Emily Buck

Prof. Aaron Ibur

Modern International Politics

18 March, 2014

Outline for Lecture on Rational Choice

Should we approach International relations as a scientific study?

If so, how deep should we go into psychology?

Is a scientific approach to international relations actually the dominant approach?

Hollis & Smith

“It is not absurd to tackle the writing of history in the same spirit but the idea is notably less persuasive”- Hollis & Smith

“Although some philosophers have argued that history is implicitly as much a general science as physics or biology, there do seem to be stubbornly particular elements that we manage to understand without generalizing”-H&S

-States are run by people with thoughts, these people are the units in the system of IR.

-Do people think in ways too particular to make generalizations about how people think?

-The Games that Nations Play/ Game Theory

-what is rational for individuals, states or people, to do when you want to achieve a certain variable?

-rational agents do not have to be people, they can be states.

-ex. Robinson Crusoe- makes choices that bring him favourable outcomes.

-outcome is the sum of the strategies chosen by each agent- it becomes a game of probabilities of most favourable short and long term outcomes depending on need and want

-This helps create equilibrium because people end up having mutual interest in beneficial convention

-co-ordination game- players fall into rhythm and have no reason in particular to fall out of rhythm, generally end in consensual norms

-assurance game- mutual interest in subscribing to a norm for continued benefit/ survival. end in assurance norms

-ex. biological weaponry, assurance norm leads to more vulnerability than the consensual norm.  if USSR arms, US should arm.  If USSR does not arm… US should still arm. US should arm no matter what.  Same for the USSR.  Enables the best outcome for both players to arm. Prisoner’s dilemma.

-How deeply should we take this as a model of human affairs?

- Is this really a two person game?

-The more players, the more defectors can get away with, because they influence the whole less.  This means everyone can and might consider getting a “free ride”

-Ex. whale fishing.  Everyone making the rational choice leads to extinction, no whales.  

- is the game a one-shot, or is it continuing?  Does this make a difference?  Generally, yes.  What is the metagame/supergame?

-Is there a relevance to these abstractions/ probabilities if they are too small of parts of the supergame?

-Should we instinctively simplify into game theory?

-Locke’s initial society was already surprisingly orderly before they decided that they needed government.

-Can a Hobbes Leviathan emerge in a world run by the Prisoner’s Dilemma when the game holds back growth/ ends in tears?  Can assurance games happen?

-According to this, with no world government, we should be fighting pretty much all of the time.  According to Hobbes, there should be constant conflict.

-Should Game Theory be viewed as an analysis rather than a history?

-Game theory presents a good theory for how rational actors may act.

-Chicken game… who will back down first?

-escalation dominance- applied to cold war again.

-Kahn’s 44 rung ladder, leading from crisis to “spasm war”

-Rapoport, applies Game Theory to IR

-Schelling, accounts for international conflict

-axelrod & brahms- how selfish actors can learn to cooperate and take advantage of prisoner’s dilemma

-Chicken relies on both sides not believing the threat of annihilation from the other

-best outcome can elude the best individual choices

-heavily realist approach, but acknowledges morality

-game theory very concerned with the idea of bargaining

-fosters cooperation to achieve best outcomes

-upholds claim that government decision making is generally rational

-states are units within a national system, they are not monoliths in a vacuum

-analogies to other things in life to do with human nature ex. price wars

-problematic- many IR decisions are not made rationally, can be made by groups, can be short sighted, or coming from places of lacking information

-problematic- different units within a government can have different agendas and ideals. state is not one unit.

-problematic- the idea that the players understand the rules, can communicate, and see similar payoffs as valuable

-problematic- does not take into account personality and penchant for risk taking

-problematic- widely accepted tool, easy to break, people assume you may follow it. strategizing, metagaming.

-problematic- creates moral dilemmas

- problematic- two radically different ways of how game theory applies.  Should it be used for predictions or is it strictly analytical?  Can it be both?

-If we can’t use game theory… what can we use?  Bureaucratic Politics model.

-How can we solve issues with Rational Actor Theories?  What are the rationalizations used?  What is the perception that creates this rationalization?

-What’s more important?  “in order to” motives or “because of” motives?

-are actions based off of conscious reasons or conditioning? why do actors see the world the way they do?

-how do actors misperceive or make errors of judgement?  What is the psychology of this?

- what is a belief system and how does it affect the perception of rational choice for actors?

-units do not choose in a vacuum.  In the end, states are made of people with perceptions.

-The most common way of looking at the actions of states is rational actor model.

-organizational and bureaucratic process models expound and deepen the rational actor model

-organizational sees the actions of states as the products of an organized decision process from a large organization operating along standard procedures. may produce different outcome than declared intention.

-bureaucratic- more about bargaining than decision making

-ex. Iran Hostage Crisis as a compromise between the models

-are both models too mechanical?  Do they treat humans like puppets?

-for rational actor theory to be more applicable, it must be more flexible

-no way to calculate personality traits, ex. hawkishness.  What does that variable do?  Can we know?

-How do you incorporate personality into this equation?  You can use prior examples, but you’ll never be exact

-other minds- we cannot actually get inside another person’s head.  We can try, but we can’t.

-empathetic inferences can be good, but are we ever truly correct?

-in game theory, intentions are clear.  The deeper we dig into the psychology of intentions, the more difficult they are to infer.

-Chess is a more difficult game because of this.

-instead of intentions, we must look at deeper motives

-games have rules, understandings, and a forum in which to play.  Is international relations actually a game?

-does international relations actually have constantive rules?

-people break the rules often.  So, do they actually matter?  Are the rules real?

-isolation is a handicap not addressed in game theory

-motives hidden on the international floor can be found in the game within the state itself

-1986 US raid on Libya example

-three ways to determine intentions- behaviourism, universal set of motives, social approach/ anthropological

-Other minds theory causes expectations between states

-Other Minds Theory is important because it acknowledges that payoffs are not always instant, and motives are not always consistent or transparent

Lisa Martin

-People seem to think that Rational Actor Theory is the dominant form, that it has been formalized, and are criticizing it as such.

-Social science relies on theory, and there is nothing inherently wrong with utilizing rational actor theory

-It has become almost cliche to criticize rational actor theory

-But, she proves that it is not the dominant form- it is in some of the most popular journals, yet across the spectrum, it is actually in the minority

-How we address rational actor theory should reflect this, and it does not.