

Final Format:

- 50% multiple choice: 16 questions
- 50% short answer: 4 short answer, you choose one from each main topic we've covered

Review

Key terms

- **Intentionality**: the aboutness or directedness of representations (see Crane)
 - E.g., picture of a dog is in some sense about or directed at the dog it is a picture of
- **Propositional attitudes**: a relation between a thinker and a representation/content (see Crane)
 - E.g., belief: Noel believes that god is everywhere
 - E.g., hope: Ishika hopes that the weather will be nice tomorrow
- **Intension and extension** (see Putnam)
 - **Extension**: the things that belong to a category
 - E.g., the extension of dog: the group/set/list of all dogs
 - Example of two different words with different intensions, that give the same extension:
 - “Creature with a heart” and “creature with a kidney”
 - **Intension**: the function/role from a situation that specifies the group/extension
 - E.g., the intension of anaerobic organism: anything that is an organism that does not respire
- **Transparent and opaque contexts** (see Fodor)
 - These are properties of sentences or complex thoughts
 - **Transparent context**: a sentence/thought where one can swap any term/concept for something that refers to the same thing, and one won't change the truth/falsity of the sentence/thought
 - E.g.,
 - (1) “Griffin went to the pet store to buy a creature with a kidney”
 - (2) “Griffin went to the pet store to buy a creature with a heart”
 - **Opaque context**: a context that isn't transparent; a sentence/thought where swapping co-referring terms can change the truth/falsity of the sentence/thought
 - E.g.,
 - Greeks called Venus “Hesperus” when they could see it in the evening, and “Phosphorus” when they could see it in the morning
 - (3) “Achilles believes that Hesperus is a planet”
 - (4) “Achilles believes that Phosphorus is a planet”
- **Inherited and autonomous meanings** (Block; Crane calls it “derived” and “original”, respectively)
 - **Inherited meaning**: a meaning that requires interpretation
 - E.g., sky writing
 - **Autonomous meaning**: meaning that doesn't require interpretation
 - E.g., your own thought that you are hungry

Concepts and arguments

1. Resemblance theory of pictorial representation: something X is a representation of Y if and only if X resembles Y (see Crane)
 - a. E.g., a photo of Lassie and Lassie herself:
 - i. A photo of Lassie is a representation of Lassie if and only if the photo resembles Lassie
 - b. Problems
 - i. Resemblance is a symmetric relation but representation is an asymmetric relation
 1. **Symmetry:** A photo of Lassie resembles Lassie, and Lassie resembles the photo
 2. **Asymmetry:** a photo of Lassie represents Lassie, but Lassie **does not** represent the photo
 - ii. "Resemblance" is very unclear
2. Semantic naturalism: the project of reducing aspects of semantics (meaning, truth) to naturalistic properties (see Loewer)
 - a. Many of views of semantic naturalism hold that thoughts mean what cause them
 - i. E.g., THERE'S A SNAKE (correspond to, e.g., an activation of a certain physical state)
 - ii. This is caused by there being a snake
 - b. Problem of error: giving a theory of meaning that can distinguish from the correct and incorrect properties that cause some representation
 - i. E.g., two things can cause my thought SNAKE!
 1. Stick in certain lighting conditions
 2. **Snake**
 - ii. How do we give a theory that can explain why SNAKE means snakes, even though SNAKE is equally caused by (1) and (2)
 - c. Problem of fine-grainedness: meanings are more fine grained than the causes that give rise to them
 - i. E.g., we can have thoughts involving TRIANGLE, and different thoughts involving TRILATERAL, even though causes involving triangles will be causes involving trilaterals
3. Externalism
 - a. Putnam's Twin Earth "water" argument
 - i. If true, this shows that: the meaning of words that refer to physical properties/objects like "water" do not only depend on what's going on inside a person's head/mind
 1. "Meanings just ain't in the head"
 - ii. **SEE [HANDOUT ON THE WEBSITE FOR FULL ARGUMENT](#)**
 - b. Burge's "arthritis" argument
 - i. If true, this shows that: the meaning of words can depend on features of one's social environment (e.g., how speakers around a person use a term)

ii. **SEE [HANDOUT ON THE WEBSITE FOR FULL ARGUMENT](#)**

4. Methodological solipsism (see Fodor):
 - a. Main idea: psychology should focus on understanding the mind as a computer (e.g., what are the symbols of the mind, and how are they manipulated); psychology should not try to understand *semantic properties* (wide content, “meanings”, truth/falsity, reference)
 - b. Example:
 - i. Compare two computers:
 1. Computer A: is hooked up to sensors that can “perceive” the world
 2. Computer B: is hooked up to a programmer who just feeds it code, but this code is identical to the code that the sensors feed
Computer A
 - ii. Fodor’s argument: we should do psychology such that the difference between Computer A and Computer B doesn’t matter, because all we care about is the single program internal to both computers
5. Representational Theory of Mind: mental states have two components, attitudes and mental representation (see Fodor)
 - a. Attitude: relations between a thinker and a mental representation
 - i. E.g., belief, desire, hope, imagine
 - b. Mental representation: representation of what the world could be like, in the mind
 - i. E.g., “the cat is on the mat”
 - c. Attitudes and mental representations can “come apart”
 - i. We can have one attitude with different mental representations
 1. Griffin believes that god is real
 2. Griffin believes that it’s going to rain today
 - ii. We can one mental representation with different attitudes
 1. Griffin believe that it’s going to rain today
 2. Griffin hope that it’s going to rain today
6. Searle’s Chinese Room (see Block)
 - a. **Computational Theory of Mind**: the human mind is a computer, where a “computer” means a device that takes in inputs, manipulates symbols according to certain rules, and can issues outputs based on those rules
 - b. **Searle’s Chinese Room**
 - i. The thought experiment
 1. A person sits in a room that is the head of a giant robot
 2. Monolingual English speaker receives slips of paper with Chinese writing
 3. Has a rulebook that tells him what symbols to write in response to the input (program) and a blackboard to keep track of a number given by the rulebook
 4. Uses rulebook to pass back Chinese looking responses through the slot
 - ii. Searle’s interpretation
 1. The robot would appear to **understand Chinese**

- a. The room manipulates symbols as if it understands Chinese
2. But many think the **person** doesn't *really* understand Chinese!
3. Thus, symbol manipulation alone cannot explain understanding (a mental state); thus, the Computational Theory of Mind is false
- c. **System's reply:** the whole room understands Chinese, even if the person doesn't!
- d. **Searle's reply to the System's Reply:** internalize the whole system in your head; still seems that the person doesn't understand!