The Right Man at the Wrong Time:
A Defense of Lyndon Baines Johnson as President
Andrew Linthwaite
History 499; Senior Year Experience in History
May 1, 2014
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Contemporary evaluation of President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s tenure has
generally been a unanimously, critical retrospective. Up until the turn of the century,
most historians would contend that President Johnson proved to be an ineffective leader.
As a result of his massive failures like that in Vietnam or in general foreign policy, the
severity of his shortcomings became a focal point for constructing a biographical
assessment. This is a massive oversight on the part of the academic community. For all
President Johnson accomplished or sought to impose, there is something fundamentally
flawed in the way his legacy is dissolved. His lasting, historical impression ought to be
scrutinized within a theoretical construct that is both universally applicable and
respectively subjective. It will the become progressively more apparent that Johnson’s
presidential malfunctions were inherently ordained due to the chaotic political climate he
presided over.
To accentuate this argument, the greatest point to begin is actually near the end.
On January 20th, 1969, the United States gave formal witness to the inauguration of their
newly elected president, Richard M. Nixon. Among the crowd of spectators present that
evening stood the attentive Lyndon Baines Johnson. Now as ex-president of the United
States, Johnson’s comprehensive energy previously aimed towards political
responsibilities were promptly reallocated inwards towards his own concerns. Historian
Michael Beschloss recounts the details of Lyndon Johnson’s first decision following the
end of his administration:
On Inauguration Day, Johnson saw Nixon sworn in, then got on the plane to fly back to Texas. When the front door of the plane closed, Johnson pulled out a cigarette-first cigarette he had smoked since his heart attack in 1955. One of his daughters pulled it out of his mouth and said, “Daddy,
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what you doing? You’re going to kill yourself/” He took it back and said, “I’ve now raised you girls. I’ve now been president. Now it’s my time!”1
Johnson’s cathartic exasperation constructed a clear beginning to a predictable
outcome for the ex-president. It would only take four more years for LBJ to succumb to
the reckless lifestyle he began that day. The Greek myth-like demise that Johnson
experienced makes a strong allusion towards how his internal dialogue developed over
the years. Instead of spending his post-presidency years in comfort and solitude, Johnson
appeared consistently burdened and desperately melancholic. His sleeping and eating
cycles fluctuated so dramatically, it caught the attention of everyone that came into
contact with the man. This pattern of behavior continued to occur for several months after
Nixon’s inauguration into office.2
In that time span, two entirely different Lyndon Johnson’s gained prominence in
the scope of their environment. He vehemently affirmed that his retirement years would
be focused solely on his own well being, things clearly didn’t evolve in that way.
However, just as suddenly did LBJ encase himself in a depression was he able to remove
himself from it. Near the end of 1969, the crowd-drawing and unmistakably present
figure underwent a formal integration to his ranch. Day-to-day activities on the field
transformed into a spectacle of bureaucratic efficiency. How Johnson chose to manage
his duties paralleled a system of order he appeared to be comfortable in as president. He
was impelled by the essence of his own being to remain situated within a setting that
allowed for him to mobilize.
1
MobileReference, U.S. History: From Colonial America to the New Century. Boston: MobileReference: 2007. http://www.mobilereference.com/USHistory/index.htm. 2
Randall B. Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press: 2006), 878.
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In spite of that, LBJ would never completely break free from his own
constraining mental state. Recreating the governmental climate in his ranching duties
may have placated his insatiable yearn action, but it only further exacerbated the dilemma
as well. Doris Kearns Goodwin, one of Lyndon Johnson’s earliest and most prolific
biographers offered a potential catalyst responsible for fueling the former president’s
destructive behavior. “As all of that sadness sets in,” she states, “then there was a certain
frenzy of wondering ‘would history remember him well?’ And then I think his whole
mood began to change.”3
On the forefront of Johnson’s typical behavior was an inclination to be devoutly
ardent towards his interests. Moreover, he was particularly fearful of any conceivable
form of failure to impart upon him. Failing in politics, or in any situation that may cause
feelings of rejection, would constantly have a strong effect. At points his shortcomings
would even cause physical illness. To historians like Robert E. Gilbert, this profound
demonstration of fortitude and character emerged directly from Johnson’s
psychologically complicated relationship to his parents. His mother’s boundless
expectations instilled a mirrored dedication within LBJ that he could not withstand to
ever fail.4 However responsible Johnson’s mother actually was in determining her son’s
success, it would be clear to anyone who ever met Lyndon that he echoed her sentiments.
The ex-president tore himself apart over every failure regardless of their magnitude,
variety, or function. As a man ordained for greatness from birth, no other individual
could match his perfect theoretical fit as president of the United States.
3 Doris Kearns Greenwin, “The Presidents: LBJ,” The American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service, aired October 9, 2008. Transcript, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/. 4 Robert E. Gilbert, “Lyndon B. Johnson’s Physical and Psychological Pain: The Years of Ascent,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26:3 (Summer 1996) 694-707.
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Yet his self-destructive routine and early death imply that all may not have
professed as Johnson honestly set fourth. Historical commentary over LBJ as a political
authority has remained firmly critical in how he handled problems thrust upon the
country. Since 1982, scholarly researchers have consistently listed Lyndon Johnson in the
second quarter of their quantitative presidential rankings. Preceding him includes the
likes of many other Democrats including Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and
even his predecessor, John F. Kennedy.5
To whatever extent these numerical diagrams can be assured for is respective to
each individual survey. More or less, they serve to showcase a general, universal
perception of each president throughout the years. Although more recent accounts of LBJ
have began to show an air of sympathy for the man, most of the available resources on
him were written in that former context. The majority of these sources run synonymous
with one another in how they all criticize Johnson for his failures as a leader,
predominately with his involvement in Vietnam. Their criticism, although not entirely
unfounded, perhaps exaggerates a pragmatic political decision by placing it within a
greater biographical work. Historian Evan Anders testifies for this tendency among
Johnson’s greatest scholars from his article, Light at the End of the Tunnel:
Character, personality, and morality are the unavoidable concerns of biographers, but judgments should be based mainly on adult actions, for which so much more information is available. Hence, as political biographers follow their subjects through their public careers, they should carefully explain the circumstances in which the historical figures acted or made decisions. That context, which reveals the range of choices available
5 Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, “Historical Rankings of Presidents of the United States.” Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. (accessed 15 April 2014).
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to a person, is essential for evaluating how good or bad his decisions were.6
Anders’ condemnation narrows down to the belief that these guilty biographers
have greatly distorted Johnson’s presidential image. Their astonishingly pedantic
representation of the man’s entire existence creates distinctions and connections that
simply may not be valid. In order to obtain an intellectual level of accuracy, presidents
have to be situated within their own appropriate context. For those who have been
subjected to considerable amounts of deprecation, this methodology offers the chance for
character revitalization. Scrutinizing Lyndon Johnson’s constraints and limitations as bi-
products of his own failed initiative is of minimal historical value when his cultural
context is ignored. On the contrary, a deduction of his actual efforts in comparison to the
political climate’s restrictions could potentially reconstruct an entire modern analysis of
the man.
One must be willing to follow the example Anders proposes in his assessment to
accurately produce a proper historical narrative. Consequently, this includes the
development of a sound, rational approach in evaluating a president’s basic functions.
Apart from the expected list of services, such as commander-in-chief or principal
diplomat, a president must uphold an unspoken level of integrity to the country.
Symbolically and pragmatically, they are the definitive manifestation of what a
democratic society seeks to accomplish. He or she must reflect an impenetrable image of
honest, unyielding dedication for the needs of every single citizen. Any personal
motivations or appetencies to at all compromise the underlining imagery behind their
service should be strictly avoided. Their boundless power ought to be recognized, but
6 Evan Anders, “Light at the End of the Tunnel: Evaluating the Major Biographies of Lyndon Johnson,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly 98:2 (October 1994): 313-314.
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lastly utilized. As historian Sidney Hyman eloquently put it, “he should diminish his own
size in the eyes of the people.”7
Should a president fail to portray any or all of these basic characteristics, it is not
likely that they will have accomplished much during their tenure. However, there are far
greater details to consider when one seeks to investigate a president’s competency.
Likewise to any other long-standing profession, a president’s basic functions will
also be susceptible to natural development and evolution. Their accepted role and
allocated scope of power corresponds to the persistent alterations occurring within the
nation itself. Obligatory manipulations occur inevitably due to the ambiguous language
used within the Constitution’s presidential description.8 Limitations in political
supremacy are purposefully left unannounced to underscore the president’s ability to
increase or decrease their own responsibilities. Through significant time gaps or from one
leader to the next, the total reach and responsibility an administration comprehends is
constantly shifting.
From the historical perspective, a constantly changing function creates the
predicament wherein misinterpreting a president’s actions can occur far too easily.
Examining Barack Obama’s presidency under the same microscope used to investigate
Abraham Lincoln’s administration is thoughtless. Concurrently, assessing Lyndon
Johnson’s term in office to the same effect as John F. Kennedy’s presents a structural
error in approach as well. Every president, to some varying degree of intensity, operates
7 Sidney Hyman, “What is the President’s True Role?” New York Times Magazine, 7 Sep 1958, 17. 8 William Marshall, “Eleven Reason Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why it Matters,” Boston University Law Review 88 (April 2008): 509-510
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in a distinctly separate political landscape.9 Included within that unique environment is a
socio-political culture that integrally presents an impeding number of challenges. For
some scholars, a president’s historical legacy depends intrinsically upon how they reacted
towards cultural dissent. Whether they combated, deflected, or succumbed to the
oppressive cultural conditions creates a strong indication for how well they will be
received decades later.10
For several reasons, failure to adapt on the part of a US president is a point of
criticism that has become bewilderingly oversaturated. Asserting that a president ought to
be predisposed to combat any cultural obstruction is presumptuous. The very essence of
presidential authority is to cope with its volatile disposition. To the majority of the public
mainstream, any vague conception of a president’s constitutional responsibilities are
amplified beyond the sphere of reality.11 The contention that their entire political legacy
can be determined from how they interact with culture likely derived from this grave
misconception. In spite of how supremely influential and iconic one particular president
may be, the final distance their power can reach depends upon the will of other
government entities.12 This fallacy bares a burden for misconstruing the true intentions of
Lyndon Johnson, as well as many other early political figures. Placing LBJ far above the
level of achievement he could possibly reach created an inevitable backlash of dissent
and criticism.
9 Christ Arthur Amlund, “President-Ranking: A Criticism,” Midwest Journal of Political Science (August 1964): 309. 10 Aaron Wildavsky, The Beleaguered Presidency (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1994), 3. 11 William Marshall, op. cit. 510. 12 Ralph P. Hummel, Politics for Human Beings, ed. Robert A. Isaak (Monterey: Duxbury Press, 1980), 90-91
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The other discrepancy that appears from culturally orientated examination is
the total disregard of supplementary pressures. A president’s obligation to address their
nation’s collective apprehensions asserts itself above most necessities. It is, however, a
fundamentally one-dimensional component to consider. Moreover, it diminishes the
value of the nation’s traditional political culture.
Conversely to a society’s standard customs, the political culture of a nation
refers to the “norms or beliefs that serve as guidelines to a people’s political action.” The
general direction many citizens want their government to mobilize towards does not
necessarily develop as intended. Just as a president must realistically circumvent through
their own restrictive protocols, so too must a country in regards to their political culture.
Likewise, the search for balance creates a distinct separation in the country’s existing
operational values and myths that drive their ideology.13 Expectations that are realized
and fully utilized reinforce the nation’s traditional authenticity. Those that fail to execute
from practical political activity nevertheless remain integral to country’s ideological core.
It is reasonable to then comprehend why a United States’ president will be
persistently conscientious in reference to these norms. They will abridge many of the
nation’s impending experiences into one or many specific values in order to satisfy their
contractual duties. Whether they act in regards to the improvement of foreign policy,
domestic stability, or anything else, their subsequent course of action rests upon the
political culture’s stable underpinning. Their attempt to construct a visible association
between both aspects has prevailed for centuries. In spite of their overall success in office,
13 ibid., 92-93.
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how well they consider and communicate the significance of their traditional policies is
absolutely paramount.14 15
Political culture is furthermore no less of a tool for presidents as it as a
significant means of analysis for investigative historians. Validity for this contention rests
upon the unique conditions that makeup the American political culture. As an aspect
deeply woven into fiber of the country’s structural integrity, it is not vulnerable to any
essential alteration. Any major change in the nation’s political culture would almost
certainly have to induce an adjustment of democratic principles as well.16 Given that the
two are reasonably co-dependant, their comprising values must also then be comparable.
Generally speaking, the emphasis on individualism, freedom, liberty, diversity, and many
other beliefs run concurrently through one another.17
Comparatively to the chaotic dynamics of a perpetually evolving social culture, a
nation’s political culture is far more conducive to generating precise research for
contemporary scholars. Henceforth, any further examination of Lyndon Johnson’s
governmental efficiency must revolve chiefly around his actions towards political culture.
This theoretical concept must also be applied relative to an accurate portrait of that
period’s civic culture. Considering historical research benefits and suffers from the
intrinsic aptitude for hindsight, this can sometimes be a difficult task. The historian’s
14 Kevin Coe, “The Language of Freedom in the American Presidency, 1933-2006,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (September 2007), 376-382. 15 David F. Ericson, “Presidential Inaugural Addresses and American Political Culture,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (December 1997), 744. 16 Donald J. Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Brown and Company, 1972), 47- 49. 17 Bruce Frohnen, “Redeeming America’s Political Culture: The Kirkean Tradition in the Study of American Public Life,” Political Science Reviewer 35 (July 2006), 237-43.