

Jacob Wilson

Employed at the park since 2012

Maintenance Electrician

Performed the role of "Park Technician often"

Mr Wilson states that the park technicians were stretched thin on a regular basis.

Mr Wilson was encouraged to raise any safety concerns with his supervisor. The supervisor would then determine the importance of that concern and address it accordingly.

Mr Wilson wasn't asked by supervisors to read the breakdown policy often, he read out of his own curiosity.

Mr Wilson has been involved with evacuation scenarios on the Buzzsaw and tiger escape scenarios, these took place in 2015 and 2016 prior to the incident but states that these scenarios are practiced within the maintenance department.

Mr Wilson also completed first aid/CRP training but it wasn't a requirement of the role.

New lockout isolation key procedures were put in place for every ride prior to the 2016 incident.

Mr Wilson was not the park technician on the day of the incident but heard the "code 6" breakdown call and decided to head over there. He states he called extra maintenance staff to assist with the "code 6" as TRR would generally require more staff if the guests had to be evacuated.

Previous issues that Mr Wilson has attended the TRR for include the conveyor not moving, water in a sensor, a problem with a jack that stopped the rafts in the station or a ride op has shut the ride down. The supervisor sent 3 additional maintenance team members with Mr Wilson to attend the TRR breakdown.

Mr Wilson has attended TRR due to a pump fault previously and states that it's a semi regular occurrence.

Mr Wilson was shown photos of the control room/switchboard and states that the safety PLC systems were updated in May 2016.

Photos from the switchboard show that all the labels are hand written on.

Mr Wilson would take a photo of the fault error code on the pump controls for future reference/discussion.

Mr Wilson is being shown photos of the switchboard and explaining the functions.

I won't go into details with this as there was no new or interesting information from that walkthrough.

Reference pictures would also need to be seen to understand the explanations given by Mr Wilson.

Mr Wilson confirmed the e-stop button functions and their locations which lines up with the e-stop run down I posted on Tuesday. Mr Wilson did confirm there were 2 lanyard e-stops along the conveyor, one either side.

Mr Wilson wasn't aware of the speed at which the e-stop buttons functioned and is aware that there are two different buttons with different speeds at which they stop the ride but isn't sure if he was aware of this prior to the 2016 incident.

Mr Wilson has previously completed an insulation test and a continuity test on the pump motors.

In the switchboards, it's common place for them to be hand labelled with either hand writing on tape or hand writing directly onto the switchboard next to the switch. Some switches were unlabeled.

Mr Wilson states that the labelling "could be better" of the controls in the switchboard and that about 50% of the switchboards are labelled in similar fashion.

In the switchboard room, the PLC box has "e-stop?" hand written on the inside of the door. Mr Wilson was grilled about the reason for this but isn't sure of why it would be there. He speculates that it could be there due to a previous technician writing it was a note to himself. Mr Wilson confirmed that there were a few instances throughout the park of notes being written on important equipment.

Mr Wilson had previously reported that the TRR lockout isolator key didn't isolate the control to the conveyor and it was reported to a supervisor. The response his supervisor gave was "that's how the attractions team wanted it"

Mr Wilson believed all the the equipment at Dreamworld was in working order.

Francoire De Villiers

Maintenance Electrician

Has been an electrician since 1992

Employed at the park since 2014

Mr De Villiers worked with the fitter/turners when he first started so he could learn the mechanical side of the rides.

Mr De Villiers has advised that he wasn't required to and never tested the e-stop button at the unload station.

At around midday on the date of the incident, Mr Villiers was aware of 3 previous times the south pump has tripped within the previous week.

The CCTV footage was shown to the court but court was closed and only open to the coroner, lawyers and families of the victims. I saw the first frame of the paused CCTV footage before the stream in the media room was turned off. That may be the closest we'll get to any actual vision of the incident.

On the control booth wall, there is a hose with a valve on the end which is used to inflate and check the inflation levels of the raft which should be done daily.

Upon inspection of the inside of the control panel, the wiring was described as a "rats nest" of tangled, loose wires with some wires not being connected to anything and no labelling. It was described that due to this, the panel could have launched rafts and caused faults on its own without the operator pressing any buttons. Mr De Villiers states that there was supposed to be upgraded to the ride's control panel prior to the incident that would update the control panel wiring.

Photos of the panel were shown and it was a cluster of messy wires.

After the pump had 3-5 issues within the week leading up to the incident, an external electrician had been organised to inspect the south pump the morning after the incident.

Mr De Villiers was the electrical maintenance engineer who advised the park technicians how to restart the pump on the day of the incident as the electricians were busy in White Water World at the time. The non electrician park technician then had the knowledge to reset the pump by himself

Mr De Villiers ended his time on the stand by offering his sincerest condolences to the families of the victims.

Quentin Dennis

Electrical maintenance

Employed at the park since Oct 2008.

Outlined his general duties in his role which are the same as previous maintenance staff.

Outlined his knowledge of the park policy and the breakdown procedure which is the same as previous maintenance staff.

If a fault occurred on TRR, due to the complex nature of the ride, a supervisor must attend. If there was a fault on TRR an alarm would go off through the park 2-way radios alerting maintenance staff and the supervisory team to send all available staff to TRR.

Mr Dennis has brought it to the attention of supervisors before about the unsafe and dangerous nature of the wiring in the main control panel. Mr Dennis states that it was brought up often and that the wiring should be labelled.

Mr Dennis can't recall the answer that was given by supervisors when the concern was raised.