

Governance Voting Concept

Why?

1. I feel Ethereum desperately needs an agreed decision making process before the next difficult decisions occur.
2. Has to be something we can implement now, using existing technology.
3. Has to be public and fair (though that is very relative).
4. Barriers of entry must be low and fair but not nothing. .
5. This paper puts forth the concept for discussion. It is not a complete system with all the rules needed. If there is enthusiasm, it could be quickly matured.
6. This concept is a system for |Ethereum as it is now. As the ecosystem matures, this must mature also.
7. Everything is up for discussion.

Summary

This paper proposes a voting system that can be developed and implemented in a short period of time. The system divides the Ethereum population into rings (miners, developer, core devs, security, users and traders). Each ring creates their own voter list before any votes using their own criteria, distributes tokens and have a DAO that allows votes.

Each ring has a set fraction of the votes adding to 100%. When there is a vote, each ring votes with their list voting list. The result counts for their fraction of the vote.

Anyone can propose a vote. All votes have to be approved by a volunteer subset of the rings. The intent is to remove trivial votes. The distribution of the rings can change depending on the topic of the vote. So a vote on the mining payout would have higher emphasis on the mining ring.

Governance Process

- Implementation starts from the EthMag and CoreDevs and brings in traders, miners and developers.
- This system is partially exclusive. It prioritizes active members over inactive. It divides the Ethereum population into groups. I realize this is far from ideal, but I think this will draw people in as small groups like trader and security groups will feel they can be heard,

- Rules are not codified yet allowing adaption before perhaps eventual coding. So we should improve this system as we go. Improvements should be voted upon (once the system exists).
- We should develop a system when there is no urgent need such that it exists before the next urgent existential question.
- This system needs to be used regularly or it will atrophy. Recommend one vote a quarter (of a year). We can't have too many votes or it will die from fatigue.
- Many things should not need a vote. Rough consensus should rule when effective. Votes are used when consensus is ineffective.
- This voting mechanism is recognized at the start as a temporary measure, until improved upon better maturity of the ecosystem.
- This system allows politics of people. Since the rings are individual groups, a whale group would have difficulty having credibility in many groups making influence of whales more difficult.

Rings

The rings are created before the votes. EthMagicians could be the core of the rings but they don't have to be on the EthM group.

The rings create a voter list. The list is public. The criteria for getting onto the voter list must be public. The list should be maintained by people in the ring if it can't be automated, this is up to the ring. The ring has a DAO for voting. One token per vote. Each ring has a responsibility to minimize bots. Votes should be anonymous.

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|---------------|---|
| 1. Miners | Must be an active miner (of some size?) |
| 2. Core Devs | Must have committed changes of some kind |
| 3. Security | Must be active in EthSecurity |
| 4. Developers | Must have some kind of code out there? |
| 5. Users | Must have had an active? Address for ? days before the vote |
| 6. Traders | Must be a trader (of some size) |

There must be consideration of whales and huge mining

Bots

Users, Developers, maybe miners are susceptible to bots. I believe there will exist methods to keep the vote on chain but keep bots out. I think this is achievable but I do not have a suggestion now.

How a Vote Works

1. Anyone submits an issue to decide. Submission is to the EthMag site. They include a weighting, a description and a bounty and a schedule.
2. The issue gets a public chat
3. There should be a method to remove stupid issues that don't deserve the effort of a vote. Perhaps a rotating subset of the voters of all rings that can vote if something is dumb. Things must be removed within X days?
4. The submitter chooses a weighting of all the rings. The weighting must allow all rings to minimum of 7% and should give higher weight to the rings affected by the issue. There will be some TBD process to modify the weighting based on community feedback up to X days after the issue, then the weighting is frozen.
5. Each ring has a public chat where they discuss the issue. The chat will indicate if the commenter is a ring voter.
6. After X days the ring votes. Should the ring votes be public or secret?
7. Within X days, if Y% of the ring think the vote must be redone it can be redone within Z days
8. After the final votes, then the weighted decision is done. (See example below).

Example

So before the vote, the following rings are created, with voting lists and processes. A generic distribution is formed. An example is below;

Generic Distribution

Group	Population	%	Entry Criteria
Miners	50,000	15	Must run a min hashrate
Developers	100,000	15	Address that has deployed code
Users	4,000,000	20	Address with a minimum of 10 transactions before start of vote
Traders	20000	15	Address with a minimum of 400 transactions before start of vote
Core Devs	70	20	Member of core dev group
Security	300	15	Active member of EthSecurity group

So a question is raised, "*Should EWASM be included in the initial Eth 2 release?*" Schedule is 2 months.

Distribution:

In this case the developers, security and users have higher percentage because they are impacted more than say miners and traders.

Specific Distribution for this Vote

Group	Population	%	Entry Criteria
Miners	50,000	10	Must run a min hashrate
Developers	100,000	25	Address that has deployed code
Users	4,000,000	20	Address with a minimum of 10 transactions before start of vote
Traders	20000	10	Address with a minimum of 400 transactions before start of vote
Core Devs	70	15	Member of core dev group
Security	300	20	Active member of EthSecurity group

A global chat on the issue is raised and open to anyone

Each ring brings up their chats which are open to the public. Each voter can vote using the ring's Aragon DApp (or other application).

Actual Results for the Vote

Group	Population	%	Actual Votes	Yes Vote	% Yes
Miners	50,000	10	4,000	2,100	10
Developers	100,000	25	25,000	18,000	25
Users	4,000,000	20	2,400,000	800,000	
Traders	20,000	10	3,000	1,400	
Core Devs	70	15	50	35	15
Security	300	20	120	75	20

Result Yes 70%

