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**“THE 2024 GENERAL ELECTION AND
SUSTAINABLE DEEPENING
DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA”**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The research fund was funded by Dana Bantuan Penelitian Operasional Perguruan Tinggi Negeri (BOPTN) DIPA IAIN Sultan Amai Gorontalo 2024. Broadly, this research mainly aims to answer the problem of democracy and Indonesia's 2024 general election. This research contributes to a fresh and new analysis and perspective on how democracy will be affected by pivotal issues regarding the 2024 general election.

The research has several findings. First, in a broad spectrum, it shows that the foundation of democracy in Indonesia is based on the principle of equality in a competitive process known as the General Election (*Pemilihan Umum* - Pemilu). In this research, we argue that democracy should encompass the significance of political parties as political institutions capable of fulfilling their function within society. Indonesia's last general election has been characterized by significant voter turnout and has been influenced by essential factors in its political dynamics. The research findings indicate that the 2024 Legislative and Presidential Elections offer valuable insights into enhancing and advancing democracy compared to the preceding elections in 2014 and 2019. However, GE 2024 primarily focuses on establishing a polyarchic or procedural democratic system. Arguably, the 2024 general elections appear to disregard the democratic processes and ideals that serve as the foundation for conducting such elections. Significantly, the ruling regime appears to exert exclusive control over the next 2024 General Election, utilizing state resources and institutions under the guise of democracy. This research provides a contemporary analysis and viewpoint on how political parties, constitutional changes, and

regular general elections have influenced Indonesia's democratization.

Second, the research finding indicates that there has been the asymmetrical constellation between the parliamentary threshold and presidential threshold decisions in contemporary Indonesian politics. The Parliamentary Threshold (PT) is a topic that has been much debated, but a precise formula for its proportional and natural implementation has yet to be devised. Similarly, the Presidential Threshold, which imposes coalition conditions in parliament, undermines the Presidential system. The recent decision of the Constitutional Court (*Mabkamab Konstitusi* – MK) regarding the Parliamentary barrier allows the legislature to reconsider and redefine the rationale for the barrier. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court continues to rely on the principles of transparent legal policy despite the existence of the Presidential Threshold. By employing Huntington's "social contract", we argue that the party system in Indonesia has effectively served as the political infrastructure of society, both in theory and reality. This article first demonstrates the asymmetry between these two entities by examining their respective regulations, which, despite being distinct, are interconnected. Secondly, the abnormality of party simplification arises from the consequences of the party system. Consequently, the most crucial position in our democratic arena should be given to people's sovereignty.

Third, the research finding also covers dynamics of money politics and its influence on voter turnout in Indonesia's legislative and regional head elections in natural-rich regions.

Sincerely,

**MUKRIMIN, HENDRA YASIN, EKA PUTRA B
SANTOSO**

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BAB I

DEEPENING OR DECLINING DEMOCRACY? GENERAL ELECTION AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN INDONESIA

Abstract

The foundation of democracy in Indonesia is based on the principle of equality in a competitive process known as the General Election (Pemilihan Umum - Pemilu). In this article, we argue that democracy should encompass the significance of political parties as political institutions capable of fulfilling their function within society. Indonesia's last general election has been characterized by significant voter turnout and has been influenced by essential factors in its political dynamics. The research findings indicate that the 2024 Legislative and Presidential Elections offer valuable insights into enhancing and advancing democracy compared to the preceding elections in 2014 and 2019. However, GE 2024 primarily focuses on establishing a polyarchic or procedural democratic system. Arguably, the 2024 general elections appear to disregard the democratic processes and ideals that serve as the foundation for conducting such elections. Significantly, the ruling regime appears to exert exclusive control over the next 2024 General Election, utilizing state resources and institutions under the guise of democracy. This article provides a contemporary analysis and viewpoint on how political parties, constitutional changes, and regular general elections have influenced Indonesia's democratization.

Keywords *Politics; General Election; Democracy; Political Party.*

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A. Introduction

Indonesia is the third-largest democracy in the world. Since its independence, it has continuously conducted regular general elections (*Pemilhan Umum - Pemilu*). Moreover, since the New Order, regular elections have been held every five years until this decade with its respective dynamics (BPS, 2021a, 2021b, 2023). Many say that since the *reformasi* era, Indonesia undermined the so-called "deepening" democracy (Pratikno, 2009; Rüländ, 2009; Sulistiyanto & Erb, 2009; Warburton, 2020a). This is especially true during the direct, general, free, peaceful and regular elections held over the last two decades (Elections 2014 and 2019). Nonetheless, in the 2019 General Election, many have seen the election as a turning point in the polarization of the nation (BBC News Indonesia, 2023; Warburton, 2020b, 2020a). This polarization was mainly caused by the use of identity politics, particularly religious identity, by political parties, politicians, and their supporters. In the 2024 election picture, the issue of polarization, especially the use of religious narratives, has surfaced again. In Indonesia, religious narratives are often used as campaign reminders for voters who are classified as religious people in Indonesia (Asmorojati & Suyadi, 2023; Bouchier, 2019; Fossati, 2019; Lahaji & Faisal, 2023; Author1, 2012, 2023a; Porter, 2002; Ramage, 1995; Zainuddin, 2015).

Meanwhile, in addition to polarization issues, research on the 2024 elections is related to the issue of neutrality to the fundamental issue of campaign funds for political parties, which is now massive in the midst of society. From the issue of neutrality, for example, the decision of the Constitutional Court (MK) number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 concerning the age limit of presidential and vice-presidential candidates (MK, 2023). The phenomenon will intersect with the neutrality of national leadership, which has government apparatuses down to rural structures. This construction makes Indonesia's democratic space encounter an unclear road.

The phenomenon mentioned above will consequently stimulate the 2024 elections; democracy as a political system that requires equality of citizens in terms of contestation will certainly experience turbulence. In various regions, the issues of non-political matters are no less interesting, such as massive information on social media, political dynamics, collision, procedures, and technical matters. Moreover, the local winning team of candidate pairs (*Tim Pemenangan Daerah - TPD*) are in various regions. As an integral part of a system, national issues must correlate with legislative election votes; the theory of the coattail effect (Hanan & Irvani, 2022; Sardini & Erowati, 2019) is one of the choices of candidates holding their presidential candidates on campaign stages. The mutually needy relationship is glued together in the body of political parties - as one of the main pillars of democracy, which is now in coalition in the national political scene. Therefore, this study should contribute to and provide an up-to-date and new analysis and perspective on how democracy is affected by pivotal issues and challenges regarding the 2024 general election.

Indonesia deserves significant recognition in any comprehensive analysis of global democratization. Following the downfall of an authoritarian regime, the so-called *Reformasi*, Indonesia undermined a significant political transformation. It shifted from being one of the few remaining and greatest strongholds of authoritarianism to being one of the most dynamic democracies in Asia. It is worth reiterating: the removal of the military from involvement in politics, the opening up of the party system, the establishment of free and competitive elections, the growth of independent media, the implementation of legal and judicial reforms, the expansion of opportunities for civil society; and a comprehensive decentralization initiative that transferred political authority to elected local officials. These accomplishments were even more extraordinary, considering they occurred in a country with a diverse population and religious beliefs (Asrinaldi & Yusoff, 2023; Author1, 2012, 2023a, 2023b; Power & Warburton, 2020).

Indonesia, once praised by political observers as a model of democracy in a chaotic nation, is now widely acknowledged to be experiencing a collapse in its democratic system (Feith, 1962; Author1 & Author3, 2023; Power & Warburton, 2020; Warburton, 2020a). Recent research has highlighted the decline in various areas, including the rise of populist movements (Gammon, 2020; Hadiz & Robison, 2017; Madung & Mai, 2022; Mudhoffir, 2020), increasing intolerance and the deepening of sectarian divisions (Hasan, 2017; Menchik, 2014). Additionally, there is a growing dysfunction in electoral and representative institutions, a deterioration of civil liberties, and an expansion of authoritarian strategies by the executive to suppress opposition and constrain criticism (Power & Warburton, 2020). For example, an analyst cautions that illiberalism continues to pose a primary and persistent danger to Indonesian democracy (Slater, 2020). Others are concerned about the decline in safeguarding individual freedom and civil society (Setiawan, 2020), alongside the ongoing weakening of political parties (Fossati, 2020; Mietzner, 2020) and the deepening of political polarization (Hicken, 2020). Indonesia's susceptibility to renewed autocratization persists due to these causes (Mietzner, 2024). Many also argued that Indonesia is now aligning with a worldwide trend of democratic decline (Asrinaldi & Yusoff, 2023; Baker, 2023; Power & Warburton, 2020; Setiawan & Tomsa, 2022).

Most of the literary studies and analyses mentioned above saw that the democracy in Indonesia is undermining 'stagnation' and even 'regression'. We contend --- following Arend Lijphart's "consociational democracy", that Indonesia might be a stagnated or regressed democratic nation, but it is a "fragmented but stable democracy" (Lijphart, 1969, 1971, 2008, 2012). At this stage, for democracy to thrive, politicians must accommodate the varied interests and demands of competing cultures, which is the general election. Their dedication to upholding the system and enhancing its unity and stability is essential. Ultimately, politicians

comprehend the dangers associated with political fragmentation and polarization (Lijphart, 1969, 2002, 2012; Lijphart & Schmidt, 1997).

Eminent scholars have suggested prominent and contemporary theories on democracy and democratization. In this study, we focus on the use of democracy theories (Dahl, 2003; Dahl, 1995, 1998; Fukuyama, 2014; Lijphart, 2008, 2012; Putnam, 2003) by looking at the stages of the election with the polarization of issues that occur in Indonesia (Liddle, 2013; Mujani & Liddle, 2021). The relationship between stages, issues, and dynamics will create empirical evidence of the massive influence of electoral variables and democracy as the chosen political system. The stages starting from the General Election Commission (KPU) produce the beginning of formal consolidation between political parties to build coalitions; in the scheme of the electoral system with an open proportional model, consolidation also targets individuals within the political parties (Simandjuntak, 2023).

The construction of this theory may be linked to "the state of emergency" (Agamben, 2011, 2021; Angiolillo et al., 2024) line of thought by placing the initial phenomenon, namely several violations of the rule of law for the sake of an election contestation. This existence will be seen massively, including whether the value of emergency now overshadows the value of democracy in terms of socio-political phenomena in Indonesia.

First, Robert Dahl proposed 'Polyarchal democracy', defined as 'maximizing democracy' (Dahl, 2003; Dahl, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2005; Dahl et al., 2003). Another concept that should be taken into account in deepening democracy is "majoritarian and consensus democracy", suggested by Arend Lijphart (2012: 241-244). For Lijphart, either a country is a majoritarian or consensus can be seen in these ten variables (Effective number of parliamentary parties; Minimal winning one-party cabinets; Executive dominance; Electoral Disproportionality; Interest group pluralism; Federalism/Decentralization; Bicameralism; Constitutional Rigidity; Judicial review; Central Bank independence) (Lijphart, 1969, 1977, 2008, 2012: 241-244).

Conceptually and typologically, as a plural society, Indonesia's case of democracy can be analyzed by using Lijphart's typology (Lijphart, 1977) (Table 1).

Table 1: Typology of democratic regimes

	Structure of Society	
	Homogeneous	Plural
Coalescent	Depoliticized Democracy	Consociational Democracy
Adversarial	Centripetal Democracy	Centrifugal Democracy

Source: Arend Lijphart, 1977, p. 106.

Broadly, this research mainly aims to analyze the problem of democracy and Indonesia's general elections over the last decade, focusing on the 2019 and 2024 general elections. Through this study, we expect to contribute to a fresh and new analysis and perspective on how democracy is affected by political parties, systems, and elites regarding general elections. Specifically, the study aimed to assess the role of political parties in deepening democratic values in Indonesia's political landscape.

B. Method

This research employed mixed-method research. The mixed method combines quantitative and qualitative research (Creswell & Clark, 2018; Hesse-Biber & Johnson, 2015; McKim, 2017). Both are important for looking at numbers of influence and descriptions of influence in a deeper space. For example, in some regions in Indonesia, it is possible to see the influence of elections on the doctrine of democracy (Pennings et al., 2006; Robison et al., 2018). The political sociology approach is essential to see the space between structure and culture; the structure is represented in political parties as election participants, while culture is the political culture of the community still demarcated with political issues.

In terms of data collection, in-depth interview techniques were employed, while observation was conducted as the initial part carried out by researchers to neatly map various political issues of elections and their influence on the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia. Subsequently, to fulfil secondary data, the research conducted by collecting quantitative data, both from election organizers as well as some field research data as a comparison with the results of this study (Bogaards, 2019; Dryzek, 2004; Freedon, 2008; Lijphart, 1971; Lively & Reeve, 1989; Pennings et al., 2006; Robison et al., 2018; Törnquist, 2010).

Technically, field works had been conducted in Yogyakarta and Jakarta in Java Island, Bangka and Batam in Sumatra, and Samarinda and Kutai Kartanegara in Kalimantan, and Gorontalo, Kota Mubagu and Makassar in Sulawesi respectively, to cover the national stage.

Overall, the research stages were done in four months: February, March, April, and May in 2024. The schedule range was pivotal, partly because the general election procedure is more extended than predicted. For example, there should be a time for the convener (KPU and KPUDs) to anticipate dispute over the dispute of the vote results at the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*-MK), which needs at least one month from the General Election Day.

C. Result and Discussion

To begin with, it is on the main topic, democracy. Democracy embraces equality in a contestation, that is, a general election (*Pemilihan Umum - Pemilu*). The existence of democracy also touches on the role of political parties as political infrastructures able to play their role within society. The argument will be analyzed and assessed from voter participation in the election space, of course, with crucial issues in its political dynamics. In this research, we will analyze both national and regional or local dynamics.

Election and Political Parties

The study deals with the role of political parties in the context of deepening democracy. These political parties are the prominent participants in the 2024 general election. According to the General Election Commission (KPU), there have been 204.807.222 voters who will come to the ballot box to choose their political rights (KPU, 2023a; KPU, 2023b). Then, there are three couples of presidential candidates. Furthermore, 24 political parties, consisting of 17 national and 6 local parties in Aceh, qualified for the 2024 general election.

Figure 1: Political Parties in Indonesia's 2024 General Election.




Source: KPU, 2024.

In the scope of the legislative election (*Pemilihan Legislatif - Pileg*), PDI Perjuangan still wins with a percentage of 16.44%, Golkar 15.1%, Gerindra 13.34%, PKB 11.59%, Nasdem 9.44%, PKS 7.52%, Demokrat 7.43% and finally PAN 6.97%. These 8 political parties are certain to qualify for Senayan with a parliamentary threshold of more than 4%. At the same time, other parties must be willing to be eliminated from the acquisition of seats in the DPR RI. From these results, political

parties that do not qualify at the national level can still get seats at the provincial, district, and city levels, especially when the candidates at that level get significant votes. This is mainly because the parliamentary threshold is intended for national achievements only, not at the regional level, like the electoral threshold during the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections.

Politically, PDI-P's achievements in the 2024 election led the party bearing the bull symbol to win the election three times in a row. We argue that many factors contribute to the PDI-P's win. One crucial factor is the party machine that continues to move at the grassroots level to the financial capital achieved in the previous legislative and presidential election victories. Equally important is that with political resources, consisting of 215 regional heads, PDI-P could become the champion again. Meanwhile, other parties were stagnant except for PKB, which received a tail effect from Muhaimin Iskandar's (commonly called Cak Imin) nomination as Anies Baswedan's vice president. PKB's gain rose from 9.69% in the 2019 legislative election to 11.59% in the 2024 legislative election. Another unlucky party was the PPP. The party bearing the Ka'bah symbol had to be expelled from parliament because it did not reach the 4% threshold. PPP, which received 4.52% of the vote in the previous election, must now be satisfied with the acquisition of 3.97%. Some factors may be due to internal dynamics draining to the competition of Islamic ideology, which is experiencing a downward trend. PSI achieved another exciting percentage. The party led by President Jokowi's youngest son did not enter parliament and only got 3.01%. This fact is inversely proportional to PSI's campaign funds, around 33.6 billion. PSI is also a party that massively campaigns for Jokowi as its central figure with the tagline "Stand straight with Jokowi".

Figure 2: Political parties' votes in 2024, 2019, and 2014.



Source: The authors, 2024, compiled from many sources.

Figure 2 shows Indonesia's political party votes trend up and down from the 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019 and 2024

legislative elections (KPU, 2023b). This decline and increase in political party votes are based on many factors. First, the coattail effect is relevant to Indonesia's election conditions. For example, from the 2009 to 2024 elections, parties with candidates for President and or Vice President who participated in the Presidential Election contest always provided a coattail effect through electoral incentives. For example, the Democratic Party in the 2009 elections, where the party's chairman was the President of the Republic of Indonesia 2004-2014. In addition, PDI-P in the 2014, 2019 and 2024 elections were the winning party. This is due to the presence of a strong party figure in the presidential election contest, namely Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who was elected President in the 2014 and 2019 elections.

In addition to the election-winning party, political party votes consistently increase based on the presidential and vice-presidential figures, even though they are elected or not elected—some examples of political parties that experience the tendency to increase their votes. For example, the PKB and Nasdem Parties successfully achieved the coattail effect because they always associated their parties with presidential and vice-presidential candidates. PKB successfully associated itself as a party with the vice-presidential candidate Ma'ruf Amin in the 2019 elections and Muhaimin Iskandar as party chairman and 2024 presidential candidate

accompanying Anies R. Baswedan. Since 2014, Nasdem has always declared its presidential candidate early, even though it is not its cadre, because it wants to associate itself with a party close to or home to the presidential candidate. Moreover, it benefits Nasdem as a political party by incentivizing electoral gain. As it turns out, Nasdem's voting trend increased from election to election (2014, 2019 and 2024). If Nasdem accompanied Jokowi's nomination in the 2014 and 2019 elections, then in 2024, it would be with Anies R. Baswedan. Another example is the Gerindra Party, which has received electoral incentives since 2014 (11.81%), which increased in 2019 (12.57%) and 2024 to 13.22%. This increase cannot be separated from the coattail effect of Prabowo Subianto, the chairman of the Gerindra Party, who consistently ran as vice president in 2009 and presidential candidate from 2014 to 2024.

Figure 3: Election day in a flooding urban area.



Source: Authors, 2024.

Second, the power of central figures is prominent in the Indonesian society. This figure's magnetism can sometimes boost votes but also erode party votes. It happened in the 2024 phenomenon when the PDIP vote dropped dramatically. This phenomenon is because Jokowi's figure is indirectly outside the PDI-Perjuangan party.

Third, associating the party with one of the presidential candidates is essential in addition to the coattail effect, which, on the other hand, strengthens and secures party votes. Nasdem is an example of a party that can survive amidst the onslaught of corruption issues that can reduce party votes. Even in the context of the 2024 legislative elections, Nasdem showed an increase in party votes. In contrast to the 2014 Demokrat phenomenon, the presence of corruption cases not supported by figures in the context of the presidential election made the party experience a decline in votes.

The 2024 General Election: The win and the losers of political parties

However, the announcement of the KPU results illustrates that of the 18 political parties participating in the election, only 8 political parties were elected. The parties qualified for the DPR RI because they passed the 4% parliamentary threshold (table 2).

Table 2: Political parties that passed the Parliamentary Threshold (PT) in the 2024 elections.

No	Political Party	Votes	Percentage
1	PDI-P	25.387.279	16,72 %
2	Golkar	23.208.654	15,28%
3	Gerindra	20.071.708	13,22%
4	PKB	16.115.655	10,61%
5	Nasdem	14.660.516	9,65%
6	PKS	12.781.353	8,42%
7	Demokrat	11.283.160	7,43%
8	PAN	10.984.003	7,23%

Source: KPU RI, 2024.

Table 3: Political parties that do not qualify for the Parliamentary Threshold (PT) in the 2024 election.

No	Political Party	Votes	Percentage
1	KPBU	5.878.777	3,87%
2	PSI	4.260.169	2,80%
3	Perindo	1.955.154	1,29%
4	Gelora	1.281.991	0,84 %
5	Hanura	1.094.588	0,72 %
6	Buruh	972.910	0,64%
7	Ummat	642.545	0,42%

8	PBB	484.486	0,32%
9	Garuda	406.883	0,27%
10	PKN	326.800	0,215%

Source: KPU RI, 2024.

The results of the 2024 Legislative and Presidential Elections at least provide some important lessons regarding the improvement and deepening of democracy compared to the previous elections in 2014 and 2019. Crucially and regularly, the election routine is Indonesia's constitutional agenda every 5 years. First, the general 2024 tends to be focused on creating a polyarchic or procedural democratic regime that at least focuses on two things, namely contestation and participation. Contestation focuses on selecting candidates that emphasize the principles of honesty and justice. In the Indonesian context, this principle must be manifested in the election based on direct, general, free, secret and honest, and fair (*Luber and Jurdil*) election. Participation emphasizes the extent to which people can become voters and be elected. In this context, the principles of equality and justice are essential. Seemingly, the 2024 elections tend to ignore the democratic processes and values that inspire the implementation of general elections. Undoubtedly, the 2024 elections seem to be monopolized by the ruling regime, exploiting state resources and institutions in the name of democracy.

Second, the open proportional concept, on the one hand, provides space for the community to determine which legislative candidates they will vote for their representatives. This condition also allows legislative candidates to interact with their constituents. So, there is no Indonesians' term of 'buying a cat in a sack' (*membeli kucing dalam karung*). However, the open proportional concept opens up space for cadres who have long been neglected by the presence of new cadres who are more popular or more capable. This condition also has the potential to lose the formation of rooted cadres and the process of institutionalizing good political parties. The most extreme is that it results in a political process that consumes a large budget for both organizers and contestants (Sukmajati & Disyacitta, 2019). This process also resulted in money politics, which was massive compared to the previous legislative elections (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Aspinall & Rohman, 2017; Reuter, 2015; Virananda et al., 2021).

Third, the general election of 2024 shows that coattail effects are crucial. The coattail effects do not necessarily apply to the same conditions in different parties. It happened in the 2024 presidential election, where 7 coalition parties that have a strong relationship with the presidential candidate received a tailcoat effect or, in other words, a spillover of electoral blessings, namely Golkar, Gerindra, PAN and PSI, which are close to Prabowo's number 02. -Gibran. Likewise, PKB, Nasdem, and PKS are strongly associated with the 01 Anies-Muhaimin pair. However, this condition differs from the coalition parties of candidate number 3 Ganjar - Mahfud, where all coalition parties did not receive abundant blessings and instead fell. For example, PDI-P (16.72%), whose vote share decreased compared to the 2019 election, reached 18.95%. The PDI-P vote was 0.25% higher than the Ganjar - Mahfud pair (16.42%). This condition also emphasizes that PDIP voters are Ganjar-Mahfud voters. In addition to PDIP, Hanura, Perindo, and PPP, members of the Ganjar - Mahfud coalition must be patient because they did not qualify for the DPR RI and did not reach the 4% parliamentary threshold. The 2024 elections show a pattern of concentrating too much on presidential elections and neglecting legislative elections.

Presidential Election

Third is the presidential election (*Pilpres*). Unlike the previous general elections (2009, 2014, and 2019), 2024 has different nuances. For example, the *Pilpres* is more important than the legislative election (both national and local). In the context of the presidential election, the General Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* - KPU) announced the victory of the number 2 Prabowo-Gibran pair with 96. 214. 691 votes, while pair number 1, Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar, received 40,971,906 votes. As a result, the Ganjar - Mahfud pair received 27,040,878 votes. The data from the field and officially released by the KPU show that Prabowo-Gibran won in 38 provinces, Anies-Muhaimin in two provinces (that is, West Sumatra and Nangro Aceh Darussalam), while Ganjar-Mahfud did not win in any other province. The percentage is asymmetrical with PDI-P's results in the legislative elections. Ganjar-Mahfud, whom the party endorsed, did not win and was even in the last position with the most minor votes. Electoral and non-electoral factors influenced the analysis of this presidential election. The electoral factor

occurred because of the massive consolidation of the winning team. On this scale, the three presidential candidates relatively have a maximum strategy to increase the popularity and electability of their respective candidates.

Figure 4: Two School Pupils put the picture of newly-elected President & Vice President of Indonesia.



Source:

googleimage.com, 2024.

Another factor is the politicization of social assistance (*Bantuan Sosial - Bansos*). Many believe that during January to February 2024 period, there had been more than 400 trillion rupiahs on social assistance (*Bantuan Sosial - Bansos*) (CNBC Indonesia, 2024; MediaIndonesia.com, 2024; MK, 2024). The term for this phenomenon is "pork barrel" politics, taken from a political portrait in America. Barrels of frozen pork are given to the public to gain votes in the upcoming elections. The indications of this action made four ministers of President Jokowi asked by the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konsitusi - MK*) to explain the mechanism for giving social assistance to the community.

Recently and crucially, the political background of several non-electoral factors is strongly suspected because of the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konsitusi - MK*) decision number 90, which made Gibran, who is the first son of President Jokowi, able to register as Prabowo Subianto's vice president. The power relations that gave birth to legitimacy from the chairman of the Constitutional Court, who is none other than Gibran's uncle, led to speculation that Jokowi had a

significant role in supporting the Prabowo-Gibran pair. Separate evidence was also interpreted as the behaviour of presidential interference ('*cawe-cawe Presiden*').

Many assumed and believed that “Presidential interference” (“*cawe-cawe Presiden*”) had changed the KPU Decree number 30 of 2024 concerning the results of the presidential election, which was questioned at the Constitutional Court. This time, the dispute was filed by pairs 1 and 3, which raised cases of alleged fraud that were structured, systematic, and massive. The hope is that, concerning this case, the Constitutional Court can get out of the term Court of Calculators, which only focuses on the results obtained, without looking upstream from the vote acquisition of the candidate pair.

With these provisions, the 14-day marathon trial at the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konsitusi* - MK) was on stage. Although in the end, the lawsuit of the two pairs of presidential candidates was entirely rejected by the panel of judges, three judges out of eight dissented or *dissenting opinions*. The contents of the dissenting opinion were related to the politicization of social assistance (*Bantuan Sosial* - Bansos), which was deemed not to meet the elements of equality, the mobilization of state apparatus to support specific candidates was reasonable according to the law, and the conclusion that there should be a re-voting, each in the regions; Jakarta Province, West Java, East Java, Central Java, Bali and North Sumatra (detiknews, 2024). The record of the three judges disputing the results of the presidential election is new in the MK and Indonesia's general election history.

Fourth, it is also essential to highlight the Regional Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* - DPRD), which is still composed of former political parties. The political parties play a central role in the composition of the senate (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah* - DPD) members, whom the dominance of political parties will indirectly overshadow.

The 2024 General Election: Lesson learned

Recently, the 2024 elections of both Presidential and Vice Presidential (Pilpres) and Legislative (Pileg) have been completed up to the stage of collecting the results as stated in KPU Decree number 360 of 2024. However, the stages have yet to be completed until the swearing-in of the Presidential and Vice Presidential oaths on

October 20, 2024. The results of the 2024 Legislative and Presidential Elections at least depict some important lessons regarding the improvement and deepening of democracy compared to the previous elections in 2014 and 2019. Regularly the election routine is Indonesia's constitutional agenda every 5 year.

First, the general election seemed to create a polyarchic or procedural democratic regime that at least focuses on two things, namely contestation and participation. However, we sometimes ignore what happens if the ruling regime can monopolize the democratic process by exploiting state resources and institutions in the name of the demos. This condition certainly needs to be improved by placing more emphasis on substantial aspects.

Equally important is that both open proportional concepts in electoral procedure, on the one hand, provide space for the public to determine which legislative candidate they prefer to elect. The condition also opens up space for legislative candidates to interact with constituents. So, there is no such thing as 'buying a cat in a sack' (*membeli kucing dalam karung*). However, the open proportional concept opens up space for long-neglected political parties' cadres with the presence of new cadres who are more popular or more capable. This condition could also lead to a loss of deep-rooted cadre formation and a good party institutionalization process. The most extreme is that it results in a political process that costs both organizers and contestants a large budget. This process also resulted in money politics, which was massive compared to the previous legislative elections (Muhtadi, 2020; Sukmajati & Disyacitta, 2019).

Furthermore, coattail effects do not necessarily apply to the same conditions in different parties. It happened in the 2024 presidential election, where 7 coalition parties that had strong associations with presidential election candidates received a tailcoat effect or, in other words, an abundance of electoral blessings, namely Golkar, Gerindra, PAN and PSI, which were close to the serial number 02 Prabowo-Gibran. Likewise, PKB, Nasdem and PKS are strongly associated with the 01 Anies – Muhaimin pair. The trend, however, is different from the coalition party in candidate number 3 Ganjar – Mahfud, where all coalition parties did not receive an abundance of blessings and instead slumped. For example, PDI-P (16.72%), whose votes

decreased compared to the 2019 election, achieved 18.95%. The PDI-P vote was 0.25% higher than the Ganjar - Mahfud pair (16.42%). This condition also confirms that PDIP voters were Ganjar-Mahfud voters. Apart from PDIP, Hanura, Perindo, and PPP, members of the Ganjar - Mahfud coalition had to be patient because they did not pass the DPR RI and did not reach the 4% parliamentary threshold.

Eventually, looking at the composition of political parties at the DPR, as a result of the recent general elections of 2019 and 2024, Indonesian politics in the years to come is likely still dominated by the central elites. Therefore, the role of political parties' engagement in deepening democracy remains endangered. It should also be noted that the *Reformasi* has produced, unfortunately, "embedded elites," quoting Suryoningrat (2004), in which the elites were the product or at least connected to the former authoritarian regime. Seemingly and crucially, the embedded elite's phenomenon can be projected to feature Indonesia's political landscape. It primarily reflects the general election of 2024; the old elites continue to regain power before the state. Finally, the 2024 and 2019 election results show how the coattail effect concept goes. The coattail effect explained the influence of central figures or figures in increasing party votes in elections—as in the case of Gerindra (2024) and PDIP (2019 and 2024). The Gerindra has the figures of Prabowo Subianto, while the PDIP has Megawati Soekarno Putri and, recently, Joko Widodo.

D. Conclusion

Politically, it can be seen that Indonesia's experience with regular general elections has been a remarkable milestone for the big and heterogeneous country. Indeed, arranging the political institutions, political resources, political landscape, and democracy sustainability are among the complex works for Indonesia - as a nation. This study highlights several lessons from Indonesia's recent general election. First, the fluctuations in political party votes are influenced by a multitude of causes. The coattail effect applies to the election circumstances in Indonesia. During the period from 2009 to 2024, political parties that fielded candidates for the positions of President and Vice President in the Presidential Election consistently generated a coattail effect by offering electoral incentives. This phenomenon might be attributed to the prominent role played by Joko Widodo (Jokowi), a formidable political personality, in the presidential elections of 2014 and 2019, where he emerged victorious and assumed the presidency.

Significantly, political party votes tend to increase depending on the

popularity of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, regardless of their election outcome. This trend is evident in several political parties. The rise in popularity is closely tied to the coattail effect of Prabowo Subianto, who has consistently campaigned as the vice president in 2009 and as a presidential contender from 2014 to 2024 while serving as the chairman of the Gerindra Party. The influence of political figures is palpable, as the appeal of an individual can sometimes boost electoral support while simultaneously diminishing party votes.

Another crucial lesson is the pivotal role of the electoral process in Indonesia's constitutional agenda, occurring every 5 years. In 2024, the primary focus is establishing a polyarchic or procedural democratic system that underscores contestation and participation. The process of contestation involves the meticulous selection of candidates who prioritize the principles of integrity and fairness. In the Indonesian context, this principle must be demonstrated in the election process, which should be conducted by direct, universal, unrestricted, confidential, and impartial means, ensuring fairness and integrity. Participation underscores the extent to which individuals can engage in the electoral process by exercising their right to vote and running for office. Within this particular framework, the ideals of equality and justice are paramount. The 2024 elections are deviating from the democratic processes and norms that typically guide the conduct of general elections. It seems that the ruling regime is exerting control over the 2024 elections by leveraging state resources and institutions under the guise of democracy.

Unlike the preceding general elections in 2009, 2014, and 2019, the 2024 election exhibits distinct features. Evidently, the presidential election holds greater significance compared to the parliamentary election, encompassing both the national and municipal levels. Various factors, both related to the electoral process and unrelated to it, influenced the analysis of this presidential election. The electoral element arose due to the extensive consolidation of the victorious team. On this scale, the three presidential contenders have different strategies to maximize the popularity and electability of their various campaigns. Finally, looking at the composition of the political parties at the legislative (DPR), it is safe to say that the central elites will continue to control Indonesian politics in the coming years, thanks to the 2019 and 2024 general elections. Therefore, political parties' ability to strengthen democracy is still in jeopardy.

Limitation

This study has depicted several essential points regarding the political parties and dynamics of political parties, legislative elections (national and local) and presidential elections; however, it did not cover the 2024 local election (*Pemilihan Kepala Daerah - Pilkada*), which is also distinguishing Indonesia's political landscape with other democratic nations. In 2024, the *Pilkada Serentak* will be conducted

simultaneously for the first time across the country. Also, this study does not include the regional senate at the national level in a detailed analysis, that is, the *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah* (DPD), which is also a new political institution in Indonesia.

BAB II

THE ASYMMETRY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY THRESHOLD AND PRESIDENTIAL THRESHOLD DECISIONS IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN POLITICS

Abstract

The Parliamentary Threshold (PT) is a topic that has been much debated, but a precise formula for its proportional and natural implementation has yet to be

devised. Similarly, the Presidential Threshold, which imposes coalition conditions in parliament, undermines the Presidential system. The recent decision of the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi* - MK) regarding the Parliamentary barrier allows the legislature to reconsider and redefine the rationale for the barrier. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court continues to rely on the principles of transparent legal policy despite the existence of the Presidential Threshold. By employing Huntington's "social contract", we argue that the party system in Indonesia has effectively served as the political infrastructure of society, both in theory and reality. This article first demonstrates the asymmetry between these two entities by examining their respective regulations, which, despite being distinct, are interconnected. Secondly, the abnormality of party simplification arises from the consequences of the party system. Consequently, the most crucial position in our democratic arena should be given to people's sovereignty.

INTRODUCTION

General Elections (GE) in a democratic system are one upstream means of circulating political elites (Bowler et al. 2015; Burlacu and Tóka 2014; Morris and Caroline 2012). Explicitly, elections are considered to create a sense of justice for citizens to participate in government. In Indonesia, citizen aggression creates a kind of rules that are jointly agreed upon and used as guidelines in starting the 5-year of General Election (*Pemilihan Umum* - Pemilu) (Indrawan 2022; Isra 2017; Perdana et al. 2019; Choi 2007; Aspinall 2005). Furthermore, the relationship between the state and its people found a constitutional basis when the elections held after the reformation demanded equality for the rights of every citizen. This general construction requires an infrastructure called a political party as an ideological anchor and a space for diverse citizen participation.

Bung Hatta's Edict X marked the party vehicle in the history of this republic to provide a doctrine of political pluralism in this country (MK 2023). The political pluralism in Indonesia was the catalyst for many ideological forces at that time, with a composition of 30 parties in the first election in 1955 (Bone 1955; Ruhdiara, Junaidi, and Fatimah 2022). Even when we contextualize it in today's threshold rules, only four parties cross the threshold, and the rest are below 3% (BPS 2019; Ruhdiara, Junaidi, and Fatimah 2022; Bone 1955) (Bone, 1955; Ruhdiara et al., 2022).

The parliamentary threshold is one requirement that is eroding our election system. After the reformation, the construction of the threshold was wrapped in the evolution of the electoral threshold to the parliamentary threshold. Both are like fences that are barriers to the people's votes given to parties with the calculation of the minimum vote limit. In fact, no matter how small the votes obtained by the party, they should be accommodated, primarily if we use proportional seat calculations for political parties participating in the election (Al-Fatih 2020; Ansari, Syamsu, and Ekawaty 2022; Bachmid 2020; Darusman, Soriano, and Kurniawan 2024; Gunanto, Murod, and Sulaiman 2022).

Meanwhile, the tendency of the parliamentary threshold affects the nomination of the President at the national level and the Governor, District Head, and Mayor at the regional level. Both depend on the percentage of the party's votes in parliament. It needs to be clarified in the presidential system because it gives birth to coalitions and oppositions, which are only valid in a parliamentary system of government. The asymmetry of this symptom has various implications. In addition to the confusion in the government system, the escalation of the dynamics of our election law politics intersects with the party system model and the space for people's sovereignty (Bachmid 2020; Slayton 2018).

This article focuses on these three things. Based on the Constitutional Court's decision number 116/PUU-XXI/2023 (Decision Number 116/PUU-XXI/2023, 2023) regarding the conditional constitutionality of the parliamentary threshold (MK 2023). Because of the decision that will come into effect in 2029, the Constitutional Court has made a somewhat encouraging constitutional leap. However, apart from that, the decision still leaves homework that should be linear, eliminating the Presidential Threshold (Helmi, Mukhrijal, and Fadhlullah 2019; Pawestri et al. 2023; Sukmawan and Pratama 2023). From this decision, there are more or less three approaches that are tried to be analyzed in this article; the first is the implications of the decision on the party system, the influence on the relationship of rules, and finally, the space for people's sovereignty.

METHOD

This study utilised a mixed-method research approach. The mixed method integrates both quantitative and qualitative research approaches (Creswell and Clark 2018;

Hesse-Biber and Johnson 2015; McKim 2017). Both quantitative and qualitative studies are crucial for examining the dynamics of the political scene in Indonesia. In certain places of Indonesia, the impact of elections on the principles of democracy can be observed (Pennings, Keman, and Kleinnijenhuis 2006; Robison et al. 2018; Svolik 2019). The political sociology approach is crucial for understanding the relationship between structure and culture. The structure is exemplified by political parties as participants in elections, while culture refers to the political culture of the community, which is still defined by political concerns.

Regarding data collecting, researchers utilised in-depth interview methodologies and made early observations to comprehensively analyse the political concerns surrounding elections and their impact on the long-term viability of democracy in Indonesia. To obtain secondary data, the research was undertaken by gathering quantitative data from election organisers and conducting field research to compare with the outcomes of this study (Bogaards 2019; Dryzek 2004; Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009; Lijphart 1971; 1969; 1977; Lively and Reeve 1989; Pennings, Keman, and Kleinnijenhuis 2006; Törnquist 2010).


To cover the national coverage, field activities had been carried out technically in Yogyakarta and Jakarta in Java Island, Bangka and Batam in Sumatra, Samarinda and Kutai Kartanegara in Kalimantan, and Gorontalo, Kota Mubagu and Makassar in Sulawesi accordingly.

The research was conducted over a four-month period from February to May 2024. The scheduling range was crucial, in part due to the fact that the general election process is longer than anticipated. For instance, it is necessary for the convener (KPU and KPUDs) to allocate time to expect potential conflicts about the contested vote results before the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi-MK*), which should be at least one month after the 2024 General Election day.

Methodologically, to assess the asymmetrical parliamentary threshold, we used Samuel Huntington's (1968) concept of institutionalization, which refers to the gradual development of value and stability inside organizations and procedures. The degree of institutionalization of a political system can be determined by its organizations' and procedures' adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence (Huntington 1968). The degree of institutionalisation of an organisation or process can be evaluated by considering its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Identifying and measuring these criteria makes it possible to compare political systems based on their degree of institutionalization. Furthermore, it will be feasible to quantify the growth or decline in the establishment of specific organizations and procedures inside a political system (Huntington, 1968, p.12). Specifically, the variables bind a social contract related to how a party is a political

infrastructure of society; in this research, we use the "adaptability" and "autonomy" concepts (figure 1).

Figure 1: Huntington's Concept of Institutionalization of Political Party.



Source: Huntington, 1968.

According to Huntington, the tendency of political party idealism in the description above intersects with the sovereign space confirmed by the systemic nature of coherence. These variables bind a social contract related to how a party is a political infrastructure of society. The degree of institutionalization of a political system can be determined by its organizations' and procedures' adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. The level of institutionalization of an organization or method can be assessed based on its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Identifying and measuring these criteria makes it possible to compare political systems based on their degree of institutionalization. Furthermore, it will be feasible to quantify the rise and fall of the institutionalization of specific organizations and procedures inside a political system (Huntington, 1968, p.9; 1970).

Furthermore, experts suggested two classifications of political parties after the reform, namely, the class path, which is explained as a party that distinguishes itself based on its views on capital, while the other is a party that tends to take a stream path that emphasizes more on religion, culture and ideology (Romli 2008; Treier and Hillygus 2009; Freeden 2008; Ramage 1995). However, the thickening of the pluralism of political parties after the reform needs to maintain the differentiation of political streams. The threshold dynamics often make parties experience changes in terms of number and ideology.

The synchronization between the political governance system and democracy and elections runs linearly. Then, in data tracing, political events that have implications for the course of the three relationships are also presented in the study of the political transition in Indonesia. The theories used revolve around the party system, which, in its classification, refers to the picture of Indonesian politics after the reform. Therefore, the formulated party system classification can measure the idealization of the party system following political dynamics.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

General Elections and Parliamentary Threshold

Historically, the 1955 Election was indeed a record of our ideal election portrait. In that year, all political parties won seats from the largest to the most minor votes (Bone 1955; BPS 2019; Ruhdiara, Junaidi, and Fatimah 2022). We certainly agree that the number is only a quantitative determinant. However, regarding the quality of ideas and the absorption of aspirations from the community, it is not only from the number but also from the existence of the elite in parliament. With such an assumption, we can see that the threshold is a weapon of the regime to simplify parties by eradicating the existence of the sovereignty of the people's voice. For example, when we examine the New Order Elections from 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, to 1997, the threshold system was implemented by amputating political parties based on Law Number 3 of 1975 (Bone 1955; BPS 2019; Ruhdiara, Junaidi, and Fatimah 2022). The logic of stability became one of the doctrines to simplify the parties into two groups at that time, Nationalist (PDI) and Religious (PPP), while Golkar was not said to be a party but could participate in elections and continuously win over 50% (Isra 2017; Indrawan 2022; Perdana et al. 2019).

The implementation of these three parties finally ended; in 1998, the spirit of reform returned to the multiparty concept in the June 7, 1999 Election, followed by 48 political parties. Unfortunately, of the 48 political parties, only 21 won seats in the DPR, and only six exceeded the electoral threshold (ET). The construction related to ET became one of the rules applied to participants in the 2004 and 2009 elections. The ET provisions in the 2004 and 2009 elections both referred to the percentage of the number of seats in the DPR, Provincial DPRD and District and Municipality, although the percentages were different. In 2004, ET required the acquisition of 2% of seats at the DPR level and 3% of the Provincial DPRD in half of the provinces in Indonesia, the same as at the Regency/City level (Isra 2017). Meanwhile, in 2009, overall, there was an increase of 1% at each electoral district level (Montlake 2009; Ufen 2009; 2010).

Interestingly, the existence of Political Parties participating in the 2009 election experienced a fluctuating increase, from only seven parties based on the 2004 election to 16 parties. This increase was due to the provisions in the constitution which stated that political parties participating in the 2004 election (table 1) that did not meet the ET requirements but had seats in the DPR could participate in the 2009 Election (BPS 2023; 2019; Choi 2007; Indrawan 2022; Perdana et al. 2019).

Table 1: Political Parties that Passed the Electoral Threshold in the 2004 Election

No	Political Party	Number of Seats in Parliament	Percentage (%)
1	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	128	23,27

2	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	109	19,82
3	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	58	10,55
4	Partai Demokrat	55	10
5	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	53	9,64
6	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	52	9,45
7	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	45	8,18

Source: KPU, 2004, compiled by the authors, 2024.

Then, in the 2004 Election, nine (9) parties still needed to pass the ET to participate in the 2009 Election (table 2).

Table 2: Political parties that did not pass the 2004 Electoral Threshold but had seats in the DPR

No	Political Party	Number of Seats in Parliament	Percentage (%)
1	Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR)	14	2,55
2	Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS)	13	2,36
3	Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)	11	2,00
4	Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)	4	0,73
5	Partai Pelopor	3	0,55
6	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB)	2	0,36
7	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (PKPI)	1	0,18
8	Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) Marhaenisme	1	0,18
9	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI)	1	0,18

Source: KPU, 2004, compiled by the authors, 2024.

Along the way, the ET system was sued by several parties that did not touch ET and did not have seats in the DPR; according to them, the policy was discriminatory and inconsistent with ET rules. In 2009, the number of parties participating in the election soared (Amiruddin, Ramadlan, and Shodiq 2015), furthermore, from 16 parties to 38 parties. However, only nine parties passed the ET and PT provisions (Montlake 2009; Ufen 2010).

Table 3: Political Parties that passed the Parliamentary Threshold in the 2009 Election.

No	Political Party	Number of Seats in Parliament	Percentage (%)
1	Partai Demokrat	148	26,43
2	Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar)	106	18,93
3	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP)	94	16,61
4	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	57	10,18
5	Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	46	8,21
6	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	38	6,79
7	Parta Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	28	5,00

8	Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)	26	4,64
9	Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura)	17	3,21

Source: KPU, 2009, compiled by the authors, 2024.

Indeed, the 2009 Election standards require political parties to be extra strict with double provisions, namely the ET and PT requirements. Both provisions were initially interpreted as a ticket to enter parliament as well as a ticket to become a participant in the 2014 election. However, with this anomalous interpretation, a number of parties filed a lawsuit at the constitutional court with 17 political parties as plaintiffs, including: the National Awakening Party of Ulama (*Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama - PKNU*), the Caring for the Nation Work Party (*Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa - PKPB*), the National Unity Party (PPN), the National Fortress Party of the People (*Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan - PNBK*), the Merdeka Party, the United National Democratic Party (*Partai Merdeka & Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan - PDK*), the Indonesian Union Party (*Partai Syarikat Indonesia - PSI*), the Indonesian Mercy & Democracy Party (*Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia - PKDI*), the Indonesian Employers and Workers Party (*Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia - PPI*), the Prosperous Peace Party (*Partai Damai Sejahtera - PDS*), the Renewal Democracy Party (*Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan - PDP*), the Republican Party (PR), and the Indonesian Youth Party (*Partai Pemuda Indonesia - PPI*) (Indrawan 2022; BPS 2019; Ruhdiara, Junaidi, and Fatimah 2022).

The Constitutional Court, with the lawsuit, issued decision number 52/PUU-X/2012, which in its ruling stated that PT was indeed not intended to be a requirement to become a participant in the next election, unlike ET, which was indeed to participate in the next election (MK 2023). Therefore, the transformation from ET to PT does not automatically provide a ticket for election participants in 2024. All parties must go through administrative and factual verification. This condition is a logical consequence of using PT as a new basis for the vote threshold in parliament.

Presidential Threshold

The parliamentary threshold regulated in the 2014 to 2019 Elections has severe implications for the nomination of President and Vice President. The provision of 4% of the vote as a requirement for political parties to pass to Senayan is linear with the threshold for presidential nomination regulated in Article 222 of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning elections (Fukuoka and Thalang 2014; Fukuoka 2013; Mietzner 2014; Sukmawan and Pratama 2023; Trihartono and Patriadi 2016; Virananda, Dartanto, and Wijaya 2021). This polemic has sparked many parties, such as political party activists and academics, to test the article at the Constitutional Court. Throughout 2020-2022, the Constitutional Court has ruled 17 times regarding the article with the

specifications that 14 were unacceptable to the Constitutional Court, one was rejected, and 2 were withdrawn (table 4).

Table 4: Constitutional Court Decision on Presidential Threshold (2020-2022).

No	Number Verdict	Applicants	Verdict/Status
1	52/PUU-XX/2022	DPD RI; Partai Bulan Bintang	Rejected/ Rejected Completely/unacceptable
2	42/PUU-XX/2022	Almizan Ulfa, Santi Lisana, DB. Ali Syarief, Petir Amri Wirabumi	Rejected/Unacceptable
3	21/PUU-XX/2022	Ajbar, Muhammad J. Watarbone, Eni Sumarno, M. Syukur; Abdul Rachman Thaha	Rejected/Unacceptable
4	20/PUU-XX/2022	Ali Ridhok, Bennie Akbar Fatah, Adang Suhardjo, Marwan Batubara	Rejected/Unacceptable
5	13/PUU-XX/2022	Syafril Sjofyan, Tito Roesbandi, Elyan Verna Hakim, Endang Wuryaningsih, Ida Farida, Neneng Khodijah, Lukman Nulhakim	Rejected/Unacceptable
6	11/PUU-XX/2022	Ridho Rahmadi, A. Muhadjir	Rejected/Unacceptable
7	8/PUU-XX/2022	Tata Kesantra, Ida Irmayani, Sri Mulyanti Masri, Safur Baktiar, Padma Anwar, Christisco Komari, Krisna Yudha, Eni Garniasih Kusnadi, Novi Karlinah, Nurul Islah, Faisal Aminy, Mohammad Maudy Alvi, Marnila Buckingham, Deddy Heyder Sungkar, Rahmatiah, Mutia Saufni Fisher, Karina Ratana Kanya, Winda Oktaviana, Tunjiah Binti Dul Warso, Muji Hasanah, Agus Riwayanto, Budi Satya Pramudia, Jumiko Sakarosa, Ratih Ratna Purnami, Fatma Lenggogeni, Edwin Syafril, dan Agri Sumara	Rejected/Unacceptable
8	16/PUU-XX/2022	Jaya Suprana	Withdrawn
9	7/PUU-XX/2022	Ikhwan Mansyur Situmeang	Rejected/Unacceptable
10	6/PUU-XX/2022	Tamsil Linrung, Fahira Idris, Edwin Pratama Putra	Rejected/Unacceptable
11	5/PUU-XX/2022	Lieus Sungkharisma	Rejected/Unacceptable
12	70/PUU-XIX/2021	Gatot Nurmantyo	Rejected/Unacceptable
13	66/PUU-XIX/2021	Ferry Joko Yuliantono	Rejected/Unacceptable
14	68/PUU-XIX-2021	Bustami Zainudin, Fachrul Razi	Rejected/Unacceptable
15	44/PUU-XIX/2021	Martondi, Naloanda, M. Gontar Lubis, Muhammad Yasid	Rejected/Unacceptable
16	74/ PUU-XVIII/2020	Rizal Ramli, Abdulrachim Kresno	Rejected/Unacceptable
17	35/PUU-XVIII/2020	Ki Gendeng Pamungkas	Withdrawn

Source: MK, 2020; MK, 2022, compiled by the authors, 2024.

As seen in the table, the Constitutional Court's decision not to accept the applicant's lawsuit related to this matter was due to the legal standing being limited to political parties or coalitions of political parties participating in the election. Meanwhile, people who in the election cycle have constitutional rights to be elected and to vote are considered to have no legal basis. Then, the Constitutional Court considers that the presidential threshold is part of an *open legal policy*, which, in terms of authority, should be a legal political policy in the legislature. Notably, behind the Constitutional Court's decision, the Presidential Threshold is considered to conflict with the provisions of Article 6A Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, which states that the presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs are elected directly by the people. It has nothing to do with the coalition formed in the DPR because the political party participating in the election has the authority to nominate presidential candidates.

The Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's lawsuit because the legal standing is restricted to political parties or coalitions of political parties involved in the election. Meanwhile, those who possess constitutional rights to participate in the electoral process, such as the right to be elected and the right to vote, are being regarded as lacking a legal foundation. According to the Constitutional Court, the presidential threshold is a component of a transparent legal strategy that should be established as a legitimate political agenda within the legislative branch. The Constitutional Court's judgement highlights the incompatibility between the Presidential Threshold and the provisions of Article 6A Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the people directly elect the presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs. The alliance created in the DPR is unrelated to the authority of the political party participating in the election to nominate presidential candidates.

The application of the Presidential Threshold has been rendered obsolete by the Constitutional Court's ruling, as the next 2019 elections will see the simultaneous election of the new DPR with the President and Vice-President. The threshold cannot be applied automatically. The presidential and vice-presidential candidates, in accordance with the concept of concurrent elections, will adhere strictly to the constitutional interpretation without any embellishments. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court's ruling does not abolish the regulations regarding the minimum requirements for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Law 7 of 2017, specifically article 222 of the DPR, establishes the criteria for submitting presidential and vice-presidential candidates. These criteria are based on the election results from five years ago. The enactment of Law 7 of 2017 resulted in a situation where many laws are simultaneously applicable, creating an overlap. Thus, the political and legal provisions set by the DPR nullify the jurisprudence of the simultaneous election.

Implications of the Party System

Political parties, as political infrastructure, become objects that impact the provisions of the law made in parliament. If we look at its function, the draft law that requires an electoral, parliamentary, and presidential threshold is part of constructing political party policies at the executive and legislative levels. From the setting of the political flow, testing the law as a political product is an effort to accommodate the interests of dominant political parties. For example, in the electoral threshold regime from 2004 to 2009, political parties had a minimum seat threshold of 3-4% from the DPR RI level to the regency and municipality. This provision requires Political Parties to be able to participate in the next election. This top-down system eliminates parties that need more seat percentages in the upcoming election. The space of this regulation is different from the Parliamentary Threshold regime, which only applies at the DPR RI level but does not tolerate votes that do not reach the threshold provisions, namely 2.5-3, up to now 4%. Reflection of the provisions: Although there are differences in political party participation, there are similarities with efforts to eliminate political parties that do not obtain the applicable threshold provisions. References from both models concerning the Presidential Threshold are not too significant because different provisions of articles in the Election Law regulate them. However, the coalition that composed seats and votes in parliament is still a bargaining chip for political parties to advance presidential and vice-presidential candidates. When referring to the presidential system, party coalitions are not commonly carried out because of the model of direct election by the people.

Meanwhile, the coalition in the modern political tradition is more about the parliamentary system with the model of electing the prime minister by parliament. From this unusual case, ideally, the Presidential Threshold is abolished with the argument of the presidential system and the freedom of the party system in choosing presidential and vice-presidential candidates. In 2024, the Constitutional Court issued a somewhat encouraging decision; the Parliamentary Threshold proposed by the Association for Elections and Democracy (*Perkumpulan untuk Pemilu dan Demokrasi - Perludem*) was declared conditionally constitutional in the 2029 general election, in which the Constitutional Court did not abolish the parliamentary threshold. However, it allowed lawmakers to review the threshold figure and its relevance.

Evidently, during this time, when the threshold was tested at the Constitutional Court (MK), one MK system was simplifying political parties (MK 2024). However, the system refers to the provisions of the rules for political parties participating in elections. The simplification will automatically apply to administrative verification and factual verification at the General Election Commission (KPU); the burden of simplification is then regulated in the threshold; political parties do not experience simplification but restrictions on constitutional rights in efforts to establish a political

party. A system bound by a threshold will make political parties disappear systematically; then, the vote acquisition will not reach the provisions that have been written. Therefore, the Constitutional Court's decision opens up space to revise the parliamentary threshold in 2029, formulating the interests of the parties currently in power that could maintain or possibly increase the parliamentary threshold. This narrative was once conveyed by the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the Nasdem Party in March 2024, wanting the parliamentary threshold to be increased to 7%. The reason is that they want to avoid a mushrooming system in the party system. They forget and seem unaware that the mushrooming practice of money politics, to 'deparpolization' (*deparpolitisasi*) in society, is a form of the system and even opportunism of our political parties today.

From several cases mentioned above, the party system of the threshold regulation rules affects the existence of political parties. Furthermore, the construction of the threshold causes small parties to experience degradation from a system. Regarding constitutional rights, the threshold places a double burden on political parties that have participated in the election stages, which are reviewed every five years by the KPU. Political party system and threshold (Ansari, Syamsu, and Ekawaty 2022; Darusman, Soriano, and Kurniawan 2024; Firdaus 2016; Gunanto, Murod, and Sulaiman 2022; Hutabarat and Affandi 2020; Mietzner 2020; Pawestri et al. 2023; Prasetio and Sianipar 2021; Sulistyarini and Wisnaeni 2024).

Space for People's Sovereignty

Philosophically, people's sovereignty is essential to a democratic system. The people's voice cannot be interpreted only in cumulative numbers but must be seen further from how massively the voice is represented in parliamentary spaces. The reconstruction of the people's voice definition must be framed from the policy on the parliamentary threshold. Regarding the threshold provisions, the people's votes given in the election event can be wasted or not used automatically. For example, in the 2024 election, ten political parties still need to pass the Parliamentary Threshold (table 5) with each percentage of votes.

Table 5: Political Parties That Did Not Pass the 2024 Parliamentary Threshold

No	Political Party	Number of Seats in Parliament	Percentage (%)
1	PPP	5.878.777	3,87%
2	PSI	4.260.169	2,86%
3	Perindo	1.955.154	1,29%
4	Gelora	1.281.991	0,84%
5	Hanura	1.094.588	0,72%
6	Buruh	972.910	0,64%
7	Ummat	642.545	0,42%
8	PBB	484.486	0,32%
9	Garuda	406.883	0,27%

10	PKN	326.800	0,21%
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Source: KPU RI, 2024, compiled by the authors, 2024.

As seen in Table 5, the number of votes that cannot be converted into seats is part of the provisions of the threshold value. From this provision, parties such as the PPP, which only have a difference of no more than 1%, must be willing not to enter parliament and other parties further from the threshold. Therefore, these parties finally took the litigation path at the Constitutional Court to track the possibility that the votes produced could reach the threshold. This reference in 2029 is likely to change, although the possibility is slight. However, the rationality of the threshold is worthy of being redefined. Indeed, some parties do not agree with the elimination of the threshold. However, the threshold, for example, eliminated, will positively correlate with appreciating the people's votes. The implementation of sovereignty can be obtained with the elimination of the threshold. Indeed, the next question is how to regulate the distribution of seat conversions if the threshold is eliminated. We can still use the Sainte League calculation or the vote divisor number that the KPU currently uses. This method can be an alternative to the average threshold without being suppressed by threshold rules. The calculation can also be proportional to the number of seats and the provisions of the votes achieved. By referring to the odd divisor number to calculate the maximum and minimum vote existence votes in obtaining seats. What is certain is that the way the KPU divides seats will refer to the proportional system of political party votes. This space is an alternative to the opening of space by the Constitutional Court in assessing whether the Parliamentary Threshold is still worthy of being maintained in 2029. The existence of people's sovereignty must be placed at the top to ensure that the representative method can be absorbed as little as possible for seats in parliament. The rest of the ratio of aspirations in the DPR cannot be seen from the quantification of the number but from how massively the people's representatives individually carry out the aspirations of their constituents. Moreover, now when we see the variety of professions becoming a member of DPR without educational filters or other strict provisions, it requires that the sovereign space must be more dynamic (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019a; 2019b; Aspinall and Berenschot 2019; Bachmid 2020; Oktasari, Razzak, and Liza 2023; Samosir 2022; Mulyani 2023).

Party System and Parliamentary Threshold

Indonesia's party system has experienced ideal party management in theory and practice. As a political infrastructure of society, political parties have been bound as a "social contract" (Huntington 1968; 1970; 1991; 1965). However, along the way, political parties have experienced degradation regarding the substance of their duties and functions. The relevance of this problem intersects constructively with the PT model, which is the rule of percentage of votes in parliament. Some of the formulations touch on four variables.

Adaptability

Adaptability in the modern party system is a form of adjustment of political elites to the environment and regulatory rules. This existence targets the professionalism of political parties that are active and responsive to the potential of their cadres in the election event. This actualization implicitly ideally gives birth to a DPR that is more open and accessible when formulating regulations. In fact, with PT's existence, adaptability's relevance has yet to find its place. Parties tend to look for popular candidates rather than educated cadres within the party. With a model like this, the party is no different from a company oriented towards capital (money) seeking electoral victory. This portrait sparks a realm of internalization whose output targets the attitude of *de-parpolisasi* or the absence of closeness of voters to political parties.

Then, in measuring the performance of political parties more than two decades after the reform, political parties became the institutions that were least trusted by the public. Strangely, however, the political participation of the community continues to increase. These two asymmetrical things show that the closeness of the community to the party is only focused on the doctrine of vote buying, which has always been a political culture in Indonesia. This reference to money politics emphasizes that the elected candidates are mainly due to how much capital will be spent and the popularity of the elite.

Autonomy

Political parties in the reform era did indeed get quite absolute freedom. It can be seen from the many parties that emerged. However, such a political situation did not allow the parties to create autonomy, especially regarding the circulation of the top elites in political parties. Of course, we see that the general chairmen of parties founded after the reform did not rigidly regulate the period of their office. Some of them are as follows:

Table 6: Chair of prominent political parties in Indonesia 1993-2024.

No	Political Party	Chair	Length of Time as Political Party Leader
1	PDI-Perjuangan	Megawati Soekarno Putri	1993/Sekarang (30 Tahun)
2	PKB	Muhaimin Iskandar	2005/Sekarang (18 Tahun)
3	PBB	Yusril Izha Mahendra	1998-2004/2014-2019/2019-Sekarang (15 Tahun)
4	Nasdem	Surya Paloh	2013/Sekarang (10 Tahun)
5	Gerindra	Prabowo Subianto	2014/Sekarang (10 Tahun)

Source: The authors, 2024.

As we can see in Table 6, political parties cannot democratize within their internal parties, let alone in their grip on the regions; the determination of regional head candidates is all the authority of the party's general chairman. The top-down relationship shows that regional head candidates are only sometimes party cadres.

Even among them are businessmen or businesswomen or famous figures who need help understanding political parties' ideology, vision, and mission.

CONCLUSION

The existence of the Constitutional Court Decision on the Parliamentary Threshold leaves a big question mark in the 2029 election. Besides, the provisions of the decision are inversely proportional to the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the Presidential Threshold, which has always been rejected and considered an open legal policy. Both are tools for the existence of citizens in terms of channelling their votes with a direct election model. Furthermore, the 4% threshold provision burdens political parties in maintaining their positions in parliament. From the party system side, this provision automatically makes small parties unable to survive the onslaught of large investors. Therefore, the threshold provision, which currently has conditional constitutional status, 2029 must be revised by eliminating it and providing a seat calculation process with the KPU technical method.

In the space of people's sovereignty, the Parliamentary Threshold and Presidential Threshold are part of the exclusion of people's voices in elections because both are political products that provide regulatory (top-down) limitations on the function of voters' voices. This reference has severe implications for the legitimacy of the people's voices that should be represented at the DPR, DPRD Province, and DPRD Regency and Municipality levels.

Therefore, the Constitutional Court's ruling preference regarding the Parliamentary Threshold in the parliamentary chamber must be able to be formulated proportionally and rationally in 2029, while the Presidential Threshold, ideally, follows the logic of the Parliamentary Threshold, which is indeed connected to Indonesia's Presidential system of government.

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BAB III

DINAMIKA POLITIK UANG DAN PENGARUHNYA PADA PARTISIPASI PEMILIH DALAM PEMILIHAN LEGISLATIF DAN PEMILIHAN KEPALA DAERAH

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Abstrak

Isu dan praktik politik uang (*money politics*) mencederai sistem demokrasi masih mewarnai kontestasi Pemilihan Umum (Pemilu) di Indonesia. Meskipun banyak yang menentang adanya praktik tersebut, tidak menjadikan politik uang sirna dari polemik demokrasi negeri ini. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode *mixed methods research* yang akan mengungkap sejauh mana politik uang memengaruhi masyarakat dalam menentukan hak pilihnya pada Pemilihan Umum (Pemilu) baik Pemilihan Legislatif (Pileg) maupun Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). Data kuantitatif yang diperoleh dari hasil survei di beberapa daerah seperti Kabupaten Bone Bolango (Gorontalo), Kutai Kartanegara (Kalimantan Timur), Bintan dan Karimun (Kepulauan Riau), dan Jayapura (Papua), kemudian diramu menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan menyeret teori *patron-client* milik James Scott. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan hasil bahwa dari beberapa sampel daerah-daerah tersebut, pola politik uang yang ditemui memiliki kesamaan dalam praktiknya. Secara empiric, dari penelitian ini, para penulis beragurmen mayoritas masyarakat paham akan ilegalnya praktik politik uang, namun tidak serta-merta menjadikan praktik politik uang ditolak dalam pemilihan umum di daerah tersebut. Kondisi sosial ekonomi daerah juga tampaknya turut mengambil peran penting pada

keputusan masyarakat dalam menerima atau menolak praktik politik uang yang ada.

Key words: Politik uang; Patronase; Demokrasi; Pilkada 2024; Pemilu 2024

PENDAHULUAN

Pemerintahan yang baik atau *good governace* merupakan konsep yang bersifat kolektif, melibatkan seluruh tindakan atau tingkah laku yang bersifat mengarahkan, mengendalikan, atau memengaruhi urusan publik. Substansi dari *good governace* atau pemerintahan yang baik adalah bersih, dan berwibawa. Pemerintahan yang baik yang baik adalah sikap dimana kekuasaan dilakukan dengan tingkah laku pemerintah yang berkaitan dengan sumber-sumber sosial, budaya, politik, serta ekonomi. Dalam perwujudan pemerintahan yang baik, perlu disokong dengan penyelenggaraan pemilihan umum yang demokratis serta terhindar dari praktik *money politic*.

Salah satu polemik yang turut mewarnai kontestasi politik dalam pelaksanaan demokrasi yakni Politik Uang (*Money Politic*). Praktik politik uang masih menjadi isu krusial serta pemegang kunci utama yang tak terpisahkan dengan sistematisa pemilihan di era demokrasi ini. Politik uang merupakan fenomena yang marak terjadi dalam demokrasi prosedural di Indonesia, terutama sejak pemilihan langsung tahun 2004¹, dan seakan menjadi praktik pengkerdilan masyarakat yang secara terang-terangan ditampakkan dalam rangkaian proses demokrasi.

Tidak hanya di Indonesia, politik uang atau *money politik* ternyata menjadi elemen kunci mobilisasi elektoral di banyak demokrasi gelombang ketiga seiring dengan penyebaran rezim demokrasi di negara-negara berkembang². Mengutip hasil Studi yang dilakukan Andrews dan Inman tentang perilaku pemilih di tujuh negara Afrika yang paling demokratis menurut Freedom House, misalnya, menemukan Fakta adanya jual beli suara³. Dengan menggunakan data survey Afrobarometer Tahap 3 Tahun 2005, mereka menemukan Ghana adalah negara paling rentan mengalami praktik politik uang atau jual beli suara dengan kisaran 42% warganya mengaku ditawarkan uang atau hadiah sewaktu pemilu⁴.

¹Robi Cahyadi Kurniawan, Dedy Haermawan, "Strategi Sosial Pencegahan Politik Uang di Indonesia", Jurnal Antikorupsi integritas. Fakultas Ilmu Politik Universitas Lampung, h.1.

²Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "Politik Uang dan Dinamika Elektoral di Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Awal Interaksi antara "Party-ID" dan Patron-Klien. Jurnal Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik UIN Syarif Hidayatullah dan Pascasarjana Universitas Paramadina, Jakarta, 2013.

³Josephine T. Andrews dan Kris Inman, "Explaining Vote Choice in Africa's Emerging Democracies" makalah dipresentasikan dalam Midwest Political Science Association, 2009, h. 3

⁴Dikutip dari Jurnal Nasional Burhanuddin Muhtadi,

Indonesia sendiri sebagai negara dengan populasi penduduk sebanyak 281.603.800 jiwa⁵, praktik politik uang bukanlah hal baru. Sejarah mencatat, pemilu terbaik hanya terjadi sekali di negeri ini yakni pada 29 September 1955. Peserta Pemilu saat itu diikuti lebih dari 30 partai politik, organisasi maupun perorangan, dengan memperebutkan 257 kursi Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat dan 541 kursi konsituante. Dikatakan demikian, sebab pada waktu itu Pemilu dilaksanakan dengan suasana yang demokratis, jujur dan adil serta tidak mengenal politik uang. Ketika itu partai peserta pemilu bertarung dengan *fair* dan obyektif dengan tidak mengandalkan uang dan kekuasaan semata, melainkan mempertaruhkan gagasan ke-Indonesi-an.⁶

Praktik politik uang terjadi dalam proses Pemilihan Umum (Pemilu) di seluruh jenjang pemerintahan, mulai dari pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden, Pemilihan Legislatif (Pileg), hingga Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). Skema politik uang yang dilakukan juga beragam, mulai dari pemberian uang tunai secara langsung kepada pemilih, penyaluran bantuan sosial kepada individu maupun kelompok masyarakat tertentu, hingga penyediaan layanan maupun pengadaan fasilitas tertentu untuk menarik simpati sehingga bisa mendapatkan dukungan politik masyarakat pada pemilihan umum.

Selain menyasar masyarakat, ada praktik politik uang yang terselubung yang tak jarang ditemui di negara demokrasi ini, di antaranya pembiayaan kampanye yang tidak transparan, serta praktik lobi politik dengan menggunakan uang sebagai sarana mendapatkan dukungan atau keputusan tertentu demi kelancaran kemenangan suatu partisan dalam Pemilu.

Pola yang demikian pernah marak terjadi dalam sejarah demokrasi bangsa ini, tepatnya pada pemilihan umum lembaga legislatif 2014 silam. Pada masa itu, tak lama setelah hari pemungutan suara pada 9 April 2014, terbentuk wacana di kalangan pegiat media massa bahwa para kandidat telah membagi-bagikan uang kepada pemilih, memberikan barang serta menyuap para pejabat penyelenggara

⁵Badan Pusat Statistik, Juni 2024

⁶

pemilu pada tingkat yang sebelumnya tidak pernah terjadi dalam sejarah pemilu di Indonesia.⁷

Sistem demokrasi yang demikian, rakyat selaku komponen penting dalam negara seharusnya mampu menentukan pilihan pada kader-kader perwakilan partai politik dengan menilai pada visi misi serta program kerja yang ditawarkan, sehingga nantinya mampu merepresentasikan aspirasi mereka untuk mewujudkan kesejahteraan dalam kehidupan bernegara. Namun, hak pilih tersebut diintervensi oleh pihak-pihak yang memiliki kepentingan tertentu dengan memanfaatkan ketidakpahaman masyarakat akan integritas pemilu serta lemahnya kondisi ekonomi masyarakat Indonesia pada umumnya. Hal ini menjadikan masyarakat tidak dapat membuat keputusan secara bebas untuk menggunakan hak pilihnya sebagai warga negara.

Praktik politik uang lebih rentan menyerang daerah dengan kondisi ekonomi lemah, dimana masyarakatnya selain memiliki pendapatan rendah, tingkat pendidikan dan kesadaran yang dimiliki individunya pun kurang. Pemahaman masyarakat yang minim terkait pentingnya integritas dalam pemilihan umum memberikan ruang yang besar bagi praktik pelanggaran pemilu dilakukan.

Berbagai literatur ilmiah menunjukkan fakta bahwa politik uang cenderung lebih masif terjadi di daerah-daerah dengan tingkat kemiskinan yang terbilang tinggi, pun dengan pendidikan maupun pemahaman politik masyarakatnya yang rendah. Jurnal Riset Tindakan Indonesia (JRTI) yang ditulis oleh Wahyudi Tanjung dan Ramadani Ramadani menyebut Masyarakat yang memiliki pendapatan rendah cenderung lebih mudah tergiur dengan uang atau barang yang diberikan oleh kandidat politik.⁸

Salah satu daerah yang terletak di Provinsi Gorontalo merupakan hasil pemerkararan dari Kabupaten Gorontalo Utara, yakni Kabupaten Bone Bolango⁹

⁷Edward Aspinall, Mada Sukmajati, *Politik Uang di Indonesia, Patronase dan Klientelisme di Pemilu Legislatif 2014*, (Jakarta: Penerbit PolGov, 2015), h. 2.

⁸Wahyudi Tanjung, Ramadani Ramadani, "Analisis Korelasi Pendapatan Masyarakat dengan Politik Uang dalam Pemilu", *Jurna Riset Tindakan Indonesia (JRTI) Universitas Islam Negeri Sumatera, Medan*, 2023, h. 194.

⁹Republik Indonesia, *Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 2003 tentang Pembentukan Kabupaten Bonebolango dan Kabupaten Pohuwato di Provinsi Gorontalo*, Lembar Negara Nomor 26 Tahun 2003.

merupakan contoh nyata dimana pendapatan per kapita yang rendah dan angka kemiskinan yang masih di tingkat menengah berkontribusi terhadap maraknya praktik politik uang. Berdasarkan data yang dirilis oleh Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS Bone Bolango) tahun 2023,¹⁰ pendapatan per kapita Bone Bolango hanya mencapai angka Rp.33,81 juta yang mencerminkan kondisi perekonomian masih tergolong lemah. Persentase penduduk miskin di Kabupaten Bone Bolango per Maret 2024 juga masih di tingkat menengah yakni di angka 14,80% dengan jumlah penduduk miskin sebanyak 23,67 ribu orang.¹¹

Kondisi inilah yang membuat banyak masyarakat selaku pemilih mudah dipengaruhi oleh tawaran uang atau barang dari kandidat politik yang berusaha mengamankan suara melalui jalan yang kurang etis. Lemahnya perekonomian membuat banyak masyarakat melegalkan jual beli suara yang dilakukan sekelompok partai politik dan calon kepala daerah hingga calon anggota legislatif.

Akan tetapi fenomena politik uang tidak hanya terbatas pada daerah dengan ekonomi lemah. Daerah dengan pendapatan per kapita provinsi yang tergolong tinggi seperti di Kepulauan Riau dengan angka Rp.154,179 juta¹² juga turut menunjukkan prevalensi praktik politik uang yang signifikan. Beberapa kabupaten di dalamnya misalnya, Kabupaten Bintan dengan pendapatan per kapita yang termasuk di tingkat menengah yakni di angka Rp.86,49 juta¹³ dan persentase penduduk miskin tahun 2024 di angka 5,44% dan Kabupaten Karimun dengan pendapatan per kapita ada di angka 74,6 juta¹⁴ per tahun 2023. Serta persentase penduduk miskin di tahun 2024 di angka yang rendah yakni 5,78%¹⁵ tidak menjamin praktik politik uang tidak merambat di daerah tersebut.

¹⁰Badan Pusat Statistik Bone Bolango, "PDRB per Kapita di Kabupaten Bone Bolango 2023," <https://bonebolangokab.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/NjQjMg==/produk-domestik-regional-bruto-per-kapita-di-kabupaten-bone-bolango.html> (diakses pada 23 Agustus 2024).

¹¹Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Bone Bolango, Berita Resmi Statistik No.03/08/7504/Th.IV, 1 Agustus 2024.

¹²<https://kepri.bps.go.id/id/pressrelease/2024/02/05/1557/pertumbuhan-ekonomi-kepulauan-riau-triwulan-iv-2023.html> Rilis 5 Februari 2024.

¹³Ringkasan Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah Kabupaten Bintan Tahun 2021 <https://bintankab.go.id/upload/berita/file/1648642077752.pdf>. Diakses tanggal 24/8/2024.

¹⁴BPS

¹⁵<https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2024/08/24/5-78-penduduk-di-kabupaten-karimun-masuk-kategorimiskin#:~:text=Persentase%20penduduk%20miskin%20di%20Kabupaten%20Karimun%2C%20data%20per%2030%20November,yang%20dilaporkan%205%2C95%20persen>. Diakses tanggal 24/8/2024.

Meskipun memiliki sumber daya ekonomi yang lebih baik dari Bone Bolango, praktik politik uang tetap saja menghiasi proses demokrasi daerah tersebut. Tak hanya di Kepulauan Riau, di Kota Jayapura, Provinsi Papua¹⁶ dengan pendapatan per kapita masyarakatnya dan persentase kemiskinan di tahun 2023 sebanyak 11,45%¹⁷ yang tergolong kemiskinan menengah

Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara di Provinsi Kalimantan Timur pada tahun 2023, persentase penduduk miskin 7,99%¹⁸

Faktor pendukung politik uang di daerah tersebut karena adanya persaingan perebutan kekuasaan yang ketat sehingga menjadikan para kandidat berlomba-lomba mengeluarkan kos politik dalam kampanye agar mampu bersaing dalam hal mendapatkan dukungan untuk pemenangnya.

Banyaknya masyarakat yang masih merespons menjadikan politik uang semakin masif terjadi. Dampak buruk yang kerap kali diabaikan tentu saja melahirkan perwakilan rakyat maupun pemimpin yang tidak kompeten dan tentunya berpengaruh pada penyelenggaraan pemerintahan di Indonesia baik di tingkat pusat maupun daerah. Implikasi praktik politik uang yang jarang diketahui masyarakat adalah perbuatan melawan hukum seperti Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (KKN). Praktik suap yang tergambarkan melalui politik uang ini sering kali disepelekan namun punya dampak negatif yang memengaruhi siklus jalanya pemerintahan, serta kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh pemerintah.

Proses transaksional yang terjadi dalam praktik politik uang antara partisan dan masyarakat mengindikasikan adanya gejala patron-klien yang sangat nyata. Partisan selaku pihak patron (tingkat elit) melakukan transaksi dalam bentuk pembelian suara secara tidak langsung melalui pemberian uang maupun barang dengan maksud memperoleh kepercayaan dari masyarakat selaku klien (tingkat bawah) agar menyalurkan hak sauranya kepada calon legislatif maupun calon kepala daerah yang sedang bertarung dalam kontestasi politik.

¹⁶<https://jayapurakota.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/MTMwIzI=/persentase-penduduk-miskin-p-0-.html>

¹⁷<https://papua.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/NDUjMg==/persentase-penduduk-miskin-menurut-kabupaten-kota.html>

¹⁸<https://kaltim.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/ODQjMg==/jumlah-penduduk-miskin-menurut-kabupaten-kota.html>

Pada hakikatnya, transaksi antara patron dan klien harus bersifat mutualisme, yakni menguntungkan kedua belah pihak. Namun pada kenyataannya dalam implementasi. Politik uang pada pemilihan legislatif tahun 2019 maupun tahun 2014 memiliki pola yang sama, yakni semakin mendekati pemilu, insiden politik uang semakin gencar dilakukan.

Badan Pengawasan Pemilu Republik Indonesia (Bawaslu RI) merilis daerah-daerah yang dikategorikan sebagai daerah rawan pemilu tahun 2024¹⁹. Dari 17 provinsi yang melaksanakan Pilkada serentak 2018, terdapat tiga provinsi yang masuk kategori nilai Kerawanan Tinggi, yaitu: Papua (3,41), Maluku (3,25), dan Kalimantan Barat (3,04). Empat belas provinsi lain mengindikasikan kategori Kerawanan Sedang, adalah: Sumatera Utara (2,86), Sulawesi Tenggara (2,81), Kalimantan Timur (2,76), Maluku Utara (2,71), Nusa Tenggara Timur (2,70), Jawa Timur (2,68), Sumatera Selatan (2,55), Nusa Tenggara Barat (2,54), Sulawesi Selatan (2,53), Jawa Barat (2,52), Riau (2,46), Lampung (2,28), Bali (2,19), dan Jawa Tengah (2,15). Sebagai catatan, IKP 2018 menemukan bahwa tidak ada satu pun provinsi masuk kategori Kerawanan Rendah dan indeks provinsi di Kerawanan Sedang berada di angka 2,5, bahkan ada tiga provinsi (Sumatera Utara, Sulawesi Tenggara, dan Kalimantan Timur) yang berpotensi naik ke kategori Kerawanan Tinggi karena memiliki skor di atas 2,75 (indeks kerawanan Pemilu, Bawaslu RI).

Politik uang tetap diterapkan dan seakan telah menjadi hal lumrah, bahkan proses demokrasi di seluruh penjuru dunia menggunakan politik uang sebagai strategi politik. Penerapan politik uang di setiap daerah memiliki polarisasi yang hampir sama. Distribusi yang dilakukan partisan maupun partai pengusungnya dalam bentuk uang maupun barang kepada masyarakat menjadi pilihan yang sama yang diterapkan di berbagai daerah untuk menggait suara.

Masyarakat dengan tingkat pendidikan yang lemah serta ekonomi yang tebilang dibawah rata-rata memang menjadi sasaran empuk penerapan praktik ini. Namun, intensitas persaingan politik juga turut andil dalam masifnya praktik politik uang yang menjadikan daerah-daerah dengan angka kemiskinan rendah maupun

¹⁹Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Bawaslu) Republik Indonesia, *Daerah Rawan Pemilu*, diakses dari bawaslu.go.id.,

daerah dengan sumber daya ekonomi yang terbilang cukup baik masih turut dijumpai praktik politik uang menjelang Pemilu.

Penelitian ini dibuat untuk mengetahui sejauh mana peran uang dalam pola politik uang berpengaruh pada pilihan masyarakat baik dalam pemilihan legislatif (Pileg) maupun Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada) serta faktor apa saja yang memengaruhi perbedaan praktik politik uang di berbagai daerah di Indonesia. Adapun dua permasalahan inti yang akan dikupas dalam penelitian ini, yaitu: “Bagaimana peran uang dalam praktik politik uang memengaruhi Pileg/Pilkada?” Serta “Bagaimana perbedaan pola politik uang di Bone Bolango, Kutai Kartanegara, Belitung, Karimun, Bintan dan Jayapura?”

Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis peran uang dalam praktik politik uang serta pengaruhnya pada Pemilihan Legislatif maupun Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, juga untuk mengidentifikasi dan membandingkan pola politik uang di beberapa daerah dengan latar belakang perekonomian yang berbeda-beda seperti kabupaten Bone Bolango (Gorontalo), Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara (Kalimantan Timur), Kabupaten Karimun dan Kabupaten Bintan (Kepulauan Riau), dan Kota Jayapura (Papua).

KAJIAN TEORI

1. Teori Politik Uang

Money Politic atau politik uang adalah suatu bentuk pemberian atau janji menyuap seseorang baik supaya orang itu tidak menjalankan haknya untuk memilih maupun supaya ia menjalankan haknya dengan cara tertentu pada saat pemilihan umum.²⁰ Saat ini, uang tidaklah menjadi alat transaksi utama dalam praktik *money politic*, banyak alternatif lainnya yang juga turut digunakan dengan tujuan yang sama yakni memengaruhi keputusan masyarakat selaku pemilik suara. Para kandidat partai politik yang maju dalam kontestasi pemilihan umum.

Politik uang umumnya rentan menyerang masyarakat dengan tingkat ekonomi yang rendah. Masyarakat yang mengalami kesulitan ekonomi mungkin

²⁰ Rahmiati, Perekembangan Perilaku Politik Uang di Pilkada 2020.

akan merasa terdorong untuk menerima tawaran politik uang sebagai solusi jangka pendek terhadap kebutuhan mereka. Keadaan tersebut seringkali dimanfaatkan para partisan partai politik dalam melancarkan strategi pemenangan mereka dalam pemilihan umum. dengan menawarkan sejumlah uang maupun bantuan kepada masyarakat, para pelaku politik uang bisa dengan sangat mudah mengumpulkan suara dukungan dalam pemilihan umum. Jika ditelaah, praktik politik uang merupakan salah satu strategi politik yang bertujuan untuk memengaruhi hasil pemilihan, namun dilakukan dengan cara yang tidak adil dimana dukungan politik dari masyarakat diperoleh dengan cara dibeli, bukan melalui proses yang sah dan transparan

Namun keadan ekonomi yang lemah nyatanya tidak menjadi satu-satunya faktor penyebab masifnya praktik politik uang mewarnai demokrasi. Beberapa faktor lain yang turut berkontribusi pada prevalensi politik uang yang diduga memengaruhi tinggi rendahnya praktik jual beli suara tersebut di antaranya kurangnya pemahaman masyarakat akan integritas Pemilihan Umum, lemahnya pengawasan dan penegakan hukum, kultur politik yang korup, serta ketatnya persaingan antar partai politik.

Secara teoretik, Salah satu faktor penting yang dipercaya menyumbang insiden politik uang adalah desain institusi politik. Termasuk sistem multipartai. Banyaknya partai politik yang ikut dalam kontestasi demokrasi menjadikan persaingan politik semakin sengit. Partai-partai yang ikut berkompetisi dalam pemilihan umum memiliki kepentingannya sendiri, sehingga semuanya berlomba-lomba memperebutkan kursi di pemerintahan. Tidak ada partai yang mendominasi secara mutlak, menjadikan partai-partai politik membentuk koalisi untuk merebut kekuasaan. Alhasil, politik uang menjadi salah satu jalan yang dipilih untuk melancarkan pemenangan partai politik di pemerintahan.

Praktik politik uang dapat menciptakan ketidakadilan di arena pemilihan, dimana kontestan politik dengan sumber daya keuangan yang lebih besar memiliki keuntungan yang tidak adil atas lawan-lawannya. Ini juga dapat mengurangi kesetaraan dalam proses demokrasi dan merusak prinsip kompetisi yang adil. Ketika uang digunakan untuk memengaruhi pengambilan keputusan politik, maka

akan mengakibatkan lahirnya kebijakan yang tidak mencerminkan kepentingan umum, tetapi lebih condong pada kepentingan finansial dari kelompok-kelompok tertentu. Hal ini tentu dapat merusak integritas kebijakan publik dan menciptakan ketidakpuasan di kalangan masyarakat.

2. Teori Patronase

Patronase merupakan hubungan dua arah antara patron dan klien. Patron adalah individu ataupun kelompok yang memiliki sumber daya (materil dan non-materil) dibandingkan dengan klien, sedangkan sumber daya adalah dimana aktor memiliki control serta memiliki kepentingan tertentu, sumber daya juga dapat diartikan sebagai sesuatu yang bisa dikendalikan oleh aktor.²¹

Patronase dalam dunia politik menggambarkan korelasi antara partai politik (Parpol) sebagai patron dan masyarakat yang memiliki hak pilih sebagai klient. Patronase didefinisikan sebagai sebuah pembagian keuntungan di antara politisi untuk mendistribusikan sesuatu secara individual kepada pemilih, para pekerja atau pegiat kampanye, dalam rangka mendapatkan dukungan politik dari mereka (Shefter 1994: 283,).

Mada Sukmajati dan Edward Aspinall dalam buku "*Politik Uang di Indonesia, Patronase dan Klientelisme di Pemilu Legislatif 2014*" mendefinisikan Patronase sebagai pemberian uang tunai, barang, jasa, dan keuntungan ekonomi lainnya (seperti pekerjaan atau kontrak proyek) yang didistribusikan oleh politisi, termasuk keuntungan yang ditujukan untuk individu (misalnya, amplop berisi uang tunai) dan kepada kelompok/komunitas (misalnya, lapangan sepak bola baru untuk para pemuda di sebuah kampung). Patronase juga bisa berupa uang tunai atau barang yang didistribusikan kepada pemilih yang berasal dari dana pribadi (misalnya, dalam pembelian suara) atau dana publik (misalnya proyek-proyek *pork barrel* yang dibiayai oleh pemerintah).²²

Sistem patronase dalam politik biasanya terjadi menjelang proses Pemilu baik pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden, Pemilihan Anggota Legislatif (Pileg), serta

²¹Andrews & Ritzer, 2018)

²²Edward Aspinall, Mada Sukmajati, *Politik Uang di Indonesia, Patronase dan Klientelisme di Pemilu Legislatif 2014*, (Jakarta, Penerbit PolGov, 2015), h.

pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). Patronase terjadi karena adanya kepentingan patron yakni partai politik maupun oknum yang terlibat dalam kontestasi Pemilu yang membutuhkan klient yakni masyarakat sebagai pemilik suara untuk mendapatkan dukungan dengan tujuan memenangkan Pemilu. Dalam sistem patronase, partai politik akan mendapatkan keuntungan dengan mengamankan suara konstituen.

Patronase adalah bentuk jaringan politik di mana dukungan dan loyalitas politik diperoleh dengan memberikan keuntungan kepada individu maupun kelompok tertentu sebagai imbalan atas dukungan politik yang diberikan. Sistem ini seringkali dikritik karena dapat memperkuat korupsi dan ketidakadilan dalam proses demokrasi. Meskipun demikian, di sisi lain sistem patronase dinilai dapat memainkan peran dalam menghidupkan bahkan memperkuat demokrasi. Adanya proses transaksional yang menggunakan imbalan dapat meningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam pemilu. Politisi dapat menarik dukungan berbagai lapisan masyarakat, termasuk mereka yang mungkin sebelumnya tidak pernah terlibat bahkan tidak tertarik dengan politik.

Tak hanya itu, patronase juga dapat menjadi penghubung antara pemerintah dengan rakyat. Dengan adanya transaksi politik uang secara langsung kepada masyarakat dapat membangun hubungan yang lebih personal dengan yang dapat mempermudah politisi untuk lebih memahami dengan baik kebutuhan dan aspirasi masyarakat sehingga perumusan kebijakan pemerintahan dapat lebih responsif terhadap kebutuhan masyarakat. Pengambilan keputusan politik dan kebijakan publik yang dilakukan oleh patron yang mendapat dukungan hasil dari sistem patronase seringkali didasarkan pada kebutuhan untuk memenuhi janji kepada pendukungnya. Akan tetapi, hal ini juga dapat menimbulkan ketidakadilan dalam pendistribusian layanan publik. Kebijakan yang dihasilkan dari sistem patronase cenderung lebih menguntungkan individu maupun kelompok yang memiliki hubungan patronase yang kuat dengan penguasa. Pejabat pemerintah yang terpilih dari hasil patronase akan merasa berhutang kepada pendukungnya, sehingga dapat memengaruhi hasil kebijakan publik yang dibuat. Hal ini menjadikan kebijakan

yang dihasilkan seringkali hanya mempertimbangkan keuntungan bagi kelompok tertentu.

Kebijakan yang lahir dari konteks patronase kemungkinan akan kurang efektif dan tidak sesuai dengan kebutuhan nyata seluruh masyarakat. Ketika kebijakan dirancang hanya untuk memenuhi kebutuhan pendukung politik tanpa mempertimbangkan kondisi nyata masyarakat, kualitas kebijakn dan hasil yang dicapai cenderung menurun dan kurang mampu untuk mengatasi masalah sosial ekonomi secara keseluruhan.

METODOLOGI PENELITIAN

Penelitian ini menggunakan *mixed method research*. Menurut Creswel dan Clark dalam buku "*Mixed Method*" oleh Ismail Pane, dkk. Penelitian campuran (*mixed methods research*) merupakan desain penelitian dengan asumsi filosofis di samping sebagai metode *inquiry*. Sebagai metodologi, penelitian campuran ini melibatkan asumsi filosofis yang membimbing arah pengumpulan dan analisis data, serta mengolah pendekatan penelitian kualitatif dan kuantitatif pada banyak fase proses penelitian tersebut.²³

Metode penelitian kombinasi kuantitatif-kualitatif adalah sebuah metode yang berfokus pada pengumpulan dan analisis data serta memadukan antara data kuantitatif dan kualitatif. Berdasarkan hal tersebut, maka tujuan penelitian *mixed methods* ini adalah untuk menemukan hasil penelitian yang lebih baik dibandingkan dengan hanya menggunakan salah satu pendekatan saja.²⁴

Pendekatan Kuantitatif pada penelitian ini memfokuskan pada analisis statistik untuk memperoleh data yang objektif dan terukur. Desain dan penyusunan kuesioner untuk mengukur prevalensi dan pola politik uang dan patronase dirancang dengan cermat agar dapat mengidentifikasi seberapa sering praktik-praktik tersebut terjadi serta pola-pola yang muncul dalam konteks tertentu. Dengan menggunakan metode kuantitatif, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menghasilkan data yang valid dan reliabel yang dapat memberikan gambaran yang

²³Samsu S., *Metode Penelitian: (Teori dan Aplikasi Penelitian Kualitatif, Kuantitatif, Mixed Method, serta Research & Development)*, (Jambi, Pustaka Jambi, 2021), h. 161.

²⁴Ibid, h.2.

kelas mengenai dampak politik uang dan patronase dalam sistem politik di beberapa daerah yang diteliti.

Pendekatan Kualitatif pada penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menggali pemahaman mendalam tentang konteks dan dinamika di balik fenomena politik uang dan patronase. Melalui metode seperti wawancara mendalam, diskusi kelompok terfokus, dan analisis dokumen, pendekatan kualitatif memungkinkan peneliti untuk mengidentifikasi motif, pengalaman, dan persepsi individu atau kelompok terkait praktik-praktik tersebut. Dengan pendekatan ini, penelitian dapat mengungkapkan nuansa dan kompleksitas yang mungkin tidak terlihat dalam data kuantitatif, serta memahami bagaimana dan mengapa politik uang dan patronase mempengaruhi proses politik dan sosial di tingkat lokal maupun nasional.

HASIL DAN PEMBAHASAN

Hasil survei yang dilakukan Curva Survey Indonesia (CSI) pada Juli 2024 di Kabupaten Bone Bolango²⁵ kepada sejumlah Responden diajukan beberapa pertanyaan mengenai praktik politik uang seperti “Menurut Bapak/Ibu/Saudara, apakah pemberian bantuan dalam bentuk uang atau barang kepada pemilih dalam Pilkada diperbolehkan atau tidak?” jawaban yang diterima adalah “Boleh”, “Tidak Boleh”, dan “Tidak tahu/tidak menjawab”. 26,00% menjawab boleh, 64,50% menjawab tidak boleh dan sisanya sebanyak 9,50% tidak tahu/tidak jawab. Hasil survey tersebut menunjukkan sebagian besar masyarakat tahu dan sadar praktik politik uang tidaklah dibenarkan dalam proses demokrasi. Oleh karenanya mayoritas responden menjawab tidak boleh ada praktik politik uang dalam kontestasi Pemilu

Kemudian pertanyaan yang diajukan selanjutnya kepada responden yang sama yakni “Jika nanti saat Pilkada ada orang yang memberi Bapak/Ibu/Saudara bantuan dalam bentuk uang atau barang supaya ikut memilih pasangan tertentu, Bapak/Ibu/Saudara akan menerima bantuan itu atau tidak?”, dan 49,00% responded menjawab tidak akan menerima, sementara 39,75% akan menerima, dan 11,25% tidak tahu/tidak jawab. Temuan ini memberikan gambaran mengenai sikap

²⁵Survei CSI

masyarakat terhadap tawaran politik uang dalam Pemilu. Meskipun hampir separuh responden menegaskan tidak akan menerima bantuan tersebut, ada persentasi signifikan dari beberapa responden yang bersedia menerima, menunjukkan adanya variasi dalam pandangan dan perilaku masyarakat terhadap praktik politik uang.

Pada pertanyaan selanjutnya, "Jika Bapak/Ibu/Saudara menerima bantuan tersebut, apakah Bapak/Ibu/Saudara akan mengikuti ajakan untuk memilih pasangan tertentu?". Hasil survey menunjukkan bahwa 16,00% responded mengatakan bahwa mereka "pasti akan mengikuti ajakan itu." Sementara itu, 27,00% responden "masih pikir-pikir atau belum menentukan pilihan" apakah akan mengikuti atau tidak mengikuti ajakan tersebut. kemudian, sebanyak 35,25% responden menyatakan bahwa mereka "tidak akan mengikuti ajakan itu," dan sisanya sebanyak 21,75% responden memberikan jawaban "tidak tahu/tidak jawab."

Hasil tersebut mengungkapkan berbagai sikap terhadap pengaruh bantuan dalam menentukan pilihan politik. Meskipun ada persentase yang signifikan yang bersedia mengikuti ajakan setelah menerima bantuan, namun mayoritas responden masih menunjukkan ketidakpastian atau menolak untuk mengikuti ajakan tersebut, menunjukkan masih adanya kesadaran dan pertimbangan kritis dalam memilih calon pemimpin mereka.

Kemudian para responden diajukan pertanyaan terkait bentuk bantuan yang disukai. Jenis pertanyaan yang diajukan yakni "Jika nanti pada saat Pilkada ada orang yang memberi Bapak/Ibu/Saudara supaya ikut memilih pasangan tertentu, menurut Bapak/Ibu/Saudara dalam bentuk apa sebaiknya bantuan itu?" Sejumlah 31,25% responden menjawab "uang", 23,00% responden menjawab "barang", 3,00% menjawab "lainnya", dan 42,75% responden memilih untuk tidak menjawab.

Hasil survei ini mengungkapkan berbagai preferensi responden terhadap bentuk bantuan yang mereka anggap paling sesuai dalam konteks politik uang, yakni responden yang memilih jenis bantuan dalam bentuk uang menunjukkan bahwa hampir sepertiga dari responden merasa bahwa uang adalah bentuk bantuan

yang paling langsung dan praktis, yang mungkin dianggap lebih fleksibel dalam penggunaannya.

Kemudian pilihan responden selanjutnya adalah bantuan dalam bentuk barang, sekitar 23,00% responden mengindikasikan bahwa mereka lebih suka menerima bantuan dalam bentuk barang. Preferensi ini mungkin mencerminkan pandangan bahwa barang tertentu, seperti kebutuhan sehari-hari, bisa lebih bermanfaat atau memiliki nilai praktis langsung dibandingkan dengan uang tunai.

Selanjutnya, sebanyak 3,00% responden memilih opsi "lainnya", menunjukkan bahwa sangat sedikit yang memiliki preferensi khusus di luar kategori yang telah disebutkan. Ini mungkin mencakup bentuk bantuan yang lebih spesifik atau tidak umum, meskipun persentasenya sangat kecil.

Sisanya, 42,75% responden memilih Tidak Tahu/Tidak Menjawab, mereka memilih untuk tidak memberikan jawaban atau tidak menjelaskan bentuk bantuan yang mereka sukai. Angka yang tinggi ini menunjukkan bahwa banyak responden mungkin merasa tidak nyaman atau tidak yakin dengan pertanyaan tersebut, atau mungkin mereka tidak ingin terlibat dalam diskusi mengenai politik uang.

Secara keseluruhan, hasil survei ini menunjukkan bahwa ada variasi signifikan dalam preferensi terhadap bentuk bantuan politik. Meskipun ada kecenderungan jelas bahwa uang dan barang merupakan bentuk bantuan yang dipilih oleh sebagian besar responden, hampir setengah dari mereka memilih untuk tidak memberikan jawaban. Hal ini bisa mencerminkan ketidakpastian atau keengganan untuk terlibat dalam praktek politik uang, yang menunjukkan bahwa banyak orang mungkin lebih memilih untuk tidak terlibat dalam situasi yang melibatkan tawaran politik semacam ini.

Selanjutnya, responden yang memilih bantuan dalam bentuk uang (sebanyak 31,25% dari total responden) kemudian diajukan pertanyaan mengenai kisaran nominal uang yang mereka harapkan diterima. Pilihan nominal yang disediakan berkisar dari Rp.150.000 hingga lebih dari Rp.500.000. jika dipersentasikan, sebanyak 4,50% responden memilih nominal uang Rp.150.000-Rp.300.000, menunjukkan

sebagian kecil responden merasa bahwa jumlah tersebut sudah cukup sebagai bentuk bantuan yang mereka terima.

Kemudian sekitar 4,00% responden memilih untuk menerima bantuan dalam nominal yang lebih dari Rp.500.000. Ini mencerminkan harapan akan jumlah yang relatif tinggi, mungkin mengindikasikan ekspektasi besar terhadap nilai bantuan yang mereka terima.

Selanjutnya, sebanyak 3,75% responden menyebutkan bahwa mereka lebih memilih nominal yang kurang dari Rp.150.000. Persentase ini menunjukkan bahwa ada juga segmen responden yang merasa jumlah yang lebih kecil masih memadai untuk mereka.

Sebanyak 2,25% responden mengharapkan bantuan dalam kisaran nominal ini. Ini merupakan kategori nominal yang lebih spesifik dan menunjukkan preferensi pada jumlah yang agak tinggi namun tidak melebihi Rp.500.000. Sementara sebanyak 2,25% responden tidak dapat menentukan nominal yang mereka harapkan dan memilih jawaban "tidak tahu." Ini menunjukkan bahwa sebagian kecil responden mungkin merasa tidak yakin tentang jumlah yang sesuai atau relevan.

Terakhir, 14,25% responden memilih untuk tidak memberikan jawaban terkait nominal uang yang diharapkan. Persentase ini mencerminkan adanya kelompok responden yang enggan atau tidak ingin menjelaskan preferensi mereka mengenai jumlah uang.

Hasil survei ini memberikan wawasan mengenai variasi ekspektasi jumlah uang di antara responden yang memilih bantuan dalam bentuk uang. Meskipun sebagian kecil responden memiliki harapan untuk jumlah yang cukup spesifik, banyak yang memilih untuk tidak memberikan jawaban atau tidak dapat menentukan nominal yang tepat. Hal ini mungkin mencerminkan ketidakpastian atau sensitivitas terhadap topik bantuan politik uang.

Selain hasil di atas, ada juga masyarakat yang memilih nominal uang di angka rendah, yakni berkisar antara Rp.50.000 – Rp.100.000. Dari persentase jawaban yang didapat, 9,75% responden memilih nominal Rp.100.000 dan 1,25% memilih

nominal Rp.50.000, serta 8,75% lainnya tidak menentukan berapa nominal yang diinginkan namun memilih nominal lainnya, serta 11,50% responden sisanya memilih untuk tidak menjawab pertanyaan.

HASIL SURVEI DAERAH LAIN ????

Hasil survei di beberapa daerah lainnya menunjukkan angka yang tidak jauh berbeda dari hasil survei di Kabupaten Bone Bolango. Faktor yang turut memengaruhi jumlah nominal yang diterima bergantung pada kondisi ekonomi masyarakat di daerah tersebut. nominal uang yang dipilih responden di Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara.

PENUTUP

Kesimpulan

1. Praktik politik uang di berbagai daerah pada dasarnya menerapkan pola yang hampir sama, yang membedakan ialah nominal yang dipengaruhi kondisi sosial ekonomi daerah tersebut, mulai dari pendapatan per kapita masyarakatnya hingga persentasi angka kemiskinan daerah tersebut.
2. Kehadiran patronase dalam dunia politik di negara berkembang memiliki dampak yang variatif. Pada dasarnya sistem ini dapat mencederai sistem demokrasi serta integritas dan transparansi pemilihan umum. Namun di sisi lain, patronase dapat menjadi faktor yang mampu menghidupkan demokrasi. Dengan adanya hubungan timbal balik yang saling menguntungkan antara pembuat kebijakan dan masyarakat dapat meningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam dunia politik serta pemilihan umum serta dapat memperkuat hubungan antara pemimpin dan masyarakat.

BAB IV

**THE DYNAMICS OF MONEY POLITICS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
VOTER TURNOUT IN INDONESIA'S LEGISLATIVE AND
REGIONAL HEAD ELECTIONS**

**DINAMIKA POLITIK UANG DAN PENGARUHNYA PADA
PARTISIPASI PEMILIH DALAM PEMILIHAN LEGISLATIF DAN
PEMILIHAN KEPALA DAERAH**

Judul alternatif:

**DYNAMICS OF MONEY POLITICS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
VOTER TURNOUT IN INDONESIA'S LEGISLATIVE AND
REGIONAL HEAD ELECTIONS IN NATURAL-RICH REGIONS**

**DINAMIKA POLITIK UANG DAN PENGARUHNYA TERHADAP
PARTISIPASI PEMILIH PADA PEMILU LEGISLATIF DAN PEMILU
KEPALA DAERAH DI KAWASAN KAYA SUMBER DAYA ALAM**

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Abstrak

Isu dan praktik politik uang (*money politics*) mencederai sistem demokrasi masih mewarnai kontestasi Pemilihan Umum (Pemilu) di Indonesia. Meskipun banyak yang menentang adanya praktik tersebut, tidak menjadikan politik uang sirna dari polemik demokrasi negeri ini. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode *mixed methods research* yang akan mengungkap sejauh mana politik uang memengaruhi masyarakat dalam menentukan hak pilihnya pada Pemilihan Umum (Pemilu) baik Pemilihan Legislatif (Pileg) maupun Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). Data kuantitatif yang diperoleh dari hasil survei di beberapa daerah seperti Kabupaten Bone Bolango (Gorontalo), Kutai Kartanegara (Kalimantan Timur), Bintan dan Karimun (Kepulauan Riau), dan Jayapura (Papua), kemudian diramu menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan menyeret teori *patron-client* milik James Scott. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan hasil bahwa dari beberapa sampel daerah-daerah tersebut, pola politik uang yang ditemui memiliki kesamaan dalam praktiknya. Secara empiric, dari penelitian ini, para penulis beragurmen mayoritas masyarakat paham akan ilegalnya praktik politik uang, namun tidak serta-merta menjadikan praktik politik uang ditolak dalam pemilihan umum di daerah tersebut. Kondisi sosial ekonomi daerah juga tampaknya turut mengambil peran penting pada keputusan masyarakat dalam menerima atau menolak praktik politik uang yang ada.

Kata Kunci: Politik uang; Patronase; Demokrasi; Pilkada 2024; Pemilu 2024.

Abstract

The issue and practice of money politics, which undermines the democratic system, still colors the contestation of General Elections in Indonesia. Although many people oppose the practice, it does not make money politics disappear from the polemic of democracy in this country. This research uses mixed methods research that will reveal the extent to which money politics influences people in determining their voting rights in General Elections (Pemilu), both Legislative Elections (Pileg) and Regional Head Elections (Pilkada). Quantitative data obtained from survey results in

several regions such as Bone Bolango Regency (Gorontalo), Kutai Kartanegara (East Kalimantan), Bintan and Karimun (Riau Islands), and Jayapura (Papua), then mixed using a qualitative approach by dragging James Scott's patron-client theory. The results of this study show that from several samples of these regions, the pattern of money politics encountered has similarities in practice. Empirically, from this research, the authors argue that the majority of people understand the illegality of the practice of money politics, but it does not necessarily make the practice of money politics rejected in general elections in the area. The socio-economic conditions of the region also seem to play an important role in the community's decision to accept or reject the existing practices of money politics.

Key words: Money politics; Patronage; Democracy; Pilkada 2024; Pemilu 20

INTRODUCTION

Pemerintahan yang baik atau *good governace* merupakan konsep yang bersifat kolektif, melibatkan seluruh tindakan atau tingkah laku yang bersifat mengarahkan, mengendalikan, atau memengaruhi urusan publik. Substansi dari *good governace* atau pemerintahan yang baik adalah bersih, dan berwibawa. Pemerintahan yang baik yang baik adalah sikap dimana kekuasaan dilakukan dengan tingkah laku pemerintah yang berkaitan dengan sumber-sumber sosial, budaya, politik, serta ekonomi. Dalam perwujudan pemerintahan yang baik, perlu disokong dengan penyelenggaraan pemilihan umum yang demokratis serta terhindar dari praktik *money politic*.

Good governance is a collective concept, involving all actions or behaviors that direct, control or influence public affairs. The substance of good governance is clean, and authoritative. Good governance is an attitude where power is exercised by government behavior related to social, cultural, political, and economic resources. In the realization of good governance, it needs to be supported by the organization of democratic elections and avoid the practice of money politics.

Salah satu polemik yang turut mewarnai kontestasi politik dalam pelaksanaan demokrasi yakni politik uang (*Money Politic*). Praktik politik uang masih menjadi isu krusial serta pemegang kunci utama yang tak terpisahkan dengan sistematika pemilihan di era demokrasi ini. Politik uang merupakan fenomena yang marak terjadi dalam demokrasi prosedural di Indonesia, terutama sejak pemilihan langsung tahun 2004²⁶, dan seakan menjadi praktik pengkerdilan masyarakat yang secara terang-terangan ditampakkan dalam rangkaian proses demokrasi.

One of the polemics that has highlighted political contestation in the implementation of democracy is the widespread the practices of money politics. The practice of money politics is still a crucial issue and the main stakeholders that is

²⁶Robi Cahyadi Kurniawan, Dedy Haermawan, "Strategi Sosial Pencegahan Politik Uang di Indonesia", Jurnal Antikorupsi integritas. Fakultas Ilmu Politik Universitas Lampung, h.1.

inseparable from systematic elections in this democratic era. Money politics is a phenomenon that is rampant in procedural democracy in local regions in Indonesia, especially since the 2004 direct elections (*Pemilhan Kepala Daerah - Pilkada*), and seems to be a practice of marginalizing the community that is openly displayed in a series of democratic processes.

Tidak hanya di Indonesia, politik uang atau *money politik* ternyata menjadi elemen kunci mobilisasi elektoral di banyak demokrasi gelombang ketiga seiring dengan penyebaran rezim demokrasi di negara-negara berkembang²⁷. Mengutip hasil Studi yang dilakukan Andrews dan Inman tentang perilaku pemilih di tujuh negara Afrika yang paling demokratis menurut Freedom House, misalnya, menemukan Fakta adanya jual beli suara²⁸. Dengan menggunakan data survey Afrobarometer Tahap 3 Tahun 2005, mereka menemukan Ghana adalah negara paling rentan mengalami praktik politik uang atau jual beli suara dengan kisaran 42% warganya mengaku ditawari uang atau hadiah sewaktu pemilu²⁹.

However, it is not only happening in Indonesia, money politics seems to be a key element of electoral mobilization in many third-wave democracies along with the spread of democratic regimes in developing countries. Citing the results of a study conducted by Andrews and Inman on voter behavior in the seven most democratic African countries according to Freedom House, for example, found the fact of vote buying. Using data from the Afrobarometer Phase 3 survey in 2005, they found that Ghana is the country most prone to the practice of money politics or vote buying with around 42% of its citizens admitting to being offered money or gifts during elections.

Indonesia sendiri sebagai negara dengan populasi penduduk sebanyak 281.603.800 jiwa³⁰, praktik politik uang bukanlah hal baru. Sejarah mencatat, pemilu terbaik hanya terjadi sekali di negeri ini yakni pada 29 September 1955. Peserta

²⁷Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "Politik Uang dan Dinamika Elektoral di Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Awal Interaksi antara "Party-ID" dan Patron-Klien. Jurnal Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik UIN Syarif Hidayatullah dan Pascasarjana Universitas Paramadina, Jakarta, 2013.

²⁸Josephine T. Andrews dan Kris Inman, "Explaining Vote Choice in Africa's Emerging Democracies" makalah dipresentasikan dalam Midwest Political Science Association, 2009, h. 3

²⁹Dikutip dari Jurnal Nasional Burhanuddin Muhtadi,

³⁰Badan Pusat Statistik, Juni 2024

Pemilu saat itu diikuti lebih dari 30 partai politik, organisasi maupun perorangan, dengan memperebutkan 257 kursi Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat dan 541 kursi konsituante. Dikatakan demikian, sebab pada waktu itu Pemilu dilaksanakan dengan suasana yang demokratis, jujur dan adil serta tidak mengenal politik uang. Ketika itu partai peserta pemilu bertarung dengan *fair* dan obyektif dengan tidak mengandalkan uang dan kekuasaan semata, melainkan mepertaruhkan gagasan ke-Indonesia-an.³¹

Indonesia itself as a country with a population of 281,603,800 people, the practice of money politics is not new. History records that the best election only happened once in this country, on September 29, 1955. More than 30 political parties, organizations and individuals participated in the election, competing for 257 seats in the House of Representatives and 541 seats in the Constituent Assembly. It was said so, because at that time the elections were held in a democratic, honest and fair atmosphere and did not recognize money politics. At that time, the parties participating in the elections fought fairly and objectively by not relying on money and power alone, but putting the idea of Indonesianness at stake.

Isu dan praktik politik uang terjadi dalam proses Pemilihan Umum (Pemilu) di seluruh jenjang pemerintahan, mulai dari pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden, Pemilihan Legislatif (Pileg), hingga Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). Skema politik uang yang dilakukan juga beragam, mulai dari pemberian uang tunai secara langsung kepada pemilih, penyaluran bantuan sosial kepada individu maupun kelompok masyarakat tertentu, hingga penyediaan layanan maupun pengadaan fasilitas tertentu untuk menarik simpati sehingga bisa mendapatkan dukungan politik masyarakat pada pemilihan umum.

The issue and practice of money politics occurs in the General Election process at all levels of government, from the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections, Legislative Elections (Pileg), to Regional Head Elections (Pilkada). The schemes of money politics that are carried out also vary, ranging from giving cash directly to voters, distributing social assistance to certain individuals and

community groups, to providing services and providing certain facilities to attract sympathy so that they can get public political support in general elections.

Selain menyasar masyarakat, ada praktik politik uang yang terselubung yang tak jarang ditemui di negara demokrasi ini, di antaranya pembiayaan kampanye yang tidak transparan, serta praktik lobi politik dengan menggunakan uang sebagai sarana mendapatkan dukungan atau keputusan tertentu demi kelancaran pemenangan suatu partisan dalam Pemilu.

In addition to targeting the public, there are hidden money politics practices that are often found in this democratic country, including non-transparent campaign financing, as well as political lobbying practices using money as a means of gaining support or certain decisions for the smooth victory of a partisan in the election.

Pola yang demikian pernah marak terjadi dalam sejarah demokrasi bangsa ini, tepatnya pada pemilihan umum lembaga legislatif 2014 silam. Pada masa itu, tak lama setelah hari pemungutan suara pada 9 April 2014, terbentuk wacana di kalangan pegiat media massa bahwa para kandidat telah membagi-bagikan uang kepada pemilih, memberikan barang serta menyuap para pejabat penyelenggara pemilu pada tingkat yang sebelumnya tidak pernah terjadi dalam sejarah pemilu di Indonesia.³²

This pattern has been rampant in the history of this nation's democracy, precisely in the 2014 legislative elections. At that time, shortly after polling day on April 9, 2014, there was a discourse among media activists that candidates had distributed money to voters, provided goods and bribed election officials at a level that had never happened before in the history of elections in Indonesia.

Sistem demokrasi yang demikian, rakyat selaku komponen penting dalam negara seharusnya mampu menentukan pilihan pada kader-kader perwakilan partai politik dengan menilai pada visi misi serta program kerja yang ditawarkan, sehingga nantinya mampu merepresentasikan aspirasi mereka untuk mewujudkan kesejahteraan dalam kehidupan bernegara. Namun, hak pilih tersebut diintervensi

³²Edward Aspinall, Mada Sukmajati, *Politik Uang di Indonesia, Patronase dan Klientelisme di Pemilu Legislatif 2014*, (Jakarta: Penerbit PolGov, 2015), h. 2.

oleh pihak-pihak yang memiliki kepentingan tertentu dengan memanfaatkan ketidakpahaman masyarakat akan integritas pemilu serta lemahnya kondisi ekonomi masyarakat Indonesia pada umumnya. Hal ini menjadikan masyarakat tidak dapat membuat keputusan secara bebas untuk menggunakan hak pilihnya sebagai warga negara.

Such a democratic system, the people as an important component in the country should be able to determine the choice of political party representative cadres by assessing the vision, mission and work programs offered, so that they can later represent their aspirations to realize prosperity in national life. However, the right to vote is intervened by parties who have certain interests by taking advantage of the public's lack of understanding of the integrity of the election and the weak economic conditions of the Indonesian people in general. This makes it impossible for the public to make decisions freely to use their right to vote as citizens.

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Praktik politik uang lebih rentan menyerang daerah dengan kondisi ekonomi lemah, dimana masyarakatnya selain memiliki pendapatan rendah, tingkat pendidikan dan kesadaran yang dimiliki individunya pun kurang. Pemahaman masyarakat yang minim terkait pentingnya integritas dalam pemilihan umum memberikan ruang yang besar bagi praktik pelanggaran pemilu dilakukan.

The practice of money politics is more vulnerable to attacking areas with weak economic conditions, where the people not only have low incomes, but also low levels of education and awareness of the individuals. The minimal public understanding of the importance of integrity in general elections provides a large space for election violations to be carried out.

Berbagai literatur ilmiah menunjukkan fakta bahwa politik uang cenderung lebih masif terjadi di daerah-daerah dengan tingkat kemiskinan yang terbilang tinggi, pun dengan pendidikan maupun pemahaman politik masyarakatnya yang rendah. Jurnal Riset Tindakan Indonesia (JRTI) yang ditulis oleh Wahyudi Tanjung dan Ramadani Ramadani menyebut Masyarakat yang memiliki pendapatan rendah cenderung lebih mudah tergiur dengan uang atau barang yang diberikan oleh kandidat politik.³³

Various scientific literature shows the fact that money politics tends to be more massive in areas with high levels of poverty, as well as low education and political understanding. The Journal of Action Research Indonesia (JRTI) written by Wahyudi Tanjung and Ramadani Ramadani said that people who have low incomes tend to be more easily tempted by money or goods given by political candidates.

Salah satu daerah yang terletak di Provinsi Gorontalo merupakan hasil pemerkan dari Kabupaten Gorontalo Utara, yakni Kabupaten Bone Bolango³⁴ merupakan contoh nyata dimana pendapatan per kapita yang rendah dan angka kemiskinan yang masih di tingkat menengah berkontribusi terhadap maraknya praktik politik uang. Berdasarkan data yang dirilis oleh Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS

³³Wahyudi Tanjung, Ramadani Ramadani, "Analisis Korelasi Pendapatan Masyarakat dengan Politik Uang dalam Pemilu", *Jurna Riset Tindakan Indonesia (JRTI) Universitas Islam Negeri Sumatera, Medan*, 2023, h. 194.

³⁴Republik Indonesia, *Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 2003 tentang Pembentukan Kabupaten Bonebolango dan Kabupaten Pohuwato di Provinsi Gorontalo*, Lembar Negara Nomor 26 Tahun 2003.

Bone Bolango) tahun 2023,³⁵ pendapatan per kapita Bone Bolango hanya mencapai angka Rp.33,81 juta yang mencerminkan kondisi perekonomian masih tergolong lemah. Persentase penduduk miskin di Kabupaten Bone Bolango per Maret 2024 juga masih di tingkat menengah yakni di angka 14,80% dengan jumlah penduduk miskin sebanyak 23,67 ribu orang.³⁶

One of the regions located in Gorontalo Province, which is the result of the expansion of North Gorontalo Regency, Bone Bolango Regency, is a clear example where low per capita income and poverty rates that are still at the middle level contribute to the rampant practice of money politics. Based on data released by the Bone Bolango Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS Bone Bolango) in 2023, Bone Bolango's per capita income only reached Rp.33.81 million, reflecting that the economy is still relatively weak. The percentage of poor people in Bone Bolango Regency as of March 2024 is also still at the middle level at 14.80% with a total of 23.67 thousand poor people.

Kondisi inilah yang membuat banyak masyarakat selaku pemilih mudah dipengaruhi oleh tawaran uang atau barang dari kandidat politik yang berusaha mengamankan suara melalui jalan yang kurang etis. Lemahnya perekonomian membuat banyak masyarakat melegalkan jual beli suara yang dilakukan sekelompok partai politik dan calon kepala daerah hingga calon anggota legislatif.

This condition makes many people as voters easily influenced by offers of money or goods from political candidates who try to secure votes through unethical means. The weak economy makes many people legalize the buying and selling of votes carried out by a group of political parties and regional head candidates to legislative candidates.

Akan tetapi fenomena politik uang tidak hanya terbatas pada daerah dengan ekonomi lemah. Daerah dengan pendapatan per kapita provinsi yang tergolong

³⁵Badan Pusat Statistik Bone Bolango, "PDRB per Kapita di Kabupaten Bone Bolango 2023," <https://bonebolangokab.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/NjQjMg==/produk-domestik-regional-bruto-per-kapita-di-kabupaten-bone-bolango.html> (diakses pada 23 Agustus 2024).

³⁶Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Bone Bolango, Berita Resmi Statistik No.03/08/7504/Th.IV, 1 Agustus 2024.

tinggi seperti di Kepulauan Riau dengan angka Rp.154,179 juta³⁷ juga turut menunjukkan prevalensi praktik politik uang yang signifikan. Beberapa kabupaten di dalamnya misalnya, Kabupaten Bintan dengan pendapatan per kapita yang termasuk di tingkat menengah yakni di angka Rp.86,49juta³⁸ dan persentase penduduk miskin tahun 2024 di angka 5,44% dan Kabupaten Karimun dengan pendapatan per kapita ada di angka 74,6³⁹ juta per tahun 2023. Serta persentase penduduk miskin di tahun 2024 di angka yang rendah yakni 5,78%⁴⁰ tidak menjamin praktik politik uang tidak merambat di daerah tersebut.

However, the phenomenon of money politics is not only limited to areas with weak economies. Regions with relatively high provincial per capita income, such as in the Riau Islands with Rp.154.179 million, also show a significant prevalence of money politics practices. Several districts in it, for example, Bintan Regency with per capita income which is included in the middle level at Rp.86.49 million and the percentage of poor people in 2024 at 5.44% and Karimun Regency with per capita income at 74.6 million as of 2023. And the percentage of poor people in 2024 at a low figure of 5.78% does not guarantee that the practice of money politics will not spread in the area. Meskipun memiliki sumber daya ekonomi yang lebih baik dari Bone Bolango, praktik politik uang tetap saja menghiasi proses demokrasi daerah tersebut. Tak hanya di Kepulauan Riau, di Kota Jayapura, Provinsi Papua⁴¹ dengan pendapatan per-kapita masyarakatnya, dan persentase kemiskinan di tahun 2023 sebanyak 11,45%⁴² yang tergolong kemiskinan menengah.

Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara di Provinsi Kalimantan Timur pada tahun 2023, persentase penduduk miskin 7,99%⁴³

³⁷<https://kepri.bps.go.id/id/pressrelease/2024/02/05/1557/pertumbuhan-ekonomi-kepulauan-riau-triwulan-iv-2023.html> Rilis 5 Februari 2024.

³⁸Ringkasan Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah Kabupaten Bintan Tahun 2021 <https://bintankab.go.id/upload/berita/file/1648642077752.pdf>. Diakses tanggal 24/8/2024.

³⁹BPS

⁴⁰<https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2024/08/24/5-78-penduduk-di-kabupaten-karimun-masuk-kategorimiskin#:~:text=Persentase%20penduduk%20miskin%20di%20Kabupaten%20Karimun%2C%20data%20per%2030%20November,yang%20dilaporkan%205%2C95%20persen>. Diakses tanggal 24/8/2024.

⁴¹<https://jayapurakota.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/MTMwIzI=/persentase-penduduk-miskin-p-0-.html>

⁴²<https://papua.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/NDUjMg==/persentase-penduduk-miskin-menurut-kabupaten-kota.html>

⁴³<https://kaltim.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/ODQjMg==/jumlah-penduduk-miskin-menurut-kabupaten-kota.html>

Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara di Provinsi Kalimantan Timur pada tahun 2023, persentase penduduk miskin 7,99%⁴⁴

Faktor pendukung politik uang di daerah tersebut karena adanya persaingan perebutan kekuasaan yang ketat sehingga menjadikan para kandidat berlomba-lomba mengeluarkan kos politik dalam kampanye agar mampu bersaing dalam hal mendapatkan dukungan untuk pemenangannya.

The supporting factors for money politics in the area are due to the intense competition for power, which makes candidates compete to spend political costs in the campaign in order to compete in terms of getting support for their victory.

Banyaknya masyarakat yang masih merespons menjadikan politik uang semakin masif terjadi. Dampak buruk yang kerap kali diabaikan tentu saja melahirkan perwakilan rakyat maupun pemimpin yang tidak kompeten dan tentunya berpengaruh pada penyelenggaraan pemerintahan di Indonesia baik di tingkat pusat maupun daerah. Implikasi praktik politik uang yang jarang diketahui masyarakat adalah perbuatan melawan hukum seperti Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (KKN). Praktik suap yang tergambarkan melalui politik uang ini sering kali disepelekan namun punya dampak negatif yang memengaruhi siklus jalanya pemerintahan, serta kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh pemerintah.

The number of people who still respond makes money politics even more massive. The adverse effects that are often ignored, of course, give birth to incompetent people's representatives and leaders and of course affect the administration of government in Indonesia both at the central and regional levels. The implications of money politics practices that are rarely known to the public are illegal acts such as Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN). The practice of bribery, which is illustrated through money politics, is often underestimated but has a negative impact that affects the cycle of the government, as well as the policies issued by the government.

⁴⁴<https://kaltim.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/ODQjMg==/jumlah-penduduk-miskin-menurut-kabupaten-kota.html>

Proses transaksional yang terjadi dalam praktik politik uang antara partisan dan masyarakat mengindikasikan adanya gejala patron-klien yang sangat nyata. Partisan selaku pihak patron (tingkat elit) melakukan transaksi dalam bentuk pembelian suara secara tidak langsung melalui pemberian uang maupun barang dengan maksud memperoleh kepercayaan dari masyarakat selaku klien (tingkat bawah) agar menyalurkan hak sauranya kepada calon legislatif maupun calon kepala daerah yang sedang bertarung dalam kontestasi politik.

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Pada hakikatnya, transaksi antara patron dan klien harus bersifat mutualisme, yakni menguntungkan kedua belah pihak. Namun pada kenyataannya dalam implementasi. Politik uang pada pemilihan legislatif tahun 2019 maupun tahun 2014 memiliki pola yang sama, yakni semakin mendekati pemilu, insiden politik uang semakin gencar dilakukan.

In essence, the transaction between patron and client must be mutual, which benefits both parties. However, in reality, in the implementation. Money politics in the 2019 and 2014 legislative elections has the same pattern, namely the closer the election, the more intense the incidence of money politics.

Badan Pengawasan Pemilu Republik Indonesia (Bawaslu RI) merilis daerah-daerah yang dikategorikan sebagai daerah rawan pemilu tahun 2024⁴⁵. Dari 17 provinsi yang melaksanakan Pilkada serentak 2018, terdapat tiga provinsi yang masuk kategori nilai Kerawanan Tinggi, yaitu: Papua (3,41), Maluku (3,25), dan Kalimantan Barat (3,04). Empat belas provinsi lain mengindikasikan kategori Kerawanan Sedang, adalah: Sumatera Utara (2,86), Sulawesi Tenggara (2,81,

⁴⁵Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Bawslu) Republik Indonesia, *Daerah Rawan Pemilu*, diakses dari bawaslu.go.id.,

Kalimantan Timur (2,76), Maluku Utara (2,71), Nusa Tenggara Timur (2,70), Jawa Timur (2,68), Sumatera Selatan (2,55), Nusa Tenggara Barat (2,54), Sulawesi Selatan (2,53), Jawa Barat (2,52), Riau (2,46), Lampung (2,28), Bali (2,19), dan Jawa Tengah (2,15). Sebagai catatan, IKP 2018 menemukan bahwa tidak ada satu pun provinsi masuk kategori Kerawanan Rendah dan indeks provinsi di Kerawanan Sedang berada di angka 2,5, bahkan ada tiga provinsi (Sumatera Utara, Sulawesi Tenggara, dan Kalimantan Timur) yang berpotensi naik ke kategori Kerawanan Tinggi karena memiliki skor di atas 2,75 (indeks kerawanan Pemilu, Bawaslu RI).

The Election Supervisory Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (Bawaslu RI) released areas categorized as election-prone areas in 2024. Of the 17 provinces that held simultaneous elections in 2018, three provinces were categorized as High Vulnerability, namely: Papua (3.41), Maluku (3.25), and West Kalimantan (3.04). Fourteen other provinces indicated the Medium Vulnerability category, namely: North Sumatra (2.86), Southeast Sulawesi (2.81), East Kalimantan (2.76), North Maluku (2.71), East Nusa Tenggara (2.70), East Java (2.68), South Sumatra (2.55), West Nusa Tenggara (2.54), South Sulawesi (2.53), West Java (2.52), Riau (2.46), Lampung (2.28), Bali (2.19), and Central Java (2.15). For the record, IKP 2018 found that none of the provinces were in the Low Vulnerability category and the provincial index in Moderate Vulnerability was at 2.5, and there were even three provinces (North Sumatra, Southeast Sulawesi, and East Kalimantan) that had the potential to rise to the High Vulnerability category because they had a score above 2.75 (Election Vulnerability Index, Bawaslu RI).

Politik uang tetap diterapkan dan seakan telah menjadi hal lumrah, bahkan proses demokrasi di seluruh penjuru dunia menggunakan politik uang sebagai strategi politik. Penerapan politik uang di setiap daerah memiliki polarisasi yang hampir sama. Distribusi yang dilakukan partisan maupun partai pengusungnya dalam bentuk uang maupun barang kepada masyarakat menjadi pilihan yang sama yang diterapkan di berbagai daerah untuk menggait suara.

Money politics is still applied and seems to have become commonplace, even the democratic process throughout the world uses money politics as a political strategy. The application of money politics in each region has almost the same

polarization. Distribution by partisans and their supporting parties in the form of money or goods to the community is the same option applied in various regions to attract votes.

Masyarakat dengan tingkat pendidikan yang lemah serta ekonomi yang terbilang dibawah rata-rata memang menjadi sasaran empuk penerapan praktik ini. Namun, intensitas persaingan politik juga turut andil dalam masifnya praktik politik uang yang menjadikan daerah-daerah dengan angka kemiskinan rendah maupun daerah dengan sumber daya ekonomi yang terbilang cukup baik masih turut dijumpai praktik politik uang menjelang Pemilu.

Communities with weak education levels and below-average economies are indeed easy targets for the application of this practice. However, the intensity of political competition also contributes to the massive practice of money politics which makes areas with low poverty rates and areas with fairly good economic resources are still found in the practice of money politics ahead of elections.

Penelitian ini dibuat untuk mengetahui sejauh mana peran uang dalam pola politik uang berpengaruh pada pilihan masyarakat baik dalam pemilihan legislatif (Pileg) maupun Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada) serta faktor apa saja yang memengaruhi perbedaan praktik politik uang di berbagai daerah di Indonesia. Adapun dua permasalahan inti yang akan dikupas dalam penelitian ini, yaitu: "Bagaimana peran uang dalam praktik politik uang memengaruhi Pileg/Pilkada?" Serta "Bagaimana perbedaan pola politik uang di Bone Bolango, Kutai Kartanegara, Belitung, Karimun, Bintan dan Jayapura?"

This research was made to find out the extent to which the role of money in the pattern of money politics affects people's choices in both legislative elections (Pileg) and regional head elections (Pilkada) and what factors influence the differences in the practice of money politics in various regions in Indonesia. There are two core problems that will be discussed in this research, namely: "How does the role of money in the practice of money politics affect Pileg / Pilkada?" And "How do the patterns of money politics differ in Bone Bolango, Kutai Kartanegara, Belitung, Karimun, Bintan and Jayapura?"

Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis peran uang dalam praktik politik uang serta pengaruhnya pada Pemilihan Legislatif maupun Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, juga untuk mengidentifikasi dan membandingkan pola politik uang di beberapa daerah dengan latar belakang perekonomian yang berbeda-beda seperti kabupaten Bone Bolango (Gorontalo), Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara (Kalimantan Timur), Kabupaten Karimun dan Kabupaten Bintan (Kepulauan Riau), dan Kota Jayapura (Papua).

The purpose of this research is to analyze the role of money in the practice of money politics and its influence on Legislative and Regional Head Elections, as well as to identify and compare patterns of money politics in several regions with different economic backgrounds such as Bone Bolango Regency (Gorontalo), Kutai Kartanegara Regency (East Kalimantan), Karimun Regency and Bintan Regency (Riau Islands), and Jayapura City (Papua).

KAJIAN TEORI

THEORETICAL STUDIES

3. Teori Politik Uang Money Politics Theory

Money Politic atau politik uang adalah suatu bentuk pemberian atau janji menyuap seseorang baik supaya orang itu tidak menjalankan haknya untuk memilih maupun supaya ia menjalankan haknya dengan cara tertentu pada saat pemilihan umum.⁴⁶ Saat ini, uang tidaklah menjadi alat transaksi utama dalam praktik *money politic*, banyak alternatif lainnya yang juga turut digunakan dengan tujuan yang sama yakni memengaruhi keputusan masyarakat selaku pemilik suara. Para kandidat partai politik yang maju dalam kontestasi pemilihan umum.

Money politics is a form of giving or promising to bribe someone either so that the person does not exercise his right to vote or so that he exercises his rights in a certain way during elections. Currently, money is not the main transaction tool in the practice of money politics, many other alternatives are also used with the same

⁴⁶ Rahmiati, *Perekmbangan Perilaku Politik Uang di Pikjada 2020*.

goal of influencing the decisions of the community as the owner of the vote. Political party candidates who are running in the general election contestation.

Politik uang umumnya rentan menyerang masyarakat dengan tingkat ekonomi yang rendah. Masyarakat yang mengalami kesulitan ekonomi mungkin akan merasa terdorong untuk menerima tawaran politik uang sebagai solusi jangka pendek terhadap kebutuhan mereka. Keadaan tersebut seringkali dimanfaatkan para partisan partai politik dalam melancarkan strategi pemenangan mereka dalam pemilihan umum. dengan menawarkan sejumlah uang maupun bantuan kepada masyarakat, para pelaku politik uang bisa dengan sangat mudah mengumpulkan suara dukungan dalam pemilihan umum. Jika ditelaah, praktik politik uang merupakan salah satu strategi politik yang bertujuan untuk memengaruhi hasil pemilihan, namun dilakukan dengan cara yang tidak adil dimana dukungan politik dari masyarakat diperoleh dengan cara dibeli, bukan melalui proses yang sah dan transparan.

Money politics is generally prone to attacking people with low economic levels. People who are experiencing economic difficulties may feel compelled to accept the offer of money politics as a short-term solution to their needs. This situation is often utilized by political party partisans in launching their winning strategies in general elections. By offering a certain amount of money or assistance to the public, the perpetrators of money politics can very easily gather votes of support in general elections. When examined, money politics is one of the political strategies that aims to influence the outcome of elections, but it is done in an unfair way where political support from the community is obtained by buying, not through a legal and transparent process.

Namun keadan ekonomi yang lemah nyatanya tidak menjadi satu-satunya faktor penyebab masifnya praktik politik uang mewarnai demokrasi. Beberapa faktor lain yang turut berkontribusi pada prevalensi politik uang yang diduga memengaruhi tinggi rendahnya praktik jual beli suara tersebut di antaranya kurangnya pemahaman masyarakat akan integritas Pemilihan Umum, lemahnya pengawasan dan penegakan hukum, kultur politik yang korup, serta ketatnya persaingan antar partai politik.

However, the weak economic condition is not the only factor that causes the massive practice of money politics to color democracy. Several other factors contribute to the prevalence of money politics, including the lack of public understanding of the integrity of elections, weak supervision and law enforcement, corrupt political culture, and intense competition between political parties.

Secara teoretik, Salah satu faktor penting yang dipercaya menyumbang insiden politik uang adalah desain institusi politik. Termasuk sistem multipartai. Banyaknya partai politik yang ikut dalam kontestasi demokrasi menjadikan persaingan politik semakin sengit. Partai-partai yang ikut berkompetisi dalam pemilihan umum memiliki kepentingannya sendiri, sehingga semuanya berlomba-lomba memperebutkan kursi di pemerintahan. Tidak ada partai yang mendominasi secara mutlak, menjadikan partai-partai politik membentuk koalisi untuk merebut kekuasaan. Alhasil, politik uang menjadi salah satu jalan yang dipilih untuk melancarkan kemenangan partai politik di pemerintahan.

Theoretically, one of the important factors believed to contribute to the incidence of money politics is the design of political institutions. This includes the multiparty system. The number of political parties participating in the contestation of democracy makes political competition fiercer. Parties that compete in general elections have their own interests, so they are all vying for seats in the government. There is no party that dominates absolutely, making political parties form coalitions to seize power. As a result, money politics is one of the ways chosen to launch the winning of political parties in the government.

Praktik politik uang dapat menciptakan ketidakadilan di arena pemilihan, dimana kontestan politik dengan sumber daya keuangan yang lebih besar memiliki keuntungan yang tidak adil atas lawan-lawannya. Ini juga dapat mengurangi kesetaraan dalam proses demokrasi dan merusak prinsip kompetisi yang adil. Ketika uang digunakan untuk memengaruhi pengambilan keputusan politik, maka akan mengakibatkan lahirnya kebijakan yang tidak mencerminkan kepentingan umum, tetapi lebih condong pada kepentingan finansial dari kelompok-kelompok tertentu. Hal ini tentu dapat merusak integritas kebijakan publik dan menciptakan ketidakpuasan di kalangan masyarakat.

The practice of money politics can create unfairness in the electoral arena, where political contestants with greater financial resources have an unfair advantage over their opponents. It can also reduce equality in the democratic process and undermine the principle of fair competition. When money is used to influence political decision-making, it can lead to policies that do not reflect the public interest, but rather favor the financial interests of certain groups. This can undermine the integrity of public policy and create dissatisfaction among the public.

4. Teori Patronase Patronage Theory

Patronase merupakan hubungan dua arah antara patron dan klien. Patron adalah individu ataupun kelompok yang memiliki sumber daya (materil dan non-materil) dibandingkan dengan klien, sedangkan sumber daya adalah dimana aktor memiliki control serta memiliki kepentingan tertentu, sumber daya juga dapat diartikan sebagai sesuatu yang bisa dikendalikan oleh aktor.⁴⁷

Patronage is a two-way relationship between patrons and clients. Patrons are individuals or groups that have resources (material and non-material) compared to clients, while resources are where actors have control and have certain interests, resources can also be interpreted as something that can be controlled by actors.

Patronase dalam dunia politik menggambarkan korelasi antara partai politik (Parpol) sebagai patron dan masyarakat yang memiliki hak pilih sebagai klient. Patronase didefinisikan sebagai sebuah pembagian keuntungan di antara politisi untuk mendistribusikan sesuatu secara individual kepada pemilih, para pekerja atau pegiat kampanye, dalam rangka mendapatkan dukungan politik dari mereka (Shefter 1994: 283,).

Patronage in politics describes the correlation between political parties as patrons and the voting public as clients. Patronage is defined as a division of benefits among politicians to distribute something individually to voters, workers or campaigners, in order to gain political support from them (Shefter 1994: 283,).

⁴⁷Andrews & Ritzer, 2018)

Mada Sukmajati dan Edward Aspinall dalam buku “*Politik Uang di Indonesia, Patronase dan Klientelisme di Pemilu Legislatif 2014*” mendefinisikan Patronase sebagai pemberian uang tunai, barang, jasa, dan keuntungan ekonomi lainnya (seperti pekerjaan atau kontrak proyek) yang didistribusikan oleh politisi, termasuk keuntungan yang ditujukan untuk individu (misalnya, amplop berisi uang tunai) dan kepada kelompok/komunitas (misalnya, lapangan sepak bola baru untuk para pemuda di sebuah kampung). Patronase juga bisa berupa uang tunai atau barang yang didistribusikan kepada pemilih yang berasal dari dana pribadi (misalnya, dalam pembelian suara) atau dana publik (misalnya proyek-proyek *pork barrel* yang dibiayai oleh pemerintah).⁴⁸

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Sistem patronase dalam politik biasanya terjadi menjelang proses Pemilu baik pemilihan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden, Pemilihan Anggota Legislatif (Pileg), serta pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). Patronase terjadi karena adanya kepentingan patron yakni partai politik maupun oknum yang terlibat dalam kontestasi Pemilu yang membutuhkan klient yakni masyarakat sebagai pemilik suara untuk mendapatkan dukungan dengan tujuan memenangkan Pemilu. Dalam sistem patronase, partai politik akan mendapatkan keuntungan dengan mengamankan suara konstituen.

⁴⁸Edward Aspinall, Mada Sukmajati, *Politik Uang di Indonesia, Patronase dan Klientelisme di Pemilu Legislatif 2014*, (Jakarta, Penerbit PolGov, 2015), h.

⁴⁹Edward Aspinall, Mada Sukmajati, *Politik Uang di Indonesia, Patronase dan Klientelisme di Pemilu Legislatif 2014*, (Jakarta, Penerbit PolGov, 2015), h.

The patronage system in politics usually occurs before the election process, both the President and Vice President elections, Legislative Elections (Pileg), and Regional Head elections (Pilkada). Patronage occurs because of the interests of patrons, namely political parties and individuals involved in the election contestation, who need clients, namely the community as vote owners to gain support with the aim of winning the election. In the patronage system, political parties will benefit by securing constituent votes.

Patronase adalah bentuk jaringan politik di mana dukungan dan loyalitas politik diperoleh dengan memberikan keuntungan kepada individu maupun kelompok tertentu sebagai imbalan atas dukungan politik yang diberikan. Sistem ini seingkali dikritik karena dapat memperkuat korupsi dan ketidakadilan dalam proses demokrasi. Meskipun demikian, di sisi lain sistem patronase dinilai dapat memainkan peran dalam menghidupkan bahkan memperkuat demokrasi. Adanya proses transaksional yang menggunakan imbalan dapat meningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam pemilu. Politisi dapat menarik dukungan berbagai lapisan masyarakat, termasuk mereka yang mungkin sebelumnya tidak pernah terlibat bahkan tidak tertarik dengan politik.

Patronage is a form of political network in which political support and loyalty is gained by providing benefits to certain individuals or groups in return for political support. This system is often criticized for reinforcing corruption and injustice in the democratic process. However, on the other hand, the patronage system is considered to play a role in reviving and even strengthening democracy. The existence of transactional processes that use rewards can increase community participation in elections. Politicians can attract the support of various layers of society, including those who may not have previously been involved or even interested in politics.

Tak hanya itu, patronase juga dapat menjadi penghubung antara pemerintah dengan rakyat. Dengan adanya transaksi politik uang secara langsung kepada masyarakat dapat membangun hubungan yang lebih personal dengan yang dapat mempermudah politisi untuk lebih memahami dengan baik kebutuhan dan aspirasi masyarakat sehingga perumusan kebijakan pemerintahan dapat lebih responsif terhadap kebutuhan masyarakat. Pengambilan keputusan politik dan kebijakan

publik yang dilakukan oleh patron yang mendapat dukungan hasil dari sistem patronase seringkali didasarkan pada kebutuhan untuk memenuhi janji kepada pendukungnya. Akan tetapi, hal ini juga dapat menimbulkan ketidakadilan dalam pendistribusian layanan publik. Kebijakan yang dihasilkan dari sistem patronase cenderung lebih menguntungkan individu maupun kelompok yang memiliki hubungan patronase yang kuat dengan penguasa. Pejabat pemerintah yang terpilih dari hasil spatronase akan merasa berhutang kepada pendukungnya, sehingga dapat memengaruhi hasil kebijakan publik yang dibuat. Hal ini menjadikan kebijakan yang dihasilkan seringkali hanya mempertimbangkan keuntungan bagi kelompok tertentu.

Not only that, patronage can also be a link between the government and the people. With the existence of political money transactions directly to the community, it can build a more personal relationship with which can make it easier for politicians to better understand the needs and aspirations of the community so that the formulation of government policies can be more responsive to the needs of the community. Political and public policy decisions made by patrons who receive support as a result of the patronage system are often based on the need to fulfill promises to their supporters. However, this can also lead to injustice in the distribution of public services. Policies resulting from the patronage system tend to favor individuals and groups that have strong patronage relationships with the ruler. Government officials elected from patronage results will feel indebted to their supporters, which can influence the results of public policies made. This makes the resulting policies often only consider the benefits for certain groups.

Kebijakan yang lahir dari konteks patronase kemungkinan akan kurang efektif dan tidak sesuai dengan kebutuhan nyata seluruh masyarakat. Ketika kebijakan dirancang hanya untuk memenuhi kebutuhan pendukung politik tanpa mempertimbangkan kondisi nyata masyarakat, kualitas kebijakn dan hasil yang dicapai cenderung menurun dan kurang mampu untuk mengatasi masalah sosial ekonomi secara keseluruhan.

Policies that arise from the context of patronage are likely to be less effective and not in accordance with the real needs of the entire community. When policies are

designed only to meet the needs of political supporters without considering the real conditions of the community, the quality of policies and the results achieved tend to decline and are less able to address socio-economic problems as a whole.

RESEARCH METHOD

Penelitian ini menggunakan *mixed method research*. Menurut Creswel dan Clark dalam buku "*Mixed Method*" oleh Ismail Pane, dkk. Penelitian campuran (*mixed methods research*) merupakan desain penelitian dengan asumsi filosofis di samping sebagai metode *inquiry*. Sebagai metodologi, penelitian campuran ini melibatkan asumsi filosofis yang membimbing arah pengumpulan dan analisis data, serta mengolah pendekatan penelitian kualitatif dan kuantitatif pada banyak fase proses penelitian tersebut.⁵⁰

This study uses mixed method research. According to Creswel and Clark in the book "Mixed Method" by Ismail Pane, et al. Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions in addition to being an inquiry method. As a methodology, this mixed research involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of data collection and analysis, and processes qualitative and quantitative research approaches in many phases of the research process.

Metode penelitian kombinasi kuantitatif-kualitatif adalah sebuah metode yang berfokus pada pengumpulan dan analisis data serta memadukan antara data kuantitatif dan kualitatif. Berdasarkan hal tersebut, maka tujuan penelitian mixed methods ini adalah untuk menemukan hasil penelitian yang lebih baik dibandingkan dengan hanya menggunakan salah satu pendekatan saja.⁵¹

The quantitative-qualitative combination research method is a method that focuses on data collection and analysis and combines quantitative and qualitative data. Based on this, the purpose of this mixed methods research is to find better research results compared to using only one approach.

⁵⁰Samsu S., *Metode Penelitian: (Teori dan Aplikasi Penelitian Kualitatif, Kuantitatif, Mixed Method, serta Research & Development)*, (Jambi, Pustaka Jambi, 2021), h. 161.

⁵¹Ibid, h.2.

Pendekatan Kuantitatif pada penelitian ini memfokuskan pada analisis statistik untuk memperoleh data yang objektif dan terukur. Desain dan penyusunan kuesioner untuk mengukur prevalensi dan pola politik uang dan patronase dirancang dengan cermat agar dapat mengidentifikasi seberapa sering praktik-praktik tersebut terjadi serta pola-pola yang muncul dalam konteks tertentu. Dengan menggunakan metode kuantitatif, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menghasilkan data yang valid dan reliabel yang dapat memberikan gambaran yang jelas mengenai dampak politik uang dan patronase dalam sistem politik di beberapa daerah yang diteliti.

The Quantitative Approach in this study focuses on statistical analysis to obtain objective and measurable data. The design and preparation of questionnaires to measure the prevalence and patterns of money politics and patronage were carefully designed to identify how often these practices occur and the patterns that emerge in certain contexts. By using quantitative methods, this study aims to produce valid and reliable data that can provide a clear picture of the impact of money politics and patronage in the political system in several areas studied.

Pendekatan Kualitatif pada penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menggali pemahaman mendalam tentang konteks dan dinamika di balik fenomena politik uang dan patronase. Melalui metode seperti wawancara mendalam, diskusi kelompok terfokus, dan analisis dokumen, pendekatan kualitatif memungkinkan peneliti untuk mengidentifikasi motif, pengalaman, dan persepsi individu atau kelompok terkait praktik-praktik tersebut. Dengan pendekatan ini, penelitian dapat mengungkapkan nuansa dan kompleksitas yang mungkin tidak terlihat dalam data kuantitatif, serta memahami bagaimana dan mengapa politik uang dan patronase mempengaruhi proses politik dan sosial di tingkat lokal maupun nasional.

The Qualitative Approach in this research aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the context and dynamics behind the phenomenon of money politics and patronage. Through methods such as in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and document analysis, a qualitative approach allows researchers to identify the motives, experiences, and perceptions of individuals or groups related to these practices. With this approach, research can reveal nuances and complexities that may not be visible

in quantitative data, and understand how and why money politics and patronage influence political and social processes at the local and national levels.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Hasil survei yang dilakukan Curva Survey Indonesia (CSI) pada Juli 2024 di Kabupaten Bone Bolango⁵² kepada sejumlah Responden diajukan beberapa pertanyaan mengenai praktik politik uang seperti "Menurut Bapak/Ibu/Saudara, apakah pemberian bantuan dalam bentuk uang atau barang kepada pemilih dalam Pilkada diperbolehkan atau tidak?" jawaban yang diterima adalah "Boleh", "Tidak Boleh", dan "Tidak tahu/tidak menjawab". 26,00% menjawab boleh, 64,50% menjawab tidak boleh dan sisanya sebanyak 9,50% tidak tahu/tidak jawab. Hasil survey tersebut menunjukkan sebagian besar masyarakat tahu dan sadar praktik politik uang tidaklah dibenarkan dalam proses demokrasi. Oleh karenanya mayoritas responden menjawab tidak boleh ada praktik politik uang dalam kontestasi Pemilu

The results of a survey conducted by Curva Survey Indonesia (CSI) in July 2024 in Bone Bolango Regency to a number of Respondents were asked several questions regarding the practice of money politics such as "According to you, is giving assistance in the form of money or goods to voters in the Pilkada allowed or not?" The answers received were "Yes", "No", and "Don't know/didn't answer". 26.00% answered yes, 64.50% answered no and the remaining 9.50% did not know/didn't answer. The results of the survey show that the majority of the public knows and is aware that the practice of money politics is not justified in the democratic process. Therefore, the majority of respondents answered that there should be no practice of money politics in the Election contestation.

Kemudian pertanyaan yang diajukan selanjutnya kepada responden yang sama yakni "Jika nanti saat Pilkada ada orang yang memberi Bapak/Ibu/Saudara bantuan dalam bentuk uang atau barang supaya ikut memilih pasangan tertentu, Bapak/Ibu/Saudara akan menerima bantuan itu atau tidak?", dan 49,00% responded menjawab tidak akan menerima, sementara 39,75% akan menerima, dan

⁵²Survei CSI

11,25% tidak tahu/tidak jawab. Temuan ini memberikan gambaran mengenai sikap masyarakat terhadap tawaran politik uang dalam Pemilu. Meskipun hampir separuh responden menegaskan tidak akan menerima bantuan tersebut, ada persentasi signifikan dari beberapa responden yang bersedia menerima, menunjukkan adanya variasi dalam pandangan dan perilaku masyarakat terhadap praktik politik uang.

Then the next question asked to the same respondents was "If later during the regional elections there are people who give your assistance in the form of money or goods to vote for a certain pair, will you accept the assistance or not?", and 49.00% of respondents answered that they would not accept it, while 39.75% would accept it, and 11.25% did not know/did not answer. This finding provides an overview of the public's attitude towards the offer of money politics in the election. Although almost half of the respondents stated that they would not accept the assistance, there was a significant percentage of respondents who were willing to accept it, indicating variations in the views and behavior of the public towards the practice of money politics.

Pada pertanyaan selanjutnya, "Jika Bapak/Ibu/Saudara menerima bantuan tersebut, apakah Bapak/Ibu/Saudara akan mengikuti ajakan untuk memilih pasangan tertentu?". Hasil survey menunjukkan bahwa 16,00% responded mengatakan bahwa mereka "pasti akan mengikuti ajakan itu." Sementara itu, 27,00% responden "masih pikir-pikir atau belum menentukan pilihan" apakah akan mengikuti atau tidak mengikuti ajakan tersebut. kemudian, sebanyak 35,25% responden menyatakan bahwa amereka "tidak akan mengikuti ajakan itu," dan sisanya sebanyak 21,75% responden memberikan jawaban "tidak tahu/tidak jawab."

In the next question, "If you receive the assistance, will you follow the invitation to choose a certain partner?" The survey results showed that 16.00% of respondents said that they "will definitely follow the invitation." Meanwhile, 27.00% of respondents were "still thinking or have not yet decided" whether or not to follow the invitation. Then, as many as 35.25% of respondents stated that they "will not follow the invitation," and the remaining 21.75% of respondents gave the answer "don't know/no answer."

Hasil tersebut mengungkapkan berbagai sikap terhadap pengaruh bantuan dalam menentukan pilihan politik. Meskipun ada persentase yang signifikan yang bersedia mengikuti ajakan setelah menerima bantuan, namun mayoritas responden masih menunjukkan ketidakpastian atau menolak untuk mengikuti ajakan tersebut, menunjukkan masih adanya kesadaran dan pertimbangan kritis dalam memilih calon pemimpin mereka.

The results reveal a variety of attitudes towards the influence of aid in determining political choices. Although there is a significant percentage who are willing to follow the invitation after receiving aid, the majority of respondents still show uncertainty or refuse to follow the invitation, indicating that there is still awareness and critical consideration in choosing their leader candidates.

Kemudian para responden diajukan pertanyaan terkait bentuk bantuan yang disukai. Jenis pertanyaan yang diajukan yakni "Jika nanti pada saat Pilkada ada orang yang memberi Bapak/Ibu/Saudara supaya ikut memilih pasangan tertentu, menurut Bapak/Ibu/Saudara dalam bentuk apa sebaiknya bantuan itu?" Sejumlah 31,25% responden menjawab "uang", 23,00% responden menjawab "barang", 3,00% menjawab "lainnya", dan 42,75% responden memilih untuk tidak menjawab.

Then the respondents were asked questions related to the form of assistance they preferred. The type of question asked was "If later during the regional elections there are people who give you to vote for a certain pair, in your opinion, what form should the assistance be?" A total of 31.25% of respondents answered "money", 23.00% of respondents answered "goods", 3.00% answered "others", and 42.75% of respondents chose not to answer.

Hasil survei ini mengungkapkan berbagai preferensi responden terhadap bentuk bantuan yang mereka anggap paling sesuai dalam konteks politik uang, yakni responden yang memilih jenis bantuan dalam bentuk uang menunjukkan bahwa hampir sepertiga dari responden merasa bahwa uang adalah bentuk bantuan yang paling langsung dan praktis, yang mungkin dianggap lebih fleksibel dalam penggunaannya.

The results of this survey reveal various respondent preferences regarding the form of assistance that they consider most appropriate in the context of money politics, namely respondents who chose the type of assistance in the form of money showed that almost a third of respondents felt that money was the most direct and practical form of assistance, which may be considered more flexible in its use.

Kemudian pilihan responden selanjutnya adalah bantuan dalam bentuk barang, sekitar 23,00% responden mengindikasikan bahwa mereka lebih suka menerima bantuan dalam bentuk barang. Preferensi ini mungkin mencerminkan pandangan bahwa barang tertentu, seperti kebutuhan sehari-hari, bisa lebih bermanfaat atau memiliki nilai praktis langsung dibandingkan dengan uang tunai.

Then the next respondent's choice is assistance in the form of goods, around 23.00% of respondents indicated that they prefer to receive assistance in the form of goods. This preference may reflect the view that certain goods, such as daily necessities, can be more useful or have direct practical value compared to cash.

Selanjutnya, sebanyak 3,00% responden memilih opsi "lainnya", menunjukkan bahwa sangat sedikit yang memiliki preferensi khusus di luar kategori yang telah disebutkan. Ini mungkin mencakup bentuk bantuan yang lebih spesifik atau tidak umum, meskipun persentasenya sangat kecil.

Furthermore, 3.00% of respondents chose the "other" option, indicating that very few have specific preferences outside the categories mentioned. This may include more specific or uncommon forms of assistance, although the percentage is very small.

Sisanya, 42,75% responden memilih Tidak Tahu/Tidak Menjawab, mereka memilih untuk tidak memberikan jawaban atau tidak menjelaskan bentuk bantuan yang mereka sukai. Angka yang tinggi ini menunjukkan bahwa banyak responden mungkin merasa tidak nyaman atau tidak yakin dengan pertanyaan tersebut, atau mungkin mereka tidak ingin terlibat dalam diskusi mengenai politik uang.

The remaining 42.75% of respondents chose Don't Know/Did Not Answer, they chose not to provide an answer or did not explain the form of assistance they

preferred. This high number indicates that many respondents may feel uncomfortable or unsure about the question, or perhaps they do not want to be involved in a discussion about money politics.

Secara keseluruhan, hasil survei ini menunjukkan bahwa ada variasi signifikan dalam preferensi terhadap bentuk bantuan politik. Meskipun ada kecenderungan jelas bahwa uang dan barang merupakan bentuk bantuan yang dipilih oleh sebagian besar responden, hampir setengah dari mereka memilih untuk tidak memberikan jawaban. Hal ini bisa mencerminkan ketidakpastian atau keengganan untuk terlibat dalam praktek politik uang, yang menunjukkan bahwa banyak orang mungkin lebih memilih untuk tidak terlibat dalam situasi yang melibatkan tawaran politik semacam ini.

Overall, the results of this survey indicate that there is significant variation in preferences for forms of political assistance. While there is a clear trend towards money and goods as the form of assistance preferred by the majority of respondents, almost half of them chose not to provide an answer. This may reflect uncertainty or reluctance to engage in the practice of money politics, suggesting that many people may prefer not to engage in situations involving these types of political offers.

Selanjutnya, responden yang memilih bantuan dalam bentuk uang (sebanyak 31,25% dari total responden) kemudian diajukan pertanyaan mengenai kisaran nominal uang yang mereka harapkan diterima. Pilihan nominal yang disediakan berkisar dari Rp.150.000 hingga lebih dari Rp.500.000. jika dipersentasikan, sebanyak 4,50% responden memilih nominal uang Rp.150.000-Rp.300.000, menunjukkan sebagian kecil responden merasa bahwa jumlah tersebut sudah cukup sebagai bentuk bantuan yang mereka terima.

Next, respondents who chose assistance in the form of money (as many as 31.25% of the total respondents) were then asked questions about the range of nominal money they expected to receive. The nominal choices provided ranged from IDR 150,000 to more than IDR 500,000. If expressed as a percentage, as many as 4.50% of respondents chose the nominal money of IDR 150,000-IDR 300,000,

indicating that a small portion of respondents felt that this amount was sufficient as a form of assistance they received.

Kemudian sekitar 4,00% responden memilih untuk menerima bantuan dalam nominal yang lebih dari Rp.500.000. Ini mencerminkan harapan akan jumlah yang relatif tinggi, mungkin mengindikasikan ekspektasi besar terhadap nilai bantuan yang mereka terima.

Then around 4.00% of respondents chose to receive assistance in a nominal amount of more than Rp. 500,000. This reflects the expectation of a relatively high amount, perhaps indicating high expectations of the value of the assistance they receive.

Selanjutnya, sebanyak 3,75% responden menyebutkan bahwa mereka lebih memilih nominal yang kurang dari Rp.150.000. Persentase ini menunjukkan bahwa ada juga segmen responden yang merasa jumlah yang lebih kecil masih memadai untuk mereka.

Furthermore, 3.75% of respondents stated that they prefer a nominal amount of less than Rp. 150,000. This percentage shows that there is also a segment of respondents who feel that a smaller amount is still sufficient for them.

Sebanyak 2,25% responden mengharapkan bantuan dalam kisaran nominal ini. Ini merupakan kategori nominal yang lebih spesifik dan menunjukkan preferensi pada jumlah yang agak tinggi namun tidak melebihi Rp.500.000. Sementara sebanyak 2,25% responden tidak dapat menentukan nominal yang mereka harapkan dan memilih jawaban "tidak tahu." Ini menunjukkan bahwa sebagian kecil responden mungkin merasa tidak yakin tentang jumlah yang sesuai atau relevan.

As many as 2.25% of respondents expect assistance in this nominal range. This is a more specific nominal category and shows a preference for a fairly high amount but not exceeding Rp. 500,000. Meanwhile, as many as 2.25% of respondents could not determine the nominal they expected and chose the answer "don't know." This suggests that a small number of respondents may be unsure about the appropriate or relevant amount.

Terakhir, 14,25% responden memilih untuk tidak memberikan jawaban terkait nominal uang yang diharapkan. Persentase ini mencerminkan adanya kelompok responden yang enggan atau tidak ingin menjelaskan preferensi mereka mengenai jumlah uang.

Finally, 14.25% of respondents chose not to provide an answer regarding the expected amount of money. This percentage reflects the existence of a group of respondents who are reluctant or do not want to explain their preferences regarding the amount of money.

Hasil survei ini memberikan wawasan mengenai variasi ekspektasi jumlah uang di antara responden yang memilih bantuan dalam bentuk uang. Meskipun sebagian kecil responden memiliki harapan untuk jumlah yang cukup spesifik, banyak yang memilih untuk tidak memberikan jawaban atau tidak dapat menentukan nominal yang tepat. Hal ini mungkin mencerminkan ketidakpastian atau sensitivitas terhadap topik bantuan politik uang.

The results of this survey provide insight into the variation in expectations of the amount of money among respondents who chose monetary assistance. While a small number of respondents had expectations for a fairly specific amount, many chose not to provide an answer or were unable to specify an exact amount. This may reflect uncertainty or sensitivity to the topic of monetary assistance.

Selain hasil di atas, ada juga masyarakat yang memilih nominal uang di angka rendah, yakni berkisar antara Rp.50.000 - Rp.100.000. Dari persentase jawaban yang didapat, 9,75% responden memilih nominal Rp.100.000 dan 1,25% memilih nominal Rp.50.000, serta 8,75% lainnya tidak menentukan berapa nominal yang diinginkan namun memilih nominal lainnya, serta 11,50% responden sisanya memilih untuk tidak menjawab pertanyaan.

In addition to the results above, there are also people who choose a low nominal amount, which is between Rp. 50,000 - Rp. 100,000. From the percentage of answers obtained, 9.75% of respondents chose the nominal amount of Rp. 100,000 and 1.25% chose the nominal amount of Rp. 50,000, and 8.75% did not specify the

desired nominal amount but chose another nominal amount, and the remaining 11.50% of respondents chose not to answer the question.

HASIL SURVEI DAERAH LAIN ????

Hasil survei di beberapa daerah lainnya menunjukkan angka yang tidak jauh berbeda dari hasil survei di Kabupaten Bone Bolango. Faktor yang turut memengaruhi jumlah nominal yang diterima bergantung pada kondisi ekonomi masyarakat di daerah tersebut. nominal uang yang dipilih responden di Kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara,

CONCLUSION

Praktik politik uang di berbagai daerah pada dasarnya menerapkan pola yang hampir sama, yang membedakan ialah nominal yang dipengaruhi kondisi sosial ekonomi daerah tersebut, mulai dari pendapatan per kapita masyarakatnya hingga persentasi angka kemiskinan daerah tersebut.

The practice of money politics in various regions basically applies almost the same pattern, the difference is the nominal value which is influenced by the socio-economic conditions of the region, starting from the per capita income of its people to the percentage of poverty in the region.

Kehadiran patronase dalam dunia politik di negara berkembang memiliki dampak yang variatif. Pada dasarnya sistem ini dapat mencederai sistem demokrasi serta integritas dan transparansi pemilihan umum. Namun di sisi lain, patronse dapat menjadi faktor yang mampu menghidupkan demokrasi. Dengan adanya hubungan timbal balik yang saling menguntungkan antara pembuat kebijakan dan masyarakat dapat meningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam dunia politik serta pemilihan umum serta dapat memperkuat hubungan antara pemimpin dan msyarakat.

The presence of patronage in the political world in developing countries has various impacts. Basically, this system can harm the democratic system and the integrity and

transparency of general elections. However, on the other hand, patronage can be a factor that can revive democracy. With a mutually beneficial reciprocal relationship between policy makers and the community, it can increase community participation in the political world and general elections and can strengthen the relationship between leaders and the community.

BAB V

Youth Participation in Digital Democracy: Opportunities and Challenges of Indonesian Digital Local Elections

Abstract

Digital democracy initiatives are transforming the political environment in Indonesia, with the involvement of young people playing a crucial role in these developments. This study examines various aspects of youth engagement, including online voting, digital campaigning, and political activism, to understand young people's challenges and opportunities when participating in the democratic process. As technology advances, it is crucial to evaluate how youth participation can influence electoral outcomes and democratic governance in Indonesia. Through the analysis of data from multiple sources, statistical analyses, and case studies, this research aims to provide a comprehensive insight into how young people are shaping the digital democratic landscape of the country. The study indicates the significance of integrating young voices into the political sphere and recognising their potential to drive positive change within Indonesia's democracy. By highlighting the obstacles and possibilities for young individuals in digital

democracy initiatives, the research strives to advocate for increased youth involvement in shaping the future of Indonesian politics. The study highlights the critical role that youth play in shaping Indonesia's democratic landscape and advocating for a political system that is more inclusive and representative.

Introduction

With the widespread adoption of digital platforms and technologies, Indonesia has witnessed a surge in online political activism and participation. Social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, TikTok, and Instagram have become powerful tools for citizens to voice their opinions, organise campaigns, and hold their government officials accountable. The ease of access to information and the ability to connect with like-minded individuals has empowered the younger generation to actively participate in shaping the country's political landscape. Furthermore, the covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the shift towards digital democracy in Indonesia. With restrictions on physical gatherings and public events, the reliance on digital platforms for communication and engagement has only increased. Virtual town hall meetings, online petitions, and live-streamed debates have become the new norm, providing opportunities for citizens to engage with their representatives and participate in decision-making processes from the comfort of their homes.

As Indonesia continues to embrace digital democracy, some challenges must be addressed to ensure inclusivity and transparency. Issues such as digital literacy, access to technology, and online misinformation remain barriers to full participation. Efforts to bridge the digital divide and promote media literacy are crucial to ensure that all citizens, regardless of socioeconomic status, can engage meaningfully in the digital sphere. Therefore, Indonesia's journey towards digital democracy is promising, with the potential to empower citizens and strengthen democratic values. By harnessing the power of technology and engaging with the younger generation, Indonesia is paving the way for a more inclusive and participatory political landscape.

Digital elections, encompassing online voting, digital campaigning, and political activism, have seen a significant rise in prominence in Indonesia in recent years. The

2019 and the very recent 2024 Indonesian presidential elections, in particular, showcased a marked increase in digital campaigning efforts, with candidates utilising various social media platforms to target and engage younger voters. This shift towards digital mediums in the political sphere has prompted discussion and debate about the efficacy of these platforms in effectively reaching and mobilising the youth demographic and their potential impact on electoral outcomes and democratic governance. Political candidates' utilisation of social media and other online platforms is seen as a strategic move to tap into the tech-savvy youth population, who are increasingly turning to digital channels for information and communication. By leveraging these platforms, candidates can directly engage with voters, share their campaign messages, and rally support in a way that was not possible before the advent of digital technology. Digital technology has fundamentally changed the landscape of political campaigning in Indonesia and how voters interact with and participate in the electoral process. However, as digital elections become more prevalent, questions about the potential drawbacks and challenges associated with this shift have arisen. One key concern is the spread of misinformation and fake news on social media platforms, which can influence voter opinions and sway electoral outcomes.

Additionally, there are concerns about the security and integrity of online voting systems and issues related to privacy and data protection. These challenges highlight the need for robust regulations and measures to ensure the transparency and fairness of digital elections in Indonesia. Despite these challenges, the rise of digital elections in Indonesia presents a unique opportunity to engage a broader population segment in the political process and promote greater civic participation. By harnessing the power of digital technology, political candidates have the potential to reach and mobilise a diverse range of voters, including those who may have been traditionally marginalised or disengaged from the political process. As the use of digital platforms continues to evolve in the realm of politics, it will be crucial for policymakers, electoral authorities, and tech companies to work together to address the challenges and opportunities that come with this digital transformation.

The study aims to delve into these dynamics by exploring the barriers and opportunities for youth participation in digital democracy. It seeks to understand how digital tools can be harnessed to enhance political engagement among young people and the extent to which their involvement influences electoral processes and outcomes. By drawing on existing literature and empirical data, this research will provide a nuanced understanding of the role of youth in Indonesia's digital democratic landscape.

Research Method

This research employs a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative data to analyse youth participation in Indonesian digital elections comprehensively. The quantitative component includes a survey conducted among young voters aged 18-24, focusing on their digital engagement habits, perceptions of digital democracy, and participation in online voting and digital campaigning. The survey aims to gather data on the extent of youth engagement and identify the factors that influence their participation in digital democratic processes.

In addition to the survey, the research incorporates qualitative data through in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, including political campaigners, digital activists, and young voters. These interviews provide insights into the practical challenges and opportunities associated with youth participation in digital democracy. By capturing the experiences and perspectives of these stakeholders, the research will offer a rich, contextualised understanding of the nuances of digital engagement among young people.

Moreover, the study leverages secondary data from existing literature, reports, and case studies to contextualise the findings and draw comparisons with other countries. Notable references include works by Berg and Hofmann (2021) and Fuller (2023), which provide theoretical frameworks and case studies on digital democracy. The research ensures a robust and comprehensive topic analysis by triangulating data from multiple sources.

Findings & Results

The survey results point to a clear trend among young voters in Indonesia towards utilising digital platforms for political engagement. The fact that nearly seven out of ten respondents are actively involved in digital campaigning activities reflects the growing influence of social media and online communities in shaping political discourse. This generation of voters is consuming political content online and actively participating in discussions, sharing their views, and mobilising support for their preferred candidates or causes. Over half of the respondents preferred online voting, highlighting a shift in attitudes towards traditional voting methods. The convenience and accessibility offered by online voting systems are seen as significant advantages, particularly for young voters who are already accustomed to conducting various aspects of their lives online. This preference for digital voting options underscores the need for policymakers to adapt to the changing needs and expectations of the electorate, particularly the younger demographic, who are increasingly important in shaping the political landscape. Overall, the survey findings suggest that young voters in Indonesia are not only embracing digital technologies as a means of political participation but also advocating for modernised and more efficient democratic processes. As technology continues to play a central role in shaping political engagement, it will be crucial for policymakers and electoral authorities to consider the preferences and behaviour of young voters in order to ensure a more inclusive and representative democracy.

The findings of our comprehensive interviews with young voters revealed the significant influence of digital platforms in enabling them to express their opinions and actively participate in political discourse. The accessibility and convenience of social media, online forums, and other digital resources have greatly facilitated young individuals in engaging with political issues and making their voices heard. Nevertheless, our research also identified several obstacles that impede young voters' use of digital platforms for political engagement. A notable challenge is the digital literacy gap, as many young people need more critical skills to assess and navigate online information effectively. This deficiency can result in the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation, posing a severe threat to the integrity of democratic processes.

Additionally, young voters' concerns regarding data privacy and security have been brought to light about their interactions with political content online. The increase in data breaches and misuse of personal information has contributed to a decline in trust towards digital platforms, leading some young individuals to approach political discussions online cautiously. These challenges emphasise the critical need for targeted interventions to bridge the digital literacy gap and safeguard the integrity of digital democratic processes. Various initiatives, such as digital literacy training programs, fact-checking resources, and enhanced transparency and accountability measures from online platforms, are essential in empowering young voters to effectively navigate the digital landscape and confidently participate in political discourse. By overcoming these challenges, we can empower young individuals to participate in politics actively, enabling them to make informed choices that shape the future of our democracy.

This study emphasises the crucial influence of digital democracy on electoral results, particularly regarding youth participation. The case of the 2019 and 2024 Indonesian presidential elections serve as a prime example of how digital campaigns can effectively engage young voters and boost voter turnout within this vital demographic. Through digital tools, political parties and candidates successfully connected with young voters innovatively, ultimately impacting the election results.

Furthermore, the research highlights the necessity of comprehending and leveraging the potential of digital platforms in contemporary political campaigns. Evidently, the ability to interact with voters online can significantly sway support and secure victory in elections. As technology continues to progress and become increasingly integrated into our daily lives, it is imperative for political entities to adapt and embrace digital strategies to communicate with and rally the electorate effectively, particularly the younger generation, who are turning to online platforms for information and interaction. By acknowledging the influence of digital democracy on electoral results, political parties and candidates can enhance their chances of success in future elections.

Discussion

Digital platforms play a crucial role in providing a platform for young people to express their views and rally for political change. However, it is essential to acknowledge that not all groups have equal access to technology and digital literacy, which can hinder their participation in online political discussions. Furthermore, issues such as online bullying and privacy concerns can create a hostile environment discouraging youth engagement. Research underscores the importance of transparency and accountability in digital democracy processes. There is a real risk of misinformation and manipulation without adequate measures to verify the accuracy and reliability of information shared online. It is imperative to implement safeguards to prevent the spread of fake news and the influence of malicious actors on digital platforms. While digital tools hold immense potential to transform youth involvement in democratic processes, it is critical to address these challenges to ensure a more inclusive and fair digital democracy.

One of the most critical challenges facing young voters today is the digital literacy gap. While younger individuals may excel at using social media and other digital platforms for personal connections and entertainment, they often lack the necessary skills to evaluate political information and participate in democratic processes online effectively. This gap in digital literacy poses a significant obstacle to young voters' ability to engage meaningfully in political discussions and make informed decisions at the polls. Without the ability to critically assess the credibility of sources or discern between misinformation and accurate information, young voters may be susceptible to manipulation by nefarious actors seeking to influence their political beliefs. To bridge this digital literacy gap, targeted educational initiatives are essential. By enhancing digital literacy and critical thinking skills, young voters can develop the tools they need to navigate the complex landscape of online political discourse. These initiatives can empower young people to become more discerning consumers of digital content and active participants in democratic processes, ultimately strengthening the integrity of our political system.

The proliferation of misinformation and fake news presents a significant threat to the health of digital democracy. In today's interconnected world, false information spreads rapidly, leading to confusion and a decline in trust in important institutions.

The impact of misinformation can be widespread, influencing public discourse and even electoral outcomes. Of particular concern is the potential for false information to manipulate voters and distort the democratic process. It is essential to take proactive steps to address this issue to protect elections' integrity.

In today's digital age, where information is constantly at our fingertips, it is more important than ever to arm individuals with the tools they need to navigate the vast sea of information. By promoting media literacy, especially among young voters who are often the targets of misinformation campaigns, we can help them develop healthy scepticism and critical thinking skills essential in distinguishing fact from hoaxes and fake news. Media literacy is the ability to recognise bias and propaganda in news sources and assess the credibility of information. Educating individuals on fact-checking and verifying information from various sources can enhance their skills in distinguishing fact from fiction and avoiding misleading narratives. Encouraging a mindset of questioning and curiosity can aid in combatting misinformation. By empowering individuals to critically analyse information before accepting it as truth, they can become more resilient against manipulation tactics employed by purveyors of false information. Promoting media literacy among young voters is an investment in the future of our democracy. Equipping individuals with the tools to make informed decisions and engage in well-informed discussions can help create a better-prepared society to counter misinformation and uphold the values of truth and transparency.

In order to effectively combat the negative impact of fake news, a comprehensive approach is needed. The approach involves implementing regulatory measures and collaborating with digital platforms to safeguard the integrity of digital democracy. Governments can play a significant role by passing laws that hold individuals accountable for spreading misinformation, while digital platforms can use technology to identify and eliminate fake content. By fostering partnerships between policymakers, tech companies, and the public, a more substantial system can be created to combat false information. Dealing with fake news requires a multi-faceted strategy, including promoting media literacy, establishing regulatory frameworks, and working closely with digital platforms. Through these collective efforts, the

transparency of democratic processes can be upheld, ensuring that voters have access to reliable information. By working together, a digital democracy that accurately reflects the people's aspirations can be achieved.

In today's digital era, the significance of data privacy and security has heightened, especially in the context of involving young voters in democratic processes. Protecting personal information from breaches and misuse is crucial with the proliferation of social media and online platforms for political engagement. Young voters are particularly cautious about sharing personal data online due to concerns about potential risks. Many hesitate to participate in digital democratic processes because they fear their data being compromised or misused. To build trust with this demographic, it is imperative to implement stringent data protection measures and communicate how data will be utilised and safeguarded. By emphasising data privacy and security, political organisations and governments can exhibit their dedication to safeguarding voters' personal information. It alleviates worries about potential data breaches and instils a culture of transparency and accountability in digital democratic procedures. By addressing these vital data privacy and security concerns, we can establish a more inclusive and trustworthy digital democracy that promotes increased participation from all voters, particularly young individuals who may be hesitant to engage in online political activities.

Conclusion

One key takeaway from the research is the importance of addressing digital literacy gaps among young voters in Indonesia. While many youths actively use digital tools to engage in democratic processes, significant portions of the population may not have the necessary skills to navigate these platforms effectively. By implementing initiatives to improve digital literacy, such as providing access to training programs and resources, we can ensure that all young voters can participate fully in digital democracy.

Another challenge must be overcome is the spread of misinformation on digital platforms. With the rise of social media and online news sources, it has become increasingly difficult to discern facts from hoaxes. Hoaxes and fake news threaten the integrity of democratic processes, as voters may be influenced by false

information. By promoting media literacy and critical thinking skills, we can help young people become more discerning consumers of information and better equipped to navigate the digital landscape. Data privacy concerns also loom large in the realm of digital democracy. With so much personal information being shared online, there is a risk that this data could be misused or exploited for political gain. Safeguards must be put in place to protect the privacy and security of young voters' data, ensuring that they can engage in digital democracy without fear of their information being compromised.

Ultimately, by addressing these challenges and harnessing the power of digital platforms, we can create a more inclusive and participatory democratic landscape for young voters in Indonesia. Future research should continue to explore the complexities of digital democracy and work towards developing strategies that enhance youth engagement in democratic processes. Only through collective effort and innovation can we fully realise the potential of digital democracy to empower young people and strengthen democratic systems.

BAB VI

Kesimpulan

Artikel 1: Dalam artikel ini, kami berpendapat bahwa demokrasi harus mencakup pentingnya partai politik sebagai lembaga politik yang mampu memenuhi fungsinya dalam masyarakat. Pemilu Indonesia yang lalu ditandai dengan jumlah pemilih yang signifikan dan dipengaruhi oleh faktor-faktor penting dalam dinamika politiknya. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Pemilu Legislatif dan Presiden 2024 menawarkan wawasan berharga untuk meningkatkan dan memajukan demokrasi dibandingkan dengan pemilu sebelumnya pada 2014 dan 2019. Namun, PRU 2024 terutama berfokus pada pembentukan sistem demokrasi poliarkis atau prosedural. Bisa dibayangkan, pemilu 2024 tampaknya mengabaikan proses demokrasi dan cita-cita yang menjadi landasan untuk melakukan pemilu tersebut.

Artikel II: Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) baru-baru ini mengenai parliamentary threshold memungkinkan legislatif untuk mempertimbangkan kembali dan mendefinisikan ulang alasan di balik batasan tersebut. Meskipun demikian, MK tetap berpegang pada asas-asas kebijakan hukum yang transparan meskipun Presidential Threshold telah ada. Dengan menggunakan "kontrak sosial" Huntington, kami berpendapat bahwa sistem kepartaian di Indonesia telah secara efektif berfungsi sebagai infrastruktur politik masyarakat, baik secara teori maupun realitas. Artikel ini pertama-tama menunjukkan asimetri antara kedua entitas ini dengan menelaah peraturan masing-masing, yang meskipun berbeda, saling terkait. Kedua, ketidaknormalan penyederhanaan partai muncul dari konsekuensi sistem

kepartaian. Oleh karena itu, posisi yang paling krusial dalam arena demokrasi kita seharusnya diberikan kepada kedaulatan rakyat.

Artikel III: Penelitian ini menggunakan metode *mixed methods research* yang akan mengungkap sejauh mana politik uang memengaruhi masyarakat dalam menentukan hak pilihnya pada Pemilihan Umum (Pemilu) baik Pemilihan Legislatif (Pileg) maupun Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). Data kuantitatif yang diperoleh dari hasil survei di beberapa daerah seperti Kabupaten Bone Bolango (Gorontalo), Kutai Kartanegara (Kalimantan Timur), Bintan dan Karimun (Kepulauan Riau), dan Jayapura (Papua), kemudian diramu menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan menyeret teori *patron-client* milik James Scott. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan hasil bahwa dari beberapa sampel daerah-daerah tersebut, pola politik uang yang ditemui memiliki kesamaan dalam praktiknya. Secara empiric, dari penelitian ini, para penulis beragurmen mayoritas masyarakat paham akan ilegalnya praktik politik uang, namun tidak serta-merta menjadikan praktik politik uang ditolak dalam pemilihan umum di daerah tersebut. Kondisi sosial ekonomi daerah juga tampaknya turut mengambil peran penting pada keputusan masyarakat dalam menerima atau menolak praktik politik uang yang ada.

Artikel IV: Persoalan dan praktik politik uang yang menggerogoti sistem demokrasi masih mewarnai kontestasi Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia. Meski banyak pihak yang menentang praktik tersebut, namun tidak membuat politik uang lenyap dari polemik demokrasi di negeri ini. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian campuran (*mixed methods*) yang akan mengungkap sejauh mana politik uang memengaruhi masyarakat dalam menentukan hak pilihnya pada Pemilihan Umum (Pemilu), baik Pemilihan Legislatif (Pileg) maupun Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). Data kuantitatif yang diperoleh dari hasil survei di beberapa daerah seperti Kabupaten Bone Bolango (Gorontalo), Kutai Kartanegara (Kalimantan Timur), Bintan dan Karimun (Kepulauan Riau), serta Jayapura (Papua), kemudian diramu menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan menyeret teori *patron-client* milik James Scott. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa dari beberapa sampel daerah tersebut, pola politik uang yang ditemui memiliki kesamaan dalam praktiknya. Secara empiris, dari penelitian ini, penulis berpendapat bahwa

mayoritas masyarakat memahami tentang ilegalitas praktik politik uang, namun hal tersebut tidak serta merta menjadikan praktik politik uang ditolak dalam pemilihan umum di daerah tersebut. Kondisi sosial ekonomi daerah juga tampaknya memegang peranan penting dalam keputusan masyarakat untuk menerima atau menolak praktik politik uang yang ada.

Artikel V: Studi ini menunjukkan pentingnya mengintegrasikan suara kaum muda ke dalam ranah politik dan mengakui potensi mereka untuk mendorong perubahan positif dalam demokrasi Indonesia. Dengan menyoroti hambatan dan kemungkinan bagi individu muda dalam prakarsa demokrasi digital, penelitian ini berupaya untuk mengadvokasi peningkatan keterlibatan kaum muda dalam membentuk masa depan politik Indonesia. Studi ini menyoroti peran penting yang dimainkan kaum muda dalam membentuk lanskap demokrasi Indonesia dan mengadvokasi sistem politik yang lebih inklusif dan representatif

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Lampiran- Lampiran



KEMENTERIAN AGAMA REPUBLIK INDONESIA
INSTITUT AGAMA ISLAM NEGERI SULTAN AMAI GORONTALO
LEMBAGA PENELITIAN DAN PENGABDIAN KEPADA MASYARAKAT (LP2M)

Kampus 2 Jl. Pone Kel., Pone, Kab. Gorontalo Telp. (0435) 822725

SURAT TUGAS

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Memberikan Tugas Kepada:

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2. Nama : Hendra Yasin, MSc
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Instansi : IAIN SULTAN AMAI GORONTALO

Untuk:

1. Melaksanakan Penelitian Tahun Anggaran 2024 dengan Judul, *"The 2024 General Election and Sustainable Deepening Democracy in Indonesia"* Di Gorontalo, Jakarta, Sulawesi Utara, Yogyakarta, Batam, dan Kalimantan Timur.
2. Penelitian dilaksanakan dari Tanggal 02 Mei s/d 02 November 2024.
3. Melaporkan hasil kegiatan penelitian tersebut kepada LP2M IAIN Sultan Amai Gorontalo.

Surat Tugas ini dibuat untuk dilaksanakan dan dipergunakan sebagaimana mestinya.

Gorontalo, 02 Mei 2024

Ketua LP2M


Dr. Nova E Muhammad, M.HI
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**KEMENTERIAN AGAMA REPUBLIK INDONESIA
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No. : 57/In.06/LP2M/TL.01/PP.00.9/05/2024 Gorontalo, 03 Syawal 1445 H.
Lamp : 1 Rangkap 02 Mei 2023 M.

Perihal : Permohonan Izin Penelitian

Yth,-

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Di,

Tempat

Assalamu Alaikum Wr. Wb

Sehubungan dengan penelitian saudara Mukrimin, Grad Dipl., MA Gov., PhD., Hendra Yasin, MA., dan Eka Putra B Santoso, MA dengan judul "*The 2024 General Election and Sustainable Deepening Democracy in Indonesia*" maka kami memohon kepada Bapak/Ibu untuk dapat memberikan izin dan pengambilan data pada objek penelitian. Surat Tugas dari LP2M sebagaimana terlampir.

Demikian surat permohonan ini, atas perhatiannya diucapkan banyak terima kasih.

Ketua LP2M

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