



Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 2015

Best Practice Forum (BPF) on Strengthening Multistakeholder Participation Mechanisms

Overview and Background

This discussion paper on Strengthening Multistakeholder Participation Mechanisms represents the ongoing work of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) Best Practice Forum (BPF) on the same subject. This paper is a working document and builds upon the foundation of work of the 2014 BPF that produced [this output document](#). Participants in the 2014 BPF process expressed a desire to move beyond discussions of definitions, asserting that for some participants, terms such as “multistakeholder mechanism” were seen as obstructive jargon that made it difficult for new participants and non-participants to view and understand Internet governance deliberations.

As the 2015 BPF process began, the group wondered if it was the intention of the BPF to cover all multistakeholder mechanisms or only certain practices and examples. There was agreement in making the public call for input in 2015 that the group would ask for concrete examples and best practices¹ in using multistakeholder mechanisms, specifically to not limit the scope of what the community might want to submit in order to gain as much input as possible that could then be examined.

The “practice descriptions and other input” section at the bottom of this paper compiled input received from the community in response to the aforementioned 2015 BPF [call for input](#). This section also contains some useful and relevant academic articles submitted and collected by members of this BPF for further discussion and use by the IGF community.

This paper, developed through an iterative process with active members of this BPF and the broader IGF community, presents both reflective and forward-looking viewpoints on the 2014 exercise from stakeholders participating this year. It also incorporates content and examples received from the call for input to further analyze much of the normative analysis of important issues raised pertaining to strengthening multistakeholder participation mechanisms both during

¹ An input paper submitted emphasized that “in order for something to be considered as possibly a “best practice,” it must first be an acceptable practice.” This input asserted that “anything that is inconsistent with democracy is certainly not an acceptable practice in any area of governance.”

the 2014 work cycle as well as in 2015. This paper will remain a working document and is available for comment and further input to the broader IGF community in the weeks leading up to the 2015 IGF and at the meeting itself.

Views and findings of the community in 2015 building on the 2014 BPF

Building Trust

Many participants in the 2015 BPF agree that a key factor in facilitating productive outcomes through multistakeholder mechanisms is the presence of trust among stakeholders. It was noted that transparency and accountability were two critically important components of building trust, and that trust is developed over time by stakeholders acting oftentimes in accordance with previous statements – as judged by other stakeholders. In the setting of Internet governance multistakeholder mechanisms, many stakeholders have had previous interactions, which bear on the initial level of trust they bring with them. Enhancing trust among stakeholders is a challenging, time consuming process. While educational and participatory resources to facilitate participation exist, there are few resources for building trust among stakeholders. Developing and making available tools and methods for building trust among stakeholders would be an important contribution to the enhancement of multistakeholder mechanisms. In addition to increased efforts among all stakeholders to build and establish such trust, there should also be targeted efforts to identify where trust is lacking and needed.

The question of authority and legitimacy converges with the one on trust. One commenter emphasized that as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) oversight transition continues, this issue has become especially apparent. The BPF participants question whether multistakeholder mechanisms can operate with an authority of their own without the ultimate backing of a government or an intergovernmental agreement. Participants in the BPF agree that this will be a key question moving forward and that an analysis of precedence in this regard in fields other than Internet governance, like the environment, would be useful as well.

Some useful analysis and examples of multistakeholder mechanisms being used in fields other than Internet governance can be found in a 2015 paper from the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University titled "[Multistakeholder as Governance Groups: Observations from Case Studies](#)." This paper synthesizes a set of twelve case studies of real-world governance structures. Facilitated by the Berkman Center, this study examines existing multistakeholder governance groups with the goal of informing the evolution of – and current debate around – the future evolution of the Internet governance ecosystem in light of the [NETmundial Principles and Roadmap](#), discussions at local, regional, and international IGF meetings, and the [NETmundial Initiative](#), as well as other forums, panels, and committees.

Another useful input to this BPF in this context was given by Thomas Lowenhaupt, the founder and director of Connecting.nyc Inc. and former member of the .NYC Community Advisory

Board, who [described his experience](#) working with the city of New York and the .nyc top-level domain (TLD) during the 2012 application period for top-level domains.

Participation and Resources

The 2014 BPF found that while many advocates of multistakeholder mechanisms seek to be expansively inclusive, their efforts are frequently inadequate in terms of educating potential stakeholders about Internet governance and enabling them to make an informed choice about participating. Similarly, some stakeholders who wish to participate may be unable to do so due to a shortage of resources. While resources are allocated to alleviating this situation, they are insufficient for the current needs and are not increasing comparably to the growth of the Internet. In light of this, the 2015 BPF community advocates for the exploration of possible solutions to the various obstacles that hinder participation in multistakeholder Internet governance processes and mechanisms.

A [report](#) from researchICTafrica.net submitted to this BPF illustrates some notable observations about the lack of education regarding multistakeholder mechanisms and processes as well as its implications within the context of Internet governance in Africa. This analysis is particularly relevant when examining the successes or failures of multistakeholder models and mechanisms in the context of the ten-year review of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS+10) at the United Nations. Inclusive participation in multistakeholder mechanisms and processes is certainly a strength of the model in general. However, as the abovementioned report describes, the necessary outreach and promotion of multistakeholder participation methods is lacking – particularly in civil society, developing countries, and industries where diverse stakeholder engagement is necessary.

Bad Actors

One significant and problematic issue raised by participants both during the 2014 BPF and again this year in the 2015 BPF was the prospect of “bad actors.” Many multistakeholder mechanisms and processes assume that stakeholders have an interest in reaching outcomes supported by rough consensus. Some then define bad actors as being individuals or organizations who seek to damage trust in the process and its outcomes through obstructive participation. Therefore, some in the BPF fear that multistakeholder mechanisms are vulnerable to bad actors because it explicitly places trust in and asserts balance among stakeholders.

Many in the 2015 BPF are, as one participant expressed, “greatly troubled by the problem of bad actors in the multistakeholder paradigm.” Some said that bad actors take multiple forms. It was said that they may be legitimate in the sense that they are interested parties to the issue at hand but they may seek dogmatically different outcomes from the consensus view or seek to discredit and undermine the process/paradigm itself. Participants’ often expressed that, from their point of view, if an outcome desired by a stakeholder considered to be a bad actor was not

achieved, the party in question then engaged in the next best outcome for their interests: to slow the process to a halt. Some commented during the BPF that given the complexity of the issues involved in Internet governance, it can be difficult to distinguish a strategy of delay from one of earnest answer seeking. If a multistakeholder process is unable to reach a conclusion, this is a victory for foes of the process itself as evidence of failure. Multistakeholder processes by their nature have a difficult time excluding a bad actor, even if identified. Some fear that the bad actor problem in a rough consensus decision-making system requires swift attention. Over time, it was said that it could threaten to undercut multistakeholder processes and delegitimize them.

There was a divide within the BPF, however, about how to define a bad actor. Therefore, many encouraged further discussion of the bad actor issue to realize greater clarity about what/who the term refers to and whether new, separate mechanisms are needed to deal with the participation of such actors in a consensus-based multistakeholder process.

Hi all,

I agree with the comments expressed by Alejandro, Marylin and Avril.

However, I would also add that, while in general it is difficult to ascertain motives and intents to people's behaviour, as argued by Avri, it becomes much easier when there is minimum transparency regarding the source of funding of the involved actors/stakeholders. It is indeed highly unlikely that a stakeholder's behaviour be contrary to his own (economic/political) interest. Therefore, when there is transparency with regard to the economic and political interests of a given stakeholder, it becomes much easier to evaluate motives and intents of his/her behaviour (and therefore the likelihood that the stakeholder may engage in "bad" behaviour in order to disrupt/delay a process).

At the end of May, I shared on this list an article I wrote on the matter. (see particularly pp 11-14) <http://policyreview.info/node/364/pdf>

Probably my input has not been fully considered because I shared it in a very early phase of this process and, in May, the discussion on actors' interests/badness had not emerged yet. Should you be interested, the article also proposes a model "Stakeholder Sheet" that can be used within any multistakeholder processes to assess stakeholders' behaviours based on affiliation, source of funding, type of legitimacy and interest in the process. (See page 13-14)

Hope this is helpful.

Best

Luca

PS: should you have problems downloading the PDF, the article is also available here <http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/heterostakeholder-cooperation-sustainable-inter-net-policymaking>

These are all good points. I think if we adopted a framework to define this issue in the way that Alejandro described, it would not only avoid the problem of singling out someone who is considered a bad actor (and the implications or fall out of doing so) but provide guidelines for future discussions regarding conduct and procedural expectations.

Could the points that have been made about individual behavior all be compiled into a list? And also, would that differ from the existing codes of conduct?

-Michael

Hi,

there are many forms of bad conduct that have not been listed and merit it:

abusing process to delay or deform substance

veiled threats

undisclosed conflicts of interest, including contingent fees etc.

astroturfing

making up "think tanks" and expert opinion, or inflating their value artificially

presenting as rights and citizen concern, dressed with citizen-activist language, what is governmental/political or commercial interest

and so many, many others. There are books listing them.

While the idea of "bad actor" is attractive it essentializes the conduct into the person.

So probably a better route is to identify the conducts. "Bad conduct" instead of "bad actors" will still be hard to define unambiguously. It will still make many people react defensively to any definition. But it may be an attempt that is less likely to flounder like this one is about to.

Also, what is specific to the multistakeholder process among all these definitions? Our findings should concentrate on that question.

I am watching this discussion and want to introduce a concept that may not be welcomed.

A bad actor is someone who does not want to enable or engage in fact based and reasoned, and respectful disagreement. Consensus may not be achievable on a topic, which might not be ripe or mature. but discussion needs to be respectful and try to present facts and not engage in personal assaults or disparagement

BUT, again, it is possible NOT to reach consensus... that does not mean that one is a bad actor.

Some issues take much much and then much longer to understand, and some have no global view, but regional or national views.... but all of these discourses need to be civil and fact based...

A bad actor to me is someone who engages in attacking and disparaging comments, attacks individuals or organizations or states with hostile and disparaging remarks... and seeks to disrupt the civil discourse.

Civil disagreement should fall into a different category..

I'd then like to define bad actors as people who consistently make remarks that are detrimental to active participation of some other people and/or to reaching a consensus in multistakeholder discussions.

First apologies for the tardiness of this note.

At our last note, we came to a question of what we mean by bad actors in the sense of a multistakeholder practices. I indicated I would start the discussion with some initial personal thoughts.

Let me start with one thing I do think it does not mean.

- it does not mean people who disagree with the prevalent view point
- if does not mean people who argue passionately for some view point they support

Some of the elements that might contribute to a definition

- people who participate in a process with the effect of scuttling the process.

- people who persist in arguing a position after it has been discussed in detail and found to not be part of the consensus, and use that position to block the continuing work of the rest of the group.
- people who persist in bringing up out-of-scope issues that act as road blocks to a group making process.
- people whose primary form of argument is personal attack, intimidation and bullying.

It is notoriously difficult to ascertain motives and intents to people's behavior, hence, unless there is evidence of intentionality in a person's or group's writings or public statements, any judgement of 'bad actor' must be taken on practical evidence. Also, it is often difficult for a single person to judge the behavior of others, and such judgements should be taken with care and with the consensus of the group if possible. Care must also be taken to not use claims of 'bad actor' to inflict a tyranny of the majority on a minority that has not had adequate opportunity to make and explain its case.

Also, great care must be taken to not confuse passion with bad behavior. A single action of bad behavior should not be confused with being a bad actor, people sometimes lose their cool under the stress of discussion and negotiation. Judgement should be based on behavior trends and long lasting patterns.

Finally, accusations of 'bad actor' should not be used to prevent a minority from including dissenting statement in relation to any consensus position taken by a group.

Working Definitions

Through the 2014 BPF process on this subject the IGF community was able to draft some important working definitions (below). The community has continued, through the 2015 BPF process, to refine and build upon these definitions. The below working definitions are the result of the discussions held during both the 2014 BPF process and within the current 2015 Best Practice Forum.

A. Multistakeholderism

Multistakeholderism² as defined in the 2014 BPF is “the study and practice of forms of participatory democracy that allow for all those who have a stake and who have the inclination to participate on equal footing in the deliberation of issues and the design of policy. While they may assign implementation to a single stakeholder group, implementers are accountable to the decision-making stakeholders.”

One commenter on the 2015 BPF mailing list said: “In our context, a multistakeholder model is a framework or an organizational structure that adopts the multistakeholder process of governance or policy development, which aims to bring together key stakeholders such as business, civil society, governments, research institutions and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs] to cooperate and participate in the dialogue, decision-making, and implementation of solutions to problems and common goals.”

One commenter in the 2015 process emphasized that an alternative definition could be: “Multistakeholder mechanisms in the realm of Internet governance is one where all relevant stakeholders are engaged in discussing issues that affect their interests and exploring possible policy approaches.”

Another commenter in the 2015 process stressed: “One of the most developed multistakeholder mechanisms in the realm of Internet governance is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). As some stakeholders may literally live or die (at least in the business sense) depending on ICANN decisions, these have to be arrived at by highly formalized procedures, and mechanisms for reviewing, revising, and redressing some decisions have been instituted. This, in turn, gives rise to the need for a huge investment by all parties involved (a permanent operational staff, etc.), a high level of contentiousness, and the need for all parties to guard themselves against possible litigation. Not all parties are equally bound nor affected by decisions, [and] not all parties involved are equal in terms of being closed or open, etc. – all leading to high complexity.”

The commenter continued, adding: “In what is somewhat an opposite extreme, the original concept of the IGF of not having binding decisions and not duplicating the decision-making fora leads to much more freedom in organizing the events and their follow-ups. The only binding decisions are the decisions of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) as to what the structure and content of the program is and who the appointed speakers will be, plus some ground rules for participation.”

One comment underscored that an effect of “bindingness” is not unique to multistakeholder cooperation, of course. It is much more general to organizations and can be addressed by views

² One comment suggested that the BPF should avoid using the word “multistakeholderism,” even if alternatives like “multistakeholder cooperation” are more verbose. The “ism” stirs the response that it sounds analogous to a faith, creed, or ideology that potentially biases the way the issues are framed, proposed, and opposed.

and tools from the general theory of organizations, including the theories of bureaucracy as well as lighter and more recent theories such as the Peter Principle and others.

As identified through 2014 BPF process, the key attributes of a multistakeholder mechanism are that it is democratic, open, and known to the relevant stakeholders, accessible, works iteratively, and achieves rough consensus (as opposed to unanimity) as well as balance between all stakeholders. “Equal footing” is not sufficient— though often necessary – if some stakeholders are funded and can participate intensively and others are not funded and cannot participate. Even remote participation methods, when available and functioning properly, are not sufficient to overcome the imbalance.

One comment in 2015 emphasized that what “balance” is suitable and acceptable for all stakeholders should be examined further. Moreover, the best practices to find and employ just and fair balance within multistakeholder mechanisms and decision-making processes is a critical issue that should be explored in depth. One organization expressed its appreciation for the discussion concerning balance between stakeholders. They support meaningful participation and engagement of all relevant stakeholders in discussions and decision-making. They also proposed that participation needs to be appropriate to the forum based on the skills and capabilities needed.

For example, it was said that discussions in technical fora often require technical knowledge and experience to participate in a meaningful and constructive manner. That being said, this approach should not be interpreted as endorsing an exclusion of viewpoints or consideration of impacts on affected stakeholders.

Where direct participation is not possible, there should always be ways for a broader range of stakeholders to provide their views or concerns. Furthermore, there should also be due consideration of the issues and concerns of those “not in the room.” In consideration of those not in the room, attention should also be paid to those who are beyond or otherwise not connected to the process, including those with limited bandwidth or no connection to the Internet; those who have yet to be connected to the Internet entirely; those whose native language is not English; those who are unable to navigate the needed tools to contribute for accessibility reasons; and also those who lack the tools to contribute, are in need of remote participation tools, or do not know how to contribute. A comment during the 2015 process noted that “processes should be transparent, clearly indicating how decisions are made and how multistakeholder input is reflected in such decisions.”

Submissions received through the 2015 BPF call for input provide unique examples of multistakeholder mechanisms and processes in practice, as described by organizers of the [2013 IGF in Bali, Indonesia](#), [a representative from the Swiss IGF](#), [an example submitted by a stakeholder from Rwanda](#), and from the [Internet Governance Conference Japan \(IGCJ\)](#).

B. Consensus and Rough Consensus

Michael Oghia provided input from the viewpoint of consensus-building, where the general view can be described as "consensus has been reached when everyone agrees they can live with whatever is proposed after every effort has been made to meet the interests of all stake holding parties." [1]

[1] Susskind, Lawrence; McKearnan, Sarah; and Thomas-Larmer, Jennifer. 1999. The Consensus Building Handbook. Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage Publications.

References for consensus-building:

<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/consensus-building>

<http://meta-culture.in/terminology>

<http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1239313.files/UNESCO%20PCCP%20Manual.pdf>

http://www.ctdatahaven.org/know/images/9/96/HEA_Consensus_Building_Steps_CBI.pdf

(Consensus Building Institute (CBI))

<http://www.cbuilding.org>

Richard Hill provided input from the viewpoint of the ISO where consensus is described as:

"General agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments.

NOTE: consensus need not imply unanimity." [1]

[1] http://www.iso.org/sites/ConsumersStandards/1_standards.html#section1_5

"ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 Standardization and related activities – General vocabulary"

Richard also describes the UN view as "there is no formal definition, but the practice is to declare consensus if there is no formal opposition. That is, the Chair says something like 'I propose to approve XYZ', and, if nobody formally objects, then 'XYZ' is approved 'by consensus'."

It is not clear that this is the UN view or an ITU view.

In IETF, RFC2418 (1998) describes a "rough consensus" process:

"IETF consensus does not require that all participants agree although this is, of course, preferred. In general, the dominant view of the working group shall prevail. (However, it must be noted that "dominance" is not to be determined on the basis of volume or persistence, but rather a more general sense of agreement.) Consensus can be determined by a show of hands, humming, or any other means on which the WG agrees (by rough consensus, of course). Note that 51% of the working group does not qualify as "rough consensus" and 99% is better than rough. It is up to the Chair to determine if rough consensus has been reached. "

However, the concept of "rough consensus" has evolved in the IETF through usage and experience and RFC2418 is currently being updated (draft-crocker-rfc2418bis-wgguidelines-01.txt) as " a community sense of strongly-dominant agreement, in the absence of compelling objections, is used to make decisions." RFC7282 has also recently been published to elaborate on the use of consensus (and humming) in decision-making. One of the key concepts here is that objections must be fully addressed even if not accommodated. The flip side is that objections must provide a fully reasoned argument relevant to the subject. The IETF case must also be understood in the context of development of engineering solutions in technical standards.

C. Mechanisms

Mechanisms as defined in the 2014 BPF are the practices of interaction within a multistakeholder mechanism sometimes rely on rough consensus requiring a degree of trust among stakeholders. However, some in the 2015 BPF said the meaning of rough consensus is not clear in the context of a multistakeholder process for policy development.

In regards to the term rough consensus, one commenter said it "is a term of art in [the] IETF [Internet Engineering Task Force], and I doubt that the way [the] IETF determines 'rough consensus' would be appropriate for other processes. There has been a recent tendency to use the term 'rough consensus' to refer to any outcome [that] was obviously not a consensus outcome, even though no IETF-like process was used to reach the outcome."

I think here is possible to add some comments about Technologies for the purpose of Multistakeholderism "draft related" processes. A system that allow stakeholders participate with "substantive agreements" is in my opinion required to be standardized with the main concept.

Here it seems like in a general way but I think it would be nice to include the features that help out the mechanism.

Multistakeholder mechanisms and processes flow from shared trust among stakeholders and common definitions. If either or both of these factors are weak or absent, a multistakeholder process may be less likely to reach an outcome. Where these factors are present, a multistakeholder process has the potential to reach substantive agreements among stakeholders. Some argue that there is no single "best" multistakeholder model.

Many in the 2015 BPF agree that basic elements of a multistakeholder mechanism as outlined in this paper should hold. Specifically, there should be involvement and input from multiple stakeholders, a shared understanding of the issues and desire to collaborate to address the

issues, and the existence of trust among stakeholders. However, it was argued that it is not clear if the same approach will have the same results across all countries and for all issues.

Indeed, there are differing views on how to make decisions in multistakeholder processes when there is lack of consensus. Some propose that all stakeholders have equal decision-making rights, others refer to the roles and responsibilities outlined in the Tunis Agenda. In all cases, the fundamental principle of democracy must be respected.

A cornerstone of multistakeholder mechanism participation is the assumption of equality among stakeholders. This does not mean that all members have equal expertise on any particular issue. Rather it means that stakeholders treat each other as peers of equal standing, even if outside the mechanism such standing does not exist. One comment from the 2015 BPF stressed that structures and equality safeguards need to be in place to enforce behavior that creates and strengthens equality among stakeholders; however, another comment underscored that this suggests a rigidity that is at odds with the ever-changing and evolving Internet ecosystem, which will continue to create new opportunities for participation and engagement by new stakeholders.

A paper titled [The Criteria of Meaningful Stakeholder Inclusion in Internet Governance](#), which was submitted by an active contributor to this BPF, proposes a civil society approach recognizing a set of four criteria for meaningful stakeholder inclusion in global Internet governance processes:

- The body should have access to the perspectives of
- all those with significant interests in a policy problem or its possible solutions.
- There must be mechanisms to balance the power of stakeholders to facilitate them reaching a consensus on policies that are in the public interest.
- Mechanisms of accountability must exist between the body and its stakeholders to demonstrate the legitimacy of their authority and participation respectively.
- For each stage involved in governance, the body should either be directly empowered to execute it, or linked to external institutions that have the authority to do so, as appropriate.

Such criteria could simplify the examination and critiquing processes that purportedly allow for public or multistakeholder involvement in public policy development.

Some interesting insight was provided on the topic of equality among stakeholders and the concept of “equal footing” by [the submission of the UK Government to this BPF](#) that describes the UK Government Multistakeholder Advisory Group on Internet Governance (MAGIG). The paper explains that the MAGIG is “not a multistakeholder model but rather an example of how governments can involve a range of stakeholders in developing policy.”

C. Stakeholder

One commentator asserted that the term “stakeholder” must be understood to be much more broadly inclusive. The same commenter suggested that being a stakeholder is simply being an interested party. Others said that for some new to Internet governance, many do not know that

being treated as a stakeholder only requires being an interested party – as other sectors require a vested interest in the issue at stake to be considered a stakeholder, which can and should be participating in any governance mechanisms or decision-making. Another comment noted that an “interested party” is a difficult term to quantify or qualify, and that “having a stake” might be a better measure or definition.

At the same time, many potential stakeholders are unaware that they might be interested and active stakeholders if they knew about Internet governance. For some, this is a language barrier and not just in terms of translation. Both the technical and non-technical jargon of Internet governance is a significant barrier to non-native English speakers. Understanding is crucial on multiple levels. The continued expansion of opportunities to learn about and participate in multistakeholder processes for new stakeholders, especially those coming from the developing world, should be addressed. Current programs to support stakeholders and provide capacity building have more applicants than they can handle, and expanded and localized opportunities would benefit wider participation as well.

One commenter emphasized that this will be even more important in post-2015 implementation of the [Sustainable Development Goals](#) (SDGs). In fostering sustainable development, in particular, it is important that local stakeholders (civil society, grassroots communities, individuals, technical experts, and members of academia, government, and the private sector) be involved in a meaningful way. This is because these local stakeholders understand the issues that need to be addressed at the grassroots level and the opportunities that can be leveraged. They also raise awareness about cultural sensitivities and contextualize Internet governance discussions. Such local knowledge would also complement participation from global stakeholders who can leverage existing practices elsewhere and/or contribute resources and expertise to address the issues at hand.

Practice descriptions and other input received through the 2015 BPF

The following practice descriptions and other input were either collected by the BPF from existing research or submitted for the consideration of the BPF by members of the IGF community. They are included in this document as examples for others to use as an educational resource.

Indonesia in IGF 2013 and the way forward:

<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1gG9pdgDsKejrR5ViRI26Lb5m2MQ6GTtSqHqk5I8CUj0/edit?usp=sharing>

City TLDs and Best Practices - Submitted by Thomas Lowenhaupt, the founder and director of Connecting.nyc Inc. and former member of the .NYC Community Advisory Board:

<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rU8h2m1-zdlbYIFzaWYzE7ljfVN67VcpWfQNeotX-N4/edit>

Contribution to the IGF Conference: Case of Rwanda in New Information and Communications Technology (NICT): [The good practice of NICT in Rwanda](#)

Research paper from the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University: [Multistakeholder as Governance Groups: Observations from Case Studies](#)

Swiss IGF contribution on meaningful multistakeholder participation mechanisms:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1hsHj_G5HBfP0mjP6xUaFKGWEH_MdX0f9Wjv6E9dMjI8/edit?usp=sharing

Paper contributed via the BPF mailing list by Mr. Jeremy Malcolm:

<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1d4jHTahdLhebykMHbaPFpTjIkECZGi5OQgjOTqGn2jg/edit>

Internet Governance Conference Japan (IGCJ): <http://igcj.jp/>

Input received through the mailing list from Ms. Anriette Esterhuysen:

http://www.researchictafrica.net/publications/Evidence_for_ICT_Policy_Action/Discussion_paper_-_Mapping_Multistakeholderism_in_Internet_Governance_-_Implications_for_Africa.pdf

Contribution from Mr. Gary Hunt of the government of the UK:

[UK DCMS Multistakeholder Best Practice \(1\).pdf](#)

Thoughts on Best Practices for Multistakeholder Participation Mechanisms:

http://www.apig.ch/best_practices.pdf

Reflections on making Internet governance democratic and participative:

http://www.apig.ch/democratic_and_participative.pdf

Contribution from Sherly Haristya and Peng Hwa Ang: *Multistakeholderism and the Problem of Democratic Deficit*:

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³ The authors of this paper note that this list may not be entirely comprehensive, this list represents a record of active contributors on record to the BPF MSM Mailing list and virtual meetings during the 2015 cycle. If a reader sees that their name is not listed here, or if a name is listed here incorrectly, please contact bgutterman@unog.ch who will correct this. Thanks for your understanding.

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