

LaForce,Paul-2-22-01;4-19-01

[Speaker 1]

I was born in Vance, Virginia, September the 20th, 1929. I was raised in several states. My father worked for Hercules Powder Company and during World War II was transferred several times in conjunction with his work in either building or operating gunpowder plants.

I went to school in, started school in first grade in Virginia, went to school in West Virginia, Wisconsin, Illinois, and back to Virginia. And while we lived in Wisconsin, I went to a military academy, Roosevelt Military Academy in Aledo, Illinois, for two years, my junior, sophomore and junior years in high school. Moved back to Virginia.

I enlisted in the United States Marine Corps Reserve and spent a year in one summer camp training in the reserve. Then I entered the Virginia Military Institute and I had finished one year at VMI when the Korean War started. I was attending summer school and heard the announcement on the radio enlisting to the Operations Program.

Instead of driving to my home, I was en route back from school in Richmond, Virginia at that time, and I drove down to the post office, saw the recruiting sergeant, and enlisted in the Army. It took a couple of months before I could get my discharge from the Marine Corps Reserve before I finally actually entered active duty about the 1st of September of 1950. I enlisted in the Army, the Red Army Enlisted Man.

It was a private, A grade E1. I took 16 weeks of basic training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Then I went to an enlisted leadership school at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

Then I went to M3 Officer Candidate School at Fort Lane, Georgia, where we started the 2nd Officer Candidate Class after the Korean War started. About 103 or 104 started and about 52 or 53 graduated. That was in August of 1951.

I was in Dallas the week before last for our 50th anniversary with that group. There were 19 of my fellow graduates there and their wives. An interesting little sidelight to that group is that of all of those who are living and have gone through a reunion, everyone is still in their first and only marriage, which we thought was some sort of achievement, maybe achievement on the part of the wives or the patients in the group.

I was, I guess, about 20 years old when I entered military service. I had good training, very good training at Fort Jackson, basic training. We trained on, at that time, something like 28 different infantry weapons.

We took the different kinds of machine guns and rifles and grenade launchers and recoilless rifles and mortars. We had all of those types of weapons in Korea. I mention that because with that number of weapons in an infantry regiment, that meant that almost all of them had a different kind of ammunition, which meant the resupply and carrying the ammo and having it in the right amounts at the right places at the right time was very difficult.

The Army since that time has seemed to reduce drastically the number of weapons that they have in addition to most of the things that they use. The training in the Infantry Officer Candidate School at that time lasted six months. It was intense training, hard physically, a lot

of knife training, a lot of physical training, more weapons training, and those small unit leadership tactics, nothing but chemical warfare, booty traps, mines, hand grenades.

Just more intense training, basically, is what we had in basic training with the addition of the leadership classes. And that, too, was good training, good instructors. By that time, we already had people who had been involved in the war in Korea.

And so they were pretty highly motivated as instructors. And that helped as a student. You've asked what my understanding of communism.

Well, I was pretty well informed about it. As a matter of fact, the year 1949 and 50, when I was a freshman at the General Military Institute, we had the former Prime Minister of Russia during the Russian Revolution in 1917. Mr. Alexander Kerensky taught a six-week course at the General Military Institute called The Power Potential of Russia. And in that, he discussed a great deal about the communist philosophy of the party to which he was now strongly opposed. So I think we were pretty well informed about the communist movement. I am one of those who believe that our intervention in the Korean War was a legal requirement by our treaty arrangement.

I think it was the proper decision. In retrospect, I think we failed to prosecute that war adequately. I think we failed to bring to bear all the power that this nation had as far as the economics and industrial capability and the military capability.

And I think this was a direct reflection of the lack of full public support for our efforts in Korea. Having been recently through World War II, there was just no enthusiasm for what we were doing and a lot of criticism for going into Korea. I personally believe, and I still believe this to this day, that we pretty well stopped what was commonly referred to as the domino effect where communism would have moved from one nation to the other.

I believe that would have happened all across Southeast Asia had we not intervened. So as one who has been there, I didn't enjoy being there, but I think it was the right and proper thing to do. You asked where I landed in Korea and my impressions of it.

Well, I flew from the United States to Japan. I went to a chemical biological warfare school in Japan for ten days before being further assigned to Korea. There was a fear at that time that there might be some sort of chemical warfare, biological warfare maybe, and I'm happy to say that didn't occur.

But it was enough to scare you a little bit. Then we went by ship from Japan to the port of Pusan, Korea. It was a 24-hour overnight night trip by ship in a terrible storm.

Not everybody got seasick. So when we landed in Pusan, we had a very happy period. We were briefed by the military police officers there in Pusan and the officers were issued M2 carbines, that's a fully automatic carbine and ammunition.

There were mostly enlisted troops. I'm not sure how many officers, but anyway, I was one of those that was issued a carbine and told that we would be on this train trip north in Korea and to be alert for enemy guerrilla activity and all that sort of thing. So it was a pretty nervous ride north.

We later found out that the radio MPs amused themselves, I think, because we saw no guerrilla or no effects of it and suffered no hostile acts for the next couple of days with the very uncomfortable train ride. My impression of the South Korean people is pretty limited, at least in the Korean experience, because I had very little contact with them. By the time I got to Korea, which was again in September of 1952, there had been a relatively quiet period all across the front.

The living conditions resembled something like from World War I. There was a series of trenches and there were cook stoves and there were bunkers that had been, in many cases, had been reinforced with logs and sandbags. We spent a great deal of our time working on improving our fortifications and trying to get the trenches deep enough to walk in, deep enough to carry a litter through if necessary, I included.

So the civilians were behind what was referred to as the farm line, and I believe there was a 25-mile, they were required to be 25 miles back behind the line where we were located. And my memory may be a little fuzzy about that, but we rarely saw civilians unless we went to the rear area for some occasion, and that's been pretty rare. We did have some Koreans that came, that worked for the military units, and some of them were likely to become called houseboys.

And there was a houseboy in our unit that eventually I sort of inherited as other people left. And his nickname was Chick, his name was Jackie June. He was a large person, probably 6'2 or so, and he was about 15 years old.

Nice-looking, very well-built young man, and very bright. And he'd spent a lot of time in the battalion rear areas. He'd seen a lot of John Wayne movies and the other kind of movies that showed back there.

And so he had a pretty good facility with the English language, primarily from watching those movies. When I left the rear, I was there about 10 months, and when I left the rear, we took Chick to Seoul where he had a sister who lived there. And he could live with her in a ten-school for about \$60 a year.

And so we left him with \$120 a year, two years worth of completed schooling. Now with his age and size and physical abilities, my guess is that the South Korean draft would have gotten him before he finished that schooling. But I don't know whatever happened there.

So my impression of the Korean people is very limited. We did have Koreans attached to the United States Army, and they were called katusas. They were Koreans attached to the U.S. They integrated into our infantry battalions and our infantry squads. There was probably average two or three katusas, as they were called, in each squad. Non-spoke English. If they learned any English, they would never admit it.

All you ever got was a yes or no. That was it. So it was hard to gather any real information about the Korean people as a people, at least during this tour of Korea.

I spent another year in Korea in 1965 and 1966, in which I came to know nothing more as Korean civilians than the people in the Republic of the Korean Army, the ROK Army, as they called it. And I liked it. I found it very nice.

The South Korean people, the few that we did see, those who were heading the fields with oxen, those who were plowing or planting rice, or doing some sort of work in the winter, which was why schools were closing over, we really had no communication with them, not at least with the people at the front line troops, but we had little or no communication with them. There were occasionally small groups of Korean prostitutes that infiltrated into the rear area, and that was one of the military police jobs, I think, was to round up those women and get them out of the area. As far as where we were on the line, we never saw that.

We went back to the reserve area sometimes to be aware of that situation. I will say this about them. When we were relieved on Final Hill, replaced by the Korean Division, ROK Division, I was surprised that when the company came on the hill that there were a few women, three or four women, mixed in with the ranks of that company.

I don't know whether their job was to cook or there was no exchange of conversation, so I don't know if it was worse than that. What were your impressions of the enemy? Well, in my ten months in Korea, I was on the front line unit the entire time.

I was never faced or opposed by North Koreans. The entire period I was there, we were opposed by the Chinese. I have their regimental numbers and locations somewhere.

I don't have it in my head. They were tenacious. They were disciplined.

They were not very well supplied. Although things have been relatively quiet, I have seen them when they, after things got active again, combat-wise, in the middle of September, early September, and on into October, and then again later in the winter and spring. I have seen several waves of Chinese come, and those in the third or fourth rank had new weapons.

They might have had grenades, but they never liked them. They were obliged to pick up a weapon when somebody was falling in front of them. They were all disciplined.

They did what they were told. They continued to attack. I think most of us believe that they didn't have the same regard and respect for human life that we have.

At least that was the appearance from where they were active. We also felt like at least the units that we faced, that they had inadequate communication. As an example of that, in the month of September, I think I was on patrol, I think, 26 times in the month of September, and it was a night patrol.

The patrols were characterized, and they were called the combat patrol or reconnaissance patrol. By definition, if you were on a reconnaissance patrol, your mission was to gather information. It was not to make contact with the enemy.

If you made contact with the enemy, and if you were discovered, then you were obligated at that time to withdraw, not to engage in firefights, unless it was necessary or if it was not bound to expect results. On the other hand, combat patrols, by definition, again, were specifically designed to make contact with the enemy and engage the enemy in combat. Those units that were in the position of trying to capture and close the door to the Japanese fortifications of their country.

I think in that month of September, I had five combat patrols, and I think I had 21 reconnaissance patrols. A few of those in which we didn't make contact, we were at least discovered by the enemy and were fired upon. I get back to this lack of communication, they fired mortar rounds at us and crackers as we were going back to our lines, and they never seemed to catch up, and they never seemed to get the idea to fire out ahead of us.

That has to believe. And also, at times we would hear them using tin cans or hitting a rock or something on their rifle, like a long or two-legged or three-legged or something with a tin, just a tin can, which was very delicious, indicating best they did not have radios out at all, but mine did.

[Speaker 2]

Heard the bugles? Heard the bugles, yeah.

[Speaker 1]

Heard the bugles in October, and just before, two or three days before, the big fight on Pine Hill happened. The Chinese tried to penetrate through our lines in one place, and we heard the bugles that night. I heard them again, I think it was in December of 1952, when the 7th Infantry Division was leading the country's 2nd Infantry Division in certain positions, and I know on Christmas Eve of 1952, by that time I had been moved to the Battalion Headquarters, and I was Assistant Operations Officer in the Battalion Headquarters, which was, from my point of view, a much better job than being an infantryman. There was a few hundred yards to the rear and a little better living conditions, maybe a little better food, but I was set up to be a liaison officer with the 2nd Infantry Division, but the Battalion I was in was going to replace us with the Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Division, and we did a couple days later, but on Christmas Eve, I went with a platoon from one of the companies in the Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Division, and our mission was to go from a hill named Arsenal or Erie, I forget which one, it was side-by-side, and that was in the vicinity of a well-known built-in hill that was called Old Baldwin, and the Chinese occupied those hills at that time, and about, of course, it got dark early, and it was December, it was dark by like 4.30, 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and I think we left the line of departure and went out into the so-called no-man's land shortly after dark, and we were going up the side of this hill, and the Chinese came on loudspeaker and said, we see you G.I.s, we know you G.I.s are down there, but this is the Christmas night, the night of peace, we will not fire, you return to your lines, and there was a lieutenant, his name was Shea, I had known him before, because Shea was the team leader, and I was just along as an observer, and so he called back to his higher headquarters, and after reconciling with another higher headquarters, I guess he told me, bring in the Chinese, so we went back down, we ran back to the Cheyenne area, and then I went on back to, stopped further back to the regimental headquarters where I was supposed to be, and got there just about in time, and the Catholic chapel was conducting the midnight mass, and we were there very early. Our unit, which was the 2nd Battalion, I was in G-Comp, the 2nd Battalion, and Newsweek magazine took some pictures in our area, and there was a Catholic chaplain, and about four soldiers kneeling in front of him, they had their rosary, and the chaplain wanted to get in a picture with him, and I said, no, I'm not Catholic, that wouldn't be honest, that would make this thing look fake or something. Anyway, that picture was on the, I think the Christmas edition of Newsweek magazine, I think it was, I had a copy of that for years, and I've been looking for it, and I can't find it.

I think I might try Newsweek to get that back now for our next, the very second after the regiment gets together. But, that Catholic chaplain, his father James Madden, and he received a silver star for his actions, I believe on final appeal. Very highly respected chaplain.

Well, they all were. And they rotated, like there was one Catholic chaplain, and one Protestant chaplain, and maybe one Jewish chaplain, and if not in the regiment, certainly in the division, and they kind of rotated around, would stay with the battalion for two or three weeks, and then rotate to another battalion. In these days, when there's no prayer in school, that sort of thing, there's an old World War II saying, maybe World War I, that there were no Indians in the foxhole in wartime.

The chaplains performed a very valuable service, not just from their religious activities, but from their humanitarian activities, also like a social worker, or a therapist, so it didn't seem to matter what particular faith the chaplain was either, so it was appreciated. I saw this father Madden years later in Germany, he was with one of the units on the border in Germany, and I ran into him on some military operations, you know, talking business. You've asked some things, like I talked about my impressions of the Indians, they were tough, they were tenacious.

One night we were successful in taking a prisoner out of the foxhole, up on Triangle Hill, before we had the attack on Triangle Hill, and he had a .45-caliber burp gun, which we took away from him, and there were two men in my squad, a big, strong, healthy guy, who was specifically designated to try to physically get somebody, and we had rehearsed this several times in the rear area, and it went pretty much the way we rehearsed it, and as soon as we got in there was a code word, like BINGO or something, and there was yelling, and all of us took off down the hill, and I had no squad, there was about eleven men, including myself, and we had these rally points, where we got certain places off the trail, where the men were dark, they were hard to find, stumble and fall all over. In fact, the land is very much, just like it is around here, around these mountains, and around Bogarde, and so forth, and just imagine taking off from your house, and going at night, cross country, over these hills and so forth, through the woods and the rocks, and it's very difficult.

And so, all the open areas, it didn't farm for so many of us, like rice paddies, when you got down from the hill, it was always open in the field, and you felt like you were out there, exposed on stage. But we got that Chinese soldier back, almost through our lines, and I shot that man, and nobody could stop his search, or pat him down, or anything, and he had a pistol, inside his, they had these padded uniforms, and inside his jacket, he had this pistol, and we stuck it in his mouth, and killed the trigger. And then we took his body on there, like proof of where we've been, and what we've done, and so then we turned that over to the, turned his body over to the Siam S2, the Atoll Control Center, and a couple of his men, came down there to meet our patrol, when they found out we had a pistol, and they took him back, and later we found out that he had like a belt, and I think he would carry a bandage, or first aid package, that he had to, filled with little pellets, which they told us later that, they're about the size of BBs, and those were some form of, I don't know if it was heroin, or what, but it was some drug, and we had heard from time to time, and this seems to confirm that, they kind of have an issue, just with the proof, and sometimes when they turn out on these,

on these waves, they acted like they were, you don't know whether they were, hyped up on some theological high, or what, that made us believe that they used drugs.

[Speaker 2]

So again they're not like suicide parties, are those? No,

[Speaker 1]

and the other thing was, that pistol was a Russell, which is a beautiful piece of equipment, and as far as weapons go, and it looked, it's the only one I've ever seen, but it looked very much like the German Luger, more commonly known to most Americans, from World War II, which was a pistol type, and that eventually came back, came to the possession of this soldier, who came in and physically grabbed this guy, and literally carried him and dragged him down the hill. The Chinese were tough, and there were all sorts of rumors, spread among the Turks, and it makes it easy to believe, you know, when you're scared of them, but there were rumors that the Chinese could see in the dark, we were always trying to defeat that idea, that, and that story would go around, about every two or three weeks, you'd hear again about how the Chinese could see in the dark, well, they probably did do better at that than we did, because they didn't have flashlights and candles, and when they, when they had been out there, and had their night vision established, they didn't, they didn't do things to destroy it, but they could not see in the dark, any better than Americans could, that was one of the, another thing that they did, in one place where we were, they had regular United States mailboxes, like a rural mailbox, standard, G.I.H. type, U.S. Post Office Supreme mailbox, or a wind post, and they put propaganda leaflets on it, and, so we, we ran into one of those one time, when I was on patrol, and we were, cleared, assumed that it was a booby trap, you know, as one opened it, so we, we eventually, sort of lassoed it, some common wire, telephone wire, and, knacked on the common wire, and took and rattled and everything, and nothing happened, and eventually, we tied a piece of common wire around a, a little handle up there, and got way back and filled it open, no explosion, but there were, in it were, there were a bunch of propaganda leaflets, it was near, near Christmas time, and, you know, there was a message, it was about, a couple of flags, and sweetheart get home, and here you are, far away on Christmas Day, but, you never, you know, you never really got to know that enemy very well, we, it was, it was a, very few prisoners ever taken, I mean, at that stage, it was very few prisoners, and everybody wanted them, all the commanders wanted, wanted prisoners, but the type of warfare just didn't lend itself to it, so, the Chinese, the Chinese were tough enemies, and, they did well this way, some of your other questions, if you wish, what were the living things, like berries, food, showers, change of clothes, and so forth, well, when, most of us when we went to Korea, had our, had our fatigues, and we had our name tags sewed on, we had your rank maybe sewed on, and stripes, well, after a short while in Korea, you, you soon lost those things, because, they had what they call shower points, well, point meaning a place, there were showers at a certain place, a point on the ground, and, to understand the, the vocabulary and the language, that you're going to a shower point, but, we tried to get our troops to a shower point, at least once a week, and, sometimes, we, maybe, depending on the circumstances, where we were, we might go back there twice a week, each infantry company had two, two and a half ton trucks, and one of them supposedly was a supply truck, and one was for the kitchen, a mess truck, and, these trucks, the mess truck was equipped with a big ring, over the, ring mounted machine gun, over the head, which, by that time, they never used, never, never used a kit like that in the back of the truck, most of the time, in fact, I, I took that machine

gun, and we were, trying to build, put it in my kitchen area, and we used it, we used it as a ground weapon there, the reason for that was because, by, by that time, the complete air superiority, I never saw, an enemy aircraft, never saw a fighter aircraft, now, that was a big difference from, from people who fought in the Pacific, people who fought in Europe, World War II, and people who fought in Korea, in the early days, but it's the kind of thing that, it was nice, not having enemy aircraft attacking you, on the other hand, the, it made the troops, less, security conscious, a little more careless, and surprisingly, it's just like, just like we have to kind of, kind of force people to wear seat belts in cars, we almost had to force the troops to wear their, their flak jackets, their armor vests, their fur coats, and their steel helmets, big old heavy steel helmets, and, we didn't wear them when we went out on patrol, because there were too noisy, too cumbersome, the other thing was, that big steel helmet, it was hard to hear from, when you wore your flak jacket, and, we, well, I kind of got away from that point, if you remember, the living conditions were, we were getting there in the daytime, when we weren't subjected to enemy air attacks, and people would lay out in the sunshine sometimes, you know, and, because most of our activity was done at night, we slept a lot in the daytime, and, when I, when I was on the front lines, soon later, going out on patrol, almost every night, we'd get back down, maybe at three o'clock in the morning, or four o'clock in the morning, and try to sleep a little later, you know, maybe seven o'clock or so, and then, as far as the living conditions, we had, we had five-gallon cans of water, and then we had to load those cans of water up the hill, and we had to, you know, parcel it out a little bit, but people would, would shave, I shaved almost every day, and, you had, you know, your drinking water, and then for your meal, usually we had the mess hall set up, somewhere in the company area, maybe down on the reverse slope of the hill, and you might have to go 200, 300 yards, maybe to get to it, but, ordinarily, you know, you'd have some sort of tent or something set up there, and, and the longer we stayed in some of these positions, the more refined those, those things became, and they were sandbagged in, and, in some cases, bunkers built, and, although the first sergeant in our company was killed in the mess area, before we went on down the hill, by a random enemy mortar round, this fire, which we called harassing an inhibition fire, one long round came out.

It just happened, it just happened to catch the first sergeant. I don't think anybody else was even wounded in that. But, along the trench line, we had these bunkers built, we had fabricated, like some poles, we used combo wire for everything over there.

You'd take these poles, the combo wire, and they'd round and round and round, and make a, you know, like a spring, not a spring, but like a platform, and, you'd lay your sleeping bag on the, on the platform and sleep, and, usually, we, we encouraged people to take their boots off at night, and, let their, let their feet dry out and breathe. We, go up in the morning and shave, and, usually the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, squad leaders at that time, would check all the men, every morning, and, try to make sure that they changed socks. You know, the foot inspection was not the most pleasant thing in the world, but it, but the truth was, you had to do it, because you'd just get, so lethargic, or lazy, or what the, they wouldn't change their socks or shoes, and, didn't want to take their boots off, in case something happened if they had them on, and, they'd rather sleep in at night, so, those were several things that were important, because there were a lot of people that, that had developed foot problems, either athletes could, or, and later in the wintertime, we got a, what we called a Mickey Mouse boot, it was a thermal boot, that's basically a rubber boot, that we'd use for, waiting, and, search for a job, or something like that, and, and they weren't

ventilated, and so all the moisture would collect in there, and you'd take your boot off, your socks were on, and where'd your feet are anyway, and, and that became worse for frostbite, because, there were people that actually had flesh that had come off the bone, and it just, deteriorated so bad, so, in the wintertime, we had, Lieutenant Petunia, who, got to, at one time, where we had to sign a certificate, that we expected the men's feet over, it was such a severe problem, other health problems, you know, I don't remember, bad cold, I don't remember, anything other than, almost everybody had, some kind of, fragmentation wound, or something, before the break, but I mean, as far as health, I, I remember one of my men being evacuated, because he had a, severe eye infection, and his eyes were all swollen up, and red, and bloodshot, but, but I don't even, I just don't recall, any real health problems, uh, back to, kind of watered away, back to the shower point, what would happen, when the, when you get on the, you walk down the, back of the hill, and get out somewhere, where you can load on a truck, and you take the truck up, a kitchen truck, or a truck would carry about, thirty men or so, like that at a time, who went, back three or four, five miles further, the engineers would set up, these shower points, and what it is, they had, they had the big pumps, that pumped out of strings, and into a, into a boiler type thing, where the water was heated, and then they had, just a string of showers, and had these in a tent, and uh, where you'd go in, and went into the tent, and you, and you uh, you kept your own belt, your own boots, and generally, your own hat, and everything else, you scooped up, and threw it in a, in a pile, and you carried your boots, and your, your belt, and your hat, and set it at the other end, of the tent, and you went in the showers, and showered, and at the other end, they had uh, big bins of, of underwear, and uh, you'd get your underwear, and a, and a pair of pants, and a jacket, somewhere near your size, but all those were custom, custom fitted, and everything sewn on, uh, were soon gone, and uh, nobody wanted to carry another one, you just, you just didn't want to be loaded down with, with clothing, so, probably average once a week, that you, that you really got to change, now you had, you had more underwear, you had a few sets of underwear, you used it up for a ring shoot, yeah, you just throw it in, and they, they ran a laundry, back in the rear quarterbacks, they ran a laundry, and they, they had these great big canvas laundry, uh, bins, and uh, you know, you'd hold up a pair, and hope that they weren't near the right side of the shorts, or something, the uh, the, the, the thing about the, about the, you got, when you got your fatigue, pants and jacket, and uh, and field jacket sometime in the winter, that they, they had, these 55 gallon drums, that uh, with solvent, with cleaning liquid, cleaning solvent, and they, they would uh, I'm told they just dump that in there, you know, swish it a couple times and hang it out, and it'll dry out, because a lot of times you had that strong solvent in your, in your clothes, I don't know, it was something else I forget what it was now, but there was always this danger of hemorrhagic fever. And rats, a lot of rats around the area.

And that was always a problem. We had to do a lot of sea rations for some of the community meals. And there was a constant battle with the troops not to throw their cans over the side of the hill or something, but to collect them all and bury them in a pit or somewhere there.

And try to maintain the sanitation of the air drains, and try to deal with the pain of everybody using the same hose everywhere. And we had these mortar rounds, or casings that carried around in tubes as they were called. And the colonel referred to it as fist tubes.

And they did a hole and stuck these tubes in and try to get it all used at the same place and then throw a little lime around it. So it was hard. With sanitation, there was a constant battle.

In the middle of the night, it's hard to get a guy to walk 50 yards in the middle of the night somewhere to find a tube to relieve himself. As far as recreational activities, when we were on the line, I can't really think of any recreational activities. There were a few portable radios.

And there was the Armed Forces Radio, AFN, Armed Forces Network. I think that every once in a while we might have gotten a few books. We had rations.

The rations were big and heavy, and almost like an orange crate sort of thing, wooden boxes. And I think sometimes we might have had some paperback books. I personally never got one.

But when we went off the hill and go back in the reserve area for a few days, then things changed. We'd shower every day. Sometimes we'd be right in one place.

We had a big camp right by a stream where everybody could swim. It was called Chipperoo. A little waterfall down there, a beautiful, beautiful location.

And we taught people to swim there. Surprisingly, the number of people who came down there did not know how to swim. And it surprised me that half the people out there did not know how to swim.

And we ran a swimming class when we were back there in the reserve one time. But everybody had volleyball. Every unit had a volleyball.

Somehow or the other, when we got in the reserve area, the Koreans loved volleyball. They were good volleyball players, too. And so that was easy.

I mean, it was easy to carry around a net and a ball and wait for the day. I don't remember any baseball or baseball gloves or any other sports activity. The only thing I remember was seeing football.

A lot of volleyball. And when we were in the reserve area, every battalion headquarters had their 16-millimeter movie camera. And we got a lot of film.

And so every night a battalion would show the film. And even when we were up online at battalion headquarters, they'd have movies. I don't remember if we ever had one in the company or not.

I just can't remember that. But I think that some of our men got back to the battalion from time to time to watch the movies in the evening. They showed them outside in the morning.

Mail was good. We got mail almost every day. As a matter of fact, one time we were on the unit I was in.

It was on Triangle Hill, which was the biggest fight we had while I was there. And our unit was up on top of that hill for four days at one time. We were the last unit there.

We didn't have to fight to take it. We got on the hill without fighting to take it. Those other Americans had already secured the hill.

But it was three straight nights. There were huge counterattacks and just intense firing. The company I was in, I think we had 17 killed.

We took a head count. In fact, I counted the men as we went up the hill. I checked off the roster.

201 men. And four days later when we were leaving, there were 61 of us that were still there that walked up the hill. A lot of those were not wounded too bad, but bad enough to have to be evacuated or to walk off, to walk back on their own, unaccompanied.

And during the time that we were up there, a male Red Cross worker came up on top of the hill. I couldn't believe it when I saw the guy. And what he had was these little packets of lightweight stationary and air made of almost paper thin.

And he came up and brought those. And it seems to me like he made it, brought our company, the people that were up there, he may have brought some mail with him. I'm uncertain about that now.

They're too many years. But I just remember the surprise that to see a Red Cross guy up there right in the middle of the fighting. And this gets back to the awards thing.

I've thought about this later. And that guy certainly should have received some kind of commendation for sure. I mean, it was also a discipline thing.

You know, if you've got 30 or 40 soldiers dug in along a line here somewhere and somebody sees something or thinks they see something or hear a noise, you don't want 40 people firing 100 rounds apiece. But it was a discipline, yeah, to be trained. The weapons were good.

The M1 rifle was the standard rifle at that time. And it weighed almost 10 pounds. It was pretty heavy, went around all the time.

It worked well. It was a semi-automatic rifle. A lot of old-timers like myself probably believe that a semi-automatic weapon is preferable to a fully automatic.

By the time we got to Vietnam, M-16s, you hear the expression, hose them down. And actually, that's literally what they did. They used that thing like it was a garden hose and fired hundreds of rounds right out of ammunition of earth.

I'm not saying that it's preferable to be able to take an aimed shot each time if you're in an ambush situation or something, but it's pretty easy to squeeze a trigger and let it go. The weapons.

[Speaker 2]

It's a three-round burst. Yeah. When I was in the Marines, this was a M-16.

We didn't even have a four-round burst. Because you couldn't just pull the trigger and fire it.

[Speaker 1]

Like the machine gun fire. I think with the machine gun, it was fire burst at six, as I recall.

How long were you in the Marines for?

[Speaker 2]

Four years.

[Speaker 1]

What kind of job?

[Speaker 2]

Communication. I was in communication. And then I was a Rock Ranger for a while in Japan.

The communications center wasn't very good. They found other things for me to do. Usually left the top rank.

[Speaker 1]

You know that Colonel Hunter here, Dave Hunter, lives here at Township. He's a retired Marine, too. We call him Colonel Hunter.

That's why I framed my Marines for reserve discharge up there because I was in his house. I said, if I go to the house one day, I'm going to show you something.

[Speaker 2]

You ever go to Camp Lejeune? Yes, sir. That's where I was.

I was there for two years in April.

[Speaker 1]

Oswego Beach? What's the name of the beach?

[Speaker 3]

Oslo.

[Speaker 1]

Oslo Beach. I took my one summer camp with the reserve. We went to Camp Lejeune in 1948, I guess.

How was it? Battery. C-battery.

First one on the pile. How was your retirement? I thought our weapons were reliable.

That was the answer to the question. I'm not aware. I don't remember any problems that we ever had because of weapon malfunction.

That is because of something wrong with the weapon. There were times when the M-1, when I had to change that clip, we had to change it pretty often. It was not easy.

You had to hold the bolt back and push down with your thumb. A lot of people, the M-1 thumb, a lot of people, particularly if you were under stress and you were arrested of some kind, the loading was not easy, not simple, but the weapon had to be maintained. That was probably true of all of us.

I don't know how many of you were in Marine Corps, but at the platoon level in 1951 or 1952, in the rifle platoon, we had something called a PRC-10. It was a new radio that came out. It was about that long, about 4-inch square, and it was an improvement.

The other radio prior to that time that the platoon leader had was SCR-300. That was Signal 4 Radio 300. It had a battery pack.

As I recall, the battery and the radio together weighed about 60 pounds. So your radio operator was generally the one that carried it out of the job. The battery had to be charged up periodically, sort of like a controlling motor battery or maybe a little heavier.

But it really was. Because it was so heavy, it was just not adequate to take on patrols, but it was too heavy and burdensome. So we had these PRC-10s that was better.

It was a little walkie-talkie. But again, it was nothing like what they had used. Last summer, I was up at the 4th level with the Blue Union, and they put on a number of entries and demonstrations.

It was unbelievable. Everybody's got a radio on them. Everybody's got a radio on them, and it might be a whole different set of problems to deal with and maintenance and everything.

When you asked this question, did you recall the rate of fire during combat?

[Speaker 2]

We had a gentleman from the University of Tennessee who got the feeler that they had at the Center for the Study of Society and War. I don't know exactly. But he came and talked to our class in this modern university about that.

And he seems to be under the impression that not everybody fires their weapon when in combat situations.

[Speaker 1]

Well, that's probably true.

[Speaker 2]

Pertaining, the question has to do with that and the reasons in here, so we may jug in.

[Speaker 1]

When we talk about the rate of fire, I think in terms of how many rounds a minute you're firing.

[Speaker 2]

That's what I believe.

[Speaker 1]

We're talking about Korea here, so I'll make my comments in that time, in those conditions, as opposed to what might be somewhat different than what it was in Vietnam. In Korea, almost always when we were, at the time when I was there, almost always when we made contact, you were going up a hill. You were always trying to take the high ground.

The enemy was always on the high ground, or else you were defending the high ground. My personal experience was that the most aggressive soldiers, the ones who moved up the hill most quickly and were up front with survivors, that more casualties occurred from those who were hanging back. Now, that's not a direct response to this, because if you, you know, it's pretty hard to dress right and keep the line of dress going up the hill when you're in attack.

But some people hit the ground much quicker than others, and some will stay there longer than others. The Chinese, particularly, I've seen a Chinese soldier stand up and throw five grenades at one time. They had these wooden handles, and they had these strings.

And he would throw a whole handful at one time. He'd have a string around each finger and thumb. Fortunately for us, their quality control of the production of grenades was terrible.

I had been hit in the head with a grenade right on the forehead. One time, I had my little second lieutenant fire on a soft cap when it hit, and it drove those clutches into my head. I quit wearing that fire after that.

I've had grenades fall at my feet and split open like two halves of an egg. I've seen them explode. They were where they exploded so much that there was nothing left, and it was just like blowing sand back to my legs, even though a lot of those little marks are on them.

But sometimes their grenades were effective. And what would happen is they'd throw the grenades, and the grenades didn't roll down the hill. And their grenades, you know, our hand grenades have a certain exposure, I mean, a time that the, from the time a striker hits it, you know, whatever it was, I don't know, two and a half seconds or I've forgotten now.

But anyway, from the time it's armed, you have about two seconds or something. A Chinese grenade may go off immediately, and one may go off half a minute later, you know, or something. Well, the people who were further down the hill were catching all the grenades flat.

The same thing was true of our own grenades that we threw. If we threw them up the hill and didn't get them up far enough or didn't get them up into the trench or whatever, you had the danger of your own grenades rolling back, and that happened. And I told you about these, these rations and PX items, stuff that come in these little orange crates, like we should take those crates and cut little strips of wood maybe six or eight inches long and tie, like an X, tie it around a grenade and throw them so that the grenade would not roll back.

I don't know if you know, but a rifle grenade, when we had the M1 rifle, I don't know if we have it in the service now, but we had the M1 rifle, you had a grenade launcher you could put on the end of the rifle. We also had a little booster round that looked like about a \$45 pistol round. It wasn't, but I mean, that booster round that you fired with your rifle and you

put your rifle butt on the ground and you estimated the angle and so you had like a little hand-held mortar is what the effect of it was.

Well, we did the same thing with those rifle grenades. We used these strips of wood, you know, about an inch wide, about 3-4-inch wide, about 8-10 inches long, and tie them with common wire and fire it like that. And then they would hit and they couldn't roll.

It was kind of an awkward looking thing, but it worked.

[Speaker 2]

But the rate of fire, I believe, the point that he was trying to make in that question, I think like he was saying 13 people in the squad, he's saying like two of those people in the squad hardly ever even fired those up.

[Speaker 1]

That probably happens. I'm not, I just don't know. I know that when we were on patrol and if we got in a firefight, I believe that most people, because we're always a small number, one squad or less usually, but I think probably everybody pretty well fired them.

When we were on Triangle Hill and our numbers got smaller and smaller and we ran out of ammunition several times, there were certainly some people who were a lot more firing than others. My platoon sergeant was, he was actually thrown off the hill with a mortar round. And so my assistant platoon sergeant, I mean, John Follett from Louisiana, he's a pretty strong guy, but I had him do another distributing, three distributing ammunition.

And so my platoon area on Triangle Hill had about a 40-yard sector that was very close to the hill. And that's all he did was, just when everybody was wounded or somebody was leaving or whatever, he'd collect the ammo and try to get it out, get it spread back out. In that case, there was probably about, let's see, I'm out in the tent, I'm trying to think.

Probably only about 13 or 14 others left by the end of that night there. So that was the most intense period of combat that I've seen. You know, about three or four days ago, the rest was periodic patrols and, you know, ambushes, you set up an ambush or something.

Later, later some of our units had to, we had to fight against on Porkchop Hill and that got real, real active. But I wasn't too many of them up there on the field at that. Well, I don't know.

I don't know about, but I think I've heard that too, that not everybody fires. And I know there's some people that had to be kicked in the butt to get them to move on up the hill. And I'm assuming if they weren't moving up the hill, they probably weren't firing because they'd be firing at one of their own soldiers in front of them or something.

So what do you think about the quality of leadership and who were the real leaders or officers, NCOs or enlisted men? Well, that probably changed as the fighting went on. There were, when I got there, I had an outstanding Lieutenant Sergeant, but he'd been there for some time.

And he'd been in Korea back in 48, 49 and peacetime. So he was an experienced soldier. By 1952, most of your platoon sergeants and your squad leaders, E-5s, E-6s, some of them had been in the Army six months or less.

And in Korea, at the time I got there, you could get a promotion every 30 days. The company commander had promotion authority up to a certain rank, I think. The company commander could promote up to maybe E-5.

And I think the battalion could promote up to E-6. I think it took the division to promote to E-7. I know that when we came on Klamath Hill, my company commander, he was a captain.

And a real one of the finest combat leaders, he was one of the finest I ever saw in the Army. And I still stay in touch with him. He goes down to Myrtle Beach, and we talked for a time.

His name was Shepard Booth. And Shep Booth was, he knew how to do everything. If you had a question about anything, you could ask him.

Whether it was map reading, or borders, or booby traps, or whatever. He just seemed always to know the right thing. And he followed the textbook pretty much.

I mean, he gave much more formal orders to the rest of the team leaders than most companies did, I think. And he sort of went by the book. He went down the line.

You know, he'd state the mission very clearly. He didn't always need the mission stated, but he always did. He said exactly what it was.

I had one squad leader who was an outstanding squad leader, a sergeant named Andrew Webb. And he had been in Korea for some time. He was the only guy that I can remember personally that I think loved the war.

He loved it. And he was a good squad leader. He had a firm grip on everything going on in the squad.

And they were well trained. And he kept them checked up where they were supposed to be. The other squad leaders were...

brilliant experience, let's put it that way. You weren't going to get a whole lot of initiative. They did what they were told to do.

And it was sort of like the blind leading the blind. There was a great shortage. The same way when these NCOs came back like the full Jackson.

They'd come back to Rio with E-5 or E-6 and be put in there in the train companies. And thank God for the old heads that had been around there a while because a lot of them had very limited experience, very limited knowledge. They got promoted because they were there and they lived, not because of the leadership of Douglas.

Team leaders did the bulk of the patrolling when I was there. Usually second lieutenant team leaders. And they either got experienced or they got killed.

Most of those I knew I thought were pretty good. The attitude was good. The company I was in, I was the only OCS grad.

All the other three were, the other three, the team leaders were OTC grads. Mr. Jeff Morgan was one. He graduated from Old Town.

In Old Town, University of Maine. He was a weapons team leader. Graduated from New Mexico.

And I see him periodically. He was a really good weapons team leader. He was gunnery.

At that time the weapons company had 360mm mortars. I think there were five men in each crew. And three 57mm reclosed rifles.

And there were five men in each of those crews. Incidentally, those usually were, the reclosed rifles were usually attached to a platoon or put in some sort of a regular platoon. I had the same 57mm reclosed rifle.

Private Mabel would come up to me. Although the team leader was a lieutenant colonel. Their day-to-day life was the same.

All five were Puerto Ricans. But they trained together. And they spoke Spanish all the time.

But they did the job pretty well. I had enough schoolboy Spanish. So the leadership, leadership was a little shaky.

And again, this rotation policy was great for the individual. For the unit, it probably wasn't so good. Because by the time you got a guy that had six months in the country, he's at this time got 24 points or so.

And they're getting reluctant to go on patrols. They're getting reluctant to stick their head out too much. And they start thinking about when they're going to rotate.

So, it had its adverse effects. It was nice to know that you weren't there for the duration of the war. As opposed to what people in World War II have been doing.

But it had its shortcomings too. Basically, if you had a combat rifle, you had nine months. If you think of that, turnover was just constant.

And it's hard to even remember everybody's names. Well, I remember most of the names of the men I was training. Pretty well.

I had a lot of black and white pictures that I took and sent back to my wife. So, a number of them, I wrote the name on the back. So that helped keep me fresh in my mind.

I'll put it this way. By the time I went to Vietnam, I'd just been promoted to the Pentagon. And a whole different ballgame.

I was in the Navy, which was kind of different. So, I was flying in a little bit different counties. It was kind of warfare.

I didn't, I mean, I made a lot of flights out into the landing zones. And I picked up people and that sort of thing. But I wasn't out on the ground, like I was in Korea.

It was a different, a whole different thing. A whole different set of circumstances required a whole different approach to how you did things. But I will say this.

The combat experience for the Army, when they started building up the Army Aviation Program, the first priority for people to go to flight school were the combat experience classes in Korea. And I fell in love with going to flight school in 1956. And, I think I was a much better aviator and a much better aviation commander because I had about six flights in Korea with two pilots on board.

And I never get to see anything. I only get to see, if I was at 80,000 feet, you're supposed to take control of everything. I remember those days.

So, the leadership, I mean, you know, the leadership, I would say probably like the officers that came from OCS were better prepared than the officers that came from college. They had had more, you know, I think it helps if you've had KP duty and you ever had to, you know, you ever had to clean out the grease trap one time or things like that. You don't have to do it every day.

You only have to do it once before you have an appreciation for what the troops are going to do. And the ROTC grads generally didn't have that kind of experience. So, it weren't that they weren't as good as the people, but it took them longer because they had more lessons to learn.

And because with a short, you know, relatively short period you stay in the country, like I thought I was a junior for about three months. when the captain left the company, he went back to take over head of the war company. So, I was the acting company commander for about, I don't know, 10 days or two weeks or something.

They had some captains coming from the states that were being assigned to all the companies and they had to make calendars. I was the junior lieutenant in the company, but when we got ready to go on final hill the company commander announced the chain of command. And, I was second in command.

So, I mean, that was, that was, I think, recognition of the fact that I was OCS by the way. I think he had issued a command. As to whether the officers or NCOs or enlisted men were bad at best, I think that the more senior, the more senior NCOs were better leaders.

And the youngest, and the younger officers were the ones that I, during the time of counter warfare we were conducting then, it was young officers who were actually in contact with the enemy. You know, I never saw a captain go out in trouble. So, that doesn't, doesn't reflect that they weren't good leaders.

Just at the leadership level that I observed, it was the platoon leaders and the platoon sergeants who really had to be good leaders. That's where the, the on the ground decisions were being made at the time the fight was going on. I was lucky I had a good one.

We still get together too. There was a question about violence directed against officers. Heard a lot about this in Vietnam.

and I'm sure that there was, there had to be enough of that. It couldn't have all been made up. But, some of that, some of that I think was ballooned up with some of the movies that were made about Vietnam.

I, I didn't go see any of them for a long time. Finally, when this movie, the platoon came out, it was supposed to be like a documentary. So, this is the most I could, I went to see that and I was disgusted with it.

My wife and I went out, I was so mad. First of all, I don't like the F word. I don't use it.

I don't think most soldiers use it in their everyday language, day in and day out all the time. That, that was so artificial that it was, when they promoted that as being like a documentary, I said, no wonder, no wonder the public doesn't, doesn't support our effort in Vietnam. Because it's not, it's not the truth.

It's not the real story. But some of that happens. Some of those things happen.

I heard, I heard in Korea once or twice about that somebody had made a threat against a platoon leader or something like that. I never personally, ever, I'm not aware of it. You know, these are some little things that go, you know, that lieutenant, we're in the company, we're going to get one of these days or something.

But I, I never saw that. I never threatened, I never felt threatened and I never had any occasion to, to anybody in our company that I know of that ever underwent anything like that. My platoon sergeant did tell me after we, after we'd become, had worked together for a while that, that he had had about three platoon leaders that were greener than grass and said they didn't know, you know, they didn't know diddly.

But that didn't mean that anybody was going to shoot him or throw a grenade at him. So I, no, I never heard, I'm really not, I never, I never personally heard or experienced any violence directed against any officer, no. Of course, on account of that it would have been something of my own, I guess.

Not, I mean, I don't mean to shoot him or anything, but I mean, anger-wise, I guess. But we had a, we had a major assigned as a company commander in our battalion because he'd never been a platoon leader and never been a company commander in any, he was on the list of people to move when we came from and the division commander assigned him down to take over heat company and put us under him for a time, which he did for about three weeks and then he destroyed the lieutenant colonel and he went on to command the 1st Battalion. That was not a happy shift at 1st Battalion, he was one of the most he had classmates at that time.

But I, I really was critical of some things he did because my platoon tied in with the platoon from the company he was commanding and we had a we had a common area that the two where they went out through the barbed wire and breaking the barbed wire and all that. I didn't know anything you know and I knew it all. I'd been there a month.

The information on no gun raid according to that officer's order to killing a civilian we never received any orders of that sort and I was never faced with that. I was never in a position where I was where civilians were involved in combat where we were. So I mean I it there was never any any reason.

However, I know from from films that I'd seen and training that I'd had at Benning some of the stuff that I saw at Benning before we went to Korea. I don't know whether it was no gun raid or not but I mean I'm aware of the fact that the North Koreans wore white white receipts white white-colored uniforms and that and that they mingled in with civilians and looked at the violation of international law where military personnel could go to their clothing you know in the North but they didn't observe international law anyway and I can I can understand the necessity of that and I understand what happened and I don't feel like any apologies in order to leave it there. You know if you can't recognize the enemy you know we've we've fought a couple of wars now and and in all appearances you can't you know you can't tell by looking whether a guy is a North Korean or a South Korean or a civilian or military because he's not in uniform and by the same token in Vietnam they had the same problem and we do know that in Vietnam I mean I am aware of many circumstances in Vietnam where civilians were some young really young little bitty kids that were involved like the gas intake on a helicopter in the U.S. about the Soviet Union and a

[Speaker 3]
grenade

[Speaker 1]
was put in there very nicely and black gray or black friction tape placed around the grenade and pulled the pin out takes about 20 minutes for it to eat through the dissolved the sticker on the on the tape and then it looks good and that was being done in Vietnam for a while I couldn't figure out what was happening to the helicopter the rope sitting on the ramp shortly after takeoff like little kids the little kids were doing that and I'm not to survey it because I didn't know what was going on and I what was on and and I I don't know what on couldn't it

[Speaker 2]
I military and

[Speaker 1]
got a letter I said that MacArthur was wrong, and I felt that Truman was right, and I firmly believe that the civilian elected officials are absolutely, must be in control of the military, and never is the military in control of our country's national policies and everything, and I believe that before I ever came in the Army, and I still believe that, and I think MacArthur made serious judgmental errors, and I think he was very poorly informed, and I've heard through the years in the Army, of course and so forth, that he made a mistake in that he kept the same group of staff officers, pretty much nucleus that he had had from World War II, and they were all part of his team and his family, and they were all scared to death to tell him no on anything, or give him any bad news, and he was sadly misinformed about the Chinese capability and everything, I think, and in all probability, and I really believe this, but had we gone on at that time, we would have assumed in World War II, as a Russian guy, the best we could have been, but he was wrong, and he was rude to the President, inexcusable, and then

when the President got him in Hawaii, he wasn't really, you know, on anything. So, I don't know what to tell you professors here at MacArthur. MacArthur has some supporters, you know, and we just went through this, one of the guys in my OCS class served on MacArthur in Japan, and we had a discussion about this in Dallas a couple of weeks ago.

He said, well, Prince had never played MacArthur, he was a real hero, you know, real heroes just come and go, you know, quit while you're ahead.

[Speaker 2]

Can you give an answer to that question? Because their brains were scarce, and all love for MacArthur, and hatred for Truman, and William Tinsley gave an equal amount of respect to both of them.

[Speaker 1]

Well, I didn't read that far, but all you've got to do is look south of the border down there and see what happened to the militaries, or even last week in China. You know, that was my concern during this time, that the Chinese military, that the civilian government got scared of the military in that situation. Even if the President of this country is not one that you voted for when you want to see, you know, he is still the elected official.

In my opinion, you've got to respect that. You have to be supportive of the President of this country. Not even argue with him.

[Speaker 2]

It's a tough picture in those little channels of man. That's right. Bill Clinton up there, as well as everybody else.

[Speaker 1]

Yep. Make you sick sometimes. Made me sick, but anyway.

How was I welcomed when I came home? Well, my company commander, Shep Booth, who later came back to the time as the S3, and our retired executive officer, Major John Hay, and I all stayed an extra five or six weeks in Korea, and we all came home together. And we all came home on the same ship to Seattle.

And then Major Hay went his way in Shep Booth, and I went to New York and met our wives that we had arranged previously with to meet us in New York. And so we had a very nice welcome in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. And I came on home to Hopewell, Virginia, and Shep Booth went on to his home.

And my mother and my stepfather and my sister were all very glad to see me home, and I don't think anybody else ever knew I'd been gone. The public sure held it. There was no parade.

Really, it was pretty quiet, pretty unnoticed. While I was in Korea, I had letters from two of my schoolteachers, one who had taught music in school and was a choir director, and I'd sung in a school chorus and enjoyed that. And the other was my football coach, who by that time was down at VMI.

And I played for him in high school, and I went to VMI to play football before I went up there with him. And he wrote to me while I was in Korea. And otherwise, except for family members, nobody knew or cared, I don't think.

And one thing about it, too, was the timing, the timing that we were there. And I've just read, I'm working on something else, on another project entirely, with a boy, a civilian whose father was in the 7th Infantry Division in Korea. And his father lived, I mean, he lived a number of years after Korea.

He never talked about Korea until he got really ill, sort of before he died, he started telling all these stories. He was on trial until the 31st Infantry Division. And so this young man was now an investment banker, and he was printing up all this stuff.

And he sent out a survey and asked lots of questions. And he's read all the books that have been written about Korea, and he sent some excerpts from them. Well, I do feel this.

The population in large part of the country was free and warm. Family members were, of course. But as the war went on, after things could restart, the scale made, which it really did.

It was like French warfare, World War I. You know, we had trenches, Chinese had trenches. Well, they dug better than we did.

They dug them deeper, they dug more of them, and they dug caves. And they had thousands where we had hundreds. We didn't know that until we were patient.

I knew that after trying it again. And it just kept coming out, coming out like ants coming out of antlers. But as far as the public was concerned, as far as the reporters and everything concerned, after it hit this low in Korea and they were looking for the armistice, for peace talks, I think there was a tendency not to rock the boat.

Well, that tendency came all the way down the chain of command and all the way up the chain of command. The tendency was to kind of keep it quiet. Well, this Triangle Hill, the actual name of that operation was Operation Showdown.

And the theory behind it was that they thought there would be an armistice, but there would be peace talks. And they thought that it would be in the best interest of South Korea. South Korea, as I mentioned, would be on that high ground, and Triangle Hill and some other hills formed there.

And then there was a wide valley, and then there was more hills. And they just thought that in the long run, the country would be in South Korea's best interest. Well, that's a simplified version, I would guess.

But nobody wanted to go back into full-scale war. Well, this Triangle Hill was planned by the Corps commander. I mean, the theory of it.

And he got approval from the United Nations Command for doing it. And they thought that Triangle Hill, the conference there, could be taken with maybe one or two battalions of young people. Well, that's, again, a case of radically underestimating the situation, knowing what the other stuff was.

And so when they started taking casualties, then they started catching fire. I think, in support of it, it's a personal thing, but I think that there was almost ready to pull the rug out from the people who were there, if you can, to hold us down to the point. Well, even the military people were there.

I read a book by Col. Lloyd Moses, the commander of 3rd Corps infantry, and his book seemed to be a little bit self-serving. But I guess he was telling us as he saw it, I felt like we were shortchanged.

Like the unit that I was in, I never had a tail end on Triangle. A lot of things had happened that nobody's written about. I mean, Triangle Hill, they talked about all the casualties, how bad it was.

But there were other little things happening along with it that were never mentioned in any official reports at that moment. I mean, little individual tales of some outstanding activities on parts of some small units, small special ops types of troops, like a little bit of range of the 10th Regiment to get some planes, and there was a lot of—never did mention anything. And even the book published by the Department of Military History, the VA, and so forth.

They told a lot of details up to a certain point, and then it just sort of petered out. I think they're glad to be rid of it. So I may have a little bit of a bitterness feeling about that, that like everybody didn't get recognition or credit for what they did, and it was a miserable damn place to go and fight for your country.

I mean, the records have to—they're just kind of, toward the end, have just got to be sort of the bitter taste of their life now, you know, all the public and the reporters and whatever. But just now, beginning to get some attention like that, you know, that was really the word, that there was a— that was the thought of police action, that there was a bona fide war, and the men and the women who fought in it fought just as hard and just as valiantly as they did in any other war they ever had, and they were quite—they were never quite recognized. Although I don't know they ever said they're good at the recognition, but still, if you play football or basketball or baseball or write an article or whatever, I'm sure you can do a good job like this man in the back here.

What type of work did I do when I came home? Well, I stayed in the career army. Then I—after I got out of the army, I taught Army ROTC in high school for seven years in Tennessee.

Then I retired completely, moved up to Virginia on Chesapeake Bay, lived back near my wife and my home, and played golf for six months, and then was hired as the town manager. I was town manager of a little town, Kilmarnock, Virginia, for a couple of years, and decided if I was going to work full-time, I ought to do something that made a little more money than that. And so I got into the country club business, managing country clubs, and I went back to Knoxville, Tennessee, where I—that's where I retired from the army.

I was on the Army ROTC faculty at the University of Tennessee. And as Americans like to put names to everything, you know, stereotype and whatnot, when I was at the University of

Tennessee, I was the number two rank. But they didn't want to call you a professor of military science, because that was not politically correct at the time.

So I had a title as the director of Army Military— Director of Army Instruction, something like that. And—but while we were doing that in Knoxville, we moved up to a brand-new development, golf course, country club development. And I later went back there and managed that for a few years, and then I moved on over to Memphis to manage the country club in Memphis.

It's a big club. We had the whole course in pro-am—I mean, a professional tour. So we moved up there.

You know, Danny found us in a new practice, and I had a heart attack while I was there, and it started to slow down a little bit. So we came to Conestoga, where we had been visiting my wife's sister and brother, and we clubbed ourselves down. I left a little weekend getaway place up here in the early 70s, and we kept coming here regularly.

Came up here to look about buying property. Found out that they were looking for a manager. I talked to them.

They hired me. I came here and took about a 50% cut in pay and about a 50% cut in the hours that I worked, and we were both happy with that. And I agreed to work for three years.

So I worked on—in 1962. And I got started on social security, and I always thought I would end up working for the next three years here. Once they had found a replacement, they wanted to hire me.

So I worked here four years. I retired in September of 1962. So it was a good life.

It was a good life. Just a note about family. I was born in Dent, Virginia, September the 20th, 1929.

I was raised in several states. My father worked for Hercules Powder Company, and during World War II was transferred several times in conjunction with his work in either building or operating gunpowder plants. I went to school in—started school in first grade in Virginia, went to school in West Virginia, Wisconsin, Illinois, and back to Virginia.

And while we lived in Wisconsin, I went to a military academy, Roosevelt Military Academy in Aledo, Illinois, for two years, my junior—sophomore and junior years in high school. Moved back to Virginia. I enlisted in the United States Marine Corps Reserve and spent a year, one summer camp training in the reserve.

Then I entered the Virginia Military Institute, and I had finished one year at VMI when the Korean War started. I was attending summer school and heard the announcement on the radio and listening to Opera Godfrey's program. Instead of driving to my home, I was en route back from school in Richmond, Virginia at that time, and I drove down to the post office, saw the recruiting sergeant, and enlisted in the Army.

That took a couple of months before I could get my discharge from the Marine Corps Reserve before I finally actually entered active duty about the 1st of September of 1950. I enlisted in the Army as a regular Army enlisted man, as a private, K-grade E1. That took 16 weeks of basic training in Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

Then I went to an enlisted leadership school at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Then I went to Infantry Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, where we started the second Officer Candidate class after the Korean War started. About 103 or 104 started, and about 52 or 53 graduated.

That was in August of 1951. I was in Dallas the week before last for our 50th anniversary of that group. There were 19 of my fellow graduates there and their wives.

An interesting little sidelight to that group is that of all of those who are living and have been to the reunion, everyone is still in their first and only marriage, which we thought was some sort of achievement, maybe achievement on the part of the wife where the patient couldn't do it. I was, I guess, about 20 years old when I entered military service. I had good training, very good training at Fort Jackson, basic training we trained on at that time, something like 28 different infantry weapons.

You took the different kinds of machine guns and rifles and grenade launchers and recoilless rifles and mortars. And we had all of those types of weapons in Korea. I mention that because with that number of weapons in an infantry regiment, that meant that almost all of them were a different kind of ammunition, which meant the resupply and carrying the ammo and having it in the right amounts at the right places at the right times where it took them.

The Army since that time has seemed to reduce drastically the number of weapons that they have in addition to most of the things that they use. The training in the Infantry Officer Candidate School at that time lasted six months. It was intense training, hard physically, a lot of knife training, a lot of physical training, more weapons training, then those small unit leadership tactics, nothing but chemical warfare, booty traps, mines and grenades.

Just more intense training, basically, than what we had in basic training with the addition of the leadership classes. And that, too, was good training, good instructors. By that time, we already had people who had been involved in the war in Korea, and so they were pretty highly motivated as instructors, and that helped me as a student.

You've asked what my understanding of communism is. Well, I was pretty well informed about it. As a matter of fact, the year 1949 and 50, when I was a freshman at the General Military Institute, we had the former Prime Minister of Russia during the Russian Revolution in 1917, Mr. Alexander Kerensky taught a six-week course at the General Military Institute called The Power Potential of Russia, and in that he discussed a great deal about the Communist philosophy and authority to which he was now strongly opposed.

So I think we were pretty well informed about the Communist movement. I am one of those who believe that our intervention in the Korean War was a legal requirement by our treaty arrangement. I think it was the proper decision.

In retrospect, I think we failed to prosecute that war adequately. I think we failed to bring to bear all the power that this nation had as far as the economics and the industrial capability and the military capability, and I think this was a direct reflection of the lack of full public support for our effort in Korea. Having been recently through World War II, there was just no enthusiasm for what we were doing and a lot of criticism going into Korea.

I personally believe, and I still believe this to this day, that we pretty well stopped what was commonly referred to as the domino effect of communism. We had moved from one nation to the other. I believe that would have happened all across Southeast Asia had we not intervened.

So as one who has been there, I enjoy being there, but I think it was the right and proper thing to do. You've asked where I landed in Korea and my impressions of it. Well, I flew from the United States to Japan.

I went to a chemical biological warfare school in Japan for ten days before being further assigned to Korea. There was a fear at that time that there might be some sort of chemical warfare, biological warfare maybe, and I'm happy to say that didn't occur, but it was enough to scare you a little bit. And then we went by ship from Japan to the port of Busan, Korea.

It was a 24-hour overnight night trip by ship in a terrible storm. Not everybody got seasick. So when we landed in Busan, it was not a very happy period.

We were briefed by the military police officers there in Busan and the officers were issued M2 carbines, that's a fully automatic carbine, and ammunition, and there were mostly enlisted troops. I'm not sure how many officers, but anyway, I was one of those that was issued a carbine and told that we would be on this train trip north in Korea and to be alert for enemy guerrilla activity and all that sort of thing. So it was a pretty nervous ride north.

We later found out that that's the way the MPs amused themselves, I think, because we saw no guerrilla or no effects of it and suffered no hostile acts for the next couple of days. It was a very uncomfortable train ride. My impression of the South Korean people is pretty limited from at least the Korean experience because I had very little contact with them.

By the time I got to Korea, which was again in September of 1952, there had been a relatively quiet period all across the front. The troops' living conditions resembled something like from World War I. There was a series of trenches and there were crock stoves and there were bunkers that had been, in many cases, had been reinforced with logs and sandbags and we spent a great deal of our time working on improving fortifications and trying to get the trenches deep enough to walk in and deep enough to carry a litter through if necessary, I think.

So the civilians were behind what was referred to as the farm line and I believe there was a 25-mile, they were required to be 25 miles away.