Emails, Phil Novack, press secretary, U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz, Sept. 8 and 15-16, 2015
From: "Selby, Gardner (CMG-Austin)"
Date: Tuesday, September 8, 2015 at 5:14 PM
To: Phil Novack <phil_novack@cruz.senate.gov>
Subject: Iran deal inquiry for a fact check
Phil:
Sen. Cruz said in Houston the other day that the Iran deal “trusts the Iranians to inspect themselves.” He said this was equivalent to law enforcement calling Tony Montana (in the movie “Scarface”) and asking Tony if he has drugs and Tony saying I don’t got no drugs.
Video of Cruz’s remarks were posted here.
Can you guide us on how Cruz reached his conclusion about the deal trusting the Iranians to inspect themselves?
I hope to zero in on this by the end of the day Wednesday. Thanks.
g.
W. Gardner Selby
Reporter / News
Austin American-Statesman
PolitiFact Texas
5:07 p.m.
AP leaked one of the side arrangements between the IAEA and Iran in regards to inspecting Parchin. Iran, as a courtesy, will provide the IAEA with photos, videos and environmental samples of certain sites at Parchin. Iran controlling what evidence the IAEA will inspect is fundamentally unserious and not a legitimate verification regime.
http://news.yahoo.com/text-draft-agreement-between-iaea-iran-193603978.html
1. Iran will provide to the Agency photos of the locations, including those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
2. Iran will provide to the Agency videos of the locations, including those identified in paragraph 3 below, which would be mutually agreed between Iran and the Agency, taking into account military concerns.
3. Iran will provide to the Agency 7 environmental samples taken from points inside one building already identified by the Agency and agreed by Iran, and 2 points outside of the Parchin complex which would be agreed between Iran and the Agency.
4. The Agency will ensure the technical authenticity of the activities referred to in paragraphs 1-3 above. Activities will be carried out using Iran's authenticated equipment, consistent with technical specifications provided by the Agency, and the Agency's containers and seals.
5. The above mentioned measures would be followed, as a courtesy by Iran, by a public visit of the Director General, as a dignitary guest of the Government of Iran, accompanied by his deputy for safeguards.
6. Iran and the Agency will organize a one-day technical roundtable on issues relevant to Parchin.
From: "Selby, Gardner (CMG-Austin)"
Date: Thursday, September 10, 2015 at 3:05 PM
To: Phil Novack
Subject: Following up
Cruz said in Houston that under the overall deal before Congress, Iran is generally trusted to inspect itself; he didn’t mention or single out the one site described in the AP story nor the described side agreement.
Is there information you can offer for his speech claim?
THANKS.
g.
From: Novack, Phil (Cruz)
Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2015 4:38 PM
To: Selby, Gardner (CMG-Austin)
Subject: Re: Following up
Right — he referred to the deal generally, and you asked me to specify the part of the deal to which he was referring. I have specified below the specific part of the deal to which he was referring.
Point to me where in here he says “the overall deal before Congress.” He only refers to it as “this deal”
http://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2431
“Fact number one: Iran is today the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism.
“Fact number two: If this deal goes through, over $100 billion will flow directly to Iran, to the Ayatollah Khomeini, and to the mullahs.
“And fact number three: If that occurs, billions of those dollars will go directly to Hamas, to Hezbollah, to the Houthis, to radical Islamic terrorists across the globe who use those billions to murder Americans, to murder Israelis, and to murder Europeans.
“Those are the facts, and it makes no sense when you have a nation led by a theocratic zealot who pledges 'Death to America', for us to allow a hundred billion dollars to go to fund the Ayatollah carrying through on that promise.
“The second major consequence of this deal going through is that it abandons four American hostages languishing in Iranian prisons. Among those hostages is Pastor Saeed Abedini, an American citizen sentenced to eight years in prison in Iran for the crime of preaching the gospel. Sadly, this deal does nothing to free four American citizens, hostages in Iran.
But the third consequence of this deal, and in many ways the most dangerous is that it facilitates and accelerates Iran's acquiring nuclear weapons. There are elements of this deal that on their face are utterly indefensible. This deal provides in effect a 24-days notice period before any facility is inspected. Now, I would encourage any defender of this deal to articulate any coherent rationale for giving Iran a 24-days advance notice. You'll recall early on the President promised anytime, anywhere inspections. That's become 24-days advance notice. Imagine in the domestic law enforcement context. Imagine if Texas passed a law before any search warrant can be executed on a drug lord, that drug lord will get 24-days notice of the property needing to be searched. That will be a rule designed to guarantee that every search comes up with nothing. I mean even the dumbest drug lord on earth with 24-days notice would know enough to make sure there was nothing to find. But as ridiculous as that is, that's not the end of this so-called inspections regime. Because in that scenario, even after 24-days, you actually send in law enforcement to execute the search warrant. In this case, this deal doesn't send in American inspectors. It doesn't send international inspectors. This deal trusts the Iranians to inspect themselves. Let me repeat that. This deal trusts the Iranians to inspect themselves. Let's go back to the drug dealer analogy. Have any of you seen the movie 'Scarface'? This is the equivalent of law enforcement picking up the phone and calling Tony Montana and saying, 'Hey Tony, you got any drugs?' 'I don't got no drugs.' 'Okay, Tony.' That's essentially the Iranian nuclear inspections regime.
On Sep 10, 2015, at 7:01 PM, Selby, Gardner (CMG-Austin) wrote:
Are you saying that when he repeatedly talked about “this deal” in Houston, the one Congress was going to vote on, he meant only the side deal described by the AP?
g.
7:05 p.m.
Sept. 10, 2015
No, he was referring to the entire deal. The side deal, reported by AP, is just one part of the whole, and it is the part that backs up Cruz's assertion that the deal trusts the Iranians to inspect themselves. That is the assertion for which you asked me to provide evidence.
It is in plain text that this side deal, agreed to by Iran and the IAEA but for some reason NOT provided to Congress, calls for Iran to inspect itself and provide its own evidence. This is why I'm being specific about your phrase "before Congress." The confidential side deal is not technically "before Congress" right now but clearly it is very much part of the entire deal that Iran agreed to.
The story states: "Two officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed to The Associated Press that this draft does not differ from the final, confidential agreement between the IAEA and Iran." Perhaps you should be fact checking the AP, if that is not clear enough for you.
From: "Selby, Gardner (CMG-Austin)"
Date: Tuesday, September 15, 2015 at 12:38 PM
To: Phil Novack
Subject: Reuters story and query
Phil:
This news story about the Parchin inspections came out the other day.
Is there anything more that the senator relied on for his claim about Iran inspecting itself?
g.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/us-iran-nuclear-parchin-exclusive-idUSKCN0RB2D420150911
Top News | Fri Sep 11, 2015 4:39pm EDT
Exclusive: Iran to take Parchin military site samples with IAEA present - diplomats
PARIS/UNITED NATIONS | By John Irish and Louis Charbonneau
United Nations inspectors will be present with Iranian technicians as they take samples from a key military site, two Western diplomats said, undercutting an objection by U.S. Republicans to the nuclear deal between Iran and world powers.
The diplomats were familiar with details of a confidential arrangement between Iran and the U.N. nuclear watchdog for inspections at the Parchin site, where some countries suspect nuclear weapons-related tests may have taken place.
Iran has denied that allegation, but agreed to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its suspect sites as part of the historic July deal in exchange for an easing of international sanctions.
An August report by the Associated Press, in its original version, said the agreement on Parchin suggested that IAEA inspectors would be barred from the site and would have to rely on information and environmental samples provided by Iranian technicians. The AP later published what it said was the text of an early draft of the agreement that remains unconfirmed.
The report was seized on by Republicans in the U.S. Congress as proof that President Barack Obama's administration gave in to Iran on the sensitive issue of inspections to check on Tehran's suspected ambition to build a nuclear bomb.
Iran says its nuclear program is entirely peaceful.
IAEA chief Yukiya Amano rejected the report as "a misrepresentation", though he declined to provide details of what some Republicans described as a "secret side deal" between Iran and the IAEA on Parchin. Amano said on Aug. 20 that the arrangements with Iran were technically sound.
The signed agreement between Iran and the IAEA has not been disclosed publicly.
But the Western diplomats told Reuters that while Iranians would be allowed to take the samples themselves, the agency's inspectors would be physically present and would have full access to their activity.
"There was a compromise so the Iranians could save face and the IAEA could ensure it carried out its inspections according to their strict requirements," said one of the diplomats. Inspections at the Parchin site, which is about 30 km (19 miles) southeast of Tehran, would by carried out by mixed IAEA and Iranian teams coupled with cameras overlooking and recording the process, the other diplomat said.
"The IAEA will be present when the Iranians take the samples (at Parchin). This approach to managed access is something that's fairly standard in the IAEA toolbox. Nothing to worry about really," the diplomat said.
"Unfortunately there have been distortions and inaccuracies in the media that made it look like Iran would simply inspect itself. That's not how it works," the diplomat added.
Neither the IAEA nor Iran's U.N. missions in New York or Vienna had an immediate response to queries about the Parchin inspection arrangement. Reza Najafi, Iran's envoy to the IAEA, said on Thursday that Iran will not permit leaks of details about its arrangements with the IAEA.
DEAL OPPONENTS SEIZED ON REPORT
Without IAEA confirmation that Iran is keeping promises enshrined in the landmark July 14 nuclear accord, Tehran will not be granted much-needed relief from sanctions.
Under the deal, most sanctions on Iran will be lifted in exchange for curbs on its nuclear program that will remain in place for at least 10 years.
According to data given to the IAEA by some member countries, Iran may have conducted hydrodynamic tests at Parchin in the past to assess how specific materials react under high pressure, such as in a nuclear explosion. The AP story revised its story several times. A corrected, three-paragraph version of the story currently on its web site says that Iran will be allowed to use its own experts to inspect Parchin, with no mention of the IAEA's role.
Republicans repeatedly cited the AP report in recent weeks as they tried to muster enough votes kill the nuclear deal in Congress. Their efforts effectively failed on Thursday when Senate Democrats blocked a resolution disapproving of the pact, clearing the way for the deal's implementation.
Republican Senator Susan Collins, who was one of very few Republicans some observers thought might support the nuclear deal, referred to the report in her Senate speech this week announcing she would vote against it.
"According to press reports, the Iranians themselves would also be responsible for photographs and environmental sampling of Parchin, a large military installation where nuclear work is suspected to have been conducted and may still be underway,” she said.
Republican Senator and presidential candidate Lindsey Graham wrote to Secretary of State John Kerry requesting information on the AP report.
"Allowing the Iranians to inspect their own nuclear sites, particularly a notorious military site, is like allowing the inmates to run the jail," said Graham.
Under a roadmap accord Iran reached with the IAEA alongside the July 14 political agreement, the Islamic Republic is required to give the IAEA enough information about its past nuclear program to allow the Vienna-based watchdog to write a report on the issue by year-end.
Iran has long stonewalled an IAEA investigation into the possible military aspects of its past nuclear activities, relating mostly to the period before 2003, saying intelligence spurring the agency's investigation was fabricated.
"The IAEA has no fears that its requirements will be met," said the first diplomat. "That's not the issue. The real issue is whether Iran satisfies our concerns by year-end. At the moment they seem to be complying."
(Additional reporting by Shadia Nasralla in Vienna, Patricia Zengerle in Washington; editing by Stuart Grudgings)
From: Phil Novack
Date: Tuesday, September 15, 2015 at 3:42 PM
To: "Selby, Gardner (CMG-Austin)"
Subject: Re: Reuters story and query
Gardner…
...with regard to the question about inspections below, this point is addressed more broadly in Sen. Cruz’s NRO oped, noting that: 1) Certain “military” facilities are off-limits to inspectors, although they could be used to conduct research on nuclear-weapons technology; and 2) For all other facilities, Iran gets 24 days’ notice before any inspections (which ensures maximum time to remove any evidence).
But I will also address it more specifically here. You now have one story from the AP and one from Reuters, both quoting anonymous people who claim knowledge of the side deal and who are making completely opposite claims about who will inspect Iran’s sites.
The more important question you should be investigating is WHY Congress has not been able to view these side deals in the first place. That would settle the question of what exactly is in the side deals extremely quickly. What is the Administration and Iran trying to hide? Why can’t Congress and the American people know what is in these side deals, which were clearly needed in order to get Iran’s agreement to the overall deal? On this, Cruz references a column by Fred Fleitz, quoted below, that is salient with respect to the sham inspections regime set up by this deal … but without Congress being able to view the side deals, how can we really know?
"Senator Risch suggested in his remarks that the IAEA would remotely monitor the Iranians’ taking of samples by video. But even if there were a reliable way to ensure that Iranian “inspectors” were carefully monitored, took samples from locations identified by the IAEA, and provided these samples directly to IAEA officials, the process would still be a sham, since it would still place unacceptable limitations on IAEA inspections. To be meaningful, IAEA inspectors must have unfettered access to suspect facilities and be free to take samples anywhere, using whatever collection devices they choose. Only by collecting samples at locations and with methods that Iranian officials may not have anticipated can inspectors reliably find possible evidence of nuclear-weapons-related work that Iran tried to clean up.” This quote cited from:
Thanks,
Phil
3:25 p.m.
Sept. 15, 2015
One more thing: Sen. Cruz has participated in multiple intelligence briefings -- both classified and unclassified -- about this Iranian deal. Without revealing the details of those briefings, they are entirely consistent with the public reports that the so-called inspections regime simply entrusts Iran with inspecting itself.
From: "Selby, Gardner (CMG-Austin)" <wgselby@statesman.com>
Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2015 at 1:11 PM
To: Phil Novack
Subject: Following up
Phil:
If there is anything published or otherwise public before Cruz made his statement in Houston that he relied on beyond what you’ve shared already, let me know?
We are hearing back from academic experts that Iran does not inspect itself under the agreement or even under the Parchin side deal, if that’s the right description.
Was there language in the July 14 agreement that contributed to Cruz’s conclusion?
We spotted these sections:
Iran will permit the IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measurement and electronic
seals which communicate their status within nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors, as well as
other IAEA approved and certified modern technologies in line with internationally
accepted IAEA practice. Iran will facilitate automated collection of IAEA measurement
recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending to IAEA working
space in individual nuclear sites.
Iran will make the necessary arrangements to allow for a long-term IAEA presence,
including issuing long-term visas, as well as providing proper working space at nuclear
sites and, with best efforts, at locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated
IAEA inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment.
Iran will increase the number of designated IAEA inspectors to the range of 130-150
within 9 months from the date of the implementation of the JCPOA, and will generally
allow the designation of inspectors from nations that have diplomatic relations with Iran,
consistent with its laws and regulations.
I hope to complete our fact check soon. Thanks again.
g.
W. Gardner Selby
Reporter / News
Austin American-Statesman
PolitiFact Texas
3:15 p.m.
Sept. 16, 2015
…
Iran will be providing the IAEA with a host of initial information on inventory and production, and the IAEA will be using this as a baseline to determine future action. This does not mean the information Iran initially reports is complete. In these circumstances, we are trusting Iran to give us necessary information:
O. TRANSPARENCY RELATED TO URANIUM ORE CONCENTRATE (UOC)
68. Iran will permit the IAEA to monitor, through agreed measures that will include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years, that all uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source, is transferred to the uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any other future uranium conversion facility which Iran might decide to build in Iran within this period.
69. Iran will provide the IAEA with all necessary information such that the IAEA will be able to verify the production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from any other source for 25 years.
R. CENTRIFUGE COMPONENT MANUFACTURING TRANSPARENCY
79. Iran and the IAEA will take the necessary steps for containment and surveillance on centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows for 20 years.
In this context:
80. Iran will provide the IAEA with an initial inventory of all existing centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows and subsequent reports on changes in such inventory and will permit the IAEA to verify the inventory by item counting and numbering, and through containment and surveillance, of all rotor tubes and bellows, including in all existing and newly produced centrifuges.
80. Iran will declare all locations and equipment, namely flow-forming machines, filament winding machines and mandrels that are used for production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows, and will permit the IAEA to implement continuous monitoring, including through containment and surveillance on this equipment, to verify that this equipment is being used to manufacture centrifuges only for the activities specified in this JCPOA.
B. ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING
15. Iran will inform the IAEA about the inventory and the production of the HWPP and will allow the IAEA to monitor the quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy water produced, including through IAEA visits, as requested, to the HWPP.
4:50 p.m.
Sept. 16, 2015
Gardner — response comments highlighted in red below in your reply. And the problem with the claims of verification you’re citing is this: For specific instances, it’s first time around, trust Iran, second time around, it’s in IAEA’s hands. The IAEA is relying upon Iran for a correct accounting of production amounts and machines from known sites. There is no consideration of undocumented instances. One cannot create a benchmark when you don’t know where you are starting.
From: "Selby, Gardner (CMG-Austin)" <wgselby@statesman.com>
Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2015 at 4:21 PM
To: Phil Novack
Subject: RE: Following up
Thanks. Here is what we’ve heard back:
Jeffrey Lewis, publisher of armscontrolwonk.com referred to the reported Parchin agreement, saying by email: “This is a one-time managed access to a single facility by the IAEA. It is not the procedure for any other inspection. It is specially designed to answer questions relating to work carried out at this site between 1996-2002.”
Justin Logan, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, told us by email it’s worth keeping in mind it takes ample “fissile material” to make a nuclear weapon and “large infrastructure.” At Iran’s known facilities where uranium enrichment is taking or has taken place, Logan said, IAEA inspectors will be present and have daily access. And unknown facilities or suspicious sites?
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) disputes this:
We have assessed the types and quantities of uranium releases from gas centrifuge plants as part of official safeguards studies and evaluated many cases where environmental sampling was used to uncover undeclared activities or failed to do so. Based on this work, we assess that Iran could likely move and disguise many small scale nuclear and nuclear-weaponrelated activities. These include:
· High explosive testing related to nuclear weapons;
· Small centrifuge manufacturing plant;
· Small centrifuge plant that uses advanced centrifuges (in this case, we assume a facility of tens of, or at most a few hundred, centrifuges organized in specially designed facilities suitable for rapid removal and with a containment system.).
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Verification_of_Iran_JCPOA_Final.pdf
By phone, Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, which has encouraged Congress to support the agreement, called Cruz’s claim an “absolutely incorrect” mischaracterization. Kimball said that even at the Parchin site, the IAEA will provide information “about where they want to sample at the site, which areas they want to soil or surface samples to see if there is individual radioactive material in these areas.” Then, Kimball said, “the Iranian specialists in the presence of the IAEA inspectors will actually do the scooping, the swiping.” After that, Kimball said, whatever is collected will be “put into packages the IAEA will take possession of (and) take to their labs for testing. The leaked side arrangement states Iran will provide photos and videos of locations that are mutually agreed upon between Iran and the IAEA. Environmental samples will be taken from locations identified by the IAEA, and agreed by Iran. As ISIS writes: “Olli Heinonen, who oversaw inspections in Iran and is familiar with at least two cases in 2003 in which Iranian technicians covered up uranium enrichment including at the secret Kalaye Electric centrifuge R&D site, concluded that evidence of certain banned nuclear work could be removed from a small secret facility in 24 days. ‘Much of this equipment is very easy to move,’ he said. ‘Then there is this dispute settlement time which is 24 days: you will use that to sanitize the place, make new floors, new tiles on the wall, paint the ceiling and take out the ventilation.’ He added: ‘Something very similar happened in a couple of cases in 2003, where the IAEA didn't find any whiff of enriched uranium in certain places where it should have been present.’ In these cases, Iran did not have to hide its activities within 24 days, as it would in the future. However, it gained valuable experience useful in sanitizing its activities more rapidly.”
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Verification_of_Iran_JCPOA_Final.pdf
By email, Kimball also pointed us to an Aug. 21, 2015, opinion article in The Hill, a Washington, D.C., newspaper, headlined: “No, Iran is not allowed to inspect itself.” In the piece, Mark Hibbs and Thomas Shea, experts on IAEA safeguards, spell out their expectation that IAEA officials would keep a close watch on Iranian staff gathering samples at Parchin and ensure the samples reached UN labs without being tainted. Iran, the two wrote, “will not be allowed to inspect itself.”
Kimball told us: “There will be a chain of custody that will be maintained that protects the agency and the Iranians.” This classified chain of custody is pursuant to the IAEA-Iran side arrangements; it has not been revealed to Congress.
Another association official, Kelsey Davenport, followed up with an email noting NBC News, citing two unidentified senior U.S. officials, said in an Aug. 19, 2015, news story that Iran would be allowed to inspect Parchin itself only regarding signs of past military activity and still, UN inspectors “would be on site to supervise the Iranians at every step of the way,” NBC said. Congress was briefed by senior U.S. officials, including top negotiator Wendy Sherman, who was only able to read a draft version of one side deal. If our own secretaries are not allowed to read the side arrangements, under what circumstances do these officials have knowledge on the inner workings of IAEA inspections at Parchin?
Davenport also pointed out an Aug. 20, 2015, post on the Arms Control Association’s website by Tariq Rauf, director of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. In the post, Rauf asserted that even if Iranians were permitted to collect samples at Parchin, IAEA officials would be present to ensure no monkey business.
Rauf went on: “It would be unusual but by no means technically compromising to have Iranian technicians collect swipe samples at sites and locations at Parchin in the physical presence and direct line of sight of IAEA inspectors, including filming, and using swipe kits and collection bags provided by the IAEA. The agency inspectors then would seal the bags containing the swipe samples; they could leave behind one sealed bag at the IAEA office in Iran as a ‘control’ to be used if there is a dispute later about the results. The other three or four bags of swipe samples would be taken by the IAEA” to UN laboratories for testing.