🇱🇺 Our Paper

Luxembourg Climate Youth Delegates Position Paper for COP31.

Written by Josephine Loschetter and Alexander Feil

After conducting a survey with 150+ young Luxembourgers, consulting with the youth parties of Luxembourg and engaging with young Luxembourgers at 5+ events, we here present the position of the Luxembourgish youth for COP31.

The points herein concern approaches to the COP31 negotiations and concrete actions the Ministry of Environment, Climate and Biodiversity should take within Luxembourg.

Key Points

  • Climate Finance:
  • Mobilise private finance in low-income countries by pricing risk on evidence, not perception;
  • Create a time-plan to phase out fossil fuel subsidies to avoid acting as an insurer of fossil fuel price volatility;

  • ETS & CBAM:
  • Support the Emission Trading System continuation proposal of the European Commission and oppose further delays;
  • Support the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and advocate for an earmarking of revenues for international climate finance;

  • Mitigation:
  • Advocate for a continuation of the Mitigation Work Programme built on sectoral cooperation and climate solution deployment rates;
  • Support the 35 by 35 goal of the COP31 presidency and announce the provision of solar panels for Luxembourgish schools as a flagship initiative;

  • Action for Climate Empowerment:
  • Integrate climate risk and climate mitigation in transport and energy into primary and secondary school curricula;
  • Expand the International Climate Finance Days beyond the centralised format to integrate academic institutions, public agencies, and young people active in climate into Luxembourg-wide Climate Finance Days.

Climate Finance

Mobilise private finance by pricing risk on evidence, not perception. GEMs data show that private lending in low-income countries defaults at 6.8%, against the 28.2% implied by S&P sovereign default rates¹, and that sovereign and sovereign-guaranteed lending has defaulted at just 0.79% since 1984². Overpricing this risk raises the cost of capital and leaves bankable climate projects unfinanced. Luxembourg should push for GEMs data to be built into MDB capital frameworks, rating methodologies and EU prudential rules. S&P’s own revision of its MDB rating criteria, informed in part by GEMs data, could unlock USD 600 to 800 billion in additional lending capacity³. Within its €320 million ICF Strategy 2026–2030⁴, Luxembourg should earmark a defined share for guarantees and first-loss capital, expand the Luxembourg-EIB Climate Finance Platform⁵, and add currency hedging, for example through TCX. Currency risk remains a key barrier to climate investment in emerging and developing economies, and hedging costs can fully offset the lower interest rates on hard-currency loans⁶.

Oppose any further rollback of EU sustainability rules. Omnibus I has narrowed the scope of the CSRD and CSDDD and removed the CSDDD obligation to adopt a climate transition plan.⁷ This takes away data financial institutions need to align their portfolios with Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement.⁸ This stop-and-go pattern undermines investor confidence. As Europe’s largest investment fund domicile,⁹ Luxembourg should also push for an SFDR revision¹⁰ with credible minimum criteria for product categories, so that the framework protects against greenwashing rather than legitimising it.

Phase out fossil fuel subsidies and avoid acting as an insurer of fuel prices. Fuel price support abolished in January 2025 has returned through the Resilienzpak 2026,¹¹ ¹² and diesel taxes remain almost 24% below the minimum level in neighbouring countries.¹¹ Luxembourg should publish an annual fossil fuel subsidy inventory and a binding 2030 phase-out plan, and let the Resilienzpak fuel measures expire as planned. Future price shocks should be met with a fixed, income-targeted reimbursement. Commercial fuel price risk should be carried by the market, through hedging and mandatory fuel cost indexation in freight contracts. ¹³

ETS and CBAM

Defend the Emission Trading System (ETS) in the form of the current Commission14 proposal and oppose any delays or reduction in the current targets and ambition. Carbon pricing is an indispensable policy tool to drive decarbonisation15. By delaying or questioning ETS regulations, the EU is creating insecurity in the market and undermining bankability of climate transition solutions.

Support the Commission’s proposal14 to close the private jet loopholes in the EU ETS for aviation. The ETS currently exempts commercial operators that fly fewer than 243 flights per four-month period, or that emit less than 10,000 tonnes of CO₂ a year. Non-commercial operators emitting under 1,000 tonnes a year are also exempt16. As a result, much of the private jet sector does not pay for the emissions it causes. Luxembourg should vocally support the Commission’s proposal to remove these exemptions.

Keep supporting the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and advocate for more countries to adopt a legislative carbon tax or carbon trading. The European Union has received wide criticism for an “arbitrary and discriminatory” CBAM21. The EU should engage with these parties in an understanding manner, stress the importance of pricing GHG emissions and advocate for a network of nations with carbon pricing.

Advocate for earmarking CBAM revenues for international climate transition finance. Revenues currently go into the national budgets17,18. Allocating them to climate solutions in partner countries would make the global climate transition more just and would create a bigger market for European technologies.

Mitigation

Advocate a continuation of the Mitigation Work Programme and use the opportunity to reshape it around sectoral and technological cooperation. The past negotiations have ended in a deadlock where the EU was not able to achieve a connection of NDCs to the Global Stocktake. The negotiations are still in the nature of a prisoners’ dilemma. Luxembourg should use this opportunity to reshape the mitigation work Programme such that it covers sectoral cooperation between countries where the deployment of climate solutions stands in the center, not emission reduction per country.

Support the 35 by 35 electrification goal of the Türkiye COP31 presidency and announce domestic flagship initiatives to achieve it19. Beyond the ambitious renewable energy subsidies, Luxembourg should engage to retrofit its schools and universities to be equipped with heat pumps and solar PVs.

Action for Climate Empowerment

Integrate education on climate mitigation and climate risk into Luxembourgish primary and secondary curricula.. In 2029, the PISA Climate Literacy20 assessment will evaluate students on their understanding and skills towards climate change. A collaboration between the MECB and the MENJE should develop methods to integrate nature and biodiversity impacts, transport and energy decarbonisation into established subjects in a coordinated manner. This would give Luxembourg a strong foundation for its ambition to become a climate finance hub and send a clear signal at the 2029 PISA evaluation.

Establish a Programme for high school student internships / workplace shadowing in climate and sustainability-related agencies in Luxembourg. Early exposure to working in the climate and sustainability sector can inspire champions of the next Luxembourgish generation and facilitate the creation of a climate-finance hub in Luxembourg. We have taken the first step in this direction by advocating for a student internship at LuxFLAG and the MECB should continue this as an established Programme.

Expand the International Climate Finance Days to a Luxembourg-wide Climate Finance Days. Luxembourg should build on the success of the inaugural 2026 edition and encourage more players to host panels, workshops and events around Luxembourg in 2027. It should particularly go beyond the centralised Climate Finance Days version, but encourage independently organised events in academic institutions, sustainability-related public agencies and other relevant societies. This would  bring the momentum of the London, New York or Brussels Climate Action Weeks to Luxembourg. Luxembourg should in this process enable young people and students to participate in these events and get direct exposure to Luxembourgish climate action.

Luxembourg should encourage all fellow EU member states to establish fully funded Climate Youth Delegate Programmes. The European Climate Youth Delegate position paper is signed by 17 countries, meaning that 10 are missing. Luxembourg could contribute to a complete representation by proposing a formal EU recommendation.

References

  1. GEMs Consortium. Multilateral Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions Default and Recovery Statistics: Private Lending 1994–2025.
  2. GEMs Consortium. Multilateral Development Banks and Development Finance Institutions Default and Recovery Statistics: Sovereign and Sovereign-guaranteed Lending 1984–2025.
  3. S&P Global Ratings. Revised Multilateral Lending Institutions criteria; October 2025. Reported in: “Devex Invested: How credit methodology could unlock billions for MDBs”. Devex; 21 October 2025. https://www.devex.com/news/devex-invested-how-credit-methodology-could-unlock-billions-for-mdbs-111150
  4. Ministère de l’Environnement, du Climat et de la Biodiversité. Luxembourg’s International Climate Finance Strategy 2026–2030. Luxembourg; June 2026. https://environnement.public.lu/dam-assets/actualites/2026/juin/lux-icf-strategy-26-30-final-eng.pdf
  5. European Investment Bank. Luxembourg-EIB Climate Finance Platform. https://www.eib.org/fr/products/blending/donor-partnerships/trust-funds/luxembourg-climate-finance-platform
  6. Ben Yahmed Z, Grant C, Pinko N. Managing Currency Risk to Catalyze Climate Finance. Climate Policy Initiative; 27 August 2024. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/managing-currency-risk-to-catalyze-climate-finance/
  7. Directive (EU) 2026/470 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 (Omnibus I). OJ L, 2026/470.
  8. United Nations. Paris Agreement. UNFCCC; 2015. Art. 2.1(c).
  9. EFAMA. Fact Sheet: November 2025. European Fund and Asset Management Association; December 2025. https://www.afg.asso.fr/app/uploads/2025/12/EFAMA-Fact-Sheet-November-2025.pdf 
  10. European Commission. Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 on sustainability-related disclosures in the financial services sector. COM(2025) 841 final; 20 November 2025.
  11. International Energy Agency. Luxembourg 2026: Energy Policy Review. Paris: IEA; June 2026. https://gouvernement.lu/dam-assets/images-documents/actualites/2026/06-juin/08-delles-birol/document/rapport-energy-policy-review.pdf
  12. Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg. Accord tripartite – Resilienzpak 2026. 8 June 2026. https://gouvernement.lu/fr/actualites/toutes_actualites/communiques/2026/06-juin/08-signature-accord-tripartite.html
  13. Code des transports (France), Articles L3222-1, L3222-2 and L3222-9 (automatic, mandatory revision of road freight prices to reflect fuel cost changes). Légifrance. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/id/LEGITEXT000023086525 
  14. European Commission. (2026). Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 as regards driving competitiveness and cost-effective decarbonisation (COM(2026) 616 final). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026PC0616 
  15. Gugler et al. (2021). Effectiveness of climate policies: Carbon pricing vs. subsidizing renewables. https://www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/science/article/pii/S0095069620301285 
  16. Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. (2003). Official Journal of the European Union, L 275, 32–46. http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/87/oj 
  17. European Commission. (2021). Proposal for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021) 570 final). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0570 
  18. ERCST. (2024). The Use of CBAM Revenues. https://ercst.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/20240625-CBAM-Revenues-v2-copy.pdf 
  19. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2026, June 9). COP31 Presidency announces new targets on global electrification, cutting waste, resilient cities; press conference transcript. https://unfccc.int/node/658682 
  20. OECD. (2025). PISA 2029 Climate Literacy. https://www.oecd.org/en/about/projects/PISA-2029-Climate-Literacy.html 
  21. IISD. (2026). The State of Border Carbon Adjustments 2026. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2026-07/state-of-border-carbon-adjustments-2026.pdf 

🇪🇺 Original EU CYD Text

Mitigation: Broad, radical and rapid changes

The past decade has been the warmest on record, with oceans also warming to alarming temperatures. As the critical threshold of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels is reached, potential tipping points are putting the wellbeing of people and ecosystems at paramount risk (IPCC, 2022). It is essential to bring down emissions radically and rapidly to limit the duration and extent of the overshoot above 1.5°C. Considerable acceleration of climate mitigation is needed on the European continent and beyond. The climate crisis is one of multidimensional, intersectional and systematic injustice. Children and young people, who are the least responsible, will have to live with the consequences the longest.

At this critical time, European leaders need to keep pushing for significantly stronger mitigation efforts. Furthermore, they must match their rhetoric on the world stage with action in their home countries.

Our key demands:         

  1. Phase out fossil fuels rapidly as part of EU climate legislation and the target to reduce emissions by 90% from 1990 levels by 2040. A phase-out needs to be implemented in a just, orderly and equitable manner and be consistent with the best available science. Clear end-dates, sectoral pathways and measurable milestones are essential to provide predictability, safeguard social fairness and ensure alignment with the 1.5°C threshold.
  • Use opportunities beyond the UNFCCC to strengthen alliances among ambitious countries and accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels. The First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels showed the value of such initiatives in building political momentum and cooperation. We encourage the EU to engage proactively in and support similar initiatives, and hope they will continue and strengthen in the future.
  • Work strategically with the COP30 and COP31 Presidencies on the transition away from fossil fuels. The EU should actively engage with and support the COP30 Presidency’s Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, helping to turn it into a strong basis for international cooperation and accelerated action. The EU should also work with the COP31 Presidency to carry this work forward and ensure that progress is reflected in COP31 outcomes, including the cover decision.
  1. Support a continuation of the Mitigation Work Programme that scales up mitigation ambition and supports concrete implementation. It should help to bridge the gap between current pathways and the pledged 1.5°C threshold. Dialogues could be held on technological cooperation between states and the transition away from fossil fuels.
  2. Strengthen long-term climate planning and implementation. Science-based, credible and coherent long-term planning is essential to translate the Paris Agreement and Global Stocktake into action and ensure that climate commitments deliver real emissions reductions.
  • Support and strengthen NDCs. The EU should support and finance the implementation of NDCs while pushing for greater ambition where current commitments fall short. COP31 should provide space to address the remaining ambition gap and ensure that pledges translate into emissions reductions by 2035.
  • Update and strengthen LT-LEDS. LT-LEDS should include clear interim milestones and sectoral pathways to guide the transition. The EU should lead by example by updating its LT-LEDS in line with 1.5°C and a net-zero 2040 pathway, while being cautious on the reliance on carbon removals and carbon capture and storage.

  1. Use the Second Global Stocktake  (GST2) to strengthen implementation and ambition. The process should draw on the latest available science, including relevant outputs from the IPCC’s Seventh Assessment Cycle, and assess progress in implementing the outcomes of GST1. This should include building on the COP30 Presidency Roadmaps for transitioning away from fossil fuels and halting and reversing deforestation, using them to inform concrete implementation strategies and enhanced climate action.
  2. Adopt a cautious approach to international carbon credits concerning the so-called 'flexibilities'. European countries should prioritise a reduction of domestic emissions to reach their climate targets. Still, Europe must establish clear guardrails and high-quality criteria for carbon credits to preserve domestic mitigation efforts and environmental integrity in hard-to-abate sectors. Further details can be found in section “Climate Finance”.
  3. Acknowledge that climate mitigation is grounded in existing international obligations. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice has confirmed that states have a duty to protect the climate system according to common but differentiated responsibilities, and that fossil fuel developments may violate international law. European climate targets and policies should reflect Europe's fair share, the highest possible ambition and its historical responsibility. Crucially, international law puts forward the principle of intergenerational equity and requires the protection of human rights.
  4. Halt and reverse deforestation by 2030. Forest protection is indispensable for achieving the 1.5°C threshold and safeguarding biodiversity and ecosystem stability. The EU must fully and effectively implement the EU Deforestation Regulation and the Nature Restoration Regulation.
  • Scale up nature-based solutions as part of mitigation strategies, including forest conservation and ecosystem restoration of wetlands and peatlands, while ensuring they complement, and never substitute, rapid fossil fuel phase-out and real emissions reductions.
  • Collaborate strategically with the Brazilian Presidency to operationalise the Presidency Roadmap for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030, launched at COP30, ensuring concrete timelines, accountability mechanisms, and alignment with established climate targets.
  • Ensure forest finance that is rights-based, safeguarding the rights of Indigenous Peoples. Communities must be respected, and biodiversity and ecosystem resilience need to be strengthened.

Climate finance and carbon markets: accelerate implementation

Climate finance is pivotal to justice, resilience, and our survival. As the climate crisis intensifies, the cost of inaction is outpacing even the most ambitious financial goals. Limiting global warming to 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels could reduce the global economic costs of climate change by two-thirds. If warming continues to 3ºC, global GDP will decrease by up to 10 percent, with the worst impacts in less developed countries. The money is there, but it is not flowing where it is needed most.

Europe has both a responsibility and an opportunity to lead. Grant-based climate finance must be scaled up rapidly to support resilience, implement NDCs and NAPs, and enable a just transition that protects those most vulnerable to the impacts of the climate crisis. This includes ending financial flows to fossil fuels, aligning all finance with the Paris Agreement, and making funding truly accessible for frontline communities. Besides this, we need to heavily accelerate the mobilisation of private finance for both mitigation and adaptation measures. The path ahead is clear: redistribute resources, remove systemic barriers, and reform the global financial system - not tomorrow, but today.

Our key demands:

  1. Enter the climate finance negotiations with a focus on the acceleration of implementing climate action.
  • Ensure that finance reaches people and targets. Climate finance requires a clear plan to mobilise transparent, predictable and accessible funding from public, private, bilateral, and multilateral sources. Local and marginalised communities must be empowered to access funds, with a special focus on women, Indigenous Peoples, children, youth, and persons with disabilities. The EU should push for debt relief mechanisms, including debt restructuring and forgiveness, to prevent the deepening of fiscal crises.
  • Establish and enforce a strong and measurable way to 1.3T. There must be a clear pathway to $1.3 trillion in climate finance per year by 2035. This is crucial to channel finance toward resilience and low-carbon development in an equitable, efficient, and accountable way. This pathway should be supported by the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap.
  • Mobilise scalable and innovative finance mechanisms:
  • Boost capital for Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to unlock private investment at scale. MDBs can leverage every €1 into €4–10, making them crucial actors in closing funding gaps without deepening debt.
  • Implement carbon pricing in international aviation. A fair, progressive carbon tax could generate up to $200 billion annually while driving decarbonisation. Additional levies on luxury air travel (business/first class and private jets) could generate further revenues in excess of $80 billion annually.
  • Introduce a coordinated tax on crude oil exports via an international 'Oil and Climate Club', reallocating revenues to climate action. A $5 per-barrel tax on 25% of global oil exports could yield as much as $18,4 billion annually.
  • Expand debt-for-nature swaps to refinance existing debt while protecting ecosystems and supporting a just transition. It is an investment in both nature and prosperity. Europe must warrant the authenticity and good faith of these swaps, considering the local circumstances and livelihoods of the populations affected.
  • Establish a mandatory carbon market, ensuring high environmental and social standards and consistent global participation. This would drive private sector investment and could provide funding for nature-based solutions.
  • When distributing climate finance, ensure that flows are based on actual on-the-ground risk, instead of perceived risk. The EIB’s Global Emerging Markets Risk database suggests that low middle income countries have an average default rate of 2.96% for public lending, while the corresponding rate for private lending is 3.79%. Sovereign- and sovereign-guaranteed lending  for low-income has an average for low income countries stands at 1.11%.
  • The tracking system of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance must ensure transparency regarding funding types (grants, loans, guarantees), areas (adaptation, loss and damage, mitigation) and recipients (countries, NGOs, local initiatives). In addition, qualitative tracking mechanisms, such as those focusing on gender or youth, would be desirable.
  • Work on Article 2.1(c) must continue beyond COP30. Following three years of the dialogue Programmeme, the focus should now shift to concrete, negotiable targets. The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) must apply, and industrialised countries must take the lead with concrete actions. A key element of the implementation of 2.1(c) must be the immediate divestment from fossil fuels in industrialised countries and, in the near future, in non-Annex countries as well.

○ Mobilise private finance: Private capital needs to deliver over half of the $1.3 trillion target. But risk perceptions, especially in developing countries, still block investment. The EU must:

  • Expand de-risking instruments such as guarantees, credit enhancements, and blended finance through public institutions.
  • Align public and private investments through country platforms that support integrated climate and development goals.
  • Use public policy to crowd in private finance, including regulatory clarity, long-term signals, and transparency mandates.
  • Distribute finance from multilateral funds according to global and country specific needs while factoring in a recipient country’s ability to provide finance on their own. Countries with less financial means to facilitate projects countering climate change should be prioritised.
  1. Align all financial flows with the Paris Agreement: Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement calls for aligning all financial flows, public and private, with low-emission, climate-resilient development. More than a decade later, this remains unrealised. Despite rhetorical climate leadership, the EU is backsliding. The recent postponement of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and weakening of the Corporate Sustainable Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) undermine the EU’s ability to align financial flows with climate and social goals. These actions weaken transparency, ignore climate and environmental risks in corporate supply chains, and delay the transition towards a sustainable economy. The EU should:
  • Mandate climate alignment of financial flows. All financial actors, including private banks, asset managers, insurers, and public finance institutions, must be required to disclose and demonstrate climate alignment of their portfolios.
  • End the stop-and-go practice of corporate sustainability policies within the EU. Clear targets, transition support and restored ambition are essential to implement Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement.
  • Together with other parties, adopt a clear roadmap to implement Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement in its national capacities, including milestones, accountability mechanisms, and timelines. The EU should lead in pushing this forward, using its influence in international forums to establish a robust and enforceable system.
  1. Legally end all fossil fuel subsidies by 2030 that do not support a just transition. Fossil fuel subsidies distort markets, lock in emissions, and block the clean energy transition. Paragraph 427 of the ICJ Climate Change Advisory Opinion emphasizes that they can constitute an internationally wrongful act following. In 2023, EU fossil fuel subsidies totalled over €111 billion, with just three countries accounting for the majority. Despite commitments to phase them out, most Member States have failed to act. Fossil fuel subsidy reform is a financial and geopolitical necessity. Eliminating them would free up hundreds of billions in public funds to finance energy independence, accelerate the clean transition, and support those most affected by climate change. Therefore, the EU must:
  • Establish legally binding EU-wide phase-out plans by 2030, with national roadmaps and transparent reporting;
  • Reallocate funds to clean energy, energy efficiency, and direct support for vulnerable households;
  • End tax exemptions for high-emission sectors such as aviation;
  • Strengthen EU oversight, with the European Commission holding Member States accountable through stricter monitoring and enforcement;
  • Make sure all Member States join the Coalition on Phasing Out Fossil Fuel Incentives Including Subsidies (COFFIS).

Article 6 & carbon markets

  • Acknowledge the significant gaps, particularly in regards to ensuring permanence and upholding human rights, in the usage of Article 6.2 and 6.4 due to the high costs, experience with the CDM and the voluntary market, the neo colonial logic and measurement problems.
  • Apply the quality criteria set out in Article 6.4 also to Article 6.2.
  • Ensure the participation of partner regions, particularly young people, smallholder farmers and Indigenous Peoples, without financial, linguistic or bureaucratic barriers.
  • Establish binding safeguards for biodiversity, human rights and land rights. Obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and introduce accessible grievance mechanisms.
  • Articles 6.2 and 6.4 may only be used to raise the level of ambition in both partner countries. They should neither be considered a flexibility mechanism nor supplementary climate finance.
  • Projects must be consistent with national climate targets (NDCs/NAPs) and food system strategies. The NDCs should make a clear distinction between domestic mitigation efforts, domestic carbon sinks and international offsetting. Scenarios for phasing out international offsetting must be presented.
  • Guarantee transparent governance and reporting to ensure accountability to civil society.

Action for Climate Empowerment: A New Action Plan

Children and youth (under the age of 24), comprising 40% of the world's population, suffer disproportionately from climate change. Extreme weather events, crop failures and heat waves all negatively impact children’s rights (right to health, right to life). Presently, one in four deaths among children under five stems from adverse environments. Climate-induced challenges impede long-term development, especially for marginalised children and youth facing discrimination and inequality. Decisions made within UNFCCC processes will affect the lives of children, young people and all future generations. Children and youth in all their diversity have been at the forefront of climate activism and pushing for inevitable climate action in line with the best available science and have a right to it as the ICJ affirmed. Intergenerational equity is a foundational principle that must be upheld through climate action as well as through meaningful participation at all levels.

Our key demands:

  1. Integrate climate education and disaster preparedness into curricula at all levels and scales, empowering teachers with the necessary resources to ensure accessibility across languages and regions. Education must provide children and youth with concrete tools applicable to the future, focussing on green skills and jobs. In this pursuit, enable and fund both formal and informal forms of climate and environmental education through dedicated EU-funding streams to national, regional and local levels.
  2. Enable fully funded, youth-led and representative UNFCCC youth delegate Programmemes for every EU Member State institutionalised at the latest by 2029. This should be mandated by a formal EU recommendation. The EU should establish regular and meaningful bilateral meetings between the network of UNFCCC youth delegates and all EU Heads of Delegations during COPs, SBs and internal EU decision-making processes.
  3. Provide funding, capacity building, and other forms of support to ensure the presence of UN Youth Delegates in every country, building on the recommendation on youth participation in the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (para. 52), while encouraging collaboration among youth delegates. The presidency should continue facilitating data collection on existing youth delegate Programmemes to promote knowledge-sharing and transparency across Parties. European states, in particular, should support child and youth participation and representation in countries that currently lack the resources or structures to do so.
  4. Recognising that climate disinformation poses a serious threat to the levels of ambition and implementation of climate action, strengthen information integrity to ensure the implementation of all six ACE elements. We therefore urge all Parties to put mechanisms in place that prevent misinformation on climate issues. (Political) leaders should unite their populations in the fight against climate change by, for example, launching public information campaigns to counter misinformation, (social) media literacy training, supporting local public forums and discussions and creating legislation that require social media platforms to moderate and fact-check their communities. We therefore urge all EU-member states to join the Global Initiative for Information Integrity on Climate Change and sign the UN-declaration for Information Integrity on Climate Change.
  5. Ensure that EU positions are informed and decided by the lived realities of marginalised children and youth in all their diversity, such as Indigenous Peoples, People of Colour, migrant and diaspora communities; girls, women and non-binary persons; persons with disabilities; and other disproportionately affected groups, acknowledging the diverse range of viewpoints and expertise. Thus, Member States should meaningfully support, consult and engage with child and youth organisations, constituencies and other civil society organisations that represent the abovementioned groups, in line with the work under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement, known as Action for Empowerment (ACE).
  6. Include an assessment of impacts on children in future NDCs and work towards child-sensitive NDCs. This includes mentioning children as a particularly vulnerable group as well as agents of change, deploying adaptation measures that improve educational infrastructure, health infrastructure, participation in decision-making and other measures.
  7. Actively follow up on the recommendations from the expert dialogues on disproportionate impacts of climate change on children in all the negotiations under the UNFCCC, as well as mandate a follow-up expert dialogue and a possible COP31 mandate to strengthen attention to the disproportionate impacts of climate change on children across relevant workstreams.
  8. Actively push for the primary consideration of children’s needs across all workstreams and outcomes. All European states who lack an ACE-focal point should appoint one, and through this role facilitate structural consultations with children and youth (organisations) in their country.
  9. Include effects of climate change on children and young people as a focus topic in the next IPCC reporting cycle.
  10. Foster understanding of policymaking processes by making them more transparent and inclusive for all affected people, including children and young people in all their diversity.
  11. Prevent disproportionate measures against environmental human rights defenders and strongly condemn the criminalisation of peaceful climate activists. The EU should support existing agreements on the protection of environmental defenders, and push for an agreement with the same purpose within the EU.
  12. The Presidency Youth Climate Champion (PYCC) should be a facilitator of the children and youth who are engaged in the UNFCCC processes and be a bridge for children and youth voices to the Presidency. However, the role is not meant to represent young people or speak on their behalf. It is a position within the COP Presidency, meaning it reflects and supports the Presidency’s agenda rather than independently advocating for children and youth, and therefore should always be referred to as the Presidency Youth Climate Champion to indicate this relation.
  13. Create a new system using a better structured reporting cycle for the six ACE pillars in the ACE Action Plan. While the Priority Areas have clear and measurable deliverables, progress on the six ACE pillars are merely measured via the submissions for the annual reports. In the new ACE Action Plan we must establish clear and measurable goals for the six pillars.
  14. Establish a better annual reporting mechanism, e.g. through templates and guidance for submissions to share progress, best-practices and experiences undertaken in the implementation of the six ACE pillars in national contexts. Make sure that ACE activities in different national contexts, such as reports on participatory processes for climate policy, new sustainable study Programmes or initiatives undertaken by, inter alia, children, youth, persons with disabilities and women in all their diversity, are easily accessible for all Parties to increase knowledge-sharing.