

Part 1 - Reasoning about Reasons.

SOPHIE: I kinda like Korsgaard's view - moral obligations are derived from constraints on what reasons the Will can adopt.¹

PHILIPP: Okay, first, of all... *the Will*? What is this supernatural b**£\$]&t?

SOPHIE: I think it's just old-timey talk for intentions. So moral obligations don't just say what you must do or may never do. They tell you something that you can't *intend* to do.

PHILIPP: That clears things up. And to be specific – we're not merely talking about *causal reasons*, the kind we invoke when we say:

- (1) The reason the match was lit was because it was struck.

And we're not even talking about *motivating-explanatory (M-E) reasons*, like:

- (2) The reason Julian walked to the window was because he believed there was a noise and wants to eliminate distraction.

Instead, we have in mind *normative reasons*, like:

- (3) The reason I will attend your birthday party is because I promised to do so.

SOPHIE: Exactly! So “publicity of reasons means” that P is a normative reason for me to do A if and only if P could be a normative reason for anyone else to do A.

PHILIPP: Doesn't that make (3) a counterexample? Necessarily, *I promised*, is a different reason for me than it is for you.

Q1a. Philipp's argument is only half-sketched. Finish constructing it.

1b. What should Sophie say in response to Philipp?

SOPHIE: I'll admit one problem I have with this picture.

PHILIPP: Go on.

SOPHIE: Well, Korsgaard says that the sensation of pain, as a necessarily private state, isn't reason-giving. At best, it's an M-E reason. But consider:

- (4) The reason Sakinah visited her mother in hospital was because they love her.

But of course, Saki's mother can never access her sensation of love. So *I love my mom* isn't a normative reason either. That seems plain wrong.

Q2a. If the sensation of pain doesn't give me a normative reason not to punch you, what does?

2b. Suppose “I love my mom” is normative reason. What follows?

¹ The constraints in question are:

- *The Hypothetical Imperative*: If you intend an action A, then you must intend the means to A.
- *The Categorical Imperative*: You may intend that A iff You intend for anyone else in your circumstances to intend that A

Part 2 – Coercion and Constraining Options

First, a series of cases:

Mugger: Dick Turpin appears from the shadows. *Your money or your life!*

Proposal: Rich friend says *If you promote my Tiktok Account, I'll give you \$100,000*

Buzzer: Test Subject unknowingly has a mind-control device implanted in their brain by Frankfurt. Whenever she tries try to cook a fried egg, the device will cause Test Subject to change their mind and stop doing it. By chance, Test Subject never even tries to cook a fried egg once the device has been implanted.²

Ultimatum: Marie says to Jerry (her husband), If you don't start doing more around the house, I'm going to divorce you.

Polizei: You're an Italian citizen and you refuse to pay your taxes. After refusing to correspond with the tax authorities, the police come and forcibly jail you and respond to tax authorities.

Couch: You're very sentimentally attached to the couch in Enemy's apartment. One day, Enemy says *If you don't clean my apartment from now on, I'll dump the couch.*³

Dinner Party: You intensely dislike X Mcoy and everything about them. X Mcoy also knows you intensely dislike them, and they enjoy bothering you. One day, X Mcoy approaches you in-person, and says *Would you like to come over my house for dinner?* Not only do you not want to come, you wish you'd never even been given the choice.⁴

And viewpoints:

Naïve Consequentialist View: Coercion is wrong because it causes people to suffer (interpret this has whatever your favourite theory of well-being is)

Impaired Action View: Coercion is wrong because it takes causes you to temporarily lose your ability to act.

Impaired Consent View: Coercion is wrong because you didn't consent to bringing about the coercer's end.

Impaired Normative Power View: Coercion is wrong because you have the power to choose for yourself; and the coercer is depriving you of that power.

² From a famous Harry Frankfurt paper.

³ From an AJ Julius Paper

⁴ Adapted from from J.D. Velleman "Against the Right to Die."

Do we see wrongful coercion from...

	Dick Turpin in Mugger	Rich Friend In Proposal	Frankfurt in Buzzer	Marie in Ultimatum	The Police in Polizei	Enemy in Couch	X Mcoy in Dinner Party
Your Intuitions!							
Naïve Consequentialist View							
Impaired Action View							
Impaired Consent View							
Impaired Normative Power View							

Note – if you want to make a distinction between wrongful coercion and coercion, do it!