF SUM OF MONEY REPORTED STOLEN FROM NAGA VILLAGE KOHIMA. IOR TCP WITHDRAWN FROM BOKOJAN ROAD.
JULY 11 RSM CONTACTS OC SOUTH LANCS, REF SUM OF MONEY STOLEN FROM NAGA VILLAGE.
JULY 12 INFO RECEIVED THAT UNIT COMMITMENTS WOULD NOW BE TAKEN OVER BY 253 L OF C PRO UNIT.
JULY 13 WIRELESS MESSAGE TO ALL TCP’S JESSAMI TRACK TO RETURN TO UNIT HQ ON 14TH. OC AND RSM VISIT DC KOHIMA REF STOLEN MONEY, ALSO VISIT SOUTH LANCS, CASE DROPPED OWING TO LACK OF EVIDENCE. 253 L OF C PRO UNIT ARRIVES KOHIMA TO TAKE OVER 21 iND DIV PRO UNIT COMMITMENTS. 1 BOR IN JEEP PROCEEDS JESSAMI TRACK TO INFORM AMERICAN FIELD SERVICE UNIT THAT THEY ARE URGENTLY REQUIRED AT UKRAL.
JULY 14 ONE HAVILDAR PLACED IN CLOSE ARREST, FAILING TO COMPLY WITH ORDERS.
JULY 21 DAAG AND CAMP COMDT. ARRIVE UNIT HQ TO OPEN SUMMARY COURT MARTIAL ON THE AFOREMENTIONED HAVILDAR. SUMMARY COURT MARTIAL ADJOURNED FOR FURTHER EVIDENCE.
JULY 27 ORDERS RECEIVED TO MOVE UNIT TO INDIA.
WO 172/4354 25 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT MAY-DEC 1944
MAR 1 MAUNGDAW, CAPT WILDE OC, CAPT BANNISTER 2 1/C.
AUG 4 12.45HRS ESCORT DESPATCHED TO ARABSHAPARA POLICE STATION TO TAKE OVER CIVILIAN PRISONER BAZAL AHMED FOR EXECUTION OF SENTENCE IMPOSED BY CIVIL COURT.
14.55HRS RETURNED WITH PRISONER.
18.20HRS CIVILIAN FAZAL AHMED EXECUTED BY SHOOTING. (PROVOST UNIT FIRING PARTY)
AUG 23 CAPT BRADBURY ARRIVES. MAJ WALKER APM.
SEPT 11 CAPT BURNISTON NEW OC ARRIVES VICE CAPT WILDE.
SEPT 12 SHELL (JAPANESE) DESTROYED PROVOST POST ON MULE TRACK, NO CASUALTIES,
LIEUT'S ANDREW AND RICHARDS.
WO 172/4364 26 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1944
JAN CHITTAGONG, CAPT G G SHEATH NORTH STAFFS LIEUT G S WALKER.
10 JAN 10 FENUA
21 JAN 21 180077 CAPT C R BULLER KING'S REG/6GR NEW 2 1/C.
27 JAN 27 CAPT C A MILLER BLACK WATCH NEW OC.
3 FEB 3 L/NAIK HYAT KHAN MP/2056 SHOT THROUGH KNEE.
30 DEC 30 LIEUT M SYMINGTON NEW 2 1/C.
WO 172 /4371 36 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT AUG-DEC 1944
AUG 1 LEDO. DPM 14 ARMY LIEUT COL DANIELS VISITS.
AUG 7 17.00HRS SIGNAL RECEIVED TO SAY L/CPL WARDROPER WHO WAS BADLY WOUNDED IN THE ABDOMEN BY A JAP BULLET ON 7 JULY IS ARRIVING AT LEDO BY AIR FROM MYITKYNA – DID NOT ARRIVE, SENT TO DACCA.
JOINT PATROLS WITH US MP.
AUG 21 SAHMAW L/CPL RICHARDS LEFT FOR MOGAUNG. HE WAS SENT BACK TO MOGAGUNG FROM NO1 SECTION WITH HQ 29 INF BDE OWING TO A NERVOUS DISPOSITION AND SHOUTING IN HIS SLEEP, WHICH IS VERY DANGEROUS IN FORWARD AREA. 29 INF BDE ARE PASSING THROUGH 72 INF BDE TO ATTACK PINBAW.
JAP POW'S TAKEN TO AIR STRIP AT PAHOK AND FLOWN OUT.
MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM”GS” LIAISON PLANE FROM SHADAZUP WILL DROP OFFICIAL MAIL DAILY. MILITARY POLICE ON DUTY AT AIR STRIP WILL KEEP A SHARP LOOK OUT FOR THIS PLANE AND WILL COLLECT ALL PACKAGES AND TAKE THEM TO “G” OFFICE. SOME PACKAGES WILL BE “FREE DROPPED” OTHERS WILL HAVE COLOURED STREAMERS ATTACHED.
APPENDIX “C” TO 36 INDIAN DIV PROVOST UNIT SP INSTRUCTION SP6.
BUSH HAT, KD BLOUSE, TROUSERS VEST & PANTS, BOOTS, SOCKS, HEAD DRESS, BLANKET, FIELD DRESSING, IDENTITY DISCS, JACK KNIFE.
PERSONAL ARMS & AMMUNITION
RIFLE AND 50 ROUNDS, PISTOL AND 12 ROUNDS, BREN GUN AND 900 ROUNDS, CMT AND 200 ROUNDS.
PERSONAL BAGGAGE (VALISE 17 POUNDS)
BOOTS, SOCKS, TROUSERS, SHIRT, ONE BLANKET, MOSQUITO NET, GROUND SHEET, MONSOON CAPE, JERSEY PULLOVER, SHOES CANVAS, CHAGUL (THIS WAS A CANVAS BAG FOR COOLING WATER), STEEL HELMET AND NET.
EQUIPMENT ON THE MAN
WEB EQUIPMENT (LESS HAVERSACK), TWO STRAPS SHOULDER (L & R), PACK CARRIED AS A RUCKSACK, BINOCULARS AND COMPASS, KUKRI OR DEH, TORCH, HANDCUFFS.
CONTENTS OF HAVERSACK
1PR SOCKS, MESS TIN, SHAVING GEAR, TOWEL AND SOAP, HOUSEWIFE, KNIFE SPOON AND FORK, PERSONAL KIT, CAMOUFLAGE FACE CREAM, ANTI MOSQUITO CREAM, WATER STERILIZING OUTFIT, SCAT, WATER BOTTLE FILLED.
PERSONAL BUNDLE. 10 POUNDS
1 KD SHIRT, 1 KD TROUSERS, 1 KD SHORTS, 1 HOSETOPS, 1 SOCKS, 1 GREEN BD BLOUSE, 1 TOWEL, 1 VEST, 1 SHORTS NOTE 2 VESTS AND 2 PANTS MAY BE CARRIED. NOTICE THE PERSONAL BUNDLE (10 POUNDS WILL NOT BE TAKEN, IT WILL BE SECURELY LABELLED WITH NO. RANK AND NAME, AND HANDED TO THE “Q”.
WHISTLE TO BE WORN, ARM BAND TO BE WORN, CAP BADGE TO BE WORN IN BUSH HAT. RED BUSH HAT BAND IN HAVERSACK (WORN ON SLOUCH HAT WHEN ON DUTY LIKE A RED CAP COVER)., WHITE TRAFFIC SLEEVES IN VALISE.
WO 172/4460 254 INDIAN TANK BDE PRO UNIT AUG-DEC 1944
AUGUST 44 IMPHAL – DIMAPUR ROAD, CAPT F H ROTTON R WARWICKS,
AUG 20 LIEUT D A NEWTON RA NEW OC. CAPT TORRON BECAME DAPM 251 L OF C SUB AREA.
WO 172/6312 BASE AREA PRO COY COLUMBO APR-DEC 1944
COLUMBO, CEYLON, CAPT J M FERGUSON CMP (I), CAPT H R HARRIS R BERKS, CAPT T A V DENTON
LONG LISTS OF TRANSFERS, ATTACHMENTS, DUTIES.
WO 172/6313 98 INDIAN(BEACH MAINT) PRO UNIT, NOV-DEC 1944
NOV 21 APBO
NOV 27 ARRIVE PALEL.
NOV 30 YAZAGYO, PLANES LANDING THICK AND FAST. 84 TODAY. REQUIRE MORE MEN AND SIGNING EQUIPMENT. TRAFFIC AT THE MOMENT GOING WHERE IT PLEASES.
DEC 5 FRANCO PLATES PROVING UNSATISFACTORY, DUST CREATED BY PLANES OBSCURES LETTERING IN A SHORT TIME. THEY HAVE TO BE CLEANED AT LEAST TWICE IN A DAY. LARGE SIGNS 2' TO 3' OFF THE GROUND ARE THE ANSWER.
WO 172/6314 61 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1944
JAN 44 DIMAPUR – IMPHAL, CAPT J PHILLIPS, CAPT A J R QUIZILDASH INDIAN ARMY 2 I/C 6 MAY 44, RSM CATLING.
MAY 29 CAPT B J COLE WEST YORKS NEW OC.
OCT 18 12 WEST AFRICANS ARRESTED AND PLACED IN POW COMPOUND. A COMPANY OF WEST AFRICANS MARCHED INTO THE LINES WITH A VIEW TO SPEAKING WITH THE 12 ARRESTED EARLIER IN THE DAY. THEY WERE ALSO PLACED IN THE POW CAGE.
NOV 1 2 SECTIONS OF GURKHAS NO'S 9 & 10 GURKHA VPP SECTIONS ARRIVE FOR ATTACHMENT TO UNIT.
NOV 21 APM 202 AREA MAJ PETRIE INSPECTED UNIT.
WO 172/6315 66 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1944
JAN JAN PANDU – NOWGONG, CAPT J G BURR OC 9 GR, CAPT REID
5 RGR 2 I/C.
FEB 14 GAUHATI, SWEEPER KASHI OF THIS UNIT ARRESTED AS A DESERTER BY L/NAIK LAL CHAND.
FEB 18 LETTER BELOW RAISING OF VPP WINGS INDIA.
THE FOLLOWING VPP SECTIONS WERE RAISED AT CMP(I) DEPOT FYZABAD, BY THE COMMANDANT HQ & DEPOT CMP(I). ESTABLISHED UNDER W.E.I/48/3 WITH SCALE “C” TRANSPORT & WEAPONS. 30 BRITISH SEC, 31 BRITISH SECT. 32 BRITISH SECT, 33 BRITISH SECT. 34 BRITISH SECT, 35 BRITISH SECT. 1 SECT GURKHA AND 2 SECT GURKHA.
DIARY LISTS WHERE VPP ARE TO BE STATIONED: KARACHI, AGRA, CAWNPORE, GAUHATI, CHITTAGONG.
MAR 17 US MP'S CALLED TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN TRACING PTE H PERRY A NEGRO US ARMY, WANTED FOR SHOOTING A US OFFICER ON 8 MARCH 44 AT LEDO.
MAR 24 L/SGT ANDERSON WEST AFRICAN PROVOST ARRIVED WITH A SECTION. CAPT MILLER DAPM.
JUL 15 79896 L/CPL LAMIDI ADEDOKUN WEST AFRICAN CMP COLLAPSED AT PANDU, ADMITTED TO 521 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL..
JUL 24 L/CPL LAMADI ADEDOKUN DIED IN 52 IGH, COMPLAINT BT & MT MALARIA. 79896 L/CPL LAMADI ADEDOKUN 18 WEST AFRICAN PRO SECTION BURIED AT GAUHATI MILITARY CEMETERY GRAVE B5
AUG 26 RSM BARNES REPLACED RSM BURNER, CAPT BARTON NOW 2 I/C. A BUSY WAR DIARY.
WO 172/6316 73 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-FEB AUG- DEC 1944
JAN 44 CHITTAGONG CAPT RUSHMAN OC LEFT 19 FEB 44.
FEB 21 RAF SP AND CMP(I) PERSONNEL OF THIS UNIT WORKING IN CONJUNCTION.
FEB 24 CAPT SAMPSON NEW OC.
AUG CAPT T A V DENTON DORSETS NEW OC
SEPT 22 CAPT WEATHERSTONE ATTACHED
CAPT I A McKENZIE 3 IND LAA, CAPT C B JACK MAHRATTA REGT.
WO 172/ 6317 81 L OC C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1944
JAN IMPHAL ROAD CAPT HETTERLEY, RSM SKINNER ,
MAJ HORN APM 14 ARMY, CAPT GURNEY DAPM, CAPT L R WARD OC,
MAJ THORNTON APM 202 AREA.
DEC 13 RSM NOBLE 119 L OF C PRO UNIT ARRIVES & ACCOMMODATED. TO BE AWARDED GEORGE MEDAL AT INVESTITURE ON 15 DEC.
DIARY CONTAINS DETAILS OF LOTS OF THEFTS AND MURDERS.
OCT 30 NO MENTION OF DEATH OF MP/1170 L/NAIK MEHAR CHAND CMP (I) OF THIS UNIT.
WO 172/6318 82 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1944
JAN DIBRUGARH, DIGBOI AND LEDO CAPT G B JACK. 5 HLI.
JAN 13 BLUE CAPS AT TINSUKIA WORKING WELL (21 VPP SECTION) 1 TRUCK ARRIVES FOR THEM.
MAY 10 REPORT RECEIVED ONE OF THE VPP L/CPL LEWIS GOT KILLED WHILST ATTEMPTING TO CAPTURE AN ABSCONDED MURDERER.
APR 11 BURIAL OF L/CPL LEWIS OF 21 VPP SECT AT PANITOLA CEMETERY.
APR 12 SEPOY MANSING ABSCONDED MURDERER CAPTURED.
JUL 21 BT COOK NARAIN DIED IN UNIT LINES (RESULT OF POST MORTEM CEREBRAL MALARIA), BODY CREMATED BY HINDU OTHER RANKS. (NOT FOUND IN CWGC ROLL).
AUG 17 MAJ YU & LIEUT MIN, CHINESE MIL. POLICE CALLED IN UNIT.
AUG 23 SGT WILSON SIB INVESTIGATES MURDER OF SUBEDAR HIDAYAT ALLAH KHAN,
DIARY CONTAINS MANY THEFTS, DACOITY AND MURDERS OF INDIANS.
WO 172/6319 83 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1944
JAN RAMU CAPT W WOOD 9 BORDER REGT.
APR 26 CHITTAGONG CONVOY DUTIES.
JUN 26 NEW OC CAPT E C BRADBURY , OX & BUCKS LIGHT INFANTRY.
WO 172/6330 84 L OF C PRO UNIT AUG-DEC 1944
JAN SHILLONG CAPT REID
SEP 15 SQUADRON LEADER REYNOLDS RAF APM VISIT HQ. CAPT BARTON DAPM.
DEC 6 CAPT R J J PULMAN NEW OC
DIARY CONTAINS THEFTS ABSENTEES AND DESERTERS AND MURDER OF INDIANS.
WO 172/6321 94 L OF C (BEACH MAINT) PRO UNIT JAN-FEB 1944
JAN RATNAGIRI CAMP CAPT ROYCE JONES WELSH REGT VICE CAPT RENFREW TAYLOR.
WO 172/6322 119 L OF C PRO UNIT JUN -DEC 1944
JAN RAMU CAPT P D DOOD OC. MAJ THOMPSON APM 404 AREA.
LT B H HOBSON KSLI, CAPT J JACKSON DAPM 451 SUB AREA.
NOV 12 HQ MESSAGE 46. 20.00HRS TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM 31 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL THAT NO. 1415 L/NAIK DARYAO SINGH DIED IN HOSPITAL FROM TYPHUS.
NOV 16 88 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL CONTACTED AND ADVICE RECEIVED ON PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY PERSONNEL AGAINST TYPHUS. UNIT AREA THOROUGHLY BURNT BY PETROL, DISINFECTANT SPRAYED ON ALL KITS AND INSIDES OF TENTS. PERSONAL APPLICATION OF SKAT DETAILED AS A PARADE EACH DAY.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM 87 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL THAT NO.
MP/1313 SEPOY FEROZ KHAN PLACED ON THE DANGEROUSLY ILL LIST DUE TO TYPHUS, ORIGINALLY ADMITTED TO 87 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL WITH NOT YET DIAGNOSED FEVER.
INFO RECEIVED FROM 87 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL THAT NO. MP/1313 SEPOY FEROZ KHAN DIED ON THE 14/11/1944 FROM TYPHUS FEVER.
NOV 28 CAPT R M WEATHERINGTON RA OC VICE CAPT DODD.
DEC 16 RSM (RSM NOBLE) PRESENTED WITH GEORGE MEDAL BY FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL AT IMPHAL.
DEC 2 MP/2348 GULHAM SARWAR DIED (NOT MENTIONED IN DIARY).
WO 172/6323 124 UNIT (VP) APRIL-DEC 1944
FEB CEYLON. VISIT OF A, B AND C COYS TO CBO DOCK (INSTRUCTIONAL DUTIES ON MERCHANT SHIPS).
VISIT OF A, B AND C COY TO CBO DOCK (ORGANISED BY CEYLON HARBOUR POLICE).
CAPT A V LOVELL-KNIGHT, CAPT H LEIGHTON AND CAPT W A HEALD ARRIVE CEYLON FROM ENGLAND TO TAKE OVER COMMAND OF A, B AND C COYS.
CCMP (VP) 1 SECTION OF CCMP (PROV) DESPATCHED TO TCO AND 2 SECTIONS TO BASE AREA PRO COY.
MAR 1 STRENGTH 2 OFFICERS, 109 ORS, 3 NON COMBATANTS.
ALLOTMENT OF NEW REGIMENTAL NUMBERS, A COY P/53 TOP/175.
MAR 6 DUTIES CBO PRT AREA DIVIDED INTO TWO SUB-AREAS (IE NORTH AND SOUTH SUB-AREAS) A COY TAKES OVER DUTIES FROM PORT SECURITY SERVICES, SOUTH AREA AND MAN THE FOLLOWING GATES:- PRT ENTRANCE AT BATTENBURG, LOVER DEC, LEYDON BASTION GATE, DELFT GATE AND CANAL BRIDGE. (DIARY HAS A HAND DRAWN MAP OF HARBOUR AND POSTS MANNED BY CCMP A COY
MARCH CAPT LOVELL-KNIGHT, CAPTAIN LEIGHTON AND CAPT HEALD ASSUME COMMAND OF A, B AND C COYS RESPECTIVELY AND COMMENCE TRAINING UNDER COY ARRANGEMENTS. DEPOT REMAINS RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE CORPS; TRAINING OF REPLACEMENTS; REFRESHER COURSES ETC.
CAPT R A BARTON LEFT CBO FOR PROVOST COURSE AT FYZABAD, CAPT RHODES ASSUMES COMMAND OF DEPOT.
MAR 31 ARRIVED COLOMBO,CEYLON FROM CMP(I) DEPOT FYZABAD, INDIA.
APR 12 SUB SECTION OF CEYLONESE CMP ARRIVE FROM BASE PRO COY.
APR 21 SGT LEE RAF SERVICE POLICE ATTACHED TO UNIT. RAIDS ON BROTHELS, UNRULY US FORCES.
MAY 11 CAPT A V LOVELL-KNIGHT NEW OC VICE CAPT F S CAMPBELL WHO BECAME OC CMP (PORTS) COY.
MAY 20 THERE IS MUCH RESENTMENT IN THE COY. AT PERFORMING PROVOST DUTIES, WHICH IS PROBABLY BASED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS, 1. THE MEN DO NOT RECEIVE PROVOST CORPS PAY AND HAVE NEVER BEEN TRAINED TO PERFORM PROVOST WORK. 2. THEY CONSIDER THEMSELVES MEDICALLY UNFIT FOR PROVOST DUTIES.
MAY 24 1 SGT ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL, OWING TO THE SEVERE SICK RATE IN THE COY. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FIND THE MEN FOR DUTIES.
MAY 27 ONE CASE OF INDISCIPLINE IN THE COY. WHICH RESULTED IN A L/CPL BEING DEPRIVED OF LANCE CORPORAL APPOINTMENT AND AWARDED 14 DAYS CONFINED TO BARRACKS.
JUL 6 6 L/CPL’S OF THE CMP REPORT TO THIS UNIT FROM BASE AREA PRO COY. AND ARE ATTACHED FOR ALL PURPOSES. THEY WILL BE EMPLOYED
IN THE MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE IN THE KDT AREA, AND SO RELIEVE THE V.P.P FROM DUTIES FOR WHICH THEY ARE NOT FITTED OR TRAINED.
JUL 13 ONE L/CPL OF THE CMP ATTACHED TO THIS UNIT IS ADMITTED TO 35 BRITISH GENERAL HOSPITAL WITH SUSPECTED V.D.
JUL 14 OC UNIT IS ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL.
JUL 16 CAPT F S CAMPBELL ARRIVES FROM CBO TO ASSUME DUTIES AS TEMPORARY OC UNIT.
WO 172/6474 DEPOT HQ CEYLON CMP DEC 43 JAN-DEC 44
JAN 44 CAP J C RHODES NORFOLK REGT OC, ADJ & QM DEPOT CCMP RSM WILSHAW, CAPT BARTON RA.
FEB 25 PHOTO A, B C, COMPANIES.
MAY 1 A & C COY AMALGAMATED TO BECOME 1 PORTS PRO COY. CAPT LOVELL-KNIGHT OC, CAPT WA HEALD E LANCS.
(LOTS OF COURSES AND POSTING IN AND OUT).
WO 172/6475 A COY CEYLON CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE MAR-APR 1944
MAR COLUMBO, CAPT A V LOVELL-KNIGHT WILTS OC, LIEUT W A SERDANCHY CEYLON LI.
MAR 1 NEW REGIMENTAL NUMBERS FOR A COY CEYLON CMP P/53 TO P/175.
COLOMBO PORT AREA DIVIDED INTO 2 SUB-AREAS NORTH AND SOUTH.
MAY 1 A & C COY BECAME NO.1 VPP (PORTS) COY CCMP
WO 172/6476 C COY CEYLON CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE MAR-APR 1944
MARCH COLOMBO. CAPT W A HEALD E LANCS, LIEUT E R P D SILWA CELYLON L I. CAPT A V LOVELL-KNIGHT WILTS OC, LIEUT W A SERDANCHY CEYLON LI.
MAR 1NEW REGT NUMBERS FOR A COY CEYLON CMP P/53 TO P/175.
COLOMBO PORT AREA DIVIDED INTO 2 SUB-AREAS NORTH AND SOUTH.
CAPTE SILWA CEYLON LI, CAPT FLAGOT SIB.
MAY 1 A & C COY BECAME NO.1 VPP (PORTS) COY CCMP.
WO 172/6477 1 VULNERABLE POINTS PROVOST (PORTS) COY CCMP MAY-DEC 1944
1 MAY 1 COLOMBO CEYLON A & C COY AMALGAMATED TO FORM UNIT, CAPT A V LOVELL-KNIGHT OC, CAPT WA SERPANCHY SOUTH SUB AREA DOCK, CAPT E R D ZILWA, NORTH SUB AREA DOCK, RSM G S CARTER.
MAY 11 CAPT LOVELL-KNIGHT BECAME DAPM KANDY. ORIGINAL NAME 1 PORTS PRO COY, 8 AUG 44 BECAME 1 VPP (P) COY.
NOV 20 FATAL ACCIDENT 1 OR (COY DESPATCH RIDER) MET WITH A FATAL MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT AT ABOUT 11.30HRS AND WAS DESPATCHED TO 54 IGH. SAME DAY PLACED ON SI LIST 13.30HRS, PLACED ON DANGEROUSLY ILL LIST 18.00HRS SAME DAY. DIED AT 22.45HRS SAME DAY.
NOV 22 REMOVAL OF BODY - THE REMAINS OF OR REMOVED BY TRUCK TO NATHANDIYA BY PARENTS OF DECEASED AND 6 COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES.
NOV 23 BURIAL OF REMAINS – THE REMAINS OF OR BURIED AT TABBOWA CEMETERY, MR 676253, SHEET 58, 1” TO 1 MILE.
(THE OR WAS P/99 L/CPL DANSENA HERATH AGED 21 CEYLON CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE)
DEC 5 LIEUT COL D WHITELAW DPM ARRIVES.
WO 172/6478 2 VULNERABLE POINTS PORTS COMPANY CEYLON MAY-DEC 1944
JAN COLOMBO, CEYLON. CAPT R H LEIGHTON RA, CAPT G F KELLAR CLI, CAPT R DE SILVA CLI, RSM PERERA.
JAN 10 B COY CCMP (VP) RAISED ON 10/1/1944 FROM PERSONNEL TRANSFERRED FROM 5BN CEYLON LIGHT INFANTRY.
MAR 1 EMBODIED AS A SEPARATE COMPANY. LIEUT G KELLAR A COY HANDED OVER COMMAND TO CAPT H LEIGHTON RA AND ASSUMED APPOINTMENT OF 2 I/C.
MAY 1 B COY CCMP (VP) LOCATED ON NORTH COAST ROAD, TCO 1/25000 299688. COMPANY STRENGTH 2 OFFICERS, 107 OTHER RANKS, DEFICIENT 13 OTHER RANKS.
MAY 4 L/CPL'S DON, PAUL AND KWAN RETURNED FROM SIB COURSE HELD AT DEPOT CMP.
MAY 11 PTE ALBERT’S COURT MARSHALL.
JUN 1 UNIT NOW NO.2 PORTS COY CCMP.
JUL 31 HARBOUR SECURITY PATROLS INAUGURATED, CONSISTING OF 2 LAUNCHES MANNED BY CEYLON NVR PERSONNEL AND A CCMP NCO ACCOMPANIED EACH LAUNCH ON 24 HOURS TOUR OF DUTY.
OCT 4 NEW UNIT LOCATION IN COLOMBO.
OCT 8 RSM CARTER FROM NO 1 PORTS COY.
WO 172/6497 APM 11 EAST AFRICAN DIV JAN-DEC 1944
JAN BENTOTA, CEYLON. MAJ J F HENN
JAN 14 CAPTAIN A S MCVEAN TEMPORARY COMMAND OF PRO COY.
JAN 15 APPENDIX A AMENDMENT NO 3 TO STANDING ORDERS 11 (EA) DIV PRO COY, EACMP. TRUNCHEONS WILL NOT, IN FUTURE, BE CARRIED BY AFRICAN MP, EXCEPT ON THE WRITTEN ORDER OF AN OFFICER, WHEN THEY WILL BE CARRIED UNDER THE SKIRT OF THE BUSH SHIRT OR IN A SPECIAL POCKET FOR THE PURPOSE IN THE SHORTS. II. PENDING ALTERATION TO SHORTS, THEY MAY BE CARRIED, WHEN ORDERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA (1), INSIDE THE LEG OF THE SHORTS.
JAN 17 LT COL WHITELAW DPM CAC. CAPT J C RHODES EACMP, LT J H JOHNSON EACMP.
MAR 3 APM VISITS MAJ FIRTH DAPM COLUMBO BASE AREA.
MAR 6 APM MEETS COL WHITELAW, DPM CEYLON ARMY COMMAND.
APR 1 11 (EA) DIV PRO COY TO MATUGAMA.
APR 27 SIGNAL FROM E A BASE ADMIN HQ REPORTING DANGEROUS WOUNDING OF LT QUINN 19 (EA) L OF C PRO SECTION AT KURUNEGALA AT 21.00HRS, NIGHT OF 26 APRIL 44. CSM KYNASTON AND SGT SHEARD BOTH WOUNDED, THE FORMER DANGEROUSLY.
APR 30 10.05HRS TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM SC EA BASE ADMIN HQ THAT LIEUT QUIN HAD DIED THIS MORNING. 11.40 HRS APM LEAVES WITH 2 PRO SECTION FOR KANDY TO ATTEND FUNERAL OF LIEUT QUIN AT 15.00HRS.
MAY 1 DAMBULLA, CEYLON.
MAY 18 LIEUT HOLM LA RSF ATTACHED 11 EA DIV PRO COY.
MAY 19 NEW APM MAJ P J KENWORTHY.
MAY 31 12.00HRS ARRIVE COLOMBO AND EMBARK ON HMT NEVASA.
JUN 7 ARRIVE CHITTAGONG, BENGAL, INDIA.
AUG 1 ARRIVE BY RAIL AT BAH ADUCABAD THEN ON TO FRAMAPURTA RIVER, CROSS RIVER BY FERRY AND ARRIVE BHARATKALI. 18.00HRS LEAVE BY RIVER STEAMER UP BRAHMAPUTRA RIVER.
AUG 4 ARRIVE PANDU.
AUG 5 LEAVE PANDU BY RAIL.
AUG 7 ARRIVE MANIPUR ROAD.
AUG 8 DIV HQ AT MILE STONE 26, PALEL.
SECRET SIGNAL: ONE WAY TRAFFIC WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON FOLLOWING STRETCHES OF ROAD. ONE BETWEEN BOTH INCLUSIVE MOREH FBE GR REF 7893 IN FERRY RF 8289 WEF 10/1200HRS. TWO. POINT WEST OF LOKOHAO BRIDGE AND ROAD JUNE RK 7202 NEAR BULLDOZER RIDGE, WEF 11/20.00HRS. GATES WILL BE ESTABLISHED BY PRO AT THESE FOUR POINTS. MOVEMENT WILL BE FORWARD A.M. REARWARDS P.M. AS FOLLOWS. FOR ONE. VEHICLES MOVING FORWARD WILL PASS MOREH GATE BETWEEN 05..30HRS AND 12.30HRS. VEHICLES MOVING REARWARD WILL PASS BULLDOZER RIDGE GATE BETWEEN 12.30HRS AND 17.30HRS. BY DAY OUTSIDE THESE HOURS ROADS WILL BE CLOSED TO ALL VEHICLES EXCEPT FLAGGED CARS, DRLS JEEPS, AMBULANCE JEEPS, ENGINEER VEHICLES ON ROAD WORK, MILITARY POLICE JEEPS OR SINGLE JEEPS WITH A PASS SIGNED BY HQ 33 INDIAN CORPS HQ, 11 EA DIV HQ, EA BRIGADES. BY NIGHT BETWEEN 19.30HRS AND 05.30 HRS ALL SECTIONS OF THE ROAD WILL BE CLOSED TO ALL VEHICLES APART FROM ABOVE EXCEPTIONS. WHEN USE OF ROAD DURING OR AFTER RAIN IS LIKELY TO DAMAGE THE ROAD SURFACE, THE ROAD WILL BE CLOSED TO ALL VEHICLES EXCEPT JEEPS. UNITS LOCATED BETWEEN GATES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROL AT THEIR SITES TO PREVENT UNAUTHORISED USE OF THE ROAD OUTSIDE HOURS AND WHEN USE WILL DAMAGE IT AFTER RAIN. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE NO REPEAT NO 15 CWT OR LARGER VEHICLES WILL USE THE ROAD SECTION MOREH HESIN ANYTIME. THIS HQ SIGNAL 0.2506 OF 9 AUG AND O.2423 OF 10 AUG NOT TO ALL ADDRESSES REFER. UNIT WILL INFORM APM 11 DIV BEFORE LARGE CONVOYS OR EXTRA HEAVY VEHICLES ARE DESPATCHED. APPLICATION FOR OPERATIONAL MOVEMENTS OUTSIDE HOURS WILL BE MADE TO GS. PRESERVATION OF THE ROAD IS OF SUPREME IMPORTANCE AND DIV COMMANDER DIRECTS THAT THESE ORDERS WILL BE OBEYED IMPLICITLY BY ALL RANKS. SEVERE DISCIPLINARY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST TRANSGRESSORS. SIGNED W SKELSEY MAJ. GII (O).
SEPT 1 RHINO HILL, INDO-BURMESE BORDER.
SEPT 21 BRIDGE WASHED AWAY, AIR DROPS
DEC 124 CHINDWIN BRIDGE ATTACKED BY 5 JAP AIRCRAFT.
DEC 15 PRO LIEUT MURPHY AND 1 SECTION LEAVE FOR DIMAPUR.
WO 172/6606 APM 81 (WEST AFRICAN) DIV PRO COY JAN-DEC 1944
DEC MOVE OF APM & 15 PROVOST SECTION TO OPERATIONAL AREA.
DEC 29 CASE OF AFRICAN OR’S OBTAINING INDIAN DRUG GANGA BROUGHT TO LIGHT. A.Q. ASKED TO REPEAT PREVIOUS ORDER FORBIDDING POSSESSION OR SMOKING OF DRUG AND ATTEMPTS TO STOP INDIANS SELLING IT.
JAN CHIRINGA MAJ E B MEE ROYAL SIGNALS 13/12/1943 TAKES OVER FROM MAJ G S B BRAMWELL A & SH.
AMTOLI, SUARATONG, MOWDOK, LEING PAING, SATPAING, PALETWA.
AUG CAPT P CLARK OC 81 (WA) DIV PRO COY OFFICIATING DURING PERIOD OF AMP’S ABSENCE.
AUG 20/21 PROGRESSIVE ENQUIRIES RE DEATH OF CFN. EKOMAFE ROGERS OF 6 (WA) HYGIENE SECT, WHO IS SAID TO HAVE SHOT HIMSELF WHILE ON GUARD DUTY.
WO 172/6607 81 (WEST AFRICAN) DIV PRO COY SEPT-DEC 1944
AUG 1 CHIRINGA, INDIA. MAJ MEE APM. CAPT P CLARK OC.
OCT 13 INA (INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY FOUGHT FOR JAPANESE) PRISONER ARRIVED FROM FORWARD AREA SENT TO 8 FIC.
OCT 20 1 INA (INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY) PRISONER TO 8 FIC.
OCT 21 1 BOR, ORD FD PARK SHOT BY AFRICAN O R - COMMITS SUICIDE.
OCT 26 AFRICAN OTHER RANK KNOCKED DOWN AND KILLED BY CIVILIAN AT MS (MILESTONE) 28. DRIVER NOT FOUND.
OCT 27 AFRICAN OTHER RANK SHOT A CIVILIAN 5 MILES WEST OF BANDERBAN ON RIVER SANGU.
OCT 28 APM & CSM TO BANDERBAN TO INVESTIGATE MURDER, 1 AFRICAN OTHER RANK ARRESTED.
NOV 1 UNIT TITLE NOW 275 (WEST AFRICAN) DIV PRO COY.
NOV 15 1 AFRICAN OTHER RANK EXECUTED FOR MURDER.
CAPT W B ADAMS. GEN LIST. NEW OC 21/11/1944.
WO 172/6861 12 ARMY PRO UNIT SEAC JUL-DEC 1945
JUL 15 LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN ARRIVED IN RANGOON BY AIR.
AUG RIOT SQUADS FORMED AND SENT TO RANGOON TO DEAL WITH VJ CELEBRATIONS. CAPT A BEAN RA OC 14/9/1945.
WO 172/6876 HQ 14 ARMY PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945
JAN 16 COL WATERS PM AND COL DANIELS DPM VISITED.
JAN 26 CAPT J HEVENHAND LEAVES TO BECOME DAPM 551 L OF C SUB AREA. CAPT J OSBORNE APPOINTED NEW OC.
MAR 3 CAPT M BIRCH OF 20 DIV ARRIVED TO TAKE OVER UNIT.
MAR 15 CAPT J ABBOTT TEMPORARILY ATTACHED TO UNIT.
SEP 10 CAPT M GRIFFEN APPOINTED OC
DEC 23 CAPT GRIFFEN HANDED OVER TO CAPT MCPHERSON.
WO 172/6909 4 CORPS PRO UNIT JAN-OCT 1945
JAN 1 06.00HRS ROAD OPEN TWO WAY, KALE MYON 0 MANIPUR ROAD.
JAN 15 LT GURBACHAN SINGH ARRIVES OPEN ARREST.
JAN 17 LT NICKLIN ARRIVES ON ATTACHMENT.
JAN 30 2 JAPANESE POW ARRIVE FROM 7 DIV. INTO UNIT CAGE.
FEB 14 D DAY CROSSING IRRAWADDY ROUTE SIGNING FOR B ASSAULT BEACH OPPOSITE NYANGU. NO. 8863 CAPT F E B HUNTSMAN RA OC, 179115 CAPT G A F BARTON RA 2 I/C.
MAR 5 TOOK OVER CONTROL OF WEST BANK OF IRRAWADDY.
MAR 8 TOOK OVER CONTROL OF EAST BANK OF IRRAWADDY.
MAR 22 CROSSED RIVER HQ NYANGU.
MAR 31 HQ AT KAMYE TOOK OVER ROAD TO TAUNGTHA.
APR 5 HQ MEIKTILA. 239073 CAPT IRVING A E CMP OC 13/7/1945, 11463 CAPT E C TAYLOR 5 RGR 2 I/C 8/6/1945. RSM BROOKER
AUG 8 MAJ BROWN APM 12 ARMY VISITS.
AUG 9 LT MINSHALL RA. ATTACHED.
AUG 14 MURDER REPORTED ON NCO INDIAN SIB DEALING
JUL 3 PEGU CAPT J H TAYLOR AND 8 NCO’S WENT ON RAID AND CAPTURED JAP AGENTS.
JUL 6 PEGU CAPT RATENBURY, 53 INDIAN LOCAL PURCHASE SECTION PLACED IN CLOSE ARREST, HELD AT HQ UNDER CHARGES OF DISGRACEFUL
CONDUCT. RUPEES 89,800 IN HIS POSSESSION.
JUL 13 CAPT A E IRVING NEW OC, 6341 CAPT J HAMILTON 4 BOMBAY GRENS TO 5 IND DIV PRO COY 19/6/1945. MAJ PETRIE, APM. RSM CORPS.
SEP 29 PEGO 4 CORPS DISBANDED.
OCT 22 ALLEGED SHOOTING OF OR BY CMP INDIAN OTHER RANK.
OCT 26 TRAFFIC ACCIDENT PEGU-RANGOON ROAD, FANY (FIRST AID NURSING YEOMANRY) SISTER FATALLY INJURED.
WO 172/6929 APM 15 INDIAN CORPS PRO UNIT JAN-OCT 1945
23 FEB AKYAB ISLAND MAJ I G WALKER.
20 AUG MADRAS
7 SEPT ARRIVE SINGAPORE, APM’S OFFICE FORT CANNING.
12 SEPT JAPS SURRENDER MUNICIPAL BUILDINGS.
2 OCT APM + 1 SECTION OF BRITISH OTHER RANKS EMBARK FOR BATAVIA.
17 OCT. MISSING PERSONS BUREAU FORMED.
30 OCT APM INVESTIGATES MURDER OF MR MUST.
WO 172/6930 15 INDIAN CORPS PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945
JAN 1 BUTHIDANNG CAPT D A BANKS JAT REGT OC.
JAN 5 L/NAIK MAYA SINGH IN MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT, ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL.
JAN 14 CAPT MCKAY TO APM 26 DIV.
MAR 6 CQMS VOLLER TO 7 INDIAN DIV AS RSM.
MAR 8 LT CANDY R.A. JOINED UNIT.
AUG 24 MADRAS.
AUG 26 EMBARK HMT MONOWAY.
SEP 8 ARRIVE SINGAPORE.
SEP 11 HQ GLOBE HOUSE, SINGAPORE. LOTS OF RAPES, ROBBERIES AND FIGHTS.
NOV 1 TO BATAVIA.
NOV 14 MAJ GEN HAKAMURA, JAP WAR CRIMINAL ESCORTED FROM UNIT LINES TO AIRFIELD FOR FLIGHT TO SINGAPORE.
DEC 25 DISTURBANCE BY 5 PARA BN.
WO 172/6946 33 INDIAN CORPS PRO UNIT JAN-JUN 1945
JAN 1 KAING CAPT A G BAX. ROYAL NORFOLK REGT OC.
DUTIES OF REGULATING TRAFFIC HQ’S AT TCP 33 TAKEN OVER BY LT TAYLOR, ATTACHED TO THIS UNIT. FERRY SERVICE BETWEEN KALEWA AND SHWEGYIN PLACED UNDER CONTROL OF REGULATING HQ’S. UNIT TELEPHONE EXCHANGE IN OPERATION FOR THE FIRST TIME, HAVE WAITED A LONG TIME FOR THIS EXCHANGE TO COMPLETE PERFECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TCP’S. EXCHANGE KNOWN AS REPAT. TRAFFIC DELAY AT MS (MILESTONE) 91, OWING TO TANK TRANSPORTER GOING OVER KHUD.
JAN 2 CAPT MINAHAN 2 I/C UNIT PROCEEDED ON 28 DAYS COMPASSIONATE LEAVE. A SQN 7 CAVALRY FERRIED TO SHWEGYIN.
JAN 3 SUFFOLKS TO TAKE OVER TCP 31 & TCP 31A FROM UNIT PERSONNEL. 7 TANK TRANSPORTERS AND 2 BULLDOZERS FERRIED TO SHWEGYIN.
JAN 4 UNIT PERSONNEL FROM TCP 31 AND 31A REPORTED TO UNIT HQ. ONE NCO PER TCP LEFT BEHIND FOR AN ADDITIONAL 24 HOURS. NEW TCP’S ESTABLISHED AS FOLLOWS. TCP 36 MUTAIK (MANNED BY 254 TANK BDE PRO). TCP 37 CHAUNGZON, TCP 38 THETKEGYIN.
JAN 5 5 JEEPS 4 X 4, 15 CWT COLLECTED AT SUB PARK AT KYIGEN. C TROOP. 297/101 HEAVY AA FERRIED TO SHWEGYING.
JAN 6 GRUB BRIDGE CLOSED FROM 10.00 TO 18.00 HRS TO REMOVE ON SECTION. ROAD FROM KAING TO SHWEGYIN CLOSED FROM 07.00HRS TILL 18.00HRS 7 JAN TO ENABLE ENGINEERS TO ERECT THE BAILEY BRIDGING KNOWN AS “THE CATWALK”. RAIN FELL AT 02.30HRS, CAUSING THE ROAD TO BE CLOSED. ROAD CLOSED TO ALL TRAFFIC EXCEPT ONE WAT CART AND RATION TRUCK PER UNIT. NO FERRYING OWING TO IMPOSSIBILITY OF GETTING GUNS OR TANKS ONTO OR OFF THE RAFTS. STILL RAINING.
JAN 7 RAIN CEASED AT 05.00HRS. ROAD NORTH OF TCP 33 OPEN TO JEEPS & 15 CWT’S WEF 15.00HRS. ROAD SOUTH OF TCP 33 REMAINS CLOSED. NO FERRYING POSSIBLE.
FEB 1 YE-U
FEB 17 NORMAL ROUTINE AND DUTIES. STATIC AND MOBILE SPEED CHECKS. UNIT PERSONNEL ATTENDED ENSA SHOW AT CORPS HQ.
FEB 18 KYAMINGYI REPORTED THAT APPROX 20 JAPS HAD INFILTRATED THROUGH THE DIBEYINGHWE AREA. ALL VEHICLES PROCEEDING ON THE
DIBEYINGWE TRACK STOPPED AT TCP 46A AND HELD TILL 07.00HRS ON THE 12/2/1945.
FEB 19 REPORTED THAT 5 OR 6 JAPS HAD INFILTRATED AND WERE IN THE VICINITY OF MS 30 MANDALAY - SHWEBO ROAD. CAPT M J MINAHAN VISITED COL GRACIE, RE SUSPECTED CASES OF RAPE OCCURRING NORTH OF SAGAING.
FEB 20 BEER & SPIRIT ISSUE DRAWN FROM CBID. SHWEBO AND NORMAL ROUTINE DUTIES.
FEB 21 DPM 14 ARMY VISITED CORPS HQ TO SEE APM. 1 BOR SECTION UNDER COMMAND OF DAPM (CAPT HARRISON) 33 CORPS HQ PROCEEDED TO FORWARD AREA TO ASSIST IN TRAFFIC CONTROL FOR 2 DIV BEACHHEAD ASSAULT ACROSS IRRAWADDY RIVER.
FEB 22 OC UNIT PROCEEDED TO SHWEBO & TCP 46 AT SADAUNG ON INSPECTION.
FEB 24 CAPT J M NINAHAN 2 I/C UNIT TOOK OVER TRAFFIC CONTROL DUTIES FROM CAPT HARRISON DAPM.
MAR 6 CAPT BAX POSTED TO 124 VPP SECTION, CEYLON. 8954 CAPT F OSBORNE 16 PUNJAB REGT ASSUMES COMMAND, 237914 LT J B O’REILLY SOUTH LANCASHIRE REGT ATTACHED.
APR 9 RSM PRESCOTT OF 33 CORPS PRO UNIT ACCIDENTALLY DROWNED IN IRRAWADDY NEAR KYAUKTALON.
APR 10 COURT OF ENQUIRY AT APM’S OFFICE RE ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF RSM PRESCOTT. 162978 LT B F TAYLOR RA ARRIVES.
JUN 15 RANGOON VICTORY PARADE.
JUN 30 CAPT J MORRELL. MANCHESTER REGT NEW 2 I/C.
WO 172/6962 2 DIVISION PRO COY JAN-DEC 1945
JAN SHWEBO - MANDALAY ROAD, 169230 CAP H MCLEAN RWF BECAME APM 7/5/1944. 253135 LT F C JENNINGS RASC, CAPT D J HARGREAVES. 253356 LT BOWCOCK W. DLI. RSM JACKSON.
APR 3 RECEIVED THE FIRST LARGE BATCH OF JAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR.
APR 6 6478165 L/CPL F T BEAGLEY, 7690127 LC/PL B HARLAND, 7687986 L/CPL H J ONSLOW, 4349054 L/CPL J ROGERS OF 2 DIV PRO COY DIED ON THIS DATE. NO MENTION IN THE WAR DIARY.
197085 LT. F STOKES RA POSTED TO 33 CORPS PRO UNIT.
MAY 26 L/CPL TELFORD CMP REPORTS WITNESSING AIR PLANE CRASH IN THE VICINITY OF ISHAPORE. HE SUCCEEDED IN EXTRACTING ONE OF THE
CREW. (LATER AWARDED THE BEM).
JUN 5 CAPT HARGREAVES TO DAPM 12 ARMY LT BOWCOCK NEW OC.
NOV 1 POONA. 284159 CAPT MCKAY D RA 5/10/1945.
DEC 14 EMBARKED ON SS HIGHLAND CHIEF.
DEC 29 ARRIVE SINGAPORE, COY HQ ROBERTSON ROAD.
WO 172/6974 5 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945
JAN 1 MANIPUR ROAD. CAPT J GLOVER 11 SIKH REGT, LATER DAPM 256 SUB AREA 17/1/1945, CQMS SALT, CAPT D D L MOORE.
MAR 12 09.30 HRS CAPT MOORE PROCEEDED TO HQ 5 INDIAN DIV TO VISIT ADOS, RETURNED 10.30HRS. 12.00HRS L/CPL’S LAW, WHEELDON, LEE, DYTER, BEYER RETURNED FROM WAR LEAVE. 14.00HRS CAPT MOORE PROCEEDED TO JORHAT TO COLLECT THE PHOTOS FROM THE PHOTOGRAPHER FOR THE CMP (I) WARRANT CARDS.
MAR 16 08.00HRS UNIT HQ PART LEFT DIMAPUR AND REACHED IMPHAL AT 17.00HRS WHERE THE PARTY CAMPED NIGHT 16/17 MARCH IN THE STAGING AREA. CAPT ARRINDELL’S PARTY INCL 161 BDE SECTION - POINTSMAN POSTED ON ROAD JUNCTION PAKKOKU PK 4390, RSM AND CAPT ARRINDELL PROCEEDED TO PAKKOKU TOWN AT 09.30HRS TO CONTACT AND LOCAL UNITS, CONTACTED 7/14 PUNJAB REGT OF 7 INDIAN DIV AND BURMA REGT - CONTACTED 4 CORPS TCP AT ROAD JUNCTION PK 3489, INFORMED THEM THAT 5 INDIAN DIV CONVOYS WERE EXPECTED THROUGH IN A FEW DAYS TIME- MAINTENANCE CARRIED OUT ON OWN TRANSPORT. L/CPL MONEY AND 3 IOR’S LEFT EX PALEL TO MONYWA WITH 2 X 15 CWT’S AT 08.00HRS.
MAR 17 08.00 HRS L/NAIK FATEH HOHD LEFT WITH THE APM FOR IMPHAL AIRSTRIP WITH ONE JEEP TO FLY TO HQ 14 ARMY, MONYWA - 08.30 HRS UNIT HQ PART LEFT IMPHAL AND PROCEEDED TO TAMU VIA PALEL REACHING DESTINATION 16.30 HRS WHERE CAMP WAS SET UP FOR ONE DAY’S STAY.06.00 HRS CONVOY OF EMPTY TANK TRANSPORTERS CALLED IN AT 161 BRIGADE TCP, ON WAY TO MONYWA - CONVOY STARTED APPROX 07.00HRS AFTER A MEAL - 07.15 HRS ONE DIAMOND ‘T’ TRANSPORTER CALLED IN AT TCP WITH AN UNCONSCIOUS I.O.R. WHO HAD BEEN SWEPT OFF ONE OF THE TRANSPORTERS BY AN OVERHANGING BRANCH OF A TREE AND WAS PICKED UP BY A FOLLOWING TRANSPORTER. THE IOR HAD INJURIES TO HIS RIGHT KNEE AND HIS FOREHEAD, TAKEN IMMEDIATELY IN A JEEP BY CAPT ARRINDELL AND L/CPL BARNETT TO THE CIVIL HOSPITAL AT PAKKOKU WHERE HE WAS ADMITTED TEMPORARILY UNTIL OTHER ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE AT 4 CORPS HQ AT MYITCHE PK 1679 - 09.00 HRS CAPT ARRINDELL VISITED THE CIVIL HOSPITAL WITH L/CPL BARNETT REF THE INJURED IOR, WAS ASKED BY THE CIVIL HOSPITAL TO REMOVE HIM TO A MILITARY HOSPITAL AS HE WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING A BRAIN INJURY, HE ATTEMPTED TO DO SO BUT RETURNED AFTER ONE
MILE AS THE MAN SHOWED SIGNS OF GREAT DISTRESS - 09.30HRS RSM AND CAPT ARRINDELL PROCEEDED TO HQ 4 CORPS AT MYITCHE TO CONTACT THE MEDICAL AUTHORITIES - ARRIVED MYITCHE APPROX 10.30 HRS CONTACTED THE MEDICAL AUTHORITIES AND ARRANGED FOR A LIGHT PLANE (L.5) TO LAND ON THE EMERGENCY STRIP AT PAKKOKU PK 4591 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, ALSO CONTACTED APM 4 CORPS AND MADE A VERBAL REPORT ON INCIDENT AND HAD CONVERSATION RE DIV MOVES ETC. - RETURNED TO PAKKOKU PK 4390 LEAVING MYITCHE AT APPROX 11.15 HRS ARRIVING PAKKOKU APPROX 12.30HRS REPORTED ARRANGEMENTS TO MO I/C CIVIL HOSPITAL, WHERE THE IOR WAS PLACED IN AN AMBULANCE AND DRIVEN TO AIRSTRIP. - 13.00HRS LIGHT PLANE LANDED AND EVACUATED THE IOR.
16.00 HRS BURMESE CONCERT PART OF DANCING GIRLS WITH ACCOMPANYING BAND ARRIVED AT BILLET AS ARRANGED BY CAPT ARRINDELL ON 16 MARCH AND GAVE A SHOW LASTING ONE AND A HALF HOURS. 9 BRIGADE SECTION - HAVILDAR JOGINDAR SINGH AND TWO L/NAIKS FLEW INTO MEIKTILA LL 2933 WITH PART OF 9 BDE 12.00HRS.
MAY 19 9 BRIGADE SECTION VISITED BY LT SMITH OC DET 4 CORPS PRO UNIT AT MEIKTILA LL 2933 WHO REQUIRED SOME AID FOR TRAFFIC CONTROL DUTIES - POINTSMEN DETAILED - REMAINDER SGT GODLEY’S SECTION FLOWN IN TO MEIKTILA LL 2933 - MP/2638 HAVILDAR JOGINDAR SINGH WOUNDED BY SHELLFIRE WHILST ON DUTY, EVACUATED TO BASE HOSPITAL.
MAR 28 IRRAWADDY.
APR 3 CAPT HOPKINS SOUTH STAFFS ARRIVES.
SEP 5 SINGAPORE.
NOV 3 EC6341 CAPT J HAMILTON BOARDED LST 380 FOR JAVA.
THIS IS A VERY DETAILED DIARY.
WO 172/6985 7 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945.
JAN 26 RSM REPORTS TO APM AND REVERTS TO CQMS. MAJ W C BOYLE APM 15 PUNJAB REGT.
FEB 1 KYIN TO PAUL.
FEB 12 2 OFFICERS AND 25 BRITISH OTHER RANKS ATTACHED TO UNIT FROM 167 HAA REGT RA. OC CAPT J D CAMPBELL.
MAR 10 RSM VOLLER ARRIVED.
MAY 29 ALLAMAYO CAPT W M HEWITT TO DAPM PORTS CALCUTTA.
JUN30 CAPT Y A NANJIANI 2 I/C.
SEP 1 RANGOON, PEGU ROAD.
SEP 5 CAPT MUSCAMP HELD IN CLOSE ARREST.
SEP 7. BANCOCK
SEP 10 RSM MARSDEN ARRIVES . .
WO 172/6995 17 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945
JAN RANCHI CAPT E A W BONNY OC, CAPT G T HAIMES 2 I/C. APM CAPT LITTLEBOY
JAN 3 NEW HEADDRESS (FIELD SERVICE BERET IN OLIVE GREEN CALLED HATS RIDICULOUS BY TROOPS).
JAN 17 DIMAPUR, 14 PALEL ROAD.
FEB 1 IMPHAL
FEB 22 RSM CROSS ARRIVES FROM 14 INDIAN DIV.
FEB 23 COLUMN MACHINE GUNNED BY 1 JAP FIGHTER, 2 VEHICLE CASUALTIES.
MAR 1 MEIKTILA AREA.
MAR 4 MEIKTILA CIVIL POLICE ACCOMPANIED PRO TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OF CIVILIANS (CAPT FORD SUPERINTENDING POLICE). MILITARY POLICE POST ESTABLISHED IN CENTRE OF TOWN WITH CIVIL AND MILITARY POLICE. ALL BUILDING AND ENEMY SUPPLY DUMPS DECLARED OUT OF BOUNDS AND LOOTING PROHIBITED. CIVIL POLICE CHECK ALL CIVILIANS ENTERING TOWN AND THEY ARE TOLD TO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE TOWN LIMITS.
MANY ENEMY DEAD IN STREETS, BUILDING AND BUNKERS AND THE SMELL OF DEAD BODIES AWFUL. PROVOST PATROLS SENT THROUGH TOWN TO CHECK LOOTING AND REPORT ON ENEMY SUPPLY AND AMMUNITION DUMPS AND TO BRING IN ENEMY PAPERS AND EQUIPMENT ETC.
12.00 HRS 63 BRIGADE, ROYAL ARTILLERY AND DIV HQ MOVE INTO TOWN. PROVOST SIGNALS LAID LINE FROM TOWN MP POST TO PRO HQ AND APM. (1 ½ MILES).
POW CAGE NOW ESTABLISHED IN DISUSED BUILDING AT PRO HQ.
MAR 5 2 JAPS AND 5 JIFS PUT IN CAGE. JIFS WERE INDIANS FIGHTING FOR JAPANESE IN INDIAN LIBERATION ARMY. 10 POW’S FLOWN OUT.
MAR 6 1 CHINESE AND 1 BURMESE PUT IN CAGE. 9 POW’S FLOWN OUT. 1 JAP FOUND IN TOWN BY OC UNIT, RESISTED CAPTURE AND SHOT. 1 JAP OFFICER’S SWORD TAKEN. 2 JAPS FOUND IN BUNKER BY PRO - KILLED TRYING TO ESCAPE.
ONE JAP FROM CURFEW TAKEN PRISONER BY RSM SIMPSON.
MAR 8 1 BURMESE HANDED OVER TO DISTRICT COMMISSIONER MEIKTILA (LT/COL EDGELY) WHO TOOK OVER WHEN TOWN WAS TAKEN.
2 JAPS IN A BUNKER WOULD NOT COME OUT SO APM MAJOR LITTLEBOY THREW IN A GRENADE, NO FURTHER MOVEMENT.
MAR 9 1 GURKHA (FROM ENEMY TERRITORY - FORMERLY ⅓ GURKHA RIFLES OF 17 DIV 1942) PUT IN POW CAGE. 2 POW’S FLOWN OUT.
10 MAR 10 13 INA AND 1 BURMESE SUE YA AND JEMEDAR BURMA REGT AHMED PUT IN CAGE.
MAR 11 2 INA AND 1 BURMESE PUT IN CAGE. 15 POW FLOWN OUT.
APR 1 RSM SIMPSON FLOWN OUT TO PRO SCHOOL, CHITTAGONG, RECOMMENDED FOR COMMISSION.
APR 11 12.00HRS PYAWBWE L/CPL ROTHERHAM AND L/NAIK CHANDRABAHADIN 48 BDE DETACHMENT JEEP BLOWN UP ON LAND MINE ON ENTERING PYAWBWE. L/CPL ROTHERHAM KILLED AND L/NAIK CHANDRABAHADIN SERIOUSLY INJURED. 1 X 3 TON LORRY BLOWN UP BY MINE ON MAIN ROAD IN TOWN.
13.00HRS 5 DIV MOVED THROUGH TO YAMETHIN - TAIL OF CONVOY CLEARED LEVEL CROSSING IN PYAWBWE 22.00HRS AND HARBOURED FOR NIGHT. HEAVY RAIN AT 20.30HRS AND 1 CARRIER BLOWN UP BY LARGE MINE IN MAIN ROAD.
APR 12 2 JAPS IN CAGE. MORE OF 5 DIV MOVED THROUGH. CONVOYS STARTED TO MEIKTILA FOR SUPPLIES.
APR 13 9 POW’S EVACUATED. 2 JIFS, 1 SUMATRAN PUT IN CAGE. MORE 5 DIV MOVED THROUGH. 4 CORPS PRO UNIT ARRIVED. RSM CROSS INVESTIGATED REPORT OF 2 JAPS WOUNDED IN VICINITY. RESISTED CAPTURE AND SHOT BY RSM
APR 26 DIV MOVED TO NYAUNGLEBIN MILESTONE 99.
APR 27 12 JAPS, 1 CHINESE, 1 INDIAN PUT IN CAGE. 8 JAPS PUT IN CAGE, 7 PRISONERS EVACUATED. DIV MOVED TO MILESTONE 74. HAVILDAR DILBAHADUR (48 BDE DETACHMENT INJURED WHILE DOING DUTY AT DIVERSION IN DARKNESS. L/CPL PRITCHARD (82 ANTI/TANK REGT) ATTACHED TO PROVOST ON PATROL RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM
A BURMAN THAT 6 JAPS WERE NEARBY, HE ORGANISED A PARTY ON THE SPOT TO DEAL WITH THEM. ALL JAPS WERE KILLED.
L/CPL WELFORD ON MOTORCYCLE PATROL SNIPED NEAR TOUNGOO.
ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL WITH NECK WOUND. MOTORCYCLE OK.
L/CPL LEAKE INFORMED BY INLA MEN THAT A JAP WAS IN THE VICINITY, HE
WENT OUT AND BROUGHT HIM IN. 2 JAPS IN CAGE.
DIV MOVED TO MILESTONE 66. PETROL SITUATION CRITICAL.
5 MAY 5 BLACK CAT NOW TO BE WORN AND PAINTED ON VEHICLES. (A SIDE VIEW OF A BLACK CAT ON GREEN WAS THE DIVISIONAL SIGN).
29 JUN 29 70876 MAJ M P HOPKINS SOUTH STAFFS NEW APM.
LOTS OF JAP PRISONERS.
SEP 12 MAJ ROTTON APM 505 DISTRICT VISITS.
OCT 18 MAJ BREWER NEW APM 17 DIV. CQMS BEDDOWS.
NOV 1 MOULMANE LT C G BENNETT. LT D CY STYLES
NOV 20 RSM DIXON NEW RSM FROM 20 DIV.
WO 172/7006 19 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT MAR-DEC 1945.
1 MAR 1 SINGU. 300970 CAPT F W WOODS, DEVONSHIRE REGT, 164622 CAPT F N NICKLIN, WORCESTERSHIRE REGT, 2 I/C.
MAR 2 COY DUTY IN PERIMETER DEFENCE.
MAR 6 177600 CAPT K N INGHAM, SOMERSET LIGHT INFANTRY REPORT FOR DUTY FROM TRAINING CENTRE, DEPOT CMP(I) SECUNDEREBAD.
MAR 9 17.15HRS NADA 6 POSTS MANNED ALL NIGHT, 3913608 L/CPL OWENS J KILLED ONE JAP WITH BREN GUN AND IS IN PROUD POSSESSION OF HIS FLAG.
MAR 14 10.00HRS CAPT’S NICKLIN AND INGHAM RECCE SITE FOR NEW DAKOTA AIR STRIP APPROX 2,000 NORTH EAST OF KABAING.
MAR 16 CPL DENNIS ARRIVES AT NEW AIR STRIP WITH SUB SECTION OF PROVOST.
MAR 20 12.00HRS FORT DUFFERIN FELL, FLAG HOISTED ON WALL.
16.00HRS ALL AVAILABLE PRO RUSHED TO FORT DUFFERIN TO CHECK LOOTING AND ESTABLISH CHECKPOINT ON GATES. APM MAJ F W WOODS, RSM CATLING.
MAR 26 MONTHLY CONFIDENTIAL REPORT WITH HEADINGS: OFFICERS
REPORTED, CHARGES AND REPORT, PRISONERS, DEFICIENCIES ON W.E.T, COMMENTS BY APM: THE UNIT AS A WHOLE IS DOING STERLING WORK AND KEEPING UP ITS GOOD RECORD.
29 APR 29 16.30HRS TOUNGOO. DIV HQ AREA SHELLED, 1 DIRECT HIS ON NO1. SECTION BILLETS, NO CASUALTIES. 17.00HRS CAPT K N INGHAM ADMITTED TO HOSPITAL.
MAY 1 STANDING ORDER FOR ALARM POST & “STAND TO” DURING THE PERIOD THE DIVISION IS EMPLOYED IN ITS PRESENT ROLE IT IS WELL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF POSSIBILITY THAT THE COY. AREA MAY BE SUBJECT TO HOSTILE ENEMY ACTION. THIS IS MOST LIKELY IN THE NATURE OF “JITTER PARTIES”, OR FROM PARTIES OF JAP STRAGGLERS ENDEAVOURING TO REGAIN THEIR UNITS. HOWEVER THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN ORGANISED ENEMY ATTACK CANNOT BE RULED OUT. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT EACH MAN KNOWS EXACTLY WHAT HE WOULD DO AND WHERE HE SHOULD GO IN THE EVENT OF ENEMY ACTION.
(DIARY THEN BROKEN DOWN INTO PARAGRAPHS). ENEMY AIR ACTION, SHELLING, ENEMY GROUND ACTION. (LAST NOTE) SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY FOR THIS UNIT TO OPEN FIRE, A REASONABLE PROPORTION OF “BODIES” FOR ROUNDS EXPENDED WILL BE EXPECTED.
MAY 4 15.00HRS OC CAPT NICKLIN, RSM, CQMS AND PARTY ATTENDED THE FUNERAL OF THE LATE 2 I/C CAPT K N INGHAM.
MONTHLY CONFIDENTIAL REPORT BROKEN DOWN INTO THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS: OFFICERS REPORTED, DRESS OR’S, SALUTING, DRUNKENNESS, IN TRANSIT, CHARGES & REPORTS, VD, PRISONERS, ASSAULTS & AFFRAYS, RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMY & CIVILIANS, LOSSES & RECOVERIES, MT DISCIPLINE, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, SPECIAL CHECKS CARRIED OUT. ROAD REPORT, CASES REPORTED AND UNDER INVESTIGATION, REPATRIATION, MATTERS OF INTEREST, REMARKS BY APM. (REPORT GIVES A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE DUTIES CARRIED OUT BY THE UNIT) 5 PAGES LONG.
JUL 30 7684846 RSM DOBSON N NEW RSM FROM 12 ARMY PRO UNIT VICE 7698002 RSM BROOKER W TO 4 CORPS PRO UNIT
AUG 3 06.00 TOUNGOO FIRING PARTY, APM MAJ F W WOODS, OC CAPT H N NICKLIN AND RSM PROCEED TO CIVIL JAIL TOUNGOO TO CARRY OUT EXECUTION OF TWO CIVILIANS.
AUG 3 RSM AND SGT SHERLOCK PROCEED TO 52 FIELD AMBULANCE TO INVESTIGATE A SHOOTING, EMPLOYED TAKING STATEMENTS. 323858 LT V CLAISSE ROYAL WEST KENT REGT.
AUG 5 SUB SIS RAM INVESTIGATES SELLING OF WD PROPERTY TO CIVILIANS.
OCT 1 RSM REED NEW RSM, CAPT G NIMSE POSTED IN (CAPT NIMSE WROTE A BOOK “TAKE WHAT YOU WANT” ISBN 1-85389-372-2 pbk A FICTIONAL STORY BASED ON HIS TIME IN BURMA WITH THE CMP(I).
WO 172/7020 20 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-OCT 1945
JAN 1 HPAUNGZEIK CAPT M BIRCH OC.
JAN 20 KADO
MAR 1 ALLACAPPA. CAPT R F HARRISON ESSEX REGT, CAPT K H FILLINGHAM RA (POSTED TO 73 L OF C PRO UNIT 23/7/1945).
JUL 23 186682 CAPT I A MCKENZIE RA NEW OC.
AUG 18 326245 LT J WATTS RA.
SEP 16 14.30 OC TO CIVIL JAIL FOR EXECUTION REHEARSAL.
SEP 17 05.30HRS OC AND ESCORT TO CIVIL JAIL TO CARRY OUT EXECUTION OF INDIAN OTHER RANK.
AUG 21 THARAWADDY. RSM COCKREM POSTED IN.
OCT 7 SAIGON.
WO 172/7032 23 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN 1945
JAN 1 79795 RSM P WATSON. MAJ L C BEECHER APM.
WO 172/7042 25 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-APR 1945
JAN 1 AKYAB. CAPT E R BURNISTON MAJ F W E H RUSHMAN ROYAL FUSILIERS.
JAN 26 MYEBON. BEACH DUTIES.
FEB 15 PARTY OF 5 BRITISH OTHER RANKS AND 7 INDIAN OTHER RANKS PROCEED TO HQ 53 BRIGADE TO TAKE PART IN BEACH LANDING AT RUYWA.
FEB 25 UNIT EMBARK MEYGON BEACH TO RUYWA.
APR 1 UNIT EMBARK AKYAB.
APR 5 UNIT DISEMBARK MADRAS.
WO 172/7054 26 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-JULY 1945
JAN 1 COLABA. 180077 CAPT C R BULLER. KINGS REGT OC 30/10/1944 URDU SPEAKER.
177681 CAPT J M SYMINGTON, CAMERONIANS, 30/12/44, URDU SPEAKER
JAN 17 CHITTAGONG.
JAN 21 RAMREE ISLAND
FEB 27 AQ VISITS UNIT HQ AND REMARKS THAT PROVOST WERE LOOKED UPON AS A “SHINING EXAMPLE”.
MAR 4 SHOWN BY GEORGE FORMBY.
APR 8 MINBYN.
MAY 7 RANGOON.
JUN 10 VADIGENHALLI.
JUL 1 MAJ C R BULLER BECOMES APM.
JUL 29 MP/728 L/NAIK JOHAR SINGH REDUCED TO RANK OF SEPOY AND SENTENCED TO 28 DAYS DETENTION FOR THEFT.
WO 172/7061 36 DIV PRO UNIT JAN-JUL 1945
JAN 1 KATHA
JAN 11 TO KUNCHAUNG. CAPT J P FORREST BALUCH REGT OC.
JAN 15 TO KOTA. MEPACRINE PARADE (ANTI-MALARIA TABLETS).
JAN 28 TO BAHE.
FEB 18 TO MAHLANINGGON
MAR 2 TO LAWA. CAPT D R A WEBB.
MAR 12 TO MONGMIT. JAP POW TAKEN INTO CUSTODY.
MAR 21 TO MOGOK. 1 JAP POW SENT BACK TO MONGMIT.
APR 1 TO MANSAW. 2 I/C AND PARTY TO MANDALAY.
APR 1 TO KUME. LT WEBB AND PART RETURN..
APR 19 2 I/C LEAVES TO SIGN ROAD TO MANDALAY - KYAUKSE.
APR 24 TO MEIKTILA. CAPT A R JONES.
JUL 30 TO URULI.
WO 172/7070 44 INDIAN AIRBORNE DIV PRO UNIT JULY-NOV 1945
JUL 1 CAPT S ANDERSON. CAPT WH DAWSON, MAJ H T WILSON APM.
WO 172/7146 254 INDIAN TANK BDE PRO UNIT JAN-MAY 1945
JAN 1 KELEWA, YE-U RA, MUTAIK 16035 CAPT D A NEWTON RA TO 20 DIV PRO UNIT.19/4/1945.
FEB 1 SHOWEBO, BURMA.
MAR 10 MANDALAY
APR 1 MYBTHA.
APR 17 LT F STOKES RA ARRIVES, NEW OC.
MAY 13 PROME.
WO 172/7187 SPECIAL FORCE PRO UNIT JAN-MAY 1945
APR 15 JHANSI 95815 CAPT B S DREW, EAST SURREY REGT OC.
APR 17 CALCUTTA. 11068 LT R RIMMER 8 PUNJAB REGT POSTED IN.
MAY 29 CHITTAGONG.
WO 172/7230 APM NORTH BURMA AREA OCT-DEC 1945
JHANSI. CAPT B S DREW (95815) EAST SURREY AND LT R RIMMER (11058) 8 PUNJAB.
JAN 16 103 RIFLES MK III DRAWN FROM ADOS SAUGOR.
FEB 18 4500 MEPACRINE TABLETS ISSUED TO UNIT FROM IDMS JHANSI
APR 1 JHANSI.
APRIL 17 MOVE TO CALCUTTA DEULA CAMP.
MAY 28 MOVE TO CHITTAGONG.
OCT 16 MIKTILA. MAJ A E IRIVING APM 505 DISTRICT.
OCT 21 81 & 82 L OF C PRO UNITS PERFORMING DUTIES DURING ARMY COMMANDERS TOUR, 19-20 OCT. NOV 15 MAJ IRIVING TO APM 19 INDIAN DIVISION.
NOV 29 MAJ W M JONES NEW APM.
DEC 10 81 L OF C PRO UNIT DISBANDED. 82 L OF C PRO UNIT STILL OPERATING.
DIARY MOSTLY CONTAINS NO. RANK AND NAMES OF MOVEMENTS AND POSTINGS.
WO 172/9195 61 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945
JAN 6 CAPT A S VERMAN ARRIVES FROM 82 L OF C PRO UNIT.
JAN 7 RSM BARNET ARRIVED FROM 81 L OF C PRO UNIT.
FEB 7 MURDER IN GWALIOR PONY COY. CAPT B J COLE DEALING.
FEB 9 MAJ PETRIE APM 202 L OF C AREA ARRIVES.
FEB 17/18 TRIPLE DEATHS IN SHOOTING AFFRAY AT DIS ROAD CAGE. INVESTIGATED BY CAPT VERMA.
MAY 5 TRAIN ACCIDENT REPORTED BY NCO I/C LUMBING DETACHMENT, 13 DEAD, 1 BRITISH OTHER RANK AND 12 INDIAN OTHER RANKS. RSM BARNES ARRIVES.
WO 172/9196 66 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-JUL 1945
JAN 1 SHILLONG CAPT D A BEATTIE.
JAN 29 RSM GATLING TO 19 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT.
APR CAPT G B JACK, RSM WOOD.
WO 172/9197 73 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-NOV 1945
JAN 1 RAMU. 164728 CAPT T A V DENTON, DORSET REGT.
CAPT I A MCKENZIE RA.
JAN 10 LT NETTELL ARRIVES
MAR 20 AKYAB. RSM BEASLEY TO 77 L OF C PRO UNIT, CSM BURTON PROMOTED.
JUN 20 BODY OF A ROYAL MARINE OFFICER RECOVERED FROM CREEK, TAKEN TO 95 INDIAN GENERAL HOSPITAL. DROWNED.
JUL 25. CAPT FILLINGHAM NEW OC.
WO 172/9198 81 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945
JAN 1 IMPHAL. CAPT I R WARD. RSM BARNES POSTED TO 66 L OF C PRO UNIT.
JAN 12 23.20 L/CPL BROWN, 118 L OF C PRO UNIT REPORTS THAT A 15CWT VEHICLE OF THIS UNIT HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT. ONE OF THE OCCUPANTS AND ANOTHER TWO SERIOUSLY INJURED. CHECKED AND FOUND TO BE L/NAIK’S TEJA SINGH AND PYARA SINGH OF THIS UNIT. L/NAIK MAHBOOB OF 628 INDIAN SUPPLY SECTION. L/NAIK PYARA SINGH DIES LATER.
JAN 14 SUBADAR SANDHURA SINGH AND PARTY OF INDIAN OTHER RANKS TO ADMIN COMMANDANT TO COLLECT BODY OF L/NAIK PYARA SINGH FOR CREMATION.
JAN 16 VISIT OF MAJOR DOCTOR PROVOST MARSHAL US ARMY AIR FORCE IN INDIA WITH A VIEW TO POSTING A SECTION OF USMP TO IMPHAL.
JAN 18 COURT OF ENQUIRY HELD AT THIS HQ RE DEATHS OF L/NAIK PYARA SINGH AND TEJA SINGH OF THIS UNIT AND L/NAIK MAHBOOB BEG OF 628 INDIAN SUPPLY SECTION. JEMADAR MISRA REPORTS AS REP OF 628 SUPPLY SECTION, RIASC. ON THE COURT.
JAN 25 UNIT KIT SALE IN RESPECT OF KIT (PERSONAL) POSSESSIONS OF LATE L/NAIK PYARA SINGH.
JUL 1 MANDALAY UNIT WAR ESTABLISHMENT I/376/1 HQ. 1 BRITISH AND 3 INDIAN SECTIONS. CAPT WARD OC. DAPM CAPT E A W BONNY DAPM 253 L OF C SUB AREA DEPARTS UNIT HQ FOR MEKTILA PROCEEDING TO UK ON REPATRIATION.
JUL 11 COLONEL THAN CHINESE LIAISON OFFICER, US 1ST ARMY ARRIVED AT UNIT HQ, ASKS FOR ASSISTANCE IN APPREHENDING 4 CHINESE DESERTERS BELIEVED LIVING IN CHINATOWN, MANDALAY. 14.30 HRS RAID CARRIED OUT BY OC, 2 BOR’S AND 3 IOR’S WITH CIVIL POLICE ON AHKYU HOTEL CHINATOWN, MANDALAY, CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES RECOVERED. 5 C.A.S.(B) DRIVERS ARRESTED AND HANDED OVER TO CIVIL POLICE.
JUL 12 VISIT OF CAPT. MCMINN OC 700 MP COY APO 218, US FORCES RE WITHDRAWING OF AMERICAN MP’S FROM MAYMYO.
JUL 14 4 CHINESE C.A.S.(B) PERSONNEL REMANDED BY CIVIL COURT FOR 7 DAYS ARRESTED IN RAID ON AHKYU HOTEL 11/7/1945. LT CHISLETT ARRIVES.
DEC 12 UNIT TO AMALGAMATE WITH 82 L OF C PRO UNIT.
WO 172/9199 82 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945.
JAN DIBRUGARH, ASSAM CAPT F LINETON OC. CAPT G B JACK 5 MAHRATTA LIGHT INFANTRY. MAJ SHEATH APM 36 DIVISION.
APR 14 22.00HRS L/NAIK IMAN DIN DIED DUE TO A MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT.
APR 15 IMAN DIN BURIED IN MOHD CEMETERY DIBRAGASH.
NOV 23 1 L/CPL DETAILED TO CONVEY A RIFLE AND BULLETS TO CALCUTTA TO OBTAIN EXPERT OPINION REGARDING MURDER CASE AT KYAUKTAING VILLAGE.
DEC 12 81 L OF C PRO UNIT AMALGAMATES WITH 82 L OF C PRO UNIT.
DEC 29 CAPT LINETON TO DAPM 253 SUB AREA.
WO 172/9200 83 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-SEPT 1945.
JAN CHITTAGONG CAPT J M HAY. RA. CAPT E C BRADBURY.
JAN 3 A RIFLE COY OF LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS ATTACHED TO UNIT FAP TO ASSIST IN ABNORMAL PRO OPS.
MAR 28 VEHICLE FITTED WITH LOUD HAILERS TO BROADCAST POLICE WARNINGS. 18.00HRS SLEEVES MUST BE ROLLED DOWN, ANTI-MALARIA DRIVE.
MAY 1 INFO RECEIVED FROM DHZI THAT PONTOON BRIDGE DHZI WILL BE CLOSED FROM 20.00HRS 1/5/1945 TO 06.00HRS 2/5/1945. LT BREE RA LEAVES FOR IMPHAL 2 I/C 118 L OF C PRO UNIT.
MAY 5 ARMS CHECK CARRIED OUT ON LEAVE TRAIN AT CHITTAGONG RAILWAY STATION. NO ILLEGAL ARMS OR EXCESS KIT FOUND.
MAY 8 MUTINY REPORTED FROM 49 WEST AFRICAN HOSPITAL. DAPM & CAPT HAY GO TO HOSPITAL. TROUBLE AROSE THROUGH 8 AFRICAN OTHER RANKS WHO WERE BEING TAKEN TO COMILLA FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION BEING “RESCUED” BY THEIR FRIENDS. THE UNIT AOR’S REFUSED TO HAND OVER THE CULPRITS. MATTER REFERRED TO SUB AREA COMMANDER.
MAY 9 REF 49 WA HOSPITAL. DAPM WITH 30 PROVOST PERSONNEL AND APPROX 150 BOR’S OF THE 4TH BORDER REGT PROCEED WITH SUB AREA COMMANDER TO 49 WA HOSPITAL. SUB AREA COMMANDER ORDERS 8 CULPRITS TO BE HANDED OVER. THEY ARE HANDED OVER AND TAKEN TO F.D.C. UNIT REMOVED TO FENI SAME DAY, SO AS TO BE AWAY FROM OTHER WA UNITS.
MAY 24 RSM ANDERSON E ARRIVES, RSM ALBERTSON J TO 5 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT.
WO 172/9201 84 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-AUG 1945
JAN 1 SHALLONG CAPT PULLMAN
DETAILS OF THEFTS, DRUNKS AND ABSENTEES.
WO 172/9202 94 INDIAN (BEACH MAINT) PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945
JAN 1 SS EKMA. CAPT V G DARLIN.
JAN 9 AKYAB
APR 24 SGT BALL DROWNED AT SEA DURING BATHING PARADE.
MAY 1 MINBYING
MAY 4 KYAUKAYU.
MAY 6 RANGOON.
MAY 17 MADRAS.
SEP 11 PORT SWETTENHAM. MALAYA.
OCT 20 SUMATRA.
WO 172/9203 95 IND. (BEACH MAINT) PRO UNIT JAN-NOV 1945
INDAW, BURMA CAPT M MATHIESON. CAPT R D BREWER.
JAN 10/12 AIRDROP.
JAN 22 YE-U, BURMA.
WO 172/9204 100 (BRITISH) IND PRO COY JAN-SEPT 1945
INDIA LOCATION NOT GIVEN.
LT J B O’REILLY, SOUTH LANCS REGT. 27/5/1945.
LT R W TICKLE RA 17/9/1945.
WO 172/9205 107 (BRITISH) L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-DEC 1945
NOV 1944 UNIT MOBILISED COLCHESTER FOR SERVICE OVERSEAS. TO LIVERPOOL, POLICE DUTIES ON BOARD SHIP TO BOMBAY.
DEC 6 KALYAN TRANSIT CAMP THEN BACK TO BOMBAY.
LIST OF NAMES: CAPT TEARMAN. CAPT F P SINCLAIR RA. LT HOBBES RA. MAJ KAYE APM. MAJ WILSON APM 44 INDIAN AIRBORNE DIV. CAPT L J SMART RA. CAPT J C A RYAN RA. LT COL E A FARMER DPM SOUTHERN ARMY. MAJ DAVENPORT APM 108 AREA.
CAPT W D HARRISON 12/1945.
WO 172/9206 118 (BRITISH) L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-OCT 1945
HQ LOCATION NOT SHOWN BUT JHANSI, SECUNDERABAD AND DOLALI MENTIONED. 176911 CAPT A R JONES, ESSEX REGT, 22/8/1944. LT J T E SHANNON, BORDER REGT 7/5/1945, 233536 CAP J S TANNER RA HAA 5/2/1945, 292798 LT W BREE RA HAA 29/4/1945, 193673 LT J ABBOTT BUFFS. 18/6/1945, 28956 LT W J BELL RA.
WO 172/9207 119 (INDIAN) L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-JUN 1945
KALEWA. CAPT R M WEATHERSTONE. MBE. RA.FORMERLY 106167 SGT RA.
WO 172/9208 121 PRO COY JAN-NOV 1945
BARASAT. 124288 CAPT E V CROMBIE RA DAPM 13/10/1944.
DEC 1944 GLASGOW TO BOMBAY TO CALCUTTA. 189356 LT E F ROBBINS DCLI. 13/10/1944. 73435 LT F D BUSHELL RA 13/10/1944. 320836 LT F DAWSON RAC,13/10/1944.
APR 1 - 30 1945 TOWN QUIET.
LT J SIMPSON ROYAL NORFOLK REGT. 20/4/1945.
WO 172/9209 112 L OF C PRO UNIT JAN-JUN 1945.
FROM KENT TO LIVERPOOL FOR SHIP.
FEB 5 ARRIVE MADRAS.
FEB 20 COIMBATORE. 304301 LT G T NALTY RA. 16/12/1944. 323062 LT T J LEE LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS. 19/11/1944. 315844 LT J F WALKER BLACK WATCH, 19/11/1944.
JUN 15 ARRIVE MADRAS.
WO 172/9210 123 PRO COY NOV-DEC 1944 JAN 1945.
NOV 25 1944 COY FORMED EAST GRINSTEAD. EMBARKATION LEAVE.
JAN 22 1945 COY EMBARKED LIVERPOOL. 50 CMP ON DUTY PER DAY.
WO 172/9211 124 UNIT (VP) CMP (I) JAN-DEC 1945
CAPT G W JACKSON.
MAR 282785 CAPT A G BAX ROYAL NORFOLK REGT (FORMERLY WOI CMP).
OCT CAPT TOKES.
WO 172/9212 3 INDIAN FD DETENTION CENTRE APR-MAY 1945
GHANATI. CAPT C D CLENNETT.
WO 172/9369 CEYLON BASE AREA PRO UNIT JAN-FEB AUG-DEC 1945
COLUMBO. CAPT J M FERGUSON OC 17/11/1943. LT H R HARRIS ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGT. 8/4/1944. MAJ D A NEWTON APM OFFICIATING OC COY. 29310 LT H CUNLIFFE KING’S REGT 27/12/1945.
AUG 15 VJ DAY BBC ANNOUNCED WAR OVER, SPECIAL PROVOST MEASURES PUT INTO FORCE. CINEMAS OPEN FREE TO TROOPS. BEHAVIOUR OF TROOPS REASONABLE.
SEPT 22 SGT AVERY REMOVED FROM SHIP AND PLACED UNDER CLOSE ARREST ON ORDERS OF APM ALFSEA.
OCT 24 CAPT HARRIS TO UK.
NOV 14 RSM C E COOKE POSTED TO CMP TRAINING SCHOOL, SINGAPORE.
DEC 27 CAPT CUNLIFFE, KINGS REGT TO BE NEW OC COLUMBO SUB AREA PRO COY.
WO 172/9428 HQ CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE CEYLON APR-DEC 1945
MAJ 153929 W A HEALD EAST LANCASHIRE REGT. OC HQ & TRG DEPOT 25/2/44
CAPT 149555 J P FORREST CAMERON HIGHLANDERS. DAPM PORT COY (CBO).22/4/1945
CAPT E A SHOTT RA OC VPP PORT COY (TCO). 23/2/1945
CAPT 373 W A SENPHAHCY CEYLON LIGHT INF. 10/2/44
CAPT 377 G F CELLAR CEYLON LIGHT INF 10/2/44
CAPT 394 E R P DE ZILVA CEYLON LIGHT INF 10/2/1944.
WO 172/9451 APM 11 (EAST AFRICAN) DIV SEAC JAN-DEC 1945
JAN BOOKAJAN, ASSAM
APR 14 CHAS, BIRHAR STATE INDIA. CAPT GUY OC LATER APM.
SEP RANCHI, BIHAR STATE. MAJ W G ATKEN.
WO 172/9557 APM 81 (WEST AFRICAN) DIV JAN-DEC 1945
CHIRINGA. 102577 MAJ E B MEE ROYAL SIGNALS. APM.
WO 172/9558 81 (WEST AFRICAN) DIV PRO COY JAN-DEC 1945
NOW 275 PRO COY WACMP.
CHIRINGA LT S W B ADMANS GEN LIST 21/11/1944. LT K H NASH ROYAL BERKSHIRE REGT 1/12/1944. LT A J LYONS RECCE CORPS 10/2/1945.
MAR 13 RENIGUNTA LT J H COATES WORCESTERSHIRE REGT 25/4/1945. LT B E DAWES RECCE CORPS 17/10/1945.
LT A C LENNIE ROYAL SCOTS 7/11/1945.
WO 172/9712 5 WEST AFRICAN MILITARY PRISON JAN-DEC 1945
CAPT G P MULLINS RA COMMANDANT 23/1/1945.
CAPT H T C MARCH DCLI 15/7/1945. CAPT P BARBER RA 15/9/1945.
CAPT K MADDOX SOUTH STAFFS REGT 10/10/1945.
WO 172/9771 12 ARMY PRO UNIT BURMA COMMAND JAN-FEB 1946
RANGOON. CAPT F BELL.
JAN 3 AREA COMMANDERS JEEP STOLEN.
JAN 4 LT GEN SIR MILES DEMPSEY KCB, DSO, MC C IN C AFSEA ARRIVED IN RANGOON, ESCORT PROVIDED
JAN 15 GEN SIR ROLAND F ADAMS MT KCB, DSO, OBE ARRIVED, ESCORT PROVIDED.
JAN 17 ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN GC VO KCB DSO ADC ARRIVES ESCORT PROVIDED.
JAN 27 BRIGADIER GENERAL TIMBERMAN US ARMY PROVIDED WITH ESCORT.
JAN 29 GEN SIR MONTAGUE STOPFORD KBE, CB, DSO MC PROVIDED WITH ESCORT.
FEB 3 12 MEN POSTED IN FROM EAST YORKSHIRE REGIMENT.
FEB 17 19 ATTACHED MEN TO ALFSEA TRAINING SCHOOL CMP SINGAPORE FOR TRAINING.
FEB 20 UNIT NOW 130 L OF C PRO UNIT CMP (I).
FEB 25 CAPT VIVERS JR KOSB TAKES OVER A OC.
WO 172/9787 PROVOST BRANCH MALAYA COMMAND JAN 1946
SINGAPORE. CAPT K DAVIS RAC OC 17/1/1946.
JAN 4 CAPT MCPHERSON DISCHARGED FROM 47 BRITISH GENERAL HOSPITAL AND TOOK COMMAND.
JAN 6 COMPANY TOOK PART IN PARADE TO DECORATE GUERILLA LEADERS. ORDERS RECEIVED TO DESPATCH 3 INDIAN OR’S TO 15 INDIAN CORPS PRO UNIT IN BORNEO.
JAN 17 LT DAVENPORT S ATTACHED TO THIS UNIT RECEIVED ORDERS FROM PM’S OFFICE TO RAISE ONE BRITISH OR SECTION WHICH IS TO PROCEED TO BORNEO. 1 SGT, 1 CPL, 17 L/CPL’S. CAPT K DAVIS, RAC NEW OC.
JAN 18 ORDERS RECEIVED TO PROVIDE 5 NCO’S TO ACT AS GUARDS AND COURT ORDERLIES FOR JAP ATROCITY TRIALS BEGINNING JAN 21.
JAN 21 JAP ATROCITY WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 7 NCO’S FROM THIS UNIT ON DUTY.
JAN 24 COMMENDATION RECEIVED FROM SENIOR LEGAL OFFICER ALFSEA RE MANNER IN WHICH DUTIES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED BY MEN AT WAR CRIME TRIAL.
JAN 28 NEW INTER SERVICE POLICE SYSTEM COMMENCED IN SINGAPORE.
JAN 30 LT BENNETT AND 1 L/CPL FROM THIS UNIT ESCORS SIR ARCHIBALD CLARKE KERR.
WO 172/9808 15 INDIAN CORPS PRO UNIT JAN-SEPT 1946
BATAVIA. CAPT D A BANKS OC
JAN 2 OC, 2 I/C AND MEMBERS OF UNIT ASSISTED BATAVIA FIRE BRIGADE TO PUT OUT LARGE FIRE IN MEESTER CORNELLIS.
JAN 7 2 I/C INVESTIGATED ROBBERY AT PHOTOGRAPH SHOP. 4 BOR’S OF 789 AIR DESPATCH UNIT ARRESTED.
JAN 8 CORPS PRO AND DIV PRO RELIEVE 5 PARA BRIGADE IN MOUNTING GUARD OVER 61 JAVANESE AND MR SHARIA INDONESIAN PRIME MINISTER’S HOUSE.
JAN 9 STOLEN JEEP RECOVERED FROM AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP.
JAN 10 JAPANESE CAPT TAKEN FROM GLODOK JAIL AND FLOWN TO SINGAPORE.
JAN 11 GERMAN PRISONERS REMOVED FROM GLODOK TO ONDRUST ISLAND. UNIT ESCORT GENERAL SIR MILES DEMPSEY.
JAN 12 OC, 2 I/C AND UNIT PERSONNEL ASSISTED FIRE BRIGADE IN OUTBREAK OF FIRE. UNIT PERSONNEL SIGNED AND ARRANGED TC FOR FOOTBALL MATCH BETWEEN RAF AND BATAVIA CIVILIANS.
JAN 13 NAVAL PROVOST MARSHAL INJURED IN TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, TO CASUALTY CLEARING STATION.
RSM & SUBADAR RECOVERED ABSENTEE FROM SENNEN AREA.
JAN 14 2 I/C ATTENDED MEETING OF ANTI-INTIMIDATION COMMITTEE AT 23 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT.
JAN 15 2 INDIAN OR’S ESCAPE FROM INDONESIANS, TAKEN INTO SAFE CUSTODY.
JAN 16 LT TAYLOR TO CLASS B RELEASE. LT COLLINS TOOK OVER GLONDOK JAIL. 15 INDIAN OR’S PROCEED ON 61 DAYS LEAVE TO INDIA.
JAN 21 SUBADAR AND INDIAN OR’S FROM UNIT ASSISTED IN SEARCH OF SAVAR BAZAR AREA.
FEB 4 LT BROWN ARRIVED EX SINGAPORE TO COMPLETE W E.
FEB 6 UNIT PERSONNEL UNDER CPL ISAAC INVESTIGATED MURDER OF INDIAN CIVILIAN.
FEB 7 LIAISON VISIT WITH DUTCH MILITARY POLICE COMMANDER. DISTURBANCE IN BROTHEL AREA INVESTIGATED, 2 ARRESTS MADE.
FEB 9 INDONESIAN PRINTING PRESS WORKS INSPECTED FOR JAPANESE CURRENCY.
FEB 11 RAID BY UNIT PERSONNEL ON BROTHEL AREA. MIXED PATROLS WITH DUTCH MP’S STARTED.
FEB 14 SUB AUTAR SINGH SHOT WHILST DISARMING BOR AND ADMITTED TO 67 IGH.
FEB 16 2 MERCHANT SEAMAN REPORTED ABSENT ARRESTED AND RETURNED TO SS OCEAN VISCOUNT.
FEB 17 CHINESE SHOT BY AMBONESE , 2 MEN DETAINED.
FEB 26 L/NK RATTAN SING AND W/C LALL DIN AWARDED 28 DAYS RI AND SENT TO 5 INDIAN FDC.
FEB 27 2 I/C INVESTIGATED REPORTS OF 5 MISSING BOR’S - RETURNED TO TRANSIT CAMP. BOR ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH SHOOTING AFFRAY.
FEB 28 DAPM AND RSM INVESTIGATED REPORTS OF IMPRISONED IOR’S (REPORTS CONNECTED WITH KIDNAPPING).
AUG 27 UNIT CONFINED TO LINES AND STAND BY BECAUSE OF INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY FESTIVAL. ONE BODY FOUND (CHINESE BOY), HANDED OF TO CIVIL POLICE.
AUG 29 ALL MUSLIMS IN UNIT HAVE HOLIDAY TO CELEBRATE FESTIVAL OF I.D. (EDE).
AUG 30 UNIT CONTINGENT PRESENT FOR PRACTICE PARADE FOR QUEEN WILHELMINA’S BIRTHDAY PARADE.
AUG 31 UNIT SUPPLIES CONTINGENT FOR ABOVE PARADE.
WO 172/9821 2 DIV PRO COY MAY-SEPT 1946
MAY 8 CAPT D MACKAY RA 5/9/1945, DEPARTS 8/5/1946
CAPT J L JONES KING’S REGT 8/5/46 ASSUMES COMMAND
LT J HEWAT BLACK WATCH 22/3/1946.
MARCH 3 LT J HEWAT BLACK WATCH (360369) POSTED IN
MAY 12 LT BROWN + 1 SECTION PROCEED TO MALACCA. LT HEWAT + 1 SECTION PROCEED TO SEREMBAN
MAY 14 LT BROWN RETURNS FROM MALACCA BRINGING COY TRANSPORT FROM KUALA LUMPUR.
MAY 20 RECEIVED INFORMATION CONCERNING JEEP 34156 WHICH HAS ON 2 OCCASIONS BEEN INVOLVED IN ARMED HOLDUPS, UNABLE TO TRACE BUT BELIEVED ON CHARGE TO ROYAL NAVY.
MAY 27 COURT OF ENQUIRY INTO TRANSACTIONS AND IRREGULARITIES OF 2 DIV PRO COY IMPREST ACCOUNT. PRESIDENT MAJ JACKSON DEVONS.
MAY 29 PROCEEDED TO SEREMBAN TO INVESTIGATE A MATTER CONCERNING SGT HASTINGS, NCO I/C DET AND A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, MR WRIGHT, REGISTRAR OF VEHICLES NEGRI SEMBILAN. CAPT D MACKAY RA ARRIVES.
JUNE 1 LT HEWAT ARRIVES FROM KLUANG DET TO REPORT ON UNSATISFACTORY CONDITIONS WHICH PREVAIL THERE.
JUNE 8 KING’S BIRTHDAY PARADE KLUANG AIR STRIP.JUNE 11 CAPT A MITCHELL OC 2 DIV CONCERT PARTY REPORTED LOSS OF WD BLANKETS. CASE BEING INVESTIGATED.
JUNE 13 AFW 3012 RECEIVED READING QUOTE “STRENGTH INCREASE AND CLOSE ARREST 284159 CAPT MACKAY D RA TO BE BORNE ON STRENGTH OF 1 NORTHAMPTONSHIRE REGT WEF 6 JUNE 45. PLACED UNDER CLOSE ARREST WEF SAME DATE. AUTHY. 2 DIV SIGNAL NO. 81 DATED 8 JUNE 46. WICKER FURNITURE PURCHASED $93 FOR BENEFIT OF DETACHMENT AT KLUANG.
JUNE 15 CAPT SAUNDERS SIB PHONED ASKING FOR ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THE JEEP IN POSSESSION OF CAPT MACKAY. LOGBOOK OF THE JEEP FOUND AND SENT TO SIB.
JUNE 29 COURT OF INQUIRY INTO CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE CAPT MACKAY RA HAD POSSESSION OF WD JEEP. CAPT JONES, CAPT BROWN & L/CPL BLAIR WITNESSES.
JUN 16 CAPT MACKAY D RA TRANSFERRED TO STRENGTH OF 1 ROYAL SCOTS STILL UNDER CLOSE ARREST.
JUNE 18 14925386 CPL BARNES D, 14943578 L/CPL WEST T, 14943528 L/CPL ROBINSON W ATTACHED TO SIB.
JUNE 24 RECEIVED NOTICE FROM DIV HQ TO CHANCE DET AT SEREMBAN OVER.
JULY 4 RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM DAPM 555 SUB AREA THAT AS CHINESE
CIVILIAN LIVING AT SENAI HAD BEEN ISSUED WITH A SUBPOENA TO TO APPEAR BEFORE A WAR CRIMES COURT AT MALACCA. HAS HE HAND NOT
OBEYED THE ORDER CAPT BROWN TOOK HIM BY ROAD.
JULY 27 SGT JONES BROUGHT IN KEMPETAI SERGEANT MAJOR (JAP MILITARY POLICE). A WAR CRIMINAL WHO HAD ESCAPED SEVERAL DAYS PREVIOUSLY.
AUG 18 MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT SENT TO APM, INCLUDING REPORT ON REACTIONS OF TROOPS TO PARACHUTE REGT MUTINY AND COURT MARTIAL. LT J HEWAT BLACK WATCH, ATTACHED FOR TRAINING.
AUG 19 FGCM CAPT MACKAY HELD AT HQ 1 ROYAL SCOTS, JOHORE BAHRU.
AUG 21 EXPLOSION ON OUTSKIRTS OF TOWN, SGT DRIVER INVESTIGATED.
AUG 24 OC COMPANY VISITED MALACCA, ESCORTING JAP WAR CRIMINAL 2/LT OMOTO SHEIHAN.
SEPT 9 6 L/CPL’S TO ESCORT JAP WAR CRIMINAL SUSPECTS TO NEIGHBOURING TOWN FOR PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION PARADE.
SEPT 10 AS ABOVE ID PARADE.
SEPT 12 6 L/CPL’S ESCORTED 9 JAP WAR CRIME SUSPECTS TO KOTA TINGGI.
SEPT 16 LT SHORT, RAC (343040) POSTED IN.
SEPT 23 REPORT FROM TUNGKI AHMAW THAT LOOTING WAS BEEN CARRIED OUT ON PROPERTY BELONGING TO HIS HIGHNESS THE SULTAN OF JAHORE. INVESTIGATED.
SEPT 26 INVESTIGATING A REPORT FROM TUNGKI AHMED REGARDING LOOTING OF HIS ESTATE IN JOHORE BAHRU, 10 INDIAN OR’S APPREHENDED.
WO 172/9837 5 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN - FEB 1946
WO 172/9860 17 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-OCT 1946
MOULMEIN. CAPT F B TAYLOR RA. OC...
JUNE CAPT D C STYLES OX & BUCKS L I OC.
CAPT J S CALDER GORDON HIGHLANDERS 2 I/C.
WO 172/9847 7 INDIAN DIV PRO UNIT JAN-OCT 1946
FEB TO TAIPING.
WO 172/11083 95 INDIAN (BEACH MAINT) BDE PRO UNIT JAN-SEPT 1946
JAN 1 RANGOON AWAITING MOVE TO BANGKOK.
JAN 14 ARRIVE BANGKOK..
14830720 L/CPL D R BRIGGS DIED 22/10/1946.
WAR DIARY FINISHES SEPT 46.
END OF DIARIES
Original map showing crossing of the Irrawaddy River at Myitche
ALLIED LAND FORCES
SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND.
This manuscript of the PROVOST SERVICE in this theatre of operations is incomplete, many of the records being destroyed as a result of enemy action.
It is an extensive as present records permit, and has been mainly compiled from a few individual Provost Officers’ reports and experiences.
Very few original Provost Officers of 11th Army Group and 14th Army are left in South East Asia, and I have only been Provost Marshal, A.L.F. for the past three months. In view of these facts, considerable difficulty has been experienced in obtaining material for these records.
Allied Land Forces,
South East Asia.
20 October 1945
4 Corps Area. (March 1944)
4 Corps Provost Unit.
17 Indian Light Div Provost Unit.
20 indian Div Provost Unit.
23 Indian Div Provost Unit.
254 Indian Tank Bde. Provost Unit.
81 L of C Provost Unit.
118 L of C Provost Unit.
23 Corps Area
33 Corps Provost Unit.
2 Div Provost Unit.
19 Indian Div Provost Unit.
50 Tank Brigade Provost Unit.
41 Beach Group.
42 Beach Group.
43 Beach Group.
44 Beach Group.
45 Beach Group.
11 (East African) Provost Unit.
119 L. of C. Provost Unit.
15 Corps Area
15 Corps Provost Unit
26 Indian Div. Provost Unit.
7 Indian Div Provost Unit.
25 Indian Div Provost Unit.
5 Indian Div Provost Unit.
81 West African Div Provost Unit.
(Shown as 275 Div Pro Coy in Div History)
82 West African Div Provost Unit.
(Shown as 276 Div Pro Coy in Div History)
73 L. of C. Provost Unit.
Ceylon Army Command.
Ceylon Corps of Military Police consisting of 20 Sections dispersed as follows:-
14 in Colombo.
6 in Trincomalee.
124 V.P.P. Coy. (Kandy)
Columbo Sub-Area Provost Coy. (6 Sections)
Trincomalee Sub, Area Provost Coy. (3 Sections)
As will be seen from the following figures, the percentage of C.M.P. employed in this theatre of operations was exceedingly small.
Total Forces employed 757,023
Total C.M.P. employed 4,089
Percentage of C.M.P. % .54
(See appendices attached marked ‘A’ and ‘B’ for details).
In April 1945, there was a general increase in Provost sections throughout ALFSEA. Establishments were increased from two British and Four Indian sections, to three British and six Indian sections, for Army and Corps Provost Units. This is the only general increase that has been made.
Growth of resources, with the exception of the one instance, was nil. This was due to lack of equipment (chiefly suitable transport), and also replacements for personnel repatriated, etc. One extra company, 120 L. of C. Provost Company, arrived in July 1945.
Special Investigation Branch, ALFSEA.
This specialised Branch of the C.M.P. (I) was organised within South East Asia Command during April 1944. Prior to this date, S.I.B. duties were performed by the Provost Branch. No. 123 Section, S.I.B., became established and were attached to H.Q., 14th Army. Comilla.
Few S.I.B. personnel were available to bring this section up to strength, and it was not until September 1944 that this section became fully operative. During this period, detachments were opened in Ceylon, and at Chittagong and Gauhati, and sub-sections were operating in the forward areas.
At the end of the year, it became evident that the strength of S.I.B. was inadequate to cover the area that were being recovered by the advancing army, and as a result a new establishment was created in February 1945.
Group H.Q. was formed in H.Q. ALFSEA, having control of three sections within S/E/A.C. - 123, 200 and 201 sections. The original 123 section remained at Comilla to cover L. of C. Command, 200 Section moved forward with the 14th. Army, and 201 section was formed in Ceylon.
No. 200 section, which was formed within 14th. Army, went forward with the advancing troops from Imphal to Meiktila, and thence to Mandalay, where he H.W. was established for a short time. On the relief of Rangoon the section eventually became stabilised there, operating in the Dock area and outlying districts.
Special Force Provost Unit
On 25th oct. 1943, 70th Division Provost Company was redesignated Special Force Provost Company (part of Special Force under Major-General Ord Wingate).
By early November 1943, a new War Establishment for Special Force Provost had been drafted. It consisted of one A.P.M.,one D.A.P.M., and two companies to be know as ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies. ‘A’ Company consisted of six sections of British Other Ranks, whilst ‘B’ Company consisted of 4 Sections of B.O.Rs, one section of Gurkhas, and one section of West African C.M.P. attached. (Note West African C.M.P. were already on War Establishment of the 3rd S.A. Inf. Bde.). This W.E was passed by G(SD) Special Force in November 1943, but was not passed to GHQ (I) until 9th February 1944, and by then operations had been in progress for five weeks.
It was not until early May 1944 that the new company was formed, and it was then too late to be of any use in the forward area as the operations then in progress were nearly completed.
This Special provost Force was disbanded in May 1945 without being employed for the purpose raised.
100 Independent Provost Company.
120 L. of C. (Burma) Provost Unit.
(Copies of War Establishment attached).
123 Section, Special Investigation Branch.
Formation - April 1944. War Establishment -
(Appendix ‘E’ attached)
Reorganisation - February 1945.
Group H.Qrs. - (W.E. - Appendix ‘F’ attached).
123 Section. )
200 Section. ) (W.E. - Appendix ‘G’ attached)
201 Section. )
The general increase in personnel in Provost was made solely to meet operational commitments, and even then in many cases it was found to be totally inadequate.
No.100 Independent Provost Company was raised for operation in Malaya, and policing large towns in L. of c. Area. This unit was ordered to be raised as soon as possible after 7 june 1945 at Chittagong from disbanded H.Q. Special Force Provost Unit, and six sections from ALFSEA Provost School. On 20th September 1945, this company was still only 47 all ranks and without complete transport and G.1098.
War Establishment. To be raised on WE.131/1/44 - a British Div. Provost Company, which title will not be used.
In june 1944, only two Sub-areas were in existence - Nos. 253 and 286. As the Army advanced new areas and sub-areas were created which made a demand for Provost officers. The L. of C. from Manipur Road through Kohima and Imphal provided many complex and difficult problems, and a D.P.M., with one A.P.M. and two D.A.P.Ms were appointed to ease the situation.
In addition the following districts and areas/sub-areas were in operation by August 1945.
505 District - Mandalay.
South Burma District.
No. 1 Area - Rangoon.
No. 2 Area - ALFSEA (Singapore).
404 Area - Chittagong.
253 Sub Area )
551 Sub Area )
) 505 District.
552 Sub Area )
553 Sub Area )
451 Sub Area)
452 Sub Area) 404 Area.
455 Sub Area) - 7 Indian Div.
Colombo Base Area )
Trincomalee Sub Area ) Ceylon Army Command
H.Q. Admin. Area, Ceylon )
ROLE OF PROVOST
Preparation Periods - Training. November 1943 to January 1944.
During training each inf. Bde. had a subsection of Provost attached to undertake the following duties:-
General discipline. Speed control & traffic checks.
Water Points. Animal Management.
Convoy Duties General investigation work.
Security duties on H.Q. & Operations rooms.
At this period troops were being allowed into the local town for evening leave. As the sub-area only had two Garrison military police for Police duties, a section of Special Force Provost was quartered there.
At this time the 5307 Div. Regt. (U.S. Army) was attached to Special Force for training and administration; they had no U.S., C.M.P. or Regimental Police.
Headquarters, U.S. Theatre Provost at Delhi were approached with a view to providing a detachment to assist the British C.M.P. Unfortunately, due to shortage of manpower , none could be provided. The C.O. of the Regiment was approached on the matter, and stated that under the circumstances his personnel should come under the British C.M.P. for all discipline, and that they should be charged on A.F.B. 252 for any breaches committed.
Early in training it was suggested that there should be a subsection of Mounted C.M.P. to assist in Animal Management. This was agreed to, but due to the shortage of ponies only two mounted men were available. Although these men underwent the most rigorous training under bad conditions without a real break for weeks, their behaviour was exceptionally good.
11 EAST AFRICAN DIV. PROVOST COMPANY. January 1945.
In January 1945, it was decided that this company should rest, rehabilitate, reorganize, and undergo training periods. Unlike the majority of other units who during this period could devote their whole time to rehabilitation and training, Provost duties had to continue. An officer and C.S.M. were appointed to supervise all training periods and following point were given special attention.
Driving. The establishment allowed for all Provost Askari to be drivers, e.e. 87 drivers. Time was not available to train this number of men, and it was decided to train 45 Jeep drivers, the instruction to include backing with trailers.
Communications. Instructions to lay and connect metallic and earth return lines, special attention being paid to the method of laying in order to obviate in some small degree some of the common causes of communications breaking down during operations, i.e. cutting by vehicles, tree-felling, and bulldozing. All Askari were taught that it was their duty to repair any broken lines together with methods of fault finding, etc. All British ranks were given instructions as to how to assemble and operate the switchboard and to operate 48 sets.
Traffic Discipline. Practice was given to the African Other Ranks in the correction of drivers in maintaining their interval and close-up.
First Aid Instruction. Simple instructions for all African Other Ranks, and particular care of own health and water discipline.
15 INDIAN CORPS PROVOST. May 1944. (Extract from report by A.P.M. Corps).
When the A.P.M. arrived to assume appointment, he found that he was expected to run a good mess and generally do as he was told. He could not expect to be consulted. The Corps as a whole was not “Pro-minded”. The A.P.M. did not have a typewriter in his office, and it was considered that he did not require one.
25 Ind. Division were very “Pro-Minded” and well trained. 26 ind. Division were not so “Pro-minded”, but the Provost Unit were food. 81 West African Division were as “Pro-minded” as a W.A. formation will ever be.
At this period Corps H.Q. had an appointment D.A.A.G traffic, and this officer was virtually the A.P.M. as far as operations went. 25 Ind. Division were the only Provost that had any traffic equipment, and this they had bought in India whilst training. Every effort on my part to obtain G.1098 from ordnance resulted in false promises.
The picture then is that is that, with the exception of 25 Ind. Div. Provost Unit, Provost were unable to train properly owing to lack of equipment. Corps Provost were expected to guard Corps H.Q., act as orderlies and guard and escort POWs. All that took time to change, but was ultimately achieved.
LANDING IN AKYAB.
The Provost party which made the initial landing in Akyab consisted of:-
Major RUSHMAN A.P.M. 25 Ind. Division.
Capt. MILLER D.A.P.M. 15 Ind. Corps.
One sergeant, five L/cpls., one Naik; three L/Naiks, and one sepoy batman.
All kit had to be carried on pack basis and consisted of the following items:
3 ‘48’ Wireless Sets. 2 E.E. ‘8’ Telephones.
500 yards white tape. Paint Brush.
Paint & Hurricane Lamps.
1 Drum single telephone cable.
Prepared canvas signs, including some blanks.
It was originally decided that owing to the weight carried, the men would not carry blankets, but late one blanket per man was issued as they would be five days at least without kit. This plus four days rations and a very heavy and bulky load. The wireless sets were wrapped in groundsheets and all the kit arrived safely, except the A.P.M’s and D.A.P.M’s rations, which the orderly left in the boat.
The partly left 25 Div. H.Q. at 07.30 hrs., on 1st January 1945, and proceeded to Teknaf by boat where they joined the Commando Brigade. Provost were allocated positions in the second wave, which was due to land at H + 40. Major Rushman, one sergeant, two L/Cpl’s, one Naik, one L/Naik, and one sepoy orderly were allocated to the first boat, and Capt, Miller and the remainder to the second of the three L.C.Ms which formed the second wave.
The party embarked in their respective L.C.Ms on the 2nd January and proceeded to a rendezvous at sea, where two of the L.C.Ms transferred their personnel to a sloop, the stores remaining in the L.C.ms. On the morning of the 3rd January (D Day) the party were told that the Japs had vacated the island, this news being received with rather mixed feelings, from which relief seemed to be entirely absent. The crew of H.M.S. Sloop “SHOREHAM” extended their hospitality to all ranks, even to the extent of giving up their beds.
At 10.30 hrs, on 3rd january, all personnel re embarked in their L.C.Ms ready for the actual landing. The beach which was sandy made an excellent landing found, and at high water vehicles could land without the water covering the axles.
By the time the Provost landed, the Commando sappers had already signed the exit from the beach for track and wheeled vehicles, and were busy laying an army track road over the loose dry sand which extended for approximately one hundred yards. The Commando vehicles were held up on the beach until this road was completed, the track vehicles pushing on to the hard ground where they were de-waterproofed. The Commandos had only one vehicle “drowned”, which was recovered at low water.
The A.P.. 25 Ind. Division, had asked for a recovery vehicle to be landed with the first vehicles, but this was turned down by the Commandos, and no recovery vehicle
was available until 74 Brigade landed. No area was provided on the beach plan for a vehicle de-waterproofing harbour, and the A.P.M. was unable to contact the Beachmaster as he had gone forward on a reconnaissance. The C.I.M.E. of 25 Div. decided to carry out de waterproofing on the beach until an plan was available.
Provost established and information post on the beach immediately on landing, and were kept informed of the location of all formations. Police control on the beach was on a 24 hour basis, and all store areas were signposted.
On the night of D + 1 - 2, no light was provided on the beach to guide boats, and Provost stepped into the breach.
On D + 4 the A.P.M. established Town Patrol and an information post on the main beach Akyab road, south of 15 Ind. Corps TAC. H.Q.
One civilian suspect was received and held by the A.P.M. on D day, and a civilian who stated he knew where mines were laid on the airstrip.
A Provost jeep was landed with the second wave of transport which allowed policing of the island to follow close up to the landing units. It is interesting to note here that it was Provost of an attacking formation which did the beaches, and not Provost of the Beach Group, who came in after the initial landing.
25 Ind. Div. Provost were also involved in the second landing at Letpan,and it was only there that serious opposition from the enemy was encountered. Provost carried out similar duties, but at this time were under fire. It is commonly known how well they did, and on one occasion carried wounded then the stretcher bearers went to ground.
The final operation carried out by Corps Provost was establishing the L. of C. from maungdaw to Foul point by the coast road, as it was switched there from Buthidaung. A ferry of two or three landing craft from Foul Point to Akyab island was instituted, and Provost organised the loading and unloading on the beaches. This they did very well, and were responsible for the craft doing many additional journeys than were thought possible. The N.C.Os were immersed in sea water all day long, and the story is still told of one N.C.O. eager to prevent a landing craft being left high and dry by the receding tide, wading so far out that when one large wave came along, only his red
top could be seen floating away. When this L. of C. became redundant and was transferred to air and sea, Corps detachment was withdrawn and the whole unit regrouped with Corps H.Q. on Akyab Island.
Meanwhile 25 Ind. Division were also regrouping on Akyab island prior to withdrawal to india. 82 West African Division had been moving down the mainland towards Letpan, and Provost had been doing all traffic control dealing with P.Ws, and signing Divisional H.Q.
26 Ind. Division now came into the picture with their assault on Ramree Island, and Provost carried out similar duties. Opposition was again nil on the initial landings.
26 Div. Provost Unit were again planned to go in with the assault on Rangoon, but again were not involved in operations. During the first two or three days Rangoon was chaotic and much looting was done. The highlight was a Subedar Sahib of 26 Ind. Div. Provost Unit who brought back to H.Q. one and a half lakhs of Indian rupees which he found in the street.
During the Battle
SPECIAL FORCE PROVOST UNIT.
In early January 1944, Adv. H.Q. moved to its operational area at Imphal. It was accompanied by a subsection of Provost who saw the road convoy through, and carried out general discipline and H.Q. security duties on arrival. Soon after, each Bdfe. Rear H.Q. moved to the same area taking with it its sub-section fo provost. Later these subsections were formed into detachments at various points to meet operational requirements.
Eventually the Provost personnel in the forward area numbered two officers (apart from A.P.M. and D.A.P.M.), 62 N.C.Os (B.O.R.), one sergeant B.O.R. (Corps of West African M.P.), 10 N.C.Os (W.A.), plus motorcycles for B.O.Rs, four 15 cwt Trucks and one Jeep (which did not arrive until May).
During the period of operations, three N.C.Os performed duties in the following forward areas:- Imphal, Dimapur, Dinjan, Tinsukia, Silchar, Kariganj, Sylhet, Agartala, Comilla, and in Burma at Warazup, Kameigh, and Pahok.
The remainder of the unit were in the rear area in India.
The A.P.M. and D.A.P.M. toured both the areas, but for operational reasons they had to remain most of the time in the forward area. A rough estimate of the road distance in visiting all detachments (worked out on a road map of India) was 4,000 miles the single trip.
The following were the duties performed during the period of operations:
Convoys. Convoy discipline and traffic control duties during road moves of Adv. H.Q. and rear Bde. h.Qs/ Similar duties with all other large convoys moving in rear and forward areas.
Security. Duties on all Operations Rooms and at Railway stations, etc.
Stragglers. Stragglers pickets and general discipline duties at Railway stations during moves of Brigades.
Prisoner of War Cage duties. Records and general administration, escorts, etc.
Duties at Air Bases at Commencement of Operations. Security of strips, planes, stores, etc. during loading of sorties, security of “ground control”, “unity” and U.S.A.A.F. Operations Rooms, Animal management during loading, Traffic Control & M.T discipline, and general discipline.
General Strip duties throughout Operations.
Air Strip traffic control in co-operation with U.S.A.A.F. control staff, traffic speed checks on strips and general M.T. discipline. Security of strips and control towers. Checking authority of all travelling by air with sorties. Taking over of P.Ws landed by plane, and escorting to cage and later to F.I.C (Forward Interrogation Centre), Palasbari. Assisting in evacuation of wounded from all ambulance planes, and control of ambulances. Dispersal of all non essential traffic on “Air Raid Alert” to allow all essential traffic immediate access to strip. Assisting U.S.A.A.F. Military Police in the event of an air crash. General assistance to all personnel arriving from inside strips by air.
Evacuation of Imphal.
Towards the end of March 1944, at the time of Major General Ord Wingate’s death in an air crash, it was decided just before Imphal was surrounded that Adv. H.W., 3 Ind. Division should evacuate to Sylhet. The war at Imphal was not actually the problem of the Special Force, their task being 3/300 miles in Central Burma behind the Japs then threatening Imphal.
The Provost G1098 and some of the motor cycles and N.C.os were flown out; the remainder of Provost escorted the road convoys to sylhet. Soon after this, the Manipur Road was blocked by the Japs, and Imphal was cut off.
It was decided that four C.M.P. should be flown into one of the air strip strongholds of the capital in Burma. These N.C.Os were issued with the special equipment that the Infantry on columns were equipped with. They were actually on the strip ready to go, but due to the fact that all planes going in that night were full, they could not be carried. Unfortunately, the following day, due to operational reasons the decision to send C.M.P. in was cancelled.
Many of the Staff who had worked on the inside strips have stated that Police would have been most useful which was proved later when a section was flown in. Their duties would have been:- To take charge of P.Ws, documents, etc. If possible they would have signalled H.Q. when P.Ws were likely to be despatched. If necessary, and N.C.O. would have accompanied them on the plane, handing them over to an escort on the Air Base. Control of air and other traffic on the strips. Security of strips, checking of passengers, stores, etc. arriving by air. Water point discipline. Anti malarial discipline. Note:- It would have been an advantage if these N.C.Os had been equipped with Airborne auto scooters and horses.
Withdrawal of 16 Brigade.
At the end of April, it was decided to withdraw the Brigade which had trekked in on foot. Arrangements were made to fly them out from an inside strip to two stirps in the rear area, one being Comilla direct, and the other Imphal, from where they were flown on after a day or so, and as planes were available to Comilla.
A subsection of Provost was established at Comilla airstrip, and three N.C.Os were flown into the stronghold of Imphal. Their duties were:- Control of M.T. and
ambulances and their parking on strip. Assisting in checking and collecting arms, etc. Assisting in evacuation of wounded from ambulance planes. Animal management. Assisting in deplaning, guiding to concentration areas of animals. Collection and guiding of fit personnel by M.T. to camp. Reporting number of arrivals, sick, wounded and fit, to staff officer on duty.
Strip Traffic Control.
The supply dropping sorties departed from the rear main strips usually between 06.00 and 07.00 hours daily, approximately 20/30 Dakota aircraft being used. These planes taxied from their revetments on to the runway and thence to the main strip for take off.
As the runways were always crowded with vehicle of all kinds, it called for high pressure traffic control on the part of the Police. (In the course of the operations many planes were damaged through vehicles not giving way). During this busy period, there was a general turn out of all available N.C.s, some on motorcycles, others at static points on foot. There was also a general turn out when all these aircraft returned.
Each plane was let to and from the strip by an N.C.O. on a motorcycle, his duty being to clear traffic from its path. A Police jeep with a red flag would have been most effective for this work, but unfortunately there were no jeeps available. Indian drivers proved the biggest source of trouble; they usually took fright on seeing a plane approaching and stopped not knowing what to do, making no attempt to go back and get into a revetment, or to pull right off the strip. Usually the Police had to take charge and get them out of it.
In one instance, and on more than one occasion, an Indian driver tried to drive under the wing of the plane. He very successfully put it out of action for several days by ripping the wing off on his hood. As this plane was loaded, and about to take off for a supply droop, it meant that some of the men inside Burma went without their rations and other supplies for that day. An extra strain was put on other planes in the succeeding days until this plane was repaired.
No. 3 Air Base.
This was established at Dinjan during May as it was still more suitably situated for operations then being undertaken with General Stilwell, and for the withdrawal of our troops when their part had been played in these operations. Six N.C.os were all that
could be provided at first from the meagre police manpower then available. However, more were asked for, and another six were despatched.
Until this time, it had not been possible to obtain any reinforcements of police from main H.Q., but ten more N.C.Os were now sent for. An effort was made to have their motorcycles ent up without avail, due to lack of waton space on the railways. These N.C.Os arrived early in June and proved to be of great assistance in the final phase of the operation.
For the period of the withdrawal from Burma, a Reception Camp was set up at Tinsukia, seven miles away from No.3 Air Base at Dinjan. Personnel were flown out from Warazup and other strips in Burma to the strip at Dinjan, and trucked to the Reception Camp. On arrival all were given a bath, clean clothing, and equipment, and after approximately three days rest were dispatched by rail to the Rehabilitation Centres at Dehra Dun and Bangalore.
During this period, Provost were employed at No.3 Air Base, Dinjan, and Reception Camp, Tinsukia, on the following duties:-
Convoy Duties. Traffic Control.
Railway Station duties. General Duties.
Control of em-bussing and de-bussing of troops.
At Dimapur the same duties were performed for 23 inf. Brigade, which had been operating with 4 Corps in an independent role. They were concentrated at Imphal and trucked to Dimapur and entrained for India.
Duties in Burma.
At the end of June, an officer and a section of C.M.P. were required urgently for duties and were flown into Burma. The officer and six .C.Os were flown in from Dinjan, and later another ten N.C.os were flown from Sylhet to Dinjan and then into Burma.
The original six flow in performed the job of “chuckers out” en route, and dropped supplies to Chindits operating near Kamaign, afterwards being landed on the strip at Tingkawk Sikang, where they stayed the night. The following day they were all flown
singly by light plane to H.Q. at Shadusup. On arrival, the officer in charge was sent for by the G.O.C. who gave him full particulars of work to be carried out. Detachments were placed at the following places:-
H.Q. Shadusup. Officer & Cpl. i/c Section.
“ “ First Ferry - 3 N.C.Os.
“ “ Second Ferry - 3 N.C.Os.
Warazup Air Strip.
Transit Camp. 2 N.C.Os.
Dropping strip. 2 N.C.Os.
Pahok Light Plane strip. 3 N.C.Os.
The duties performed were as follows:-
Shadusup - First & Second Ferries. Liaison with American and Chinese C.M.P. there, assist generally with the control of the ferry traffic, and evacuation of 3rd Ind. Division wounded and sick, and to take a nominal roll of all such personnel. The three N.C.os. At the first ferry lived at H.Q. and hitchhiked to their duties daily, whilst those of the second ferry lived with an American negro Pioneer Battalion, and were very well looked after.
The total number of evacuated personnel that crossed the ferry during the period that Provost men were on duty was 289. All these men after being checked by Police, were assisted in some way or other by them, many having to be carried across on stretchers.
Warazup. The Police liaised with the Camp Commandant, and controlled all outgoing and incoming planes evacuating casualties and Burmese refugees.
Kamaign. Liaised with O.C. Reinforcement Camp, and assisted in the control of the evacuation of troops to Warazup and established a Stragglers Post. All reinforcements arriving reported to C.M.P. for information regarding their onward transit to their respective columns.
A great deal of looting by the Chinese was taking place from the supply dumps, and drops when they occurred, and out Police assisted the Americans in preventing this; there was also a great deal of trafficing in arms by the Chinese.
Security of a great quantity of arms and ammunition taken off evacuated sick and wounded personnel, until the recovery detachment could take over. P.Ws. were also dealt with, but they were few in number.
Pahok. Control of traffic on the strip. Here the road ran directly across the strip, and all vehicles had to be held up during take-offs and landings. Provost also assisted in the evacuation of wounded from the main dressing station, and established a Stragglers Post there.
M.T. in Burma. The section had no transport, and a motorcycle was flown in and landed at Warazup. This machine was used by the N.C.o. i/c to traverse the road between Kamaign and Pahok. This road had been shelled by the Japs, and was only passable during fine weather. A jeep would have proved invaluable but was unobtainable.
20 Ind. Inf. Div. Provost Unit.
Phase 1 - Assam
After discussion with Major Daniels, A.P.M., 4 Corps, Major P. B. Laxton, A.P.M. 20 Ind. Division, commenced taking over the Palel-Tamu road from Major Beecher, A.P.M., 23 ind. Division completing this on 4 November 1943. The resources of 20 Ind. Division Provost Unit at that time were the Adv. Div H.Q. detachment only, comprising one sergeant, two corporals, and eight L/Cpls, with Jemadar, two Havildars, and eighteen I.O.R Military Policemen.
The unit took over T.C.Ps staffed as follows:-
TCP 41 Shenam, TCP 43 Dampol. TCP 44 Khonkhang
TCP 45 Lokohao. TCP 46 Sibong.
.Communications. All T.C.Ps had telephones. T.C.P. 41 was connected to Shenam locality exchange, and T.C.Ps. 43 - 46 were on an omnibus line also connected to Shenam locality.
Convoy Running. Convoys were run from both ends passing at Khonkhang at about 11.00 hours. Thereafter, the road was reserved for R.E. work up to 18.00hrs, after which free running was allowed to 06.00hrs.
Comments and Appreciations. The organisation which pro. Took over was carrying about 40 vehicles daily each way in convoy on what was in effect a ‘private’ Div. road. It was anticipated that the traffic organisation must be modified to obtain the greatest possible efficiency.
Three factors of equal priority were taken into consideration:- (1) Road construction (2) Movement of Div. troops, and (3) Stocking at Moreh and other forward dumps.
It seemed obvious that the Staff authorities at 4 Corps H.Q. G.R.E.F, HQ. and Div. H.Q. would require equal satisfaction on these three aspects of the problem.
A.P.M. was fortunate in being able to establish early a close and effective liaison with 5 M.T. Regt, with Lieut-Col Carrell, C.R.E 107, and as always with the A/Q and D.A.Q.M.G at Div H.Q. In particular, Lieut. Col Carrell, C.R.E. was always most ready to foresee, discuss and solve in advance all possible problems. The Corps Lines Maintenance Signals were also most helpful and gave a very high priority to all requests for assistance on the T.C.P. Lone. There was at this time no staff interference in matters of detail, and all problems were settled by personal and telephonic liaison with the above authorities, the results being submitted to the appropriate H.Q wherever desirable.
The telephone communications were first modified. All T.C.Ps were placed on one omnibus line, and an additional phone was installed at Konkhang, where the A.P.M. lived, leaving the O.C. Provost Unit to represent him at Div. H.Q. The phones were D.5 with additional earphones which were worn permanently by T.C.P. duty men during busy periods. A very high standard of telephone discipline was required of men on duty, and private conversation over the T.C.P. line about the rum ration, etc. was cut to a minimum.
The convoy timings were then altered so that the supplies convoy ran out and back in a day. The daily maintenance/stocking convoy rose to 105 vehicles, and the following steps were taken to achieve the very high standard required to complete the run:-
(b) Extreme strictness in preventing vehicles moving against the convoy for any reason. There were no exceptions to this, whether ambulances, water carts, C.R.E. technical officers, or visiting officers. All vehicles moving against the convoy were reported by O.C. Convoy direct as well as by the Police. A Military Police despatch rider led and followed the convoy.
(c) A very high standard of organisation and discipline by C.R.Es working parties, and efficient disciplinary action if R.E working parties failed to have the road open for the convoy at convoy times.
(d) Improvement to M.T. discipline in convoys by:-
(i) Continual M.P.roving patrols
(ii) Centralised control and strict records of Convoy running by TCP 44 at Khonkhang.
Delays as little as three or four minutes in the convoy at any point were investigated and reported.
These measures were only effective because of the very thorough say in chich 5 M.T Regt. backed up reports..
The result of these steps was that running time was improved by nearly 100% being cut from six hours to three and a half, while the ‘turn-round’ time ex-Palel was improved by nearly 225% being cut from 36 hours to 15 hours. Serious accidents were almost unknown and senior visiting officers could be given a clear run by adjusting their timing to fit in with the convoy.
(e) The rule of “No individual running” had to be relaxed for certain types of
vehicles, and this was done by a system of passes. The number of vehicles which could be allowed to move against the convoy was carefully estimated. It was found that six light vehicles per hour caused no appreciable delay, and that jeeps and motorcycles did not require controlling. Permanent passes were then issued in three colours. Priority WHITE, of which only six were ever issued, gave complete freedom of road movement to such personnel as Div. Commander, C.R.E., and certain technical officers. Priority RED permitted vehicles to move against convoy timings, provided that they halted on meeting the main convoy. Priority BLUE were passed to the head of any convoy, but were not allowed to move outside convoy times. These passes were registered and the number of each in circulation watched very carefully. Any abuse was investigated and the offenders brought to book.
(f) Rain. The road was unmetalled and cut up if used during rain. If not
used, it dried off rapidly, and if heavy vehicles, particularly six-wheeled Studebakers were released onto it at precisely the right moment when it was drying out, a rolling effect was obtained and the road packed down into a hard clean surface which lasted some time before cutting up into dust.
The rule was therefore that traffic should halt in the event of rain and not
proceed until the police, acting on technical advice of R.E. officers, released it. This never quite worked in spite of strenuous efforts, but the degree to which it was enforced did show beyond doubt that the theory was correct.
(g) Points which should have been tried, but were not owing to lack of staff, etc.
Movement Control, had it been enforced, could have reduced the
traffic on the road by 25% without loss of efficiency. A but service for officers and men. Orders requiring empty returning vehicles to check in for loads. Organised ferrying forward of certain stores (e.g. if every vehicle going forward had carried a coil of dannert wire on the bonnet and dumped it forward, many lorry loads would have been saved). These and similar steps could have saved many wasted journeys. The Steps could have saved many wasted journeys. The necessary staff would have had to be incorporated in the Traffic H.Q. at Khonkhang to have got the full benefits.
Security. A small detachment of Field Security men were eventually
established with the Military Police H.Q. at Khonkhang, and good work was done. It should have started earlier, but the men could not be obtained.
Pilfering. In the same way, additional Military Police to specialise in this
would have had plenty of scope. It was not a serious problem, but a certain amount of stores did go, particularly rum, and also tea, milk and sugar, used as enticements for the local ladies, although they did not in point of fact need it.
Mobile “Courtesy” Repair Patrols. A most definite need. Provost men
who were good enough were also the best N.C.Os, and were needed as
i/c T..C.Ps. Specialist mechanics in jeeps and on motorcycles were required,
(h) All T.C.Ps were also Stragglers Posts with an indefinite supply of hot
tea. The additional rations were obtained by courtesy.
A Prisoner of War collecting post was set up as part of T.C.P.43 at Charing Cross in Tamu. it was found that the best results were for the F.S.S. and C.M.P. to get well forward and relieve unit escorts as soon as possible without insisting on the book.
Discipline. Obtained entirely by respect and liaison. Charges were
never used, their place being taken by telephonic reports by the A.P.M. to the O.C. unit concerned. In bad cases, the offenders were arrested, conducted immediately by the N.C.O. effecting arrest to the unit lines and dealt with at once.
(i) Description of Road and Distribution of T.C.Ps. At the time under
review, it was one way for convoys from Mile 38 to Mile 70, and R.E. work was in progress on many parts. There were six manned T.C.Ps on this sector, i.e. one per five miles of road. This is very much higher than normal, but was the minimum for efficiency during such time as R.E. work was in progress.
The problem of a one way road with some 30,000 men living on it in
Pioneer Units requiring maintenance, is quite different from that on a road with a few residents. Normally the palel-Tamu road could have been run with three T.C.Ps at Shenam (Mile 38), Khonkhang (Mile 52), and Moreh (Mile 70).
T.C.P.. duties were:-
T.C.P. 41 Shenam and TCY 47 Moreh were “Gates”, i.e. responsible for
releasing convoys on to the one-way sector in accordance with timings under orders from Control. Counting and booking convoys.
T.C.P. 43. Dampol and TCP 45 Lokchao were “Filters”, responsible for
cutting the tail of stragglers falling behind the main convoy to avoid delay to reverse convoy from the other direction.
TCP 44 Konkhang exercised control of all T.C.Ps, booking and analysis of
running times, reporting and effecting all liaison with outside authorities.
An example of the complexity which was eventually reached without
mishap under the control of Sgt. Booton, L/cpls. Evans, McGowan, and Davis, at T.C.P. 44 is as follows:-
Convoy SUGAR 1. Moving south. Composition perhaps one hundred
3rd line three-tonners, sixty 2nd line 15 cwts, forty five miscellaneous vehicles. As soon as tail clears Dampol and adjacent camps, up to forty Studes (Studebaker heavy American lorries.). released northwards for loading. “Gate” closed at Shenam to ensure road clear. As soon as tail clears Khonkhang, waiting MAM 1. Released north - composition perhaps thirty miscellaneous vehicles. On tail of this clearing Dampol waiting stragglers proceed south. When clear of Milt 47, R.Es close road for blasting. In the afternoon, waiting vehicles at Mile 47 proceed south as soon as road is opened, park at Khonkhang in time for returning 3rd line supply vehicles to proceed north. As soon as they are clear at Dampol, waiting Studes pass through to camps, which they had to do in daylight as fe had lights. When in, stragglers at Khonkhang proceed north.
This example (which was repeatessimilary on other sector of the road) is
included to show that it is not necessary to aim at undue simplicity at the cost of efficiency. Well trained B.O.Rs can handle a complex convoy time-table provided that it is regular and ot changed too often, and provided that their officers obtain first class liaison with all relevant authorities. The above system was ‘critical’ at many points, but on no occasion le to any serious dislocation. Really good telephone communications on an ‘omnibus’ circuit with permanently manned phones is also essential.
(j) During February 1944, the road was handed over to 4 Corps Provost,
and the Div. Provost Unit moved forward to the Kabaw valley. Iti is of interest to note that two T.C.Ps (43 and 45) were manned entirely by I.O.r.s, including telephones.
Phase 2. - KABAW.
Provost duties in the Kabaw valley were more normal as the roads were
nearly all two way. Two small convoy controlled road systems were established on the Pyinbon Sakan road from Mile 12 to Mile 23, and on the Tilaung WA road from Mile 10 to Mile 21. Other T.C.Ps were established at Sidmouth Junction, Charing Cross, and Brigade posts at nanmunta and Blezeik. Routine duties call for no comment. The men were trained in the construction of field works and bashas for their own use, and T.C.Ps were not permitted tents. A good deal of mobile police patrol work to check speeding, and the consequent dust nuisance and deterioration of the roads was carried out. Charges were preferred in the normal way, though kept to a minimum during this period.
This period also coincided with the loss of may old unit B.O.rs by
repatriation, and the unit was weakened. Replacements were difficult to obtain and were of poor quality and untrained in field work. Provost did a good deal of work in conjunction with “1” on roads at this time, and issued and kept up to date a diagram keeping check on the somewhat exuberant naming of road junctions, etc.
The villages of Sunle, Minthami, and Kibyugon, forward of the Div. F.D.Ls
was carried out in February 1944 as a combined operation by the Border Regt., S. & T., Burma Rifles and Provost. It was a model of its type, going off without a hitch. Vehicles were moved up and parked near Witok overnight, and taken forward by Provost guides before first light. The villagers, cleared by Burma Rifles under the protection of the border, were en bussed and moved to Tamyu and thence back to Imphal without incident, although the enemy had the area within range of guns and carrier patrols.
Phase 3. - KABAW.
The move back, commenced in late February 1944, found the Div. Provost
Unit short of trained men, and dealing with new staff officers. While certain hitches were inevitable, the Provost work in general proceeded smoothly and well.
The move back of Div. H.Q. and Divisional and Brigade troops generally
was a complex and piecemeal operation governed by changing circumstances. At no time did vehicle movement become a governing factor. The credit for this must og largely to the B.O.Rs of the unit and to Div. Signals who were superbly co-operative, laying lines and lending radio jeeps whenever required.
The pressure of work was considerable at this stage. Elaborate convoy
timings and staff orders were ‘out’, and from a police point of view it was largely a “soldier’s war” with the individual Military Policeman continually going out to police a changing situation as it occurred.
It was in general a situation which showed how essential it is to have
intelligent, fit and tough Military Policemen in forward areas who can stand up to long spells of work in emergency, and who have had sufficient field training to deal intelligently with situations without waiting for orders.
By about 10 March 1944, the Division had drawn in its horns. TAC H.Q.
was in Moreh (A.P.M. included) with one brigade back. The evacuation of Moreh dumps then proceeded. The G.R.S.F road construction forces had by then travelled back and the road was two-way, the only restriction being that night movement was not
allowed. As the road Morch - Palel was two-way, no special problems arose from the Provost angle.
Stragglers Posts were established in conjunction with F.S.S. personnel at
the entrances to Moreh and a large number of personnel checked and redirected. During this time both Jap, Jif, and B.T.A. prisoners had been dealt with and sent back without incident.
By about 20 March, Div. H.Q. was at Shenam, and the road was
occasionally under fire. It was during this time that the staff control seemed at times somewhat detailed, and it was felt that 15-20% more efficiency would have been obtained by leaving more freedom to the A.P.M. who was in a position to decide what traffic the road could bear.
On 31 March, the A.P.M. was at Khonkhang on patrol when he was
informed that the road at Mile 54 was under fire, and the last convoy ex-Moreh delayed. The A.P.M. proceeded there with L/Cpsl Mcgowan and Davis, and passed the convoy through the sector being fired on. The Jap was apparently using a mountain gun of about 3.7 calibre, and his fire was ineffective, though alarming to drivers unless someone was about. At about 16.50 hours, two Diesel steam rollers appeared in convoy, causing much delay on the one-way sector. It was decided to try and pass them through rather than abandon them, and in doing this, L/Cpl McGowan who behaved very well indeed, and the A.P.M. were wounded from splinter. The convoy continued as soon as the rollers were clear, and got back without further incident.
4 CORPS AREA - March - May 1944.
Facts and Figures.
The Tamu and Tiddim Roads.
First forty miles on both roads were two-way. Thereafter both roads were one-way and difficult to negotiate, being cut through mountain, hill, and valley. Sometimes tarmaced, sometimes metalled, more often an earth surface.
Tamu Line - 400 tons daily.
Tiddim Line - 300 tons daily.
Traffic Posts. On the eighty miles two-way road there were no posts. This was due to the length and difficulties encountered on the one-way road, and to lack of personnel. On the 156 miles one-way road, seventeen traffic posts were established. Each post was manned by a mixed detachment of B.O.rs and I.O.Rs. Personnel were thin on the ground; at several posts only two B.O.rs were stationed.
(b) Sectors. Sectors varied in length from three to thirty miles.
Tamp Line. All posts were connected on an omnibus line. Regulating HQ was connected to the main exchange.
Tiddim Line. owing to length of the road, wire was not available to give Provost a private line. Posts close together south of Mile 127 were linked on an ominbus line to the main exchange. The remaining posts, widely separated, were connected direct to main exchanges.
(d) Road Patrols. Effective road patrolling could only be carried out in jeeps.
Motorcycle patrols were only effective in three sectors on the Tamu road. The extra four sections attached to Corps Provost had no jeeps on charge. Corps Provost had only ten jeeps. Ten jeeps for seventeen traffic posts meant that patrolling was not carried out right down the line.
USE OF ROADS.
Both roads were in use for convoys for an average of eighteen hours per day.
The Battle Begins.
The decision was taken not to fight where we stood, but to withdraw into the plain, with the front line approximately thirty miles from Imphal. The main Provost task was therefore traffic control which divided into two phases:-
(i) To evacuate all soft troops on both roads into the Imphal plain, and to evacuate all supplies and equipment from road heads and forward road heads into Imphal.
(ii) To evacuate all soft troops (not required for operations) from Imphal to Base as Dimapur.
Concurrent with phases (i) and (ii) to control the withdrawal of the forward divisions.
TAMU ROAD - Evacuation.
(b) Enemy did not cut this road until much later.
(c) Main convoy timings were adhered to so that Corps 3rd line transport could reach road head to evacuate supplies and personnel. Special timings were given from Regulating H.Q. (at Khonkhang - Mile 52), at which only a sergeant was in charge.
(d) Soft troops, which had no transport of their own and which could not be brought back by Corps 3rd line, marched to a Transit Camp, at Palel (Mile 29).
(e) The majority of soft troops belonged to G.R.E.F. A scheme to cope with such a withdrawal had been drawn up some weeks previously. It was therefore known which units were to remain in Imphal, and which were to go direct to Base. it was possible to go direct to Palel to Base because Palel was the terminus of the O. of C. Transport organisation.
(f) An officer from G.R.E.F H.Q. went to Palel to meet the withdrawing soft troops and give their new destinations, This was to big a task for one man, so Provost was asked to assist. Provost had no officer and no men available. C.C. unit was cut off on the Tiddim road (see below), and the second in command was fully occupied at H.Q. There were not sufficient men on either road to deal with the volume of traffic.
(g) one officer and twenty men from R.A., and six jeeps, were placed at
the A.P.Ms disposal. The officer and six men were sent to aid at the transit Camp at Palel. Three jeeps and eight men were sent to regulating H.Q. to be disposed of as the
sergeant in charge desired. The remaining three jeeps and six men remained at Corps Provost H.Q., as by this time Corps H.Q. was also moving with only four L/Cpls. And twn L/Naiks to assist.
(h) Troops at the Palel Transit Camp were eventually sorted out. The majority went to Base in L. of C. Transport, and the remainder came to Imphal.
TIDDIM ROAD - Evacuation.
Only two B.ORs and four I.O.Rs were located at each of these posts. With manning the telephone and checking convoys through, road patrollin as a regular duty was out of the question. The road was rough from start to finish. Jeeps were excellent for patrolling, but motorcycles were useless. There was one jeep at mile 80, but none at Mile 50.
(i) For the previous six months, 150/200 three tonners had been using the road daily between Imphal and Mile 80 without much difficulty. The A.P.M. anticipated that the Brigade and tanks would do the same. This was a mistake.#
(j) Drivers who were new to this road found it extremely difficult south of Mile 40. Breaking down was frequent, and road patrolling essential. No help came from the posts at Miles 50 and 80, due to lack of men and jeeps. 254 Tank Bde. Provost Unit could only produce one jeep to go with the tanks. Detachment of 23 Div Provost Unit which moved with 37 Bde. were all I.O.Rs moving with the convoy. They had no jeeps, and a detachment of B.O.Rs was sent from 23 Div. Provost to assist in this move.
(k) A few days later, 49 Bde. (23 Div.) was ordered up the road. Traffic Control from Mile 37 to Mile 80 came under command of 23 Division. Four traffic posts were established between Mile 37 and 80. All were manned by B.O.Rs with one jeep at each post. Existing telephone communication between Imphal - Mile 80 - Mile 50 - remained. The other two posts were out of communication. It was not possible to ‘tee’ into the line owing to the number of subscribers already using it. There was insufficient time to lay fresh cable. Radio sets were given to these post, but owing to distance and the geographical features, they were not effective.
(l)The move of 49 Brigade was successful compared with the move of 37 Brigade.
(m) Once 37 and 49 Brigades became established in the Mile 32 area, the troops who had made their way from Miles 109 and 82, together with all soft troops from Mile 82 area, began to make their way into Imphal in unit and in Corps 3rd. Line transport.
MOVES IN THE IMPHAL PLAIN.
RECEPTION IN IMPHAL.
(a) All units returning to Imphal, whether from the Tamu or Tiddim roads, together with sixty units from kanglatongbi, had to be met and given their new locations. Provost were told to assist in this task, as it was realised that with existing resources the Police could not effectively deal with the situation alone.
(b) The enormous difficulties will be appreciated from what has been said in connection with the moves in the Imphal plan.
(c) Method employed.
(i) Tamu line. Mention has already been made of the Transit Camp at Palel, with the G.R.E.F. officer, the R.A. officer and six gunners attached to Provost. The units which were destined for Imphal may well have been given a box destination, but the net result was that they all concentrated at the Rest Camp in the heart of Imphal. For several days, there were never less than 5,000 troops at the Rest Camp. They eventually reached box destinations through representatives from the Services who personally contacted O.Cs Units.
(ii) Tiddim Line. An organisation known as Corps control was established at Mile 37. The staff consisted of G.1.Ops, O.C. 4 Corps provost Unit (who had returned by this time), two staff officers, six B.O.R and eight I.O.R. police. The task was to separate all Corps from Div. troops, put them into lorry loads by units, and
despatch them north to Mile 4 where they would be met by A.P.M. together with representatives from the Services who would give them box destinations. This did not work in practice. The enemy were across the road in areas Miles 70 and 40. Immediate despatch from Mile 37 was imperative. When the lorries reached Contro Post at mile 4 several units were mixed in one lorry. Attempt was made to get troops to correct destination, but again the net result was concentration at the Rest Camp or at a Transport Marshalling Area; which had been formed near Corps H.Q. Units sorted themselves out during the following days.
(iii) Kanglatongbi. A decision was taken at very short notice to evacuate Kanglatongbi. Police in this area (sub-section of 81 Provost Unit) were not told of the evacuation until after it had begun. Not only were sixty units sent off, but vast quantities of petrol, ammunition, and ordnance stores from the depots, had to be brought in. An order of march was given by the Admin. Codt., Kanglatongbi, but this was not adhered to. The enemy was already in Depot area, and the road was being mortared. Units got out as soon as they could. So great was the volume of traffic that vehicles were nose to tail all the way from Kanglatongbi to Imphal.
A.P.M. with service representatives were sent to meet the units and given box destinations. The same difficulties were again encountered. Units were mixed in different lorries. To explain the location of a box to I.O.R. drivers took time and patience. The only practical solution was to allow the transport access to the Marshalling Area and the Rest Camp.
TRAFFIC IN IMPHAL.
(a)The volume of traffic in Imphal increased enormously during this period.
(b) A great number of boxes including those under Commander H.Q. 4 Corps, and the R.A.F. boxes, were located in re-entrants which lie either side of the road from Imphal to a point five miles north. The main two-way road which runs down the middle was drenched with vehicles from dawn to dusk. There was no question of dispersing, as vehicles had to reach their destinations, and there was not enough road space. There was no question of police control at each box, allowing only certain vehicles on the road, for all vehicles had assumed operational importance, and in any case, no police were available.
(c) M.T. discipline deteriorated greatly. Drivers smoked, and speeded whenever the road was clear. When they came to a stationary line of traffic, they double-banked and blocked the road entirely. Officers driving jeeps were noticeably bad in this respect.
(d) The police did good work in keeping the traffic on the move. There was one big bottle-neck just south of the Imphal airstrip, where a narrow road turned east into Corps H.Q., and another road turned west in the R.A.F. area. The A.P.M. asked for a roundabout to be built which was the only solution to keep the traffic flowing evenly, This was refused on camouflage grounds. The A.P.Ms request was sanctioned one week later, but one week was too late.
(e) There were complaints at this time that insufficient Military Police motorcycle patrols were on duty. The A.P.M. was told to put all unit motorcycles in a pool to be used by any Military Policeman at any time of day. The A.P.M. did not agree. Corps Provost Unit was ten motorcycles under establishment, and there was no hope of replacements. To create this pool for any Military Policeman to use was asking for trouble.
(f) Staff Officers who went out onto the road during this period desired to see a Military Police motorcyclist every five hundred yards, forming a “White Line” between the two streams of traffic. Perhaps they were calling to mind a Corps Provost Company on British War Establishment with nine sections and a fleet of motorcycles in a unit, in which every man can ride efficiently. Certainly they forgot that the Police had other duties to perform, such as the encirclement of Imphal with a ring of traffic posts for security purpose, to prevent the entry of Jifs and disguised Japs.
THE RETURN OF THE DIVISIONS.
(c) In the initial stages of the withdrawal, Div, & Bde. transport moved to the main road which began at Morsh, over a network of roads and tracks which had been built in the Hessin - Tamu area. The A.P.M., 20 Division, got two radio sets from Div. Signals. He mounted both in jeeps, one being left at Div. H.Q. The other was given to the second in command who toured the network of road, and told the A.P.M. what was happening. The A.P.M. who was also in touch with the traffic posts on the road by telephone then gave orders as to the volume of traffic which could be allowed into the main road.
(d) The Tamu road was not cut by the enemy for some time, but Japs sprang up at various points from day to day. In this connection, the Police from traffic posts gave valuable information to the A.P.M. as to whether the road was open or not.
(e) 17 Division - Tiddim Road. By the time the enemy cut the road at Mile 100, all soft troops along the road had moved to boxes at:
MS. 109 Road Head.
MS 127 Manipur Road River Bridge.
MS. 134 Tonzang.
MS. 164 Tiddim.
(f) The box at Mile 109 did not hold out for long.
(g) Boxes at Miles 127 & 134 awaited the arrival of 17 Division.
(h) The traffic post at Mile 134 remained outside the box area in order to assist the arrival of 48 Brigade, which had been ordered to the Tonzang Box. Commander, 48 Brigade, later wrote an appreciation of the services rendered by the staff of this post. He stated that their work was invaluable to the administration of his forces.
(i) 17 Division moved by bounds. A Provost officer and a number of police went with each reconnaissance party in order to meet the Division on arrival, and show units their areas. Since the exact location of the enemy was unknown, going was very slow, with the result that more often than not the main body moved directly behind the reconnaissance party. Thus sufficient time was not give to the police to make an efficient arrangement to meet the Division.
(j) The road was so narrow in most places that patrolling up and down the
Moving column was not possible. The police rendered most assistance by walking up and down the line, pushing completely broken-down vehicles over the side, and making towing arrangements for others.
(k) In the harbour areas, Police undertook duties at:-
Bathing Points. Water Points.
Petrol Points. Ammunition Points.
A Stragglers and Information post was also set up in each harbour. Much hard work was done by officers and men in scouting around the area in the early stages, in order that accurate information could be given.
When the battle settled down in the Imphal Plain, traffic control ceased to be the problem, it had been during the preceding weeks. There were two reasons for this:- (a) The four Divisional axis were situated along four two way roads.
(b) Due to the supply situation, the running of all vehicles was restricted to a minimum.
All troop movements through Imphal, such as the interchange of role between two division, brigades moving from ‘A’ to ‘B’, the movement of tanks on transporters to any of the four division, were assisted by patrols from 4 Corps Provost.
In point of fact, as far as traffic control was concerned, the role of the police became inverted. Rather than keep the vehicles moving, the slogan became “Keep all vehicles off the road in order to save petrol.” All drivers had to be in possession of a special pass, signed by Brigade/Box commander or above, authorising the use of the vehicle and stating nature of essential duty. Police were put out to check all vehicles. Over three hundred reports were submitted against drivers on this account during the first week of checks.
The main tasks of Provost during this period were concerned with security and general discipline. There was the constant threat of Jifs and Japs disguised as
civilians entering the box areas. To guard against this, traffic posts were established on all road leading into Imphal. Field Security personnel and civil policemen were attached to each post, whose duties were to check all vehicles and occupants of vehicles, and all personnel on foot who entered Imphal. Military Police at these posts also carried out normal traffic duties. In addition, these posts served as Stragglers Post.
General disciplinary duties fell into eight main heads:-
(d) Bathing & Water Point Regulations. Vast numbers of troops were now concentrated in Imphal. The enemy interfered with the main water supply. New sourced had to be found as water became short. Washing and drinking water came from one river, and the risk of infection grew. The river had to be placed out of bounds, and this order enforced by police.
(e) Thefts & Pilfering. Supplies were all delivered by air. There were six airstrips (3 fine weather and 3 all-weather) in use. In the early days, it was never certain at which strips the planes would land, owing to changes in weather. Stores and equipment were unloaded, and lorries sent to take them to depots. Until the organisation for reception could be tightened up, there were thefts and pilfering at the airstrips. Police were sent to patrol the strips and to ensure by road patrols that lorry drivers did in fact to straight to the depots, and not loiter en route in order to sell good to civilians.
(f) Price Control As the ration scale was reduced, the many local bazaars became more and more thronged. A price control list had been issued by the military and civil authorities, but black market and profiteering was rampant in all areas. Civil and Military Police Liaised in an attempt to control this abuse.
(g) Assaults & Affrays. With the concentration of troops into small areas near villages, assaults and affrays became frequent. Troops went into villages demanding comen, thieving, and in a few cases committing murder. Twenty two cases were
reported during late March and in April. In May, such cases ceased altogether. To some extent this was due to the good work by 81 Provost Unit who tracked down and armed gang of sepoys and Manipuri, who had committed four major dacoities. Orders were issued for a strict check to be kept over unit personnel. Military Police located in or near boxes patrolled the areas in which troops were stationed with civilians.
(h) Traffic. Mention has been made of deterioration in traffic discipline during the withdrawal period. It was now the task of Provost to bring traffic discipline back to normal. This was done by personnel at the posts mentioned previously, and by special patrols sent out from the H.Qs of Corps and Divisional Provost Units.
(a) There has been no refugee problem. There was a certain movement of Manipuri from the hills into Imphal, but the movement was never so great as to cause dislocation to traffic or embarrassment to the civil authorities.
(b) A plan was prepared by GS(I) in case the refugee problem did arise. All refugees were to be directed to an area south of Imphal between the Tamu - Tiddim roads. A sketch map was produced and copies given to all traffic posts located on the roads leading to Imphal.
(a) Relations between the military and civil population were amicable. There was a certain ill-feeling over profiteering and the outburst of assaults and affrays, but this was never serious enough to cause major incidents.
(b) The new location of troops in box areas entailed the evacuation of civilians from many local villages for security purposes. These civilians were moved into areas in Imphal which had been vacated by units. Military Police assisted in the evacuation.
PRISONERS OF WAR.
(c) When the Divisional H.Q. took up more static locations, all Provost Units erected small barbed wire cages. These cages were “holding depots” in which prisoners could be kept overnight before despatch to the Corps cage.
(d) The greater number of prisoners were wounded, who had to be brought into a C.C.S. near Corps H.Q. A wired enclosure was built by Corps Provost within the C.C.S. to accommodate these wounded Japanese.
(e) Both the cages mentioned previously were administered and guarded by 4 Corps Provost. In the initial stages, guards were provided from Reinforcement Camps or from any unit located nearby. This arrangement was totally unsatisfactory. Such guards changed daily, and at times no guards could be found. In view of this and of the importance of adequately guarding all P.Ws, the A.P.M. decided it was best to supply guards from the surplus I.O.R. Sections still attached to the Corps Provost Unit.
(f) P.Ws stayed for no length of time in either cage. They were flown out as soon as fit, or as soon as GS (I) had no further use for them. All arrangements for flying out were undertaken by ‘A’ Branch.
(g) Jifs were not a problem to Provost. They were all taken to a special cage at No.3 F.I.C. A certain number passed through the Divisional Provost “holding depots”.
PRISONERS - other than P.Ws.
(a) A big problem was where to accommodate and how to deal with the following categories of prisoner:-
(i) Prisoners awaiting trial.
(ii) Prisoners awaiting despatch to Military Prisons.
(iii) Prisoners awaiting promulgation of sentence.
(iv) Prisoners awaiting despatch to Civil Prison.
(v) Prisoners undergoing Field Punishment, Detention or Rigorous imprisonment for periods from 28 days to 3 months.
(vi) Civilians arrested under Ordinance XXZVII.
(b) During the period covered, there were never less than 150 such prisoners to handle.
(c) Staff and equipment of No. 115 prisoner of War Unit had some months previously been loaned to the A.P.M. for this purpose.
The staff consisted of:- British Officer 1
Medical Officer 1
C.Q.M.S. 1 C.Q. M.H. 1
Provost Havildar 1
Orderlies and non-combatants.
The Provost havildar was evacuated sick before operations began. The O.C. was quite unsuited to such work. The remainder of the staff were useful, but there was
no prison staff as such. Four B.O.Rs were attached from a Reinforcement Camp, all of low category, and not suitable as a prison staff. One havildar and four L/Naiks were attached from 4 Corps Provost, but owing to heavy commitments elsewhere, it was not possible to attach any B.O.R. Military Police.
(d) When units moved into boxes, the cage, which had been established to accommodate such prisoners, was left in isolation. Speedy erection of a new cage within a box was not possible. All wire was required for defence purposes. A section of the civil jail was cleared, and the prisoners moved in there. This was so unsatisfactory that after one week they were moved back to old location still outside the box area.
(e) A new site was allotted within a box. The A.P.M. secured poles and wire to erect a new cage. No sooner was the cage completed and prisoners moved in, than an order was issued for the dismantling of the cage as the wire was required for defence purposes. The A.P.M. managed to persuade GI (Ops) Corps H.Q. to leave half the cage standing, the other half being dismantled. Three weeks later, fresh wire was obtained and the cage completed.
(f) The guarding of these prisoners was unsatisfactory. Guards consisted of old personnel from a Garrison company who were unfit for the task in hand. At one point, this guard thought fit to pilfer kit from a nearby site from which a unit had just moved out. The entire guard had to be interned in the cage they had just been guarding.
(g) In such conditions, a system of strict and efficient punishment was difficult. Given an O.C. of a different type, the situation should have been better. As has been stated, the present occasion found the O.C. incapable of surmounting the current difficulties.
(h) The situation had improved during the next few weeks. Standing orders were published, and general discipline tightened up.
Lessons to be learned.
(a) Control along 236 miles of Lines of Communications on two roads (156 miles of which were one-way) by Corps Provost Unit, thereby denuding Corps H.Q. of
effective police control, was a freak commitment. It stresses the importance of an adequate reserve under Army control to be held against such a contingency.
(i) Traffic Posts must be properly staffed if control is to be efficient. That is to say that units must be up to strength with first-class men, for duties are numerous, viz.
Manning the telephone & Maintenance of D.O.B. Gate Control.
Security duties. Checking convoys.
Liaison with local engineer, recovery & hospital units. Road Patrols.
Maintenance of vehicles. Fetching water & rations.
Dealing with numerous requests for permission Cooking, sweeping &
To proceed out of time schedule. Washing clothes.
(ii) War Establishment of Followers does not permit a sufficient allotment to each post.
(iii) If a unit has to man five or six such posts with one British and two Indian Sections, the hours of duty for the B.O.Rs are long, with a consequent droop in efficiency over a period of months.
(c) Road Patrols.
(i) Must be carried out at all times, especially when the “gate” system is imposed between sectors. This is to ensure that the road is clear so that traffic may proceed in the opposite direction. Every effort must therefore be made to be up to vehicle establishment.
(ii) The idea of a Military Policeman riding in the last vehicle of a convoy is a poor substitute for not having his own vehicle. This last vehicle may overtake another vehicle which breaks down. If the Military Policeman waits with the broken-down vehicle, he may wait for hours. Meanwhile, he is out of touch with the post ahead and at rear, and no information as to the clearance of the road is available.
(i) A private Police line connecting all traffic posts to regulating H.Q., with a private line from the latter to the formation controlling the road, is the ideal to be achieved.
(ii) The communications by posts being connected on an omnibus line were effective before the battle began, since there was time to wait until another subscriber finished his call on the main line, which had to be used to connect with the Regulating H.Q. But once the battle began, the main line was blocked with emergency calls for hours at a time. Unless you were a G.1 or above, the telephone became useless.
(i) Posts which are not completely isolated must be sited, not for comfort, but with a view to a plan for co-ordinated box defence with neighbouring units. The move of posts into boxes just before the battle began, caused dislocation at a time when steadiness was of paramount importance.
(ii) Regulating H.Q., or posts of lesser importance, must be sited right next door to the Admin. Commandant or Staff Captain, or whatever name is given to the formation representative who is responsible for the general administration of that area through which the L. of C. runs, so that vital messages received by him can immediately be given to the police or visa versa, without telephone calls or messages having to be written out.
(f) Wireless Sets.
(i) A.P.M., 20 Division, found wireless sets invaluable during the initial stages of the withdrawal.
(ii) Sets loaned to 23 Div. Provost were ineffective dut to the distance covered.
(iii) Every opportunity must be taken of putting out jeeps and motorcycles with every unit or formation moving, no matter how straight the road or how clear of other traffic the road is thought to be. Provost must be able to move any convoy over any type of ground at any time of day or night. It is only by constant practice that efficiency will develop as second nature.
(i) Every endeavour must be made to give all Provost officers, V.C.Os, and senior N.C.Os, both B.O.R. and I.O.R., the opportunity of reconnoitering and becoming familiar with areas other than their own divisional areas. Only in this way can the police be prepared for quick moves in any direction.
(ii) Every opportunity must be taken of putting out jeeps and motorcycles with every unit or formation moving, no matter how straight the road or how clear of other traffic the road is thought to be. Provost must be able to move any convoy over any type of ground at any time of day or night. It is only by constant practice that efficiency will develop as second nature.
(a) Provost commitments are heavy. Mixed units and men of poor quality create difficulties. An adequate and efficient reserve is therefore seldom held by any Provost unit. The sudden attachment of B.O.Rs from a local unit is not solution. At all times, particularly in an emergency, the Police must know their job. Such B.O.Rs from local units know nothing about Police duties, and in an emergency there is not time to teach them; they become a liability. The solution is to have units up to strength with first class men.
LOCATION OF UNITS.
(b) Supplementary information must be sent out from Provost H.Q. This is theoretically simple but difficult in practice. Location statements from Formation H.Q. are sometimes lengthy, and much typing is involved. They are often out of date.
(c) Someone who is up to date with locations must be in the Provost H.Q. office at all times in case stragglers arrive at H.Q., or in case N.C.Os i/c traffic posts telephone for information.
(d) An efficient and trustworthy clerk is the answer. Clerks on the strength of Provost Units do not reach this standard. The establishment of B.O.Rs does permit a B.O.R. being put into an officer.
LIAISON WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES.
(c) It is well to remember that routine reports are written to higher civil
authorities in which mention may be made of some small matter affecting
the Provost Service. This small matter may be misconstrued by the
higher authority, and all manner of repercussions ensue. Hours of time
have to be spent in gathering and writing reports from various sources,
all of which might so easily have been averted if liaison had been
Accommodated. Often there may be no accommodation and be scarce.
The Police must understand that it is their job to separate the good from
the bad, and to return all of them to their units as soon as possible. The
importance of accurate location statements is again stressed in this
(b) No stragglers should be accepted from another unit without an
apprehension or surrender certificate in accordance with Indian Army
Orders. During active operations, such certificates are difficult to obtain.
Entry must therefore be made in the records of all stragglers taken in,
stating whether the man surrendered or was apprehended, and by whom.
PRISONERS OF WAR.
Prisoners of War though small in quantity were important in quality. A
small static cage is required at Corps. Forward divisions need not make
elaborate arrangements. The importance of P.Ws from the Intelligence
point of view renders an efficient guard essential. Indian Military Police
who are trained in the method of dealing with P.Ws, and who understand
their suicidal tendencies must be in charge of the guard.
PRISONERS - Other than P.Ws.
Arrangements must be made for the various categories of prisoners listed previously, in any theatre of war. This is due to large numbers of administrative units in any formation. Such units have no Quarter Guard, and no means of detaining prisoners. Even units which have a Quarter Guard, such as G.P.T. companies, find it difficult to administer efficiently 56 days Rigorous Imprisonment. When the unit is operating on a difficult L. of C., this question becomes more serious. In addition, military and civil prisons often cannot accept prisoners when vacancies are requested.
Whether the arrangements for detaining and administering punishment to such prisoners is a Corps or an Area responsibility, it is well to remember that no staff is ever available to run the cage or centre. If officers, B.O.Rs or I.O.rs are attached from Reinforcement camps or local units, they are generally untrained for this type of work and they may be unsuited.
In these circumstances, it would appear that loss of efficiency in the administering of punishment with the consequent deteriorating effect discipline must be accepted.
(c) This is a desperate state of affairs. Each man must be made to realise
the importance of disciplinary duties whilst at the Depot. Officers and
senior N.C.Os must ensure that they and junior N.C.O’s carry out their
duties in this respect at all times.
It is not proposed that such detachments should be composed solely of
I.O.Rs, as they always need stiffening by B.O.Rs. To take the example of
traffic control alone, I.O.Rs by themselves are not capable of moving a
(c) War Equipment Tables. More watches are required. It is suggested
that eight per section instead of the present allotment of two per section.
(d) Transport Scale. The scale is considered good, but sometimes more
motorcycles are required, and often more jeeps. If any change is
contemplated, it is suggested the following scale would be adequate for
H.Q. Each Section.
3 ton Lorry FWD 1 -
15 Cwt. Truck FWD 3 1
Jeep 2 4 (50% trailers)
Motorcycles 4 4
(e) Arms Scale. Considered good. Rifles, Stens and L.M.Gs were useful when traffic post personnel moved into box locations.
(f) War Establishment - Personnel. All Provost officers agree that efficiency could be increased if the establishment were changed to three British and three Indian Sections. All equally realise that this is never likely to take place. It is essential that the two B.O.R. sections should be up to strength at all times, and what an adequate supply of reinforcements should be readily available within Fourteenth Army, so that unit should not have to wait until extracts from strength returns have been passed to the Depot, via G.H.Q. (I), before reinforcements are despatched.
The W.E. for a Tank Brigade Provost Unit is not adequate. In this type of warfare, a Tank Brigade sends detachments to the various formations. These detachments mover over difficult roads, sometimes on transporters, sometimes on tracks, and traffic control is all important.
Owing to the presence of the enemy, lamps and arrows sometimes cannot be used, and pointsmen are essential at every diversion, which are frequent on roads in this area in which many bridges are unsafe for tanks.
Personnel of an Indian Tank Brigade are half British and Indian. Vehicles (approximately 1,600 as against 2,500 in a division) are far heavier and need more control than in a division. The present W.E. of Provost (half British and One Indian
section) is out of all proportion. Traffic Control is the main Provost task with a Tank Brigade, and for this reason it is considered that a W.E of two British and two Indian sections necessary.
(g) Quality of .O.Rs and I.O.Rs.
B.O.Rs. There is no point in again reiterating that we must have
first-class men of Medical category A.1. Such men are not obtainable, and we are forced to make the best of what we do get. Provost is supplied with small men, illiterate men, men who have no desire at all to be in the C.M.P.(I), and men who volunteer because the life is better than the life of an infantryman, and because the pay is better. It is all very well to blame officers, V.C.Os, W.Os, and senior N.C.Os for this, and to say that such men must be chased and made into policemen. They can be chased, and they can be made to do their duty but they are not policemen. Spiritless policemen are a liability.
I.O.Rs. It is a sorry state of affairs to be compelled to state that the great majority of I.O.Rs can only be used as pointsmen, and on such duties as water point control. In general terms, the fact must be faced that I.O.rs cannot read, write, ride, or drive. They may be able to ride and drive along a straight, level road, but this is not enough. In an area such as 4 Corps, they must be competent on all types of ground.
It is usual to say that training must continue when men reach their unit, and to blame officers for not doing more about this. As far as M.T. training is concerned unit commanders are unwilling to train their I.O.Rs on unit transport for which they may have waited months, and which they know cannot be replaced, and when they know that no matter how much training they are given, only one or two are likely to be of use operationally.
Training to any efficient standard within the unit is not possible when duties and commitments are heavy, and when the unit is split up into numerous detachments over the area. Great efforts have been made within certain units to
improve the efficiency of the I.O.Rs, but even in these units such men are far from being efficient policemen. The quality is not there.
(h) Administration. The task of a Unit commander is sometimes forgotten. On the British W.E. of a Provost Company, there are three officers, and on the Indian W.E only two officers. Officers must know about British and Indian administration. Whatever they say or write in one language ought to be said and written in another. There is seldom an efficient clerk on the establishment. There is always trouble over British cooking. Cooks (BT) have always to be watched and no one can be spared with such a small W.E.
If the unit is to efficient, all reports and returns have to be most carefully watched. Not only the Provost service returns, but all the normal returns, such as casualty, posted strength, fighting strength, ration strength, vehicle strength, and other returns,. Reports and A.F.B 252 from personnel of the unit have to be scrutinised. When such points are mentioned, it is often remarked that unit commanders must not allow themselves to become blocked with administration, that they must be out and about, and train their staffs to submit routine work correctly. This is agreed, but the quality of personnel is not such that efficient results are produced without constant observation. Indeed and efficient Provost officer often finds himself playing the part of Lance-Corporal, quartermaster, sergeant major, transport officer, and unit commander all in one.
The preceding two paragraphs have been written in order to indicate some of the difficulties under which Provost is working. It should not be inferred from this that Provost is functioning badly. The Police have had a definite role to perform in these operations. Staff officers from all formations have stated that they have performed this role with efficiency. It is because it is realised how much more assistance might be given that these difficulties are stressed.
4 CORPS AREA.
IMPHAL - RANGOON
PHASE 1 The move of H.W. 4 Corps, Corps troops, and all formations under that command, from Imphal to Irrawaddy crossing.
THE PROBLEM To control an armoured and mechanised force consisting of vehicles of all types (Indian Tank Brigade) in the advance south from Imphal.
RESOURCES AVAILABLE. - Personnel & Equipment. To avoid any misunderstanding as to facts and figures the resources held should be compared alongside the unit W.E. 1/48/3 as given below:-
A Divisional Provost Unit (Six sections).
Off. WOs S/Sgt. Sgt. Cpl. L/Cpl. VCOs Hav. Nk. L/Nk. Sepoy
W.E. 2 1 1 3 4 28 2 4 10 60 6
At the opening of the advance, the Corps Provost Unit was equivalent to that of a division, the actual strength
Off. WOs S/Sgt. Sgt. Cpl. L/Cpl. VCOs Hav. Nk. L/Nk. Sepoy.
2 1 1 3 4 28 2 3 15 65 3
The composition of these units are as follows:-
Mixed H.Q. B.O.R Section 2
I.O.R Section 4
In the case of a Corps unit, an additional B.O.R. and two I. O.R. sections are authorised.
Second I/C 1
M.T. Sgt 1
‘Q’ Naik 1
M.T. Naik 1
‘Q’ Storeman (Sepoy) 1
L/Naik (D.R.) 1
Sepoy Orderly 1
Corps Provost has additional British Officers and Orderly.
It should be noted that although the Corps Provost Unit has since been increased to nine sections, this authority did not materialise until after the crossing of the Irrawaddy river.
Composition of a Provost section is:-
1 Sgt., 2 Cpls. 14 L/Cpls. 1 Hav. 2 Naiks, 14 L/Naiks.
It will be appreciated that although mention must be made of the equipment of a Provost unit, it is proposed to refer to several items only, all of which require careful examination, e.e. Vehicles.
W.E. 1/48/3 allows a standard Div. Provost Unit vehicles as under:-
Jeeps. Trailers. Motorcycles.
40 40 21
It must be emphasized, however, that details of individual units at the commencement of operations cannot be given accurately other than those held
by 4 Corps Provost Unit, i.e.
15 cwt. Jeeps. Trailers. Motorcycles.
W.E. - 55 55 30
Held 21 21 6 11
Mention must be made that Divisional companies, and indeed the Corps Provost, were allotted vehicles on a scale considered necessary by Divisional/Corps staffs.
With reference to the Corps Unit, as must have been the case in other units, vehicles as authorised on W.E. (jeeps) were not apparently available, and the units were equipped with other types of vehicles, invariably 15 cwt Trucks (See 4 Corps Pro. Unit).
An example of the latter is the case of 19 Ind. Div Pro Unit who passed through the Imphal area in November 1944 ex-India. This unit was as per W.E. in jeeps and trailer.
At the commencement of operations all Provost Units were equipped with wireless sets per War Establishment. Divisional units were in possession of three No. 48 sets each. In the case of Corps Provost, three No.22 sets were held.
It should be noted that vehicle all units were in possession of their wireless equipment, they were not authorised a battery charging plant. Operators for these wireless sets were not available in the early days of the operations, these were, however, invariably loaned by formation signals.
All Provost units are authorised telephones on their W.E. scale:-
1 ten line switch board.
30 miles of telephone cable, and all other accessories.
Units are, it will be noted, expected to lay their own telephone lines. This was, however, in very many cases impossible to comply with, and signal units were called upon to perform this duty.
TRAFFIC CONTROL EQUIPMENT.
This very major problem, although adequately catered for in a Provost W. E. was not available to all units other than 19 Ind. Division, who it will be recalled came ex-India in November 1944, when they had been able to acquire equipment by local purchase. The only items which were available at the start of the operation were:-
100 sheets metal 7’ x 3’ which were cut into three portions, each half of which
was given to 7 Div.
Paints & Brushes.
Electric Lamps (hand) approximately 30% of entitlement.
Sets stencil 4” letters.
This item of great importance, was held up to scale (i.e. 14 sets oper unit) by the 17 and 19 Div. Provost Units. Other formations had none whatever. In the case of 4 Corps unit, only one set of stencils were in their possession.
METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT. Control.
Provost are an “A” service, but for the purpose of operations Provost come under direct control of “G” Branch of the formation concerned. The Provost are, however, still responsible to “A” for:-
(i) Collection and onward transmission of P.Ws.
(ii) The maintenance of discipline outside the powers of local commanders, and for providing assistance of police investigations to assist unit commanders in cases of rape, decoity, etc.
The deployment of Provost is, therefore , made by “G” on the advice of the A.P.M. of the formation. Minor duties which materialise in any operational move are dealt with by the A.P.M. of the formation, in collaboration with the A.P.M.Corps.
ORDERS TO PROVOST.
The A.P.M. of a formation, having been allotted a task by “G” proceed to give detailed instructions to the O.C. Provost Unit under command, Corps A.P.M. advising his Provost representative in other formations which are likely to participate.
Note:- It must be stated that road timing, etc, are not compiled by Provost. These are acquired from either “Q” (Mov) or “G” Branch. Up to and inclusive of the irrawaddy crossing, all road timings were controlled by “Q” (Mov), but thereafter “G” (SD) issued the orders.
The best method of acquiring Provost control is for the A.P.Ms or his representative to liaise with other A.P.Ms and ensure that each knows where and when to start operating. This particularly applies to the passing of one formation through another. A practice which will be shown later, as having been the method on which the Corps made the advance.
SYSTEM OF DEPLOYMENT.
Divisions. As had been previously indicated, Provost units are made up in a section basis.
The system, therefore, in a division on operations, is for each brigade to receive one (mixed) Provost section. Thus, when a division has three brigades under command, it allows one section to be employed with Divisional |H.Q. (Permanent), and the remaining two sections for other duties. It is the practice to reinforce a brigade which has been given an arduous Provost task.
It is, however, always the case that Div. H.Q. police control the route over which the Division or Brigade are moving, thus permitting Brigade Provost to concentrate on road discipline, marshalling, and harbouring of their brigades. Internal route signing is always the duties of the formation Provost.
Corps. The Corps Provost Unit was a unit consisting of two British and four Indian Sections. It was not until after the crossing of the Irrawaddy river that their
strength was increased by a percentage of the additional three sections as was then authorised in an amendment to W.E.
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL.
It is the responsibility of Corps Provost to police and control traffic passing along the Corps axis of advance. This is performed by the formation of T.C.Ps. This then enables divisional Provost accompanying their formations to be free of L. of C. responsibilities on the Corps axis, and enables them to operate wholly as a Provost unit, when their formations are ordered into battle.
The method in which the system is operated is illustrated by the move of 4 Corps and formations under command southwards from Imphal, at which time the entire Corps with 10 Indian Division leading was passed through a L. of C. Provost unit who were employed on traffic posts situated along the route.
With 19 Ind. Division in the lead, T.C.Ps were established by theii Provost on the Tohnan-Tonhai track in the wake of the initial assault troops to control the battalion and divisional transport. As soon as was practical, the Corps Provost unit relieved the Division of its T.C.P. responsibilities to enable the latter to continue the advance with a complete Provost unit.
Communications during these operations were by telephone and No. 22 Wireless sets belonging to and operated by Signals personnel. This method of operating was continued during the whole of the advance, with the exception of the Irrawaddy crossing. It should be noted that the Corps assumed traffic responsibility from the rear to the leading division during the entire advance to Pegu.
EXCEPTION - Irrawaddy crossing.
For the purpose of controlling traffic at the crossing of the Irrawaddy in the initial stages, 4 Corps Provost unit and 7 Ind. Div. Provost unit were attached to 5th Mahratta Anti-Tank Battalion. Wht latter was wholly employed as Military Police to assist in traffic control. An additional sixty B.O.R. personnel from R.A. resources were attached for police duties. For this operation, all persons detailed for police duties came under the
command of O.C., 5th. Mahratta Anti-Tank Bat
talion, who in turn was receiving orders from “G” Branch, 7 Ind. Division.
POLICING THE FAMO.
With the arrival of a F.A.M.O. at Kan, Corps Provost were called upon to supply police for the organisation. Provost have since been continually employed in this manner, and on several occasions two F.A.M.Os were working simultaneously. This method of employing Provost personnel was a considerable strain on Provost resources. A similar duty was performed by divisional Provost units, who were called upon to provide police of “Dropping Zones” when their formations were receiving supplies by parachute.
COMPOSITION OF T.C.P.s and DETACHMENTS.
It will be appreciated that with the duties enumerated above, and the fact that I.O.R personnel of a Provost unit outnumber B.O.Rs with a ration of two to one, the system of acquiring full use of I.O.R. personnel was the forming of “mixed sections”, the composition of which is given:-
1 Sgt. 4 L/Cpls. 1 Hav. 1 naik, 9 L/Naiks.
Note: The four remaining B.O.Rs were transferred to the H.Q. section for W.T. duties. It did not necessarily mean that one full mixed section operated a T.C.P.
OUTSTANDING EXAMPLES OF TRAFFIC CONTROL PROBLEMS.
The move from Kan to Pauk. The move southward from Kan to Pauk of a division, Corps H.Q., and Corps troops, all under the command of 4 Corps, must be considered as an outstanding example of traffic problems. The road, approximately seventy miles in length, travels over extremely difficult and mountainous country.
The breadth of this road was only sufficient to permit one-way traffic, and no overtaking by any type of vehicles. With considerable steep gradients and innumerable dangerous bends, and bearing in mind the road was in actual fact a cart track which soon became many inches deep in dust, the speed of convoys was reduced to a
walking pace with long and numerous halts due to vehicles breaking down in the column owing to mechanical defects.
For the purpose of control of the route, five T.C.Ps were established to regulate the flow of traffic and always where a suitable harbour space existed. In addition to this, Provost were so placed in convoys to assist the entire column to maintain road discipline.
Communications with T.C.Ps and road patrols were non-existent other than by aircraft. It was during this operation that a light aircraft was allotted to Provost for the purpose of observing road movement and dropping of information regarding vehicle to be staged, thus allowing priority moves to be carried out. Breakdowns and road blocks were also reported to T.C.Ps in this manner. It is well to note that the Provost wireless could not be utilised, having no operator’s, and in fact the effect of the mountainous country reduced wireless efficiency. Corps signals were unable to assist in this matter. To facilitate movement of traffic, permission was obtained to order any broken-down vehicles causing a traffic hold-up, to be abandoned and pushed off the roadway.
The Crossing of the Irrawaddy River. The Provost operating under the command of O.C., 5 Mahratta Anti-Tank as has previously been stated, together with their personnel strength at the time, were charged with the task of controlling the beachhead and all approaches thereto.
A sketch map showing the traffic plan at this crossing is attached (Appendix (‘H’).
The planning for this operation had been decided upon many weeks in advance, Provost being represented by the D.A.P.M. Corps. It had been decided that the crossing would take place from Myitche, and that all traffic and vehicles taking part in the assault would assemble on the Pakokku-Myitche road. A reconnaissance party consisting of Engineers and others, accompanied by a Provost representative examined the approaches leading up to the beach-head. It was decided that troops and vehicles would form up for the assault on a series of tracks branching south from the Pakokku-Myitche road. These tracks were marked and signposted in different colours, four in all. Tracks were known by their respective colour, each for a particular purpose:-
White Route. For the initial assault.
Yellow Route. For marching troops.
Black Route. For returning transport.
Green Route. Tracked vehicles and heavy guns.
These tracks converged on a “FUP” which was in telephone communication with a Regulating H.Q., the latter being established on the river bank in such a position that the traffic moving down to the loading platforms on the beach could be regulated, i.e. called forward from the “FUP” as required. The “FUF” was sited approximately half a mile from Regulating H.W., and was under cover of trees, etc.
The A.P.M., Corps, was stationed at Regulating H.Q with O.C., 5 Mahratta A/Tanks (Beachmaster).
The white route was used for the initial and diversionary assault, and did not approach the beach which was known as “A” Beach.
The yellow route was never utilised.
A further white route was made for the approaches to “A” beach, this being adjacent to black route, and was utilised by all types of wheeled transport proceeding to the beach.
The black route was utilised for returning transport, as all infantry had had debussed at Regulating H.Q.
The green route was, as had been indicated, utilised for tracked and heavy vehicles. This route did not converge on the “FUP”, but approached the beach at Regulating H.Q.
For the purpose of police control, T.C.Ps were established at points shown on the attached sketch. It will be observed that a police post known as “Control Tower”, equipped with “loud hailers” and in telephone communication with Regulating H.Q., was established on the river bank for the purpose of calling forward traffic and indicating the particular jetty to which certain vehicles were to be loaded. A similar method of
controlling traffic was operated on the far side of the river by the leading division after the assault had been launched. Police were posted along the approaches to the beach to ensure that drivers maintained distances between vehicles.
IRAWADDY - PEGU.
Move - Myitiche to Maiktila. The problem of the move of rear elements of 17 Division, 5 Ind. Division, Corps and Corps troops, over a distance of approximately 130 miles through enemy controlled territory, and the crossing of the Corps axis of advance by 33 Indian. Corps.
17 Ind. Division, having captured Meiktila, 4 Corps had to open the L. of C. The routed decided upon was Myitche - Naungu - Kamye - Taunghta - Mahlaing - Meiktila. The method adopted was that of a “Block”, each block consisting of approximately 1,000 vehicles, these to be escorted by 5 Ind. Division, supported by armoured cars. As the enemy was in occupation of Taungtha, and all vehicles had to be escorted south from that point, vehicles for convoy were concentrated at Kamye.
The difficulties added to those already given above were the infiltration of 33 Ind. Corps, who were ordered to advance towards Kyaukpadaung and Pagan from the area of Myingyan, thus crossing the line of advance of 4 Corps towards Meiktila. The bulk of 33 Ind. Corps crossed 4 Corps axis of advance at Kamye. Part of the Corps came by way of Taungtha from the Myingyan area, and then turned west along the Taungtha - Mayme road, when they again joined the main body. This latter move caused a good deal of traffic congestion, as the road from Taungtha to Kemye is in many places extremely narrow.
This congestion need not have occurred had the arrangement for the move of 33 Corps been adhered to, and all vehicle for that formation had crossed the 4 Corps axis of advance at Kamye.
Provost Plan. 4 Corps Provost were for this move reinforced by twenty gunner personnel. In addition, the undermentioned wireless sets with operators were attached:-
One 399 set. Corps of Signals.
Three No.22 sets R.A.
One Cipher N.C.O.
The route was controlled by Corps Sector Control Posts (TCPs), and were established at the undermentioned places, giving code names:-
NYAUNGU - (Start point)
KAMYE - Garter.
TAUNGTHA - Banner.
MAHLAING - Olympia.
MEIKTILA - Plassey. (D.P.)
Regulating H.Q. was at Taungtha (Banner). Communications between Corps and Sector Control Posts were:-
399 set from Corps to Regulating H.Q.
No.22 sets between Taungtha - Mahlaing - Meiktila.
Corps Provost wireless was operated by mobile patrols between Nyangu and Kamye. Kamye and Taungtha were in telephone communication. The personnel strength at each post varied with the amount of work that was to be performed from the particular post. In the initial stages of the advance 5 Di. Provost Unit were called upon to supply police personnel at Mahlaing and Meiktile. They remained in position until relieved by 4 Corps Provost Unit, but were under orders of Corps for that duty.
The Passing of one Division through another.
To facilitate the rapid advance of 4 Corps on the Meiktila-Rangoon road, 5 Ind. Division were passed through 17 Ind. Division after the latter had captured Pyawbwe. H.Q., 4 Corps, ordered that 5 Ind. Division were to be given complete priority on the road, and instructed 17 Ind. Division to enforce this. At this stage, 4 Corps Provost only controlled the road up to and inclusive of five miles south of Meiktila. Due to demolished bridges, the road was regarded for some considerable time as fit for one-way traffic only.
This column of 5 Indian Division, when on the move south, were subjected to a strafing attack by Japanese aircraft in the area of Pyawbwe, and approximately thirty vehicles carrying petrol and ammunition were destroyed. These vehicles caused a serious road block, which due to exploding ammunition, prevented the column from continuing the advance south. Meantime, the entire divisional transport was on the main road and facing south.
These vehicle had only travelled a few miles before being held up in a block of traffic stretching fourteen miles. Vehicles being head to tail throughout, and as the column was only half-way through the area occupied by 17 Division, they could not be taken off the road. As at other places on the road, vehicles were unable to get off the road, owing to the steep banking at either side. After the obstruction of the burning vehicles had been overcome, the move south was accelerated.
The Crossing of the SWA CHAUNG and the passing of 17 Division through 5 Ind. Division.
With 5 Indian Division leading the advance up to Toungoo, 17 Indian Division had followed closely in pursuit, and were ordered to pass through 5 Ind. Division, and continue the advance south as the leading division. The passing through of 17 Division was accomplished without much difficulty. The major obstruction was the river at Toungoo, where the road bridge had been demolished. The policing at the river crossing which was made over a low-level “Elephant Bridge” was accomplished by 17 Div. Provost Unit. The 5 indian Division followed the leading division southwards, whilst Corps H.Q. remained north of Toungoo. At this time, heavy rains were encountered causing the rivers to be responsible for demolishing the “Elephant bridge” over the Swa Chaung, and greatly reducing the efficiency of the bridge over the river at Toungoo.
It must be pointed out that 19 Ind. Division who had pursued the other formations taking over the defended localities from the rear division, were at the time of the braking of the bridge over the Swa Chaung, mixed up with Corps, Corps troops, and part of 5 Ind. Division units under command of Army and R.A.F. convoys. The breaking of the bridge caused a halt to all road traffic. This halt lasting for over 48 hours caused the traffic on the north bank to “pile up” head to tail, and the column extended for over thirty miles. There were, however, gaps on this column due to convoys halting and staging, knowing full well that they could not get over the river. Due to several convoys overtaking others, the whole of the thirty miles of transport was what might be called a
“mixed” convoy. Efforts by convoy commanders to collect their own convoys were futile.
On the opening of this bridge, only light traffic was permitted over and on a priority basis, issued by “G” Branch at Corps. The move thereafter was good, and maintenance convoys were given a high priority.
Personnel Strength. That the Provost were inadequately staffed was obvious due to the many occasions that Provost had to have B.O.R. personnel attached for police duties and operators of wireless sets from Signal resources. It is suggested, therefore, that the B.O.R. strength of a Provost unit which is at present two I.O.Rs to one B.O.R, should be altered to read - two B.O.Rs to one I.O.R.
That a Provost unit must on entering operations be fully equipped with all items as per War Equipment Table. It is suggested that in the light of experiences in these operations that the W.E.T. should be amended in several items.
Vehicles. The scale of issue for a Provost Unit on Scale “E” is 40
jeeps and trailers. It is considered therefore in the light of these
operations that a unit complete to W.E cannot be self-supporting.
It is recommended that the W.E.T. be amended to permit one 15
cst. Truck per section, and an additional five 15 cwt. Trucks for H.Q.
These would be utilised under:-
2 15 cwts. Q.M. Stores.
1 “ L.A.D. purposes.
1 “ Provost Office.
1 “ Permanent P.W. cage.
Communications. This very major item has been inadequate during
operations, and subsequently reduced the efficiency of Provost.
Road movement was considerable but much retarded owing to
breakdown in communications between Provost and the controlling
body, invariably “G” Branch. The lesson learned was never to
depend upon small wireless sets to form a line of communication
over an extended move. Range must be restricted over which
small sets are operated. It is recommended that on moves of
major importance, a 388 set be attached from Signal resources
up direct with Corps.
Use of Aircraft. Owing to distances between T.C.Ps, and the
intervening hilly terrain, T.C.Ps were not in communication with
each other.. At this stage of the operations. “G” Branch
authorised the use of a light aircraft for Provost purposes. This
was put to good effect by studying the general move of traffic by
road, obstruction, and communicating with T.C.Ps, in that
instructions were dropped to respective posts.
The lesson learned was the need for communication from ground to
air. It is recommend that this matter receive immediate
consideration for future operations.
Disposition of T.C.Ps. A lesson learned in the area of Meiktila was to
avoid operating too great a distance of road, and the need to
collect T.C.Ps after the main body of troops have passed through
thus permitting Provost to collect and push forward in a new
advance. Difficulties of this nature were encountered at
Meiktila-Pyawbwe, where the Corps Provost unit were held to
responsibilities as far back as Taungtha inclusive, until only a few
vehicle per day were proceeding past their posts. The personnel
so employed could well have been sent forward to the Pyawbwe
area sooner than they were, and perhaps would have prevented
the colossal traffic jam which occurred between 5 and 17 Divisions,
a situation which was observed by the Army Commander and
apparently caused him to issue a strong letter on the subject.
The lesson learned, therefore, is to keep the Division or Corps
Provost operating forward of the Divisional or Corps H.Q., and
avoid having personnel held to commitments rear of that H.Q. The
method of operating must, therefore, apply to Army Provost who at
no stage in the operations relieved 4 Corps Provost of rear
commitments, although called upon to do so.
Inability and Lack of Initiative of I.O.R. Provost. As has already
been suggested, the I.O.R personnel of Provost unit are in so great
a number in comparison with NB.OR. policemen. It was found
that beyond point (traffic) duty, there was very little else they could
be called upon to perform in the way of duties in the recent
PROVOST DUTIES DURING 11 (E.A.) DIVISION OPERATIONS
From a traffic control point of view, there were two definite phases, Monsoon and post-Monsoon, each with its own special problems. During the Monsoon period, the Division advanced from Tamu to Sittaung, and from Tamyu to Yazagyo under the worst possible conditions for transport. During the post-Monsoon period, the Division advanced more rapidly from Yazagyo to Kalowa and captured the bridgehead beyond.
During the Monsoon period, roads which during the dry season are two-way roads could only be used for one-way traffic, This was done by block timings and the general principle adopted was forward traffic in the morning, and rearward in the afternoon. Provost enforced this by means of T.C.Ps in the usual manner.
In consultation with R.E and Provost, the “G” Staff laid down whether the road should be used by jeeps or large vehicles. During the heavy rains it was found that once a road was thrown open to 30 cwts (normally under pressure from S. & T. to save transhipping stores), the road thereafter was unfit for jeeps as the tracks became too deep. One of the greatest problems was preventing drivers, tracking. Each vehicle would follow in the preceding vehicle’s tracks, thereby making the tracks deeper every time, and in the end the ruts would be so deep that no vehicle could pass until much work had been done on the road.
Road blocks were sometimes caused by vehicles running out of petrol through not having provided for the low mileage per gallon as a result of the state of the road. The mud often made it impossible to push the vehicles off the road, and the cutting of a deviation involved hours of work. To reduce these, it arranged for all T.C.Ps to hold a stock of petrol, and traffic control vehicles carried containers with petrol for those vehicles out of petrol, or about to run out.
At one period, traffic control was done on foot. This took place when the Division forced itself through the mud from Tamu to Khampat. The bridges had been built and miles of road corduroyed. Tac. Division went forward but nothing else could follow because the heavy rains again set in, followed by a deluge which washed away all bridges and damaged most of the corduroy. The work was started again, and during this period it was the duty of Provost to prevent the road from being used by any but the most essential vehicles. This control was done on foot. Daily reports were made by Provost on the state of the road, depth of Ford’s, progress of work, and the weather. Rain gauges were made by T.C.Ps as it was found more reliable to report by inches of rain.
After two and a half weeks and a spell of dry weather, the move was continued again. It was found the road would not stand the traffic after the first few vehicles, and mud conditions were as bad as ever. Progress of five miles in 24 hours was considered outstanding, and guns had to be winched from tree to tree.
The Divisional Commander’s orders were that every nerve should be strained to get forward, and any driver who showed more initiative or energy could pass any other vehicle. So far as the laggards were concerned, Provost became slave drivers and had to watch constantly for any unit or individual who did not battle on from dawn until sunset. Winching and corduroying in darkness was tried and abandoned.
One story is illustrative of this factor:- one Lieut-Colonel, who was annoyed at the more energetic passing him, took names on six occasions in one day. He arrived with his unit at a tC.C.P at 16.00 hours, and asked the Provost sergeant for a place to camp. He was politely told that the orders were no halts till darkness. When he insisted he was going to stay, the Provost sergeant said, “Then, Sir, I must ask you for your name”, whereupon he jumped into his jeep and ploughed on, followed by his unit.
Road control by air was tried once. A vague report was received that all movement between Khampat and Yazagyo had stopped, because a battery was stuck in the mud and was not trying hard enough to get forward. To reach the head of the column would not have been possible by jeep, and on foot through the mud would have taken all day. At the Div. Commander’s suggestion, the A.P.M. flew over the road in a light aircraft and did the return trip in forty minutes. Trees prevented the identification of the battery, but he was able to satisfy himself that traffic was fairly evenly distributed along the whole road, and that there was no block.
When the rains ceased, narrower roads were reached which require strict traffic control of a different kind. Block timings were necessary for 15 cwts and over. By strictly enforcing twenty five yards at the halt and on the move, and pulling up as near to the left of the road as possible, it was not at any time between Kyigon, Kalewa, and Mutaik necessary to have one-way traffic for jeeps. Jeeps without trailers always had free running. There is seldom time to lay minor charges on operations, and a form was therefore adopted which was filled in on the spot.
Prisoners of War.
These presented no special problems. There were not may live Jap P.Ws,and the prisoners were mainly Jifs and Burmese suspects. A cage was always built at main Div. H.Q. In addition, well made mobile cages were constructed by wiring in a captured jap 3-ton lorry. This was also used as a static cage when after a move the new cage had not yet been constructed. Provost were never required to escort P.Ws, but only to guard them in the Div, cage and to evacuate them. It was agreed from the start that there were insufficient British ranks to provide escorts, and it was impracticable for African ranks alon. Escorts were usually provided from returning supply columns.
The manner of registering PO.Ws in and out of Div. cages by Provost should be standardised. From experience in Abyssinia, it was know that unless this is done with great care, complaints of missing valuables which usually were made long afterwards cannot be investigated.
A register was made with the following headings:-
Div, cage number.
Date & time received.
P.W number, rank & name.
Date & Place of capture.
Date & place of Medical attention (if any) & health.
Interrogation by Div. (I) Branch completed on.
Date of despatch to Corps Mobile Cage.
O.C., P.O.W. Cage.
Above prisoner and property as listed received.
This meant passing the information on by letter when the prisoner was evacuated. Forms were therefore cyclo-styled and a form made out in triplicate for each prisoner. If printed forms on these lines were available in book form, it would simplify matters. I agree that this could not be done if Jap prisoners were taken by the thousand, but they are not, and the numbers are usually small.
Civil Population & Co-operation with Field Security Personnel.
Provost worked in close liaison with Field Security and the Civil Administration Officers. Provost duties were to patrol villages to prevent looting and incidents. The most satisfactory was was to attach a small detachment of Provost to Field Security, and as a result incidents were few and far between.
There is only one answer to this question, and that is for Signals to provide a section whose sole duty it is to lay and maintain T.C.P lines for Provost with black twisted cable. This is done in other formations. Although Provost hold against W.E. thirty miles of D3 cable, it is not considered that it was ever intended that Provost should lay and maintain ten to fifty miles of line. Provost should only do this for one-way traffic control over short stretches such as the Chindwin bridge. In any case it was found that D3 cable is useless of very long distances if used with buzzer telephones.
In certain places it was found best for Provost to lay a metallic return line so that if one broke as a result of enemy fire the other line could be turned into an earth return line. This happened when the Chindwin Bridge was bombed. The No18 sets proved useless. They did not have sufficient range, and when the transformers chiefly as a result of damp gave in, replacements were unobtainable. No.48 would have been drawn instead of No.18 sets had they been available, but these neither have the range. The only answer seems to be No.22 sets, but these require stained Signals personnel. If more British ranks could be obtained, an endeavour would be made to train them, although Signals state that twelve months training would be necessary.
With regard to Div. communications, during the monsoon it frequently happened that Div. Signals lone parties could not repair the Div. line to Brigades as the roads were impassable and the rivers in flood. T.C.Ps on numerous occasions relaid the Div. lines across rivers when washed away as a result of the poles on the bank being swept away, and also trees. When for two and a half weeks most units were isolated as a result of the deluge, T.C.Ps patrolled road sectors on foot and until a Div. Courier service was started, ferried the D.R.L.S bags and A.P.O mail forward by carrying them in their packs.
These required a good deal of policing to prevent theft, chiefly from wide drops. The majority of thefts did not occur at the Dropping Zone, but at the base where the aircraft are loaded. This applied chiefly to sugar, cigarettes, and rum. This was reported to the proper quarters. During the deluge period at Witok, the A.P.M. became isolated with six hundred troops and responsible for their feeding, etc. Provost therefore had a Dropping Zone, and obtained intimate knowledge of Dropping Zone control.
There was no occasion during the operations when motorcycles could have been used. The mud was either too deep or the roads too rough. The Provost Company were never brought up to scale in transport, and sections only had one 30 cwt, 6 x 6 and one jeep each. Latterly two sections had no jeeps. This was totally inadequate and with the small numbers it made the work even more difficult. Representations were made from time to time to Div. H.Q., but the answer always was that there was no more available.
The W.E. in for five jeeps and trailers per section and eight for Company H.Q. An alternative establishment might be provided, e.g. one 30 cwt 6 x 5 and three jeeps and trailers, or five jeeps and trailers. During the monsoon there are times when a 30 cwt 6 x 6 can get there when a jeep cannot, especially when provided with a trailer.
This presented no special problems and was operated on the Chindwin until the Bailey bridge on pontoons was built.
The operations showed that the present establishment is unsatisfactory, particularly in the scale of B.O.Rs.
Provost were always well forward. A Provost section went over the Chindwin the same night as the assault troops, and was occasionally shelled on the forward bank. A second in command of a Battalion which approached Kalewa along the left bank fro Mawlaik, and spent weeks of operations getting there, remarked that the first he saw on entering Kalewa was a Military Policeman.
SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 11 EAST AFRICAN DIVISION PROVOST UNIT.
Unit Traffic Control. Some time ago, instructions were issued that all units should maintain a small traffic control sections, its strength being dependent on the strength of the unit and relative numbers of vehicles. This was never carried out to any extent.
There will never be enough Provost to station a pointman at every bad corner and at every steep hill. Unit have been seen blundering onto a new location without any planning. At a steep hill where a vehicle stuck half way, all Africans would have to get out and another attempt made. No one was left behind to warn the rest, the next vehicle would make the same mistake, and the whole move forward would consequently be delayed. Similarly, the placing of the unit’s winch vehicle at the steep hill where trouble could be expected, was often omitted. Provost had on one occasion to produce a winch lorry from another battery which hauled up one in every eight vehicles of the battery moving.
The cutting of a “vehicle harbour” large enough to take the unit’s vehicles is often not carried out before the arrival of the unit transport. When vehicles arrive and cannot fit in, no attempt is made by the unit to send out personnel to halt the column to prevent vehicles piling up on the road. These are a few examples of what could have been prevented if unit maintained a small traffic control section.
The duties of such a section would be to go forward to cut a vehicle harbour leaving pointsmen at bad places on the way. When the move has been completed, the section would resume the normal duties in the unit. Provost would be prepared to train the Officer or British N.C.O. 1/c Unit Traffic Control Section.
Interval on the Move and at the Halt. There is no doubt that the most important part of all traffic discipline is maintaining proper distance on the move and at the halt, and also pulling up as near to the left of the road as possible. To prevent drivers falling into bad ways as a result of the example of L. of C. Units, it is suggested that during the rest and training period, these rules are strictly enforced by units.
Lack of Transport. During the whole of the operations, the Provost company never had more than five jeeps which prevented adequate traffic patrols being sent out. Regulating traffic is the least of the duty of a T.C.P., but rather that of a mobile patrol H.Q. The establishment put up by D.P.M., 14th Army is for 38 Jeeps.
Lack of Communications. The greatest handicap was lack of adequate communication between T.C.Ps. As a result, chaos was too often only narrowly prevented. Improvisation was resorted to and T.C.Ps were linked to Battalion exchanges. Battalions moved on overnight, and left the T.C.Ps out of communication again. Patrols were frequently sent out after midnight to give the next T.C.P. information regarding the next day’s moves and traffic plan. A telephone call would have obviated this and left men fresh for the next day’s work. Frequently there was no available transport to enable T.C.Ps to communicate by this method.
Labelling Telephone Lines. Not only Provost but other units have had their lines completely “stolen” by linesmen, i.e. put into the service of another unit which subsequently claimed the line as their own. Latterly Provost labelled their lines by coloured pieces of parachute and other material wherever the line crossed a chaung or culvert. A standardised method might be adopted by all units when circumstances permit.
OPERATIONS OF 17 INDIAN DIVISION PROVOST UNIT.
The Division advanced elements crossed the Irrawaddy a few days prior to the main body. This reconnaissance element was an armoured one, and withy it went two Military Police jeeps and six Military Policemen. It was the duty of these M.Ps to make a road reconnaissance and to report confirming (or otherwise) information already obtained from air photos. This was done, and on receipt of their report, a traffic control plan was prepared. Bad chaung crossings were manned, T.C.Ps erected, and T.C.Ps established at bottlenecks.
The Division then started its drive to Meiktila. A road party to man pre-selected points was sent forward in the rear of the leading battalion. These men stayed in position at their points until all the division had passed through. They then rolled up and came in with the rear elements.
Layout Groups, Harbouring & General Discipline.
These consisted of div. And unit representatives and Military Policemen, and were sent forward with the leading brigade. It was the duty of the layout group to select the harbour, and on their doing so, the M.Ps signed and routed it. Thus, by the time the main body arrived, the harbour was ready to accept them, and not any time was lost in harbouring the vehicles. If possible, it is better to have more than one entrance to a harbour area; this has been found to speed up the process of harbouring considerably.
A great thing when moving a column such as the one that moved during this operation is to keep the tail of the column moving at all times. This can, however, only be done effectively by having pre-selected bounds and by speedy harbouring. Double banking should not be allowed unless the road on which is operated will accept three streams of traffic. Double banking is then advisable as it halves the length of the column, and if two entrances to the harbour are made, the time saved is amazing. Prior, however to permitting double banking, it must be ascertained that there are not bottlenecks such as bridges or railway crossings, which will necessitate a single stream of traffic. If no such obstacles exist from one bound to another, double banking is advocated, but not unless there is the maximum police control. The reason for only allowing a double stream of traffic on a road that will with ease take three is to permit the bringing up of guns, bridging, or sapper material, that is required on demand, with the least possible delay.
When guns etc. are required to be brought forward from the middle of the rear of the convoy, the roving W/T set acts as guide for such vehicles, leaving a Military Policeman to ensure that nothing other than the vehicles required follows. The Military Police road part that goes forward should be as strong as possible to man culverts or any other place where there is likely to be a stoppage, which is not allowed for in the traffic plan. The password at all times is to keep the vehicles moving at all costs and under any conditions. Speed and density must always be maintained. Only at Chaung crossings and bridges are vehicles allowed to close up. Once over these they resume their density.
Use of Wireless Telephony.
Aset was established at the Starting Point, and another at the Dispersal Point, whilst a third had a roving commission up and down the column. By doing this, the progress of the column could be ascertained at any given time.
Grouping of the Colum,
The Division was split into groups, and with each of these groups were marshalling M.Ps. It was their job to marshal their group prior to moving, and whilst on the move to keep M.T. discipline. On arrival at the harbour, the marshalling N.C.O. would report the number of vehicles that had broken down en route, and how the recovery had been made, and also any breaches of M.T. discipline. It was also the duty of these M.Ps to ensure that the number of vehicles which passed the S.P. arrived at the D.P. This system was found to be very effective and at all times all vehicles arrived safely in harbour except on one occasion when a vehicle was destroyed by air activity. Each Brigade has a mixed section, and it is their responsibility to bring the Brigade vehicles to the S.P. and arrange reception at the D.P.
The road on which the Brigade was to travel was manned by personnel remaining at H.Q. Signing of mined areas, diversions, and classifying bridges, is done by the road party. In the case of bridges, they are classified by the sappers and signed by the M.P.s accordingly. If owing to enemy opposition the Division could not make its boud, a temporary harbour was selected and all vehicles got off the road. It is considered that even if three or four such temporary harbours have to be made before making the final bound, it is worth the trouble of harbouring rather than risk a stoppage on the road.
Use of Motorcycles.
Motorcycles were given a stretch of road which they were responsible for patrolling whilst the convoy was moving through.
Taking over of Towns.
On arriving at a town the M.Ps accompanied by the Civil Police would go forward with the leading troops and establish both Military and Civil Police posts, sign the town, and place out of bounds all captured enemy dumps. On arrival of the Division, orders for the disposal of stores in the dumps were issued, and the guarding of them handed over to units.
On arrival at Meiktila the road party went forward into the town, selected the best routes, helped the sappers clear the mines, and signed the mined area. Patrolling was carried out although snipers still existed and had to be cleared. Once settled in Meiktila, a permanent Police post was erected in the town and all roads were named. T.Ps were manned at all main road junctions and bridges, and the movement of mobile columns in and out of Meiktila were notified to the Police and they were routed in and out of the town. The move forward from Meiktila was carried out working on those lines, and hitches were few and far between.
It has been found essential to have as many police as possible on Dropping Zones to prevent pilfering. The area of Dropping Zone is very large, and with insufficient police it is not possible to prevent pilfering.
The importance is stressed that the maximum training periods be allotted at the Depot to movement by road. During such training it must be realised that in county such as this, only the absolute maximum of control must be maintained at all times. Men must be prepared to work 24 hours. A vigil on the road must be maintained the whole time, or state of chaos is bound to arise. During the course of these operations, the Military Police have played their part and have upheld the traditions of the C.M.P. (I).
OPERATIONS OF THE 26 INDIAN DIVISION PROVOST UNIT.
ARAKAN. FEB. TO MAY 1944.
At the beginning of February, 1944, 26 Ind. Division at that time in a training area (Fenua Camp), just north of Chittagong, suddenly received orders to proceed to the Arakan, to assist in the relief of 7 Ind. Division.
The move to Bawli was completed in three days, Brigades by road and rail, and Div. H.Q. by road. A Provost detachment of one and three British, and two and eight Indian was allotted to each Brigade, and one and two British were sent to Dohazari under the command of a Div. Liaison officer. All remaining Provost were employed to control traffic on the Class ‘B’ road - Fenua Camto to Nazir Hat (about 10 miles), and also at Nazir Hat Railway station to assist directing the loading of trains. The A.P.M. went to Nazir hat railway station at the commencement of the moves and remained there until the last train departed, when he returned to Fenua Camp. Provost Company officers remained at Fenua Camp; forming up convoys, etc. and patrolling the road.
Considering the complete lack of written orders, the move was a great success. Vehicles were loaded at Fenua and despatched in convoy to Nazir Hat, where they off loaded and returned in convoy to Fenua. All other vehicles were halted when these convoys were travelling. Brigades were out in two days and were followed by Main Div. H.Q., who proceeded direct to Baeli, via Chittagong, in M.T.
Main Div. H.Q. were allotted a Provost Company, an officer, one and three British, and one and three Indian other ranks. Read Div. H.Q. made a similar move the next day in three groups, with a Provost vehicle leading and tailing each group, in addition to Provost outriders. The Dohazari detachment followed up in the rear of this convoy. On arrival at Bawli, on 11 Feb. 1944, liaison with A.P.M., Corps, was made, and 26 Div. were instructed to police the Goppe Pass road in addition to its camp area. This class ‘B’ road ran from Bawli to the foot of the Goppa Pass (Garrets Garden), and was about five miles in length. T.Ps were established, one at each end of the road, with two B.O.Rs and four I.O.rs at each post, control being maintained with telephones and patrols.
For the sake of concealment from the enemy, and possible security, the Div. Commander issued instructions that red cap covers would not be worn on the Goppe Pass or anywhere within east of the Mayu Range. 100% stand to at dusk and at dawn came into effect on 11 Feb. and was continued until the withdrawal to Ukhia in May.
On 14 February, Main Div. h.Q., with its Provost detachment increased by four I.O.rs, moved over the pass to Goppe. This move was made on foot, baggage being lifted on mules. Personal kits were cut down to:- Officers - 30 llb. Other Ranks - 15llb. The only equipment carried by this Provost detachment was six arrows and two Div. H.Q. signs. Surplus baggage and stores were left with rear Div. H.Q. At that time 4 Brigade and 71 Brigade were pushing south from Goppe, in an endeavour to make contact with the surrounded 7 Division, while 36 Bde. was held in reserve at Bawli.
Stragglers Posts were established at Goppe and at Bawli. A P.W. cage was not considered necessary as a Corps cage was already in existence at Bawli. A fortnight later, as the forward Brigade had made such grand headway in breaking into the 7 Div. “Box” and had assisted to open the Ngakyedauk Pass, main Div. H.Q. moved forward to Badana. At the same time, 35 Bde. moved over the Goppe Pass to Goppe, making the position:-
4 and 71 Brigades. Sinzweya “Box” Area.
Main Div. Badana.
36 Brigade. Goppe.
Read Div. Bawli.
Shortly afterwards, all personnel at Read Div. reduced their kit to the scale used by main Div. All surplus baggage was then sent back to the Div. dump at Nawapara.
On 1st march 1944, the A.P.M. and six B.O.Rs moved forward by road over the Ngakedauk Pass to the Sinzweya “Box”, where they contacted the A.A. & Q.M.G., who had come forward from Badana, and reconaissanced an area for Rear Div. H.Q. This part was accompanied by a battalion of 71 Brigade. No light of any description was allowed after dusk. The following day the A.P.M. reconnaissanced and signed a route for the move of Main Div. H.W. from Badana to Awlanbyin, approximately four miles from Sinzweya. The next morning the A.P.M. led a convoy of empty vehicles from Sinzweya to Badana. The vehicles were loaded and moved off. About a mile from Badana considerable firing was heard, and shortly afterwards the A.P.M. was halted by a Garhwal officer who stated that the enemy, approximately a company, was astride the road, but that he expected the road to be clear in a very short time.
The little battle, however developed rather than diminished, and it was seven hours later before the convoy could continue its journey in safety. Fortunately the move was completed in daylight.
The following day, the previously reconnaissanced area for Read Div. H.Q. was signed, and that night Read Div. H.Q. moved up from Bawli. The Provost party already at Sinzweya provided guides from the Ngakyedauk Pass to the new area. As at Bawli, Provost were placed on the perimeter of Read Div. camp, and allotted a sector. Four L.M.G. positions were dug and manned during the hours of darkness. During daylight, two sentries sufficed. Liaison was made with the A.P.M 7 Division, and respective traffic control duties on the main roads were arranged. Owing to the difficulties of defending Rear Div. camp, three days after their arrival in the area, Read Div. H.Q. moved to another site, still in Sinzweya and quite near the east gate of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Again Provost were allocated their sector of the perimeter, and L.M.G. positions were sited and dug.
On 10 March, all non essential vehicles were sent back to the Div. M.T. park at Nawapara, Provost retaining only nine jeeps and two trucks. Provost detachments at Main Div, and Brigades each retained one jeep. All motorcycles were sent to Nawapara as they were quite useless on the terrible dusty and uneven roads. Provost traffic control duties at that time were six traffic pointsmen, and a jeep patrol on the road from Sinzweya to Awlanbyin. A few days later, 36 Brigade moved forward from their Goppe - Badana area to a position south of Maungdaw - Buthidaung road, about two miles west of Buthidaung. In consequence, three additional traffic pointsmen and a jeep patrol were found on the Sinzweya -Buthidaung road.
On 25 March, about 06.30 hours, considerable firing was heard east of Read Div. H.Q. camp shortly before a message was received from Operations to the effect that approximately four hundred Japs were in the vicinity. A 30% stand-to was ordered, and no one was allowed to leave the camp. Fortunately on this occasion the traffic pointsmen had not departed, and a third of the unit (other than the duties employed in the camp area) stood-to for two hours, and were then relieved for a break of four hours. By midday the firing had quietened considerably and at dusk it was reported that the majority of the enemy had been disposed of. Nevertheless, the 30% stant to was continued throughout the night, and also the following day and night.
On the 27 March, normal duties were resumed, with the exception of duties on the Sinzweya - Buthidaung road, as small parties of the enemy were still in the vicinity, and the daily supply convoy to 36 Brigade was practically the only traffic to use this road. The road was also occasionally under enemy shell fire, and Provost jeep patrol which came into operational again on 29 March had on more than one occasion quite a hectic time. Immediately the shelling commenced, the patrol halted all vehicles, as it was considered that the dust raised by transport on the move provided the enemy gunners with their bearing.
The visit of General Pownall to the Division on 29 March necessitated provost outriders and additional traffic control, and on 11 April there was a similar job in connection with the visit of the Supreme Allied Commander.
During the closing stages of operations, Provost excelled themselves in leading convoys to and from the forward Brigades, and on one occasion were held up on account of enemy mines, The Jap gunners also were a constant worry till the very last day of operations.
On April 30th, Rear Div. H.Q., with the Provost unit, moved back to ukhia. Four trucks from our reserve at Nawapara were brought forward for the move. The A.P.M. with a sergeant and eight B.O.Rs, and a havildar with twelve I.O.Rs, remained with Main Div. H.Q. to arrange and control the moves of Brigade main and Tac, H.Q. After every Div. vehicle had left the Sinzweya box area, this party crossed the Ngakyedauk Pass and joined Main Div. at Bawli. A fortnight later, they rejoined Read Div. H.Q. at Ukhia.
The most important lesson learned from the season’s operations was that a Military Policeman first and foremost must be a well trained soldier, and obviously 100% physically fit. Personnel below Medical Category A.1. showed repeatedly that they were far from capable of carrying out their duties efficiently.
Provost “Brigading” (apart from causing a unit shortage of British ranks)was very successful. Military police were on the spot for immediate moves, etc.,
And were able to advise and assist Regimental Police on more than one occasion. There were few Traffic problems (apart from operations in which the Dragoons came under command), as units invariably operated without M.T.
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS OF 15 INDIAN CORPS
ARAKAN. After the battle.
Communications were so difficult that reinforcements took as long as six weeks to move from Chittagong forward. L5 single passenger planes were the only physical means of communication, and C47s for larger parties. Sea travel was tendious and overcrowded, and long delays were experienced. Equipment and transport was scarce and worn out.
The A.P.M. started a system for the escorting of V.I.Ps throughout 15 Ind. Corps by Provost outriders. Whether in jeep or on motorcycle, they would wear a black and white jerkin, and when thus dressed all vehicles on sighting them would know that a V.I.P. vehicle was approaching, and would immediately draw into the side of the road and stop until it had passed. This was practised on many occasions and had the desired result.
25 ind. Division withdrew to India in April, 1944, Corps h.Q. in May, followed by 26 ind. Division in June. 82 (WA) Division remained as garrison troops in the Toungoup area. 41 Beach Group also withdrew to India, under command 33 Ind. Corps. A Corps F.D.C. was under the supervision of the A.P.M., and located at Ukhia, but owing to communications was closed, withdrawn to Chittagong, and sent to India.
33 IND. CORPS PROVOST.
OPERATIONS March 1944 to May 1945.
H.Q., 33 ind. Corps in March 1944 was located at Poona, and had under command:-
2 British Division.
19 Ind. Division.
50 Ind. Tank Brigade.
41 Ind. Beach Group.
42 Ind Beach Group .
43 Ind. Beach Group.
44 Ind Beach Group.
Included in this total were a large number of Corps troops. All training was for future amphibious operations.
The Provost situation at that time was as follows:-
33 Corps Provost Unit W.E. 3 Brit. & 3 Ind, Sections.
(but only 2 Ind. sections posted).
2 Brit. Div. Pro Coy. H.Q. and six sections.
19 Ind. Div Pro Unit. H.Q. 2 Brit, & 4 Ind. sections.
Each Beach Group H.Q. 1 Brit & 2 Ind. Sections
Provost Unit. H.Q. 1 Brit & 1 Ind. Section.
Shortly afterwards the Beach Group Provost Units were increased by an additional British section.
Early April saw H.Q., 33 Ind. Corps in Assam with 2nd British Division under command, working up the manipur Road with the object of relieving Kohima, (Milestone 42). At one end of the road there was 33 Corps, plus one division, and a brigade from 7 Ind. Division (flown out of the Arakan), and 133 miles south was 4 Corps in Imphal, with 17, 20 and 23 Ind. Divisions and 5 ind. Division having recently been flown in from the Arakan. Their Provost strength was:-
4 Corps Provost Unit H.Q., 2 Brit. & 4 Ind. Sections.
Each Div. H.Q. and 2 Brit. & 4 ind. Sections.
Each Beach Group Pro Unit H.Q., 1 Brit & 1 Ind. section.
118 L. of C. Provost Unit (H.Q. & 6 Brit. Sections) was operating the road from Manipur to Imphal, and at the time of the Japanese cutting the road, two sections slipped into Imphal, and the remainder successfully reached Dimapur.
The Manipur Road by 1944 had been widened and given a tarmac surface, one of the biggest engineering feats, but even so it was a very dangerous road for M.T. Rising to 7,000 feet at Mao, the Road twisted and turned on the very edge of the hills, never flat for more than 2/300 yards, and rarely straight for more than 100 yards. It was considered two way with caution, but the monsoon which started in June 1944 very soon caused landslides which broke up the surface and made many patches one way traffic throughout the campaign.
Kohima fell to 33 Corps at the end of May, and the road was reopened to Imphal by the beginning of July. After redistribution of forces, 33 Corps took over operations from 4 Corps, and with 11 (East African) Division now under command., pushed through the worst possible weather towards Tamu, and 5 Division commenced their journey towards Tiddim.
As 33 Corps H.Q. remained in Imphal, the Lines of Communication on the two axis of advance increased daily. Corps H.Q. did not move until the middle of October, by which time 11 (EA) Division were well down the Kabaw valley towards Yazagye (a distance of nearly 120 miles from Imphal), and 5 Division had reached Tiddim (also over 100 miles away), by sections withdrawn from 2 Div. and 7 Div. Shortly afterwards, 5 Division went on to 100% Air supply, and in view of the appalling road conditions in the Kabaw valley, 11 Div. also had to resort to air drops.
It was while Corps H.Q. were at Bulldozer Hill (6 miles west of Tamu) that 4 Corps H.Q. again moved into the picture taking up a position east of Tamu. 2 Div. and 20 Div. who had been resting were brought up, and 19 Division from India came under command of 4 Corps.
On one narrow earth surface road 2 Corps H.Q. and Corps troops, two Tank Brigades (254 & 255), and four divisions were being supplied from Imphal. Provost had been reinforced by bringing 119 L . of C. Provost Unit ( 2 Brit. & 4 Ind. sections) from the Arakan, and they worked from Imphal to Milestone 71 (Moreh), and 33 Corps Provost unit from Moreh to Tamu and on to Yazagyo and Indainggyi.
In fine weather over 1,000 vehicles a day were passed along the Imphal-Tamu road, and this included a 4 mile one-way stretch at Lockehao Bridge. The road was open the whole 24 hours a day. Provost communications were poor. The telephone line was useless, being cut daily by small slides, or tanks & bulldozers moving on tracks. The distance was too great for effective wireless communication and the nature of the terrain made R/T reception at short distances very unsatisfactory.
The main policy adopted was to send forward supply vehicles which left the Palel depots from 04.00hours onwards, followed immediately by forward bound units. Transport was heavily overstrained, and many vehicles had
already covered colossal mileages. One large Bridging convoy of 169 vehicles left Imphal at first light (06.15 hours) to make the 70 mile run to Tamu. Heavily loaded with bridging equipment for the Chindwin bridge, and with the severe gradients en route, the convoy made extremely slow progress in spite of a clear road kept for them. At 19.00hrs only forty vehicles had reached Tamu, and 48 hours later there were still 28 lorries spread over the seventy miles with Mechanical defects. Many of these vehicles had run over 25,000 miles.
Tank Transporters (loaded), in spite of many very difficult corners to negotiate, and gradients were it was necessary to off-load the tanks, made this difficult journey in very good time.
With the East Africans still in the lead, 33 Corps continued down the Kabaw valley, and with Corps H.Q. at Yazagyo, and the 11 (EA) Div. working along the Myittha george from Kyigen to Kalewa (20 miles), contact was again established with 5 Division which had proceeded from Tiddim and Kennedy Peak to capture Kalemyo. From there they were withdrawn up the Kabaw valley and back to Imphal just relieved by 20 Ind. Division.
By early November, the East Africans were across the Chindwin at Kalewa and ready to be relieved by 2 Division, who were to pass through on the last stretch of 120 miles to Ye-u, from which point reasonable roads were available for the run down to the Irrawaddy and Mandalay.
The longest floating Bailey bridge was erected between Kalewa and kaing on the Chindwin, but owing to the difficult approaches, and the fact that the road was in fine weather several inches thick in fine earth powder, and in wet weather an impenetrable mass of thick mud, Provost had the closest control possible in operation. No movement of M.T. was possible in wet weather, but after a few hours of sunshine, the road dried off, and approximately ninety vehicles an hour passed over the Bridge (the maximum permitted).
Having crossed the Chindwin river at Kalewa, Provost were confronted with seventy miles of the most difficult road in the whole campaign. Kalewa - Shwergyin is a distance of five miles by road, but convoys in the leading division (2 Div.) took up to 4 1/2 hours to accomplish this stretch. Two wheeled drive
vehicles could not climb the extremely severe gradients, and a Police check post was formed to weed out all 4 x 2 vehicles regardless of the priority of stores they carried. Fortunately being a British division, the supply vehicles were driven by experienced B.O.Rs, and this resulted in quicker delivery with less accidents.
On one gradient with a drop of 600 feet to the Chindwin river below, a recovery vehicle winched up the hill 185 lorries in one day, a very remarkable achievement, but which only illustrates that even 4 x 4 vehicles experienced immense difficulties in covering this short journey. Fortunately Shwegyin was on the river (the dumping point for vehicles abandoned in the 1942 retreat), and a fleet of DUKWs towing rafts carried large supplies of stores from Kalewa to Shwegyin by river, doing a round trip in about 2 hours.
From Shwegyin onwards the road climbed and twisted for a further seventy miles before reaching the Ye-u plain. It was narrow, earth surface, and crossed by innumerable streams, som crossed by culverts, others by wooden bridges (built by Japanese), and others by Bailey bridge.
Three Corps companies of nine British sections would have found it difficult to come with the vast volume of very slow moving traffic on this one vital “road”. As it was, we had only 2 Div. Provost Company, who were almost fully committed forward of Div. H.Q., and a very overworked 33 Corps Provost unit with three British and two Indian who attempted to control the seventy odd miles back to Kalewa, and also operate the Kalewa bridge and approaches. \it was then that the 2nd Bn,. Suffolk Regt. (Jan. 1945) were given to Provost to assist. Although untrained in Provost operational duties and equipped with trucks and motorcycles (both quite useless in this campaign), they did nevertheless relieve the strain on Provost personnel, and were very enthusiastic over the job realising perhaps for the first time that a policeman’s lot is not a happy one.
By the middle of January, 2 Division had reached Ye-u, where a reasonable road commenced, and made rapid progress via Shwebo and Endaw and took up positions on the north bank of the Irrawaddy river, a few miles west of Sagaing. On their right, 20 Ind. Division who had proceeded down the east bank of the Chindwin had made excellent progress, and were now at Allagappa preparing for their crossing of the Irrawaddy river.
On 16 February 1945, 20 Division crossed the river against formidable opposition, and the Provost (2 Sections Brit. & 4 Indian) were obliged to do the job unaided. On the south bank there were no roads of any description and considerable areas of thick sand, tall elephant grass, and a few very isolated villages, some three to five miles inland. The task of singing routes (with no proper T.C. equipment) was enormous, as tracks in the elephant grass went in all directions, and in the earlier days of the crossing, to venture along an unmarked track was asking for unpleasant consequences. One reconnaissance by the A.P.M. and O.C. Company took them from one Brigade to another Brigade H.Q. behind a small ridge occupied by the enemy. The tall elephant grass was their salvation.
2 Division crossed the river at the end of February and then began the encirclement of Mandalay with 20 Division making at full speed for Kyaukse, 24 miles south of Mandalay, to cut off the retreat of any Japs desirous of using the main Mandalay - Rangoon road (400 miles). The rapid move of 20 Division is shown on the attached sketches (Appendices ‘I’ - ‘J’ - ‘K’).
The capture of Meiktila by 17 Divison of 4 Corps (100 miles South) resulted in rapid fold up of Jap forces north of Meiktila, who retreated east into the Shan Hills, and contented themselves with sporadic raids in our L. of C., now the main Mandalay road as far as Meiktila.
33 Corps then reorganised and both Corps crossed over. 4 Corps took on the main road Meiktila - Rangoon, and 33 Corps with one division up (20 Div) switched west from meiktila to the Irrawaddy, and proceeded south down to and along the east bank. Again Provost resources were stretched to an alarming extent. 20 Division had a bare month to capture Magwe, Taungdwingyi, Allanmyo, and Prome, before the monsoon broke. Half this distance was on earth tracks that crossed chaungs that were often ¼ mile wide, but reasonably dry. Once it rained, the chaungs became impassable and impossible to bridge for many reasons. From Taungdwingyi south, the all weather road to Rangoon was struck. This road had over 300 bridges, large and small, and many had been blown during the 1942 retreat, and not repaired by the Japanese.
To add to Provost’s difficulties at Taungdwingyi, a complete battalion of I.N.A. (Indian National Army, Indians who fought for the Japanese) (800) surrendered to the Division. The only evacuation was by air from the Div. supply strip. During the three weeks following, a total of 2,000 Jifs (I.N.A.) had surrendered to the Division, and the H.Q. insisted that it was a Provost responsibility to administer these numbers. Fortunately, the I.N.A. officers helped considerably. The greatest difficulty was drinking water, and the Provost had no water cart, were refused one, and had to use empty 40 gallon petrol tins on an ordinary 15 cwt. Truck. As 20 Division were quite alone (Corps H.Q. being 120 miles away), it was a question of doing the best possible, and this was done.
With the capture of the all weather strip just south of Allanyme, and of Prome early in May, the weather broke and although many bridges had to be manned by Provost 24 hours a day (in spite of an order giving no movement by night - and an order regularly broken), the greatest difficulties of 20 Div. Provost were over.
Rangoon fell with 20 Div H.Q. sitting in Tharrawaddy, seventy miles north of Rangoon, with their forward Brigade thirty miles from the big city. It was then that 33 Corps H.Q. was disbanded and became 12th. Army H.Q.
PRISONER OF WAR CAGES.
A small number of japanese who surrendered, coupled with their national characteristic of committing ‘hari-kari’, renders this question different to that in other theatres where large numbers without suicidal tendencies having surrendered do not give much trouble.
Consequently, large cages are unnecessary, but on the other hand supervision and surveillance of the prisoners must be of the strictest, even of those who have been wounded. Hence, Provost have been used contrary to normal procedure to escort them, and this extra duty has been a heavy strain on their resources.
In order to economise the number of escorts and to prevent prisoners from escaping, certain Div, Provost units converted a 15 cwt. Truck by certain modifications, and by covering the canopy in strong army wire matting into a prison van in which P.Ws were conveyed from Div. to the Corps cage. Recently 30 h.p 4 x 4 Chevrolet Operational Station Wagons have been sanctioned for release to Armies, on the scale of three per Army for this purpose. With very slight modifications, this type of vehicle makes an excellent conveyance for prisoners, and can carry eight person.
FIELD DETENTION CENTRES.
The need for these has been clearly established, but up to the present it has not been possible to obtain sanction for a War Establishment, those in existence being on an ‘ad hoc’ basis, the staff being provided by loans from various formations and units. This is obviously precarious, as at any time the personnel may be withdrawn to replace battle casualties, or for various other reasons.
Suitable F.D.Cs with a proper War Establishment capable of taking 150 to 200 men should be made available in forward areas. Whether these should be under command of Corps or Sub-areas is debatable, but to saddle an active Corps engaged in offensive operations with a static installation seems on the face of it unsound.
When the manpower situation permits, the sanctioning of these units should provide simple medical treatment, and limited hospital accommodation within the perimeter of the Field Detention Centre should be provided for the purpose of avoiding the necessary procedure in sending sick men to the usual hospitals which cannot be properly guarded.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH.
200 Section, S.I.B.
This section was formed within 14th. Army, and went forward with the advancing troops t6o Meiktila, and thence to Mandalay, where a H.Q. was established for a short time. On the relief of Rangoon, the section eventually became stabilised there, operating in the Dock area and outlying district.
The conditions under which the personnel of this section had to undertake the investigation of serious crime are unequalled in the history of Police investigation. Although they were operating against almost Insurmountable difficulties, being on occasions cut off by the enemy and undergoing shellfire, yet their records show a remarkably high percentage of successful investigations.
During the advance down to Rangoon , the principal crimes investigated were Armed Dacoities, Murder and Rape.
Photograph from Police Review, 17th Aug. 1945 page 402.
128 Section, S.I.B.
When 200 section moved forward with 14th Army, this unit undertook a L. of C. role. The conditions under which it had to operate were rather more favourable than those experienced by 200 section. In addition to serious crime, consisting of murder, bribery & corruption, and sexual offences, the main problem was the protection from theft and pilferage of L. of C. Stores. In one month alone, this section made a total recovery of Rs 13,14,246. (Sterling value - £93,568.9.0).
To appreciate the work of this section, it must be realised that the total strength of the unit consisted of three officers and seventeen investigating B.O.Rs, covering the whole of Eastern Bengal and Assam. These men were distributed as far afield as Imphal, Manipur Road, Dibrugarh, Gauhati, Comilla, and Chittangong, and owing to the great distances to be covered, they were in many cases entirely without immediate help
and advice from their H.Q., and had thereby to exercise to the full their resource and initiative.
201 Section, S.I.B.
This Section operated solely in Ceylon Army Command. It has never had the opportunities to “shine” as the other two sections, as there is very little of the serious type of crime in that area. Their main problem has been the investigation of thefts of WD property, which at one period drew to an alarmingly high figure, but is now under complete control.
The section controls the whole of the island of Ceylon, its main centre of activities being the city of Colombo and the dock areas, with a detachment at Trincomalee. Experience has proved that a very high percentage of crime is committed by civilian, and not by military personnel.
RELATIONS OF PROVOST OFFICERS WITH THE STAFF.
It must be realised that before 1942 the Corps of military Police (India) was non-existent. This later led to many difficulties. Many of the senior Staff Officers within ALFSEA were regular Indian Army, who in most cases possessed no knowledge whatsoever of the role of the Military Police. Complaints of the misuse of Provost by these officers have been many and widespread, but today the position has greatly improved as a result of practical experience.
Similarly, S.I.B. experienced difficulty in the initial stages, and did not appear to be appreciated amongst the Staff. However, within a very short time this attitude was completely reversed, and S.I.B. officers and men were recognised as being a very essential part of our Army, and co-operation became excellent.
Allied Service Police.
In this theatre of operations, with the exception of the R.A.F., the percentage of Allied Service Police as such was very small.
U.S. Military Police were normally to be found in the Chittagong and Gauhati areas, and also on isolated airfields. Cooperation was excellent, and they always provided valuable assistance when and where required.
Liaison with the R.A.F Special Investigation Branch was of considerable value on airfields which were supplying forward troops, and where pilferage was taking place on a large scale.
The Naval authorities in Chittagong became 100% “S.I.B.” minded, and on every occasion gave the greatest possible assistance.
In all areas, liaison with the Civil Police was closely maintained. Without their local knowledge and co-operation, particularly with provost, the task of the fighting forces would have been increased tremendously.
Other Arms of the Service.
The experiences of Provost officers with regard to cooperation with ‘G’ and ‘Q’ Branches are practically without exception that a lack of foresight and imagination on the part of these Branches. As has been previously stated, this is in most cases due to the inexperience of Staff officers. With all other arms of the Service, the standard of cooperation was of the highest and except in isolated cases very satisfactory.
Liaison with the Field Security, particularly in the forward areas, was often proved to be of mutual benefit. When the battle settled down on the Imphal plain, the mains task of Provost was concerned with Security and general discipline. There was the constant threat of Jifs and Japs disguised as civilians entering the Box areas. To guard against this, traffic posts were established on all roads leading into Imphal. F.S.S personnel and civil policemen were attached to each post whose duties were to check all vehicles and all occupants of vehicles, and all personnel who entered Imphal on foot.
With the reoccupation of Burma, a Civil Affairs Staff was organised, and they provided the bulk of the cases investigated by 200 Sectio, Special Investigation Branch, in the 14th Army area.
STATISTICS. Special Investigation Branch.
From the time that this Branch was formed in ALFSEA, i.e. April, 1944 to 30 June 1945, the numbers of cases investigated, resulting arrests, and amount of Government property recovered , is as follows:-
Cases. Arrests. Property Recovered.
1,036 1.027 Rs. 33,92,752
Arrested persons as summarised as follows:-
British Ranks. Indian Ranks. Indian, Singhalese, &
Burmese & Civilians.
59 264 704
Types of important cases investigated are as follows:-
Murder. Suicide. Rape. Dacoity. Robbery. Bribery.
36 19 15 5 6 20
Apart from these major cases, thefts of WD stores, provided the bulk of the enquiries. Pilferages on the Railways, and wholesale thefts at railhead, docks and WD dumps, were prevalent at this time.
During 1943, the Military Operational Area (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1943, was passed, introducing legislation to convene Superior Military Courts and Summary Military Courts.
This Ordinance extended to the Province of Assam and to manipur, and to the districts of Tippera, Noakhali, and Chittagong, in the province of Bengal. Its object was to bring to trial in an area contiguous with enemy occupied territories all persons who might be helping the enemy against the interests of H.M. Forces.
The Ordinance embraced the unauthorised possession of Military stores and equipment, or any other property belonging to or consigned to H.M. Forces, or the forces of a Power in alliance with his Majesty.
Sentences could be awarded to the extent of imprisonment for seven years, or with a whipping, or with both imprisonment and whipping, and in addition the liability of a fine.
Offences triable under the Ordinance were as follows:-
Communicating with the enemy ) Death
Misleading Military Forces ) Death
Assisting enemy ) Death
Obstructing Military Forces ) Transportation.
Failure to give information )
Concerning enemy ) Imprisonment for 7 years.
Poisoning water supplies & )
Damaging Military Equipment ) Death
In September 1944, the only occasion took place where the Special Investigation Branch were hampered and stayed from carrying out a thorough investigation for political reasons. Allegations were made and information received that certain high officials of Tripura State, Eastern Bengal, were guilty of misappropriating Government stores and Equipment.
Correct procedure was adopted (peculiar to that State), and advice taken from the Political Agent. Searches were carried out and property seized, resulting in the conviction of citizens of the State.
The Special Investigation Branch were advised by the Political Agent and the Area Commander to drop further enquiries directed against the Chief Minister, Chief Engineer, and other officials of the State.
The ruler of the State had objected to the Government that S.I.B. personnel would not operate within his dominion. It is known that this objection was overruled. Two battalions of Infantry supplied by Tripura State have fought in the Burma campaign.
Army/Corps Provost Units.
3 British Sections
6 Indian Sections.
It has been proposed by the Provost Marshal, A.L.F., S.E.A.C., to reduce the I.O.R strength in Army/Corps Provost Units from 6 Indian sections to 3 Indian sections.
I.O.R. personnel in Army and Corps Provost Units were employed during operations primarily on traffic control. Under existing conditions in S.E.A.C, considerably fewer personnel are required for these duties.
I.O.R. personnel generally have not been found suitable for these patrols and enforcement of general discipline in Burma and Malay.
Operations of 15 Corps during months of Sept and Oct 1945
The arrival of 15 Indian Corps HQ in SINGAPORE on the 9th Sep. 45. Marked the beginning of a new type of work altogether for all Provost Personnel. Acting in the capacity of an occupying force involved many new problems for Pro, which had to be met as they occurred. The result of all the work involved was self evident after 15 Corp’s three weeks stay in Singapore, and I think it reflects great credit on all members of 15 Corps Provost and is only a just return for the untiring work everyone did.
Upon arrival in Singapore everything was reasonably quiet. This gave us the chance to make an immediate recce of Singapore town. To decide on the various areas of responsibility, and to determine out of Bounds Areas. In conjunction with this, liaison was quickly established with Civil Police, Fire Services, FSS and 5 Div Pro Unit.
With the liberation of Singapore, cafes and restaurants immediately opened in all quarters of the town. I conducted an immediate inspection of these and in most cases discovered them dirty and unhygienic. Immediate action was necessary for the health of our troops, so I gave the order to place all cafes, restaurants etc, out of bounds. This was done. I then inspected the better class restaurants with Medical Officers from Corps HQ and as their sanitary arrangements were approved. Sto they were placed in bounds. This same policy has been adopted in BATAVIA and has been found to work very satisfactorily.
Stray JAPS rounded up in SINGAPORE Area were firstly vetted by FSS and the disposed of in Japanese labour camps.
Thefts of cars presented a serious problem but the registration check carried out by the APM No.2 Area eased the situation considerably.
The Out of Bounds areas were of necessity very large, and the rate of V.D. in Singapore necessitated immediate action. A contract was arranged for the provision of Out of Bounds Notices and within a week of landing these were in place and regular Police Jeep patrols instituted. These achieved a good deal of success.
All my dealings with Civil Police were very satisfactory and liaison from the Senior Police Officials was excellent. The civil policeman himself, however, though willing and in most cases trustworthy, was lacking badly in experience. This was particularly noticeable in the Surrender Ceremony taken by Lord Louis Mountbatten at Singapore when the civil police were not able to control the crowds, and all the work fell on to this Pro. unit. During the stay of this Corps HQ in Singapore visits were made to Singapore Island by Lord Louis Mountbatten, General Slim, and Secretary of State for War, Mr. Lawson. All escorts and Guard Duties were provided by 15 Corps Pro Unit, and I think they did an excellent job of work, an opinion which was echoed by Mr. Lawson himself.
15 Corps H.Q. arrived in Batavia, on the 9th Oct. 1945, and it was very quickly obvious that the situation would involve many new responsibilities for Provost. The tense situation between the Dutch and the Indonesians at present necessitated the use of a great deal of tact; and this fact has been explained to all the units under my command.
Occupying British Troops are responsible for the maintenance of Law and order amongst the Dutch and Indonesian Civilian population, as well as for our own troops. Shortly after our arrival here it was decided that I should hand over complete command of all Police, both Civil and Military. In addition to acting as Commissioner of Police I was also given the job of Superintendent of Jails in Batavia. These jails are run by Provost backed up by guards of the 1st Seaforth Regiment and clerks from178 Field Regiment. This meant for me a great deal of extra responsibility and in view of the level at which I have to work General Christison ordered that I should be granted the local rank of Lt. Col. This has greatly assisted me in my duties.
The Civil Police are not dependable and have little or no control over the Indonesian population. I have issued standing orders to the Civil Police, one of which restricts their powers to arrest. No arrests of Dutch or any European nationals are allowed to be made without previous reference to me. Previous to this order Dutch men and women were being detained on trumped up charges. This amounts to KIDNAPPING. As far as it it possible I am checking up to see that my orders are being carried out. Owing to the terrific number of persons reported missing I instituted a Missin Persons Bureau with Major Mussett, APM 23 Division, in charge.
Also it has been necessary to organize an aliens bureau where all correspondence regarding German and italian nationals is handled. I am assisted in this task by a special delegate of the Swiss Consul in Java, who is handling German and Italian affairs.
Car registration of all cars in Batavia was carried out by Corps Pro Personnel, and at three control centres which were established at strategic points inside the city, over 2000 cars were registered during three days work. This car registration is still going on as a sideline to normal Pro. duties.
Dutch Military and Civil Police are non existent.
From the point of view of our own troops, discipline is good, and what little trouble does crop up can be easily dealt with by our own Military Police. Clashes between the Dutch and Indonesians though are frequent and murders have been committed on both sides. These are also our responsibility and have been dealt with by our Pro. personnel. It has been noticed that when serious trouble occurs the Civilian Population do look to the Military Police for help and furthermore a handful of Pro. can
disperse a crowd of Indonesians with complete goodwill on both sides. This I think, must be attributed to the excellent way in which the BORs of this Corps Pro. unit are handling all situations. Their deportment and behaviour at all times is absolutely correct. The IORs are also very correct in behaviour, but cannot be expected to cope with the situations that arise in this city.
Several good cafes have been placed in bounds in the city and are subject to frequent visits by Pro. Personnel. Very little trouble has occurred in them. All other cafes have been placed out of bounds and shops which openly sell local liquor have also been placed out of bounds. An Anti-Vice committee has been formed under my control, and as soon as Pro. reinforcements arrive an Anti-Vice Patrol will be instituted.
A curfew has been established for all Allied Troops ensuring that everyone both BOs and ORs are in their billets by 22.00hrs.
To sum up, I can say that considerable headway has been made since we arrived in Batavia. The discipline of all troops under command is very good, and we are successfully meeting all situations which arise. I think that special praise should be given to all Pro. personnel under my command for the careful and excellent way they are dealing with the situation in Batavia, which I can assure your is a very difficult one.