

PLEASE READ BEFORE USING:

Aff blocks = responding to con

Overviews = overarching arguments that could be useful (e.g. nuclear war is improbable etc.)

Blocks = direct responses to certain links or impacts

Frontlines = responses to blocks

Backlines = responses to frontlines

Indicts = responses to specific pieces of evidence

Look at the example for how to format

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Overviews

NFU has No Practical Impact

1: No credibility

John R. Harvey, 2019, "Assessing the Risks Of A Nuclear 'No First Use' Policy." War on the Rocks,

<https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/assessing-the-risks-of-a-nuclear-no-first-use-policy/>

Viewed through a strategic — and perhaps more cynical — lens, **the no-first-use doctrine also has a huge credibility problem.** For the U.S. pledge to truly matter, a president who otherwise favors a nuclear first strike would have to decide not to press the button because of this policy. But **in an extreme national crisis — one involving, say, North Korean nuclear missiles — a president is unlikely to feel bound by America's former assurance.** After all, if a country is willing to use nuclear weapons, it's also willing to break a promise.

Two factors might mitigate such risks to deterrence were a no-first-use policy adopted. First, **a no-first-use pledge is unlikely to appear credible to an adversary contemplating major aggression.** For example, North Korea is unlikely to base any military planning to reunify the Korean Peninsula by force, or plans for its regime survival after an unsuccessful effort to achieve that objective, on a U.S. promise of no-first-use. Consider China's existing no-first-use pledge, which has not caused the United States to moderate its own nuclear posture one iota. **Few states will risk their national security based on a declaratory policy that can be reversed overnight.** Dominic Tierney, an academic who supports a no-first-use policy, eloquently addresses this point:

Iain King, 2019, "A commitment to never use nuclear weapons first will not make us safer," The Hill, found at:

<https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/475965-a-commitment-to-never-use-nuclear-weapons-first-will-not-make-us-safer>

However, upon closer examination, these benefits are illusory. "No First Use" is almost impossible to verify in peacetime. **In a crisis situation, few would trust any adversarial nuclear powers to keep their "No First Use" pledge.** Instead, they would expect them to qualify their commitments to gain leverage because interests, not stated

commitments, will remain a much more trustworthy guide to their behavior. Finally, how could a “No First Use” policy deter the use of other weapons of mass destruction? It may embolden adversaries to attack by increasing the odds of success.

[Empirics prove:]

Ankit **Panda**, 2018, "'No First Use' and Nuclear Weapons," Council on Foreign Relations, found at: <https://www.cfr.org/background/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons>

Most states with nuclear weapons maintain policies that would permit their first use in a conflict. **Pledges to only use these weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack—or a no-first-use (NFU) policy—are rare. Where these pledges have been made by nuclear states, their adversaries generally consider them not credible.**

2: We already functionally have it

Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020, "No-First-Use Policy Explained," Union of Concerned Scientists, found at:

<https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/no-first-use-explained>

Under current policy, the United States will not use nuclear weapons against the vast majority of the world's countries in any circumstances. Longstanding US policy, re-affirmed in the Trump administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), says that the United States "will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations"; this promise covers more than 180 countries (OSD 2018). This policy is known as a "negative security assurance."

However, **[only] China, Russia, and North Korea do not fall under the US negative security assurance.** China and Russia are nuclear weapon states under the NPT, and North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003 and conducted its first nuclear test in 2006.

[All three of those have nukes, and we would never use nukes against a nuclear ally]

Tom Z. **Collina**, 2016, "America Would Never Be the First to Use Nukes. So Why Say We Might?," The National Interest, found at:

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-would-never-be-the-first-use-nukes-so-why-say-we-17168>

Against a state with nukes, like Russia, U.S. first-use would be suicidal; the attacked state would hit us back with atomic devastation. Imagine Washington looking like Hiroshima in 1945, only worse. Nukes are truly weapons of last resort, useful only to deter their use by others.

Dylan **Brethour**, 2017, "Are Nuclear Weapons Legal? - EachOther," EachOther, found at: <https://eachother.org.uk/nuclear-weapons-legal/>

One of the most important instruments governing nuclear weapons is the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions, which are made up of four treaties and three additional protocols, set the standard for humanitarian treatment during war. **Protocol I is relevant because it specifically prohibits weapons that “cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” and types of warfare that “cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment.”**

Lionel **Beehner**, 2006, "The United States and the Geneva Conventions," Council on Foreign Relations, found at: <https://www.cfr.org/background/united-states-and-geneva-conventions>

The Geneva Conventions provide an agreed-upon framework of legal protections to safeguard soldiers, civilians, and prisoners during wartime. The original Geneva Convention, drafted in 1864, dealt with the treatment of wounded troops. Shortly after the Second World War, it was expanded to include military personnel shipwrecked at sea, as well as prisoners of war and civilians under enemy control. **The Conventions have been ratified by nearly every country in the world—194 states in total—including the United States.** Countries that violate the Geneva Conventions, including Common Article Three, can be held accountable for charges of war crimes.

International Committee of the Red Cross, "Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries," ICRC, found at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=US

United States:

Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977

Signature:12.12.1977

3: We would never use nukes first

Tom Z. **Collina**, 2016, "America Would Never Be the First to Use Nukes. So Why Say We Might?," The National Interest, found at:

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-would-never-be-the-first-use-nukes-so-why-say-we-17168>

No sane U.S. leader would ever—ever—initiate the first use of nuclear weapons.
So why keep the option open?

And nuking a state that does not have them, such as Syria or Iran, would cast Washington as a global pariah, an international bully, undermining U.S. leadership on all issues—including terrorism and nonproliferation—for decades to come. It is unthinkable, and utterly unnecessary. **Any threat from a nonnuclear state—including chemical and biological weapons—could be countered with diplomacy or conventional force.**

4: Biden will implement an NFU

Burns, R. 2020, September 21. Biden Would Push For Less US Reliance On Nukes For Defense. *NBC Southern California*. NBCUniversal Media.

<https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/politics/decision-2020/biden-would-push-for-less-us-reliance-on-nukes-for-defense/2431722/> .

During the campaign, **Biden** also **has embraced** what nuclear strategists call a “**no first use**” **policy**. In simplest terms, that means not initiating a nuclear war — not being the first to pull the trigger, so that in a nuclear crisis, the U.S. president might opt to unleash a retaliatory strike but not a preemptive one. Longstanding U.S. policy has been to reserve the option of striking first, arguing that this makes war less likely.

Nuclear Weapons don't deter

1: Analytic: Mutually assured destruction means no nukes at nuclear states

2: NPT means no nukes at non nuclear states

Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020, "No-First-Use Policy Explained," Union of Concerned Scientists, found at:

<https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/no-first-use-explained>

Under current policy, the United States will not use nuclear weapons against the vast majority of the world's countries in any circumstances. Longstanding US policy, re-affirmed in the Trump administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), says that the United States "will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations"; this promise covers more than 180 countries (OSD 2018). This policy is known as a "negative security assurance."

3: States are rational actors

NUO, 2017, "5 Key Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis," Norwich University Online, found at:

<https://online.norwich.edu/academic-programs/resources/5-key-approaches-to-foreign-policy-analysis#:~:text=The%20most%20widely%20cited%20foreign,perceived%20benefits%20to%20the%20state.>

The most widely cited foreign policy analysis approach is the rational actor model. This approach [which] assumes that the main actor in foreign policy is a rational individual who can be relied on to make informed, calculated decisions that maximize value and perceived benefits to the state. The rational actor model relies on individual state-level interactions between nations and government behavior as units of analysis; it assumes the availability of complete information to policymakers for optimized decision making, and that actions taken throughout time are both consistent and coherent

4: No evidence supports deterrence, claims impossible to prove

David **Barash**, 2018, "Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that," the Guardian, found at:

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash>

There is no evidence, for example, that the Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe, much less that it was restrained by the West's nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the currency of pundits, but are impossible to prove, and offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened.

Blocks

EXAMPLE: A/2: Nuclear war

Response 1: Turn: Nuclear war results in beneficial diversity

Brian Molinarim, August 2018, "10 Reasons Why A Nuclear War Could Be Good For Everyone," Listverse, found at:

<https://listverse.com/2018/08/22/10-reasons-why-a-nuclear-war-could-be-good-for-every-one/>

Every few tens of millions of years, a mass extinction event occurs, erasing most of the life on the planet. After every extinction, surviving creatures evolve into more complex life-forms, resulting in a diversity of beings never seen before.

Response 2: Earth will be safe

Brian Molinarim, August 2018, "10 Reasons Why A Nuclear War Could Be Good For Everyone," Listverse, found at:

<https://listverse.com/2018/08/22/10-reasons-why-a-nuclear-war-could-be-good-for-every-one/>

The bombing [from a nuclear war] will not be enough to destroy Earth.

Response 3: Analytic: No one wants a nuclear war because no one wants people to die

A/2: Deterrence

General

Response 1: Soft power and conventional military deter everything but nukes

James **Cartwright et al.**, 2016, “End the First-Use Policy for Nuclear Weapons.” The New York Times, found at:

www.nytimes.com/2016/08/15/opinion/end-the-first-use-policy-for-nuclear-weapons.html

After the end of the Cold War, which coincided with revolutionary advances in our nonnuclear military capacities, the range of **these missions steadily narrowed to the point where nuclear weapons today no longer serve any purpose beyond deterring the first use of such weapons by our adversaries**. Our nonnuclear strength, including **economic and diplomatic power, our alliances, our conventional and cyber weaponry and our technological advantages, constitute a global military juggernaut unmatched in history**. The United States simply does not need nuclear weapons to defend its own and its allies’ vital interests, as long as our adversaries refrain from their use.

Response 2: NFU doesn't change nuclear deterrence

Jon **Wolfsthal et al.**, 2018 “No First Use and Credible Deterrence.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, found at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257>.

Despite progress in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the largest arsenals, a number of states are now looking to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons not only for deterrence, but also for coercion or war fighting. There is scant evidence that nuclear weapons are effective or well suited for these roles, and the risks of relying on nuclear weapons for more than deterrence of nuclear attack are under appreciated. We review the evolution of US nuclear strategy and assess the prospects for establishing a policy of no first use. **A no first use policy would in no way reduce deterrence of nuclear attack against the United States or its allies**. Nuclear weapons are not an effective deterrent against non-nuclear attack because there are few if any scenarios in which a US threat to use nuclear weapons first in response to non-nuclear aggression against the United States or its allies would be credible. The benefits of adopting a policy of no first use include reducing the risks of accidental nuclear escalation or nuclear use from miscalculation, as well as supporting nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. This was

often summarized in the form of a question: Would an American president be willing to risk New York or Washington or Chicago to save London or Paris or Hamburg?

Response 3: Conventional military deterrence is more credible

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2020, “No First Use: Myths vs. Realities - Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,” CAC, found at:

<https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/no-first-use/no-first-use-myths-vs-realities/>.

Reality: Adopting a No First Use policy will not reduce the United States’ commitment to extended deterrence. Extended deterrence is about much more than just nuclear weapons. **Forward deployments of U.S. conventional forces paired with strong and unwavering political commitments play the most immediate roles in deterring aggression against the United States and its allies.** The United States maintains thousands of troops and hundreds of ships in commands around the world to balance crisis zones and deter aggression. The United States employs advanced conventional capabilities including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tools and precision-guided weapons in conflicts, but also to help deter potential attacks. **The United States’ robust conventional forces are more than sufficient to deter or counter non-nuclear attacks on U.S. allies, and conventional military threats are more credible than threats to use nuclear weapons first.** Current and former military officials have emphasized the crucial role that U.S. conventional forces play in projecting power globally and credibly deterring aggression.

Response 4: Nuclear deterrence doesn't work against non-nuclear actors

Jon Wolfsthal et al., 2018 “No First Use and Credible Deterrence.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, found at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257>.

Despite progress in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the largest arsenals, a number of states are now looking to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons not only for deterrence, but also for coercion or war fighting. There is scant evidence that nuclear weapons are effective or well suited for these roles, and the risks of relying on nuclear weapons for more than deterrence of nuclear attack are under appreciated. We review the evolution of US nuclear strategy and assess the prospects for establishing a policy of no first use. A no first use policy would in no way reduce deterrence of nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. **Nuclear weapons are not an effective deterrent against non-nuclear attack because there are few if any scenarios in which a US threat to use nuclear weapons first in response to non-nuclear aggression against the United States or its allies would be credible.** The benefits of adopting a

policy of no first use include reducing the risks of accidental nuclear escalation or nuclear use from miscalculation, as well as supporting nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. This was often summarized in the form of a question: Would an American president be willing to risk New York or Washington or Chicago to save London or Paris or Hamburg?

Response 5: Nuclear deterrence doesn't empirically do anything, it was more about luck and personal judgement in the Cold War

James E. Doyle, 2013 ("Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, found at: <https://nukewatch.org/importantdocs/resources/Doyle.pdf>

But **explanations of war-avoidance during these episodes based on post-Cold War historical research**, including first-hand interviews with participants, **have little to do with the theoretical operation of nuclear deterrence and much more to do with luck and personal judgement**. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted that the decision-making process in Washington, as well as in Moscow and Havana, during the Cuban Missile Crisis was characterised by 'misinformation, miscalculation, and misjudgment'.

Response 6: Turn: Nuclear first use increases aggression

Mike Ryan, 2003, "Facing the Failures of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, found at:

<https://www.wagingpeace.org/facing-the-failures-of-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-regime/>

First, it [first use] is **setting a dangerous precedent for other nuclear powers to justify using aggressive preventive force to settle international disputes. Some countries have already begun echoing the new US doctrine as a possible approach to solving long-standing regional conflicts**. Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha stated recently, "There were three reasons which drove the Anglo-US forces to attack Iraq possession of weapons of mass destruction, export of terrorism and an absence of democracy all of which exist in Pakistan." On April 11, 2003, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said he endorsed Sinha's recent comments that India had "a much better case to go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the United States has in Iraq." Such a doctrine of preemption pursued by India towards Pakistan is extremely dangerous, particularly given Pakistan's conventional weakness. In the face of an Indian policy of preemption, Pakistan is likely to approach its own nuclear arsenal with an even higher alert status, bringing these two countries a step closer to intentional or accidental nuclear war, as well as accelerate the regional arms race.

NATO

Response 1: NATO's nuclear weapons have no credibility

Hans M. **Kristensen**, 2016, "RAND Report Questions Nuclear Role In Defending Baltic States," Federation Of American Scientists, found at:
<https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/02/nato-nukes-rand/>

Without spending much time explaining why Russia would launch a military attack against the Baltic States in the first place – the report simply declares “the next [after Ukraine] most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania” – the report contains some surprising (to some) observations about the limitations of nuclear weapons in the real world (by that I mean not in the heads of strategists and theorists).

The central nuclear observation of the report is that **NATO nuclear forces do not have much credibility in protecting the Baltic States against a Russian attack.**

Response 2: US sanctions are the best weapon against Russia

Anthony **Tata**, 2017, “Anthony Tata Interview on CNN Newsroom Transcript”, CNN Newsroom, found at: <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/170219/cnr.05.html>
Putin is our enemy. There's no question about that. And his **[Putin's] country is imploding**. The **[US] sanctions** that we put on them **for the Crimea annexation and meddling in Ukraine**, so they could get more natural resources down there and have one more rapport, **have absolutely crushed the Ruble by 50 percent. And GDP from 2014 to 2016 is 50 percent down in Russia as well.**

Response 3: NATO is centered around conventional deterrence

Henrik Ø. **Breitenbach**, 2017, NATO: Conventional Deterrence Is the New Black, <https://www.japcc.org/conventional-deterrence-is-the-new-black/>

After Ukraine, conventional deterrence will be the main purpose of NATO's armed forces. NATO contingency planning, operational training and defence planning will all revolve around conventional deterrence. Russia's ready use of force in Ukraine, Georgia and beyond shows that its non-NATO neighbours are very much at risk for military intervention. President Putin challenges the post-Cold War order by breaking the rules underlying its stability. His means include the use of covert agents to stage unrest and create excuses for Russia to intervene in the supposed name of Russian-speaking minorities. Could Moscow apply the same measures in a NATO country with a significant Russian minority population, such as Latvia? This question should keep NATO leaders up at night and by the morning they should realize that the solution is conventional deterrence.

Response 4: America will defend NATO No Matter What

James **Stavridis** APRIL 4, **2019**, "Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander",

Most can't name the three Baltic countries. Yet **thanks to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's charter**, which was signed 70 years ago in Washington, **every American is bound by law to defend with blood and treasure each of [the baltic nations]** those nations, and 22 others to boot.

To many who lived through the Cold War, the alliance may seem like an obvious good deal. **By binding Europe's democracies together, NATO decreased the chances of the brutal conflicts** that dominated the continent through the end of World War II.

For Allies

Response 1: Conventional and retaliatory capabilities solve

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2020, “No First Use: Myths vs. Realities - Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,” CAC, found at:

<https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/no-first-use/no-first-use-myths-vs-realities/>.

Reality: The financial, political, and security consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons are strong deterrents against nuclear proliferation among U.S. allies, as are their own legal obligations. U.S. allies understand that developing nuclear weapons in contravention of their Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations would severely disrupt alliance relationships and would certainly have a greater negative impact than a shift in U.S. declaratory policy. U.S. allies have no need to pursue nuclear weapons, as there is no reason to question the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. **An NFU policy will have no effect on the ability of the United States to deter threats to its allies’ security with its robust conventional forces and the threat of nuclear retaliation in response to a nuclear attack.**

Response 2: US umbrella will not close

John P. Holdren, 2020, “The overwhelming case for no first use.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, found at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701277>

First of all, **nobody is proposing that the US nuclear umbrella deterring nuclear threats or attacks against US allies would be withdrawn under no first use.** To misunderstand this reality is to conflate the two forms of extension in the term “extended deterrence”: extension of the nuclear umbrella to protect allies, as opposed to extension to cover nonnuclear threats. **It’s the latter form of extended deterrence, extension to non-nuclear threats, that would be renounced under no first use.** The United States should be crystal clear in reassuring its allies – and reminding potential adversaries – on this point.

Response 3: Nuclear deterrence for our allies isn't credible

Nina Tannenwald, 2019, “It’s Time for a U.S. No-First-Use Nuclear Policy - Texas National Security Review.” Texas National Security Review, found at:

<https://tnsr.org/roundtable/its-time-for-a-u-s-no-first-use-nuclear-policy/>.

As for threatening to use nuclear weapons first in support of extended deterrence commitments, such a policy lacks credibility because the costs of starting a nuclear war would vastly outweigh the benefits. **As Henry Kissinger once said, “Great powers don’t commit suicide for their allies.” Thus, as a number of analysts have persuasively argued, extended deterrence based on a conventional military**

response to a conventional threat is much more credible. Moreover, constantly arguing that nuclear weapons are necessary reduces the credibility of the United States' more usable conventional deterrent.

Chemical Weapons

Response 1: Saddam Hussein was deterred by conventional war

Nina Tannenwald, 2019, "It's Time for a U.S. No-First-Use Nuclear Policy - Texas National Security Review." Texas National Security Review, found at: <https://tnsr.org/roundtable/its-time-for-a-u-s-no-first-use-nuclear-policy/>.

As Scott Sagan has persuasively argued, however, **it is highly unlikely that a nuclear threat in fact deterred Saddam from using chemical weapons**. Indeed, recent research suggests that the threat to use nuclear weapons first against non-nuclear states has little credible coercive power.

Response 2: These weapons are not a problem, regulation exists

Michael E. O'Hanlon, 2016 "In Support of Nuclear No First Use." Brookings, Brookings, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/08/19/in-support-of-nuclear-no-first-use

While the notion of biological warfare conjures up horrible images of incurable and fatal diseases that create slow, painful death, Their actual use to date has been so restricted that the perceived potency of the threat has diminished in the eyes of many. In addition, given their typically slow incubation times, and indiscriminate effects, **they often have been seen, rightly, as instruments of terror rather than of purposeful state violence.** This is not to deny that existing agents could be extremely lethal, only that they would have to be disseminated extremely effectively and in a manner not yet witnessed.

[We're not going to deter terrorists with nukes so this makes no sense]

Response 3: Nukes against conventional weapon would be seen as disproportionate

John P. Holdren, 2020, "The overwhelming case for no first use." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, found at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701277>

Retaliating with nuclear weapons against chemical or biological weapons use (in the subset of cases where the source was clear) would likewise almost certainly be seen as disproportionate. Indeed, the disproportionality aspect makes it so unlikely that any US president would order either a pre-emptive or retaliatory nuclear attack in the chemical and biological weapons context that including the option in declaratory policy seems perverse, given the downsides of doing so.

Response 4: NFU's Empirically include chemical weapons

Sundaram 2017, "India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons", T and F online, found at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1438737>

The country's stated doctrine from January 2003 includes a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first but with a significant caveat, that nuclear weapons could be used if Indian forces are attacked with biological or chemical weapons. The NFU policy has often been held up by Indian diplomats, government spokespeople, and various strategists as proof of India's status as a responsible nuclear power. At the same time, there is also a history of strategists, military leaders, and, more recently, government officials questioning, or calling for the abandonment of, the NFU commitment.

Response 5: N/U: US response to chemical weapons is conventional war, not nuclear war

Miller, James N. (2020), "No to no first use—for now", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Informa UK Limited,

https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf .

In making this strengthened assurance, the United States affirms that **any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response** – and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable. Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.

China

Response 1: Turn: Agreeing with China on NFU lowers tensions

Ankit **Panda**, 2018, "'No First Use' and Nuclear Weapons," Council on Foreign Relations, found at: <https://www.cfr.org/background/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons>

China sought to make its NFU pledge appear credible by separating its ballistic missile and warhead units; under these circumstances, China's intention to use nuclear weapons before first suffering a nuclear attack would ostensibly be easily detectable. So far, there have been no public caveats to China's NFU policy, but some U.S. and Indian strategists doubt the credibility of China's pledge. China has been able to maintain its NFU pledge because it has invested so heavily in conventional military modernization, making it unlikely that it would consider nuclear escalation in a conventional war. **China has publicly called on nuclear weapon states to create and join a multilateral NFU treaty—what it has called a Treaty on Mutual No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons.**

Response 2: Analytic: China has NFU, no need to deter

Nuclear Umbrella

Response 1: The Umbrella is bluff

Irving Kristol, 1983: "WHAT'S WRONG WITH NATO?", New York Times, found at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/09/25/magazine/what-s-wrong-with-nato.html>

The nuclear umbrella is 99 percent bluff. Mutual assured destruction, the threat upon which the umbrella over Europe relies, really no longer exists as a believable strategy.

One can imagine the United States responding to a Soviet attack on the American homeland with, in effect, a suicidal gesture, saying, "All right, you are going to obliterate us, we will obliterate you, just for the satisfaction of it." But **it is unimaginable, really, that the United States is going to engage in a mutual holocaust with the Soviet Union in order to protect Western Europe.**

[This sentiment continues after the fall of the soviet union, since:]

Ival Eland 2010, "Extending Nuclear Umbrella Is a Bad Idea", AntiWar.com, found at: <https://original.antiwar.com/eland/2010/12/28/extending-nuclear-umbrella-is-a-bad-idea/>

Even though the Soviet Union has long collapsed, the U.S. now extends its nuclear umbrella over an expanded group of European nations, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and probably some other countries more secretly (maybe even Israel). **Right now, sacrificing American cities to save the Taiwanese from a Chinese onslaught or the South Koreans from a North Korean invasion seems even less intelligent than protecting the much larger GDP of Western Europe during the Cold War.**

Response 2: Nuclear Umbrella is Weakening by the day

James Inhofe, 2015: "Inhofe: America's nuclear umbrella has holes in it, leaving U.S. vulnerable to Iran, Russia", Inhofe's website, found at:

<https://www.inhofe.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/inhofe-americas-nuclear-umbrella-has-holes-in-it-leaving-us-vulnerable-to-iran-russia->

Inhofe stated that **in the meantime the United States' warheads are nearly 40 years old and the delivery systems are roughly 50 years old. Edelman also pointed to degradation of America's nuclear umbrella**

We're supposed to be and historically have been the nuclear umbrella. Our umbrella has holes in it. We have serious problems. And when you look at countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey and others, if they [countries] see what our capabilities are, then you know, or I would assume, they're going to be involved and we're going to have another arms race coming -- coming up.

Response 3: Analytic: Umbrella has failed to cover allied nations such as Ukraine from Russian aggression.

A/2: Prolif

General

Response 1: The benefits of prolifer are outweighed by the harms of NPT violation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2020, “No First Use: Myths vs. Realities - Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,” CAC, found at:

<https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/no-first-use/no-first-use-myths-vs-realities/>.

Reality: The financial, political, and security consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons are strong deterrents against nuclear proliferation among U.S. allies, as are their own legal obligations. **U.S. allies understand that developing nuclear weapons in contravention of their Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations would severely disrupt alliance relationships and would certainly have a greater negative impact than a shift in U.S. declaratory policy.** U.S. allies have no need to pursue nuclear weapons, as there is no reason to question the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. **An NFU policy will have no effect on the ability of the United States to deter threats to its allies’ security with its robust conventional forces and the threat of nuclear retaliation in response to a nuclear attack.**

Response 2: Turn: Proliferation will decrease when other countries see they don't need nukes

John P. Holdren, 2020, “The overwhelming case for no first use.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, found at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701277>

When the country with the most capable conventional forces the world has ever seen insists that it nonetheless needs nuclear weapons to deter and respond to non-nuclear attacks, it is logically conceding, to any country that fears or professes to fear attack by another, the right to acquire its own nuclear weapons to deter or respond to such attacks. The US stance of “first use if we think we need to” undermines, in the eyes of most of the world, any moral authority the United States might wish to assert against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by others. And if potential adversaries that don’t possess nuclear weapons think the United States would use nuclear weapons against their conventional forces or in retaliation for an actual (or suspected!) chemical or biological attack, that can only increase their incentive to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.

[This is empirically true,]

Mike **Ryan**, 2003, "Facing the Failures of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, found at:

<https://www.wagingpeace.org/facing-the-failures-of-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-regime/>

Second, **the US policy of preemption is** heightening the level of threat felt by potential nuclear weapons states by **adding to the perceived need to possess nuclear weapons in order to ward off an aggressive offensive attack. Instead of warning or discouraging nuclear threshold states such as Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear arsenals, the lesson that these countries are most likely to learn from the Iraq example is that they must accelerate their nuclear weapons programs** in order avoid to the fate of the Ba'th regime.

Response 3: Turn: Proliferation will decrease when adversaries w/o nukes know we won't nuke them

John P. **Holdren**, 2020, "The overwhelming case for no first use." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, found at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701277>

When the country with the most capable conventional forces the world has ever seen insists that it nonetheless needs nuclear weapons to deter and respond to non-nuclear attacks, it is logically conceding, to any country that fears or professes to fear attack by another, the right to acquire its own nuclear weapons to deter or respond to such attacks. The US stance of "first use if we think we need to" undermines, in the eyes of most of the world, any moral authority the United States might wish to assert against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by others. And if potential adversaries that don't possess nuclear weapons think the United States would use nuclear weapons against their conventional forces or in retaliation for an actual (or suspected!) chemical or biological attack, that can only increase their incentive to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.

Response 4: Countries are already moving to proliferation

Eric **Brewer**, 2020, "Toward a More Proliferated World?", CSIS,

https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200902_Toward_a_More_Proliferated_World.pdf

But fundamental trust in the United States appears to be on the decline, increasing the risks of proliferation by U.S. allies and partners.

The structural changes to the international system and the U.S. role in it—including a shift in the U.S. domestic debate toward retrenchment and belief that the international

order no longer advances U.S. interests—cannot be entirely disentangled from Trump’s worldview and those who support it. **Allies and partners thus fear that the problem is not confined to Trump alone, but rather reflective of a broader shift in the U.S. political debate, and the turning away of the American people from the commitments and costs of upholding the international order.** It is therefore not difficult to imagine how **allied confidence in the United States could similarly wane to a point where partners reevaluate their nuclear options.**

Prolif Good

Response 1: Turn: When proliferation happens conflict decreases

Kenneth Waltz, 1981, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better," Adelphi Papers, found at:

<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm>

Nuclear weapons in the hands of six or seven states have lessened wars and limited conflicts. The further spread of nuclear weapons can be expected to widen those effects.

Deterrent strategies promise less damage than war-fighting strategies. First, deterrent strategies [because they] induce caution all around and thus reduce the incidence of war

Response 2: Turn: Prolif. Forces Radical States to be Reasonable

Kenneth Waltz, 1981, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better," Adelphi Papers, found at:

<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm>

Many fear that states that are radical at home will recklessly use their nuclear weapons in pursuit of revolutionary ends abroad. **States that are radical at home. however, may not be radical abroad. Few states have been radical in the conduct of their foreign policy, and fewer have remained so for long.** Think of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. States coexist in a competitive arena. The pressures of competition cause them to behave in ways that make the threats they face manageable, in ways that enable them to get along. **States can remain radical in foreign policy only if they are overwhelmingly strong—as none of the new nuclear states will be—or if their radical acts fall short of damaging vital interests of nuclear powers.** States that acquire nuclear weapons will not be regarded with indifference. States that want to be freewheelers have to stay out of the nuclear business. **A nuclear Libya, for example, would have to show caution, even in rhetoric, lest she suffer retaliation in response to someone else's anonymous attack on a third state.** That state, ignorant of who attacked, might claim that its intelligence agents had identified Libya as the culprit and take the opportunity to silence her by striking a conventional or nuclear blow. **Nuclear weapons induce caution, especially in weak states.**

Japan

Response 1: Only 10% of the Japanese support proliferate

Patrick Winn, 2019, "Japan Has Plutonium, Rockets and Rivals. Will It Ever Build a Nuke?" Public Radio International, found at:

<https://interactive.pri.org/2019/03/japan-nuclear/index.html>.

"So, even if there may be some who'd wish to build those weapons in just a couple of months — even if Japanese technology is capable of doing so — there's a process." Clearing that process, Taniguchi says, would require the Japanese public allowing elected leaders to build nukes in full view of a disapproving world. No one sees that happening anytime soon, he says. "The parliamentary process, plus our budgetary process, media checks and balances — they all make it impossible for Japan to do anything like that." Or next to impossible, at least. **Only 1 in 10 Japanese people want their government to acquire nuclear weapons.** The horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still resonate. Conventional wisdom says that disdain for nuclear weapons is baked into the Japanese psyche.

Response 2: US will protect Japan, no reason to proliferate

Steve Fetter et. al., 2018 "No First Use and Credible Deterrence." Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, found at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257>

That brings us to today. It is clear that Japan is rightly concerned about its security in the face of an aggressive North Korea with increasingly advanced nuclear and missile capabilities. Japan also has reason to be concerned about the possibility, however remote, of nuclear attack by China or Russia. However, **the US strategic nuclear arsenal is a highly effective deterrent against such an attack. America has over 4000 nuclear weapons in its active stockpile**, and the entire US strategic nuclear force is undergoing modernization. **This aspect of the nuclear umbrella would not be diminished in any way if the United States adopted a policy of no first use. US threats to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for nuclear attacks on Japan are highly credible, because Japan is a very close ally and the US has military bases and over 100,000 troops and dependents based in Japan.**

Response 3: The Japanese Gov. said they wouldn't proliferate under any circumstances

Megan Amundson et al., 2016, "A Call for Japan to Support a US No-First-Use Policy" Ucsusa, found at:

<https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/no-first-use-letter.pdf>

A frequent argument raised by opponents of a no-first-use policy is that it may lead Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons. Some US policy makers may find this argument compelling because some Japanese officials have voiced opposition to no-first-use. However, the Japanese public overwhelmingly opposes developing nuclear weapons. Even **an official high-level Japan Defense Agency commission in 1995 concluded that there was no foreseeable circumstance in which it made sense for Japan to develop nuclear weapons.**

[No first use has been around since 1964, so US NFU was likely one of these circumstances]

Response 4: The Japanese Gov. supports NFU

ID, User (November 10, 2010), "Japan And America's Nuclear Posture", Union of Concerned Scientists, **Union of Concerned Scientists**We are a 501, <https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/japan-and-americas-nuclear-posture>.

The prime minister, the foreign minister, and more than 200 members of the Japanese Diet—Japan's national legislature—have expressed strong support for a change in U.S. declaratory policy stating that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter or respond to the use of nuclear weapons by another country.

Saudi Arabia

Response 1: Saudi Arabia is in economic crisis, can't proliferate

Tarek **Fadlallah**, 2020, "A Radical Shift May Worsen Saudi Arabia's Economic Crisis," Bloomberg.com, found at:

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-11/the-radical-shift-that-may-worsen-saudi-arabia-s-economic-crisis>

Saudi Arabia's economic downturn is about to worsen. Already reeling from the slump in oil prices and lockdowns to halt the spread of the coronavirus, the kingdom has now increased taxes and cut spending.

The shift, announced on Monday by Finance Minister Mohammed al Jadaan, has led analysts to cut their projections for the Arab world's biggest economy for a second time in just a few weeks. Samba's Reeve has slashed his **2020 forecast** and **estimates gross domestic product will drop 3.7%**, while JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s Giyas Gokkent now thinks his expectation of a contraction of 3% is too optimistic. Standard Chartered Plc's Bilal Khan revised his **estimate to a fall of 5%**.

Saudi Arabia's finances have been battered by a more than 50% slump in crude prices this year. The commodity still accounts for most government revenue four years into Prince Mohammed's overhaul of the economy. Coupled with a strict curfew to contain the coronavirus, the kingdom is set for its deepest financial turmoil in decades.

State-controlled oil giant Saudi Aramco announced a **25% drop in profit for the first quarter on Tuesday**. Even though it's on track to pay a \$75 billion dividend this year, the overall money the government receives from Aramco will be "a far cry" from what it expected originally, according to Credit Suisse Group AG.

Dong-Joon **Jo et al.**, 2007, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," SAGE, found at:

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27638542.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1344f19328fa98e09c0ed181c8cdab6d>

Opportunity refers to "the possibilities that are available to any entity within any environment, representing the total set of environmental constraints and possibilities" (Siverson and Starr 1990, 48). Opportunity for nuclear weapons production can be organized into three categories. The first is the set of technologies (knowledge) related to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Even though the number of states that could develop nuclear weapons has increased substantially since World War

II, nuclear technologies are severe obstacles for poor and undeveloped states. The second category is related to nuclear fissile materials. There have always been severe restrictions on the production and trade of nuclear fissile materials (Helmreich 1986).⁵ The third category [**The opportunity to produce nukes**] involves economic capacity. **The cost of nuclear weapons proliferation has increased over time because of the need for larger, more sophisticated nuclear arsenals and more complex control and delivery systems** (Kincade 1995).

South Korea

Response 1: US & South Korea won't respond to North Korean provocations, so there's no risk of war

Van **Jackson**, 2016 (Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, "The Trouble With The US Bomber Overflight Against North Korea,"

<http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-trouble-with-the-us-bomber-overflight-against-north-korea/>, Accessed 2/6/2016 , rwg)

In my new book, I explain why **North Korea**—a state that Richard Nixon once called a “fourth-rate pipsqueak power” and that late night comedians routinely mock—**has been able to commit more than one thousand acts of unreciprocated violence against the United States and South Korea** going back to the 1960s. How is a much smaller state repeatedly willing and able to not only defy a much stronger state, but attack it and its ally without provoking a larger war? It boils down to perceptions of resolve; there can be no other answer than that **the smaller state believes the larger state won't retaliate if the provocation is limited in scale. In thousands of strategic interactions over the decades, the United States and South Korea have shown an unwillingness to take actions that risk war.** With few exceptions, when North Korea attacks, the alliance has not responded in kind, or at all.

Response 2: South Korea Proliferation hurts their international standing

Stangarone, Troy (February 29, **2016**), "Going Nuclear Wouldn't Be Easy for South Korea", The National Interest, Center for the National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/going-nuclear-wouldnt-be-easy-south-korea-15345> Accessed on December 3, 2020.

For South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons program it would have to join North Korea as the only country to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an ignominious club for sure. **Withdrawal [from the NPT] would dent Seoul's growing international standing and make it the only member of MIKTA, an**

emerging club of middle powers, to have a nuclear weapon, something which would not enhance South Korea's middle power prestige.

Response 3: Proliferation puts South Korea's nuclear power supply at risk

Troy **Stangarone**, 16, "Going Nuclear Wouldn't Be Easy for South Korea," The National Interest, found at:

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/going-nuclear-wouldnt-be-easy-south-korea-15345>

While a loss of international stature to ensure domestic security might be an acceptable trade off, there would likely be economic costs as well. Developing a nuclear weapon would have consequences for South Korea's own nuclear industry. **Nuclear power provides a third of South Korea's electricity** and represents 13 percent of its primary energy consumption. **Lacking adequate domestic reserves of nuclear fuel, South Korea is dependent upon members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which conditions supply on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pursuing a nuclear option would put the fuel supply for South Korea's domestic reactors at risk.**

Response 4: South Korean leadership have disavowed nuclearising

<https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/will-south-korea-go-nuclear/>

This flurry of pro-nuclear reactions to the latest North Korean test, however, provides a misleading picture. **President Park Geun-hye, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, Defense Minister Han Min-koo, and other senior government officials have all strongly and publicly opposed South Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons.** So have the leading moderately conservative newspaper JoongAng Ilbo, key members of opposition political parties, and prominent experts outside the government, such as progressive Yonsei University professor Moon Chung-in. The Saenuri Party itself is divided on the issue, with influential ruling party officials taking issue with the pro-nuclear views espoused by their colleagues. **Ruling Saenuri Party Chairman Kim Moo-sung claimed that advocates of nuclear arms do not have a deep understanding of nuclear issues. He advised us not to "waste any time" on the possibility that South Korea will pursue nuclear weapons and maintained that "there is nothing to worry about."**

A/2: Military spending

Response 1: Biden will drop nuclear spending

Robert **Burns**, 2020, "Biden Would Push for Less US Reliance on Nukes for Defense," NBC Southern California, found at:

<https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/politics/decision-2020/biden-would-push-for-less-us-reliance-on-nukes-for-defense/2431722/>

Democrat Joe Biden leaves little doubt that if elected he would try to scale back President Donald Trump's buildup in nuclear weapons spending. And although the former vice president has not fully detailed his nuclear priorities, he says he would make the U.S. less reliant on the world's deadliest weapons.

Response 2: Military spending is going down

Macrotrends, 2020 "U.S. Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2020,"

Macrotrends, found at:

<https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/military-spending-defense-budget>

[Graphs say that spending has been going down as a percent of GDP since 2010]

Response 3: Military spending will be cut under Biden

Joe Gould, 2020, "Biden not planning defense cuts, but they may come anyway,"

Defense News, found at:

<https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/09/11/biden-not-planning-defense-cuts-but-they-may-come-anyway/>

But internal pressure from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, combined with pandemic-related economic pressures, may ultimately add up to budget cuts at a Biden Pentagon.

Response 4: Turn: Spending away from nukes is good

Steve Fetter et. al., 2018 "No First Use and Credible Deterrence." Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, found at:

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257>

The Government of Japan no doubt believes that maintaining the option of nuclear first use by the United States provides some measure of deterrence against conventional attack on Japan. The key question is how much deterrence it provides and whether these deterrence benefits are worth the price. Nuclear deterrence of

conventional attack is not cost-free because such threats lack credibility. As we saw in Europe during the Cold War, **actions to increase the credibility of nuclear threats have consequences, such as increasing the likelihood of nuclear war. It would be far better to strengthen conventional defenses so that there was no reason to resort to nuclear use, and to provide for a more credible deterrent.**

A/2: First Strike

Response 1: We have nukes in too many locations for a first strike to work

Khushboo **Sheth**, 2018, "Where Does The US Keep Its Nuclear Weapons?,"
WorldAtlas, found at:

<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/where-does-the-u-s-keep-its-nuclear-weapons.html>

The nuclear warheads of United States of America are stored in some 21 locations, which include 13 U.S. states and 5 European countries. There are said to be some 5,113 atomic weapons, which are scattered all around U.S., and some are on board U.S. submarines. There are some "zombie" nuclear warheads as well, and they are kept in reserve, and as many as 3,000 of these are still awaiting their dismantlement. It also extends its nuclear umbrella to such other countries as South Korea, Japan, and Australia.

Response 2: US has nuclear submarines so a first strike never works

Kyle **Mizomaki** Dec 3, 2019, "The U.S. Navy Signs Up for 9 New Nuclear Submarines",
Popular Mechanics, found at:

<https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a30109198/block-v-virginia-submarine/>

The U.S. Navy has approximately 65 submarines in service. **Fourteen are Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines**, part of America's nuclear triad and built to carry out nuclear deterrence patrols. **[and] A handful of these submarines are at sea at all times, armed with nuclear weapons.**

The service will [also] pay more than 20 billion dollars for nine new Virginia-class [nuclear] attack submarines.

A/2: Nuclear Terrorism

Response 1: Terrorists have shown no interest

John **Mueller**, 2017, Cato Institute, “76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism”, found at:

<https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons>

The possibility that small groups could set off nuclear weapons is an alarm that has been raised repeatedly over the decades. However, terrorist groups thus far seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. Perhaps, after a brief exploration of the possible routes, they have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to succeed.

Careful assessments have concluded that it is unlikely that any nuclear devices have been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even nonexistent because nuclear weapons require continual maintenance.

Response 2: No nation will ever give terrorists nukes

John **Mueller**, 2017, Cato Institute, “76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism”, found at:

<https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons>

One route a would-be atomic terrorist might take would be to receive or buy a bomb from a generous, like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. That route, however, is highly improbable.

Nuclear-armed states are unlikely to give or sell their precious weapons to non state actors.

Response 3: Nukes can be remotely disarmed

John **Mueller**, 2017, Cato Institute, “76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism”, found at:

<https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons>

Moreover, **finished bombs are outfitted with devices designed to trigger a nonnuclear explosion that will destroy the bomb if it is tampered with** . Bombs can also be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults (a common practice in Pakistan). Two or more people and multiple codes may be required not only to use the bomb, but also to store, maintain, and deploy it.

Response 4: Terrorists can't produce Nukes

John Mueller, 2017, Cato Institute, "76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism", found at:

<https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons>

The Gilmore Commission — the advisory panel on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction — stressed, building and deploying a nuclear device presents “Herculean challenges.” The process requires a lengthy sequence of steps; if each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can’t produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can’t be delivered.

Physicists who have studied the issue conclude that fabricating a nuclear weapon “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group” because of “the difficulty of acquiring the necessary expertise, the technical requirements (which in several fields verge on the unfeasible), the lack of available materials and the lack of experience in working with these.”

Response 5: Pakistan has nukes and supports terrorists, but has not given them nukes

Vanda Felbab-Brown 2018 “Why Pakistan supports terrorist groups, and why the US finds it so hard to induce change”, Brookings, found at:

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/>

The United States has long been frustrated with Pakistan’s persistent acquiescence to safe havens for the Afghan Taliban and its vicious Haqqani branch in Pakistan (both of which benefit more from misgovernance in Afghanistan, but Pakistan’s aid helps a lot). Worse yet, **Pakistan has provided direct military and intelligence aid to both [the Mujahideen and Taliban]** groups, resulting in the deaths of U.S. soldiers, Afghan security personnel, and civilians, plus significant destabilization of Afghanistan.

[Pakistan also has nukes and yet they have not given any of these weapons to the groups they support]

A/2: US-China War

Response 1: China is investing in defensive weapons

David P. **Goldman**, 2020, "Why there won't be a US-China war," Asia Times, found at: <https://asiatimes.com/2020/08/why-there-wont-be-a-us-china-war/>

That's why **there won't be a shooting war between the US and China. China has spent massively on anti-access/area denial weapons – A2/AD for short – that make war impractical.**

But China has invested enormously in coastal defenses. Its surface-to-ship missiles, from the initial DF-21 unveiled in 2008 through the DF-26 first displayed in 2018, are dubbed "carrier killers" by the press.

Response 2: China's conventional army is terrible

David P. **Goldman**, 2020, "Why there won't be a US-China war," Asia Times, found at: <https://asiatimes.com/2020/08/why-there-wont-be-a-us-china-war/>

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the worst-trained and worst-equipped land army fielded by a major power today, and perhaps ever. The PLA spends just \$1,500 to equip an infantryman – not much more than the price of a rifle and a uniform – compared with \$18,000 for an American soldier.

Response 3: China has way less soldiers than America, can't win war

David P. **Goldman**, 2020, "Why there won't be a US-China war," Asia Times, found at: <https://asiatimes.com/2020/08/why-there-wont-be-a-us-china-war/>

But China's rapid deployment forces are tiny compared with America's. Analysts estimate that China has between 7,000 and 15,000 special forces, versus about 66,000 in the current US defense budget.

Response 4: Trade talks are stabilizing the relationship

Global Times, 2020, "Trade talks help stabilize tumultuous China-US ties: Global Times editorial - Global Times," Globaltimes, found at: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1198847.shtml>

Chinese Vice Premier Liu He held a phone conversation with US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin on

Tuesday morning upon invitation. Both sides described the conversation positively in their statements afterward. As previously, the US side touched more upon its concerns, yet its statement confirmed that the phase one deal is being implemented, which is basically being carried out smoothly, and that the US wishes to "ensure the success of the agreement." **Neither side used critical language in their statements.**

This is a very positive communication between China and the US. It involves the most substantial interests of both countries. Before the talk, there had been quite a lot of extremely unfriendly voices against China, with various threats every now and then in the US. The situation and the call were in sharp contrast, reminding people to observe China-US ties, which are in the midst of turbulence, from more perspectives.

Response 5: Too much entanglement for war: 80% US drugs from China

Rebecca **Mansour**, 2020, "Coronavirus Exposes China's Monopoly on U.S. Drug, Medical Supplies," Breitbart, found at:

<https://www.breitbart.com/asia/2020/02/13/coronavirus-outbreak-exposes-chinas-monopoly-on-u-s-drug-medical-supplies/>

The coronavirus outbreak has exposed the United States' dangerous dependence on China for pharmaceutical and medical supplies, including an estimated 97 percent of all antibiotics and 80 percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients needed to produce drugs in the United States.

Response 6: Too much entanglement for war: China Employs 1.8 Million in the US

Meltzer, February 2019, "The US-China economic relationship", Brookings, found at:

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/us_china_economic_relationship.pdf

The U.S.-China economic relationship delivers more benefits to the U.S. than is commonly understood. For example, recent data shows that **U.S. exports to China support around 1.8 million jobs** in sectors such as services, agriculture, and capital goods

Response 7: Too much entanglement for war: China Reliant on Manufacturing

CIA, 2012, “The World Factbook”, CIA, found at:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20120224190802/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2012.html?countryName=China&countryCode=CH®ionCode=eas&#CH>

47% of China’s economy comes from industrial sectors.

[Analysis: China’s economy is primarily based on industry, factories only work when there is investment into manufacturing. It is logical that without specifically US, and more Widely NATO companies to invest in factories, the chinese economy would collapse]

A/2: Militarization of Space

Response 1: The Outer Space Treaty already prevents Space Militarization

Department of State 1967, “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies”, Department of State Archive, found at:

<https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm>

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

A/2: NPT

Response 1: NPT is failing

Fred Kaplan, 2005, "The Real Nuclear Option: The Non-Proliferation Treaty is a mess. We have to save it anyway.", Slate, found at:

<https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2005/05/how-bad-is-the-non-proliferation-treaty.html>

The NPT—in effect for 35 years and signed by 189 countries (every country in the world but three)—is teetering in crisis, possibly on the edge of obsolescence.

One country, North Korea, has abrogated the treaty, the first signatory ever to do so, and has since reprocessed enough plutonium to build at least a half-dozen bombs. Another, Iran, is poised to go down the same road via enriched uranium.

More broadly, **vast loopholes in the treaty**, which have long been noticed, are finally **being exploited. It is increasingly doubtful whether the NPT, in its current form, can remain a useful tool for constraining nuclear ambitions.**

Altaf, Beenish (July 23, 2018), "NPT Turns 50: A Legacy Of Failures", Foreign Policy News, found at:

<https://foreignpolicynews.org/2018/07/23/npt-turns-50-a-legacy-of-failures/>

Since its inception, the Treaty has faced enormous challenges in securing its objectives. Ambiguity of its various clauses and **[the] discriminatory nature of its agenda has remained crucial in its failure to move towards non-proliferation and complete disarmament. [the] NPT, as an instrument of eliminating nuclear weapons from this planet earth, does not have a well-connected, internally coherent mechanism to achieve the stated objective of arms control and disarmament.**

Adding to this, the text of this agreement provides for the serious rifts between its signatories and creates an unfavourable environment for the survival of the NPT.

Furthermore, the question of haves and have-nots' establishes the authority of some states and denies this privileged treatment to others. Based on these contradictions, **its member states [have] clearly manipulated its existence for certain vested interests.** The USA's attempt to provide its NATO allies with nuclear technology and the recent nuclear deal between India (non-NPT state) and the US characterises a clear violation of provisions of the NPT.

Response 2: NPT will fail in the next decade

Henry **Sokolski**, March **2020**, “NPT Turns 50: Will It Get to 60?”, npolicy, found at: http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Will_the_NPT_last_out_the_next_decade.pdf.

Perhaps the most profound reason to worry about the treaty’s future cuts in a very different direction. **In the next decade, it is all too likely that the NPT’s past success** in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons among the world’s nations — **will be reversed.**

A/2: Taiwan invasion

Response 1: Conventional forces of all countries enough to deter Taiwan

Wikipedia, 2015, "Foreign relations of Taiwan - Wikipedia," En.wikipedia, found at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Taiwan

[England, Germany, France, Russia, etc. all have the same ties with Taiwan as the US]

A/2: SCS trade

Response 1: Japanese trade is 1.5% global GDP, only a fraction w/ China

A/2: Biden Enacts an NFU

Response 1: Biden will Mirror Obama

Finaud, M. 2020, November 7. GCSP Article | Nuclear Weapons: What Is Biden Expecting And What Can Be Expected From Him? Nuclear Weapons.

<https://www.gcsp.ch/global-insights/nuclear-weapons-what-biden-expecting-and-what-can-be-expected-him>

Once he has put the relevant teams in place and given them time to consider the issue of US defence doctrine, **the new president will publish his "Nuclear Posture Review" that will likely move away from Trump's of 2018 and return to a doctrine closer to Obama's of 2010.** In particular, Biden has pushed through in the Democratic Party programme the no-first-use posture that **Obama failed to get the Pentagon to accept [a no-first-use posture].**

Roberts 2016 corroborates , "America Must Be Ready to Nuke First", The National Interest, found at:

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-must-be-ready-nuke-first-17233?nopaging=1>

Shortly after taking office, the Obama administration conducted a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in which it specifically rejected NFU primarily on the basis of a potentially devastating biological attack but also because the security environment was so precarious

Response 2: Advisors Oppose NFU

Sonne 2016, "'No First Use' Nuclear Policy Proposal Assailed by U.S. Cabinet Officials, Allies", Wall Street Journal, found at:

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-first-use-nuclear-policyproposal-assailed-by-u-s-cabinet-officials-allies-1471042014>

The possibility of a "No First Use" declaration—which would see the U.S. explicitly rule out a first strike with a nuclear weapon in any conflict—**met resistance at a National Security Council meeting** in July, where the **[when the] Obama administration reviewed possible nuclear disarmament initiatives** it could roll out before the end of the president's term.

The pushback on “No First Use” and other proposals shows the difficulty Mr. Obama has encountered in trying to advance a nuclear disarmament agenda that he first articulated less than three months after taking office.

[Analysis: Lloyd Austin, Biden’s new pick for the head of the Pentagon, served in the Obama Administration, which rejected a no first use.]

Frontlines

Backlines

B/2: Japanese Prime Minister

Backline 1: He argued against NFU at a low point in his relationship with Obama

Backline 2: He has since changed his mind and called for nuclear abolition

BBC, 2015, "Abe: 'Eliminate nuclear weapons'," Bbc, found at:

<https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-33839854>

Japan PM calls for 'elimination of nuclear weapons'

Backline 3:[Analytic]: Shinzo Abe is no longer Prime Minister and the new one has not said anything about nfu yet

Indicts

I/2: Waltz

Response 1: Waltz Relies on Minimal Data and Justification

David Krieger 2012: "WHY WALTZ IS WRONG", Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, found at:

<https://www.wagingpeace.org/why-waltz-is-wrong/>

In essence, **Waltz puts his faith in nuclear deterrence and justifies this in historical terms. But the history is short and** there have been many close calls. During the 67-year period **since the dawn of the Nuclear Age there have been numerous accidents**, miscalculations and threats to use nuclear weapons

Waltz makes the bet that no leader of a nuclear weapon state will ever strike the match or allow the match to fall into hands that will strike it. It is a foolish bet to make.

Response 2: Waltz Vastly Oversimplifies International Relations

Alochonaa 2014: "More is Not Better – Why Kenneth Waltz is Wrong on Nuclear Proliferation", Alochonaa , found at:

<https://alochonaa.com/2014/03/26/more-is-not-better-why-kenneth-waltz-is-wrong-on-nuclear-proliferation-3/>

Waltz himself argues that the assumptions on which theories are built are radical simplifications of the world and are useful only because they are as such. Any radical simplification [which] conveys a false impression of the world

I/2: Union of Concerned Scientists

Response 1: Union of Concerned Scientists are charlatans

Tom **Hartsfield**, 13,"Union of Concerned Scientists' Are Charlatans | RealClearScience," Realclearscience, found at:

https://www.realclearscience.com/articles/2013/11/21/union_of_concerned_scientists_are_charlatans_108371.html

After a brief UCS website tour, however, I tore up their letter and threw it away. (Just kidding, I recycled it!) This group does not consistently practice “science advocacy.”

Rather, it **[UCS] mostly pursues partisan politics, unashamedly using “science” as nothing more than a phony badge of credibility.**

Reading the list of UCS policy positions quickly reveals that the group simply does not consistently support a scientifically sound agenda.

Scientists need better representation in Washington, DC. Unfortunately, **the Union of Concerned Scientists is little more than a lobbying group willing to taint the objectivity of science to advance their political agenda. Certainly, don’t let the group’s name fool you.**

I/2: US would lose war against Russia and China

Response 1: The study relies on a baseless claim that Russia and China would have a decisive military defeat of the United States

Gady, Franz-Stefan (December 17, 2018), "Would The US Really Lose A War With China And Russia?", The Diplomat, Diplomat D,

<https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/would-the-us-really-lose-a-war-with-china-and-russia/>

For one thing, in its treatment of the two countries the study begs the question whether China and Russia are indeed capable of inflicting a “decisive military defeat” on the United States. The report does not offer any persuasive evidence to back up this claim; instead, it engages in confused threat inflation.