# CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

## Background to the Study

Apart from the challenges of poverty, sectarian, economic and political crises, and Niger Delta Militancy, Nigeria is currently facing a deeper and profound challenge of insurgency, especially in the North-Eastern region of the country. In the past two years, one have witnessed the vulnerability of the Nigerian state to insurgents, criminality and instability. The list of these disheartening phenomena includes, but is not limited to the bombing of several Churches, Mosques, Police Stations, Schools and Prisons in Bauchi, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.[1] Other parts of the country were not spared, as the sect-bombing activities were witnessed in the Federal capital territory, Abuja, Plateau, Kaduna and Kano states. The bombing of the United Nations office in Abuja is perhaps what the insurgents used to gain global recognition; as they are now listed amongst terrorist organizations by the United States and its allies. Available statistics on the number of deaths and property lost to Boko Haram insurgency between 2009 and 2018 to say the least is highly controversial. Over 10,000 people (including women and children) have been killed and properties worth over 100 million dollars have been destroyed during the period under discussion review.[2]

Using various variables, several scholars have tried to intellectualize what drives Boko Haram insurgents to carry out ferocious attacks against other people. Some have used religion to explain their act of violence, by simply arguing that there is something in their religion that

[1]C. Okoli, "Nigeria: Volunteer Vigilantism and Counter-Insurgency in the North-East", *Conflict Studies*, Quarterly Issue 20, 2017, 34-35.

[2]F. Akpan, O. Ekanem and A. Olofu-Adeoye, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria", *Canadian Social Science*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, 151.

influences them to undertake violence on a large scale. However, this argument is weak, because there is no significant relationship between being a Muslim and being a terrorist. Apart from that, the group attacks both Muslims and Christian. Some others have used political, sociological and psychological variables to explain their action.[3] The key point is that terrorism is not a mono-causal phenomenon. Rather, it is a multi-causal one. A multi-analytical approach provides powerful insights for understanding terrorism around the globe compared to the religion-focused theory that is mono-causal in nature.

Insurgency in the northeast has taken its toll on human lives, economy, hampered the all-round development and has continued to act as a divide between the tribal's and non-tribal's. This has prevented integration and cross-cultural exchange and most importantly, there has been no solution to the age long war. The Boko Haram insurgency started in 2002 as a domestic Islamic religious group in Maiduguri, Borno State, in northern Nigeria. The insurgent group clearly opposed the Nigerian government and Western influence in the northern part of Nigeria as it sought to introduce Sharia law.[4] Like most insurgent groups, the Boko Haram sect resorted to the use of violence and guerrilla tactics against the Nigerian state in an attempt to undermine the government. Unlike other insurgent groups, the Boko Haram wanted to replace government rule and establish a Caliphate within the northern region. Despite the efforts by the Nigerian government to curtail the insurgent group Boko Haram has transformed into a transnational threat, thereby creating more concern for the international community. Boko Haram currently operates throughout the Republic of Niger,

[3]M. Mustapha, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Dynamics of Counter-Insurgency Approach in Northeast of Nigeria", *Journal of Resources and Economic Development*, Vol.1, No.1 2018,157-171.

[4]F. Akpan, O. Ekanem and A. Olofu-Adeoye, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria", *Canadian Social Science*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, 154.

Chad, and Cameroon.[5] The group has carried out series of coordinated attacks against citizens, government officials, military forces, and foreigners in order to create fear, gain popularity, or inspire other Islamic extremist groups and individuals. Consequently, the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents have threatened the existence of the sovereign state of Nigeria and its neighbours within the Lake Chad Basin.

Boko Haram insurgence has been a major threat to the Nigerian state since 2009 killing thousands of people and causing wanton destruction of both private and public property worth of billion of naira.[6] Being an anti-government establishment, Boko Haram has directed its attacks on the security agencies and government institutions which it believed were bastions of injustice, corruption and maladministration. This is derived from the extremist sect`s abhorrence of western education, civilization and values and its bid to Islamize the country. The lslamic sect had unleashed terror attacks on the innocent citizens which cut across ethnic and religious divides. In Nigeria today, especially in the North-East region where Boko Haram insurgent activities are more pronounced, nobody is safe. In response to response to high levels of terrorist attacks in the region, the Federal government declared state of emergency in some local governments of Borno and Yobe States in January of 2012. When the insurgency continued unabated, state of emergency was extended to the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa in May, 2013.[7] The insurgents had also unleashed terror attacks on travellers on both inter-state and trans-border road travels in the area. Most of the motorists and travellers had fallen victims of either killed or kidnapped by the insurgents on

[5]D. Iweze, "Insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria and its Implications on Inter-State and Trans-Border Mobility" *Calabar Historical Journal*, Vol.3, No.1, 2017, 170.

[6]D. Iweze, "Insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria and its Implications on Inter-State and Trans-Border Mobility" *Calabar Historical Journal*, Vol.3, No.1, 2017, 171.

[7]C. Juliet, "Re-Defining Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Nigeria: Towards Achieving Security in the North-East Region", *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, Volume III, Issue V, 2019, 57.

the major highways. It is against this background that this paper looks at the risk posed by insurgents in the region and its implications on inter-state and trans-border mobility.

In any war situation, the level of hierarchy in the army or the fighting forces is of primary importance. While strategy is mostly formulated at the highest political level, the order and executive details are generally formulated down the line. The actual execution of the strategies is, however, done by the leaders in the forces, who implement the strategies on the ground. This is also applicable in traditional war situations. Any kind of insurgency and militancy is a serious threat to the internal security and stability, in view of the sensitive position of Nigeria in the face of hostile neighbours. Moreover, it threatens the political structure of the country, and consequently the entire political socio-economic fabric of the country. Thus, there is an urgent need to formulate a constructive and concrete strategy to combat such threats, and at the same time, measures must be adopted and implemented to look into the grievances and aspirations of the people which when left unattended, drive them to take up extreme steps. Counter-insurgency is a difficult task. It is not limited to the army alone, it involves a multitude of agents which have to work in close coordination, to successfully counter the activities of the insurgents. It has been proved beyond a shadow of doubt that when military means alone is adopted, neglecting the political and social dimension, counter-insurgency cannot claim to have any far reaching success. There are innumerable obstacles in effective counter-insurgency measures.

**Statement of the Research Problem**

A lot has been written both by scholars and policy makers on the emergence of Boko Haram and the counterinsurgency operations of the government. The extant work so far either discussed the counterinsurgency activities of the government or assumed that everything so far done was done by the military. Military leaders, therefore, are very important assets of the

military. In order for military commanders to be good leaders, they are supposed to follow a strict path of training and practical experiments for quite long time while in services. There is therefore need for the military leaders to be more transformational. The role of leadership in all its ramifications in counterinsurgency in the Northeast region has not attracted adequate scholarly attention. It is against this backdrop that this study sets out to examine the role of leadership in counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast region of Nigeria with focus on Borno state.

**Aim and Objectives the Study**

The aim of the study is to give a comprehensive critique of leadership and counter-insurgency in the Northeast Nigeria with focus on Borno state. The specific objectives of the research are to:

i. to highlight the evolution and growth of the North East Region of Nigeria
ii. to examine the origin and evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria.
iii. to quantify Boko Haram's threat to both human and national security since its inception in Nigeria and
iv. to investigate the role and challenges faced by both the military and civic leadership in countering Boko Haram and suggest possible ways of overcoming such challenges.

**Theoretical Framework**

This research is anchored on two Theoretical Frameworks – Social disorganisation theory and Karl Marx conflict theory.

Social disorganization theory, popularized by Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, argues that widespread poverty and social instability in urban poor neighbourhoods correlates directly to gang development and the spread of crime. Social disorganization occurs when a

community is unable to achieve shared values, and when there is a breakdown in community institutions such as churches, schools, and most importantly families. Disorganization intensifies in areas with structural deficiencies such as, high rates of unemployment, and low rates of educational achievement are concentrated in urban neighbourhoods.

Although this theory buttresses some of the factors that led to the emergency and sustenance of insurgency and Boko haram, it does not amplify the fundamental root causal factors of exploitation of the proletariats or peasants by the ruling class and the failure of Government in upholding its side of the bargain of social contract hence the Marxist conflict theory and the frustration-aggression theory which establishes that deprivation, exploitation and other forms of social, economic and political injustice in the society are the drivers and triggers of frustration and aggression which gives birth to insurgency.

This Marxist Conflict Theory which was developed by the German idealist and Philosopher, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels believes that uneven distribution of nature's wealth would be sustained by laws where the bourgeoisie would compel the proletariat to accept their current repressive conditions. Marx believes that as the proletariat (for instance, the poor and working class) continues to be subjected to worsening forms of dehumanization, deprivation and lack, there would be a mass revolution which will inspire a change in the control and distribution of the means of production.

Thus the massive inequalities and inequities in the North East engendered by only a few individuals (for instance, bourgeoisie) amassing and accumulating all of societal wealth meant for the entire society to themselves while the masses wallow in abject penury make conflict inevitable.

**Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The scope of this study is basically centered on the activities of Boko Haram and the role of leadership in fighting the Boko Haram debacle. The research timeline shall be canalized to the period when the Boko Haram became active as an Islamic Jihadi sect, evolved into a radical Islamic insurgent group and eventually labelled a terrorist organization. This period marked the emergence of the sect and the crescendo of their activities judging from security

force fatalities of 750 in 2019 which is the highest since the insurgency began. [8]Hence, our scope of study shall be between 2009 and 2019.

The limitations of the study include not being able to fund and travel to the North East Region to get first-hand information for obvious reasons, as there is still ongoing crisis and also to travel to countries surrounding Nigeria where Boko Haram attacks occur. Another Limitation is paucity of materials as it is contemporary and there are very few materials on the study. Also there is the objectivity of informants, as the informants may be biased as a result of their religious belief or their own sentiments and prejudice.

However, these limitations were tackled, by interviewing soldiers who had fought against Boko Haram in the North East and have been deployed back and also eyewitness and victims of the attacks. I also interview informants of different religious views and belief and got as much information as possible, compare then get as much relative truth from the information gotten.

**Justification of the Study**

Counter-insurgency strategy is any measure adopted by States to prevent, pre-empt, counter and respond to insurgency and terrorism. Though counter-insurgency differs in certain aspect, they generally include any step taken to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately, defeat insurgents and terrorist organisations. It is the right and duty of every State to take effective counter-insurgency measures to ensure public security. By their nature however, most counterinsurgency operations are characterised by violence and violation of the human rights of the civilian population. Hence, as part of global efforts to mitigate incidents of human

[8] N. Allen, "How Boko Haram has remained the Initiative and what Nigeria should do to stop it", War on Roks, 24 December 2019.

rights abuses associated with counter-insurgency operations, the international community has taken certain measures to ensure that any strategy adopted by states to counter insurgency and terrorism complies with their treaty obligation under international law.

This research attempts to examine the role of leadership in counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast region of Nigeria with focus on Borno state between 2009 and 2019. It takes a critical look at leadership in different sectors of religion, tradition, political and military in counter-insurgency highlighting key challenges and prospects. It examines the origin and evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria; quantifies Boko Haram's threat to both human and national security since its inception in Nigeria; takes a cursory look at the tactics, strategies, means of recruitment and the acquisition of weapons by the Boko Haram sect; examines the role as well as challenges of the Nigerian military and civic leadership in countering the Boko Haram menace and suggest possible ways of overcoming such challenges. It is therefore recommended for scholars, military leaders, researchers, political leaders, researchers and those who wants to gain insight into insurgency in the North East and the role of leadership in countering it as well as gain an understanding of the concepts behind the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, and how the military leadership can use that understanding to effectively fight the group.

**Research Methodology**

The research was based on a combination of analytical, descriptive and inferential methods involving primary and secondary sources of data collection. The primary data were gathered through unstructured interviews and discussions with key actors, military leadership, civil servants and women who are experienced in this field.

Secondary data were gathered from the existing related literatures obtained from books, journals, articles, official publication, magazines, and records from Borno state government,

and Newspapers reports and the internet. The primary data were collected through structured interview conducted with important personalities. Books, Journals, official publications, Magazines and Newspapers were also reviewed and analysed for additional information. Internet facilities were also explored extensively for more information on relevant areas of the study. The data collected for this research work were analysed qualitatively using logical arguments to arrive at valid conclusions which led to deductions that informed the final conclusion.

**Conceptual Clarifications**

In this section, a few words that are vital to the perceptive of this study have been identified and clarified.

**Leadership**

Several scholars and practitioners have attempted to define leadership. Before looking at a few of these definition it behoves to understand who are leader is. A leader is one who exerts unusual influence and considerable power over another individual, groups or organisation. Leadership in this sense is therefore considered as the process by which an individual motivates others and mobilizes resources to achieve a goal.

Okechukwu C. Iheduru quoting Chinua Achebe, wrote "leadership is a process of social influence in which one person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task"[9] Bernard Keys and Thomas – 'Leadership is the process of influencing and supporting others to work enthusiastically towards achieving objectives'[10]. Although there are myrads of definitions of leadership, that of "Forbes" clearly stands out: "Leadership is a process of social influence, which maximizes the efforts of others, towards the achievement of a goal". What makes this definition so different from many of the academic definitions is the inclusion of "maximizes the efforts". Technically, a leader could use social influence to just organize the efforts of others, but leadership is about maximizing the effort. Irrespective of these definitions of leadership, there are common denominators of ledearship.

- Leadership galvanizes people into action.

[9] Caroline Obiageri "Gendering Leadership":…p.226
[10] R. Trumptimaye "What is Leadership?
https://www.economicsdiscussion.net/management/leadership/what-is-leadership/32116

- Leadership is interpersonal influence, exercised in a situation, and directed, through the communication process, toward the attainment of a specified goal or goals
- Leadership is a critical success factors in all human endeavour's and its absence or ineffectiveness will always result in failure or poor performance at best.
- Leadership is a process of social influence, which maximizes the efforts of others, towards the achievement of a goal

**Insurgency**

Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a country.[11]The term insurgency can also refer to the group itself. Insurgents can combine the use of terrorism; subversion; sabotage; other political, economic, and psychological activities; and armed conflict to achieve its aims just like the method being applied by Boko Haram in the northeast region.[12] It is an organization political-military struggle by a predominantly indigenous group or movement designed to weaken, subvert, or displace the control of an established government for a particular region. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics, but they typically include the following common elements: a strategy, an ideology, an organization, a support structure, the ability to manage information, and a supportive environment. These characteristics present a significant threat to the existing government. Insurgents will typically solicit, or be offered, external support or sanctuary from state or non-state actors.

**Counterinsurgency (COIN)**

As with insurgency, the term counterinsurgency suffers from imprecision and confusion. It has, in the past several years, been used interchangeably with stability operations, foreign internal defence, counter-guerrilla operations, and, most recently, countering irregular

[11]V. B. Abia, *Contemporary Issues in International Relations*, Lagos: Concept Publications Ltd., 2003, .33.

[12]B. Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1997, 6.

threats.[13] In addition, it has been included as a subcomponent of small wars, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, asymmetric warfare, low-intensity conflict, and military operations other than warfare. While intuitively, most who conduct any or all of these types of operations know counterinsurgency when they experience it, each of these terms denotes a distinctly, if interrelated, type of conflict or military strategy that, does not define counterinsurgency as a whole. For example, small wars encompass a wide range of military operations that may include counterinsurgency, but also interventions, peacekeeping operations, crisis actions, and irregular warfare. On the other hand, counterinsurgency may encompass or, conversely, be a component of, depending on the strategic situation, efforts to combat terrorism, suppress guerrillas, restore security and stability, assist with foreign internal defence, and reconstruct post-conflict societies. It is easy to see where confusion may begin. Because of these interrelationships, a clear concept of the term counterinsurgency becomes necessary.

The Department of Defence definition of counterinsurgency reads as follows: "Those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."[14] Counterinsurgency in this context simply refers to an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of Boko Haram activities in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability.

**Terrorism**

[13]A. Oladiran, "Security Challenge and Development in Nigeria: Leadership to the Rescue" *International Journal of Academic Research in Public Policy and Governance* , Vol. 1, No. 1 , 2014, 49-54.

[14] M. Aaron, Young jr. and David H. Gray, "Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and Its Application for the Future", *Global security studies*, vol. 2, 2011, 61.

The concept of terrorism has over the years been seen from different perspectives. Each scholar tries to view terrorism from their understanding of the concept, making the concept lack a widely accepted definition. It is as a result that scholars in the international system argue that the international system has never been successful in providing an all-encompassing definition of terrorism. According to Jeffrey cited in Ngozi*et'al*, the United States army have over 109 definitions of the term terrorism with 22 different elements used to define them.[15]This is not quite different in the issue related to the definition of terrorism by the United Nations as different member states perceive terrorism differently. While some scholars see terrorism from the prism of wide range of activities and events, other like Lazarrdos cited in Ngozi*et'al* stressed that terrorism should be defined from the perspective of the goals the actors seek to achieve rather than mere abstract explanations. This according to him would make the reason behind the development of the terrorist group and their action unknown, as important element to facilitate their understanding would be displaced. Tilly added that a good definition of terrorism should also include the goals, which are to inflict or spread a sense of horror or general psychological distress in the minds of their victims to gain political-ideological interests.[16]

**Insecurity**

Defining insecurity, one needs to understand the concept of security. The concept of security is one that is seen from the National perspective and human security perspective. The national perspective of security is one that dominated the international scene prior to the cold war. However, after the cold war, with the international society embrace of the right of individual in the face of threats they encounter from their states along with the changing

[15]M. Bukovac, *Failed States: Unstable Countries in the 21st Century,* New York: Rosen Publishing, 2011, 1-9

[16]C. Gerard, and A. Blin, *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda,* California: University of California Press, 2007, 12.

nature of warfare, a dimension to security was adopted.[17]This dimension was aimed at widening the concept of security from state centric to a wider view that places premium on individuals which is the human security perspective embodying the elements of national security, human right and national development. The perspective was first given attention in the international system during the United Nations Development Programme by MahbubulHaq in the 1994 human development report.[18] The report argued that development should be globally expanded to include seven aspects of which included; economic security, food security, health security, environment security, personal security, community security, political security.[18] However due to the lack of concession on the definition of the concept of security and human security specifically, different authors have tried to provide a definition that tries to capture security in such a way that includes the state-centric as well as the human security perspective. This is because even the concept of human security has been contested for not allowing the measurement of the potential harm that conflicts inflicts on the civilians of states. Human security therefore, is seen as an effort to reconstruct security in a fundamental manner as an analytical tool which focuses on ensuring security and mitigating threat to the insecurity of individuals rather than states.

**Military**

Military as construed in this study refers to the armed forces of Nigeria. It therefore refers to a system that suggests a set of interacting and independent military subsystems combined to form an integrated whole. The military system consists of two major parts namely; The Tangible and Intangible Elements. The Tangible Elements are Land, Naval, Air and Special Forces and their weapons which include Tanks, Armour Respond Center (APC), Ships, Aircraft and other Platforms and Weapons. The Intangible elements of the military system are

[17]A. Bellamy, and P. Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010, 23.

[18]J. Frank, "A Neutral's Perspective: The Role of the Austrian Armed Forces in Homeland Security", Connections, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2005, 99.

those aspects that determine the potency of the tangible elements[19]. They include Human Resource Management, Training, Military Logistics System and Financial Resources. In this study, armed forces and military connote the same idea. It must be further noted that Nigerian Military constitutes Nigerian Army, Navy and Air Force, whose primary assignment is to protect the state from external aggression and internal insurrection, while maintaining peace and order.

**Military Leadership**

Within the military and behavioural science, the concept of leadership has been examined for many years. Although there is no single, universally accepted definition of leadership, it has been suggested that a leader is one who is innovative while seeking to solve new problems, along with bringing something new and different to a group.[20]This would be considered a behavioural view of leadership, in that it describes the way a leader acts and exhibits these characteristics. Contrastingly, leadership has also been described as a trait that some people simply possess.[21]Within a behavioural perspective, several theories have been developed describing the various behaviours that leaders may exhibit or possess. According to Burns and later expanded upon by Bass, leadership can be split into a dichotomy, consisting of transactional and transformational leadership styles. The former refers to those leaders who simply give orders, while the latter denotes those leaders who aid in the growth and development of their subordinates. More specifically, transformational leaders are those who

[19]O. Muhammed and A. Zukic, "A Descriptive Study on the Military Leadership*", International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 7, 2013, 711-713.

[20]O. Muhammed and A. Zukic, "A Descriptive Study on the Military Leadership*", International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 7, 2013, 713.

[21]O. Muhammed and A. Zukic, "A Descriptive Study on the Military Leadership*", International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 7, 2013, 721.

utilize their charm and charisma in a way that convinces subordinates and other participants to put the needs of the organization or the whole above the needs of themselves. By doing this, the subordinate may experience an increase in level on Maslow's hierarchy, moving from achieving more basic needs (such as physiological, safety, love and belonging, and esteem) to achieving increased levels of self-actualization and achievement. The focus of a transformational leader is on the betterment and growth of his or her subordinates.

**Internally Displaced Persons (**IDP**s)**

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order o avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.[22]

While the above stresses two important elements of internal displacement (coercion and the domestic/internal movement) it is important to note that rather than a strict definition, the Guiding Principles offer "a descriptive identification of the category of persons whose needs are the concern of the Guiding Principles" In this way, the document "intentionally steers toward flexibility rather than legal precision" as the words "in particular" indicate that the list of reasons for displacement is not exhaustive.[23] However, as Erin Mooney has pointed out, global statistics on internal displacement generally count only IDPs uprooted by conflict and human rights violations. Moreover, a study has recommended that the IDPs concept should be defined even more narrowly, to be limited to persons displaced by violence. Thus, despite the non-exhaustive reasons of internal displacement, many consider IDPs as those who would be defined as refuges if they were to cross an international border hence the term refugees in all but name is often applied to IDPs. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in this context of

[22]R.Stagner, *Psychological Aspects of International Conflict*, Belmon: Brooks Publisher, 1967, 127.
[23]Deng Francis, "The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement", *New York: United Nations*, 2016,.1.

this research seeks to lays emphasizes on the fact that factors that necessitated displacement are internal and associated with the area of study.

**Conclusion**

The emergence of the Boko Haram Insurgency in northeast Nigeria has created a security vacuum within the region. The threat of the group to Nigeria, its neighbours and the international community cannot be ignored. The group has engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Nigerian government and its citizens for the last decade. Living conditions in the region have been degraded, life and properties have been destroyed, and an increasing refugee crisis across the region calls for action. Despite efforts by the Nigerian government and its partners to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, theNigerian government and its partners to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, the group continues to pose a threat and challenge to the government of Nigeria and its partners. The security situation in the region has deteriorated, and the territorial integrity of Nigeria is being undermined. The chapter has been able to introduce the research title, provided the statement of the research problem which states to need to embark on the research. The aim of the research and objectives were outlined. Moreso, the research justification, its contribution to knowledge and the academia, the methodology used to collate data in the course of the research and challenges faced in the course of the research were briefly surveyed and discussed. Furthermore, the chapter also provided clarification to certain concepts that are relevant to the study.

# CHAPTER TWO

# LITERATURE REVIEW

## Introduction

Despite the existence of a number of write-ups on the subject of Counterinsurgency in the Northeast, the subject is not always studied from a holistic perspective. This chapter exposes the weakness and strengths of the scholarship in this field and as well demonstrate where to carry out further research.

## Review of Related Literature

A. Nnamdi, "Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights Limitations in Nigeria"[24] posits that the armed forces all over the world, long used to preparing to fight conventional wars, are now mostly confronted by enemies without any discernible orders of battle. Their shapes and sizes, tactics, strategies and methods of operation may change several times in a day. Non-state actors and indeed, insurgent forces do not adhere to rigid hierarchical structures that can be easily held accountable for atrocities committed. The enemies they face today are averse to observing the laws of war, no weapon is beyond their use and tactics is abhorrent to insurgent forces.

This new security environment with its ever-changing challenges has tasked the imaginations of some nations' armed forces. Major counterinsurgency tactical operations include Strike operations and Populace and Resource Control operations. Strike operations are operations to find, fix and finish insurgent forces in areas under insurgent control where the counterinsurgent does not want to maintain a permanent presence afterwards. Population and resources control operations are government operations to control the populace, deny insurgents' access to the populace and resources, and re-establish law order. Against this background, this paper examines the extent of limitation of human rights in the conduct of counter-insurgency campaigns in any State, including Nigeria. The paper argues that in view

[24]A. Nnamdi, "Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights Limitations in Nigeria", *The Age of Human Rights Journal*, Vol. 3, 2014, 46-62.

of the unconventional methods of warfare deployed by insurgents and the difficulty of pinning them down to a particular battle ground, it is not possible to launch a successful counter-insurgency campaign without some form of limitations placed on the enjoyment of basic human rights such as life, dignity of human person, liberty, private and family life, association and assembly as well as right to freedom of movement. It, however, urges that appropriate and reasonable balance should be struck between the need to enforce security and the need to accord citizens their basic rights. This thesis is therefore an attempt to investigate this assertion.

C. Okoli, in "Nigeria: Volunteer Vigilantism and Counter-Insurgency in the North-East"[25] argues that contemporary terror-insurgency is an asymmetric warfare that requires an equally unconventional remediation. The civilian intervention in counterinsurgency in North-East Nigeria reflects this strategic imperative. Amidst the lethal onslaught of Boko Haram insurgents against the communities of North-East Nigeria and the apparent helplessness of the state (the government and its security forces) in mitigating the situation, the inhabitants were faced with three unpleasant and dicey options: to flee their communities; to join the insurgent groups; or to be killed. In effect, while some inhabitants succeeded in fleeing to safer places, others were stuck in the volatile area where they were compelled to, indeed, either join the insurgents or be killed. Overtime, the people thought of the fourth option-mobilizing for self-defence based on self-help. They thus mobilized themselves into community vanguards poised to confront the machinations of the rampaging Boko Haram insurgents. This resolve marked the genesis of what is today known as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and its allied volunteer vigilantes. The involvement of these vigilantes in counterinsurgency in North-East Nigeria marks a departure from the military-centric to civilian-oriented counterinsurgency operations. Apart from policing their local communities,

[25]C. Okoli, "Nigeria: Volunteer Vigilantism and Counter-Insurgency in the North-East", *Conflict Studies*, Quarterly Issue 20, 2017, 34-55.

these volunteer vigilantes have been assisting the military in identifying, arresting and spying suspected insurgents. They have largely facilitated the major breakthroughs made by the military in terms of high profile arrests of suspected insurgents as well as rescue of their hostages. However, the activities of the volunteer vigilantes have been unfortunately associated with some untoward occurrences, such as human rights abuses, extortions, oppression, gang violence, sexual harassment, child/woman recruiting, forced recruitment and other extra-judicial excesses. More unfortunately, the vigilantes have often provoked retaliatory violence whereby the insurgents capitalize on their counter-attacks to raid communities that are associated or sympathetic with the vigilantes. These occurrences have smeared the efficacy of the involvement of these vigilantes in counterinsurgency in the area under review. There is, therefore, a need to ensure that the vigilantes operate in a manner that forecloses untoward and counterproductive outcomes. First, they must seek to operate within the confines of the law. In this regard, the activities of the vigilantes should be properly coordinated and regulated through established legal and institutional procedures to forestall operational impunity. In this direction, the Federal Government of Nigeria needs to evolve coherent policy-cum-institutional mechanisms for harnessing the vigilantes, so that they can operate as authentic community policing system. This thesis thus suggest that the government should consider absorbing some of the organized vigilante formations into the existing paramilitary structures or institutionalizing them into a national reserve force amenable to emergency mobilization. It is the conviction of this paper that the aforementioned measures would go a long way in optimizing the potentials of volunteer vigilantes and at the same.

D. Iweze, "Insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria and its Implications on Inter-State and Trans-Border Mobility"[26]examines the insurgency in the North-east region and its implications on interstate and trans-border mobility. Northern Nigeria, particularly the

[26]D. Iweze, "Insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria and its Implications on Inter-State and Trans-Border Mobility" *Calabar Historical Journal*, Vol.3, No.1, 2017, 161-172.

northeast region is obviously facing unprecedented social and economic crises. The insurgency has turned the northeast which used to be one of the most stable and peaceful regions in the country to become the most volatile, insecure and high risk region in the last five years. This has led to lost of several lives and property worth millions of naira. According to Human Rights Watch, the insurgency has claimed more than 3,000 lives since it began in 2009. Recently, the United Nations confirmed that 6 million people had been directly affected by the insurgency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. Between 2013 and 2014 the region has witnessed the escalation of insurgents` threats to travellers on the major highways and rural roads as well as the bombing of bridges, which obviously marked a new trend in the war of terror in the Northeast enclave. The Northeast, which is strategically located on a crossroad between Nigeria and the neighbouring countries, mobility in the region, is now often fraught with fear, uncertainty and trepidation. The fact that transportation is a necessary pre-condition for sustain economic growth of any state or region, insurgency had obviously hampered the economic growth and development of the area. This is because ease movement of people and goods acts as a catalyst for rapid socio-economic development and invariably boosts trade and other socio-economic interactions among the people is being hampered by threats of insurgents. This work will give insight to the impact of Boko Haram on Nigeria's growth.

C. Akale and K. Chigozie Udegnunam, "Media and National Security: An Appraisal of Counter Insurgency Operations in North East Nigeria"[27] they opines that the media and security agencies are two of the most strategic institutions of the modern state. Therefore, securities agencies must ensure that the right information is put across to the right audiences

[27]C. Akale and K. Chigozie Udegnunam, "Media and National Security: An Appraisal of Counter Insurgency Operations in North East Nigeria", *Scholars Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, 2018, 800-807.

towards maintain public and political support. Security agencies must come out first with a positive and proactive approach rather than adopting a defensive and reactive stance. Increasingly, COIN operations are conducted under the spotlight of the media, and the difference between the local and international media is just a click of the internet. Virtually all the media houses today operate in the World Wide Web (www), the situation is compounded by the fact that due to the prevalence of the mobile technology and the cheap availability of internet facilities, the general public can now access information easily not necessarily worrying about the credibility of the source. However, this paper failed to point out that the Nigerian Government has created several centers to communicate information to the media in order to reduce the frictions that exist between security agencies and the media.

I. Oden Ewa, "Nigeria's Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Implications, Issues, and Lessons for National Security"[28] is of the opinion that insurgency has brought changes into the theatre and targets of warfare, with implications for national security efforts. Traditionally, wars are fought between the armed forces of belligerent states, with civilians who are non-combatants not brought under enemy targets. However, insurgency has come to change the fields of battle and targets of warfare, to the extent that every place and humans within the enemy territory have become targets of warfare. This changing scenario of warfare bodes ill for the endangerment of the civil population and places new demands on national security agencies. In fact, national security strategy should label any civilian population under insurgency as an endangered group and fashion ways for its protection. In fashioning such ways, care must be taken to think, that insurgents could have access to weapons of mass destruction, a possibility that may not be far off, and make projections and contingency plans against such a possible development.

[28] I. Oden Ewa, " Nigeria's Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Implications, Issues, and Lessons for National Security" *Review of History and Political Science,* Vol. 6, No. 1,2018 33-42.

Inter-agency collaboration and coordinated efforts are critical in the post degrading stage of insurgency, where COIN operations should cover the entire landscape of activities, with special focus on continuous disruption of the insurgents' logistics, cutting the insurgents off from supply, and disputing their local and foreign links. The disruption of logistics would be achieved with good intelligence network, continuous pursuit of the insurgents, strategic bombing in the Sambisa Forest, and cooperation from neighbouring countries. Efforts for cutting the insurgents from supplies should be targeted against their real and potential sources of the recruits that are used as suicide bombers and combatants. As much as possible, communities and settlements should be insulated from contacts with insurgents and their radical ideas through appropriate orientation. This research investigated this assertion by bringing to limelight the role of military leadership in the theatre of operations.

I.C. Achumba, O. S. Ighomereho, *et al*, " Security Challenges in Nigeria and the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development"[29], the paper examines the insecurity situation in Nigeria and its implications for business investment, operations and sustainable development. The evaluation of the level and dimension of insecurity which was based on secondary data and observations among authors in different places, zones and walks of life as expressed in their comments, as well as, on concrete evidences of insecurity incidence in different parts of Nigeria, indicated that the insecurity challenge in the country is enormous and complex and would continue to be, if the situation remains unabated. They also emphasized the need to evolve a safe business environment that allows for effective business activities and a sustainable development process. The security management models recommended to achieve this, are aimed at combating the creators and perpetuators of situations of insecurity, and simultaneously addressing and removing the sources of

[29] I. Achumba, O. S. Ighomereho, *et al*, " Security Challenges in Nigeria and the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development", *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, Vol.4, No.2, 2013, 79-97.

dissatisfaction and discontentment which spur security breaches and the involvement of all stakeholders both in public and private capacity-government, business organizations, civil society, religious groups, communities and individuals- to supply resources, expertise and information that are required to ensure a safe environment. Their work did not make mention of the insurgency ravaging the Northeast region of Nigeria and this research filled the gap.

P. Asfura-Heim and J. McQuaid, "Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria"[30] states that regardless of which trajectory the conflict takes, for the short to mid-term, Boko Haram will continue to present a significant threat to stability in Nigeria. Indeed, in recent months, Boko Haram has grown increasingly active and brazen in its attacks, and is for the first time attempting to hold territory. The Muslim population remains frustrated with the government and with continued poverty and economic disparity in the north. If the Nigerian government is unable to deal with underlying grievances and reverse current dynamics, conditions on the ground in the northeast are ripe for potential expansion of the conflict, whether it is led by Boko Haram, its splinter factions, or other extremist groups. Based on the analysis presented in this report, this thesis concludes that the conflict in the northeast is most accurately viewed as a counterinsurgency problem rather than a pure counterterrorism problem. Boko Haram is a regional insurgent group with local and national political objectives, though it lacks a political front. Instead, it uses subversion, guerilla tactics, and terrorism to carve out living space for itself and to further its aims of eventually overthrowing the Nigerian government. Its emergence and sustainment have been driven by a number of underlying contextual factors and proximate causes, including decades of poor governance, elite delinquency, and extreme economic inequality. It is becoming increasingly clear that Boko Haram and other

[30]P. Asfura-Heim and J. McQuaid, "Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria", *CTC Sentinel*, Vol.7, July 2015, 18-23.

violent, fundamentalist extremist groups which may emanate from the northeast will not be defeated by military force alone. Despite its decapitation in 2009 and considerable losses in recent years at the hands of state security forces, the group has managed to regenerate and come back even stronger.

Moreover, the Nigerian government's use of military force in the north has further alienated the population, which in turn has reduced the amount of intelligence it can obtain—intelligence it needs to operate effectively against Boko Haram and to protect its forces in the field. In a very real way, the conflict is now being driven by the weaknesses of the national government and northern elites and institutions rather than by Boko Haram's strengths. The results of this conflict assessment suggest that a new, more comprehensive approach by the Nigerian government—one that seeks to address political, economic, and social grievances—will be needed to degrade and eventually defeat the threat posed by Boko Haram. Such an approach would also work to stamp out the current extremist rejectionist thinking which periodically generates these violent extremist organizations in the northeast of the country. For the United States and the rest of the international community, this will mean working with the government of Nigeria on a variety of assistance fronts, including political, developmental, economic, and military. Partnering with the Nigerian government has been a challenge for the United States. Due to a range of complex political, social, and economic reasons, the government of Nigeria has not taken an effective approach to the Boko Haram conflict. If the U.S. and its international partners continue to participate in efforts to end this conflict, they must focus on identifying areas for cooperation and coordination with Nigeria—and its neighbours, which are increasingly being touched and threatened by Boko Haram.

T. William in his thesis titled "Military Culture and Counterinsurgency in the Twenty-First Century: Defeating Boko Haram in Nigeria"[31] is of the opinion that the advent of conventional military forces, engaging in 'set piece' battles against themselves, large armies have generally abhorred unconventional fights. Following WWII, the dismal performance of powerful military forces against relatively inferior irregular foes has been a subject of debate among military theorists. The paper showcased how military cultures have influenced the performance of conventional forces in irregular warfare. It exploits how conventional militaries can best adapt to the changing nature of warfare in the twenty-first century, by applying lessons learnt from centuries of irregular warfare. With recent upsurge in activities of terrorists' organizations such as Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in sub-Saharan Africa, the paper points out that there is increasing focus on this region. Particularly, Nigeria is of vital interest to the United States, being a regional power in the continent as well as one of the largest suppliers of petroleum to the United States. The paper utilizes the historical development of conventional forces to explain their predisposition to conventional fights. Furthermore, it exploits the fundamental differences between conventional and irregular warfare, as well as the nature of modern international terrorism. This study assisted in the area of elaborating the changing pattern of Boko Haram and changing nature of the Nigerian Military COIN operations.

F. Akpan, O. Ekanem and A. Olofu-Adeoye, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria",[32] this study discusses the inherent weaknesses in the

[31] T. William "Military Culture and Counterinsurgency in the Twenty-First Century*:* Defeating Boko Haram in Nigeria" *A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements the Air Command and Staff College, Alabama April 2013, 1-7.*

[32]F. Akpan, O. Ekanem and A. Olofu-Adeoye, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria", *Canadian Social Science*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, 151-155.

Government's counter-offensive policy to the threat posed by the Boko Haram insurgents to the Nigerian state. Available evidence shows that the counter-terrorist policy of the government is defective. The study highlighted the measures the government should undertake to curb the menace of the insurgents such as policing its borders in the North Eastern region effectively, collaborating with countries that it shares borders with, equipping her security organizations and enlisting the support of her citizens in the fight against the insurgents, amongst others. This thesis thus opines that a more effective way of checkmating the threat posed by Boko Haram insurgents to the Nigerian state is for the government to treat the insurgents like terrorists rather than freedom fighters.

C. Juliet, "Re-Defining Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Nigeria: Towards Achieving Security in the North-East Region",[33]argues that Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999 ushered in waves of insecurity virtually in every region and range of violent conflicts across the country. These include the militancy in the South-South (Niger-Delta Region) with kidnapping, cultism, communal clashes in other states in the Southern region, terrorism and insurgency in the North. The Northeast as part of the six geo-political zones of the country have experience waves of insurgency attacks from Boko Haram sect which also extended to other Northern states and across other neighbouring countries.

In seeking solutions to these various security challenges, the Nigerian government offered the initiation of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) as part of the strategies in the rehabilitation of the Northeast region. The nature of the insurgency in the Northeast therefore, determines that government response should be able to curb Boko Haram terrorists'activities and secure communities from sporadic attacks of the insurgent. Unlike the

[33]C. Juliet, "Re-Defining Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Nigeria: Towards Achieving Security in the North-East Region", *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science*, Volume III, Issue V, 2019, 54-61.

Niger Delta which has been plagued by conflicts and violence as a result of the large deposit of crude oil and the environmental challenges experienced by communities in the region, Boko Haram‘s campaign of terror ends have become a matter of serious concern in Nigeria and beyond. Subsequent governments of Nigeria have been committed to a series of efforts to contain Boko Haram‘s violence; yet, the urgent need for the government to develop an effective and efficient population centric proactive counter-terrorism approach to combat the attacks remains paramount. Although, the escalating incidences of kidnapping, girls adoption from schools, cattle rustling and increasing clashes between pastoralists and farmers across the country surpasses the insurgency in the Northeast. In expanding its dominance, Boko Haram have continued to acquire sophisticated weapons to engage the Nigerian military thereby ravaging the entire Northeast with extreme violent and radical ideological objective extending from carrying out simple advocacy for Islamic puritanism in northern Nigeria to the creation of the Islamic State in West Africa and Lake Chad region in particular. The Northeast still remains volatile following the quantum of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) used on one hand by the insurgents themselves and on the other hand by armed vigilantes and the Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) who provided security for communities in the Northeast.

The impact of violence in every locality across the Northeast created the physical and mental torture in the lives of the populace as majority of communities fled for safety after losing their homes and livelihoods. Still, the persisting sense of fear and insecurity still engulfs the region, even though many whom were Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have returned back to their communities. The Nigerian government and concern international bodies have mapped out various strategies and now implementing efforts to restructure the Northeast. These line of activities have also provided opportunities for Boko Haram members who are willing to renounce their membership of the terror group and lay down their arms. It also

includes re-integrating the insurgents, disarming, demobilizing them alongside other combatants like the vigilantes and Civilian JTF. However, this thesis intends to point out that the situation in the Northeast differs from the conflicts in the Niger-Delta. This means that enrolling repented Boko Haram members as the case may be, will largely require that DDR is structured and mandated to occur in the shadow of on-going military operations and directed towards de-radicalization of violent extremists.

F. Baucum*, An Evaluation of counterinsurgency as a Strategy for Fighting the Long War*,[34] opines that success in the Long War is neither measured nor achieved merely by doing more, spending more, or involving more service members. Instead, success is measured and achieved by implementing the most efficient, sustainable strategies that allow the United States to maintain a given effort level for generations, even if the Long War continues only for decades. It is critical for the United States not to cause greater harm to itself in the process of attempting to destroy al Qaeda than the harm al Qaeda could cause to the United States. Sustainability has three overall components; each is essential. The means used to wage the Long War must be economically, politically, and militarily sustainable. The most efficient, sustainable strategies to combat al Qaeda are counterterrorism and antiterrorism. Each has an important role in the overall strategy, subject to their inherent risks and limitations. Employed together, they form a complementary overall strategy, employing both offense and defense, attacking the enemy at a distance and defending both internationally and domestically. The United States must be mindful that the clandestine nature of counterterrorism does not become a means to engage in actions that are antithetical to American values. Counterterrorism must be executed, like all war, consistently with the values of America, and many antiterrorism measures carry with them potential civil liberties concerns. Support to

[34]F. Baucum*, An Evaluation of counterinsurgency as a Strategy for Fighting the Long War*, Carlisle : Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2011, 1-13.

insurgencies is a second tier strategy in fighting the Long War. It is economically and militarily efficient and sustainable, but it carries substantial political risks. It must be employed very carefully, mindful that insurgents, particularly those who have the greatest capacity to win, may be no better in many ways than the governments they replace. The greater the U.S. involvement in supporting an insurgency, the greater may be its international and domestic political responsibility for the insurgents' actions after they become rulers. Enduring U.S. support to an insurgent formed government engaged in unsavory actions continues and deepens the political harm to the United States. COIN is a third tier strategy because it is the least efficient, least sustainable strategy for fighting the Long War. COIN consumes enormous economic and military resources, whether executed well or poorly. It also consumes enormous political resources if executed poorly, and a medium quantity of political resources if it is executed neither particularly well nor especially poorly. COIN is a high risk strategy in terms of success, because its nature favors al Qaeda, pitting insurgent strengths against U.S. weaknesses. COIN is also a high risk strategy because it is a very public endeavor in which the United States employs enormous total resources. This work did not make mention of Boko Haram but it gives foresight in the role of leadership in countering insurgency.

M. Mustapha, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Dynamics of Counter-Insurgency Approach in Northeast of Nigeria"[35] this article provides the context for discussing the various approaches to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Northeast region of Nigeria. Since 2009, Boko Haram had sought to establish a theocratic Islamic state "Caliphate" in North-eastern part of Nigeria and this violent insurgency was accompanied by dual approaches to counterinsurgency that includes military interventions as part of the traditional

[35]M. Mustapha, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Dynamics of Counter-Insurgency Approach in Northeast of Nigeria", *Journal of Resources and Economic Development*, Vol.1, No.1 2018,157-171.

counter-insurgency COIN measures as well as non-forcible approach by the NGOs using peace building strategy to counter violent extremism in the region. The article examines how the interplay between the forcible military approach and the NGOs peace building approach to COIN ultimately help in creating spaces for sustainable peace in the Northeast. The traditional state-centric military approach to COIN, focuses much on deploying units of Special Operations Forces under the mandate of the Operation Lafiya Dole to conduct targeted strikes, cordon operations and provide intelligence and build the capacity of local partners to conduct ground operations. In contrast to the military use of force, The NGO approach to COIN is laid on the assumptions that countering violent extremism (CVE) requires not only the capability of states to conduct military response or conventional war, but also building bridges through peace building perspectives in post-conflict settings. Recently, peace building efforts by most humanitarian agencies focused much attention on reconstructions, rehabilitation, reintegration (RRR) projects, deradicalisation and CVE programmes, foster social cohesion and building consensus and dialogue during post-conflict interventions in marginal border areas. This perspective has emerged to reflect the soft-power approaches to fighting terrorism and the other side of COIN in Africa. The article establishes that military strategy along without peace building effort is counterproductive in the fight against Boko Haram.

O. Muhammed and A. Zukic, "A Descriptive Study on the Military Leadership*",*[36]this study descriptively identify the degree of motivating military leadership, military environment, characteristics of military leaders and military leadership benefits in the selected army. According to the results, it can be concluded that the results of descriptive analysis could provide a high agreement level of respondents for the questions asked. The study has

[36]O. Muhammed and A. Zukic, "A Descriptive Study on the Military Leadership*", International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 7, 2013, 707-721.

provided expected results in general. The responses are accumulated generally with high positive agreement on the military leadership benefits and characteristics of military leaders. According to the results, there identified a positive motivating military leadership. Furthermore, military environment is found to be positive. This research identifies the degree of impacts of military leadership experience of respondents in the selected army. The negative answers indicated that military environment and the missions are simple, and the environment includes regular activities. Since the military environment is full of routine works, this result is quite expected. According to the results, there appeared a task, team and organization oriented leadership and shared leadership which are naturally in line with the characteristics of the army. It is also observed that the respondents are mainly unit commanders who have generally routine tasks to be completed and therefore regular orders. The military leaders are rated themselves as very competent. Moreover, it is also observed that motivating ability of military leaders is high. The reason for this may be because the orders must be strictly obeyed by the ones who are in the low level. Therefore, the leaders may consider themselves as highly competent. Following research may analyze its reasons in detail. This research is limited in that it only discovers the employees of a specific army. Future research can involve different armies or departments in the same army. This study also considers the issue from the leaders' perspective. The results might have differed, if the survey had been conducted on the soldiers. This thesisis therefore an attempt to point on these issues.

**Conclusion**

This chapter is the review of related literature that assessed a good number of works written by many writers in books, journals, articles as well as edited books. Some talked about the impact of insurgency on Nigerians and its impact to the growth and development of Nigeria. An encouraging number of writers argued extensively about how counter-insurgency plays a

crucial role on a nation's unity especially to a developing country like Nigeria. These reviewed literature are within the scope of this research but they all failed to narrow down to how leadership has helped Nigeria in the counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast region of Nigeria which automatically becomes a gap this research aims to fill.

# CHAPTER THREE

## THE EVOLUTION AND GROWTH OF THE NORTHEAST REGION OF NIGERIA

### Introduction

The political zone referred to as North-Eastern Nigeria comprises of the present states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. Among the prominent factors that make an area a unit of historical study are its geography and human activities. This area shares various geographical, economic, social and political features. This paper shall identify the

varying and important roles these features played in the historical process that brings the different social groups of the area together. We shall examine how the geography of the area provided for the favourable human settlements in which agriculture and pastoralism flourished. We shall also look at how migration, trade and commerce brought the people together for peaceful coexistence. The paper concludes with an analysis of this peaceful living and the lesson it entails for the contemporary zone and Nigeria at large.

**Natural Landscape, Climate and Vegetation**


The area which constitute North-East zone of Nigeria lies between the vast arid expanse of the Sahara and the dense tropical rain forest along the Guinea Coast. Delimiting the area is Cameroon on the east, Niger and Chad republics on the north, North-Central Nigeria on the west, and South-Eastern Nigeria on the south. This geographical area constitutes the largest zone in Nigeria and comprises of the presents states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe since the states creation of 1996. It has a total of 103,639 square miles, representing 29.1 per cent of the total area of Nigeria.[37] Interestingly the region is politically unique in its pre-colonial set up. This could be seen it is combination of the Kanem-Borno Empire in the northern part and the Sokoto caliphate controlling most of the southern part. Borno-Kanem Empire converted to Islam before any other part of what is now Nigeria, and is the one section of the North that withstood the Sokoto jihad of the nineteenth century. It is the aim of this paper to explain why this region constitute a unit of historical study by looking at the prominent factors which makes an area so, vis-avis geography and human activities. The geographical features that interest us are the natural landscape, climate and vegetation and the role they play in the historical process that brings the different social groups of the area together. Our attention on the social features shall focus on population distribution, the ethnic

[37]K. Barbour, "North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of State Formation", in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 9, No.1, Cambridge University Press, 1971, 52.

groups, and most importantly their economic activities in relation to the environmental conditions. Our discussions shall conclude with issues of economic and social conditions for entrenching peaceful existence up to the early years of Nigerian independence and the lesson from the period for particularly the contemporary inhabitants of the zone and generally for Nigerians.

Probably the most distinctive characteristic feature of the North- Eastern State as a whole is its geographical diversity. It contains high mountains and dissected plains. The climate is essentially continental in type, with rainfall totals varying from more than 60 inches in the south to less than 15 inches in the north.[38] The vegetation varies from dense Guinea savannah in the south, through a broad belt of Sudan savannah to a zone of thin Sahel savannah with thorny *acacias* and low annual grasses in the far north.[39] The soils are very varied. In certain areas they are well suited to irrigation, elsewhere short periods of cultivation must be interspersed with longish periods of fallow.[40]

**Plate 1.0: Geographical location of Nigeria's North East Region**




[38]K. Barbour, "North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of State Formation… 54.

[39]K. Barbour, "North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of State Formation… 54

[40]K. Barbour, "North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of State Formation… 55

**Source:** J. Appleton, and W. Belden, "Northern Nigeria: A Study in Political Geography", in *Economic Geography*, Vol. 12 No. 4, Clark University, 2007, 321.

In the south the land rises from the densely forested and swampy coastal plain of South-Eastern Nigeria to a belt of comparatively leveled park like country which finally merges into the sandy Sahara in the north. The continuity of the plain is broken by the Bauchi plateau, the extreme western state of the zone, an extensive area of rugged highland approximately 4,000 feet above sea level[41]. The plateau presents a precipitous escarpment towards the south, but on the north and west it descends by a series of steps to the great rolling plains of Hausaland and Borno which extend northwards to the Sudan and north-eastwards to Lake Chad. Within the region are also highlands and plateaus like the Mandara, Hosere, Shabshi, and Alantica in the south, and Lala, Kilba and Mandara in the north. This constitutes the general surface features of the zone. The southern region is drained by the river Benue which offers somewhat limited facilities for navigation owing to its marked seasonal variation in depth. Smaller rivers that drain their waters to the Benue include River Gongola, River Taraba and River Hawal. The northern part, however is largely drainer by Lake Chad and the smaller rivers that carry their waters to this historic lake includes River Yedsaram, Ngadda, Komadugu Yobe and Hadejia.[42]

The hydrology makes for the existence of spotted marshy areas all over the zone in addition to the River Benue, Lake Chad and other smaller rivers that serve as tributaries to these two. The banks of these rivers serve as routes for nomads as they travelled along them for pasture. This water availability was important for so many reasons and one of them is fish harbouring.

[41]J. Appleton, and W. Belden, "Northern Nigeria: A Study in Political Geography", in *Economic Geography*, Vol. 12 No. 4, Clark University, 2007, 325.
[42] S. Abubakar,*The Lamibe of Fombina: A political History of Adamawa 1809-1901*, Zaria: A. B.U. Press,2002, 78.

In addition, the presence of water in this zone made it attract both human beings and animals.[43]

The climate, however, is not different from that of the northern Nigeria. It has a definite rhythm of wet and dry seasons, to which the whole life of the zone is adjusted. The rainy season usually starts in April and last through September. At this period of the year the zone receives copious rain with Yola and Jalingo due to their comparatively heavy precipitation, and Mambila due to its comparatively high altitude having 41 inches. While Bauchi and Gombe receive an average of 36 inches, the northern frontier (Maiduguri and beyond) receives approximately 20 inches.[44] The mean annual rainfall in the zone varies from 290 mm at Abadan in the far north of the zone to 1125mm in the foothills of the Mandara Mountains near Mubi. The rain cease rather abruptly at the end of September and the wind, veers to the north to become what is known throughout West Africa as the *Harmattan*. The strength and regularity of this wind are in large part responsible for the encroachment of the desert sand along the northern borders of Borno and Yobe. It also causes the destruction of valuable grazing land. Windstorms that are seldom destructive do often occur in the zone. The winds blow between October and April consistently from the north-east, and between May and September they blow from the south-west. While rain comes with the south-west winds, the *Harmattan* comes with the north-east winds.[45] The *Harmattan* consists of very dry winds, particularly in December and January blowing from the Sahara across the Chad basin to the Bauchi Plateau. The winds "carry a great deal of diatomaceous dust…and cause a thick haze and marked a drop in temperature".[46] The mean daily temperature for North-Eastern Nigeria is 85$^{o}$ and during the dry season the average is approximately 95$^{o}$. The temperature range

[43]G. Connah, *Three Thousand Years in Africa: Man and His Environment in the Lake Chad Region of Nigeria,* Cambridge:Cambridge Press, 1981, 24.
[44]J. Appleton, and W. Belden, "Northern Nigeria: A Study in Political Geography… 326-327.
[45]J. Appleton, and W. Belden, "Northern Nigeria: A Study in Political Geography… 327.
[46]J. Appleton, and W. Belden, "Northern Nigeria: A Study in Political Geography…21-22

becomes more marked from south to north with increasing distance from the Bauchi and Mambila plateaus which are considerably cooler.

Availability of water in the zone, as evident in River Benue and others and the Lake Chad, has affected the flora and fauna and provided conditions for game species that otherwise would either not exist in the Sahel savanna or exist only in far smaller numbers.[47] The game species in the Bauchi plateau have existed in a large number and avail themselves to hunters from all over the zone and beyond. As part of the Chad Basin, the northern part of the zone has a flora that constitutes a distinct vegetation area dominated by aquatic and semi aquatic species.[48]

On the geology of the area, i.e. soil and its mineral deposits, the zone has different soil formations. In the northern area around Borno the soil is sandy with little fertility which is not so good for crop production. Towards the west around Yobe the soil formation is different and relatively good for pasture and crop production. However, close to the Lake Chad is another type of clay soil known as the *firki*. This type of soil, because of its clay content, is good for crafts work like pottery and figurine. The *firki* soil has the capacity of holding water when the water level of Lake Chad dropped, thus it is additionally very important for crop production. This enables dry season crop production of especially the dwarf sorghum after the long sorghum planted in the wet season has been harvested.[49] This type of soil made the *firki* area a place where crops are produced throughout the year, thus there was availability of food for human consumption throughout the zone. This zone is also rich in natron (potash)

[47] G. Connah, *Three Thousand Years in Africa: Man and His* Environment…24
[48] G. Connah, *Three Thousand Years in Africa: Man and His* Environment…24

[49]J. Lavers, "Kanem Borno to 1800", in Ikime O. (ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History* Heinemann, Ibadan,187-188.

and salt found in the western part of Lake Chad and northern banks of the Benue. Natron is very important because it is used for its medicinal values and for rearing cattle, salt, of course, is important for human survival.

The adjustment of natural vegetation to decreasing rainfall is clearly evidenced by changes in vegetation which occur from the southern part to the northern part. The area that experienced more rainfall tends to have a belt of *acacia* dominated tress and savanna shrubs. There is woodland dominated by species of the *Combretaceae* family.[50] The southern boundary of the zone is characterized by deciduous trees, of which yellow satinwood and a species of oak are the most common. This in turn gradually changes to high grass and orchards bush with dense forest along the Benue river valley. The grass becomes increasingly predominant but shorter, the trees less numerous and smaller, and landscape takes on the appearance of parkland towards the northern part. Increasing aridity, intensified by the fuller effects of the *Harmattan*, eventually eliminates all but drought resistant types of plants. Consequently the greater portion of the northern part is covered by *Savannah* which consists of poor grassland dotted with small stunted trees, of which the shea butter and the *acacia* are characteristic. In the extreme north arid conditions, sandy soil, and the effects of the *Harmattan* are shown in the prevalence of very space, thorny, or prickly vegetation, the so-called forest of the Sudan[51]. Because of the heavier precipitation, vegetation on the Bauchi and Mambila Plateaus is more luxuriant than on the other surrounding. On the other hand, owning to the high temperatures, the season's distribution of rain, the long dry season and the *Harmattan*, much of the extreme north offers only meager grazing possibilities.

**Distribution of Population**

[50] J. Lavers, "Kanem Borno to 1800", in Ikime O. (ed.), Groundwork…32

[51] F. Galding, "On the Ecology of the Acrididace near Lake Chad", in *Bulletin of Environmental Resources*, Vol. 25, 2000, 2.

When discussing the pattern of population in North-Eastern zone of Nigeria we must relate it to the distribution and character of population in Northern Nigeria which were largely determined by the ancient trade routes across the Sahara. The intersection of the north-south route by one running east and west by way of a better watered, comparatively safe Hausa country accounted for the early importance of some of the cities states as market centres[52]. The areas south of Lake Chad, precisely Borno and Adamawa, are areas where by 1800AD security and agriculture, rather than commercial opportunities, have favoured comparatively close settlements. The Bauchi, Gombe and Mambila plateaus are areas inhabited by almost entirely ethnic groups who lived in scatted villages. However, the greater part of the zone under study had on average density of 11-40 persons to square mile.[53]

Migration played a very crucial role in population distribution. It is evident that some of the inhabitants of this zone residing in the southern part are migrants from the north. This fact was captured by Connah thus:

> "Central Sudan, which was once fertile for economic activities and encouraged large concentration of population about 20,000 years ago, but the desiccation of the place from about 7000 BC due to the drying up of the Mega Chad into what is now known as the Lake Chad forced the movement of the chadic group of languages southwards to their present location around the upper Niger-Benue Rivers".[54]

[52] Kano, for example became a strong commercial centre and a stronghold of the Hausa cultures due to its contact with the trans-Sahara traders since about 1000AD.

[53] J. Appleton, and W. Belden, "Northern Nigeria: A Study in Political Geography…328

[54] G. Connah, *Three Thousand Years in Africa: Man and His* Environment…22

It is also evident that majority of the ruling Fulani who had become the ruling group in Fombina emirate came from Borno. In this connection, the vast majority of the ethnic groups in Fombina claim to have emigrated from Borno. The most remarkable among these are the Mbum, Tikar and Chamba who at present inhabit the area south of the upper Benue Valley.[55]Apart from them, other early inhabitant of the Chad basin and its adjoining territories that migrated southwards are said to have been the Jukun who, by the 13th century, were said to have adjoined the Ngalaha tribes of Kanem to their north.[56]

**The Ethnic Groups and their Locations**

For a very long time the Kanuris and the Fulanis had contacts with the Moorish and Arabian civilizations by way of Trans Sahara trade. These contacts have been maintained except for an interlude during the colonial conquest. The zone, therefore, has been settled as a result of series of infiltration and conquests, the weaker people being pushed southwards into the plateau regions and the River Benue banks.Among these invaders, the Hausas, Kanuris and Fulanis have long been the dominant groups.[57]The Hausas have maintained a clearly defined political individuality throughout their history. Their language has also been one of the most important factors in the development of commerce not only in this zone but the entire western Sudan. Their settlements, though not on a large scale, are found throughout the zone.

The Kanuris often associated with the Hausas, are distinctly different group with a language of their own[58]. In appearance, they are generally broad-faced and heavy-boned. They inhabit

[55] S. Abubakar, "Relations between Borno and Fombina before 1901", in Alkali N.and Usman, Y.B. (eds.), 1983, 222-224.

[56]J. Appleton, and W. Belden, "Northern Nigeria: A Study in Political Geography…327.

[57] G. Kwanashie, *et.al*, *A Little New Light: Selected Historical writings of Abdullah Smith*, Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation Ltd, 19871, 78

[58] Y. Usman, "A Reconstruction of the History of Relations between Borno and Hausaland Before 1804", in Y. Usman, and N. Alkali,1983, 175-210.

the larger part of Borno and some of them are found in Yobe. The Fulanis were perhaps among the important elements in the history of the region. They established the Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa and Muri emirates. They are not Negroid people but intermarriage has resulted in black or red skins among them. While the Bade and the Karekare are located in Yobe, the Jarawa, Tangale, Waja, Balewa Sayawa and Terawa are located in Bauchi and Gombe areas. Other ethnic groups such as Mumuye, Jukun, Jango, Kuteb, Chamba and Mambila are found in Taraba area. In this areas also, and parts of Adamawa are found the Mbum, Tikar, Bata, Kilba, Margi, Chamba, Gude, Chikke and Fali.

By the early 19th century, the organization of the Muslims among these ethnic groups is largely the outgrowth of the acceptance of the Islamic law. Under the Sokoto caliphate and the Borno Empire the region was divided into emirates, each of which was ruled by an emir assisted by his council of advisers. The emirates were in turn divided into districts controlled by District heads whose principal duties were the collection of revenues and settling disputed. The District heads were also the administrative officials for a number of villages. Majority of these ethnic groups were essentially agricultural people living in a zone in which the climate was conducive to the development of a comparatively healthy, intelligent, energetic people capable of a high degree of organization. These conditions, together with the caliphate leadership of Sokoto and Borno, explain in large part the remarkable organization obtained in the zone.

The characteristic cultural dwelling throughout the zone is a round hut of plain mud walls with a steep thatched roof to throw off the heavy rains. However, construction varies according to precipitation of rainfall. The thin walls found in the warmer southern part of the zone are replaced by thick mud walls in the northern most part where marked diurnal

variations temperature occurs. A village may consist of a number of these dwellings clustered near the cultivated lands. Unlike the other parts of northern Nigeria, the walled towns are few and they included Ngazargamu, Damaturu, Gombe, and Bauchi. In most case, the buildings in the cities are distinctly Arabian in character. The narrow streets and closely grouped buildings give the cities a huddled appearance.

**Economic Activities**

It is evident that the Nigerian area for a very long time is primarily an agricultural area. In this zone, because of the long dry season, as much food as possible is raised during the three to five months growing period, so the crops are necessarily annuals. The most important crops grown are guinea corn, millet, cotton, groundnuts and beans. However yam, sweet potatoes, peanuts, benni-seed and other minor grains are also grown for domestic use. The work of the farmer begins in April, when a comparatively heavy rainfall allows for the planting of especially millet crop, Guinea corn is planted immediately thereafter. The weeding of these occupies most of the farmers time until July or early August when beans is then planted. Mixed cropping is not usual but inter-planting does take place in some instances. Guinea corn and beans, for example, were usually grown on the same farmland.

Many farmers also interplant millet and maize with cotton. These crops were ready for harvest soon after cotton is planted. By growing a corn crop as well as cotton on the same land, the farmer is able to obtain a greater total return of his labour. This practice represents the way in which the farmer learns to adjust himself to changing economic conditions. The area cultivated at any one time by the individual farmer varies according to the amount of labour available. The work is shared by the whole family. In some areas the men generally do the heavy work but in others the women participate fully in farming activities. While the men

mostly do the clearing and making the ridges for planting, major weeding and assist with the harder part of the harvesting, the women usually do the planting, keep the farm clean between main weeding, harvest and market crops. Irrigation is practiced along the banks of most of the rivers and water courses in the zone. Water is lifted from almost all the major rivers in the drier sections to irrigate some small fenced patched of land, which are intensively cultivated. The crops grown in most of these irrigated gardens are tomatoes, onions and other vegetables and spices.

The peoples of this region are known for their practice of rearing animals. They have numerous types of cattle and the breeds are considerably mixed. The bulk of them are owned by nomadic or semi-nomadic Fulani ethnic group, and the aim of every Fulani clan (*ardo*) is to maintain a herd best suited to the territory covered by the clan. Purity of breed has to be sacrificed to ability to resist epidemics and withstand drought and semi-starvation during a part of the year, together with other qualities making for survival. The cattle are of two main varieties-humped (*Zebu*) and hump-less (*Muturu*). The names of the different sub-varieties of these are confusing as no traditional names exist for most of them. The Fulani have names in plenty but only for particular colours, markings, and other minute distinctions within the sub-varieties. There exist thousands head of cattle own by nomadic Fulani. Moreover, nearly every farmer owns a few head of sheep or goats. The goats are valued primarily for their skins which serve as an important article of commerce.[59]

Fishing was, as still is a very important activity along the settlers around Lake Chad, River Benue etc. The fishing industry in the area of Lake Chad was a well developed commercial

[59] G. Jones, "The Beef-Cattle Trade in Nigeria" , in *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International African Institute, 1964, 29-38.

enterprise since before the Seifuwa dynasty. This seemed to be a monopoly of an aquatic community called the Yedina.[60]

Arts and crafts in this zone are mainly due to a response to local geographical conditions. In Borno and Taraba areas cotton weaving has been carried out for centuries. The Borno cotton cloth (called '*yar-Borno* by the Hausa traders), for example has been long marketed throughout North Africa. As might be expected, in an area with many cattle and goats, Borno was famous for its beautiful coloured leather works.[61] What were more of general crafts throughout the zone are pottery and basket making.

Trading activity was an important segment of the zone's economy. From the early period three levels of exchange were noticed in the zone since the early 19th century. These were local, regional and long distance trades.[62] Hausa traders have gone throughout the zone, as they are known to have gone throughout West Africa, with cotton clothes and leather works. They also traded stork feathers brought from Sudan. While some of the products of the area like salt, antimony and cloth found profitable markets at the different levels of exchange, some, especially agricultural stuff, were marketable only at the local and to a small extent regional levels.[63] The Kanuri are known to have traded potash or natron to areas as far as the Mambila plateau. There was considerable trade on natron and salt, which were left as deposits after Lake Chad had subsided. The production of these minerals was carried out in commercial quantity by sedentary Kanembu and Budama and was transported for trade by

[60] G. Adebayo, "The Production and Export of Hides and Skins in Colonial Northern Nigeria, 1900-1945" , in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 33, No. 2 ,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 273-300.
[61]J.Lavers,"Trans-Saharan Trade before 1800: Towards Quantification", in *The Sokoto Caliphate and the European Powers 1890-1907*, Frobenius Institute, 1994, 243-278.

[62] M. Hamman, *The Middle Benue Region and the Sokoto Jihad 1812-1869: The Impact of the Establishment of the Emirate of Muri*, A.B.U. Press, Zaria, 2007, 21-22.
[63]M. Hamman, *The Middle Benue Region and the Sokoto*…22.

the Kanuri and Hausa traders throughout the zone. Natron was important for feeding the large number of cattle in the zone. The production of this commodity also gave rise to other industries such as pottery.[64]

Cattle owners employ the services of skilled nomads who were organized in family units. Cattle traders also serve as agents to owners and moved along the east west trade routes following the various markets. The cattle trade was a very productive occupation which supported a large percentage of the population living in the zone.[65] Internationally, Borno was the meeting point of several trade routes which linked the zone with other international market centres. There was a Tran's Saharan trade route which liked the zone with Agades through the Kelle-Tanout route. This same route also branched from Kelle to the Termitz mountains to link up with the Kawar-Tripoli (or the eastern Borno) route. Thus, items coming from North Africa to the zone pass through Borno.[66]

Since the conquest of the Nigerian area by the British colonialist a lot of changes have occurred in north-eastern Nigeria. Scholars and researchers have recorded the motive for the conquest and the changes it brought about.[67] Like in other areas, provinces were created by the colonialists for easy administration. Four provinces emerged from this zone and these were Bauchi, Borno, Adamawa, and Sardauna. The basis of colonialism is something very clear: exploiting the colonized through siphoning their surpluses and expatriating it to develop Europe. In the course of achieving this they disrupted the development of the colonized, entrenched ethnic and religious bigotry, instituted corruption and intensified class

[64] G. Adebayo, "The Production and Export of Hides and Skins in Colonial Northe…66.
[65] M. Hamman, *The Middle Benue Region and the Sokoto*…243.

[66] M. Hamman, *The Middle Benue Region and the Sokoto*…243

[67] M. Tukur, 'The imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States, I897-I9I4', Ph.D. thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 2012, 92-97.

division among the people. It is stated earlier that the principal occupations of the inhabitants of North-Eastern Nigeria are agriculture and animal rearing. These activities have been slightly modified since the beginning of the colonial era, as surplus livestock and crops have been sold for cash, and as new cash crops have been introduced. The cultivation of groundnuts and of cotton was increased. It was encouraged by prices that have been relatively stable and by a Marketing Board that has allowed the producers a higher share of their crops' value. Mixed farming with ox-drawn ploughs continued to extend groundnut cultivation on light soils, and the cotton areas came to have enormous increases as irrigation spreaded in the Benue and Gongola valleys. Rice, sugar, and wheat, the latter in the fadamas of the extreme north only, were other crops that increased in the area with the extension of irrigation. Cattle rearing have been supported by the protective activities of the veterinary service and tsetse eradication work extended the area of safe grazing. The export of animals on the hoof, by road and rail continued to increase, the rate being largely dependent on the ability of the Fulani and Shuwa to rear their animals more rapidly. The all-weather road to Lake Chad also increased sales of fresh and dried fish. That was how the zone contributed to colonial economy.

After independence, industrial activity in the zone became confined to the simple processing of primary products, such as the crushing of oil seeds, the ginning of cotton, the slaughter of animals, and the canning of meat at a factory in Bauchi.[68] Moreover, the one important and under-employed resource in the zone as a result of colonialism is land, both in the extensive plains of the Chad Basin and in the alluvial terraces flanking the Gongola and Benue Rivers. If capital, technical knowledge and determination, and reasonably large parcels of such land, with secure tenure, could be brought together, it is quite on the cards that considerable agricultural products could be grown, like was done before and during colonialism. These

[68]K. Barbour, "North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of State Formation…56.

might in due course support improved communications and other services, and substantial processing industries. The missing factors, however, appear much too numerous and significant to be readily supplied: the land is generally too widely and too densely settled for it to be easy to envisage substantial parcels becoming or being made available for commercial farming, except perhaps in the Benue valley; Nigerians with the drive, ability, and capital required to transform the landscape scarcely exist, and those who do can find easier and safer ways of employing their efforts and their resources. The apparently inescapable alternative, therefore, is a continuation of development along existing lines, with mixed farming schemes, programmes to encourage the use of improved seeds, tools, and fertilisers, and with extension officers and licensed buying agents to improve and maintain the quality of produce. A poor peasantry will remain, capable of only low productivity but occupying the countryside at a rising density; this will provide a perpetual supply of discontented young men and women whose one desire is to escape to urban life, but with no evidence of achieving any revolutionary increase in income per capita.

The preceding gloomy prognostications are based on the assumption that North-Eastern Nigeria will continue for many years to enjoy a social situation not very different from the present. Improved health services may prolong the average expectation of life, and lessen infant mortality; more and better education may reduce illiteracy; improved communications may make agricultural products more widespread, and may increase population mobility. Nevertheless, essentially both landscape and people will change rather little, the basic reason being the mismanagement of resources and the persistence of established modes of thinking and living, i.e. ethnic and religious as entrenched by colonialism.

**Conclusion**

It is evident from the foregone discussion that the North- East Nigeria is a zone of cultural, political, social and economic relations for centuries despite the fact that the geography of the

area differs from the southern end to the north. The zone had no geological, ecological, hydrology and vegetation uniformity. Its geographical features never provided equal opportunity and as such some area developed more than others. Culturally, and to a large extent socially the migration pattern show that the speakers of the chadic group of languages in the south inhabiting the upper Benue confluence were from the Lake Chad area in the north. Politically, the Bauchi, Gombe, Fombina and Muri emirate shared the Sokoto Caliphate heritage while up north the Borno Empire occupied the areas of Kanuri, Shuwa and Bedde. The economic relations seem to be of great significance among the peoples. Trade in agricultural products like cereals, livestock, sodium, antimony, salt etc. have made the various communities within the zone dependent on each other, thus making it a unit of historical study. However, colonialism came and halted this development that after independence the people were no longer partners in progress.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## THE EVOLUTION AND GROWTH OF BOKO HARAM

### Introduction

Over the past decade, the Northeast region of Nigeria has experienced a surge in terrorist violence instigated by the sectarian group known as Boko Haram. Several analysts have advanced the view that poverty, longstanding economic disparities within Nigeria, and structural violence, are key factors underlying the crisis. However, the complex nature of the situation in Nigeria has at the same time caused some observers to characterise Boko Haram's aggression as violent extremism beyond a domestic agenda. The group's use of suicide attacks particularly presents a dreadful trait typical of international terrorist violence; a style of brutality hitherto alien to the Nigerian state.

Nevertheless, Boko Haram has been able to draw upon a considerable base of local sympathy and support largely from the ranks of uneducated, unemployed and impoverished youths in northern Nigeria. In addition, the group's ability to manoeuvre and stage-manage the force of religion in achieving its objectives appears to be dangerously reinforced by the influence of political interests and elites.[69]These multi-dimensional challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, leaving it struggling to clearly define the problem and to devise a comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter it. This phase of the research is an attempt to bring to limelight that the effective formulation and implementation of such a strategy requires an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and religious/ideological drivers of public support for Boko Haram. Enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed and sustain the group could particularly inform a more proactive counterterrorism framework for the Nigerian state.

**A Brief History of Boko Haram**

[69]S. Anyanwu and I. Nwanaju, *Boko Haram: Religious Conflicts and Dialogue Initiatives in Nigeria*, Vol. 1, Owerri: Edu-Edy publications, 2010, 45.

Most researchers generally agree that the Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, more widely known as Boko Haram, first appeared in 2002. However, a view seems to be emerging that traces back the rise of the group as far as 1995, when it existed as a little-known Muslim youth organisation called Shabaab. During this period, it was under the leadership of a man known as Lawan Abubakar, who situated the group's headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State, in the north-eastern part of Nigeria.[70] Lawan was reported to have departed for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, and the group's control was transferred to the late Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf.

There are additional accounts that trace Boko Haram's emergence to a group of Muslim students from the University of Maiduguri. Some scholars argues that these students, led by a man known as Aminu Tashen Ilimi, dropped out of school in response to the preaching of a foreign Islamic scholar who convinced them that Western education was haram (unlawful) in Islam. This particular account suggests that it was this band of individuals that came in contact with Mohammed Yusuf, who, following conviction about his newfound ideology, altered the message of his religious sermons to the extent that he was later prevented from preaching at the Indimi mosque in Maiduguri around the year 2000.[71] While contention over the precise year of Boko Haram's formation is not the main focus of this section, it is important to note that the trajectory of the group's journey predates the period that is commonly assumed and analysed by scholars.

More significantly, the group's antecedents prior to 2002 underscore similarities with some of the circumstances surrounding the Maitatsine uprising during the 1980s in northern Nigeria. What is noteworthy about the period between 2002 and 2009 is the fact that Mohammed

[70]D. E. Agbiboa, "The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity, Conflict and the Current Terrorism ofBoko Haram," Conflict, Security and Development, 13 (1), 2013, 2-9.

[71]D. E. Agbiboa, "The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity...9.

Yusuf is believed to have successfully gained a huge followership comprised of individuals aged between 17 and 30 years old.[72] Many poor families and unemployed youths from northern Nigeria, as well as neighbouring countries such as Niger, Chad and Cameroon, enrolled in Yusuf's religious complex, which included a mosque and school used for ideological propagation. In fact, in 2004, the group extended this structure to Yusuf's home state of Yobe where a base called "Afghanistan" was established in the village of Kanamma.[73] Boko Haram initiated social programmes aimed at helping the impoverished and the indigent.

The group's rhetoric appeared to be populist because it came across strongly as a defence for the common northerner against the rapacious plundering of the rich as represented by the state itself. When translated from Hausa language into English, Boko Haram conveys a meaning which suggests that "Western education is sinful". However, in his study of "Islamic Radicalisation and Violence in Nigeria", Abiodun Alao draws attention to a clarification made by the group's leadership about how the group's belief actually affirms the supremacy of Islamic culture and civilisation, rather than just a limited opposition to Western education.

In its early years, the group generated mass appeal among thousands of youths who were already disenchanted with the Nigerian state, which Boko Haram regarded as a poorly administered secular system. The group's name was further indicative of the bidding games over Islamic authenticity that undergird the Salafi discourse appropriated by the Kanuri and disaffected Hausa against an already Islamised elite, resented for the prevalence of corruption and white-collar crime. Boko Haram also impugned the political elites of northern Nigeria for their cooperation with Christian political leaders within the national framework of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

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[72]D. E. Agbiboa, "The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity...9.
[73]J.J.F. Forest, *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*, Florida: The JSOU Press, 2012, 23.

Boko Haram's popularity in northern Nigeria benefitted immensely from the immediate post-September 11 global context, which was characterised by al Qaeda's anti-Western avowals calling for universal jihad. In spite of widespread condemnation against the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States (US), there was a prevailing mood among numerous young Muslims in northeast Nigeria which drew inspiration from the "guts" that Osama bin Laden personified. While there was an increase in religious consciousness, 2002 also saw a rapid increase in the number of babies bearing the name Osama in northern Nigeria. In Borno State, where there were celebrations after the September 11 attacks, Four out of ten babies in a particular hospital were reported to have been given the name by their parents.[74]

The ensuing military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, which commenced in 2001 and 2003 respectively, coincided with diffuse events in Nigeria that inadvertently created the ideal environment for Boko Haram to capitalise on.[75] Muslims in the Middle East were thus portrayed as oppressed brethren in the eyes of socio-economically vulnerable youths amid an atmosphere of religious anxiety and expressions of sympathy by people in northeast of Nigeria steadily transcended to bolder expressions of violence, aided by the catalytic and charismatic input of Boko Haram's leadership.

It is important to briefly draw attention to another historical detail that may have also fed into the contemporary dynamics of support for Boko Haram's rise and insurgency. Prior to British colonisation, the current region of north-eastern Nigeria was a territory under the sovereign control of the Borno Empire, composed of a majority of Kanuri-Muslims. However, the imposition of British control contributed to an increased allegiance of the local people to the

[74]J.J.F. Forest, *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram*…23

[75]D. E. Agbiboa, "The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity...12.

Borno Sultanate, as well as profound dissatisfaction with the activities of the British authorities.

It can be argued that this fuelled the rise of fundamentalism among the Kanuri. Although this anti-colonial discontent was not unique to only the Kanuri people, it could help to explain aspects of the genesis of sympathy and popular support for Boko Haram. While the group focused on internal planning and mobilisation, this state of affairs was complicated by conflicts with the Nigerian police in communities such as Gwoza, Borno State in 2004.[76] Clashes with security agencies later extended to other areas including Kanamma, Geidam and Damaturu in neighbouring Yobe State and also in October 2004, Boko Haram ambushed a police patrol team in Kala-Balge, near Lake Chad, killing three officers and capturing twelve who were later killed.[77] The combination of local and global factors associated with the foundational years of Boko Haram contributed to the elicitation of public support enjoyed by the group. However, this fusion was not devoid of the intervention of political actors in Nigeria's northern establishment.

**Political Interests and Leaders Exploitation of the Sect**

The spectrum of public support for Boko Haram is representative of both active and passive elements of Nigerian society. Passive supporters may not make personal sacrifices in the form of suicide attacks. However, their sympathy with the activities of insurgents, as well as refusal to betray them, is a key factor that undermines the government's counter-terrorism

[76] O. Akinola , "Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), Research Paper, October 2013: 2-4.
[77]Akinola O, "Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating...4.

efforts. Therefore, public support for the purpose of this paper refers to both, active and passive backing of the group by sections of Nigerian society.

In January 2012, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan noted that some sympathisers of Boko Haram were not only members of the executive, legislative and judicial arms of his government, but also the country's armed forces.[78]Although intelligence reports in 2013 appear to suggest that the group's support base is generally weak, earlier periods are highly indicative of the passive, yet profound role that political entities may have played in bolstering the group. For instance, the expression of this tacit role by northern Nigerian elites is reflected in the complex political dynamics in Borno State.

Before 2009, Boko Haram was believed to be under the influence of key politicians. There have been suspicions that certain political elites in Borno State funded the group and lifestyle of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf. Such individuals were further described as politicians who relied on the popular support which Yusuf could amass in favour of electoral victory during elections in 2003 and 2007.[79] In fact, during this period, an influential affiliate of Yusuf's group was appointed as the Commissioner of Religious Affairs in Borno State. This man was known as Alhaji Buji Foi and before his death at the hands of security forces in July 2009, he was regarded as a major financier of Boko Haram.[80]

While the late Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf was executed in a similar fashion around the same time, evidence of popular (and political) support for Yusuf was reflected in his position as a Borno State representative in Nigeria's Supreme Council of Sharia. Northern Nigerians who lent support to Boko Haram in the past are suspected to have done so partly

[78] M. Opeloye, "The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: A Critical Study of the Movement's Ideological Posture and Implications",*International Proceedings of Economics Development and Research* 51, No. 38, 2012, 172-181.

[79] M. Opeloye, "The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria...178.
[80] M. Opeloye, "The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria...178.

because they believed in the group's radical ideology. However, more significantly, when this ideology resonates among individuals with access to power and resources, it clearly benefits the group's operational capacities. Political actors who at one period or the other associated themselves with Boko Haram's leadership capitalised on the ability of the group to mobilise broad support from its members. This support was of course based on Yusuf's access to resources, which was partly invested in the acquisition of dozens of taxis, buses and motorcycles that he distributed to unemployed youths who became members of his group. While these ventures generated daily monetary returns to the group's coffers, they also endeared the teeming population of jobless youths to Yusuf.

It is important to point out that prior to 2009, the activities of Boko Haram were yet to be regarded as a major security threat to the country.[81] Therefore, the prevailing perception of the group by many northern indigenes at the time was that of a radical organisation with occasional tendencies towards violence. The theory of securitisation as advanced by the Copenhagen School helps to make sense of the counter-terrorism dynamics that followed the Nigerian government's reaction to Boko Haram in 2009. In July that year, over 1,000 people lost their lives in several cities across the northern region as a result of major clashes between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces. This created the conditions under which the then Yar 'Adua government was able to declare the group as a significant security threat to the country. More recently in June 2013, securitisation of the group was reinforced by President Jonathan, who authorised the gazetting of an order which officially brought the activities of Boko Haram within the purview of Nigeria's Terrorism Prevention Act.[82]

The securitisation policy appeared to diminish the appeal that Boko Haram exuded among political circles and altered the perception of some who previously saw the group as one with

[81] M. Opeloye, "The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria...178.
[82] M. Opeloye, "The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria...178.

legitimate motives. It further induced a surge in the exchange of allegations between political elites suspected to be affiliated with Boko Haram before 2009.[83]

For instance, in 2011, a senator representing one of the senatorial districts in Borno State refuted allegations of association with Boko Haram following the arrest and interrogation of a group member known as Mallam Ali Konduga.[84] More pointed suspicions have characterised the altercation between another serving legislator from Borno State and a former governor. A thrust for this controversy stems from the arrest of Shuaibu Bama, who happens to be a nephew of a senator, and who was arrested at the house of a former governor in October 2012.[85] While these issues remain tainted with some obscurity, it should be noted that allegations exchanged between (political) elites which hint at Boko Haram affiliation can also be a shrewd political tool to neutralise opposition within the context of state politics. However, beyond this ambiguity is the fact that since the takeover of Boko Haram's leadership by Abubakar Shekau, accompanied by the escalation of violence since July 2009, the evolution and outlook of the group has grown beyond proportions that both political leaders can manage.

**Boko Haram's Internal Linkages**

One significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment and support for Boko Haram is economic deprivation. Abject poverty and economic dislocation of livelihoods have drastically reduced the options of many young Nigerians in the northern region. As highlighted above, deducing from the structural violence paradigm, individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination,

[83]I. Ker, "Diagnostic Review of Insurgency in Nigeria: The Cultural Dimension", in *The Eminent and Expert Working Group Meeting on National CounterInsurgency Strategy*, Plateau: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), 2012.

[84]I. Ker, "Diagnostic Review of Insurgency in Nigeria...

[85]I. Ker, "Diagnostic Review of Insurgency in Nigeria...

and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. As this section will highlight, in the particular context of Nigeria, it is the combination of these factors that Boko Haram has exploited in a bid to gain support for its activities in the northeastregion of Nigeria.

In May 2013, the Nigerian government released dozens of women and teenagers previously detained as relatives of suspected Boko Haram members.[86] Among the youths were individuals who confessed to previously accepting payments of 5,000 Nigerian Naira from Boko Haram militants, who in turn provided them with kegs of fuel to set schools ablaze in Maiduguri, Borno State.[87] This is indicative of the economic desperation expressed by thousands of youths who have been rendered vulnerable by the shortcomings of Nigeria's leadership over several decades. According to Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the measure of relative poverty is most apparent in the northern region. In comparison with the southeast and southwest zones, which have relative poverty rates of 67.0% and 59.1% respectively, the north-east and north-west zones have higher figures of 76.3% and 77.7% of relative poverty.[88] In regard to other vital indicators such as the education of girls, there are similar patterns of inequality with the northern region having much lower enrolment rates in comparison with the south. However, it is important to point out that the contrast in overall deprivation levels between the north and south is also a consequence of bad governance by successive north-eastern leaders in their constituencies.

The phenomenon of the "youth bulge" in Africa and particularly in Nigeria has further increased the steady supply of economically-deprived individuals who have become susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram. With almost 200 million people aged between 15

[86]O. Bolaji, "Terrorism and the Nigerian Federation", *African Security Review* 21, No. 4, 2017, 4-16.

[87]O. Bolaji, "Terrorism and the Nigerian Federation...5

[88]O. Bolaji, "Terrorism and the Nigerian Federation...5

and 24, Africa has one of the youngest population groups in the world and it is growing rapidly.[89]While Nigeria is firmly within the category of a very young age structure, with nearly three-quarters of its population under the age of 30, political violence inspired by marginalised youths in the country are stark reminders of the negative impact exceedingly large and mismanaged youth populations can exert across the world.[90] Although many scholars are justified in pointing out that the connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect and complicated, the huge number of young people living on the margins of Nigerian society intensifies these linkages. Ahmed Salkida, who had close contact with Mohammed Yusuf, held the belief that followers of Boko Haram were numbering up to hundreds of thousands, most of them Almajiris, school dropouts, renegade civil servants and parliamentary staff. While the lack of reliable data and the difficulty of discerning between passive and active support for the group still poses a challenge, as of May 2013, Boko Haram youths were reported to still abound in areas such as Sambisa Games Reserves Forest in Borno State.[91] Although socio-economic deprivation is clearly a powerful variable in the crisis equation in Nigeria, caution must be exercised in the way its predictive value is underscored. This is because there are other intervening variables which must be examined. Therefore, in considering the theoretical relevance of structural violence in a crisis that has a sectarian angle, reducing the Boko Haram crisis to causes such as economic inequality and social marginalisation can obscure analysis of the role which other factors play – the most predominant among them being religion.

The factor of religion is examined here because of the central role it plays as a defining feature and fault line of the Nigerian state. In Nigeria, the two dominant religions of

[89]E. Okemi, "Boko Haram: A Religious sector Terrorist Organization", *Global journal of politics and law research,*Vol. 1, No. 2, 2013, 18.

[90]E. Okemi, "Boko Haram: A Religious sector Terrorist...18.
[91]E. Okemi, "Boko Haram: A Religious sector Terrorist...18.

Christianity and Islam have considerable reverence for the respective spiritual headship provided by their leaders, and this has been a major issue underlining sectarian consciousness, tensions and radicalisation. More significantly, nearly every decade of Nigeria's contemporary history is replete with violence and conflicts that have religious undertones. Prior to Nigeria's civil war, thousands of southern Igbos of Christian orientation were killed by northern Hausas (Muslims) in 1966.[92]

In 1980, hundreds died as a result of several weeks of rioting sparked by a confrontation between the Maitatsine group and the Nigerian Police at a rally in Yobe State.[93] In 1991, over 200, mostly southern Christians, lost their lives while over 20 churches were burnt by Muslims reacting to news of a planned visit by German Christian evangelist Reinhard Bonnke to Nigeria.[94]The 2000s ushered Nigerians into the bloodiest decade in which thousands have died as a result of Christian-Muslim clashes and terrorist violence instigated by Boko Haram. Religion in some cases thus appears to be the language of politics exploited by both state and non-state actors towards ends that are essentially parochial.

However, beyond these, religion by itself is not the problem or cause of the crisis in northern Nigeria. Rather, the destructive exploitation of Nigeria's religious temperament by Boko Haram has been contrived into a key driver of public support for violence in the country. It is the manipulation of religion that has been capitalised on by Boko Haram to the detriment of the Nigerian state while misrepresenting the Islamic faith and community. This point is crucial for an understanding of how the cause of conflict is not based on the mere presence of the factor of religion. Rather, conflict erupts when this factor, individually or collectively with other factors, is manipulated in favour (or disfavour) of certain interests. This assertion

[92]K. Mohammed, "The Message and Method of Boko Haram", in M.A. Perouse de Montclos (ed.), *Boko Haram ;Islamism, Politics, Security and the state in Nigeria,* Netherland:IpskampDrukker,2014, 12.
[93]K. Mohammed, "The Message and Method of Boko...12.
[94]K. Mohammed, "The Message and Method of Boko...12.

about the role of religion is also acknowledged by Jeffrey Seul, who explains that "religion is not the cause of 'religious conflict.

It should be noted that when conflicts involving one or more religious groups occur, the combatants may be emboldened by a sense of religiously-defined identity and purpose, and their traditions may provide a fund of symbolic, moral and institutional basis that can be used to mobilise the group and legitimise its cause. This occurred in the Nigerian case, while religion is essentially a force for good, Boko Haram employs it as a machination to express high levels of negativity. It has thus been stage-managed by the group as an instrument for stereotyping and demonising opponents, such that exhortations to violence in northern Nigeria have acquired great potency once framed in religious terms.[95]

More often than not, the predominant narrative advanced by Boko Haram has been the call for a Sharia state in Nigeria. For many years, this demand resonated with the religious aspirations of many young Muslims who were drawn by the group's assurance of political and economic emancipation. Consequently, the surge in the group's membership translated into widespread attacks against targets that are symbolically linked to the Christian community in Nigeria. Some of these incidents include the attack on a Catholic Church in Chibok on the outskirts of Borno which claimed at least 35 lives; the suicide attack on the Church of Christ in Nigeria in Mubi ; and the attacks close to a Living Faith Church in BornoState on Easter Sunday, 8 April 2012.[96] The character of these targets, however, does not conceal the fact that victims of the group's assaults also include Muslims who reside within northern states already governed by Sharia law in Nigeria.

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[95]A. Ejiofor, "Boko Haram: One Sect, Conflicting Narratives", *Journal of African Renaissance,* V. 9, No. 1, 2016, 3.

[96]A. Ejiofor, "Boko Haram: One Sect, Conflicting...8

In his book, Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty, Stuart Elden makes a compelling attempt to explain how terrorist attacks targeted at US interests are part of a complex chain of cause and effect that fit into a nuanced and broader geo-political picture, into which countries like Nigeria fall. For instance, Elden's analysis of Osama bin Laden's message broadcasted on 11 February 2003 informs an understanding of why certain countries like Nigeria are experiencing violence today.[97] In the broadcast, bin Laden criticised 'illegitimate' Muslim nations that have become 'apostate' and are in need of liberation by jihad. Evidently, it is this rhetoric of liberation that Boko Haram has used in anchoring its call for a replacement of the Nigerianfederation with a pure Sharia state.

However, this objective is problematic for a variety of reasons, not in the least because Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria clearly states that the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State religion. The escalation of violence and its impact on the northern region appears to have diminished the influence which the call for a (Boko Haram-styled) Sharia imposition previously conveyed. Similar to the actions of al Qaeda, the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram is not religiously inspired; rather they purport to be religiously justified by manipulating Islamic law and its sources in order to legitimise themselves in the eyes of Muslims.[98] Indeed, within mainstream Sunni legal writings on the conduct of war, it is forbidden to intentionally kill individuals classified under the category of non-combatants. Consequently, a number of leaders in the Nigerian Muslim community have spoken against Boko Haram's professed objectives and actions. Some of these individuals include Mallam Yusuf Inuwa, late Sheikh Abba Aji, Sheikh

[97]J.P. Golwa and H.O.Alozieuwa, "Perspective on Nigeria's Security Challenges; The Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency compared", *Journal of African Renaissance,* Vol. 9 No. 1, 2018, 10.

[98]J.P. Golwa and H.O.Alozieuwa, "Perspective on Nigeria's...12.

Ahmad Gumi, Sheikh Dahiru Usman Bauchi and late Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmud Adam. The Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Sa'ad Abubakar III – the spiritual head of Muslims in Nigeria – has further denounced the actions of the group by calling them evil.[99]

**Boko Haram's External Linkages**

Following the extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram's leader in 2009, the group's reliance on domestic public support appeared to be in dire need of external reinforcement, especially in the form of weapons and fighters. While such external involvement has for long remained contentious, they appeared to be more apparent in light of Boko Haram's insurgency since July 2009. This external reinforcement seemed to have been reflected in the sophistication of the attack on the UN office in Abuja in August 2011. The incident helped to corroborate the often assumed transnational dimension of the crisis in Nigeria. Not only was the UN (suicide) attack a novelty in the country, it underscored a semblance with terrorist tactics employed by infamous groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al Shabaab, and the al Qaeda core. In May 2013, security agencies in Nigeria discovered an arms warehouse at the residence of a Lebanese national in Kano State. The cache of weapons was located in an underground bunker beneath the master bedroom and investigations point towards the existence of a Hezbollah terrorist cell in Nigeria with links to Boko Haram. Some of the weapons confiscated included rocketpropelled guns and anti-personnel mines, which were clearly beyond the range of weapons normally stolen by Boko Haram from local police stations.

In addition to allegations of financial proceeds from local politicians, businessmen and organised criminal networks, suspicions have increased with regard to Boko Haram's interception of charity funds generated by the UK-based aid organisation Al-Muntada

[99]J.P. Golwa and H.O.Alozieuwa, "Perspective on Nigeria's...12.

Al-Islami Trust. In 2012, Lord Alton of Liverpool raised fears in the Britishparliament about Boko Haram's alleged links with this organisation. While the exact context of financial flow from this organisation remains unclear, it calls to mind previous claims about this organisation's involvement in financing a violent uprising in Yobe State, Nigeria in 2003.[100] In relation to this, the director of the charity was arrested by the Nigerian authorities in February 2004 following the discovery of his financial transactions running into millions of Naira with a Kano-based businessman who acted as a middleman between the charity and Boko Haram.[101]

In a court case involving Kabiru Sokoto, the Boko Haram mastermind behind the 2011 attack on St. Theresa's Catholic Church in Madalla, the name of an Algerian organisation was revealed by prosecution witnesses based on the testimony of the accused. When translated from Arabic, the name of the organisation denotes "the group from the sunset".[102] Sokoto further confessed that Boko Haram had earlier received a cash donation from this organisation. These external funding links have similarly found expression elsewhere. In September 2011, rare pointers regarding Boko Haram's funding sources were further disclosed during a visit led by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo and civil rights activist Mallam Shehu Sani to the relatives of the late Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf. On this occasion, Yusuf's family revealed that about 40% of the group's funding came from outside Nigeria.[103] They further noted that while the group had representatives in Chad, Niger and Cameroon, it would be difficult for the Nigerian army to crush Boko Haram

[100]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Quest for a Permanent Resolution of the Crisis", *Global journal of Arts, Humanities and Social sciences, V*ol. 3, No. 8, 2014, 45.

[101]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram...45.
[102]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram...46.
[103]A. Falode, "The Nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram War, 2010-2015",*Journal of Social Research,* 2016, 7.

because of their capacity to reach out beyond Nigeria if they so desired. These statements match some accounts which explain how suicide bombers of the group are usually Chadians, Nigeriens and Cameroonians.

The regional proximity of groups such as AQIM and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) further problematises the external ramifications of Boko Haram's activities. Although a well-defined network between these Sahelian groups and Boko Haram may not be identifiable for now, isolated alliances between them appear to exist.61 In November 2011, the Algerian Deputy Foreign Minister cited intelligence reports that indicated ties between Boko Haram and AQIM.[104] In June 2012, this claim was followed up by the US' designation of Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kambar as global terrorists with close ties to AQIM. It is believed that Kambar, a native of Borno State, trained together with al-Barnawi in Algeria at an AQIM training camp around 2009, following the major Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria that year. Beyond this, a number of arrests following counter-insurgency operations by the Nigerian government have revealed an increasing number of Boko Haram-hired mercenaries. Some of these foreign fighters include Cameroonians and Nigerians who through the assistance of local Almajiris participated in Boko Haram attacks in Bama area of Borno State.

In June 2013, the Nigerian government's Joint Task Force (JTF) arrested a major recruiter for Boko Haram as several militants reportedly fled from Maiduguri towards Niger Republic.[105] These terrains beyond Nigeria's borders also harbour camps where Boko Haram militants have trained in the past. Quite understandably, these external dynamics influenced Nigeria's military involvement in the Sahel as part of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).

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[104]A. Falode, "The Nature of Nigeria's Boko...8.
[105]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram...46.

**Patterns of Raising Funds by Boko Haram**

Insurgent groups in particular have a strong tendency to become involved in black and grey market activity, precisely because they cannot participate in the state-regulated licit economy or at least do so openly. Since the end of the Cold War, illegal activities have provided critical revenue streams for insurgent groups around the globe, helping them to survive much longer than they could have without them, and also attracting transnational organized crime groups which gain comparative advantage by doing business in unstable war environments.

In order to carryout out effective propaganda and attacks on their target audience, finances are very essential for any terrorist organization. Terrorist groups have developed quite a number of ways for financing their operations and its includes but not limited to the following; channelling money through charities and front oranisations, drug and human trafficking, smuggling (Taliban trading on opium before the United States invasion) and operating legitimate trade (like the Haggani network running a grocery store in North Waziristan) but focus here will be on robbery and kidnapping and hostage taking by Boko Haram.

It is also relevant to examine Boko Haram violence through the lens of political economy; high profile attacks by the group in the capital Abuja, for example, have fed perceptions that Nigeria remains in a state of chaos and that the military has little chance of stabilizing the country. Another characteristic that sets the Boko Haram apart from other regional actors who engage in illicit activities is its level of efficiency, honed over years of activity, and its concealment capabilities, which have sharpened in the last couple of years. Boko Haram have been much more professional than other insurgent groups in terms of how they manage their business, and they are much more ruthless.

Also typical to the mafia structure, money moves in both directions up and down the command chain. Shekau distributes operational funds and salaries to amir's in the field, in return those amirs with high earning potential must send a portion of what they raise to their superiors.

A renowned method for raising funds by Boko Haram is through bank robberies and similar actions. The robberies are meant to provide financing for the group and also to assist in the achievement of the secondary benefit of increasing fear in the public and weakening support for the government. The funds generated from the robberies (raids) were either used to purchased weapons and explosives and also to increase the potential of Boko Haram continuing its struggle. In an attack on a UBA branch in Askira, two persons were killed including a police officer, while in Gombi, Adamawa, the group robbed four banks and many bank customers and bank employees were killed in the raid.[106] The pattern of robbery by Boko Haram follows similar pattern, raids on banks is always accompanied by attacks on police stations. Attacks by Boko Haram on Nigerian financial institutions went on and on unabated. Most of the banks closedown some of their branches especially in the North-East were adequate security measures were not in place during the heydays of the insurgency.

Boko Haram resorted to kidnappings as a technique. Like robberies, kidnapping serves multiple purposes. They demonstrate the abilities of the group to government and the public, and they also indicate that the government is weak and that individuals in society are vulnerable. When it comes to kidnapping, Boko Haram does not discriminate or have specific target, though in rare cases, they have kidnapped important symbols of the government (students like in the case of the Chibok and that of Dapchi school girls). Successfully kidnapping gives people the notion that the government cannot even protect its own citizens.

[106]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram...45.

The most identifiable and possibly the most lucrative funding sources are Boko Haram's criminal activities. Beginning in February 2013, Boko Haram began kidnapping as a means of increasing revenues, creating distrust of the government, and discouraging Western business interests in Nigeria.[107] The April 2014 kidnapping of 270 school girls from the northern town of Chibok gained international attention, but is only one of many kidnappings happening regularly in Nigeria.Seven members of a French family kidnapped just over the border in Cameroon on 19 February 2013 were reportedly worth $3 million to Boko Haram. Most kidnappings, however, tend to be more modest.[108] During attacks on villages, women and girls are often taken to be used as slaves or sold in human trafficking networks. The combination of funding, intimidation and publicity has made kidnapping an effective tactic for Boko Haram and the success recorded by the Niger Delta militants seems to have encouraged Boko Haram to use it. Militants in the Niger Delta became quite adept at raising money and attention for their agitation with kidnappings. They have often targeted foreign executives of multinational corporations with investment in the Niger Delta region. The multinational companies were ideal targets since they were often unpopular with many people and they were willing to pay the ransoms.

Hostage situations have some similarities with kidnappings since the individual hostages are held against their will. Hostage situations provide Boko Haram with an opportunity to demonstrate the vulnerability of the government and to attract publicity for the goals of the group. Boko Haram have sought to gain the release of imprisoned comrades or others in jail. Such demands are both practical and symbolic because they would gain freedom for the individual and at the same time demonstrate that the group can negotiate as an equal with the Nigerian government. When they succeed in gaining the freedom of colleagues in prison, the loyalty of current members is increased. If the government fails to negotiate, they risk seeing

[107]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram...47.
[108]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram...47.

the hostages killed or will be forced to mount a rescue attempt which can lead to deaths among the hostages as well. Like in the case of an attack on Gashigar on the border with Niger were twelve soldiers were taken hostage and the botched attempt to rescue an Italian and a Briton that were being held hostage by Boko Haram by the Nigerian government which resulted in their untimely death.[109]

**Conclusion**

Boko Haram represents an ugly paradox: its ideas have limited appeal but significant staying power. At the ideological level, its violence is framed by two themes: an exclusivist claim to represent true Islam, and grievances against the state and non-members of the sect. Boko Haram has paired Salafi theology with a commitment to jihad. It has anchored this global ideology in a particular reading of local politics, viewing decades-old inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria, the contentious career of Muhammad Yusuf, and the sect's clashes with the military and the C-JTF as part of a unified narrative of anti-Islamic violence. Acting on its exclusivism, Boko Haram has inflicted massive brutality on civilians, many of them Muslims. The group can be crushed militarily, yet state violence fuels its narrative of victimhood. Countering Boko Haram will require attention not just to material problems in the Lake Chad region, but also to the cyclical violence that has reinforced Boko Haram's sense of victimhood.

[109]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram...48.

# CHAPTER FIVE

# THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN BORNO STATE OF NIGERIA

## Introduction

Nigeria's response to Boko Haram has been largely unsuccessful for many reasons. In 2013, Nigeria passed anti-terrorism legislation in order to facilitate counter-terrorism coordination in response to the threat posed by Boko Haram.[110] However, corruption and mismanagement among its own security forces has limited the government's ability to respond effectively. In addition, Nigerian troops lack adequate resources to defend against the powerful Boko Haram insurgency. Nigerian military funding is skimmed off the top, leaving the soldiers ill equipped, especially in the northeast. Consequently, the soldiers suffer from low morale, feelings of fear, and reluctance to engage the enemy. The heavy losses experienced by Nigerian forces in Boko Haram attacks help explain the military's slow response to the Chibok school abductions. According to Amnesty International, the army division tasked with countering Boko Haram received information in the hours preceding the attack on Chibok Government Girls Secondary School. Despite the warning, troops were not deployed nor were measures taken to protect the girls, due to lack of resources and fear of engaging with better equipped Boko Haram fighters. Rescuing the remaining captives is virtually impossible at this point as the girls are likely being held in relatively inaccessible areas of the Sambisa forest or in remote mountain areas on the Cameroon boarder.

**Traditional Leaders in the Counter-Insurgency Operations in Borno State, Nigeria**

The existence of traditional institutions in Nigeria predates the coming of Europeans and their powers are derived from norms and values of their societies. The importance of traditional institutions in the promotion of peace and security cannot be underestimated. The traditional

[110]A. Ejiofor, "Boko Haram: One Sect, Conflicting Narratives", *Journal of African Renaissance,* V. 9, No. 1, 2016, 8.

institutions are so much cherished and very important in mobilization and are relied upon for the promotion of ethical values in the society. This is largely due to the legitimacy enjoyed by these institutions seen as the custodians of customs and traditions of the people. Traditional institutions are those political institutions predating the coming of British colonialism in Nigeria that cater for the economic, social and political aspirations of their people, which today have become part and parcel of our cultural heritage. Right from pre-colonial Nigeria, traditional institutions played a key role in ensuring the security of their domains. Traditional institutions were conferred with legislative, executive and judicial powers, which they discharge diligently without dictatorial tendencies.[111]

However, the chiefs ruled with the advice of a council that has been variously termed an inner or Privy Council. Where the system functioned well, these institutional checks as well as the Queen Mother safeguarded against dictatorial tendencies. The coming of the Europeans stripped the traditional rulers of some of their powers. They were subjected under the control of the colonial authority where the ultimate authority lies. The attainment of independence brought a new set of class ofpeople (the educated and political class) who took charge of the political affairs of the country. Traditional institutions status as administrators was replaced with advisers in their different communities. The newly emerged class saw the traditional institutions as a threat to their grip on power and therefore, clamped on the powers of the traditional institutions. The neglect of the traditional institutions in the general administration of their communities greatly contributed to the security challenges facing Nigeria today. On

[111]I. Saidu, *The Roles and the Challenges of Traditional Rulers in Land Conflict Resolution and Management in Nigeria: A Case Study of Bauchi State, Nigeria* , Ibadan: Safari Books Limited, 2010, 42.

this note, this phase of the study seeks to examine how traditional institutions can improve national security most especially on the issue of Boko Haram in the North East.

The traditional institutions exercised a number of powers in the pre-colonial Nigeria ranging from executive, legislative and judicial powers in consultation with a council of advisers. Traditional ruler's power and authority were largely derived fromtraditions. Four functions of traditional rulers in pre-colonial Nigeria are: organization of troops; administration of justice; collection of taxes and protection of their territorial domains. The fusion of powers on traditional rulers in the pre-colonial Nigeria did not make them dictators in the administration of their territories. The reason is that; they consulted their councillors and officials in the administration of their territories. In the pre-colonial Nigeria, the safeguarding of peace and stability is carried out at different levels. In the north, three committees were in place to ensure peace and security through settlement of conflicts, these are a low level committee, comprising of village head, Fulani and farmer leaders. They can resolve the issue at their level, mostly by mediation and payment of compensation. A second middle level committee comprising district head, Sarkin Fulani and branch chair of the farmers' association settle disputes. Very few issues pass this level without being resolved. The final committee which operates at a higher level comprises the Emir, the Galadima (who also represents the chairs of associations) and other member of the emirate council.[112] The verdict here is final and the conflicting parties must adhere to it. In pre-colonial Nigeria traditional rulers as its leaders carried out governance, exercised power and authority or influence over their respective communities. Exercising these power, authority and influence had its root in tradition, in turn; it helped (tradition rulers) in the aspects of managing affairs, administering justice and most especially resolving conflict.

[112]I. Saidu, *The Roles and the Challenges of Traditional* ...2.

Suffix to say, the pre-colonial Nigeria benefited immensely from these roles played by the traditional rulers, as a result, crisis based on tribal, ethnic and religious sentiments were very minimal.Changes that occurred in the traditional institutions with the advent of colonialism largely depended on the nature of administration in the traditional institutions. In decentralized traditional institutions like the Igbo, the colonial masters appointed chiefs and carved out spheres of authority for them. In centralizedtraditional institutions the colonial masters operated a system of indirect rule. The British introduced indirect rule in recognition of the centralized nature of the traditional institutions in pre-colonial Nigeria and the good administrative structures they found. Indirect rule brought British rule to bear on the natives through the instrumentality of traditional institutions. Traditional institutions' powers were eroded and become subordinate to the colonial officers. Colonial officers in turn depended largely on the traditional rulers because they (traditional rulers) enjoyed legitimate support from their subjects.

The introduction of a federal constitution in 1954 brought to an end the system of indirect rule as it was replaced by a new system of local government.[113] Despite this, the British intensified her hegemony by merely replacing her officials with privileged individuals trained in Britain in the 1940s and 1950s to manage Nigeria along with traditional rulers. Although, these individuals acted under the auspices of fighting or negotiating for federalism but the fact remains that their assumption of power did not help the traditional rulers in gaining back their sovereign authority.[114] Traditional institutions in the colonial period retained some powers which were considered customary.

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[113]Ahmed Ubah , 40, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, interviewed in Kaduna on September, 29, 2020.

[114]Ahmed Mohammed , 40, Ministry of Culture and Tourism...

> They (chiefs) retained legal powers and authority over land allocation and local taxation, thereby maintaining some degree of autonomy, especially in issues that were considered as falling under the domain of customary law as interpreted by native courts. Thus, though the boundaries of these administrative spheres were not sharply demarcated, there was some degree of separation between the central government and local administration, hence the notion of a dual system. One may think that the British were really concerned with preserving the moral and spiritual significance of the chiefly office of the natives, when in reality; the aim was, to undermine traditional structures.[115]

At the height of the struggle for independence, a new class emerged which was later to challenge the roles of traditional institutions in modern day Nigeria. With the attainment of independence, their status (traditional institutions) as administrators was replaced with advisers in their different communities. The ruling Northern People Congress (NPC) pushed for the creation of a minster oflocal government and an elected premier solely to oversee the native authorities. Thus, the introduction of the chief-in-council system was part of the grand strategy to reduce the powers of the chiefs by both British and Nigerian nationalists. The educated and political elites that fought against colonial occupation and struggled for independence later constituted the ruling class in independent Nigeria. The colonial government has thus, succeeded in polarizing the chiefs and the emergent nationalists. The nationalist pushed for increased roles of the elites in the day to day administration. As a result, in 1954 the powers of traditional institutions were reduced. The post-independence period witnessed the clamping down of the powers of traditional institutions.

In 1962, for example, the NPC government of the north passed the provincial commissioner law that subordinated the Emirs and Chiefs to their control. Following a dispute with the regional government in 1963, the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sanusi was removed from office on the basis of a conflict arising from the provisions of the provincial administrative law. This was followed by the formal take-over of the native authority police, prisons and native courts in the same year. While the three

[115]I. Saidu, *The Roles and the Challenges of Traditional* ...12.

> institutions gave the chiefs some legal powers with impunity, the policy was aimed at reducing them to nothing.[116]

The new elites that emerged after independence saw the traditional institutions as a threat to their rule and subsequently reduced their powers. Traditional institutions' roles were not significantly changed until when in 1976 a local government reform was carried out which drastically reduced their power to merely advisers in the administration of their domains.[117] The military intervention in politics and the subsequent coup d'état did little to give the traditional institutions specific roles in the administration of their domains. The long years of military intervention, traditional rulers largely preserved their status, except for the major change in 1967/8 when their powers were significantly reduced. The 1979 constitution whichis a product of a military regime striped the traditional institutions of the powers that hitherto remained.[118]

Traditional institutions have been able to survive in a modern state system and their efforts in peace and conflict resolution is highly acknowledge. We cannot disregard the traditional institutions in our search for peace and security; it should be utilized effectively for the purpose of giving out security. Problems that we are having now had existed before, we need to explore how they managed it in the past. Recently, there is a clamour for traditional institutions to be given constitutional roles that will further enhance their roles in peace and conflict resolution in their respective areas. For instance the 1979 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provided for a council of chief in each state with powers to advice on customary law or cultural affairs, inter-communal relations, chieftaincy matters and the maintenance of public order within the State. However, needless to say the 1999 constitution

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[116]U. Ukıwo, "Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 41, No.1, 2003, 112.

[117]U. Ukıwo, "Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic...112.
[118]U. Ukıwo, "Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic...113.

that ushered in Nigeria's fourth republic was salient on the functions of traditional institutions.[119] It is the view of this paper that a definite role has to be entrenched in the Nigerian constitution that will give traditional institutions some powers in the maintenance of law and order. This is more pertinent in view of the current security challenges bedevilling the country. Peace and stability along our borders can only be guaranteed if we service the traditional rulers as they solidify their filial, religious and political relationships with their people.

**Religious leaders and organizations Role in Curtailing Boko Haram Influences**

Some of the most influential figures in Nigeria's Muslim north are religious leaders known as emirs. Emirs exert a great deal of political influence as the titular rulers of local religious communities. They draw authority from their historical influence in social and political life as well as their role as trusted conflict mediators. Some emirs have strong ties to the government, which pays them a stipend. Government officials will turn to popular emirs to legitimize political plans and to gain some of their popularity by association. The current Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar, is considered the overall leader of Nigerian Muslims and carries the title of president general of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs.[120]

There have are several religious organizations and movements which have operated in the north at one time or another. One of the best-known and influential organizations was the Izalatul Bidi'a wa Ikhamatis Sunnah (People Committed to the Removal of Innovations in

[119]Victor Akap, 40, Historian, interviewed in Kaduna on September, 29, 2020.

[120]Garuba Ahmed , 40, Historian, interviewed in Kaduna on September, 29, 2020.

Islam), or Izala for short. Founded in 1978 by Sheikh Ismaila Idris, Izala was a reformist movement influenced by Wahhabism with ties to Saudi Arabia.[121] At one point it ran a charity and first aid organization. Though Izala went into decline after a split of the leadership in the 1990s, its reformist ideas still have support in many sections of society, and its former members have gained positions of power and influence in several states.

Similarly, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (an offshoot of the Muslim Students' Society and a Nigerian version of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood) also runs schools andclinics and publishes newspapers. A somewhat more radical group, it was inspired by the Iranian revolution and founded by Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Zakzaky. Its objective is the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria and the removal of the secular Nigerian government and its northern elites, which the group considers to be a corrupt affront to Islam.

Aware of the threat that Boko Haram presents (both to the population and to the northern elites themselves), many established Muslim rulers, such as the Sultan of Sokoto, have been vocal opponents of the group. A number of lesser leaders have also spoken against Boko Haram's objectives and actions. In their rejection of extremism, many religious leaders are closely aligned with the political establishment. Nigeria's national security adviser has worked with emirs, Islamic scholars, and moderate Salafists to help establish dialogue and attempt to broker ceasefires.

Unfortunately, it appears that the close relationship between religious leaders and corrupt northern officials over the last 30 years has damaged the legitimacy of the Nigerian Islamic establishment. Moreover, while the emirs and the Sufis remain somewhat influential, they now compete with a number of reformist and fundamentalist alternatives.

**Political Leadership Response to the Boko Haram Menace**

[121] I. Elizabeth, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-1985", *Journal of Religion in Africa,* 1987, 194

The escalation of the insurgency in early 2010 caught the government flat-footed. It initially believed the violence would peter out. Sustained attacks, however, ushered in more sober responses. Since 2012, it has tried to address the challenge on multiple tracks but especially by increasing the defence budget from 100 billion naira ($625 million) in 2010 to 927 billion naira ($6 billion) in 2011 and 1 trillion ($6.25 billion) naira in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Much of these increases was to combat Boko Haram.[122] Other measures include strengthening anti-terrorism legislation, boosting the capacities of the military and other security agencies, exploring dialogue with the insurgents, declaring a state of emergency in the North East and launching military offensives against the insurgents. Results have been limited.

President Jonathan signed the Terrorism (Prevention) Act in 2011. It was amended in 2012 to designate the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) as the national coordinator for anti-terrorism, in order to prevent in-fighting among security agencies. On 4 June 2013, the government proscribed Boko Haram and Ansaru, describing their activities as terrorism, and warned that any persons associated with the two groups was liable to prosecution. It is prosecuting hundreds of suspected Boko Haram and Ansaru members and collaborators. Mohammed Bello Adoke, the attorney-general and justice minister, reported that eleven convictions of Boko Haram members were obtained in 2013.[123]On 4 December 2013, the defence headquarters recommended the immediate trial of over 500 suspects arrested in the north-eastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa.[124] They were among almost 1,400 detainees in Maiduguri, Yola and Damaturu screened by a joint investigation team. Among those recommended for trial were paramilitary personnel and a medical doctor who allegedly

[122]J.P. Golwa and H.O.Alozieuwa, "Perspective on Nigeria's Security Challenges; The Niger Delta militancy and Boko Haram insurgency compared", *Journal of African Renaissance,* Vol. 9 No. 1, 2018, 14.
[123]J.P. Golwa and H.O.Alozieuwa, "Perspective on Nigeria's Security Challenges...9.
[124]J.P. Golwa and H.O.Alozieuwa, "Perspective on Nigeria's Security Challenges...9.

offered the militants direct logistical support; others who trained them in weapons handling; and those who confessed that they were trained in Mali and other countries.

Boosting the capacities of the military and other security agencies; the military had not anticipated the insurgency and was not prepared for its bombing campaign, as the late National Security Adviser Owoeye Azazi admitted in August 2011. Over the last two years, the government has sought to improve the capacities of the military and security services to respond to the challenge, particularly by improving training, equipment and coordination. More emphasis has been placed on retraining personnel in urban warfare, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. Personnel management and training is also prioritised, as well as equipment for close quarter combat, intelligence and amphibious operations, demolition and explosive breaching, tactical communication and civil-military relations.

In September 2012, the Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Centre in Jaji, Kaduna graduated 316 personnel, its ninth class. According to its commandant, Brigadier-General Tijani Golai, the army has trained over 7,000 from the army, police and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). Seeking to strengthen counter-insurgency capacity, the army recently built the country's first indigenous armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and now produces other protective gear, such as bullet-proof vests.[125]

On 17 December 2013, President Jonathan unveiled the first drone designed and constructed by the air force. Senior security officials are first to admit, however, that their agencies are ill prepared for today's challenges, especially terrorism. Factors blamed include underfunding, lack of training and equipment, poor intelligence, corruption, complicity, inter-agency rivalries and lack of effective political leadership. The Galtimari Committee, established to analyse the security challenges in the North East, noted in September 2011 that "on the part of

[125]Anonymous, 45, Nigerian Army, interviewed in Kaduna on September, 12, 2020.

the security forces, there are palpable operational lapses, service rivalry, under-funding, under-equipment and lack of collaboration". This perhaps explains why the inspector-general of police said in December 2011 that all suspected Boko Haram militants arrested were mere "foot soldiers; that the security agencies lacked evidence to apprehend the leaders of the sect". The police force is ill-equipped to address the Boko Haram threat and enjoys little public confidence. It has been grossly underfunded – less than 5 per cent of the budget – since military rule ended in 1999 and needs reform. The 2012 budget allotted 1.6 million naira ($10,000) per soldier but only 870,000 naira ($5,400) per police officer. At current levels, police colleges "can only turn out demoralised, frustrated and dehumanised policemen". Many residents accused police of selling informants' identities to Boko Haram. Given the urgency of the situation, the police are in no fit state to answer the Boko Haram challenge, but to truly achieve stability in the long term, Nigeria will need to address the shambolic state of law enforcement and carry out systematic police reform.

The problem with intelligence is not so much its gathering as its poor and inconsistent application. Politics also sometimes interferes. Both General Sani Abacha and former President Umaru Yar'Adua ordered the release of some detained Islamist extremists for fear of alienating northern supporters. The SSS says it alerted the political leadership to the Kano bomb attacks 48 hours before they happened in January 2012, but nothing was done. In September 2011, however, a pro-active response to intelligence reportedly prevented the defence headquarters bombing.[126] Constraining factors also include interagency mistrust, poor information sharing and institutional flaws such as unsound recruitment.

**The Approach of the Nigerian Security to the Insurgency**

[126]Anonymous, 45, Nigerian Army...

According to some scholars, the Nigerian police and the military have intelligence units and the principles used in training security intelligence officers was not different from what was used for civilian counterparts. In the police we have what is called the crime intelligence division. Peculiar to the army, we have the Air Force intelligence who are more involved in imagery. We also have the naval maritime intelligence that covers the maritime industry. Then we have the infantry intelligence that focus on the land and use more human intelligence collections due to their interaction with the people. This means the Nigerian intelligence community has a well-grounded structure that covered most significant areas of intelligence needs and that the infantry in this war has a direct responsibility but not without the support from the Air Force and the Navy in their intelligence led operations against the Boko Haram militants. In the views of operational intelligence is essentially processed, purified and up-to-date information about the enemy. For intelligence to be more useful in support of military operations, experts must be kept well informed of all the latest developments concerning their own forces' operation plans. The availability of intelligence under such condition permits the achievement of better results on the battle field at a lower cost, thus intelligence act as a force multiplier. How effective was this rule applied in the fight against the militants. This is a very difficult question to answer. However, when asked whether there was an alternative to the deployment of intelligence as a forerunner to tactical operations.

The only alternative to intelligence is the brazen use of military force. If you want facts and you don't get them, you use military tough force. It was a response that necessitated many questions and deep reflections. Has Nigerian security been able to gather intelligence as a pre-tactical strategy or has chosen excessive force in fighting Boko Haram. Von Clausewitz argued that most intelligence is false and any war built on intelligence is an effort foundering on straw and for these reasons Clausewitz endorsed self-reliance as the best defence.

However, their tactic as the sledge hammer approach and further claimed the security did not understand the nature of the war they were fighting. This gave the indication that the federal security apparatus either lacked the skills to engage the terrorists or have the skills but failed to apply them or chose a short cut to solving the problem. The only resorted to sheer use of force thinking probably the sledgehammer approach will quell the terrorists. It is important admitting Clausewitz was writing about an era different from what currently pertains.

However, many literatures affirmed the federal security lacked intelligence led operations. One of them was Agbiboa who described their method as the stick approach which he indicated had been the favoured option by the security forces with the use of aggression on Boko Haram members and innocent civilians. He noted that the Operation Restore Order in which 8000 officers and men were deployed to Borno region resulted in extra-legal killing, pursuit of the innocence and intimidation of the Borno citizens.[127] Far from conducting intelligence-driven operations, the JTS just halted access to areas, carried out house to house searches and shooting young men in their homes at times. Borno citizens were threatened on two fronts, the menacing fangs of Boko Haram insurgents and the hard-hearted guns of JTS soldiers. The soldiers brought in to enforce state of emergency declared as much more war against the people than against the Boko Haram insurgents. Whilst the military denied such reports, Agbiboa insisted the legacy of the Nigerian armed forces has been arbitrariness, ruthlessness, brutality, vandalism inactivity, low accountability to public and corruption. Nigeria he further noted presented itself as an apparatus of violence and relied on coercion for compliance rather than winning hearts and minds.

**Challenges Encountered by Military Leadership in Tackling the Boko Haram Menace**

[127]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the Quest for a Permanent Resolution of the Crisis", *Global journal of Arts, Humanities and Social sciences, V*ol. 3, No. 8, 2014, 49.

Concerned by the threat of terrorist groups such as the one Boko Haram poses to Nigeria and her neighbours, the military leadership in Nigeria engineered ECOWAS adopted a Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism in 2013, which provides for a regional Counter Terrorism Strategy and an Implementation Plan to help member states combat terrorism.[128]The strategy was meant to facilitate the implementation of regional, continental and international measures in combating terrorism and to provide a common operational framework for community- wide actions to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related acts. The strategy was intended to enhance coordination among member states; strengthen national and regional capacities to detect, deter, intercept and prevent terrorism; promote criminal justice approach; prevent and combat violent religious extremism; harmonize responses and promote regional and international cooperation on terrorism. However, it lacks a soft approach which would put an emphasis on the provision of state services, humanitarian aid and the protection of citizens as measures to prevent further appeal of the insurgents.

**Corruption and Porous Borders**

Corruption is the most pre-emptive and social problem that is affecting the entire sectors of Nigeria not only the security. It has been observed that corruption exists among the top-ranking security personnel, bureaucrats and politicians in the fight against insurgency. Many top-ranking military officers were discovered to have been involved in the corrupt practices involving the money earmarked for fighting the insurgency in the Northeast. For instance, a large sum that was budgeted for the procurement of weapons by the Nigerian military to tackle the insurgency was diverted by top military brass.

There are many corruption allegations against military leadership in the fight against insurgency. Most of the informants interviewed revealed that there is massive corruption in the fight against insurgency in the Northeast. Their summarized views disclosed that the

[128]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern...49.

military, bureaucrats in the region, politicians and the public are all involved in the corruption allegations which bedevilled the strive towards success in the fight against insurgency. They agreed that security personnel mounted checkpoints all over Borno state so as to collect tokens of N20, N50 and N100 to allow vehicles to pass easily through the checkpoints without any thorough investigation.[129] In this process, sophisticated weapons passed through the roads and reached the insurgents for their criminal activities.[130] These views are supported by many scholars.

Nigeria is one of the countries in the world with a large geographical size, different climatic terrain and a porous border particularly in the North where it has the largest size with neighbourhood of more than four countries. Nigeria's land area is one of the biggest in the world. For instance, Cameroon shares the largest border with Nigeria in the North and the South of about 1, 680 kilometres, Nigeria's border with Nigeria's 1, 497 kilometre and the size of the border with Chad is 87 kilometre.[131] These are the three countries that share the border and insurgency conflict with Nigeria and most of these borders are porous where there are entry and exit points uncountable.

The insurgents have easy route to stage their criminal activities and escape without being traced. The Sambisa forest in Borno state has a total size of 60 kilometres and this is the place where the insurgents hide and commit their crimes untraced. The nature of Nigerian porous is identified by many scholars as one of the reasons why the fight against Boko Haram is challenging and continuous. In the summary of the views of the informants, most of them or almost all of them agreed that the nature of Nigerian porous border is one of the challenging factors that prevent the fight against insurgency to succeed accordingly in the Northeast.

[129]Anonymous, 45, Political Activist, interviewed in Kaduna on September, 12, 2020.
[130]Anonymous, 45, Political Activist...
[131]Anonymous, 45, Political Activist...

They believed that the borders served as the main source of weapons, logistics, escape routes and other hiding places for the insurgents.

**Lack of Synergy among the Affected Countries**

It is on record that there is poor or better still no cooperation and support among the security personnel and this is one of the challenges that led to the prolonging of the fight against insurgency in North-eastern Nigeria. There are tensions, rivalries, hostilities and discord among them especially the military, police and DSS. This has been reported severally. The joint operation by these security agencies often ended in fiasco being defeated severally by the Boko Haram insurgents for them later to engage in trading words of blame among them. This is because of the failure by the security leadership to coordinate and design a strategic and tactical designation of responsibilities and operations among them. The indiscriminate militarization of the areas affected by the security crisis in the far North has crippled the resilience of these communities. Mora, Waza, Kolofata, Ashigachia and Bargaram have been the main targets of Boko Haram attacks because of the MNJTF bases there.

The indiscipline of some soldiers who take pleasure in tormenting villagers,extorting money from passengers and confiscating cattle recovered from Boko Haram militants as well as the recurrent fatal accidents involving military vehicles has slowly whittled confidence and trust in the military leadership to fight the sect. Travel restrictions imposed by the military leadership have also impacted negatively on the economy of the state and region and helped to prepare the ground for radicalization. The closing of markets, including cattle and border markets, has disrupted trans-border trade which the population of the region relies heavily on. Other restrictive measures (ban on some agricultural products and on the movement of motor bikes) that were implemented without providing alternatives have forced hundreds of young men into unemployment, and caused many teachers, nurses, agricultural monitors and animal

breeding technicians who travel to remote areas to provide expertise and assistance", to stay home for lack of means of transportation.[132]

All these measures have fuelled resentment and dislike for military leadership and turned the region into a fertile ground for Boko Haram recruiters. Some of the measures taken by the authorities have violated fundamental human rights. Many of the violations of human rights by the security forces during security operations were against civilians, a situation that has impacted negatively on the population's confidence in, and readiness to cooperate with the army. This has contrasted with the avowed strategy to fight the insurgency by winning the hearts and minds of the population which would then be willing to provide the army with intelligence and denounce sympathizers of the sect hiding in the communities. The continuation of attacks and abductions is proof positive that this strategy has not worked and that Boko Haram still has a powerful network of supporters within these communities.

**Hostilities from the Host Communities**

One of the challenging issues that is harmful to the success of the war against insurgency in North-eastern Nigeria is hostilities and suspicions between the host communities and the security agencies that are operating in the areas affected by the insurgents' activities. For instance, the security agencies blamed and suspect the host communities of withholding vital information that will lead to the success of their operation. They also suspect the host communities of shielding the insurgents. The informants too revealed related information with the above views. Most of them narrated that there is a mutual suspicion between the security personnel and the host communities. They agreed that the host communities sometimes do not cooperate with the security agencies in giving relevant information that will lead to the success of the fight against the insurgents. On the other hand, the informants

[132]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern...50.

believed that the military torture and suffer the host communities especially the innocent souls and this is why they sometimes cooperate more with the insurgents than with the security personnel.

**Successes Recorded by the Military Leadership in Tackling Boko Haram**

There is a caveat to what has been said so far. Insofar as Boko Haram's ability to field an overt front has been degraded, this does not rule out the possibility that more individuals can be conscripted or otherwise recruited as fighters. A high incidence of military-aged males in insurgency always poses the possibility that the insurgency, through persuasion or coercion, can exploit this demographic to replenish its ranks. Boko Haram has exploited the environment in this way, to recruit its supporters in the past; and this remains a possibility for the future, too. Nonetheless, there are more present implications for the losses suffered by Boko Haram's army of irregulars.

First, numbers alone do not make an overt front. Even assuming Boko Haram can convince or coerce sufficient fighters into its rank and file; training, acquisition of equipment and arms, and reestablishment of cross-border logistics and supply chains, would be more challenging as of 2017. This is largely due to the two counter-insurgency focused Army divisions in Borno state, as well as counter-insurgency operations by Chad, Niger and Cameroon around their border regions. All of this not exist, or only had marginal impact in being newly formed, a few years ago. Second, military fighting has now been subordinated to guerrilla warfare and terrorism, within Boko Haram's campaign. This may well become an enduring feature of the insurgency; yet, so deep into the conflict's life, this sort of terrorism is unlikely to yield long-term strategic benefits. Used at the start of the insurgency, covert operations helped Boko Haram trade space for time. Guerrilla warfare, quite unlike military fighting was not as useful for territorial ambitions; but it bought Boko Haram time: to build a reputation; to

mature its campaign; to build local networks within local communities; to strengthen cross-border links, and to build combat-readiness capabilities.[133] Conducted early on in the conflict life cycle, such covert operations also slowed the momentum of the traditional Nigerian military response, and even forced a panicked Nigerian government to float the possibility of strategic negotiations. But with the conflict now mature, and with military counter-insurgency operations greatly expanded in the last few years, Boko Haram's reversion to a war avoidance doctrine suggests it simply is too weak and in no position to deploy an irregular army across so many fronts, inside Nigeria and cross-border in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Yet, by focusing on terrorism and guerrilla warfare as the main tactical plank of its insurgency, Boko Haram's threat can still extend into these countries while also enduring in north-east Nigeria.

Terrorism as a tactic of insurgency, what Neumann and Smith refer to as "strategic terrorism", suggests some sort of clear strategic objective is in play. Now, Boko Haram has lost most of its captured territory as a result of the military offensive carried out by the Nigerian military, possibly thousands of irregular fighters, large amounts of material, and has had cross-border operational links severed or weakened.[134] Crucially, Boko Haram has also lost virtually all local support. With millions displaced, several thousand killed, entire villages deserted or semi-deserted, and hundreds coerced into fighting for Boko Haram, locals have come to deeply despise the group and what it now represents. Bearing all this in mind, it therefore becomes unclear what Boko Haram's "strategic" use of terrorism is. There seems to be no real overall or long-term objectives to the scores of suicide bombings and attacks on local communities. These incidents do not take the insurgent any closer to his territorial ambition, they do not serve to convince victims that Boko Haram is a viable alternative to the Nigerian state's dereliction of duty, and they do not serve to dissuade further

[133]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern...52.
[134]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern...50.

escalation of the military's counter-threat. Rather then, Boko Haram's terrorism thus appears to be an end in and of itself; not a means to a viable strategic end, but a sign of desperation.

For military leaders tasked with countering this threat, the task at hand is as intractable as it is vexing because there is no longer a clear sense of what the insurgent is fighting for. If the insurgent's objective is the capture of a certain town, or the defence of a particular location, the counter-insurgent can plan ahead, mobilize forces and set out a task. Such a task, moreover, is more likely to have clear parameters for its completion; and so, progress can be measured. If, however, the insurgent reverts to guerrilla warfare doctrine; striking at random without a clear objective or pattern, then military counter-insurgency operations are more vaguely defined; parameters for task completion are more unclear and trickier to measure. Such becomes the counter-insurgent's dilemma.[135]

Having lost so much, however, and now being denied the ability to operate as it did in the past, guerrilla warfare may be the one approach that can protract Boko Haram's campaign and simultaneous make Nigerian Army leaders tasked with security, look amateurish. Here, indeed, Boko Haram may well be at its most dangerous. There is now less need to calculate for the long-term; less incentive to be methodical, and more benefit in being spontaneous and highly unpredictable. Cumulative campaign losses also mean that, for Boko Haram, objectives must now smaller and limited: tactical, rather than strategic. The counterinsurgency war against Boko Haram in the Northeast region and Borno state in particular recorded tremendous success when the military leadership in the operation theatre was headed by officers with the following qualities:

i. Ability to lead by practical example

ii. Ability to utilise and manage available human, material and financial resources

[135]O. Akanbi,"Examining the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern...52.

iii. Ability to communicate effectively

iv. Ability to think innovatively and critically in complex environments

It is therefore, necessary that a military leader should implement all feasible measures to sustain and, where possible, increase the momentum in any successful military operation. This will not only increase the morale of the soldiers but will also guarantee the realisation of strategic and tactical goals of the operation, and possibly unveil an exit or terminal point in the military campaigns against Boko Haram.

**Conclusion**

Leadership as a phenomenon pervades all of human endeavours. As a construct, leadership is inherently laden with a lot of meanings, features and characteristics. Leadership may also be about who gets what done and achieve certain result. Also, the ability or inability of military leadership to acknowledge various challenges in the theatre of operations and tackle same effectively with the basic skills listed above determines the outcome in a complex military operation such like the one in Borno state.

# CHAPTER SIX

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This study has observed that terrorism in all its forms poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of Sub-Saharan countries, and to international stability and prosperity. It is a persistent global threat with serious repercussions on borders, nationality and religion and is a challenge that the international community must be tackled together.

Nigeria failed in at least two broad ways. First, the political leadership, military and traditional leadership largely showed a sheer inability to recognize the possible localization of the global terror threat as well as work towards the renewed threats posed by the proliferation of weapons. Boko Haram did not start as a global threat but did take great inspiration from other established groups such as ISIS. They perfected their models so much that it took them a few years to even surpass ISIS in terms of the number of casualties. Following this, it is important that other countries in the ECOWAS sub-regional zone, most especially Ghana, Senegal and Mauritania among others develop broad and comprehensive pre-emptive measures to counter the threat of terrorism pre-emptively. Nigeria needs to channel more

funds into the military industry of the country to save the country from over-reliance on imported military hardware which has hampered the operation and may continue to hamper similar military operations elsewhere. Today, there are countries in West Africa that do not possess enough military power to contain potential insurgencies without reaching out to the countries of the global north. Adequate moral support and welfare should also be made available to officers and men of the Nigerian military, most especially those who are at the forefront of the operation against Boko Haram. Leaked videos and audios from the frontlines reveal widespread dissatisfaction among Nigerian soldiers due to neglect, corruption and diversion of fund meant for their welfare. The usual use of brutal tactics and crackdown by officers of the Nigerian Police and other security agencies is a well-known trend in the country which further aided the impetus and resolve of the group. Disregard for the rule of law, continuous human rights abuses and systemic failure are some of the many problems that led to the emergence of Boko Haram as a terrorist group. These factors have also continued to hinder Nigeria's efforts to combat the group. The potential for similar conflicts is widespread in the country due to institutional failures. For example, one of the potentially similar cases is the re-current Shia-Army standoff facing the country with the army killing hundreds of members of the group. Finally, Boko Haram as a group gives an interesting insight into the evolution of terrorist groups for any theoretical consideration. The patterns in its evolution are different and it offers a fertile ground for a serious academic discourse that would be separate from this paper.

To bring any major armed conflict to an end, it is important to understand the nature of the war. The South African mercenaries were effective against Boko Haram because they had a better understanding of the nature of the war in northern Nigeria. Hence, their adoption of the tactic known as 'relentless pursuit'. Nigeria has variously referred to the conflict with Boko Haram as a terrorist campaign, a religious war and an insurgency. In line with this reasoning,

the government had tried various strategies which did not fit the kind of warfare being fought by Boko Haram. The army's own approach had failed to quell the activities of Boko Haram, partly for lack of fighting motivation of the soldiers, partly due to the corruption and incompetence of their superiors and partly – as has been argued above – because the government misread the nature of the war.

This paper thus concludes that, it is very clear that the Nigerian military institution and which transmuted from a colonial oppressive force to an agency of an independent state has been through many years of transformation. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the Nigerian politics which threw up military Generals as administrators for a long time, created opportunity for the underdevelopment of the military as a way of prolonging and perpetuating themselves in power. Though the outbreak of civil war in Nigeria saw a phenomenal increase in terms of personnel and budgeting, the end of that war and the peace that followed for many years of relative peace but the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast region of Nigeria became a game changer for Nigeria and its military service. The lack of peace in Nigeria is a result of the failure of the Nigerian military leadership. A less peaceful environment cannot produce economic progress and Nigeria may continue to suffer retrogression and underdevelopment.

The paper therefore recommends that for counter-insurgency to be affective:

1. There should be transparency and accountability in both budgeting, release of funds and usage. The Political leadership should be committed to prosecuting military leadership involved in corruption and disloyal activities. The military should cleanse its house and ensure the effective utilization of its funds and provide security to Nigerians. Too much consumption of office and procurement funds cannot take the Nigerian military anywhere it ought to be. It is therefore recommended that military

budget and procurement must be more transparent and capacity building should be prioritize as the Boko Haram insurgency seems to have come to stay in Nigeria and the country cannot raise its hand in submission.

2. There should be increased synergy between the Military, Paramilitary, law enforcements and other formal and non-formal security actors. This is especially important in putting in place the right Air-to-Ground Integration strategies during attacks as well as timely and up to date intelligence gathering, management and utilization.
3. Counter-insurgency efforts should be supported with hard and soft powers including Peace-building programmes, programme aimed at Deradicalization, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reconciliation and Reintegration of not only low risk ex-fighters but also victims of BH through psychosocial supports and stigmatization.
4. Nigeria should leverage on existing regional agreements and conventions to build strong regional counter-insurgency strategy to ensure BH is choked out of the region. This could be through Leveraging on the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Lake Chad Basin Regional Governors Forum.
5. Given the remote cause of the insurgency and the cyclical nature of impoverishment and insurgency, Nigeria leadership should demonstrate sincerity of purpose in upholding the social contract of providing basic infrastructures and upholding the life and dignity of citizens especially those in the North East.
6. Nigeria should demonstrate political will in working with Development Agencies ensuring effective coordination in provision of humanitarian and development interventions to the people in the North East. This include commitments through counterpart finding, matching grants, ownership and leadership in interventions including military engagement supports.

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