Contents

Disinformation Aff/Neg

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Contention 1: Inherency

NATO and its allies depend heavily on a strong cyber defense.
NATO 2022

("Cyber defence," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), March 23, 2022,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm, NAUDL)

Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive and coercive, and are
becoming ever more frequent. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. **NATO and its Allies rely
on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance's core tasks of collective defence,
crisis management and cooperative security.** The Alliance needs to be prepared to defend its networks and
operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats it faces. Cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective
defence. NATO Allies have affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace. NATO's main focus in cyber defence is to protect its
own networks, operate in cyberspace (including through the Alliance's operations and missions), help Allies to enhance their national
resilience and provide a platform for political consultation and collective action. In July 2016, Allies reaffirmed NATO's defensive
mandate and recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on
land and at sea. **Allies also made a Cyber Defence Pledge in July 2016 to enhance their cyber
defences, and have continued to bolster their national resilience as a matter of priority.** NATO
reinforces its cyber capabilities, including through education, training and exercises. **Allies are committed to enhancing
information-sharing and mutual assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber
attacks.** NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams are on standby 24 hours a day to assist Allies, if requested and approved. At the 2018
NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies agreed to set up a Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of NATO's strengthened Command
Structure. They also agreed that NATO can draw on national cyber capabilities for operations and missions. In February 2019, Allies
endorsed a NATO guide that sets out a number of tools to further strengthen NATO's ability to respond to significant malicious
cumulative cyber activities. NATO and the European Union (EU) are cooperating through a Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence,
which was signed in February 2016. In light of common challenges, NATO and the EU are strengthening their cooperation on cyber
defence, notably in the areas of information exchange, training, research and exercises. **NATO is intensifying its
cooperation with industry through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership.** At the 2021 NATO Summit in
Brussels, Allies endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which supports NATO's core tasks and overall deterrence and
defence posture to enhance further the Alliance's resilience. Allies are using NATO as a platform for political consultation, sharing
concerns about malicious cyber activities and exchanging national approaches and responses, as well as considering possible
collective responses. Allies are promoting a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, and pursuing efforts to enhance stability and
reduce the risk of conflict by supporting international law and voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

The United States needs to increase cyber efforts with NATO to improve NATO's and their own cyber security.

Ilves et al. 2016

("European Union and NATO Global Cybersecurity Challenges," Luukas Ilves, Counselor for Digital Affairs at the Permanent Representation of Estonia to the EU. Timothy Evans is Senior Advisor, Cyber Strategy and Policy, at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in Arlington, Virginia. Frank Cilluffo is the Director of the George Washington University's Center for Cyber and Homeland Security. Alec Nadeau is a Presidential Administrative Fellow at the George Washington University's Center for Cyber and Homeland Security. July 28, 2016, https://cco.ndu.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=HVj82hUX7_s%3d&portalid=96, NAUDL)

Developments in the cybersecurity operations of both NATO and the EU have paralleled the growth of cybersecurity as a major policy concern to the United States and other national governments. The digital revolution has also changed the basic environment in which governments operate, necessitating increasing levels of cross-border interdependence and connectivity. **European countries have responded to the need to increase coordination and cooperation through new initiatives at the national level and under the auspices of NATO and the EU.** Nevertheless, the relationship between national capabilities and sovereignty, and the authority of these two international organizations, remains unsettled. **The efforts of NATO and the EU to mainstream cybersecurity into existing activities have thus far proven insufficient to fully address the growing cyber threat landscape.** NATO's Development of Cross-border Cyber Defense Policy and Coordination NATO forecasted today's cyber threat environment in 2010: "**Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly [...]; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.**"6 NATO faces a cyber threat landscape that abounds with hackers, hacktivists, nation-states, and criminals. **NATO itself has been targeted directly by Russian hackers seeking information on its defensive posture against Russia.7 Furthermore, the recent attack by Russia on the Ukrainian power grid underscores the fact that Russian cyber attack capabilities are very real**.8 **NATO also faces the same types of cyber breaches that affect businesses in America on a daily basis, ranging from random criminal acts to infiltrate NATO's systems to those of a more sophisticated, targeted nature.** Despite preventive measures, cyber criminals around the world continue to gain access to these networks, including those that are classified.9 In all, the current threat environment embodies much more significant risks than those first exemplified by the Russian cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007, which initially prompted NATO to address the dangers of cyber warfare.

Cyber security attacks are becoming more and more dangerous.
Maigre 2022

("NATO's Role in Global Cyber Security," Merle Maigre is the senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia. She is a member of the Executive Board of the Cyber Peace Institute in Geneva and the International Advisory Board of NATO CCDCOE, April 6, 2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security, NAUDL)

Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace. **What the war in Ukraine says about cyber power is yet not entirely cleared from the fog of war. Many aspects remain uncertain, but given the unpredictability of the Putin regime, the risk of an escalation in hostile cyber exchanges between Russia and NATO states remains high. What is clear is that, as of February 24, 2022, we live in a different world in which the European and global security orders have been shattered.** This brief first explores the challenge that cyber threats pose to NATO allies and how the rapidly evolving cyber-threat landscape can alter the international security environment. Secondly, it looks at developments in cyber defense policy within NATO. Finally, the brief analyzes how NATO needs to adapt to address cyber challenges, studying how allies align their sovereign interests, capabilities, and cyber doctrines with NATO operational requirements and strategic ambitions. **NATO is set to issue strategic documents in 2022 that will guide the next decade of its military planning. This will certainly require more transatlantic consultation on political-military matters with an emphasis on cyber security and cyber defense.** Cyber Challenge to World and NATO Allies**: Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years while the world has kept turning amid the omnipresent pandemic** and now war in Ukraine. States, non-state actors, **and criminal groups compete and are increasingly weaponizing sensitive information and infiltrating other countries' networks to steal data, seed misinformation, or disrupt critical infrastructure.**

Thus the Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in cyber security.

Advantage 1: Russia

The past attacks on US cyber space will continue to happen without strong cyber security.

Purdy 2021

("The US Needs A Stronger Commitment To Cybersecurity," Andy Purdy, July 30, 2021, Andy is CSO for Huawei Technologies USA, overseeing Huawei's US cyber assurance program. https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/07/30/the-us-needs-a-stronger-commitment-to-cybersecurity/?sh=7a5b9db0 5daf, NAUDL)

The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack illustrated the vulnerability of America's critical infrastructure to a security breach. Fuel shortages and rising prices got people's attention. Data breaches have more than doubled over the past decade. Recent cyberattacks have exploited the "trusted supplier" status of SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange, among other companies, and raised concerns at the highest levels of government and the private sector. The stakes are only getting higher as the internet of things makes everything more connected and we all become more dependent on 5G-enabled technologies. What's being done to prevent cyberattacks — and is it enough? Last month, President Joe Biden issued an executive order to begin developing mandatory baseline security requirements for government agencies and the companies that do business with them. The order states that the federal government must collaborate with the private sector and with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop and implement a zero-trust model that "eliminates implicit trust in any one element, node, or service and instead requires continuous verification" from multiple sources.

U.S. cyber- security is currently weak against attacks.
Marks and Schaffer on June 6, 2022

("The U.S. isn't getting ahead of the cyber threat, experts say," Joseph Marks and Aaron Schaffer, June 6, 2022, Joseph Marks, writes The Cybersecurity 202 newsletter focused on the policy and politics of cybersecurity. Before joining The Washington Post, Marks covered cybersecurity for Politico and Nextgov, a news site focused on government technology and security. He also covered patent and copyright trends for Bloomberg BNA and federal litigation for Law360. Aaron Schaffer is a researcher for Technology 202 and Cybersecurity 202, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/06/us-isnt-getting-ahead-cyber-threat-experts-say/, NAUDL)

Our network of cyber experts have a less-than-rosy take on the United States' ability to fend off cyber attacks. Most of them said the U.S. is either just as vulnerable to cyberattacks or even more vulnerable today than it was five years ago. That assessment, from a group of experts polled by The Cybersecurity 202, reflects **a half-decade during which government and industry have supercharged their efforts to defend against devastating hacks from foreign governments and criminals — but the bad guys have upped their game even more**, most experts say. '[We're] less vulnerable against the threats of five years ago. But **I see no evidence that the threat has stood still, and in fact, it is likely that it has grown at a faster rate than our defenses," said Herb Lin, senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at Stanford University.** "We become evermore vulnerable with each passing day," warned Lauren Zabierek, executive director of the Cyber Project at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. "I don't know where the bottom is." The breakdown, **About 43 percent of respondents** to our Network experts poll **said the United States is more vulnerable to cyberattacks now.** About 38 percent said we're just as vulnerable as we were five years ago. Just 19 percent of experts said the United States is less vulnerable in cyberspace than five years ago. **The sobering results come as cyber executives and analysts are convening in San Francisco for the RSA Conference, the largest annual industry-focused cybersecurity gathering,** which is being held in person for the first time since the start of the coronavirus pandemic. The cyber industry has fared extremely well during the past half-decade — nearly doubling in value, according to some estimates — but it has also struggled to keep up with the dizzying pace of attacks. More targets: One key problem, according to experts who said the United States is more vulnerable now: The nation has become more reliant on technology during the past five years — significantly increasing the targets that hackers can aim at. And that technology is often being built without security foremost in mind.

"Cybersecurity is improving constantly, but the complexity of our digital society may be outpacing our efforts to keep up," Mandiant Threat Intelligence chief John Hultquist said. Cyber and tech investor Niloofar Razi Howe: "We are more vulnerable because of the dizzying pace we are adopting technology, engaging in tech transformation, and adding devices without prioritizing security."**One particularly rich target has been a vast new array of Internet-connected devices, such as refrigerators, thermostats and cameras. These devices,** commonly called the "Internet of things" or "IoT" **are notorious for relying on weak or default passwords and being difficult to update with software patches — making them easy pickings for hackers.**"Many of these technologies have shortchanged their cybersecurity expenditures, creating ever-increasing liabilities for everyone," said Sascha Meinrath, founding director of X-Lab, a think tank at Penn State focusing on the intersection of technologies and public policy."As the cyber-strategist Biggie Smalls would have said, 'More IoT, More Problems,' " quipped Peter Singer, a fellow at the New America think tank. (Singer said the United States is equally vulnerable compared to five years ago). **Many experts blamed the United States' ongoing vulnerability to hacking on the increased brazenness of U.S. adversaries, especially Russia. Norma Krayem, a cyber policy expert at Van Scoyoc Associates: "Russia's use of cyber tools against Ukraine has clearly demonstrated to the world that it can fully disrupt key aspects of critical infrastructure.**

Simple U.S. deterrence does not work.
Pham 2022

("IN CYBERSPACE, NO ONE CAN HEAR YOU BLUFF," By Captain Tuan N. Pham, U.S. Navy, Center for International Maritime Security May 11,2022 https://cimsec.org/in-cyberspace-no-one-can-hear-you-bluff/, NAUDL)

General Paul Nakasone – Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (USCC) and Director, National Security Agency (NSA) – asserts that "traditional military deterrence is binary in regard to conflict and a deterrence model…does not comport to cyberspace where much of the nefarious cyber activity plays out non-stop in an ambiguous strategic gray zone." While this article is in agreement with the "futility of totally deterring adversaries from operating in cyberspace and instead actively disrupting those activities before they can inflict damage," it takes the position of respectfully disagreeing that traditional deterrence is binary and the rules of traditional deterrence do not hold in cyberspace. **Deterrence centered around domain denial is neither desirable nor sustainable. Hindering access to cyberspace is not consistent with the enduring American values of individual liberty, free expression, and free markets. This encumbered access also runs counter to the U.S. national interest of protecting and promoting internet freedom to support the free flow of information that enhances international trade and commerce, fosters innovation, and strengthens both national and international security; and the universal right (global norm) of unfettered free access to and peaceful use of cyberspace for all.** Restricting access to cyberspace is also not practical considering the cost to operate in cyberspace is modest, the barriers to entry low, and the ease of operating negligible. Deterrence, the "prevention of action by either the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the costs of action outweigh the perceived benefits," is more complicated and nuanced than a simple binary response of yes or no. **Deterrence can create a delay or pause for transitory maneuvering space to mitigate the effects of the threat action, or better yet, take preemptive or preventive measures to disrupt (neutralize) the threat action.** Deterrence, like warfighting (war), involves universal and immutable "human nature" that does not change over time or across nationality, demographic, culture, geography, and domain. Rational actors choose to act or not to act based on fundamental "fear, honor, and interest (Thucydides)" and are deterred to act or not to act by real or perceived "capability, intent, and credibility (deterrent triad)." Additionally, as Henry Kissinger once noted, "deterrence is a product of capability, intent, and credibility and not a sum…if any one of them is zero, deterrence fails." **Washington accordingly must do more and do better to ensure each factor succeeds as an aggregate deterrent triad for increased integrated deterrence, decreased strategic risk, greater strategic alignment, and lesser likelihood of conflict across all the interconnected and contested domains.** Deterrence works best when it is clear, coherent, uniform, and complementary across the fluid competition continuum (steady state to crisis to conflict); expansive instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement – DIMEFIL); and interconnected and contested domains (physical and nonphysical) for strategic consistency, operational agility, and tactical flexibility. Last year in an article titled "In Space, No One Can Hear You Bluff," this author made the policy case for a more active space deterrence to better manage the growing threats to the vulnerable U.S. high-value space assets. This article makes the same policy case now for a more active cyber deterrence to better address the exigent factors of time, space, and force in cyberspace. **An attack in cyberspace can come from anyone, occur anywhere, and happen anytime with no warning to react and no opportunity to respond – an increasing real risk as the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine persists and President Putin becomes more impatient and desperate for victory while becoming at risk of dangerously perceiving a shift in U.S. policy from conflict containment** (vertical and horizontal) **to conflict escalation, or worse, regime change.**

A strong cyber security front helps secure the U.S. from further Russian attacks. Maigre 2022

Another set of threats comes in the form of belligerent state actors that seek to steal sensitive data for espionage. **In December 2020, Russian intelligence services infiltrated the digital systems run by US tech firm SolarWinds and inserted malware into its code. During the company's next software update, the virus was inadvertently spread to about 18,000 clients, including large corporations, the Pentagon, the State Department, Homeland Security, the Treasury, and other US government agencies. The hack went undetected for months before the victims discovered vast amounts of their data had been stolen**.5There are also politically motivated cyberattacks mandated by states that interfere in democratic processes and political discourse. I**n September 2020, the internal email system of Norway's parliament was hacked**.6 Ine Eriksen Søreide, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, underlined the significance of the attack by calling it an important cyber incident that affected the "most important democratic institution" of the country.7 **Norwegian authorities later identified Russia as the actor responsible for the attack**, marking the first time that Norwegian authorities had made a political attribution to such an attack.Since the beginning of this year, Ukraine's government has been hit by a series of cyberattacks that defaced government websites and wiped out the data on some government computers. In mid-January, hackers defaced about 70 Ukrainian websites, including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Energy, Education, and Science, as well as the State Emergency Service and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, whose e-governance portal gives the Ukrainian public digital access to dozens of government services. The hackers replaced the home pages of about a dozen sites with a threatening message: "be afraid and expect worse." After a couple of days, however, most of the sites were restored.8 The international hacktivist collective Anonymous has declared "cyberwar" against Russia's government, claiming credit for several cyber incidents including distributed denial of service attacks that took down Russian government websites and Russia Today, the state-backed news service.9Around the globe, aging critical infrastructure has long been vulnerable to attack. The most worrying type of cyberattack is sophisticated malware designed by states or state-backed actors that act as "time bombs" in the critical cyber networks of target countries, such as the energy, telecom, and transportation sectors. Around the globe, aging critical infrastructure has long been vulnerable to attack. In 2020, the UK's National Cyber Security Centre issued a warning of Russian attacks on millions of routers, firewalls, and devices used by infrastructure operators and government agencies.10**On the day of the Russian invasion, ViaSat, a provider of high-speed satellite broadband services, was hacked along with one of its satellites Ka-Sat, whose users included Ukraine's armed forces, police, and intelligence service. Destructive wiper malware attacks by Russia against Ukraine included WhisperGate, discovered in January by Microsoft, in Ukraine's networks that "provide critical executive branch or emergency response functions";**

Russian Attacks could go nuclear.

Ellyat 2022

("Could there be war between Russia and the West? Strategists predict what could happen next," Holly Ellyat, a correspondent with CNBC's international team in London – she cites multiple experts in this reporting, CNBC, April 29, 2022 Holly Ellyat is: https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-war-should-the-west-prepare-for-war-with-putin.html, NAUDL)

Nonetheless, Ramani noted the threat posed by Russia could become more acute if it felt humiliated on the battlefield. In particular, military setbacks in Ukraine around May 9 could pose some danger. That's Russia's "Victory Day" — the anniversary of Nazi Germany's defeat by the Soviet Union in World War II. **"Putin has had a history of escalating unpredictability if he feels that Russia is being humiliated in some way ... and if there are major setbacks,** especially on around the 9th [of May] **then there's a risk of unbreakable action**," he said. "But also there's a logic of mutually assured destruction that hopefully will rein everybody in." **Threatening nuclear attacks is part of Putin's "playbook," said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank. "Putin enjoys using risks and he thinks he has a much more appetite for risk than the West does," he told CNBC on Thursday. "He's trying to use the old playbook of 'if I terrify you enough, you'll back down'," he said. "Ultimately, if he uses nuclear weapons, even a demonstration strike, this would turn Russia into a global pariah,"** Alberque said. He advised Western leaders, "We just need to be able to manage our risk and keep our nerve and not panic when he does something that we might not expect."

Advantage 2: Civic-Engagement

Many Americans lack trust in their election process
Kulke 2020

("38% of Americans lack confidence in election fairness, Stephanie Kulke, Northwestern University, December 23, 2020, https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2020/12/38-of-americans-lack-confidence-in-election-fairness/, NAUDL)

With the Georgia Senate runoff elections set for Jan. 5, 2021, a nationwide survey conducted post-election could provide insights about voter perceptions of fairness in the U.S. election and trust in democratic institutions. **Researchers from a university consortium of Northwestern, Harvard, Northeastern and Rutgers surveyed more than 24,000 individuals across the nation between Nov. 3 and 30. The survey found that overall, 38% of Americans lack confidence in the fairness of the 2020 presidential election. That number is especially high among Republicans (64%) and Trump voters (69%) compared to Democrats (11%) and Biden voters (8%). "This level of distrust is not surprising, given political rhetoric, but it certainly is concerning. Elections are the foundation of our democracy and loss of faith in the process could undermine the new administration's legitimacy and ability to get things done," said James Druckman, the Payson S. Wild Professor of political science in the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences at Northwestern and associate director of the University's Institute for Policy Research.** The survey showed large partisan gaps of over 40 percentage points in public concern about mail-in fraud (85% of Republicans and 38% of Democrats), inaccurate or biased vote counts (84% of Republicans and 44% of Democrats) and illegal votes from non-citizens (81% of Republicans and 34% of Democrats). **To better understand the reasons why some Americans distrust the election process, respondents were asked about their level of concern regarding voter suppression, intimidation, inaccurate or biased counts and interference.** The problem most people found troubling was voter suppression (making it harder for certain groups to vote), with over two-thirds of respondents (67%) saying they were somewhat or very concerned about it**. Voter intimidation was a concern for 62% of respondents,** while inaccurate or biased vote counts concerned 60% of Americans**. Foreign country interference was a concern for 59%, mail-in ballot fraud for 57%** and illegal votes from non-citizens was a concern for 52%. "These numbers create a puzzle for the current Senate elections in Georgia," said Druckman. "For some, the concerns may de-mobilize but for others it may be a mobilizing factor to get your vote in, especially to combat concerns about suppression and intimidation." The three most polarizing election process issues with partisan gaps of over 40 percentage points had been heavily promoted by President Trump and received attention by right wing media. These included mail-in fraud (reported as somewhat or very concerning for 85% of Republicans but only 38% of Democrats), inaccurate or biased vote counting (a concern for 84% of Republicans and 44% of Democrats) and illegal votes from non-citizens (a concern for 81% of Republicans and 34% of Democrats). **Partisan differences were lowest with regard to foreign interference in the election (60% Republicans and 63% Democrats), voter intimidation (60% Republicans and 67% Democrats) and voter suppression (63% or Republicans and 73% of Democrats). "The results make clear that we have a long way to go to restore faith in our electoral process," Druckman said.**

The U.S. weak cyber security and constant attacks from Russia are the cause for growing election distrust.
Milligan 2019

("A Growing Lack of Faith in Elections," Susan Milligan, U.S. News, May 10, 2019, https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2019-05-10/after-russian-election-interference-americans-are-losing-faith-in-ele ctions, NAUDL)

As lawmakers, state elections officials and social media executives work to limit intervention in the 2020 elections by Russia and other foreign operatives, an unsettling truth is emerging. Vladimir Putin may already be succeeding. The troubling disclosures of Russian meddling in the 2016 campaign – "sweeping and systematic," special counsel Robert Mueller concluded in his report on the matter – **have policymakers on guard for what intelligence officials say is a continuing campaign by Russia to influence American elections. But even if voting machines in all jurisdictions are secured against hacking and social media sites are scrubbed of fake stories posted by Russian bots, the damage may already have been done, experts warn, as Americans' faith in the credibility of the nation's elections falters."** This is Vladimir Putin's game plan – sow distrust, discord, disillusionment and division," Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut, says about the Russian leader. "It's his playbook for all Western democracies – not just us, but Europe and around the world. We're open societies, we're vulnerable to disinformation, and he regards himself as superior because he controls the press," adds Blumenthal, one of the authors of bipartisan legislation meant to improve election security. "There's a real danger to such distrust in the integrity of our election system that has lasting damage," he warns. Allegations of uncounted – or wrongly counted – ballots, voter suppression and other grievances tend to emerge in every election. Most famously in recent history, the 2000 presidential race was effectively determined by the Supreme Court. But the events of the past few years – including frequent comments by President Donald Trump questioning the integrity of a race he won – have aggravated the distrust, pollsters and analysts say. **An NPR/Marist poll before last year's midterms found that nearly 2 in 4 voters do not believe elections are fair, and well over half said they did not think all votes would be counted in November 2018. That compared with a 2016 Gallup poll that found nearly two-thirds of Americans were confident in the vote count. Marist polling over decades shows that public faith in many institutions has plummeted, says Lee Miringoff, director of the Marist Institute for Public Opinion**. For example, Miringoff says, in 1990, 62 percent of Americans said the media provided fair and accurate coverage of campaigns, with 37 percent disagreeing. Now, the numbers are virtually flipped, **with an April Marist poll showing that 63 percent of Americans don't trust the media for fair and accurate campaign reporting, with 37 percent saying they do trust the media. The diminished trust in institutions is worrisome, Miringoff says, since it is those very institutions that inform the public of possible election meddling and handle the consequences of a disputed election.**

POC voter turnout is already low, election fraud is another way to stop them from voting.
Vij 2020

With ethnic and racial minority populations in the United States rising, there is a growing population of voices that remain unaccounted for. Though current legislation has been implemented to ensure fair and impartial voting access, there is too much leeway given to state governments in the voting system's execution. As a result, restrictions in the election system have resulted in systematic discrimination toward minority populations, making them ineligible to vote. Voter ID laws have underlying racial biases and prevent minorities from engaging in active democratic participation. These requirements compel an individual to present his or her ID in order to cast a ballot on Election Day. Obtaining an ID can be costly and requires an individual's birth certificate, which may be burdensome. Proponents advocate for the law under the guise of preventing voter fraud and ensuring that only voter-eligible citizens partake in elections; however, individuals who lack government-issued identification are more likely to be younger, less educated, and impoverished, and—most notably—nonwhite. An example of the inherent discrimination of voter ID laws can be found in the implementation of Georgia's "exact match" system. This program requires an individual's voting status to be suspended if the name on their driver's license or Social Security records does not exactly match the name they inputted on their voter registration form. Of the 51,000 individuals that this law affected in 2018, 80 percent of them were African American. There is evidence that the "exact match" law played a role in the 2018 Georgia gubernatorial election, as African American candidate Stacey Abrams lost by approximately 55,000 votes. It is also far more difficult for members of minority communities to be able to locate polling places on Election Day. Only 5 percent of white survey respondents reported that they had trouble finding polling locations, compared to 15 percent of African American and 14 percent of Hispanic respondents. When deciding where to place a polling station, election officials are required to assign each precinct a designated station based on factors such as population, accessibility, and location recognizability; locations may be changed at the officials' discretion.

Minorities have a lower voter turnout compared to whites and, in many cases, this has resulted in discriminatory polling place distributions. Disparities in polling places can also be the result of a change in the majority of election officials; minority populations are more likely to be left-leaning and, as a result, officials may shift polling locations to areas that are more representative of their political ideals.

US democracy could collapse in the next decade causing widespread instability and violence.

Homer-Dixon 2022

("The American Polity is Cracked and Might Collapse, Canada Must Prepare," Thomas Homer-Dixon is the Executive Director of the Cascade Institute at Royal Roads University. He has a Ph.D in International Relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is an expert on threats to global security in the 21st Century, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-american-polity-is-cracked-and-might-collapse-canada-must-prepare/, NAUDL)

By 2025, American democracy could collapse, causing extreme domestic political instability, including widespread civil violence. By 2030, if not sooner, the country could be governed by a right-wing dictatorship. **We mustn't dismiss these possibilities just because they seem ludicrous or too horrible to imagine. In 2014, the suggestion that Donald Trump would become president would also have struck nearly everyone as absurd. But today we live in a world where the absurd regularly becomes real and the horrible commonplace. Leading American academics are now actively addressing the prospect of a fatal weakening of U.S. democracy.** This past November, **more than 150 professors of politics, government, political economy and international relations appealed to Congress to pass the Freedom to Vote Act, which would protect the integrity of US elections but is now stalled in the Senate. This is a moment of "great peril and risk," they wrote. "Time is ticking away, and midnight is approaching." I'm a scholar of violent conflict.** For more than 40 years, I've studied and published on the causes of war, social breakdown, revolution, ethnic violence and genocide, and for nearly two decades I led a centre on peace and conflict studies at the University of Toronto. Today, **as I watch the unfolding crisis in the United States, I see a political and social landscape flashing with warning signals.**

Advantage 3: Social Media Misinformation

Russia's cyber attacks have planted false information in the media.
Ling 2022

("NATO Should Elevate Its Cyber Game, and Quickly," Justin Ling, Centre for International Governance Innovation, May 13, 2022, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/nato-should-elevate-its-cyber-game-and-quickly/, NAUDL)

Russia's propaganda and disinformation apparatus is extraordinarily complex. Some outlets are fully state-run, some are merely state-funded, and others are operated at arm's length by Putin-linked oligarchs. The system churns out conspiracy theories and whataboutism to aid Moscow's objectives. From the start of the all-out invasion on February 24, **Russian disinformation has thumped on a series of narratives: that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) posed a security risk to the Russian Federation; that Ukraine was run by neo-Nazis; that Ukraine is responsible for slaughtering civilians on its own territory.** Those narratives have, unfortunately, been somewhat effective in discouraging a unified response from NATO. They've influenced millions of Westerners and found purchase with far-right and Russophilic politicians the world over. **The most visible Western response to date has been the collective taking offline of Russia Today, or RT, the state-run television network.** Yet trying to ban Russian media is a mug's game. Any outlets forbidden by law or suspended by the social media giants would simply jump to the Russian-founded social media platform Telegram, which abhors regulation. Rather than playing whack-a-mole outlet by outlet, Ukraine's allies would be better off exposing how these disinformation networks work. **Many of these social media pages, self-styled think tanks, blogs and media outlets are designed to look fully independent and authentic. Efforts by Twitter, Alphabet and Meta to expose them as disinformation have been inconsistent.** Berlin-based, Moscow-run video aggregator Ruptly is "state-affiliated media," according to Twitter, but "state-controlled media" per Facebook; its "transparency" feature notes that the outlet's page administrators are in three EU countries, but doesn't name them. **Some smaller but perhaps more effective outlets** — such as the French-language Donbass Insider, which **has used manipulative practices to spread Kremlin disinformation on its Facebook page — carry no disclaimer at all.**

Hackers have broken into real news sites and planted stories.
Greenburg 2020

("Hackers Broke Into Real News Sites to Plant Fake Stories," Andy Greenberg, senior writer for WIRED, covering security, privacy, and information freedom. He's the author of the forthcoming book Tracers in the Dark: The Global Hunt for the Crime Lords of Cryptocurrency. July 29, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-broke-into-real-news-sites-to-plant-fake-stories-anti-nato/, NAUDL)

OVER THE PAST few years, online disinformation has taken evolutionary leaps forward, with the Internet Research Agency pumping out artificial outrage on social media and hackers leaking documents—both real and fabricated—to suit their narrative. More recently**, Eastern Europe has faced a broad campaign that takes fake news ops to yet another level: hacking legitimate news sites to plant fake stories, then hurriedly amplifying them on social media before they're taken down.** On Wednesday, **security firm FireEye released a report on a disinformation-focused group it's calling Ghostwriter. The propagandists have created and disseminated disinformation since at least March 2017, with a focus on undermining NATO and the US troops in Poland and the Baltics; they've posted fake content on everything from social media to pro-Russian news websites.** In some cases, FireEye says, Ghostwriter has deployed a bolder tactic: **hacking the content management systems of news websites to post their own stories. They then disseminate their literal fake news** with spoofed emails, social media, and even op-eds the propagandists write on other sites that accept user-generated content. **That hacking campaign,** targeting media sites from Poland to Lithuania, **has spread false stories about US military aggression, NATO soldiers spreading coronavirus, NATO planning a full-on invasion of Belarus, and more.** "They're spreading these stories that NATO is a danger, that they resent the locals, that they're infected, that they're car thieves," says John Hultquist, director of intelligence at FireEye. "And they're pushing these stories out with a variety of means, the most interesting of which is hacking local media websites and planting them. These fictional stories are suddenly bona fide by the sites that they're on, and then they go in and spread the link to the story."FireEye itself did not conduct incident response analyses on these incidents and concedes that it doesn't know exactly how the hackers are stealing credentials that give them access to the content management systems that allow posting and altering news stories. Nor does it know who is behind the string of website compromises, or for that matter the larger disinformation campaign that the fake stories are a part of.

Fake news is driving a false wedge between countries
Greenburg 2020

("Hackers Broke Into Real News Sites to Plant Fake Stories," Andy Greenberg, senior writer for WIRED, covering security, privacy, and information freedom. He's the author of the forthcoming book Tracers in the Dark: The Global Hunt for the Crime Lords of Cryptocurrency. July 29, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-broke-into-real-news-sites-to-plant-fake-stories-anti-nato/, NAUDL)

But the company's analysts have found that the news site compromises and the online accounts used to spread links to those fabricated stories, as well as the more traditional creation of fake news on social media, blogs, and websites with an anti-US and anti-NATO bent, all tie back to a distinct set of personas, indicating one unified disinformation effort. **FireEye's Hultquist points out that the campaign doesn't seem financially motivated, indicating a political or state backer, and notes that the focus on driving a wedge between NATO and citizens of Eastern Europe hints at possible Russian involvement. Nor would it be the first time that Russian hackers planted fake news stories; in 2017, US intelligence agencies concluded that Russian hackers breached Qatar's state news agency and planted a fake news story designed to embarrass the country's leader and cause a rift with the US,** though US intelligence never confirmed the Kremlin's involvement."We can't concretely tie it to Russia at this time, but it's certainly in line with their interests," Hultquist says of the Ghostwriter campaign. "It wouldn't be a surprise to me if this is where the evidence leads us." Much of the disinformation has focused on Lithuania, as DefenseOne reported late last year. In June 2018, for instance, the English-language, Baltic-focused news site the Baltic Course published a story claiming that a US Stryker armored vehicle had collided with a Lithuanian child on a bicycle, killing the child "on the spot." The same day, the Baltic Course posted a notice to the site that "hackers posted this news about the deceased child, which is FAKE!!! We thank our vigilant Lithuanian readers who reported on our Facebook page about fake new on site. We strengthened security measures."A few months later, the Lithuanian news site Kas Vyksta Kaune published a story stating that "NATO plans to invade Belarus," showing a map of how NATO forces in Polish and Baltic countries would enter the neighboring country. Kas Vyksta Kaune later acknowledged that the story was fake, and planted by hackers. Someone had used a former employee's credentials to gain access to the CMS. Then in September of last year, **another fake story was posted to the site about German NATO soldiers desecrating a Jewish cemetery, including what FireEye describes as a photoshopped image of a military vehicle with a German flag visible behind the cemetery.** More recently, the fake stories have attempted to exploit fears of Covid-19. One story posted to both Kas Vyksta Kaune and the English-language Baltic Times in January claimed that the first Covid-19 case in Lithuania was a US soldier who was hospitalized in critical condition, but only after he "visited public places and participated in city events with child and youth participation," according to the Baltic Times version of the story. In April and May of this year, the focus turned toward Poland: A fake story was posted across several Polish news sites in which a US official disparaged local Polish forces as disorganized and incompetent. This time the campaign went even beyond news sites. A fake letter from a Polish military official was posted to the Polish Military Academy website, calling on the Polish military to cease military exercises with the US, decrying the US "occupation" of Poland, and calling the exercises an "obvious provocation" of Russia. The Polish government quickly called out the letter as fake.

FireEye's finding that all of those operations to plant **fake news were carried out by a single group comes on the heels of a report from The New York Times that Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU, has been coordinating the publication of disinformation on sites** like InfoRos, OneWorld.press, and GlobalResearch.ca**. US intelligence officials speaking to the Times said that disinformation campaign, which included false reports that Covid-19 originated in the US, was specifically the work of the GRU's "psychological warfare unit,"** known as Unit 54777.**Given the GRU's role in meddling in the 2016 presidential election, including its hack-and-leak operations against the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton Campaign, any GRU role in more recent disinformation raises fears that it may be targeting the 2020 election as well.** While FireEye has made no such claims that the Ghostwriter news site compromises were the work of the GRU, **Hultquist argues that the incidents in Poland and the Baltics should nonetheless serve as a warning. Even if false stories are spotted quickly and taken down, they could have a significant temporary effect on public opinion, he warns.**

More Americans are turning to social media for their news.
Vorhaus 2020

In these days of pandemic, protests, economic recession and angst among the world's population a recently issued report shows that consumers continue to shift away from traditional media sources for their news and are moving more towards social media and messaging services to find the news. Long gone are the days of people getting most of their news from a local TV station, their local newspaper or the national newscast from one of the networks. Over 15 years ago, we already saw the substantial decay of Americans using traditional news sources and instead the Internet becoming a major source of news, particularly for the 18 to 34 year old demographic. This data comes from a study done for Carnegie Corporation in 2005. A research group I led at the time was responsible for the study. Carnegie Corporation is a major U.S. charitable foundation with a significant interest in journalism and news. **As newspapers have fallen dramatically in usage, and the national newscasts have dropped in ratings, the swing to new sources of information has accelerated considerably. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University has recently issued a report on the state of digital news around the world.** One of the very notable facts coming out from the study is the heavy use of Instagram for news which could soon possibly overtake Twitter. Instagram news consumers were 11% of the social media population. Twitter was statistically tied at 12%. **Just as we found in 2005 for Carnegie Corporation, the shift away from traditional news media sources is being led by the younger generation, in this case people under 25 years old.** Two-thirds of that age cohort said they use Instagram for gathering news information. The same age group reported that they were two times more likely to look at news on social media apps. Facebook leads with 36% of social media consumers using the social media giant for consuming news. YouTube had 21% of social media users looking at news on the popular video site. WhatsApp had 16% of consumers in that group and 12% used Twitter. Facebook owns both Instagram and WhatsApp. **In this time of political and social upheavals, it is interesting to note that the Reuters study (conducted by YouGov, a research agency) only found 14% of people in the US trusted news on social media** compared to 22% in regard to news gathered from search engines. Also, as further evidence of the power of social media in driving news to consumers, social media as a news source, saw ongoing growth with news consumers, unlike platforms such as all online sources combined, TV, and print. When thinking about what we know about the news and where we get our news, I reflect back on Will Rogers' famous quote: "All I know is just what I read in the papers, and that's an alibi for my ignorance."

The impact is American fascism, war and economic collapse.
Homer-Dixon 2022

("The American Polity is Cracked and Might Collapse, Canada Must Prepare," Thomas Homer-Dixon is the Executive Director of the Cascade Institute at Royal Roads University. He has a Ph.D in International Relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is an expert on threats to global security in the 21st Century, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-american-polity-is-cracked-and-might-collapse-canada-must-prepare/, NAUDL)

But **there's another political regime**, a historical one, **that may portend an even more dire future for the U.S.: the Weimar Republic.** The situation in Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s was of course sui generis; in particular, the country had experienced staggering traumas – defeat in war, internal revolution and hyperinflation – while the country's commitment to liberal democracy was weakly rooted in its culture. But as I read a history of the doomed republic this past summer, **I tallied no fewer than five unnerving parallels with the current U.S. situation. First, in both cases, a charismatic leader was able to unify right-wing extremists around a political program to seize the state. Second, a bald falsehood about how enemies inside the polity had betrayed the country** – for the Nazis, the "stab in the back," and for Trumpists, the Big Lie – **was a vital psychological tool for radicalizing and mobilizing followers. Third, conventional conservatives believed they could control and channel the charismatic leader and rising extremism but were ultimately routed** by the forces they helped unleash. **Fourth, ideological opponents of this rising extremism squabbled among themselves; they didn't take the threat seriously enough,** even though it was growing in plain sight; and they focused on marginal issues that were too often red meat for the extremists. (Today, think toppling statues.)To my mind, though, **the fifth parallel is the most disconcerting: the propagation of a "hardline security doctrine."** Here I've been influenced by the research of Jonathan Leader Maynard, a young English scholar who is emerging as one of the world's most brilliant thinkers on the links between ideology, extremism and violence. In a forthcoming book, Ideology and Mass Killing, Dr. Leader Maynard argues that **extremist right-wing ideologies generally don't arise from explicit efforts to forge an authoritarian society, but from the radicalization of a society's existing understandings of how it can stay safe and secure in the face of alleged threats.Hardline conceptions of security are "radicalized versions of familiar claims about threat, self-defence, punishment, war, and duty,**" he writes**. They are the foundation on which regimes organize campaigns of violent persecution and terror.** People he calls "hardliners" believe the world contains many "dangerous enemies that frequently operate in and through purported 'civilian' groups." Hardliners increasingly dominate Trumpist circles now.Dr. Leader Maynard then makes a complementary argument: Once a hardline doctrine is widely accepted within a political movement, it becomes an "infrastructure" of ideas and incentives that can pressure even those who don't really accept the doctrine into following its dictates. **Fear of "true believers" shifts the behaviour of the movement's moderates toward extremism. Sure enough, the experts I recently consulted all spoke about how fear of crossing Mr. Trump's base – including fear for their families' physical safety – was forcing otherwise sensible Republicans to fall into line.** The rapid propagation of hardline security doctrines through a society, Dr. Leader Maynard says, typically occurs in times of political and economic crisis. Even in the Weimar Republic, the vote for the National Socialists was closely correlated with the unemployment rate. The Nazis were in trouble (with their share of the vote falling and the party beset by internal disputes) as late as 1927, before the German economy started to contract. Then, of course, the Depression hit. **The United States today is in the midst of crisis – caused by the pandemic, obviously – but it could experience far worse before long: perhaps a war with Russia, Iran or China, or a financial crisis when economic bubbles caused by excessive liquidity burst.**

Contention 2: Solvency

The United States should join forces with NATO to increase their own cyber security.

NATO 2022

("Cyber defence," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), March 23, 2022 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm?, NAUDL)

To keep pace with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain robust cyber defences, **NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan, which were endorsed by Allies at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. The 2014 policy established that cyber defence is part of the Alliance's core task of collective defence, confirmed that international law applies in cyberspace, set out the further development of NATO's and Allies' capabilities, and intensified NATO's cooperation with industry**. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allies reaffirmed NATO's defensive mandate and recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea. As most crises and conflicts today have a cyber dimension, treating cyberspace as a domain enables NATO to better protect and conduct its operations and missions. **At the Warsaw Summit, Allies also pledged to strengthen and enhance the cyber defences of national networks and infrastructures, as a matter of priority.** Together with the continuous adaptation of NATO's cyber defence capabilities, this will reinforce the cyber defence and overall resilience of the Alliance. At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which supports NATO's three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, as well as its overall deterrence and defence posture. NATO's defensive mandate was reaffirmed, and Allies committed to employing the full range of capabilities to actively deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats at all times. Responses need to be continuous and draw on elements of the entire NATO toolbox that include political, diplomatic and military tools. Allies also recognised that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as an armed attack. The nature of cyberspace requires a comprehensive approach through unity of effort at the political, military and technical levels. The 2021 policy and its corresponding action plan will drive forward activities across these three levels. Developing the NATO cyber defence capability The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), based at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, protects NATO's own networks by providing centralised and round-the-clock cyber defence support. This capability evolves on a continual basis and maintains pace with the rapidly changing threat and technology environment. NATO has also established a Cyberspace Operations Centre in Mons, Belgium. The Centre supports military commanders with situational awareness to inform the Alliance's operations and missions. It also coordinates NATO's operational activity in cyberspace, ensuring freedom to act in this domain and making operations more resilient to cyber threats. To facilitate an Alliance-wide common approach to cyber defence capability development, NATO also defines targets for Allied countries' implementation of national cyber defence capabilities via the NATO Defence Planning Process. **NATO helps Allies to enhance their national cyber defences by facilitating information-sharing, exchange of best practices and by conducting cyber defence exercises to develop national expertise.** Similarly, individual Allied countries may, on a voluntary basis and facilitated by NATO, assist other Allies to develop their national cyber defence capabilities.

Working with NATO would improve the U.S.' own security.
Cavelty 2012

("Cyber-Allies: Strengths and Weaknesses of NATO's Cyberdefense Posture," Myriam Dunn Cavelty, January 2012 Cavelty is a senior lecturer for security studies and deputy for research and teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS). She studied International Relations, History, and International Law at the University of Zurich. She was a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies (Brown University) in 2007 and fellow at the stiftung neue verantwortung in Berlin, Germany 2010–2011. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228199410_Cyber-Allies_Strengths_and_Weaknesses_of_NATO's_Cyberdefense_Posture, NAUDL)

NATO has more of a history with cybersecurity than is widely known. With its new strategy and continued investments, the Alliance seems to want to expand its cybersecurity capabilities and responsibilities dramatically. But NATO needs to avoid its Article 5 aspirations for cyberattacks and risks taking on too much cybersecurity accountability NATO's New Tricks Looking back, **2010 seems to have been dominated by reports on one security issue in particular: cyber threats. The discovery of Stuxnet, the industry-sabotaging super worm that scared politicians all over the world; tales of (Chinese) cyberespionage in many variations; the growing sophistication of cybercriminals as evidenced by their impressive scams;** as well as Wikileaks' release of US diplomatic cables and the subsequent actions of the hacker group Anonymous all catapulted the cyber topic from the realm of geeky experts and military strategists to a mainstream public fear. Whether the damage inflicted by cyberattacks is becoming more frequent, more organized, and more costly or if our perception has merely changed is unimportant. **The outcome is clear: cyberattacks are considered one of the top security threats and have been anchored firmly in national strategy documents all over the world**. Given this general mood, **NATO's mention of cyberattacks as one of the primary future security concerns** in its new Strategic Concept of November 2010 was widely applauded. But NATO was not just following the common strategic trend: this reference in its new roadmap marked the temporary culmination point of the Alliance's dealing with the threat.

Passing the AFF would provide the U.S. with tools to better protect their cyber space.
Pham 2022

Despite a considerable arsenal of sophisticated offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, American political and military systems still struggle at times with inconsistent strategic communications and a dogged credibility gap. The new deterrent framework in cyberspace must therefore focus more on communicating clear intent and building enduring credibility through redlines, deterrent language, and cross-domain options to impose further costs, deny added benefits, encourage greater restraints, and control more the narratives. Declaratory redlines make clear the unwanted risks, costs, and consequences of specific actions. They are an important way to influence an adversary's risk perception and rational calculus, lower the likelihood of misunderstanding, and encourage restraint. They also outline the conditions of and willingness to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage or destruction. **U.S. policymakers should therefore "privately" reinforce to strategic competitors** (and potential adversaries) the deterrent public statements contained therein the 2018 National Cyber Strategy (NCS), 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG), 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and (anticipated) forthcoming National Security Strategy (NSS). **U.S. law enforcement officials should likewise continue to "publicly" warn cyber criminals of egregious illicit cyber acts. In doing so, they should make it clear to both state and non-state threat actors that any cyber attack or cyber act that threatens U.S. national security interests, U.S. economic prosperity, and U.S. political stability is unacceptable and will be met with severe and disproportionate consequences for them. If they attack or act, they should not expect a proportionate response. They should expect prompt and devastating force that will cause retaliatory damages much greater than what they intended to inflict. This clear warning should have the effect of causing malicious cyber actors to think twice before acting and consider that the real costs may be much greater than any intended benefits.For cyber powers like China and Russia, it should be made unequivocally clear that any cyber attack on** critical military space systems – missile warning, command and control of nuclear forces, and positioning, navigation, and timing – **is an act of war and will be dealt with accordingly.** Doing so interlocks the 2020 National Space Policy with the 2018 NCS, both of which acknowledge the imperative of and calls for improvements to space cybersecurity. Like any other increasingly digitized and networked critical infrastructure, space-based and ground-based space systems and their communication links are vulnerable to cyber attacks. A future space conflict will undoubtedly involve cyber attacks, and conversely, a future cyber conflict may also involve space attacks.

NATO's cyber-security is considerably stronger than the U.S.
Dolan 2022

*Note: Since the date this article was made the 2022 Strategic Concept has been passed. Although this card is in future tense, in reality, it is happening currently.

This month **in Madrid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will update its Strategic Concept, the principal document that guides the alliance's political-military strategy and collective defense operations.** The war in Ukraine has put resilience in the face of Russian aggression front and center, especially in the cyber and information operation domains. Over the years, NATO has digitized and enhanced its security platforms, emphasizing interoperability of systems among its now 30 current member states. **If NATO is to become more resilient against advanced persistent threats, hackers, and the maligned states that sponsor them, then the 2022 Strategic Concept must infuse multinational warfighting and deterrence against hybrid threats with methods that facilitate access to data and information sharing on its platforms and across multiple domains,** namely in air, cyber, information, land, maritime, and space operations. **The Strategic Concept is among NATO's most important documents as it informs alliance planning, resource allocation, and programming based on changes in the threat environment.** But the document has not been updated since 2010. The 2010 Strategic Concept, entitled "Active engagement, Modern Defense," contained just one brief sentence about cyber attacks and did not even mention China. It also stated that "Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace," even though Russia had invaded Georgia two years before and the threat of a return to great power competition loomed. To argue that a lot has happened between 2010 and 2022 would be an understatement. **Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered any illusions of a lasting peace with Russia. China's territorial ambitions, economic assertiveness, threats against Taiwan, and military modernization threaten the rules-based order. Emerging technologies – in the form of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and machine learning – have intensified great power competition.** The 2022 Strategic Concept should highlight the essential role of technology in collective defense. To build greater digital capacity while also emphasizing resilience, NATO must adopt a new technological orientation on the military strategic level of command, especially within the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia and the Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. ACT leverages advanced technologies for security and defense in capabilities, procedures, public-private partnerships, civil-military relations, and at NATO's Centers of Excellence. Led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, ACO is responsible for collective defense through direction, requirements, planning, and execution at the strategic level. However, **the Strategic Concept 2022 should focus less on the emergence of new technologies and more on how NATO's military and civilian personnel use them.** ACO and ACT must emphasize greater accessibility to information and data for its multinational warfighters, cyber operators, and civilian professionals. **NATO must reach out to experts in the private sector, academia, and non-governmental organizations to harness ways to expand access and emphasize flexibility in multi-domain operations. NATO can do this by providing more grants to private sector partners and establish a new center of excellence on data and information sharing.** ACO and ACT should also enable personnel and partners to readily access data and information in DIMEL domains: diplomatic, information/cyber, military, economic, and legal. This would expand the range of measures needed by ACT and ACO to connect and correlate deterrence with evolving hybrid threats. To deter hybrid threats across multiple domains, with enhanced access on different digital platforms, **NATO members should develop smarter and lethal capabilities to confront threats from state and non-state actors. This would allow ACT and ACO to prepare for any contingency and respond to adversaries in battlefields and battlespaces.**

2AC Extensions

2AC Russia Advantage Extensions

The U.S. is vulnerable to a cyberattack now. We do not have sufficient defenses and past Russian cyberattacks prove that Russia will attack.

Roger 2021

("Why America would not survive a real first strike cyberattack today," Mike Rogers is a former member of Congress who served as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and now is a senior fellow with the Intelligence Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, 02/22/21, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/539826-we-would-not-survive-true-first-strike-cyberattack/, VY)

If a full on "turn the lights off" cyber war were to happen today, we would lose. Think about that. We would lose a cyber war. With a few clicks of the mouse, and in just a few seconds, hackers in Beijing or **Moscow could turn off our electricity, millions would lose heat, groceries would spoil, banking machines would not work, and people could not get gasoline.** It would be what we have seen down in Texas, but on national scale and with no end in sight. That we have escaped a digital catastrophe thus far is not due to skill. **It is due to blind luck and restraint from our adversaries.** Just a few weeks ago, hackers attacked a water treatment plant in Florida, trying to increase the amount of lye in the water to toxic levels. A worker was able to prevent the contamination. Luck was all that stood between hackers and a potentially deadly cyber incident. If that were not enough, we are still uncovering the full scale of the Solar Winds hack nearly three months on from its first disclosure. At least nine federal departments or agencies and over 100 companies were compromised and, as the probe continues, it remains likely that more targets are identified. Think about how significant this breach was. **Hackers likely from Russian intelligence penetrated the software supply chain and used the software update feature to spread malicious code to more than 18,000 users.** Their aim was to steal as much data and credentials as possible for their Russian interests and to undermine our own security. This almost certainly will be one of the broadest espionage efforts in history, like the Chinese theft of over 22 million background investigation records in 2015. **The Russian attack was launched from within the United States using our servers. This was an incredibly clever way to mask the origin and ensure that our intelligence agencies would not see a foreign attack, as they are barred by law from running inside our country.** Once inside government networks, the hackers monitored the way we identify and intercept their systems penetration efforts and designed an attack that made it difficult to identify. These foreign hackers know about our weak spots. **The only thing that prevented the Russians from launching a destructive malware attack or inserting malicious code was the Russians themselves.** They could have caused a major disruption across our government and private sector networks, changing or deleting data, planting viruses, or simply turning off the networks. Restarting the systems and deleting the offending code alone is not a solution. In 2016, the Ukranian electricity grid was targeted by the Russians and, until this day, the country is still finding and removing vulnerabilities left behind by Moscow. **We had to rely on Russian restraint rather than our defenses to stop what could have been a devastating offensive attack.** Sadly, we have confused luck and the restraint of our adversaries with our own skill. Policymakers, business owners, and everyday citizens are numb to the regular attacks. We assume that if they have not yet been destructive or damaging then they will never be, and that our protections are sufficient. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our adversaries are moving forth with plans to cause massive disruption. **Our country should harden our defenses and offer credible deterrents. If we simply wait, it will be too late.**

Cyber-strikes could escalate through tit-for-tat retaliation and lead to nuclear war.

Klare 19

("Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation," Michael Klare, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association, Arms Control Association, November 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation)

Yet **another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers,** along with Iran and North Korea, **have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary's key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks.** As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as "Nitro Zeus," intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13 **The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary's critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict.** For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. **At some point, such attacks "could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war."**14 These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others include efforts by third parties, such as proxy states or terrorist organizations, to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing early-warning systems to generate false readings ("spoofing") of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a clear indication of the severity of the threat. **As states' reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the dangers of unintended or accidental escalation can only grow more severe.**

Cyberattacks escalate – deterrence fails, and the risk of miscalculation is high. Schulze 19

("Cyber Deterrence is Overrated," Matthia Schulze, Deputy Head of Research Division of International Security at German Institute for International and Security Affairs ", August 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C34_she.pdf, JHW)

The damage potential of cyber capabilities is unreliable and difficult to control. It is complicated, although not impossible, to limit cyber capabilities to one target and to avoid collateral damage, for example in uninvolved third countries. This is particularly true in time-critical situations. The effectiveness and thus the exact damage potential of cyber capabilities are often difficult to determine in advance. **The potential damage is largely determined by the configuration of the target system.** In this respect**, it is often impossible to anticipate how long a cyber attack can disrupt a system,** for instance. **This fact complicates the proportional and controlled use of such capabilities. This** in turn **increases the risk of deterrence failure. Even attacks** such as Stuxnet (2010), **which were carefully tailored to specific targets, also infected other systems worldwide. Collateral effects** such as WannaCry or NotPetya (both 2017) **are habitual in cyber conflicts.** No one can realistically estimate where else a certain system configuration is in use. On the other hand, threat of punishment can be made too specific. If, for example, D is about to respond to a cyber attack on a dam by A with a retaliatory strike on a dam owned by A, A can take this off the grid as a precaution. **It is difficult to find the right measure for potential damage that is neither too precise nor too vague, especially as the risk of deterrence failure is high.** Furthermore, **the risk of escalation increases in asymmetric contexts. This makes cyber capabilities seem unreliable as a deterrent.**

2AC Civic-Engagement Extensions

Public trust in the media is at record lows. Means there is no journalism impact. Brenan 2021

("Americans' Trust in Media Dips to Second Lowest on Record," Megan Brenan, October 7, 2021, https://news.gallup.com/poll/355526/americans-trust-media-dips-second-lowest-record.aspx, VY)

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- **Americans' trust in the media to report the news fully, accurately and fairly has edged down four percentage points since last year to 36%, making this year's reading the second lowest in Gallup's trend. In all, 7% of U.S. adults say they have "a great deal" and 29% "a fair amount" of trust and confidence in newspapers, television and radio news reporting** -- which, combined, is four points above the 32% record low in 2016, amid the divisive presidential election campaign between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. In addition, 29% of the public currently registers "not very much" trust and 34% have "none at all." Line graph. Americans' trust in the mass media when it comes to reporting the news fully, accurately and fairly, since 1997. In 2021, 36% have a great deal or fair amount of trust in the mass media, and 63% have not very much or none at all. **This is the lowest rating since 2016, when trust was 32%, the lowest on record.** These findings, from a Sept. 1-17 poll, are the latest in Gallup's tracking of the public's confidence in key U.S. institutions, which began in 1972. Between 1972 and 1976, 68% to 72% of Americans expressed trust in the mass media; yet, by 1997, when the question was next asked, trust had dropped to 53%. Trust in the media, which has averaged 45% since 1997, has not reached the majority level since 2003. After hitting its lowest point in 2016, trust in the media rebounded, gaining 13 points in two years -- mostly because of a surge among Democrats amid President Donald Trump's antagonistic relationship with the press and increased scrutiny of his administration by the media. Since 2018, **however, it has fallen a total of nine points, as trust has slid among all party groups.** Democrats' Trust in Media Dwarfs Republicans' and Independents' **Partisans' trust in the media continues to be sharply polarized. Currently**, 68% of Democrats, **11% of Republicans and 31% of independents say they trust the media a great deal or fair amount.** The 57-point gap in Republicans' and Democrats' confidence is within the 54- to 63-point range for the two groups since 2017. While **both Democrats' and independents' trust has slid five points over the past year,** Republicans' has held steady. **Historically, Republicans' confidence in the accuracy and fairness of the news media's reporting has not risen above 52% over the past quarter century.** At the same time, Democrats' confidence has not fallen below the 2016 reading of 51%. For their part, independents' trust in the media has not been at the majority level since 2003.

Americans distrust the election process now – 2 reasons: Media and government.

Jones and Matsa 2022

("Why Americans are losing trust in elections and the media," Bradley Jones and Katerina Eva Matsa, both researchers at the Pew Research Center, January 16, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/01/16/1073505164/why-americans-are-losing-trust-in-elections-and-the-media, VY)

MICHEL MARTIN, HOST: **Americans' trust in both their government and in each other is declining. That might be something you have concluded on your own from watching the news or even talking with your neighbors.** But the respected research institute, the Pew Research Center, did what researchers do. They tried to get their hands around this by taking a fresh look at the data they've gathered in recent years to try to understand how and why Americans are losing trust in a number of their critical institutions. **Right now, we want to focus on two of those institutions, elections and the media.** By elections, we're thinking about how elections are administered. As you must know, Democrats and many Republicans are engaged in a furious fight over new restrictions that Republican-led states are trying to, or, in many cases, have imposed on the administration of elections. Republicans are calling these common-sense measures to tighten up lax practices or to respond to voter concerns. But Democrats say most of these are unnecessary at best and unfair, punitive and racist at worst, with a clear strategy to keep minorities and others from voting. As you probably know, the White House and progressive congressional Democrats have been trying to pass new legislation that would standardize some of these rules around the country, an effort that has been stymied both by Republicans and more conservative Democrats. And **trust in the media - well, that's been on the decline for some time, even before former President Trump and his allies started haranguing news reporters and outlets he didn't like as enemies of the people.** We wanted to hear more about what researchers have to say about this, so we called two of the researchers at Pew, Bradley Jones and Katerina Eva Matsa, to tell us more about what they found out. And they're with us now. Thank you both so much for joining us. KATERINA EVA MATSA: Thank you for having us. BRADLEY JONES: Thank you. MARTIN: So, Katerina, I'm going to start with you. And this is a basic question, but why focus on trust? MATSA: **We know that the news media is an important pillar of U.S. democracy, of democracy overall. So trust is a huge part of that, right? Like, we want to see how trust in the news media may have a relationship with the sources that people turn to and how, especially now, with this misinformation environment that people are in, how they manage to make sense of the world.**

U.S. democracy is necessary to prevent large-scale wars.

Epstein et al. 2007

(Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Specialists in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, "Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?" CRS Report for Congress, December 26, 2007, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf, VY)

A common rationale offered by proponents of democracy promotion, including former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and current Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice**, is that democracies do not go to war with one another. This is** sometimes referred to as **the democratic peace theory. Experts point to European countries, the United States, Canada, and Mexico as present-day examples.** According to President Clinton's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement: **"Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners, and are far less likely to wage war on one another."**22 Some have refined this democracy peace theory by **distinguishing between mature democracies and those in transition, suggesting that mature democracies do not fight wars with each other,** but that countries transitioning toward democracy are more prone to being attacked (because of weak governmental institutions) or being aggressive toward others. States that made transitions from an autocracy toward early stages of democracy and were involved in hostilities soon after include France in the mid-1800s under Napoleon III, Prussia/Germany under Bismarck (1870-1890), Chile shortly before the War of the Pacific in 1879, Serbia's multiparty constitutional monarchy before the Balkan Wars of the late 20th Century, and Pakistan's military guided pseudo-democracy before its wars with India in 1965 and 1971.23 The George W. Bush Administration asserts **that democracy promotion is a long-term antidote to terrorism.** The Administration's Strategy for Winning the War on Terror asserts that **inequality in political participation and access to wealth resources in a country, lack of freedom of speech, and poor education all breed volatility. By promoting basic human rights, freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, association and press, and by maintaining order within their borders and providing an independent justice system, effective democracies can defeat terrorism in the long run**, according to the Bush White House.24 Another reason given to encourage democracies (although debated by some experts) is the belief that **democracies promote economic prosperity.** From this perspective, as **the rule of law leads to a more stable society and as equal economic opportunity for all helps to spur economic activity, economic growth,** particularly of per capita income, is likely to follow. In addition, **a democracy** under this scenario **may be more likely to be viewed by other countries as a good trading partner and by outside investors as a more stable environment for investment,** according to some experts. Moreover**, countries that have developed as stable democracies are viewed as being more likely to honor treaties,** according to some experts.25

2AC Social Media Advantage

An increasing share of Americans get their news through social media. Shearer 2021

("More than eight-in-ten Americans get news from digital devices," By Elisa Shearer, research associate focusing on journalism research at Pew Research Center, January 12, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/12/more-than-eight-in-ten-americans-get-news-from-digital-devices/)

The transition of news from print, television and radio to digital spaces has caused huge disruptions in the traditional news industry, especially the print news industry. It is also reflected in the ways individual Americans say they are getting their news. A large majority of Americans get news at least sometimes from digital devices, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted Aug. 31-Sept. 7, 2020. Large majority of Americans get news on digital devices **More than eight-in-ten U.S. adults (86%) say they get news from a smartphone, computer or tablet** "often" or "sometimes," including 60% who say they do so often. **This is higher than the portion who get news from television,** though 68% get news from TV at least sometimes and 40% do so often. Americans turn to radio and print publications for news far less frequently, with half saying they turn to radio at least sometimes (16% do so often) and about a third (32%) saying the same of print (10% get news from print publications often). How we did this Roughly half of Americans prefer to get news on a digital platform; about a third prefer TV **When asked which of these platforms they prefer to get news on, roughly half (52%) of Americans say they prefer a digital platform – whether it is a news website (26%), search (12%), social media (11%)** or podcasts (3%). About a third say they prefer television (35%), and just 7% and 5% respectively say they prefer to get their news on the radio or via print. Though digital devices are by far the most common way Americans access their news, **where they get that news on their devices is divided among a number of different pathways. About two-thirds of U.S. adults say they get news at least sometimes from news websites or apps (68%)** or search engines, like Google (65%). **About half (53%) say they get news from social media,** and a much smaller portion say they get news at least sometimes from podcasts (22%).

Russia attacks social media and spreads disinformation to Americans. Bushwick 2022

("Russia's Information War Is Being Waged on Social Media Platforms," Sophie Bushwick, associate editor covering technology at Scientific American, on March 8, 2022, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/russia-is-having-less-success-at-spreading-social-media-disinformation/)

Days after Russia invaded Ukraine, multiple social media platforms—including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube—announced they had dismantled coordinated networks of accounts spreading disinformation. These networks, which were comprised of fabricated accounts disguised with fake names and AI-generated profile images or hacked accounts, were sharing suspiciously similar anti-Ukraine talking points, suggesting they were being controlled by centralized sources linked to Russia and Belarus. **Russia's Internet Research Agency used similar disinformation campaigns to amplify propaganda about the U.S. election in 2016.** But their extent was unclear until after the election—and at the time, they were conducted with little pushback from social media platforms. "There was a sense that the platforms just didn't know what to do," says Laura Edelson, a misinformation researcher and Ph.D. candidate in computer science at New York University. Since then, she says, platforms and governments have become more adept at combating this type of information warfare—and more willing to deplatform bad actors that deliberately spread disinformation. Edelson spoke to Scientific American about how an information war is being waged as the conflict continues. [An edited transcript of the interview follows.] ADVERTISEMENT How do social media platforms combat accounts that spread disinformation? **These kinds of disinformation campaigns—where they are specifically misleading users about the source of the content**—that's really easy for platforms to take action against because Facebook has this real name policy: **misleading users about who you are is a violation of Facebook's platform rules.** But there are [other] things that shouldn't be difficult to take down—that historically Facebook has really struggled with—and that is actors like RT. RT is a Russian state-backed media outlet. And Facebook has really struggled historically on what to do with that. That's what was so impressive about seeing that [Facebook and other platforms] really did start to take some action against RT in the past week, because this has been going on for such a long time. And also, frankly, [social media platforms] have had cover from governments, where governments in Europe have banned Russian state media. And that has given cover to Facebook, YouTube and other major platforms to do the same thing. In general, banning anyone—but especially banning media—is not a step anyone should take lightly. But RT and Sputnik [another Russia state-backed media outlet] are not regular media: they have such a long track record of polluting the information space.

2AC Answer to Journalism Turn

<The affirmative focuses on cybersecurity, not journalism and free speech, means there is no link.>

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("Americans' Trust in Media Dips to Second Lowest on Record," Megan Brenan, October 7, 2021, https://news.gallup.com/poll/355526/americans-trust-media-dips-second-lowest-record.aspx, VY)

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2AC Solvency Extensions

NATO has an excellent track-record of reaching consensus. This is a democratic tool, not a solvency deficit.

Skaluba and Rodihan 2022

("No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective." Christopher Skaluba, the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Conor Rodihan, associate director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Transatlantic Security Initiative, January 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-consensus-no-problem-why-nato-is-still-effective/, VY)

Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO's unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates **the importance of political consensus to NATO's value and understates its role as an effective** and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine. First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. **Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it's astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will.** The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn't end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda. Second, **a belief that NATO's value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right.** Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance's frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. **Such flexibility should be a point in NATO's favor,** not evidence of its ineptitude.

Answers to Off-Case

2AC Frontline – Russia Aggression DA

1. Non-unique: NATO expansion to include Sweden and Finland thumps or overwhelms the disadvantage. This means the disadvantage should have already happened.

Siebold and Emmott on June 29, 2022

("NATO invites Finland, Sweden to join, says Russia is a 'direct threat'," Sabine Siebold and Robin Emmott, June 29, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-finland-course-join-nato-russia-china-focus-allies-2022-06-29/, VY)

MADRID, June 29 (Reuters) - **NATO invited Sweden and Finland on Wednesday to join the military alliance in one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades after Russia's invasion of Ukraine** pushed Helsinki and Stockholm to drop their traditional of neutrality. **NATO's 30 allies took the decision** at their summit in Madrid **and also agreed to formally treat Russia as the "most significant and direct threat to the allies' security",** according to a summit statement. **"Today, we have decided to invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO,"** NATO leaders said in their declaration, **after Turkey lifted a veto on Finland and Sweden joining.** Ratification in allied parliaments is likely to take up to a year, but once it is done, **Finland and Sweden will be covered by NATO's Article 5 collective defence clause, putting them under the United States' protective nuclear umbrella.** "We will make sure we are able to protect all allies, including Finland and Sweden," Stoltenberg said. **In the meantime, the allies are set to increase their troop presence in the Nordic region, holding more military exercises and naval patrols in the Baltic Sea to reassure Sweden and Finland.** After four hours of talks in Madrid on Tuesday, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan agreed with his Finnish and Swedish counterparts a series of security measures to allow the two Nordic countries to overcome the Turkish veto that Ankara imposed in May due to its concerns about terrorism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded in 1949 to defend against the Soviet threat. Russia's Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine gave the organisation a new impetus after failures in Afghanistan and internal discord during the era of former U.S. President Donald Trump. "We are sending a strong message to (Russian President Vladimir) Putin: 'you will not win'," Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez said in a speech. **Allies also agreed on NATO's first new strategic concept - its master planning document - in a decade. Russia, previously classed as a strategic partner of NATO, is now identified as NATO's main threat.** Russia's invasion of Ukraine is "a direct threat to our Western way of life," Belgian Prime Minister Alexander de Croo added, citing the wider impact of the war, such as rising energy and food prices. The planning document also cited China as a challenge for the first time, setting the stage for the 30 allies to plan to handle Beijing's transformation from a benign trading partner to a fast-growing competitor from the Arctic to cyberspace. Unlike Russia, whose war in Ukraine has raised serious concerns in the Baltics of an attack on NATO territory, China is not an adversary, NATO leaders said. But Stoltenberg has repeatedly called on Beijing to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow says is a "special operation". 'MORE NATO' At the summit, NATO agreed a longer-term support package for Ukraine, in addition to the billions of dollars already pledged in weapons and financial support. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that arms would continue to be supplied to Kyiv, which seeks help to overpower Russian artillery, particularly in eastern Ukraine, where Russia is slowly advancing in a grinding war of attrition. "The message is: We will continue to do so - and to do this intensively - for as long as it is necessary to enable Ukraine to defend itself," Scholz said. The Western alliance is also in agreement that big allies such as the United States, Germany, Britain and Canada pre-assign troops, weapons and equipment to the Baltics and intensify training exercises. **NATO is also aiming to have as many as 300,000 troops ready for deployment in case of conflict, part of an enlarged NATO response force.** read more Russia is achieving the opposite of what Putin sought when he launched his war in Ukraine in part to counter the expansion of NATO, Western leaders say. Both Finland, which has a 1,300 km (810 mile) border with Russia, and Sweden, home of the founder of the Nobel Peace Prize, are now set to bring well-trained militaries into the NATO, aimed at giving the alliance Baltic Sea superiority. "One of the most important messages from President **Putin** ... was that he was against any further NATO enlargement," Stoltenberg said on Tuesday evening. "He **wanted less NATO. Now President Putin is getting more NATO on his borders."**

<2. No Link: Putin's warnings are propaganda to rally his country behind the invasion of Ukraine. He does not have the resources to actually be more aggressive against NATO.>

3. No internal link: Increased NATO presence does not lead to more conflict in Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict is not about NATO presence but Russia's power ambitions.

Cornell 2022

("No, the war in Ukraine is not about NATO," Svante Cornell, director of the American Foreign Policy Council's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 03/09/2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/597503-no-the-war-in-ukraine-is-not-about-nato/, VY)

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to widespread condemnation and an unparalleled outpouring of support for Ukraine. At the same time, a motley crew, including some academics and former U.S. officials, has essentially blamed the war on the West, and in particular NATO enlargement. **The argument is basically that Russia would not have become so aggressive if Western powers had been more accommodating. This line of thinking, however, is simply incorrect.** That's because Russia rediscovered its imperial vocation before NATO enlargement, and **the war in Ukraine is, in fact, about Putin's great power ambitions.** Russian leaders have emphatically argued that NATO countries, led by the United States, violated assurances made to Moscow at the end of the Cold War that the alliance would not expand to the east. This claim, however, has been debunked as a myth. Even the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has denied that the issue of NATO enlargement was even discussed at the time. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself did not have much to say about NATO enlargement until his infamous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. NATO's enlargement began in the mid-1990s, at a time when the alliance was embarking on a strategic shift, focusing on out-of-area operations instead territorial defense. NATO urged new member states to focus on specific cutting-edge expertise, and programs for partner countries like Georgia were mostly about training for peacekeeping operations in places like Afghanistan. NATO's shift is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the alliance lacked a workable plan to defend the Baltic states when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. It is really only after that war, and in particular after Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014, that NATO returned to its original focus on collective defense.

The real reason for the deteriorating security situation in Europe — and most blatantly the Russian invasion of Ukraine — can be found in changes that have taken place within Russia itself, and most directly the increasingly imperialist worldview of the Russian leadership. This change began as early as 1994 and accelerated after Putin came to power. The war in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya from 1994 to 1996 was in many ways the starting point. Russia's defeat there showed how far the country had fallen, leading many former Soviet republics to part ways with Russia. Moscow responded by systematically undermining neighboring states like Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan through the incitement of ethnic conflicts on their territories — a classic divide-and-rule tactic. It is largely forgotten today that Putin built his political career on regaining control of Chechnya, something he did by starting a bloody war on the basis of a lie. It is generally well established today that the explosions in apartment buildings in Moscow in the summer of 1999 that Putin blamed on Chechen rebels were in fact carried out by the Russian security service under Putin's own leadership — the purpose being to create popular support for Putin's war, and by extension his leadership. **Putin's view of the world, in turn, is closely linked to his own hold on power — and that explains Russia's increasingly aggressive actions.** The "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003-4 had the potential to show that democratic change could happen in former Soviet countries, something that would undermine Putin's pursuit of authoritarian rule (what he called a "vertical of power"). Democratic rule in neighboring countries therefore had to fail. Ukraine, in particular, was central to Putin. If a kindred Slavic and Orthodox country like Ukraine developed into a functioning democracy, this could pull the rug out from under Putin's project. If Ukraine showed that something better was possible, why should Russians be content with living under an authoritarian and corrupt regime? For a time, Moscow tried other tactics. Pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych managed to get elected as president of Ukraine in 2010, but his misrule led to the popular uprising of 2013. That event, in turn, showed that the Ukrainian people saw Europe, rather than Russia, as their future. Putin responded by annexing Crimea and starting a war in eastern Ukraine. At home, Putin's rhetoric became increasingly nationalistic, and now focused on concepts such as the "Russian world" in order to foment a divide between Russia and an allegedly decadent West. **For this to succeed, however, Putin needs to bring Belarus and Ukraine into the "Russian world," by force if necessary. This, rather than NATO enlargement, is what the war in Ukraine is about.**

<4. We solve better for Russian escalation. Our Russia advantage is clear that cyberattacks present unique opportunities for Russia aggression and lead to escalation.>

5. No impact: The conflict in Ukraine won't escalate, Russia won't use nuclear weapons, and there will be no draw-in. History proves.
Rose 2022

("Why the War in Ukraine Won't Go Nuclear," Gideon Rose, Distinguished Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of How Wars End, April 25, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-04-25/why-war-ukraine-wont-go-nuclear, VY)

As the fighting grinds on, however, **the war is looking more familiar and increasingly resembles many other conflicts over the last seven decades. This suggests that general, structural features of the situation are imposing themselves on the belligerents, guiding their choices into surprisingly well-worn grooves. Ukraine,** in short**, is following the pattern of limited war in the nuclear age,** echoing a script written in Korea and copied many times since. **This is not a new era, only a new phase in the old one. And even the new phase is playing by the same old rules—with significant implications for the remainder of the war and beyond.** IT FEELS LIKE THE FIRST TIME In the late 1940s, U.S. policymakers faced an unprecedented problem: what do you do with weapons that can destroy the world? Throughout history, states had settled their biggest differences through war. But over time, the wars had gotten more and more destructive, culminating in the total war just ended—which had itself culminated in the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, destroying entire cities in a single blast. Nobody knew what would come next. Breaking the cycle of war seemed impossible. Continuing it seemed unthinkable. Tensions ratcheted up further when the Soviet Union got the bomb in 1949. And then, in June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Washington and its allies quickly jumped in on Seoul's side, facing off against Moscow, which along with Beijing was backing Pyongyang. How would war play out in the nuclear age? Now the question would be answered. For three years, as brutal fighting raged up and down the Korean peninsula, the two sides gradually felt each other out and tacitly settled on rules of the road for the new epoch. Neither of the nuclear powers wanted another total war, so both put strict limits on the conflict's means, ends, and scope. They chose not to use nuclear weapons. They chose not to attack each other's territory or regime, keeping the fighting to the Koreas. And beyond that, the war was allowed to proceed conventionally, as viciously as the belligerents wanted. These rules weren't read out of a book or arrived at through negotiations. They weren't followed out of faith, or hope, or charity. They were rooted in practicality. Policymakers in Moscow and Washington had to make crucial decisions in real time about how to pursue their objectives during the war, and the logic inherent in the situation made some courses of action much more attractive than others. Nuclear weapons, for all their power—because of all their power—turned out to be surprisingly powerless. Using them would carry many costs and bring few benefits. It would create more problems than it solved. And so neither superpower did it. A decade later, the Cuban missile crisis reinforced the growing taboo against nuclear use and left the parties still more risk averse. Then Vietnam followed the same pattern as Korea. None of the nuclear powers, now including China, used nuclear weapons. None attacked another nuclear power's territory or regime. And beyond that, anything went. The same rules held in the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan. They held for conflicts involving nuclear powers elsewhere (apart from some minor skirmishing). And they are holding now in Ukraine. HOW THIS ENDS **Russia's plan A was to conquer Ukraine quickly,** install a friendly government, and present the world with a fait accompli. **When that was blocked by determined military resistance, Moscow turned to plan B, pounding cities from a distance and trying to crush Ukrainian morale.** When that didn't work either, the Kremlin turned to plan C, abandoning the attempt to seize the whole country and refocusing on trying to capture and hold a swath of territory in the east and south. The coming battles in the Donbas will be crucial in shaping the outcome, but already much can be said about how this war will end. **The struggle will either conclude with a negotiated settlement involving a territorial status quo ante, or it will subside into a frozen conflict along the armies' stalemated line of contact in the east. That is, the war's end will resemble those in the Korean and Gulf Wars or the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.** Either way, as in Korea, the shock of the initial aggression has galvanized a broader balancing coalition that will remain even when the fighting stops. **Russia chose a hot war and will get a cold one in the bargain.** Whatever some interpretations of Russian military doctrine might suggest, Moscow **will not use nuclear weapons during the conflict.** Since 1945, every leader of a nuclear power, from homespun politicians such as U.S. Presidents Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson to mass-murdering sociopaths such as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, has rejected the use of nuclear weapons in battle for excellent reasons. Putin will be no exception, acting not from a soft heart but a hard head. **He knows that extraordinary retaliation and universal opprobrium would follow, with no remotely comparable strategic upsides to justify them—not to mention the fact that the radioactive fallout from such use might easily blow back onto Russia itself. For related reasons, NATO will not attack Russia or try to decapitate the Russian regime so as to avoid making Putin desperate. There will be no introduction of NATO troops, no no-fly zone, and no hot pursuit of Russian forces should they withdraw back into home territory.** All these actions would carry major risks of escalation, which NATO wants to avoid as much as Moscow. Conversely, NATO will feel compelled to deny Moscow a significant

victory, not just for Ukraine's sake but to avoid setting the dangerous precedent that nuclear weapons are useful for protecting the ill-gotten gains of conventional aggression.

2AC Frontline – China Pivot DA

1. Non-unique: NATO's focus is on Russia, not on counterbalancing China now. China has taken a backseat for NATO.

Fitch Solutions 2021

("NATO Unlikely To Focus On Countering China, As Russia Will Remain Priority," Fitch Solutions, 15 Jun, 2021, https://www.fitchsolutions.com/defence-security/nato-unlikely-focus-countering-china-russia-will-remain-priority-15-06-2021, VY)

Despite the inclusion of China in its communique, NATO is unlikely to prioritise counterbalancing Beijing's growing power in the near term. Of the 79 points in NATO's communique, China was the focus of only points 55 and 56, and was mentioned only 10 times, compared to 63 mentions of Russia, 25 of Ukraine, 23 of terror or terrorism, 18 of Georgia, 10 of Afghanistan, and three of Iran. In our view, **the US will continue to counterbalance China's growing military power in the Indo-Pacific region** by means of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ('the Quad'), which also includes Japan, India, and Australia, and through Washington's bilateral defence pacts with Japan, South Korea, and other regional allies, **rather than through NATO, whose main focus will remain the Euro-Atlantic area and western Eurasia.**

European NATO members, most notably the United Kingdom and France, are likely to increase their participation in **US-led military activities in Asia**, but this **will be limited and not be under the auspices of NATO.** Biden Keen To Reaffirm US' Alliance Network That said, many European NATO states are hardening their attitudes towards China, and the alliance may increasingly be used to step up diplomatic criticism of Beijing on issues such as Indo-Pacific security and China's alleged human rights abuses. For its part, China will view these developments – correctly in our view – as part of an effort by the US Biden administration to build a multilateral front to pressure China. The deterioration of EU-China relations was most visibly underscored on May 20, when the European Parliament suspended the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) after China imposed sanctions on 10 EU officials in response to Western sanctions against Chinese officials accused of mass detentions of ethnic Uighurs in China's Xinjiang province. The CAI was only finalised in December 2020 after seven years of negotiations. Meanwhile, President Joe Biden is seeking to improve US relations with the EU, which became very strained over trade and climate change issues during the presidency of Donald Trump (2017-2021). Biden is holding a summit with EU leaders on June 15. One area of cooperation is likely to be a new EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to set standards for emerging technology, strengthen and diversify supply chains, and rein in the growing power of 'Big Tech'. Although NATO and the EU are completely separate organisations, their close overlap in membership means that there is a broad 'Western coalition' emerging to challenge China. Russia Will Remain NATO's Focus **Russia will remain NATO's overwhelming security challenge, amid ongoing tensions in Ukraine and Belarus, as well as NATO and Russian military activities in Eastern Europe.** Although European NATO and EU leaders are increasingly cognisant of the challenges posed by China, they will continue to focus on Russia, given that Moscow poses much more geographically closer and more immediate security risks. In particular, the governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland remain very concerned about recurring Russian military pressure on Ukraine, and Russia's support for Belarus' embattled President Alexander Lukashenko. Meanwhile, Western European leaders will remain concerned about potential Russian interference in their domestic affairs, cyber attacks, and Russia's harsh treatment of opposition figures such as Alexei Navalny. Indeed, the NATO summit also announced a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, aimed at deterring and defending against cyber attacks. Although President Biden is scheduled to hold a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Switzerland on June 16, the wide range of issues that divide their two countries implies that there is no clear path to a rapprochement.

2. No link: NATO can focus on both China and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which means that NATO can focus on both China AND the affirmative.
Sprenger and Gould 2022

("US military readies to 'walk and chew gum' as multiple crises loom," Sebastian Sprenger is Europe editor for Defense News, and Joe Gould, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, Jan 28, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/01/28/us-military-readies-to-walk-and-chew-gum-as-multiple-crises-loom/, VY)

WASHINGTON — **As roughly 100,000 Russian troops amass around Ukraine, a series of emerging crises around the world — the Middle East, China, North Korea — are demanding the full attention of NATO,** and particularly its most powerful member, the United States. **Now, there's a growing sense among national security experts that the crisis in Ukraine is just one of many conflicts on the precipice, putting pressure on the alliance and its member countries to address this threat and at the same time brace for the next one.** Indeed, China this week flew 39 warplanes toward Taiwan. And consider the United Arab Emirates reported this week it had intercepted multiple ballistic missiles aimed at Abu Dhabi. Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, described the ongoing dispute between Russia and Ukraine as a "microcosm" of the types of threats Western analysts were expecting all along. "All of this is becoming very real," she said this week at a panel in Brussels sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. At the same time, "something could happen on China and Taiwan next week," said Ian Lesser, vice president at the think tank, referring to the possibility of China attacking the U.S.-backed island nation that Beijing sees as a renegade province to be eventually united with the mainland. Asked about that possibility on Thursday, Defense Department spokesman John Kirby said the military remains watchful of other theaters. **"I think the gist of your question is, why can't we walk and chew gum at the same time,"** he told reporters at the Pentagon**. "We can, and we are. ... Just because we're focused on bolstering our allies because of the worrisome accumulation of combat-credible power by the Russians in and around Ukraine doesn't mean that we aren't focused on the pacing challenge that China represents to the department."**

<3. No Link: The affirmative is part of the NATO Strategy against China. It fights back against future cyberattacks by China.>

4. Internal-link turn: The NATO focus and threat construction of China is what causes China to be a threat.
Lonas 2021

("China warns NATO to stop 'hyping up' threat posed by Beijing," Lexi Lonas, 06/15/21, https://thehill.com/policy/international/china/558484-china-warns-nato-to-stop-hyping-up-threat-posed-by-beijing/, VY)

China on Tuesday issued a warning to NATO, saying the group needs to stop going after Beijing. The statement accused the group of a "Cold War mentality," and said it needs to stop "hyping up" the threat posed by Beijing, a spokesperson of China's mission to the European Union said, according to NBC News. **NATO is "slandering China's peaceful development and misjudging the international situation and its own role,"** the spokesperson said. China's statement comes after NATO said on Monday that the country poses "systemic challenges to the rules-based international order," according to the outlet. China rebuked the statement, saying it won't "sit by and do nothing if 'systemic challenges' come closer to us." "I think there is a growing recognition over the last couple years that we have new challenges," President Biden said on Monday. "We have Russia that is not acting in a way that is consistent with what we had hoped, as well as China." **The back and forth between NATO and China comes after G-7 leaders met to discuss how to compete with China, and called for the country to engage in a transparent investigation into the origins of COVID-19. "The days when global decisions were dictated by a small group of countries are long gone," a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy responded.**

5. No Impact: No US-China war. 4 warrants: mutually assured destruction, weak Chinese military, China's focus on soft-power, and economic interdependence. Krulak and Friedman 2021

("The US and China are not destined for war," Charles C. Krulak, a retired four-star general, is a former commandant of the US Marine Corps and former president of Birmingham-Southern College, and Alex Friedman is a former chief financial officer of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 24 Aug 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-and-china-are-not-destined-for-war/, VY)

True, throughout history, when a rising power has challenged a ruling one, war has often been the result. But there are notable exceptions. A war between the US and China today is no more inevitable than was war between the rising US and the declining United Kingdom a century ago. And in today's context, there are four compelling reasons to believe that war between the US and China can be avoided. First and foremost, any military conflict between the two would quickly turn nuclear. The US thus finds itself in the same situation that it was in vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Taiwan could easily become this century's tripwire, just as the 'Fulda Gap' in Germany was during the Cold War. **But the same dynamic of 'mutually assured destruction' that limited US–Soviet conflict applies to the US and China.** And the international community would do everything in its power to ensure that **a potential nuclear conflict did not materialise,** given that the consequences would be fundamentally transnational and—unlike climate change—immediate. A US–China conflict would almost certainly take the form of a proxy war, rather than a major-power confrontation. Each superpower might take a different side in a domestic conflict in a country such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Iran or North Korea, and deploy some combination of economic, cyber and diplomatic instruments. We have seen this type of conflict many times before: from Vietnam to Bosnia, the US faced surrogates rather than its principal foe. **Second, it's important to remember that, historically, China plays a long game.** Although **Chinese** military power has grown dramatically, it **still lags behind the US on almost every measure that matters.** And while China is investing heavily in asymmetric equalisers (long-range anti-ship and hypersonic missiles, military applications of cyber, and more), it will not match the US in conventional means such as aircraft and large ships for decades, if ever. **A head-to-head conflict with the US would thus be too dangerous for China to countenance at its current stage of development.** If such a conflict did occur, China would have few options but to let the nuclear genie out of the bottle. In thinking about baseline scenarios, therefore, we should give less weight to any scenario in which the Chinese consciously precipitate a military confrontation with America. The US military, however, tends to plan for worst-case scenarios and is currently focused on a potential direct conflict with China—a fixation with overtones of the US–Soviet dynamic. This raises the risk of being blindsided by other threats. Time and again since the Korean War, asymmetric threats have proven the most problematic to national security. Building a force that can handle the worst-case scenario does not guarantee success across the spectrum of warfare. **The third reason to think that a Sino-American conflict can be avoided is that China is already chalking up victories in the global soft-power war.** Notwithstanding accusations that Covid-19 escaped from a virology lab in Wuhan, China has emerged from the pandemic looking much better than the US. And with its Belt and Road Initiative to finance infrastructure development around the world, it has aggressively stepped into the void left by US retrenchment during Donald Trump's four years as president. **China's leaders may very well look at the current status quo and conclude that they are on the right strategic path. Finally, China and the US are deeply intertwined economically.** Despite Trump's trade war, **Sino-American bilateral trade in 2020 was around US$650 billion, and China was America's largest trade partner. The two countries' supply-chain linkages are vast, and China holds more than US$1 trillion in US Treasuries, most of which it can't easily unload, lest it reduce their value and incur massive losses.**

Answers to Taiwan Impact Module

Internal-link Turn: It is the NATO focus on Asia that causes Chinese aggression and a possible invasion of Taiwan.

Bloomberg News 2022

("China Warns U.S. Over Forming Pacific NATO, Backing Taiwan," Bloomberg News, March 7, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-07/china-urges-world-not-to-add-fuel-to-fire-in-war-in-ukraine, VY)

China warned the U.S. against trying to build what it called a Pacific version of NATO, while declaring that security disputes over Taiwan and Ukraine were "not comparable at all." Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his annual news briefing Monday that the "real goal" of the U.S.'s Indo-Pacific strategy was to form Asia's answer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. China has often accused the U.S. of trying to form blocs to suppress its growth, a complaint that's likely to attract greater attention after President Vladimir Putin cited similar grievances before his invasion of Ukraine. **"The perverse actions run counter to the common aspiration of the region for peace,** development, cooperation and win-win outcomes," Wang added. **"They are doomed to fail." Complaints about U.S. efforts to strengthen its alliance network in Asia were among several points of contention raised by Wang in the almost two-hour briefing on the sidelines of the National People's Congress in Beijing.** The senior diplomat repeatedly alluded to the U.S. as the source of problems with countries around the globe and issued some of China's most pointed warnings yet against calls to expand U.S. ties with Taiwan. **"This would not only push Taiwan into a precarious situation, but will also bring unbearable consequences for the U.S. side,"** Wang said on the sidelines of the National People's Congress in Beijing, later adding: "Taiwan will eventually return to the embrace of the motherland."

No Impact: A China will not go to war with Taiwan – peaceful military approach, US deterrence, and risk of economic sanctions.
Scobell and Stevenson-Yang 2022

("China is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine." Andrew Scobell, Ph.D.; Lucy Stevenson-Yang, United States Institute of Peace, March 4, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine, VY, ***2 page card***)

China Is Not Russia Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country's president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others. **Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations.** Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. **But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries** since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. **China's largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions.** Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge. Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China's borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China's armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, **Xi** — at least to date — **has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power.** Employing positive rhetoric touting "win-win" solutions and aspirations to build a "community with a shared future for mankind," China under Xi's leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Putin, by contrast, has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the EAEU is touted as Russia's answer to China's BRI. In terms of geostrategic activism, Russia's major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of some of the world's largest "emerging economies": Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. However, Moscow's most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen Russia's strategic partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship — which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States have deteriorated. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and Xi during the Russian leader's visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia's invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the Olympics. Russia's invasion poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to Beijing's long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on China's national interests in Ukraine. Russia's actions clearly contradict China's cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other countries' affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good customer of Ukraine's armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in Beijing's signature foreign policy and economic initiative. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin's calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia's commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine. By contrast, **Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world's most capable military. The People's Liberation Army** — as all branches of China's armed forces are known — **continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene.** The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically "unofficial" due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, **the Biden**

administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing's assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States. However, there is no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S. administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island's armed forces. Second, although there is no language in the1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits the United States to come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack on the island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists. While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a de facto alliance with Taiwan. China's increased military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere around China's periphery in recent years have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with China. However, Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington, and thanks to Taiwan's pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide network of de facto diplomatic missions. Although Ukraine's diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan's, the European country's military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO, although it is a very active member of NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close and consequential security partners, most notably the United States. China Is China and Taiwan Is Taiwan Taiwan continues to be the most contentious issue in U.S.-China relations. Moreover, the Taiwan Strait is routinely identified as the most plausible location of a military confrontation between the United States and China. For Xi and his Politburo colleagues, Taiwan looms large and is prominently identified as a "core" national interest of China's, with Xi reiterating in 2021 that "resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China" and that "no one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity." Moreover, most Chinese citizens consider Taiwan to be Chinese territory and view the island as something worth fighting for. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has staked its political legitimacy on the ultimate goal of unifying Taiwan with China and in the meantime is working resolutely to prevent the island from becoming de jureindependent. Beijing's preferred means of realizing unification or preventing independence is peaceful but the CCP has never renounced the use of armed force. Furthermore, the PLA's central warfighting scenario is Taiwan and China's military has been focused on planning and preparing for an operation against the island for decades. A Cautionary Tale? The above differences notwithstanding, Russia's combat experience in Ukraine will have a spillover impact on how China thinks about Taiwan. If the Russian armed forces remain bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine for an extended period and/or face a prolonged and widespread insurgency, this may give Xi and his fellow Politburo members pause. If Russia's military experiences major setbacks and perhaps even embarrassing defeats, this may make China's political leaders think twice about the advisability of an invasion of Taiwan. After all, an invasion of Ukraine is relatively straightforward — the country is geographically contiguous to Russia, sharing an extended land border with mostly gentle terrain. By contrast, an invasion of the island of Taiwan is a far more complex operation — a successful campaign requires careful planning and coordinated execution between air, naval and ground forces. It would also involve amphibious landings in addition to considerable urban warfare — on an even larger scale than in Ukraine — including operations on rugged mountainous terrain. Certainly, the PLA will carefully study Russia's Ukrainian campaign and draw lessons from it, much as they have studied campaigns of other major powers. Such analyses are conducted with great seriousness because China's armed forces themselves have not fought a major war since 1979 (when Chinese forces invaded Vietnam) and have not conducted a major island landing campaign since 1950 (against Hainan Island). **One way that China's leadership might be taking notes from Russia's Ukraine invasion is by rethinking the risks associated with escalation.** In addition to noting the potential military embarrassment that Russia is facing, **China might be wary of the sweeping economic sanctions levied by the international community. If China were to receive similar backlash for an invasion of Taiwan, it would raise the possibility of truly crippling sanctions at a time when the Chinese economy is experiencing anemic growth and structural challenges.** In particular, the weaponization of the SWIFT payments system might give China pause. Russia has been trying to popularize a cross-border financial information transmission system, and China is committed to developing the CIPS payment network, but neither has had significant success outside Russian or Chinese borders**. Despite its flaws, SWIFT remains the most efficient system for international financial transactions for banks and being removed from SWIFT could potentially be devastating to the Chinese economy. Furthermore, the lessons of Russia's invasion of Ukraine to date are that the costs of armed aggression are high in blood and treasure, as well as strong international censure of Moscow and a resolute collective response by NATO member countries.**

2AC Frontline – US Unilateral CP

1. Perm do both – NATO is purely transactional to US military interests.
Thimm 2018

("NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin, Johannes Thimm, PhD, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 04.09.2018, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/nato-us-strategic-dominance-and-unequal-burden-sharing-are-two-sides-of-the-same-coin, VY)

The asymmetry in NATO contributions between the United States and Europa is no accident, Johannes Thimm writes. Europeans should not be too alarmed about President Trump's threats to withdraw from the alliance – and instead follow their own priorities. US President Donald Trump accuses Europe of exploiting the United States, because most NATO members, including Germany, spend less than 2 percent of their GDP on defense. He calls for a significant increase in defense budgets – most recently to 4 percent of GDP, and threatens that the US will otherwise abandon its alliance commitments. **It is true that Europe benefits from American security guarantees, and the diagnosis of European "free-riding" is not completely unfounded either. However, this does not mean that the US is being taken advantage of.** There are three important arguments here: **NATO provides practical support and legitimacy to US supremacy First, even if NATO is viewed in purely transactional terms, leaving aside values like solidarity among allies, it is a good deal for Washington.** Americans calling for more equal burden-sharing, including Trump himself, suggest that the US supports NATO mostly for altruistic reasons. In other words that America is doing Europe a favor. But this picture is incomplete. **For the US military, NATO is a force multiplier, providing legitimacy to American power.** European allies are engaged in numerous missions like Afghanistan, while **the United States mostly calls the shots.** US bases in Europe not only protect European allies, but serve as logistics hubs to project power into the Middle East. These are assets the US military would not want to give up.

2. Perm do the aff – NATO just proves legitimacy, but acts in the U.S.'s interests.
Shifrinson 2021

("The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future," Joshua R. Shifrinson, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, January 28, 2021, https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-approach-to-nato-and-its-future/#5ddf6a760080, VY)

Introduction Since its creation in the early days of the Cold War, American policymakers have been of two minds about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). **Seeking to project American power and influence in Europe and gain legitimacy for U.S. ambitions, policy planners have seen NATO as a useful vehicle for organizing Europe in ways conducive to broader American interests.** At the same time, the United States has proven reluctant to pay or risk too much to achieve this result. For a country that is secure at home, **influence in Europe is desirable for some** but of dubious necessity. These contradictory impulses have been reflected not only in the variety of America's approaches to the alliance over time, but also in the attitudes of different policymakers. Now, having successfully helped to foster an unprecedented level of European stability and security, and facing growing pressure to reduce America's strategic burdens, **American strategists in the years ahead must be prepared to revisit the fundamentals of the U.S. presence** in Europe and devolve authority to local actors.

3. Counterplan can't solve the aff: The U.S. working within NATO to fight cyberattacks will strengthen its own cyber capabilities and signal that cyberattacks are a military attack which increases deterrence and credibility. Herr and Schneider 2018

("Sharing is Caring: The United States' New Cyber Commitment for NATO," Trey Herr, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Jacquelyn Schneider, an assistant professor and affiliate faculty at the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, Council on Foreign Relations, October 10, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/sharing-caring-united-states-new-cyber-commitment-nato, VY, ***2 page card***)

Given the recent blockbuster headlines about alleged Chinese snooping on server hardware sold to major technology companies and the latest joint-denunciation of Russian cyber operations, you could be forgiven for having missed an important NATO-related development. The Associated Press reports that **the U.S. Defense Department will announce a new commitment to use offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities on behalf of NATO allies. The new commitment is notable given how cybersecurity has long been treated as an exceptional domain of operations, and cyber capabilities reserved as strategic national assets to be shared with only the closest of allies.** With this announcement, **the Pentagon is suggesting that cyber capabilities might be used alongside conventional weapons with allies and indeed, equal weight appears to be given to offensive and defensive operations. Perhaps most significantly, the announcement moves NATO partners closer to what has been a tight coterie of U.S.-favored signals intelligence partners** such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. **The DoD announcement is a sign of the continued,** if nascent, **normalization of cybersecurity under the current administration and in Europe.** Even where offensive cyber operations may not rise to the level of war, they provide decision-makers with options to influence the geopolitical environment. **This aligns with recent trends in the U.S. military to integrate cyber capabilities into maneuver units and large exercises, and reflects the shift towards more risk acceptant and offensive measures to counter cyberattacks found in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy. Moving cyber capabilities into the same strategic frame as conventional weapons, especially with NATO, reflects a shift in institutional cyber arrangements within the United States and the growing power of the military relative to the intelligence community.** For the United States, cyber capabilities have always had a complicated relationship with the intelligence community, in particular the National Security Agency (NSA). When Cyber Command stood up in 2010 as a sub-unified combatant command within the Department of Defense, it moved into the NSA's headquarters, staffed its management ranks with longtime NSA employees, borrowed networks and technical capabilities, and to this day shares a dual-hatted commander. In the immediate years after the command was created, it was logical that the structure of partnerships with allies looked more like the special signals intelligence relationships formed around the NSA rather than traditional alliance networks in NATO and Asia. **The recent announcement aligns cyber operations more closely with Department of Defense missions, which are more likely to posture capabilities for deterrent effects, than intelligence missions, which view capabilities as assets to be carefully husbanded. Treating cybersecurity capabilities more like conventional arms and less like national assets also helps drive the integration of cyber operations into the planning and execution of a broader array of conventional military missions.** Early cyber operations were largely conventional espionage and surveillance activities supercharged by the spread of computing and the internet. In the United States, this led to the creation of large and complex software tools, carefully guarded by the intelligence community as national assets (sometimes unsuccessfully). The DoD's announcement indicates a move towards treating at least some of these capabilities, along with their supporting infrastructure, more like conventional armaments and making them available for broader use; a model closer to Central or Special Operations Command and less like the National Security Agency. The Pentagon's new commitment also reflects changes in how Europe talks about cybersecurity and characterizes the Russian threat. The last two years have seen a trend toward more open discussion of offensive cyber operations and the possibility of the alliance adopting more assertive postures to counter cyber operations against its members. After years of devastating ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled information attacks, NATO members are more willing to explore cyber triggers to Article 5. They have also been more willing to articulate the cyber threat against the alliance. In addition to last week's denunciation by Dutch, UK, and U.S. authorities, Russian state actors are widely suggested to be responsible for an increasingly brazen series of operations, including targeting German government ministries, French and British TV stations, and more. Sharing offensive cyber capabilities raises the question of whether cyber operations can extend effective deterrence to NATO partners. There seems to be little focus on using these operations to deter conventional or nuclear attacks on NATO countries, but this may evolve. **The United States seems to want NATO to use cyber operations to deter other**

cyber operations, particularly those falling under the threshold of armed conflict. Cyber operations have all sorts of problems for deterrence: signaling is difficult, they can be perceived as a cheap threat, and their effects are largely uncertain. By contrast, moving new military forces in Eastern Europe or conducting ground exercises are credible signals of extended deterrence, but are costly and time consuming. Cyber capabilities aren't free, nor are they necessarily cheap, but the promise to use them can add new credibility to a deterrent threat without the same investment and delay as conventional alternatives. **Sharing cyber capabilities may be a cheaper way to signal alliance commitment than other options and might signal a further maturation, and acceptance, of cybersecurity into geopolitics.**

<4. The counterplan links to the net benefit:
The Russia DA: Russia will still see the counterplan as NATO imperial ambitions because the US is the leader of NATO and their adversary.

The China DA: Since the US is the largest contributor to NATO, the CP will also cause a lack of focus and resources to focus on China.>

1AR Answer to Consensus

NATO has an excellent track-record of reaching consensus. This is a democratic tool, not a solvency deficit.

Skaluba and Rodihan 2022

("No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective." Christopher Skaluba, the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Conor Rodihan, associate director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Transatlantic Security Initiative, January 18, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-consensus-no-problem-why-nato-is-still-effective/, VY)

Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO's unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates **the importance of political consensus to NATO's value and understates its role as an effective** and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine. First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. **Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it's astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will.** The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn't end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda. Second, **a belief that NATO's value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right.** Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance's frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. **Such flexibility should be a point in NATO's favor,** not evidence of its ineptitude.

2AC Frontline – Topicality

1. Counter-interpretation: Security coop is extremely broad. NATO cooperation can utilize Cyber Command strategy and apply it to allied engagement
Bilms 2021

(Kevin; January; career Department of Defense civilian serving in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; War on the Rocks; "What's in a name? Reimagining irregular warfare activities for competition," https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/whats-in-a-name-reimagining-irregular-warfare-activities-for-competition)

Merge "Civil-Military Operations" and "Security Cooperation" Into "Security Partner Engagement" **Civil-military operations and security cooperation are similar, but each term contains ambiguity that prevents non-practitioners from fully understanding how they fit in competition**. For example, "civil-military operations" risks confusion with "civil-military relations," the study of the dynamic between the military and civil society writ large. As a term, "**security cooperation" is broad enough to encompass virtually anything involving a partner. Both activities specifically emphasize the use of military forces to establish, maintain, influence, and leverage security relationships** through increased defense interactions. Recent history exemplified the importance of non-standard (i.e., non-military) security partners to consolidate strategic gains, and the ability to manage complex and non-traditional security relationships could yield even greater impact in great-power competition**. Concerted security engagements before conflict help align U.S. efforts with allies and partners, provide invaluable access and placement in event of crisis, and facilitate U.S. campaign and contingency plans. Both conventional forces and special operators are capable of engaging partners and allies to not only increase interoperability, but also enhance U.S. influence, as a low-cost contribution in competition below armed conflict.** "Security partner engagement" acknowledges the importance of security partnerships and ensuring that regular engagements will secure U.S. influence and preserve the United States as the preferred partner of choice. **This terminology adapts U.S. Cyber Command's concept of "persistent engagement," where regular engagement helps to get ahead of problems and forestall opponents' abilities to gain advantage.** Applying this logic to civil-military security engagements acknowledges that the influence and advantages afforded by a deep network of security partners are neither predetermined nor indefinite, and require concerted effort to deter opponents that seek to make headway or generate fissures among partners and allies. Reshaping "security partner engagement" in this fashion could account for one way that the department operationalizes its Guidance for Development of Alliances and Partnerships, which looks to maintain and sustain this asymmetric advantage in all stages of competition.

2. We Meet: NATO is military-to-military cooperation, so the affirmative will be military-to-military cooperation on emerging technology.

3. Prefer our interpretation –
Standards:
A. Ground – regulations and cooperation are important affirmative ground. The negative's interpretation destroys affirmative ground and does not garner good negative ground either. New regulations give important stable negative links.

B. Limits – military-to-military is over-limiting. The topic areas are not generally military-to-military so new cooperation within NATO is necessary to the affirmative ground on this topic.

4. Voters:

A. Education – nearly any affirmative is going to be broad NATO cooperation. Their definition excludes important topic education like LAWs, cybersecurity, and biotech regulations.

B. Literature checks limits and ground loss – affirmatives have to have a solvency advocate based in the topic literature

C. Reasonability – The affirmative only must be reasonably close to topic to allow for educational debates. If we are close to the topic, it is not a reason to reject the affirmative.

2AC Frontline – Security K

1. Framework: They must disprove the consequences of the plan. Comparing opportunity costs is best for clash and argument refinement, which is a prerequisite to making their framework portable.

2. Perm do both: We can securitize and desecuritize at the same time to make more effective policy.
Austin and Beaulieu-Brossard 2018

("(De)Securitization Dilemmas: Theorising the Simultaneous Enaction of Securitization and Desecuritization." Jonathan Luke Austin, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen, and Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard, professor of Defence Studies at Canadian Forces College, Review of International Studies, Forthcoming 2018, https://jonathanlukeaustin.com/2017/08/20/publication-desecuritization-dilemmas/, VY)

In this article, **we explore the processes by which securitizing moves are frequently simultaneously coupled with desecuritizing moves. We see these simultaneous (de)securitizations as critical moments of political coercion that occur within the (world) politics of security. The demands made by Obama, Reagan, or others upon elements of very broadly securitized referent subjects** (a 'referent subject' is 'what threatens' in Thierry Balzacq's terms3) **are political 'pre-conditions' for the desecuritization of particular groups or individuals within a societal sector. These pre-conditions are frequently laid out at the very moment of securitization itself due to elements of ambiguity that exist within all the key elements of any (de)securitization process**: the securitizing actor(s) themselves and their respective audience(s), as well as referent objects (i.e. 'what is threatened'). However, this simultaneous enaction of desecuritizing pre-conditions with securitizing moves is deeply problematical for classical strands of ST. **Typically, processes of securitization and desecuritization are seen as mutually exclusive.** While securitization is said to represent a turn to the exceptional, desecuritization is spoken of as a return to 'normal' politics. It is generally argued, then, that desecuritization is a process that necessarily follows securitization, temporally: it must come 'after' securitization.

But, as we have now seen, this conceptualization is in fact very frequently empirically falsified and, instead, **desecuritizing moves come with securitizing moves. We provide a theoretical resolution to this paradox of the simultaneous enaction of securitization and desecuritization by developing the methodologies, temporalities, and ontologies of ST.** In doing so, however, **we** seek not to undermine the fundamental tenets of ST but – quite the contrary – to **demonstrate that this process can be comprehended from within the very founding texts of ST.** Indeed, we theorize the simultaneity of (de)securitizing moves by way of a return ST in its – more or less – original form. We propose to move forward by turning back. And we do so precisely in order to theorize the complexity that our empirical phenomenon of concern demonstrates without diluting ST as a collective research programme. Indeed, the possibility (or even necessity) of the simultaneous enaction of securitizing and desecuritizing moves can be tacitly located within the classical literature of ST, whether that of its first (e.g. Waever, Buzan and De Wilde) or second (e.g. Balzacq, Stritzel, and Vuori) generations. Consider indeed ST's founding text – Security: A New Framework for Analysis – and Buzan et al's early words that securitizing speech acts are required to: Follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes an existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out. 4

3. Investing in realism is necessary to solve the problems and impacts presented by emerging technologies like the affirmative. Only realism can prevent these impacts from escalating and solve the impacts of the affirmative.
Kegley and Raymond 2021

("Realism in the Age of Cyber Warfare," Charles W. Kegley, Distinguished Professor of International Relations Emeritus at the University of South Carolina, and Gregory A. Raymond, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Boise State University, April 26, 2021, Carengie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2021/realism-in-the-age-of-cyber-warfare/, VY, ***2 page card***)

The national security implications of cyber warfare are enormous. Consider outer space, which is now recognized as a pivotal war-fighting domain. With the great powers increasingly relying on space-based platforms to monitor enemy movements, communicate with their earth-bound military forces, and provide targeting coordinates to precision guided munitions, protecting orbiting satellites is essential. To be sure, satellites are vulnerable to kinetic threats, such as missiles and space mines, as well as to directed-energy weapons, such as lasers and particle beams. However, a cheaper, less obtrusive way to nullify these vital assets is through a cyberattack that severs their links to control stations on the ground. Once its electronic connections are incapacitated, any country that relies on satellites for reconnaissance, navigation, and communication would find its military seriously weakened, essentially eliminating the option of taking coercive action in a face-off with a rival. The national security implications of cyber warfare are enormous. **A similar problem bedevils automated warfare, a prospect made possible by progress in robotics, sensors, and artificial intelligence. Lethal autonomous weapon systems,** which include aerial drones, submersible vehicles, and terrestrial machines that select and engage targets using pattern recognition software**, may one day be able to collaborate on the battlefield without direct human supervision.** According to some defense policy analysts, packs of these small, inexpensive machines could overwhelm the large, expensive military platforms upon which the world's great powers currently rely. Here again, though, **cutting-edge military technology can be disabled by artful cyberattacks.** A sophisticated hacker could neutralize autonomous weapon systems simply by corrupting their programs. Even partially autonomous weapon systems—those that are not completely independent and self-governing—are vulnerable to digital assaults. Quantum computers, which will be able to perform computations in seconds that otherwise would take conventional computers centuries,[7] amplify the danger posed by hackers. Development of a large-scale operational version of this technology will give its possessor the ability to break standard cryptographic systems, providing that state with unparalleled opportunities to infiltrate and possibly control digital networks in a target country.

The months-long cyberattack on U.S. corporations and government agencies during 2020 highlights the exposure of even the world's most powerful states.[8] **Widely attributed to Russia-linked hackers,** undoing the damage from this massive "supply-chain attack" (the insertion of malicious code into software updates) may take years. Infected networks must be quarantined, replacements constructed, and software fixes developed. Remediation will be time-consuming and difficult. In the judgment of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the ramifications of this breach are staggering, posing a grave risk to both the private and public sectors.[9] Nor are powerful states vulnerable only to cyberattacks from peers. According to a declassified National Intelligence Council document released in March 2021, Iran has carried out multiple cyberoperations against the United States. Other reports have made similar disclosures about North Korea.[10] **In short, cyberweapons are "the great equalizer."**[11] They give middle powers the means to assail larger, stronger states in ways that would have been unimaginable in the past, making traditional threat-assessment methodologies outdated . **As cyber warfare extends interstate competition from the material to the virtual world, not only does the legal distinction between peace and war become archaic but also the calculus by which relative power has commonly been determined is no longer sufficient for assessing threats.** Cyber-enabled physical attacks enable states ranking low on traditional indicators of military capability to sabotage dams, fuel pipelines, and nuclear power plants in distant countries. Cyber-enabled influence operations allow states that heretofore have been deterred from interfering in the domestic affairs of their adversaries to intervene furtively, confident that anonymity in cyberspace protects them from reprisals. New challenges require new responses. The equilibrists of yesterday were consummate Newtonians, steeped in the logic of checks and balances, and proficient at applying counterweights to lessen disparities among jealous rivals. But the chessboard on which politics among nations is now being played has become more complex than during that bygone era. Metaphorically speaking, it is larger, containing additional pieces and new players. Even states that just a few years ago were not considered formidable can now use cybertechnology to strike the world's most prominent nations with stealth and scale. **Given this threat, government officials are likely to gravitate toward security strategies based on anticipatory self-defense**. Support for national defense is firmly entrenched in international law. States are justified in preempting forthcoming attacks and resisting those that are in full swing as long as their responses are proportionate to the danger and only target combatants. Anticipatory self-defense is more expansive. It permits states to take preventive action

without waiting for an imagined threat to materialize. Pitfalls abound, however. Intelligence on an adversary's aspirations, intentions, and capabilities is rarely dispositive. It is usually opaque, incomplete, and nuanced. Signals of gathering dangers may be obscured by background noise, a shroud of secrecy, a well-laid deception campaign, or the analyst's own cognitive biases. In addition to the difficulty of receiving a timely warning precise enough to justify preventive action, a more far-reaching problem exists. By legitimizing the use of force against incipient threats, anticipatory self-defense triggers suspicion, breeds worst-case analyses, and fosters the temptation to launch a first strike—all of which increase the odds of war. If cyber technology makes customary balance-of-power calculations unreliable and anticipatory self-defense is not a fungible remedy, how can states construct a durable framework of world order on a networked planet? Beyond Balancing The difficulty in crafting such a stabilizing framework is exacerbated by the

two-level, multi-party arms competition that currently is occurring. **On one level, the great powers are following the standard realist script by augmenting and upgrading their conventional military arsenals.**

On a second level, they (along with Israel, Iran, and several other middle powers) are developing cyberweapons that have the potential to paralyze those arsenals. Ironically, advantages accruing from the former buildup are being annulled by advances in the

latter, which is why nowadays "it is difficult to understand the balance of forces."12 **To call attention to the problems in applying balance-of-power logic to contemporary world politics does not warrant dismissing realism altogether. On the contrary, cyber warfare renders classical realism's recognition of the pacifying effects of a shared diplomatic code of conduct more relevant than ever.** Ever since Cardinal

Richelieu advised King Louis XIII of France that "**it is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly,"**13 **realists have described patient, pragmatic give and take as a vehicle for advancing national interests while simultaneously mitigating international conflict.** Remaining vigilant, keeping lines of communication open, and backing diplomacy with the capability to respond firmly to instances of improbity are guidelines that seasoned diplomats—realist and liberal—largely follow. To defend the nation, "the art of negotiation is not less useful than that of war," wrote François de Callières in a prominent eighteenth-century manual on statecraft. When broached at the

right moment, "a single word or act may do more than the invasion of whole armies."14 **Classical realists understood that evoking trust, considering issues from the perspective of other nations, and seeking the middle ground on issues short of a vital interest was critical in preserving peace.**15 Doggedly insisting on one's preferences in matters of lesser importance and banking on the ability to pressure opponents into conceding routinely fails when the moment calls for cajoling and conciliation. Persuasion, compromise, and the threat of force—all are required for successful diplomacy, with the degree of emphasis given to each technique determined by the particular circumstances of the situation.

4. Even if it's not perfect, Realism is still the best tool to understand international politics and for policymaking. It is preferable to any alternative. Elashkar 2020

1. Introduction **Realism or realist theory and its intellectual origins represent great value and importance at the level of international relations as well as at the level of modern political thought.** The emergence of the realistic political school that arose after World War II came as a natural response to the failure the Idealist School faced in limiting international conflicts, crises and wars and its inability to prevent, contain or address aspirations and the ambitions of the countries participating in the war. At the time, the realistic school showed its idealized, high vision of what is happening globally. On the one hand**, it became clear that realism came to study and analyze what exists in international relations, and to define the politics of force, wars, and conflicts.** While, on the other hand, it did not come with the purpose of presenting ideas and theories about what international relations should be like idealism did, rather, it was intended to study the world with what actually exists. **There is no doubt that the interactive vision of the real school and its specific theories represents the cornerstone of its existence and has the real values it possesses, which are effective in interpreting foreign policies and their phenomena in general, despite criticisms that may head towards it.** 2. Realism as an Epistemological Theory of Studying the Field of International Relations International relations represent a vast, multi-dimensional and evolving field of knowledge in an unprecedented way, especially in our time. Given that for every domain of knowledge (paradigm), it must have a theory or many theories to study, analyze and evaluate, and explain everything that surrounds it (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). **Realism or Realist Theory emerged as one of the most important theories in studying the field of international relations. There is no doubt that the development of theory and the depth of theorizing together constitute the shortest path or the key to this science, because theory provides us with ways to systematize facts and simultaneously transform those facts into data and information, and then comes the other role of theory in how to select information and important useful data in the processes of description, classification, analysis, interpretation, and prediction** (Faraj, 2007). Realist theory and international relations have gained together a coherent and stable relationship since the emergence of international relations as an independent academic concept or field. This strong relationship has emerged in a clear form since World War II. Thus, realist theory has become the predominant theory in Anglo-American studies because of its interacting potential. Moreover, the role of realism during the Cold War seemed as dominant as the writings of thinkers like Edward Carre and Hans Morgenthau, and visions of prominent politicians like George Kennan and Henry Kissinger played a prominent role in that domination (Faraj, 2007). **That domination the realism has achieved was no mere coincidence. It was particularly attractive in giving clear explanations of everything that happened.** However, the end of the Cold War has accelerated its decline. At the time, it seemed to many specialists that realism was in a fundamental and critical test or dilemma, for a theory that sought to primarily explain the sustainability of the bipolar world (Dunne; Kurki & Smith, 2016).

5. Recent Russian actions prove that Russia is a real geopolitical threat to NATO and is not constructed.

McInnis and Fata 2022

("Russia Is a Real Threat to NATO," Kathleen J. McInnis, senior fellow in the International Security Program and the director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Daniel Fata, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO in the George W. Bush administration, currently a nonresident senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 20, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/20/russia-threat-nato-madrid-summit/, VY)

Recent events in Ukraine have once again proved that reports of NATO's death are an exaggeration. Many leaders across the alliance have been quick to respond to Russia's invasion of Ukraine with aid to Kyiv, increases in their own country's defense budgets, or both. **But as the war grinds on and the geopolitical reality of an adversarial relationship with Russia sets in, NATO must once again take the longer view on what all this means for trans-Atlantic and global security.** Conveniently, in less than two months, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid to endorse the alliance's new strategy. The key question, therefore, is whether member states will use the moment to reforge NATO's raison d'être to meet current and future challenges—**in particular, by naming Russia as a threat to the alliance itself. Given the implications of Ukraine for European and global order, the stakes could hardly be higher.** Some take the view that Madrid should mark a reprioritization of U.S. efforts away from Europe and back toward Asia. Their logic goes that not only is European defense spending increasing, but **Russia has also demonstrated ineptitude in the prosecution of its war in Ukraine.** That means the longer-term need for significant U.S. forces in Europe has also therefore declined. And, after all, China is the pacing threat for Department of Defense planning. In fact, the opposite is true. **For starters, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it abundantly clear that he views NATO as a strategic threat. Recent events suggest we should take these statements at face value.** In the runup to the current war, some analysts developed elaborate rationales for why the buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border didn't mean an invasion was coming, such as a strengthened negotiating position vis-à-vis Ukraine's future political directions. Another Russian invasion of Ukraine was so obviously strategically counterproductive that there must have been another reason for the buildup. In the event, there wasn't. And while Russian military incompetence has been startling, planners shouldn't leap to conclusions. Russian forces were not able to capture Kyiv, but they have been able to seize tens of thousands of square miles of territory along Ukraine's eastern border—at least for now. Estonia, a Baltic NATO member that borders Russia, is less than 20,000 square miles in size. Militaries can also reform, especially after disaster, as Ukraine's own army did after its failures in 2014. **The United States has good reasons to want to keep NATO vibrant:** The strategic benefits of U.S. leadership are manifold. Not only does American leadership in NATO provide pathways for organizing military coalitions, but it also affords the United States privileged status on trade partnerships and access to bases. **If Putin achieves his aim of discrediting NATO, this could lead to trans-Atlantic strategic insolvency: a situation whereby allies, including the United States, are unable to meet their security obligations and, relatedly, maintain favorable standards of living for their populations.** Which brings us back to Madrid. The last time that NATO agreed on a strategic concept was in 2010. It is a document that specified that, among other things, defense of allied territory remains a critical mission for the alliance, but it is silent on naming nation-state threats to NATO. For a variety of domestic and international political reasons, building formal consensus on threats among 30 allied states is extremely challenging. Indeed, in the 2010 document Russia is viewed as an aspirational partner for NATO when it comes to European security—despite the warning sign of Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia. In the intervening years, Russia has conducted destabilizing disinformation campaigns in NATO states and has attacked Ukraine twice. And while NATO leaders have condemned Russian aggression, the rhetoric falls short of formally declaring Russia as a long-term strategic threat to the alliance. Durable consensus requires clarity. To prepare NATO to contend with this threat over the long term requires a frank admission of the strategic realities that Russia poses in the alliance's new strategic concept, to be adopted in Madrid. As a practical matter, this will commit NATO members to take budgeting, force planning, acquisition, and possible troop repositioning seriously—and put teeth into the declaration. This is needed for NATO planners to determine, for example, whether spending 2 percent of GDP on defense is sufficient to meet the challenges to the alliance. But the real value of the document is what the collective members reaffirm as to what NATO continues to stand for, what it calls out as the threats to the member territory, and what it intends to do to address, deter, and, if necessary, defend against these threats. **By stating up front that Russia is a formal threat, member states—and the alliance as a whole—will find it harder to backslide from their current cohesion.** It is difficult to overstate how important it is for NATO to ensure its consensus is durable; as the war grinds on and publics begin feeling the economic effects of the conflict and sanctions on Russia, the temptation to dilute support to Ukraine will undoubtedly mount. Not to mention, calling it like it is will send an important message to Putin: NATO will not be deterred. Words matter. It is time for NATO leaders to formally accept reality: **Putin is a threat to the alliance and its members, and, therefore, they should declare so in the news strategic concept.** Indeed, not declaring Russia a formal threat to NATO territory would compromise NATO's

credibility and would give Putin a pass for the atrocities and violations he has committed in Ukraine. Neither NATO nor the United States can afford to allow that to happen.

2AC Climate Change Impact Turn

6. Embracing modern security logic is necessary to solve global warming. Only global security is large enough to solve.

Causevic 2017

("Facing an Unpredictable Threat: Is NATO Ideally Placed to Manage Climate Change as a Non-Traditional Threat Multiplier?" Amar Causevic, researcher at Global Economic Dynamics and the Biosphere program at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2017, https://connections-qj.org/article/facing-unpredictable-threat-nato-ideally-placed-manage-climate-change-non-traditional-threat, VY)

Understanding climate change as a security threat means understanding security in the twenty-first century. In the traditional sense, security revolves around the idea of survival. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde of the Copenhagen School introduced the theory **that the existential threats to security depend on the "relation to the particular character of the referent object in question."**[19] There is no universal standard that can define threats. **The environmental sector encompasses broad fields of threats to security;** it ranges from issues of survival of the species to large-scale issues such as minimizing the impact of big floods. Non-traditional threats are harder to define and require different response strategies because they focus on the relationship between human civilization and the biosphere, and not on the relationship among states themselves. Climate change impacts cause two types of threats: (i) easily securitized (e.g. survival of human civilization); and (ii) non-easily securitized (e.g. destruction of the entire ecosystem). **Unlike traditional security threats that imply the ignition of one security risk at different points of time, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that climate change may initiate multiple chronic conditions, which could occur simultaneously on a global level.** In 2014, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel unveiled the Pentagon's Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. **The central argument of this document is that climate change is a threat capable of multiplying and aggravating already existing problems (water shortages, droughts, etc.) as well as generating fertile ground for future security threats**.[20] **Climate change is able to accelerate instability and exacerbate other drivers of insecurity that will simultaneously affect the environmental, economic, social, and political fabric of any modern society.** Nonetheless, the theory of climate security has been exposed to criticism. Alan Dupont, an academic at the University of Sydney, states that environmental threats are not going to act as main triggers of major conflict between states.[21] In his opinion, climate change impacts complicate existing disputes and create tensions, but they do not act as a direct cause of conflict. Daniel Deudney, a professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University with strong connections to the theory of geopolitics and republicanism, is completely against the idea of environmental security. According to Deudney, the concept of national security is centered on the idea of organized violence.[22] Hence, he argues that natural disasters are elements of unorganized violence that cannot be included under the umbrella of national security doctrine. In his view, national security planning is characterized by a zero-sum assessment, nationalism, and power maximization. Therefore, threats from climate change are not logical inputs to any of these concepts and including them in security calculations only creates confusion in the political leadership and makes them prone to conducting an impetuous foreign policy. Deudney's concept of national security as organized violence is in complete contrast to the national security policies of some European Union (EU) and NATO member states. Addressing climate change through the mitigation principle has been firmly integrated into EU-wide 20-20-20 greenhouse gases (GHGs) policy reduction targets.[23] Correspondingly, in 2016 the German government issued a white paper, which categorizes climate change as permanent item on its national security agenda.[24] Beck classifies climate change as a threat that is so large it cannot be contained on the national level, but is more a concern with global implications. Moreover, he argues the following on the notion of global risk, "The experience of global risks is an occurrence of abrupt and fully conscious confrontation with the apparently excluded other. Global risks tear down national boundaries and jumble together the native with the foreign."[25] Wolfers agrees that the nature and source of a threat define the scope of security**. Securitizing climate change is necessary because climate change is inseparable from human security. At present, traditional security discourse must reexamine its state-centric conceptual approach to security.** A monodisciplinary approach that emphasizes the maximization of power is highly unlikely to comprehend and respond to the serious existential challenges facing humanity in the twenty-first century. In order to properly confront the threat of climate change, states will need to develop an interdisciplinary approach that includes the inputs of a range of experts from environmentalists to defense specialists.

7. Climate change must be addressed now with policy changes. This is the only way to avoid ecological disaster and mass extinctions.
Weston 2021

("Top scientists warn of 'ghastly future of mass extinction' and climate disruption," Phoebe Weston, 13 Jan 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jan/13/top-scientists-warn-of-ghastly-future-of-mass-extinction-and-climate-disruption-aoe)

The planet is facing a "ghastly future of mass extinction, declining health and climate-disruption upheavals" that threaten human survival because of ignorance and inaction, according to an international group of scientists, who warn people still haven't grasped the urgency of the biodiversity and climate crises. The 17 experts, including Prof Paul Ehrlich from Stanford University, author of The Population Bomb, and scientists from Mexico, Australia and the US, say **the planet is in a much worse state than most people – even scientists – understood. "The scale of the threats to the biosphere and all its lifeforms – including humanity – is in fact so great that it is difficult to grasp for even well-informed experts,"** they write in a report in Frontiers in Conservation Science which references more than 150 studies detailing the world's major environmental challenges. The delay between destruction of the natural world and the impacts of these actions means people do not recognise how vast the problem is**,** the paper argues. **"[The] mainstream is having difficulty grasping the magnitude of this loss, despite the steady erosion of the fabric of human civilisation." The report warns that climate-induced mass migrations, more pandemics and conflicts over resources will be inevitable unless urgent action is taken.** "Ours is not a call to surrender – we aim to provide leaders with a realistic 'cold shower' of the state of the planet that is essential for planning to avoid a ghastly future," it adds. **Dealing with the enormity of the problem requires far-reaching changes** to global capitalism, education and equality, the paper says. These include abolishing the idea of perpetual economic growth, properly pricing environmental externalities, stopping the use of fossil fuels, reining in corporate lobbying, and empowering women, the researchers argue. The report comes months after the world failed to meet a single UN Aichi biodiversity target, created to stem the destruction of the natural world, the second consecutive time governments have failed to meet their 10-year biodiversity goals. This week a coalition of more than 50 countries pledged to protect almost a third of the planet by 2030. **An estimated one million species are at risk of extinction, many within decades, according** to a recent UN report. "Environmental deterioration is infinitely more threatening to civilisation than Trumpism or Covid-19," Ehrlich told the Guardian. In The Population Bomb, published in 1968, Ehrlich warned of imminent population explosion and hundreds of millions of people starving to death. Although he has acknowledged some timings were wrong, he has said he stands by its fundamental message that population growth and high levels of consumption by wealthy nations is driving destruction. He told the Guardian: "Growthmania is the fatal disease of civilisation - it must be replaced by campaigns that make equity and well-being society's goals - not consuming more junk." **Large populations and their continued growth drive soil degradation and biodiversity loss,** the new paper warns. "More people means that more synthetic compounds and dangerous throwaway plastics are manufactured, many of which add to the growing toxification of the Earth. **It also increases the chances of pandemics that fuel ever-more desperate hunts for scarce resources." The effects of the climate emergency are more evident than biodiversity loss, but still, society is failing to cut emissions,** the paper argues. **If people understood the magnitude of the crises, changes in politics and policies could match the gravity of the threat.** "Our main point is that once you realise the scale and imminence of the problem, it becomes clear that we need much more than individual actions like using less plastic, eating less meat, or flying less. Our point is that **we need big systematic changes and fast**," Professor Daniel Blumstein from the University of California Los Angeles, who helped write the paper, told the Guardian. The paper cites a number of key reports published in the past few years including: The World Economic Forum report in 2020, which named biodiversity loss as one of the top threats to the global economy. The 2019 IPBES Global Assessment report which said 70% of the planet had been altered by humans. The 2020 WWF Living Planet report, which said the average population size of vertebrates had declined by 68% in the past five decades. A 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report which said that humanity had already exceeded global warming of 1C above pre-industrial levels and is set to reach 1.5C warming between 2030 and 2052. The report follows years of stark warnings about the state of the planet from the world's leading scientists, including a statement by 11,000 scientists in 2019 that people will face "untold suffering due to the climate crisis" unless major changes are made. In 2016, more than 150 of Australia's climate scientists wrote an open letter to the then prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, demanding immediate action on reducing emissions. In the same year, 375 scientists – including 30 Nobel prize winners – wrote an open letter to the world about their frustrations over political inaction on climate change. Prof Tom Oliver, an ecologist at the University of Reading, who was not involved in the report, said **it was a frightening but credible summary of the grave threats society faces under a "business as usual" scenario. "Scientists now need to go beyond simply documenting environmental decline, and instead find the most effective ways to catalyse action,"** he said. Prof Rob Brooker, head of ecological sciences at the James Hutton Institute, who was not involved in the study, said it clearly emphasised the pressing nature of the challenges. **"We certainly should not be in any doubt about the huge scale of the challenges we are facing and the changes we will need to make to deal with them,"** he said.

1AR Realism Good Extensions

Realism is the most useful lens to explain modern international politics. Anything else fails to explain the world. This means the politics of the affirmative are necessary for sound policymaking.

Walt 2018

("The World Wants You to Think Like a Realist," Stephen M. Walt, columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, May 30, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/30/the-world-wants-you-to-think-like-a-realist/, VY, ***2 page card***)

Realism has a long history and many variants, but its core rests on a straightforward set of ideas. As the name implies, **realism tries to explain world politics as they really are, rather than describe how they ought to be.** For realists, power is the centerpiece of political life: Although other factors sometimes play a role, the key to understanding politics lies in focusing on who has power and what they are doing with it. The Athenians' infamous warning to the Melians captures this perfectly: "The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must." Quentin Tarantino couldn't have put it any better. **For realists, states are the key actors in the international system.** There is no central authority that can protect states from one another, so each state must rely upon its own resources and strategies to survive. Security is a perennial concern — even for powerful states — and states tend to worry a lot about who is weaker or stronger and what power trends appear to be. Cooperation is far from impossible in such a world — indeed, at times cooperating with others is essential to survival — but it is always somewhat fragile**. Realists maintain that states will react to threats first by trying to "pass the buck" (i.e., getting someone else to deal with the emerging danger), and if that fails, they will try to balance against the threat, either by seeking allies or by building up their own capabilities.** Realism isn't the only way to think about international affairs, of course, and there are a number of alternative perspectives and theories that can help us understand different aspects of the modern world. But if you do think like a realist — at least part of the time — many confusing aspects of world politics become easier to understand. **If you think like a realist, for example, you'll understand why China's rise is a critical event and likely to be a source of conflict with the United States** (and others). In a world where states have to protect themselves, the two most powerful states will eye each other warily and compete to make sure that they don't fall behind or become dangerously vulnerable to the other. Even when war is avoided, intense security competition is likely to result. And by the way, thinking like a realist helps you understand why China is no longer committed to Deng Xiaoping's policy of "peaceful rise." That approach made sense when China was weaker, and it fooled plenty of Westerners into thinking China could be inveigled into being a responsible stakeholder that would meekly embrace various institutions and arrangements created by others back when China was weak. But realists understand that a more powerful China would eventually want to modify any features that were not in China's interest, as Beijing has begun to do in recent years. Bottom line: **Thinking like a realist is essential if you want to understand Sino-American relations. If you think like a realist, you wouldn't be surprised that the United States has repeatedly used military force in distant lands** over the past 25 years and especially after 9/11. Why? For one simple reason: Nobody could prevent it. Americans were also convinced their global role was indispensable and that they had the right, the responsibility, and the wisdom to interfere all over the world. But America's dominant position was the permissive condition that made this overweening ambition seem feasible, at least for a while. As Kenneth Waltz warned way back in 1993: "One may hope that America's internal preoccupations will produce not an isolationist policy, which has become impossible, but a forbearance that will give other countries at long last the chance to deal with their own problems and make their own mistakes. But I would not bet on it." Good realist that he was, Waltz understood that the "vice to which great powers easily succumb in a multipolar world is inattention; in a bipolar world, overreaction; in a unipolar world, overextension." And that's precisely what happened. **If you think like a realist, the crisis in Ukraine looks rather different than the typical Western version of events. Western accounts typically blame Putin for most of the trouble, but realists understand that major powers are always sensitive about their borders and are likely to react defensively if other great powers start encroaching on these regions.** Ever heard of the Monroe Doctrine? In the case of Ukraine, the United States and its European allies had been expanding NATO steadily eastward (violating pledges made to Soviet leaders when Germany reunified) and ignoring repeated warnings from Moscow. By 2013, the United States and European Union were making a concerted effort to pull Ukraine into closer alignment with the West and openly interfering in Ukraine's domestic political processes. Because the Obama administration did not think like realists, however, it was blindsided when Putin seized Crimea and derailed the EU/U.S. effort. Putin's response was neither legal nor legitimate nor admirable, but it wasn't surprising either. It is equally unsurprising that these events alarmed the Europeans and prompted NATO to shore up its defenses in Eastern Europe, precisely as a realist would expect. **Thinking like a realist can also help you understand why the EU is in trouble.** The entire EU project was designed to transcend nationalism and subordinate state interests within broader supranational institutions. Its architects hoped the separate national identities and interests that had

torn Europe apart repeatedly would fade over time and a broad pan-European identity would supplant them. European unity was facilitated by the Cold War because the Soviet threat gave Western Europe ample incentive to cooperate, gave the Soviets' Eastern European satellites an ideal to aspire to, and kept the "American pacifier" on the continent. But once the Cold War was over, nationalism returned with a vengeance and especially after the euro crisis hit. Suddenly, populations wanted their elected officials not to save Europe but to save them. Despite herculean efforts by a number of European leaders and EU officials, these centrifugal tendencies seem to be getting worse, as the Brexit decision, the recent elections in Italy, and the resurgent nationalism in Poland and Hungary all attest. Those who hoped that European integration would prove irreversible have trouble understanding how their noble experiment went awry, but realists don't. **If you think like a realist, you might not be quite so outraged by the support that Iran and Syria gave the anti-American insurgency in Iraq after 2003.** You might not like it, but you wouldn't find their conduct surprising. Their response was classic balance of power behavior because the United States had just overthrown Saddam Hussein and the Bush administration had made it clear that Syria and Iran were next on its hit list. It made good strategic sense for Damascus and Tehran to do whatever they could to keep the United States bogged down in Iraq so that Washington couldn't reload the shotgun and come after them. Americans have every reason to be upset by what these states did, but if more U.S. officials thought like realists, they would have expected it from the get-go. **And if you think like a realist, it is obvious why North Korea has gone to enormous lengths to acquire a nuclear deterrent and obvious why a country such as Iran was interested in becoming a latent nuclear weapons state as well.** These states were deeply at odds with the world's most powerful country, and prominent U.S. officials kept saying that the only solution was to topple these regimes and replace them with leaders more to their liking. Never mind that regime change rarely works as intended; the more important point is that any government facing a threat like that is going to try to protect itself. Nuclear weapons aren't good for blackmail or conquest, but they are a very effective way to deter more powerful states from trying to overthrow you with military force. And you'd think Americans would understand this, given that the U.S. government thinks it needs thousands of nuclear weapons in order to be secure, despite its favorable geographic position and overwhelming conventional superiority. If U.S. leaders think like that, is it any wonder that some weaker and more vulnerable powers conclude that having a few nukes might make them more secure? And is it so surprising that they might be reluctant to give them up in exchange for assurances or promises that might easily be reversed or withdrawn? Someone really should explain this logic to John Bolton. **Thinking like a realist also helps you understand why states with radically different political systems often act in surprisingly similar ways.** To take an obvious example, the United States and Soviet Union could not have been more different in terms of their domestic orders, but their international behavior was much the same. Each led vast alliance networks, toppled governments they didn't like, assassinated a number of foreign leaders, built tens of thousand of nuclear weapons (deployed on missiles, bombers, and submarines), intervened in far-flung lands, tried to convert other societies to their preferred ideology, and did what they could to bring the other down without blowing up the world. Why did they behave in such similar fashion? Because in an anarchic world, each had little choice but to compete with the other, lest it fall behind and become vulnerable to the other's predations. Last but not least, **if you think like a realist, you're likely to be skeptical about the ambitious schemes that idealists keep dreaming up to bring an end to conflict, injustice, inequality, and other bad things. Striving to build a safer and more peaceful world is admirable, but realism reminds us that the ambitious efforts to remake world politics always create unintended consequences and rarely deliver the promised results.** It also reminds that even allies fear unchecked power and will have misgivings whenever the United States tries to run the world. If you think like a realist, in short, **you are more likely to act with a degree of prudence, and you'll be less likely to see opponents as purely evil** (or see one's own country as wholly virtuous) **and less likely to embark on open-ended moral crusades. Ironically, if more people thought like realists, the prospects for peace would go up.**

1AR Security Key to Climate Extension

Security rhetoric, particularly about climate change, is necessary to find policy solutions and motivate action.

Scott 2012

("The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have We Come and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?" Shirley V. Scott is an associate professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 2012, https://www2.helsinki.fi/sites/default/files/atoms/files/scott_shirley_v_2012_the_securitization_of_climate_change_in_world_politics_0.pdf, VY)

More specifically, **framing climate change as a security issue could serve to enhance and broaden the policy response at various governance levels by facilitating policy makers and their publics recognizing the common origins of what may otherwise appear as unconnected phenomena. Debate about climate change is often couched in terms of a hypothetical future: by how much the temperature will rise, by how much countries should reduce their emissions, and the nightmare scenarios that may come into play if they fail to do so.** We hear, for example, that by 2050 fifty million people may have been displaced from the coastal belts of Bangladesh.78 This focus on what may appear a hypothetical future renders climate change a particularly daunting and difficult policy arena for governments because, as NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen explained: The science is not yet perfect. The effects are just starting to be visible, but it's difficult to pin down what's actually changing because of climate change. The timelines are not clear either. And as a politician, I know exactly what that means. When we have to choose between spending money now on schools or health care, or diverting funds to try to prevent something that will likely only hurt long after they have left office, the choice for most leaders is pretty clear. And, let me say, not hard to understand.79 **Once**, however, **various issues of contemporary security are all seen as interrelated via climate change, the need to respond as expeditiously as possible should appear even more obvious.** Consider, for example, the violence between Sudan and South Sudan. South Sudan broke away from Sudan in July 2011 following a decades-long civil war. The boundary was not fully demarcated at the time, however; nor was there agreement as to how to share the oil wealth found in the border region. This led to violence around the border region, and in April 2012 Sudan claimed to have killed hundreds of South Sudanese during a day-long battle for Heglig, Sudan's most important oil field.80 At first glance, this situation might seem unrelated to the jockeying for positions that is taking place in relation to increasingly accessible resources of the Arctic or to recent extreme weather events elsewhere in the world. Although the extent to which the Sudan conflict has been caused by climate change is not universally agreed, it is clear that climatic changes are impacting on the availability of water, exacerbating tensions stemming from the distribution of wealth from oil and the increasing difficulty of maintaining a pastoralist lifestyle.81 Such topics may already have been addressed by the relevant institutions but not explicitly recognized as being underpinned by climate change per se. **Once all are perceived in a climate change frame, the political will to undertake far-reaching mitigation and adaptation efforts may well increase markedly.** CONCLUSIONS **Climate change is an interesting case study for theorists of securitization because, despite plenty of climate security rhetoric, the effectiveness of the global policy response continues to lag well behind the alleged seriousness of the issue with which the world is confronted. This begs the question as to whether the theorists overestimated the potential power of security discourse** or whether in this case the process is simply slower than its protagonists might have hoped. All in all, the jury is still out on the ultimate effectiveness of securitizing climate change. What the debates in the Security Council in particular have made clear is that, at least so far as climate change is concerned, if we are to understand why some audiences remain unconvinced by securitizing moves, **we need to ask what the political and legal implications of full securitization would be for each actor in terms of the key questions in dispute. For most members of the climate securitization 'audience', their degree of acceptance of climate security has to date been determined primarily by the implications in respect of institutional powers and associated scope for those audience members contributing to law making as well as bearing the costs of the necessary action.**

1AR AT: Climate Change Impact Constructed

The threat of climate change is real, science-based, and human caused.
Harrington 2022

("Scientists agree: Climate change is real and caused by people," Samantha Harrington, Associate Editor of Yale Climate Connections, February 17, 2022, https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2022/02/scientists-agree-climate-change-is-real-and-caused-by-people/, VY)

The scientific consensus that climate change is happening and that it is human-caused is strong. Scientific investigation of global warming began in the 19th century, and by the early 2000s, this research began to coalesce into confidence about the reality, causes, and general range of adverse effects of global warming. This conclusion was drawn from studying air and ocean temperatures, the atmosphere's composition, satellite records, ice cores, modeling, and more. In 1988 the United Nations and World Meteorological Organization founded the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, to provide regular updates on the scientific evidence on global warming. In a 2013 report, the IPCC concluded that scientific evidence of warming is "unequivocal" and that the largest cause is an increase of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere as a result of humans burning fossil fuels. The IPCC continues to assess this science, periodically issuing new reports. **Climate change is real and caused by humans The IPCC is not the only scientific group that has reached a clear consensus on the scientific evidence of human-caused global warming.** As this NASA page points out, **200 global scientific organizations, 11 international science academies, and 18 American science associations have released statements in alignment with this consensus.** Amanda Staudt is the senior director for climate, atmospheric and polar sciences at the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, where she has worked since 2001. The Academies, she said, first began studying climate change in 1979, researching how much warming would likely happen if the amount of carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere were doubled. Four decades later, **those findings have held up and have been strengthened based on scores of continued studies and analysis.** "The remarkable thing about that study," she said, "is that they basically got the right answer" from the start. This 1979 study by the National Research Council, Staudt said, led to investment in climate science in the U.S. **Though this consensus has been thoroughly established, scientific research and new findings continue.** Staudt said countless attempted rebuttals of climate science findings have been researched and disproved. "We did a lot of studies in that time period, looking at those questions," she said, "and one by one, putting them to bed and **convincing ourselves over and over again, that humans were affecting climate, and that we could document that effect."** At the National Academies, reaching consensus requires open sessions and dialogue with scientists and agreement from committees, which typically consist of 12-15 experts. Their draft reports go through peer review, and reviewers' concerns are resolved before publication is approved. The goal is for the complex science of climate change to become as thoroughly researched and substantiated as possible. "One of the things I think about scientists is that we're all inherently skeptics at some level," Staudt said. "That's what drives us to science, that we have questions about the world around us. And we want to prove that for ourselves." **Scientists consistently reaffirm evidence that climate change is happening** Climate scientists worldwide go through similar processes before their findings are published. And their research papers, too, show a strong consensus about global warming. As NASA states on its website, "**Multiple studies published in peer-reviewed scientific journals show that 97 percent or more of actively publishing climate scientists agree: Climate-warming trends over the past century are extremely likely due to human activities."** (By sound practice, scientists resist saying science is for all times "certain" or that its findings are "final," and the "extremely likely" language respects that practice.) One of the studies about the consensus was led by John Cook, a fellow at the Climate Change Communication Research Hub at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. Cook and colleagues reviewed nearly 12,000 scientific papers to examine how aligned published research is on major findings on climate change. That study found that 97 percent of scholarly papers that take a position on climate change do endorse the consensus. The papers that rejected the consensus position contained errors, according to subsequent research.

1AR Climate Change Impact Extensions

Climate change is the greatest threat to human survival. We must act now or risk catastrophic collapse of society and human extinction.

Specktor 2019

("Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims," Brandon Specktor, June 04, 2019, https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html)

It seems every week there's a scary new report about how man-made climate change is going to cause the collapse of the world's ice sheets, result in the extinction of up to 1 million animal species and — if that wasn't bad enough — make our beer very, very expensive. This week, a new policy paper from an Australian think tank claims that those other reports are slightly off; **the risks of climate change are actually much, much worse than anyone can imagine.** According to the paper, **climate change poses a "near- to mid-term existential threat to human civilization," and there's a good chance society could collapse as soon as 2050 if serious mitigation actions aren't taken in the next decade.** Published by the Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration in Melbourne (an independent think tank focused on climate policy) and authored by a climate researcher and a former fossil fuel executive, the paper's central thesis is that **climate scientists are too restrained in their predictions of how climate change will affect the planet in the near future.** [Top 9 Ways the World Could End] **The current climate crisis,** they say, **is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. General climate models — like the one that the** United Nations' Panel on Climate Change (**IPCC**) **used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of** 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (**2 degrees Celsius**) **could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes;** as such, **they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth,** the authors wrote**, is probably far worse than any models can fathom.** How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. **At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the Amazon rainforest (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions. "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability,"** the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, **droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert. Entire ecosystems collapse, beginning with the planet's coral reefs, the rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets.** The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture **and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees. This mass movement of refugees — coupled with shrinking coastlines and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to stress the fabric of the world's largest nations,** including the United States. **Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in nuclear war, are likely.** The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps "**the end of human global civilization as we know it." How can this catastrophic vision of the future be prevented? Only with the people of the world accepting climate change for the emergency it is and getting to work — immediately. According to the paper's authors, the human race has about one decade left to mount a global movement to transition the world economy to a zero-carbon-emissions system.** (Achieving zero-carbon emissions requires either not emitting carbon or balancing carbon emissions with carbon removal.) The effort required to do so "would be akin in scale to the World War II emergency mobilization," the authors wrote. The new policy paper was endorsed with a foreword by Adm. Chris Barrie, a retired Australian defense chief and senior royal navy commander who has testified before the Australian Senate about the devastating possibilities climate change poses to national security and overall human well-being. "I told the [Senate] Inquiry that, after nuclear war, **human-induced global warming is the greatest threat to human life on the planet,"** Barrie wrote in the new paper. **"Human life on Earth may be on the way to extinction, in the most horrible way."**

1AR AT: Climate Extinction Discourse Bad

Climate apocalypticism leads to activism that averts catastrophe—studies prove. This means that the extinction framing of the affirmative is GOOD and motivates change.

Veldman 2012

("Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse", Robin Globus Veldman, doctoral candidate in the Religion and Nature program at the University of Florida, Volume 17, Number 1, Spring 2012, Ethics & the Environment, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/ethicsenviro.17.1.1)

Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that **apocalypticism** also often **goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence** of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism **comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous.** As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz **identified several "interpretive communities," which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in** their levels of **risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled "alarmists," described climate change** [End Page 5] **using apocalyptic language,** such as "Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation," "Heat waves, it's gonna kill the world," and "Death of the planet" (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. **If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary,** however, **Leiserowitz found that alarmists "were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions"** (ibid.) **than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat.**

Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz's findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled "**the Alarmed"** (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) "**are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response"** (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that **"[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet** (31%)" (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this **group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe,** rather than some other motivation, **that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies** (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) **provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.**