Guide to the Factions of the Syrian Civil War

(now with an update log!)

by Bulbajer

Wordpress … Facebook … Twitter

with much help from Sol

Other sources and resources used: Syria Research Group (@void_xeroxed, Šerif Imamagić, Ryan O'Farrell, Hasan Mustafa, Alexander Killian, Ömer Özkizilcik, Noor Nahas, Vince Beshara, Abdulelah, Hampton Stall, Yazid_Umayya, shaikh, Abdulrhman al-Masri, revolutionfarsi, Sol, LaLaKdaho, Abu Omar al-Shami, Tristan Sloughter, Ayman al-Das, Desert Fox Reporting, Wyvern, Omar al-Addem, Jens Hittrien, Yalla Souriya, Eray, DrThrax123, john_locke_next_02),

Wikipedia, Syria in Crisis (Carnegie Middle East Center), Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi’s blog, Al-Monitor, Syria Comment, Jihadology, Hasan Mustafa’s blog, Charles Lister’s Twitter, Thomas van Linge’s Twitter, this collaboration between @void_xeroxed and Ryan O’Farrell, Hassan Hassan’s Twitter, Rao Komar’s Twitter, Henry Leconte’s Twitter, MENAConflict’s Twitter, Alexander McKeever’s Twitter, Jihad Intel (Middle East Forum), Syrian Rebellion Observatory, Syria Direct,  /r/syriancivilwar,  /u/flintsparc, /u/wiki-1000, Google/Google Images/Google Translate, YouTube

Last updated: June 29, 2024

Political factions

Government and supporters

Opposition

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava)

Military factions

Government and supporters

Opposition

Islamic State

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava)

Notable former groups

Notable regional alliances (operations rooms)

Political factions

• Government and supporters 

• National Progressive Front (ruling coalition)

• Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party – Syria Region

Ideology: Assadist neo-Ba’athism (personalism, Arab nationalism, authoritarianism, Alawite favoritism, socialism (nominally)). The original Ba’ath Party split in 1966 between the Syrian and Iraqi branches. The Assadist (pro-Syrian) and Saddamist (pro-Iraqi) movements have little ideological differences, but their rivalry has been fierce. The Syrian Ba’ath has ruled Syria since 1963; the Assad family has led the party since 1970.

• Arab Socialist Union Party of Syria

Ideology: Nasserism

• Syrian Communist Party (Bakdash)

Ideology: Stalinism. The original SCP split in 1986 over the issue of perestroika, with the SCP-B being opposed to it.

• Syrian Communist Party (Unified)

Ideology: Leninism. aka Syrian Communist Party (Faysal). This was the pro-perestroika faction of the split.

• Socialist Unionist Party

Ideology: Nasserism. Split from the Ba’ath Party in 1961.

• National Covenant Movement

Ideology: Arab nationalism, socialism. Split from the Arab Socialist Movement.

• Syrian Social Nationalist Party

Ideology: Greater Syria (incorporation of wider Levant region, especially Lebanon and Palestine, into Syria), Syrian nationalism (historically ultranationalism), left-leaning economics, Christian interests, anti-Semitism. It has its own militia (see Nusur al-Zawba’a). Historically suppressed by various Syrian governments, it began reconciling with the government under Hafez al-Assad and was fully legalized in 2005.

• Arab Socialist Movement (pro-government faction)

Ideology: Arab nationalism, socialism. Founded in 1950, it was an early rival to the Ba’athists, though much smaller. It merged into the Ba’ath in 1953 but split in 1963. In 1972 it joined the ruling National Progressive Front, leading to a split. Another faction of the party supports the opposition (see its entry in the opposition section). In recent years the pro-government faction has lost representation in the legislature, but it continues to identify with the National Progressive Front. Two armed groups are led by members of the party: the Tribal Fighters Forces and the Zilal Groups.

• Arab Democratic Union Party

Ideology: Nasserism. Split from the Arab Socialist Union Party of Syria in 1981. Like the Arab Socialist Movement, it is no longer represented in the government.

• Democratic Socialist Unionist Party

Ideology: Nasserism, democratic socialism? Split from the Socialist Unionist Party in 1974. Another party that has lost representation in recent years.

• Popular Front for Change and Liberation

The officially-sanctioned opposition to the government. Formed in 2012. Currently only one known affiliate:

• People’s Will Party

Ideology: Leninism. Expelled from Syrian Communist Party (Bakdash) under allegations of Trotskyism. Originally known as the National Committee for the Unity of Syrian Communists. Led by Qadri Jamil, who is seen as very close to Russia. It signed an agreement with the National Coordinating Committee (see opposition section) in 2014.

• Syrian Social Nationalist Party - al-Intifadah

Ideology: (see original SSNP entry). Split from the original SSNP in 1957. This faction is more critical of the government and is close to Russia. Helped create the Popular Front for Change and Liberation in 2012 but left in 2014 to support Assad’s re-election. Unknown if the SSNP-I has any seats in parliament.

• Social Democratic Unionists

Ideology: Social democracy, Arab nationalism (presumably). It was part of the ruling NPF but has lost representation in recent years and may no longer exist.

• Syrian National Youth Party

Ideology: pro-democracy. Has a militia that has been accused of lawlessness and has clashed with the YPG.

• Democratic Arab Solidarity Party

Ideology: Arab nationalism, pro-democracy. Considered part of the Russian-backed “opposition”.

• Palestinian Democratic Party

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism, anti-Zionism. A Palestinian refugee party. It has an armed wing known as the Liberation and Return Company.

• Free Palestine Movement

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism, anti-Zionism, anti-Semitism. Another party made up of Palestinians. It has an armed wing known as the al-Aqsa Shield Forces.

• Syrian Steadfastedness Party

Ideology: Ba’athism? Formed in 2016. Emphasizes its loyalty to the ideals of Hafez al-Assad.

• One Syria Gathering

Ideology: Arab nationalism. Formed sometime in 2020 by pro-government Arab tribes in al-Hasakah governorate. Wants to move the Kurdish-led administration away from the United States and towards Damascus.

• Council of Sheikhs and Notables of Syrian Tribes and Clans in al-Hasakah Governorate.

Ideology: Arab nationalism. Formed in early 2016 at the latest. Another pro-government tribal group. Both this group and the One Syria Gathering seem to be led by the Tayy tribe.

• Men of Dignity

Ideology: Druze interests. Sometimes translated as “Sheikhs of Dignity”. Led by popular Druze sheikh Wahid al-Balous, who strongly criticized the regime but did not join the opposition. Balous was killed in a bombing in September 2015; the perpetrator is unclear, but the Syrian government seems to be the most likely candidate. The group also has several associated militias, many of which are united under Quwat al-Fahd (see armed section).

• Forces of the Men of Dignity

Ideology: Druze interests. Formed by the sons of Wahid al-Balous in March 2018 after they felt that the Men of Dignity’s new leader was not strong enough. This new group stresses that it is not a rival of the original group. In February 2019 the Forces of the Men of Dignity established an armed wing called the Shield of the Men of Dignity (see armed section).

• Arab Druze Identity Movement

Ideology: Druze interests. Focused on defending Druze identity from perceived cooptation, particularly “Shi’ification”. Like the Men of Dignity, it is highly critical of the regime despite not being part of the opposition.

• Lebanese political parties:

• Syrian Social Nationalist Party in Lebanon

(see SSNP above)

• Hezbollah

Ideology: Shia Islamism, anti-Zionism. Also involved militarily.

• Arab Democratic Party

Ideology: Arab nationalism, Arab socialism. Often seen as a Syrian-backed Alawite party.

• Popular Nasserist Organization

Ideology: Nasserism

• Arab Tawhid Party

        Ideology: Arab nationalism, Druze interests

• Amal Movement

Ideology: Shia interests, Arab nationalism, conservatism. The other major Shia party in Lebanon.

• Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq

Ideology: Shia Islamism. One of the main Shia parties in Iraq. Like the Badr Organization, it has connections in the Iraqi intelligence sector and (to a lesser extent) is associated with anti-Sunni discrimination. Ideologically close to Iran, though since 2007 it has moderated its pro-Iranian rhetoric.

• Badr Organization

Ideology: Shia Islamism. See military section below. It split from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq in 2012.

• possibly other Iraqi Shia parties?
• Patriotic Party

        Ideology: socialism, Kemalism, Maoism? A Turkish party.

• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades

Ideology: Leninism, anti-Zionism, Palestinian nationalism. One of the major Palestinian militant groups, although they have, along with other left-wing groups, ceded the spotlight to Islamist groups like Hamas. Currently close to both Iran and Syria, but not enough to truly be considered a proxy group like the PFLP-GC.

• Arab Resistance Movement to Liberate Palestine

Ideology: Arab nationalism, anti-Zionism, Palestinian nationalism. Formed in February 2019 amid several attacks on Israeli soldiers. Its armed wing is called the Return Battalion (which is not listed in the armed section as this group is not active in Syria).

• Palestinian People’s Party

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism, Marxism. Formerly known as the Palestinian Communist Party; it rebranded during the collapse of the Soviet Union and adopted a more moderate ideology, although it maintains links with communist parties across the globe. It has a small armed wing in Damascus (name unknown).

• Revolutionary Palestinian Communist Party

Ideology: Leninism, anti-Zionism, Palestinian nationalism. A minor communist party that broke with the official (pro-Soviet) Palestinian Communist Party when the PCP decided to recognize Israel. (The PCP later became the Palestinian People’s Party - see above)

• Palestine Liberation Front (Abu Nidal Ashqar faction)

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism, Arab nationalism, anti-Zionism. The original PLF split into three parts 1983 over the actions of Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization. This faction was neutral. It became closely associated with Syria. The pro-Arafat faction later renounced violence and the anti-Arafat faction faded from existence.

• Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Palestinian nationalism, anti-Zionism. Active in the West Bank and Gaza. Its main funder was Iran until 2015 (PIJ refused to condemn Saudi Arabia’s military intervention against the Iranian-linked Houthis in Yemen); funding reportedly switched to a newly-established offshoot called as-Sabireen; since then, PIJ appears to have repaired its links with Iran.

• Opposition

• Syrian National Coalition/Syrian Interim Government and Syrian National Council

Ideology: pro-democracy, pro-human rights. The Syrian National Council left the National Coalition in January 2014 in protest of the Coalition’s decision to attend peace talks. Nevertheless many Council members appear to still be in the Coalition, so members of both groups are listed here.

• Local Coordination Committees of Syria

Ideology: liberal democracy, human rights. A very loose network of local activist groups. One of the three main opposition bodies in the first few months of the war. Initially insisted on non-violence and rejected armed rebellion.

• Muslim Brotherhood in Syria

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Islamic democracy. It was a very influential organization in Syria, despite persecution, until the end of clashes with the government in 1982, by which point its reputation was severely damaged. It is very influential in the exiled opposition.

• Commission for the Protection of Civilians

        The Brotherhood’s administrative arm in Syria. May be defunct.

• Syrian Islamic Council

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Islamic democracy. Formed in April 2014, mostly by rivals of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it includes some Brotherhood members. It enjoys closer relations than the Brotherhood to the remnants of the original Damascus-based clergy who founded the Brotherhood.

• Movement for Building Civilization

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, Sufi Islam. Intended to be an alliance of moderate rebel groups; only one signatory group is known - the Movement of the Free Sufi Muslims, which is now defunct. One of the founders is Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, a well-respected Sufi scholar who is at the forefront of combating Islamic extremism and has been consulted over the years by many rebel factions.

• Syrian National Current

Ideology: liberalism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Initially known as the Independent Islamic Current. Founded to counter the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the SNC.

• National Working Group for Syria

Ideology: conservatism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Close to certain members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

• Democratic Coordination Meeting

Ideology: unknown. Made up of academics.

• Syrian National Democratic Bloc

Ideology: secularism, Arab nationalism

• Kurdish National Council (see Kurdish section)
• Kurdish Future Movement (see Kurdish section)
• Kurdish Brotherhood Coordination (see Kurdish section)
• Syrian Emergency Task Force

Ideology: secularism. A U.S. advocacy group that lobbies to get the US military involved in the war. Possibly connected to the Coalition of Secular and Democratic Syrians.

• Assyrian Democratic Organization

Ideology: Assyrian/Syriac interests, social democracy. Linked to the Iraq-based Assyrian Democratic Movement.

• Syrian Turkmen Assembly

Ideology: Turkmen interests. Includes four political parties:

• Syrian Turkmen National Bloc

Moderate Sunni Islamist? Possibly connected to the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey (see below).

• Syrian Turkmen National Movement Party

Split from the Syrian Turkmen National Bloc and originally known as the Syrian Turkmen Democratic Movement Party. I have found mixed evidence regarding the group’s ideology - I used to think it was somewhat left-leaning, but now it appears it may be more radically right-wing than the National Bloc.

• National Loyalty Party

Mostly made up of Turkmen from Homs governorate.

• Syrian Turkmen Development Party

Moderate Sunni Islamism?

• Damascus Declaration

Ideology: pro-democracy, pro-human rights. Formed in 2005; most of its initial member parties have left. Remaining affiliates:

• Syrian Democratic People’s Party

Ideology: social democracy (Leninism historically). Also involved with the National Democratic Rally (see below).

• Movement for Justice and Development in Syria

Ideology: centrism, economic liberalism, moderate Sunni Islamism

• National Liberal Alliance

Ideology: liberalism. The personal party of businessman Samir Nashar.

• Arab Socialist Movement (see National Democratic Rally)
• Arab Revolutionary Workers Party (see National Democratic Rally)

• Commission for Supporting the Syrian Revolution

Ideology: unknown. Originally formed as the National Salvation Front in Syria in 2006 by exiled former Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood left in 2009, leaving the Front as little more than a tool for Khaddam. He renamed the group in 2011 and tried unsuccessfully to gain influence in the opposition before dying in March 2020.

• Syrian National Democratic Council

Ideology: opposes Assad but wants to preserve authoritarian state structure. Founded by Assad’s exiled uncle Rifaat al-Assad. Includes his personal party, the United National Democratic Rally (not to be confused with the National Democratic Rally listed below).

• National Coordination Committee for the Forces of Democratic Change (NCC)

Initially ambivalent about the war, but lately has been leaning towards the opposition. Still distrusted by most rebels. It lost most of its remaining membership in 2015.

• Democratic Islamic Current

        Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism

• April 17 Youth Movement for Democratic Change in Syria

Ideology: democracy, human rights, leftism? Arab nationalism? Based mainly in Daraa.

• National Democratic Rally

A group of leftist and Arab nationalist parties founded in 1980. Many of its members were part of the NCC but later left.

• Democratic Arab Socialist Union

Ideology: Nasserism, democratic socialism. Has often come in conflict with the more stridently anti-regime Syrian Democratic People’s Party. Possibly left the NCC in 2015.

• Syrian Democratic People’s Party (see Damascus Declaration above)
• Arab Revolutionary Workers Party

Ideology: Marxism. Split from the Ba’ath Party in 1966. Also a member of the Damascus Declaration. Left the NCC in 2011.

• Arab Socialist Movement (opposition faction)

Ideology: Arab socialism. Also a member of the Damascus Declaration. Another faction of the party exists and is pro-government but doesn’t have any seats in the legislature.

• Communist Labor Party

Ideology: Leninism. Split from the original Syrian Communist Party in 1976. Left the NCC in 2015.

• Democratic Socialist Arab Ba’ath Party (see Rojava section)

• Marxist Left Assembly

Ideology: Marxism. Heavy overlap with the National Democratic Rally. Left the NCC in 2015.

• Together for a Free and Democratic Syria Movement

Ideology: democracy, human rights, left-wing politics. Left the NCC in 2015.

• National Unity Movement for the Liberation of Syria

Ideology: liberal democracy. Unknown if it is affiliated to the Syrian National Council or Syrian National Coalition in any way. At least at one point, it was linked to Liwa Jisr Horan, Tahrir al-Sham Division, and possibly the Aleppo-based Yusuf al-’Azma Brigade (see armed section). Possibly defunct.

• Islamic Rally for Syria

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, Arab nationalism. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC.

• National Alliance for the Forces of the Syrian Revolution

Ideology: liberal democracy. Opposes federalism. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC. Founding members include a variety of Syrian and international political and human rights groups.

• Free Popular Current

Ideology: pro-democracy, pro-human rights. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC.

• Movement for Reform and Construction

        Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Unclear relationship with the SNC and NC.

• Muwatana

Ideology: secularism, liberal democracy. Also known as Citizenship for Civil Action. Close to Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, at least at one point. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC. Led by prominent Syrian activist Mouffaq Nyrabia, a former member  of the Syrian Democratic People’s Party.

• Center Party of Syria

Ideology: liberal democracy, Arab nationalism. Emphasis on equal rights for all. Seems to be hostile to the SNC and NC.

• Upcoming Syria

Ideology: Alawite interests. An Alawite party formed in November 2015 that supports the rebels. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC.

• Hasakah Youth Union

Ideology: unknown. Very opposed to the PYD/YPG. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC.

• Freemen of Horan League

Ideology: unknown. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC. Likely close to the Southern Front.

• Syrian Front

Ideology: secularism, economic liberalism, women’s rights, liberal democracy. Formerly known as the Syrian National Front (see second logo). It opposes federalism for Syria. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC.

• Syrian Movement for Renewal

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, Arab nationalism. Opposes foreign intervention. Unclear relationship with the SNC and NC.

• Free Scholars, Preachers, and Advocates for Syria

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Emphasis on freedom of religion and interfaith dialogue. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC.

• Syrian Revolution Coordinating Cavalry

Ideology: Christian interests, Christian-Islamic unity. Unclear relationship with SNC and NC.

• Syrian National Liberal Party

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, anti-Shia and anti-Alawite sentiment, non-interventionism. Despite claiming to support a democratic state incorporating all elements of Syrian society, it is viruliantly sectarian. Supports the Turkish intervention.

• Syrian Transitional Military Council

Ideology: unknown. Formed in 2021 by Brigadier General Manaf Tlass, a former member of the Assad family’s inner circle who defected from the Republican Guard in 2012. Based in France, where Tlass has lived for most of the war; possibly has French government backing. Posing as an alternative to the Turkish-backed National Coalition/Syrian Interim Government, it aims to oversee a transition of power away from the Assad government in accordance with UN agreements and claims to have support from both the West and Russia, but has little support in Syria itself.

• Syrian Kurdish Revolutionary Clans Council  

Ideology: Kurdish interests. Based in the countryside around Azaz and al-Bab in Aleppo governorate; sponsored by Turkey.

• Syrian Kurdish Independents League

Ideology: Kurdish interests. Based in the Afrin region of Aleppo governorate. Originally formed in late 2011 as the Kurdish Democratic Forces Union (see second logo); it reformed and adopted its current name in 2016. Many members were formerly associated with the Kurdish Future Movement (see Kurdish section). One of its leaders was part of Mustafa Cumma’s Kurdish Freedom Party (the wing that is currently part of the KDPS, not to be confused with the Mustafa Osso-led party which is listed in the political section) and has had connections with several Kurdish FSA brigades. Strongly supportive of Turkey and its FSA allies. Criticizes the Kurdish National Council as being a tool of the PKK.

• Popular Union

Ideology: Arab nationalism? Sunni Islamism? A tribal-based organization in western Aleppo governorate. Linked to Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. It is critical of Turkey’s intervention in Syria. Possibly defunct, as Zenki folded in March 2019.

• Jazira is Arab and Syrian

Ideology: Arab nationalism. An organization of Arabs in Hasakah governorate that aims to counter the Kurdish nationalist movement. Unclear if it is armed. Possibly defunct.

• National Salvation Council in al-Hasakah

        Ideology: Arab nationalism?

• Council of Tribes and Clans of Deir ez-Zor

        Ideology: Arab nationalism? Formed in April 2017 in Turkey.

• Syrian Tribes and Clans Council

Ideology: Arab nationalism? Formed in November 2017 in Turkey as the Supreme Council of Syria Tribes and Clans (see first logo). Reformed and renamed in December 2018.

• Social Society for Patriotic Work

Ideology: unknown. An anti-regime party operating in the Druze-majority Suweida governorate, which has remained outwardly loyal to the regime but has become increasingly dissatisfied with Assad.

• Syrian Legion Party

Ideology: democracy? Formed in early 2021 in Suweida Governorate; officially named in July. Its armed wing is known as the Anti-Terror Force (see armed section). It denounces the role of the Assad government’s intelligence agencies in terrorizing the population (though its leader allegedly had ties to Military Intelligence in the past) and accuses pro-Iranian groups, especially Hezbollah, of ruiniing Suweida with the drug trade. In February it claimed to offer training under the supervision of the SDF and said it had the support of one or more foreign countries. But in July it denounced all proposals for federalism and denied having foreign funding. Suweida residents and other armed groups in the area have reacted with suspicion and forced it to leave at least two villages.

• Syrian Salvation Government

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism. A rival to the National Coalition/Syrian Interim Government set up by the jihadist-led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

• Turkish parties:

• Justice and Development Party

Ideology: conservatism, economic liberalism, Turkish nationalism, moderate Sunni Islamism. It has attracted controversy over the past few years due to its perceived increasingly Islamist and anti-democratic tone.

• Great Union Party

Ideology: Turkish ultranationalism, Sunni Islamism. A far right party in Turkey that has sent members of its youth movement to fight with Syrian Turkmen.

• Nationalist Movement Party

        Ideology: Turkish ultranationalism. Turkey’s leading far-right party.

• Grey Wolves

Ideology: Turkish ultranationalism, neo-fascism. A youth movement and militant group closely connected to the Nationalist Movement Party.

• Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front

Ideology: Turkish ultranationalism, Sunni jihadism. A militant group in Turkey. It conducted several deadly attacks in the 1990s, but since 2014 it has been partially rehabilitated by the Turkish government and has sent fighters to Syrian Turkmen groups.

• Lebanese parties:

• Future Movement

Ideology: classical liberalism, Sunni interests. Not to be confused with the Kurdish Future Movement.

• Guardians of the Cedars/Lebanese Renewal Party/Movement of Lebanese Nationalism

Ideology: Phoenicianism (Phoenician nationalism), anti-Palestinian sentiment, Christian interests

• Progressive Socialist Party

Ideology: democratic socialism, social democracy, Druze interests

• Hamas

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Palestinian nationalism. The ruling party in the Gaza Strip. Loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

• Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava)

[note: this section is out of date]

• Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM)

The mass organization and electoral alliance of the PYD (see below). TEV-DEM’s flag (which is also Rojava’s flag) has become the de facto flag of the PYD. From 2012 until the formation of the Federation of Northern Syria (later renamed to its current state) in late 2015, TEV-DEM was an arm of the Rojava government and was overseen by the now-defunct Kurdish Supreme Committee (see second logo).

• Democratic Union Party (PYD)

Ideology: Democratic Confederalism (a mix of libertarian socialism, feminism, and environmentalism), democratic socialism, Kurdish nationalism. Linked to the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party. It was part of the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (see opposition section) until 2015.

• Kongreya Star

Ideology: feminism, Democratic Confederalism. Formerly known as Yekitiya Star (see second flag). A women’s organization close to the PYD.

• Syrian Kurdish Democratic Peace Party

        Ideology: left-wing politics; communalism?

• Syriac Union Party

Ideology: Syriac interests. Linked to Lebanese SUP. It was part of the NCC until 2015.

• Communist Party of Kurdistan

Ideology: communism. Not to be confused with several other parties of the same name outside Syria. Possibly known as the Libertarian Communist Party of Kurdistan.

• National Assembly of Kurdistan

        Ideology: left-wing politics

• Liberal Union Party of Kurdistan

        Ideology: unknown

• Kurdish Syrian Democratic Party

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism. Also known as KDPS 1970. Left the KNC after the KNC signed an agreement with the Turkey-based Syrian opposition.

• Assembly for the Left and Democracy in Syria

        A leftist electoral alliance.

• Kurdish Left Party in Syria

Ideology: democratic socialism. Split from the KDPS. Also a member of the Marxist Left Assembly (see opposition section). Formerly part of the Kurdish National Council and the NCC.

• Democratic Change Party

        Ideology: progressivism; center-left?

• Green Party of Kurdistan

        Ideology: environmentalism, social democracy

• Kurdistan Workers Party

Ideology: support for trade unions. Not to be confused with the Turkey-based PKK.

• Booster Movement of Kurdistan

        Ideology: left-wing politics

• Democratic Socialist Arab Ba’ath Party

Ideology: left-wing Ba’athism (e.g., anti-neo-Ba’athist), democratic socialism. Also part of the National Democratic Rally. Left the National Coordination Committee (see opposition section) in 2015.

• Kurdish National Alliance in Syria

Mostly consists of former KNC members that supported the federalist project and sought closer cooperation with the PYD. Known members:

• Democratic Unity Party of Kurdistan (Democratic Yekiti)

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, progressivism. Split from the original Yekiti (see below) in the late 80s - early 90s. Formerly known as the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party of Syria (see second logo). Said to be the PYD’s largest rival in Afrin canton. Expelled from the KNC in late 2014 for alleged closeness with the PYD.

• Democratic Left Kurdish Party in Syria

Ideology: social democracy, democratic socialism. Split from the Kurdish left Party in Syria in 2012.

• Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria - al-Parti

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, progressivism. Split from the larger KDPS over a leadership struggle. It was originally a member of the National Coordination Committee (see opposition section) but left soon after the NCC’s formation. Expelled from the KNC in late 2014 for alleged closeness with the PYD.

• Syrian Kurdish Democratic Accord

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, social democracy? Split from the PYD in 2004. The PYD accused it of collusion with the Syrian government and there were brief clashes. At one point it merged into the Kurdish Left Party in Syria, but now it appears to have re-asserted its independence.

• Syrian Reform Movement

        Ideology: unknown

• Kurdish National Council

From 2011-late 2015 the KNC functioned as an umbrella group for anti-PYD Kurdish parties. Many of its affiliates have since left, showing more willingness to cooperate with the PYD. Also part of the Syrian National Coalition. Has links with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.

• Kurdistan Democratic Party in Syria (KDPS)

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, conservatism. The dominant party in the KNC. Affiliated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq. The party’s militia, Rojava Peshmerga (see the third logo), has not been permitted by the PYD-dominated government to operate in Syria but it does have a small presence in Iraq. The Rojava Peshmerga are officially affiliated with the KNC as a whole.

• Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria - al-Parti (splinter)

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, conservatism. Split from the above-listed party of the same name when the original was expelled from the KNC for alleged closeness to the PYD; this faction stayed with the KNC and kept the name and original logo.

• Kurdish Union Party in Syria (Yekiti)

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, progressivism. One of the more active Kurdish parties in the initial protests before and during the early stages of the war. It has expressed support for federalism but has nonetheless remained a bitter opponent of the PYD.

• Kurdish Democratic Equality Party in Syria

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, social conservatism. Split from the KDPP (see below) over leadership issues.

• Kurdish Future Movement

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, liberalism. One of the most pro-opposition Kurdish parties. Member of the Syrian National Council, at least at one point. Its founder and leader, Mashaal Tammo, was an ardent supporter of the original 2011 anti-government protests and a fierce critic of the PYD. He was assassinated in November 2011; his supporters blamed the PYD and the government. The party split in two in 2012 over a leadership dispute and the stance of the party towards the PYD. This faction, being more stridently anti-PYD than the other, established a small militia in 2014; it is unknown if this militia is still active. It is also unknown whether the other faction is still active.

• Kurdish Youth Movement

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism. A political organization (not an electoral political party) founded in the aftermath of the 2004 Qamishli uprising, which was brutally crushed by the Assad regime. Close to the KNC. It had an armed wing called the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (see defunct section).

• Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria (KDPP)

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, social conservatism. Linked to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Iraq, despite being ideologically closer to the KDP. Close to the Kurdish National Alliance in Syria; possibly a member. Formerly part of the KNC.                        

• Kurdish Freedom Party (Azadi) (Mustafa Osso faction)

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, progressivism. There were two parties with this name. The original was a left-leaning split from the main KDPS. As part of the KNC, it was one of the fiercest critics of the PYD and one of the more active Kurdish parties in the initial 2011 protests. Both factions merged back into the KDPS in April 2014, but the faction led by Mustafa Osso appears to have re-asserted its independence.

• Kurdish Leftist Party in Syria - Reform Movement

Ideology: democratic socialism, Kurdish nationalism. Possibly a split from the Kurdish Left Party in Syria.

• Syrian Yazidi Council

Ideology: Yazidi interests. Left the KNC and the Syrian National Council in September 2016, citing frustration with the SNC’s Arabization policies and Islamism and the KNC’s failure to deal with them.

• Yazidi House

Ideology: Yazidi interests

• Arab National Coalition

        Ideology: Arab interests

• Honor and Rights Convention

        Ideology: Arab interests, left-wing politics

• Teyar al-Qameh

Ideology: human rights. Also known as the Law - Citizenship - Rights Movement. Founded by noted human rights advocate Haytham Manna, who had previously been involved in the NCC (see opposition section).

• Syria’s Tomorrow Current

Ideology: Kurdish-Arab unity. Also known as Syrian Democratic Society. Led by Ahmad Jarba, former head of the National Coalition (see opposition section) and a major Shammar tribe leader. Its military wing is called the Syrian Elite Forces (see opposition military section).

• Arab Council in al-Jazira and the Euphrates

Ideology: Arab interests. Formed in 2017 to represent Arab tribes in Raqqa, al-Hasakah, and Deir ez-Zor governorates. Although it is sympathetic to the opposition, it generally cooperates with the SDF.

• Syrian National Democratic Alliance

Ideology: left-wing politics. Close to the PYD. Supposedly the governing party in         the “Shahba” region between Afrin and Kobane cantons, northern Aleppo.

• Assyrian Democratic Party

Ideology: Syriac/Assyrian interests. Split from the Assyrian Democratic Organization (see opposition political section) in 1978. Historically close to the Syrian government. Its unofficial military wings are the Khabour Guards and the Nattoreh (see military section).

• Kurdish Brotherhood Coordination

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism. Based in Aleppo. Notable for being closer to the mainstream opposition than the PYD. Possibly defunct.

• National Action Front in Response to Syria

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, moderate Sunni Islamism? Also close to the mainstream opposition.

• Iraqi Kurdistan

Governing parties:

• Kurdistan Democratic Party

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, conservatism

• Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, social democracy

• Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, social democracy. Led the Soviet-aligned Republic of Mahabad from 1946-1947 and an insurgency in Iran from 1989-1996 (which re-ignited in 2015). Connected to the Iraqi KDP at one point. Still illegal; maintains a small number of troops in Iraqi Kurdistan.

• People’s United Revolutionary Movement

A collection of leftist militant groups in Turkey declared in March 2016. Some of them contribute fighters to the International Freedom Battalion (see armed section). Notable members:

• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Ideology: Democratic Confederalism (see PYD entry), Kurdish nationalism (Leninism and Maoism historically). It has been engaged in an insurgency in Turkey for decades. Although an end to the insurgency was announced in 2013, it resumed in 2015 after controversy over Turkey’s response to IS’ siege of Kobane across the border in Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with the unrelated Syrian Kurdish party of the same name (see above).

• Marxist-Leninist Communist Party

Ideology: Hoxhaism (Albanian-style communism; pro-Stalin, against “revisionism” that started with Khrushchev). Armed wing is known as the Armed Forces of the Poor and Oppressed.

• Communist Labor Party of Turkey/Leninist

        Ideology: Leninism

• Maoist Communist Party

Ideology: Maoism. Split from the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist. Has two armed wings, the People’s Liberation Army (HKO) for rural areas and the People’s Partisan Forces (PHG) for urban areas.

• Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit

Ideology: Leninism. Split in 1975 from the Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front (see second and third logos), which is the ancestral organization of several other Turkish communist groups. Part of the United Freedom Forces (see below).

• Revolutionary Communist League of Turkey

        Ideology: Stalinism (historically Maoism)

• Revolutionary Communard Party

Ideology: revolutionary socialism, Leninism? Merger of two groups in 2016. The main force behind the United Freedom Forces (see below). A third group, Revolutionary Headquarters (see second logo), merged into it in 2017. Revolutionary Headquarters had been infamous for a number of attacks in the 2000s and for purportedly being infiltrated by Turkish intelligence. In 2018 the group split in two, but both factions continue working under the PURM and the United Freedom Forces.

• Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist

Ideology: Maoism. Armed wing is known as the Liberation Army of the Workers and Peasants of Turkey (TiKKO). It was included in the formation announcement of the People’s United Revolutionary Movement but withdrew later the same month due to strategic disagreements.

• United Freedom Forces

Ideology: leftism. A collection of small groups from Turkey. Contributes fighters to the International Freedom Battalion (see armed section). Its all-female wing is known as the Women’s Freedom Forces (see third logo).

• Revolutionary Communard Party (both factions; see above)
• Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (see above)
• Social Insurrection  

Green anarchist and platformist (a trend within anarcho-communism and anarcho-syndicalism stemming from the experience of Nestor Mahkno’s anarchists in Ukraine during the Russian Civil War).

• Marxist-Leninist Party (Communist Reconstruction)

        Ideology: Hoxhaism. From Spain, where it has been effectively banned.

• Communist Party of Turkey - Spark

        Ideology: leftism, Leninism?

• Anarchist Struggle

Ideology: left anarchism. Mainly consists of volunteers from Turkey. Formed in 2017. Initially it worked in anonymity as part of other groups, including the Antifascist Forces in Afrin and the YPG. In January 2019 it adopted a more public approach in order to show support for Rojava at a time when prospects looked dim. Like many other Turkish leftist groups, it operates as part of the International Freedom Battalion.

• Revolutionary Union for Internationalist Solidarity

Ideology: anarcho-communism, platformism, left communism? From Greece.

• Party of Free Life of Kurdistan

Ideology: Democratic Confederalism, Kurdish nationalism. A political-military organization affiliated to the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Based in Iran, where it is engaged in an insurgency.

Military factions

• Government and supporters

• Syrian Armed Forces

• Syrian Arab Army

• National Defense Force

A volunteer force. Formed by Shabiha (pro-government thugs) and others fearful of the rebellion. One of its notable units:

• Golan Regiment

Formed in 2014 by ex-rebels. Operates mainly in Quneitra governorate. Its original leader (killed in 2017) had helped form the FSA’s Mu’tasim Battalion in December 2011, which may have later become the Daraa-based Liwa Mu’tasim Billah (see defunct section). He accused many rebels of simply posing as revolutionaries in order to receive support from the Gulf and also condemned rebels who worked with Israel. It had a close relationship with the Quneitra Hawks Brigade (from a similar background) and was also close to the now-defunct al-Bustan Association (see below), but in late 2017 a rift developed between the Regiment’s new leader, who was close to the Syrian Republican Guard and the Military Intelligence Directorate, and one of Regiment’s three battalions, which was closer to the al-Bustan Association. That battalion merged with the Bustan-affiliated Quneitra Hawks Brigade in December 2017.

• Syrian Republican Guard

A special forces division based in Damascus but deployed across the country. It sponsors a number of militias, including:

• Coastal Shields Brigade

        Based in Latakia. Possibly defunct.

• Liwa Sayf al-Haqq Assad Allah al-Ghalib

Based in Rif Dimashq. Influenced by Shia Islam, but not openly Shia Islamist like many of the brigades described below.

• Tribal Army

Ideology: unknown. Formed in December 2017 in Daraa governorate. It includes many recently defected fighters from the Omari Brigades. Not to be confused with the defunct SDF-aligned group of the same name (see Jaysh al-Ashaer).

• Union of the Army of the Tribes

Ideology: unknown. Formed in October 2017. Its only notable unit, Fawj al-Karbala’i, has been accused of looting and corruption in Aleppo.

• Leopards of Homs

Ideology: unknown. Operates mainly in Homs governorate. Close to the now-defunct Liwa Khaybar. Affiliated with the al-Bustan Association of Rami Makhlouf, Assad’s cousin and Syria’s wealthiest man, until the government cracked down on that organization in August 2019 and incorporated its militias into the Republican Guard.

• Kataib al-Jabalawi

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Homs governorate. Another group formerly affiliated with well-connected businessman Rami Makhlouf’s al-Bustan Association. It appears to have had tensions with other pro-Assad forces in the past.

• Kameet Forces

Ideology: unknown. Operates across Syria. Formed in 2013. Also known as the Kameet Special Assignments Battalion. Affiliated with both the al-Bustan Association and the Tiger Forces.

• Quwat Dir’ al-Watan

Ideology: unknown. A group of brigades in southern Syria affiliated with the al-Bustan Association and the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, and with close connections to the Iraqi Shia militia Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar (see below). Not to be confused with the now-defunct Suweida-based Dir’ al-Watan. Notable subgroups:

• Liwa Dir’ al-Watan

Operates in Rif Dimashq governorate. Not to be confused with the now-defunct Suweida-based Dir’ al-Watan. Its leader is also the leader of Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar.

• Salah al-Din Ayyubi Brigade (Rif Dimashq)

Operates mainly in Rif Dimashq governorate. Not to be confused with the defunct rebel group of the same name.

• Quneitra Hawks Brigade

Operates in Quneitra governorate. Mainly made up of former rebel fighters, including many from Liwa al-Mu’tasem Billah. It was close to the Golan Regiment (formed from a similar background). It became affiliated with the al-Bustan Association after the death of its original leader in 2015. One of its members was allegedly assassinated by the Ba’ath Brigades in July of that year.

• Southern Shield Brigade (see Republican Guard)

• 25th Division Special Mission Forces/Tiger Forces

A special forces division created in 2013 to support the tattered Syrian Arab Army and focus on offense, rather than the primarily defense-oriented Republican Guards. Its command structure was largely independent from that of the army until 2019. Reportedly very close to the infamous Air Force Intelligence Directorate (see below), of which the group’s leader Suheil al-Hassan used to be an officer. Also considered close to Russia. Known for both its prowess on the battlefield as well as its corruption behind the front lines and history of human rights violations. In September 2019, after a crackdown on influential businessman Rami Makhlouf (see Republican Guard subgroups), who had been connected to Hassan, the government reorganized the Tiger Forces as a formal component of the SAA, reportedly as part of an effort to bring powerful militias more under Damascus’ control.

• Syrian Arab Navy
• Syrian Arab Air Force
• Military Intelligence Directorate

One of several intelligence agencies/secret police forces. It sponsors a number of militias, including:

• Military Security Shield Forces

Based in Latakia and also operating in Homs and Aleppo governorates.

• Desert Commandos Regiment

Operates in Homs and Aleppo governorates. Not to be confused with the now-defunct Desert Commandos Brigade. Formed in late 2015. Its leader later participated in the creation of the Raqqa-based Popular Resistance.

• Tribal Fighters Forces

Operates mainly in Aleppo governorate. Led by a member of the pro-government faction of the Arab Socialist Movement.

• Military Security Falcons

Operates in Homs governorate. Close to the Military Security Shield Forces.

• Southern Shield Brigade

Operates in Quneitra governorate. Also considered part of the Republican Guard-affiliated Quwat Dir’ al-Watan.

• Saraya Sha’bat al-Mukhabarat

        Operates in the Badia region of southeastern Syria.

• Liwa al-Quds

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed by predominantly Sunni Palestinian refugees. Possibly linked to the PFLP-GC (see below). It was part of the Iranian-sponsored Local Defense Forces (see below) for a time.

• Liwa al-Imam Zain al-Abidain (Deir ez-Zor)

Ideology: Shia Islamism? Operates in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Close to the Aleppo/Hama-based group of the same name.

• 8th Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in eastern Daraa governorate. Essentially a rebranded Youth of Sunna Forces (see defunct section), one of the larger groups of the FSA’s Southern Front, which surrendered to the government in July 2018. It has been involved in clashes with other pro-government militias and with IS remnants.

• Air Force Intelligence Directorate

The country’s most powerful and infamous intelligence agency/secret police force. It sponsors a number of militias, including:

• Quwat al-Ghadab

A Christian militia based in the Greek Orthodox-majority city of al-Suqaylabiyah in Hama governorate. Also affiliated with the Republican Guard and Local Defense Forces.

• Guardians of the Dawn

        A network of Christian militias active in central Syria.

• Syrian Special Mission Forces

The “quick reaction force” of the Ministry of Interior. Tasked with countering attacks in urban areas, mainly in Aleppo and Damascus. They also guard the properties of wealthy Syrian elites.

• ISIS Hunters

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in eastern Syria. Formed in 2017. Close to Russia.

• Shaitat Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates mainly in Homs and Deir ez-Zor governorates. Formed by members of the Shaitat tribe, which suffered a horrific massacre by IS in 2014 after a failed uprising.

• Tribal Forces of Idlib

Ideology: Arab nationalism? Formed in October 2017 with the eventual goal of securing the rebel-dominated Idlib governorate. Close to Russia.

• Liwa al-Areen

Ideology: unknown. Operates mainly in Homs governorate. Formed in March 2017. Formerly affiliated with the Military Intelligence Directorate; now works closely with Russia.

• Scandinavian League

Ideology: Nordic ultranationalism, Islamophobia, neo-Nazism? A Sweden-based far right organization that has sent fighters to participate in pro-government offenses under Russian command. The group’s youth wing, Nordic Youth (see second logo), has fought in Ukraine for the Kiev government and is notorious for attacking immigrants.

• Local Defense Forces

Ideology: mixed. A collection of NDF-like militias mainly operating across the country, primarily in Aleppo governorate. Very close to Iran; it appears to have arisen partly out of Iran’s dissatisfaction with the NDF, which it had previously financed. Also close to Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba. Some of the notable affiliates:

• Liwa al-Baqir

Tied to the al-Bekara clan, which was one of the more infamous Shabiha groups. Sometimes known as Liwa al-Imam al-Baqir.

• Manbij Tribal Regiment/Thunder of the Mahdi Regiment

Shia Islamist. Operates in the area of countryside west of Manbij that was handed to the Syrian government by the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces in March 2017 as a buffer zone between the SDF and the Turkish-sponsored rebels. Close to the Iranian Republican Guards.

• Circassian Regiment

Made up of Circassians from the Khanasir area.

• Imam al-Huja Regiment

A Hezbollah-type militia (see similar groups further below). Formed in 2016.

• Al-Ghalibun

Operates in Rif Dimashq and Quneitra governorates. Also known as the Islamic Resistance Company in Syria or the National Resistance Brigades in Syria. Formed in 2014 largely as a split from the NDF. Another Hezbollah-type militia, although it has grown less religious in recent years.

• Saraya al-Wa’ad

Based around Damascus but deploys around the country. Formed in 2012. Close to the Air Force Intelligence and Russian-backed 5th Corps.

• Saraya al-Ra’ad

Operates in Hama and Idlib governorates. Made up of SAA fighters who had been stationed in Idlib prior to the completel rebel victory in that governorate in 2015. Formed in December 2016 as part of Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thiqfi.

• 313th Battalion

Shia Islamist. Operates across Syria. Also known as 313th Force and Liwa al-Rasul al-’Adham. Split from Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya in 2016. Not to be confused with the FSA’s 313th Brigade.

• Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya

Shia Islamist. Based in the Damascus area but operates across the country. Also known as the Jafari Force. Formerly part of the National Defense Forces and later Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.

• Saraya al-Muqawama

Based in Latakia governorate.

• Liwa Usoud al-Hussein

An Alawite group that operates mainly in Latakia governorate. Also known as Quwat Humat Souriya - Usoud al-Hussein (see second logo). Based on a pre-war smuggling group known for extortions and kidnappings; much of this activity seems to have continued during the war. Formerly tied to the al-Bustan Association.

• Liwa Ashbal al-Hussein

        Shia Islamist. Operates mainly in Homs governorate. Formed in 2017

• Special Force

Shia Islamist. Operates mainly in and around the Damascus area. Although it is a part of the Iranian-backed Local Defense Forces, it has a more direct relationship with Hezbollah.

• Saraya al-Areen/Abu al-Harith Regiment

Ideology: Alawi interests. Operates mainly in Latakia governorate. Also known as the 313th Regiment. Also affiliated with the Military Intelligence Directorate. Accused of corruption, looting, and murder.

• Rijal al-Qa’im

Ideology: Shia Islamism? Based in Latakia governorate but active across the country. Founded in 2015 as Owais al-Qarni.

• Saraya Fursan al-Basil

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo and Idlib governorates. Formed in 2017 and based mainly in the countryside of Manbij, close to the border with US-backed SDF territory. This group is closer to the Syrian Arab Army than many of the more Iran-influenced LDF affiliates.

• Fawj al-Hadi

Ideology: unknown. Has operated in Idlib, Hama, Homs, and Deir ez-Zor governorates.

• Fawj al-Nasr

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Homs and Deir ez-Zor governorates. Formed in 2016; most of its fighters are from Homs city and its countryside. Notable for being a primarily logistics-based unit, focusing on providing food and water to other units.

• Liwa al-Ahrar

Ideology: unknown. Operates mainly in Hama governorate. Also known as Quwat Abu Ja’afar. Formed in 2017. Affiliated with Hezbollah.

• Fawj al-Nabi al-Akram

Ideology: unknown. Based around Damascus and operates in Homs, Deir ez-Zor, and Hama governorates. Led by an Syrian-Iranian Druze.

• Syrian Resistance/Popular Front for the Liberation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta

Ideology: Leninism, Syrian nationalism. Operates mainly in Latakia governorate. Some evidence indicates that it is more of an Alawite sectarian group than a communist group. Its leader was formerly a member of the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), one of several leftist militant groups in Turkey.

• Quwat Hosn al-Watan

Ideology: unknown. Operates mainly in Rif Dimashq governorate. Split from Quwat Dir’ al-Qalamoun in May 2016, cutting ties with the SAA’s 3rd Division.

• Hassan Melhelm Homs Commando Regiment

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Homs governorate.

• Jaysh al-Wafaa

        Ideology: unknown. Formed by former rebels in Rif Dimashq governorate.

• Dareh al-Areen

Ideology: Alawi interests. Operates in Latakia governorate; composed largely of men from Assad’s hometown of Qardaha.

• Popular Resistance (Raqqa)

Ideology: Arab nationalism? Operates in Raqqa governorate. Not to be confused with the pro-rebel group of the same name in Daraa. Formed in February 2018 to fight the YPG-led SDF. In March it claimed to have shot down an American helicopter.

• Shields of Syrian Jazira

Ideology: Arab nationalism. Formed in reaction to tensions between the regime and the Kurdish PYD and YPG in Hasakah governorate.

• Al-Magawhir

        Ideology: Arab nationalism. Another Arab militia in Hasakah.

• Popular Resistance Front in the Eastern Region Against ISIS

        Ideology: unknown. A guerrilla outfit in Deir ez-Zor governorate.

• Zilal Groups

Ideology: Arab nationalism, socialism. Operates mainly in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Also known as the Zilal Brigade. Formed in 2013 and led by a member of the pro-government faction of the Arab Socialist Movement (see political section).

• National Ideological Resistance

Ideology: Shia Islamism, Syrian nationalism. Operates in Hama, Aleppo, and Tartus governorates. Very similar to Hezbollah; possibly set up by Hezbollah.

• Quwat al-Ridha

        Ideology: Shia Islamism, Syrian nationalism. Another Hezbollah-type militia.

• Quwat al-Wa’ad al-Sadiq

Ideology: unknown. Founded in 2012. Based primarily around Shia shrines in Damascus, though it has deployed across the country. Unlike many Hezbollah-type groups, this one appears to be multi-sectarian.

• Junud al-Mahdi

Ideology: Shia Islamism. Another Hezbollah-type militia. Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Nakhsa

Ideology: Shia Islamism? Operates in the Shia cities of Nubl and al-Zahraa in Aleppo governorate. Formed in 2016.

• Liwa al-Imam Zain al-Abidain (Aleppo and Hama)

Ideology: Shia Islamism? Operates in Aleppo and Hama governorates. Close to the Deir ez-Zor group of the same name and the Syrian Resistance.

• Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib

Ideology: Shia Islamism. Based in the Damascus area but operates across the country. Formed by an Iraqi and made up of Iraqis and Syrians, but unlike the Special Groups listed further below, this group does not operate in Iraq. Originally affiliated with the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, but disaffiliated in 2015 after dissatisfaction with treatment. Close to the now-defunct Suqour al-Sahara for a time. Not to be confused with several other groups in Iraq and Syria with similar names, including an Iraq-only group with the exact same name.

• Kafr Saghir Martyrs Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Though mostly made up of Kurds, it is officially neutral in the war and exists to keep the peace between the regime and the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the Shaykh Najjar area. Affiliated with the now-defunct Syrian National Resistance.

• Tell Aran Martyrs Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Appears to be a small pro-regime Kurdish brigade.

• Khansawat Syria

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Hasakah governorate. An all-women battalion formed in February 2017.

• Sootoro/Syriac Protection Office/Gozarto Protection Forces

Ideology: Syriac interests. Originally the branch of the Sutoro (see Kurdish section) in Qamishli, Hasakah governorate; aligned itself with government.

• Nusur al-Zawba’a

Ideology: Syrian nationalism, left-leaning economics, Christian interests. The militia of the main faction of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

• Quwat al-Jalil

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism, Arab nationalism. Claims to operate across Syria. Its political wing is known as the Movement of the Return of the Palestinian Youth.

• Liwa al-Jalil

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism, Arab nationalism, secularism, leftism. Operates in Rif Dimashq and Quneitra governorates. Its political wing is known as the National Resistance Action Movement. Possibly defunct.

• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command/Jihad Jibril Brigades

Ideology: Arab nationalism, Palestinian nationalism, anti-Zionism. A split from the original PFLP (see political section). One of the main Syrian proxy forces in Palestinian refugee camps.

• As-Sa’iqa/Vanguard for the Popular Liberation War

Ideology: Assadist neo-Ba’athism. The official Palestinian branch of the Syrian Ba’ath.

• Liberation and Return Company

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism. Operates in Latakia governorate. The armed wing of the Palestinian Democratic Party (see political section). Another Syrian-Palestinian proxy force.

• Fatah al-Intifada

Ideology: Arab nationalism, Palestinian nationalism, anti-Zionism, socialism? Split from the more well-known Fatah. Another Syrian Palestinian proxy force.

• Palestine Liberation Army

Ideology: Arab nationalism, Palestinian nationalism, anti-Zionism. Another Syrian Palestinian proxy force.

• Al-Aqsa Shield Forces

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism, anti-Zionism, anti-Semitism. Operates mainly in and around Damascus. Another Syrian Palestinian proxy force. The armed wing of the Free Palestine Movement (see political section). Close to Fatah al-Intifada.

• Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (Khalid ‘Abd al-Majid faction)

Ideology: socialism, Palestinian nationalism. Another Syrian Palestinian proxy force. The original PPSF was formed in 1976 as a pro-Fatah split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (see political section). It soon grew critical of Fatah and aligned with Syria and Libya, committing a number of terrorist actions. In 1991 the group split over how to react to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; the majority rejoined the Fatah-led Palestine Liberation Organization, abandoned arms, and participated in elections, while a minority under Khalid ‘Abd al-Majid rejected the peace process and retreated to Damascus.

• Quwat al-Aouda

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism, anti-Zionism. Operates in and around Damascus. Set up by Hezbollah.

• Jaysh al-Muwahhideen

Ideology: Druze interests. Operates mainly in Suweida governorate. The principal Druze volunteer militia.

• Burkan al-Jabal al-Na’im

Ideology: Druze interests. Operates in Suweida governorate. Close to the now-defunct Dir’ al-Watan.

• al-Zaghaba

Ideology: Druze interests. Operates in Suweida governorate. Close to the now-defunct Dir’ al-Watan.

• Lebayk ya Salman

                Ideology: Druze interests. Operates in Suweida governorate. Set up by Iran.

• Labawat al-Jabal

Ideology: Druze interests. Operates in Suweida governorate. An all-female group.

• Kata’ib Humat al-Diyar

Ideology: Druze interests. Operates in Suweida governorate. Close to the now-defunct Dir’ al-Watan. It has been accused of criminal behavior including murder, torture, and kidnapping.

• Katibat Jalamid Urman

Ideology: Druze interests. Operates in and around the village of Urman in Suweida governorate.

• Saraya al-Tawhid

Ideology: Druze interests, Arab nationalism. Operates in Quneitra governorate; most of its activity actually takes place in Lebanon. An affiliate of the Arab Tawhid Party, a pro-Assad and pro-Hezbollah Druze party in Lebanon (see political section).

• Liwa al-Jabal

Ideology: Druze interests. Formed in January 2017 by five small groups. Operates in Suweida governorate.

• Quwat al-Fahd

Ideology: Druze interests. Operates in Suweida governorate. An attempt to unify Druze militias affiliated with the Men of Dignity (see political section).

• Bayraq Quwat al-Fahd

Ideology: Druze interests. Operates in Suweida governorate. Also inspired by the Sheiks of Dignity, but it has no official connection to them. No relation to the Quwat al-Fahd above.

• Shield of the Men of Dignity

Ideology: Druze interests. Operates in Suweida governorate. Formed in February 2019 as the armed wing of the Forces of the Men of Dignity, a split from the original Men of Dignity (see political section).

• Arab Nationalist Guard

Ideology: Arab nationalism. A volunteer force that includes many foreign members. Close to Abu Nidal Ashqar’s faction of the Palestine Liberation Front.

• Wagner Group

Ideology: unknown. A Russian private military company; sometimes accused of being directly under Russian government control. It has also fought in Ukraine and includes members of the now-defunct Slavonic Corps, another Russian PMC. It has links with Russian ultranationalist groups.

• ENOT Corp

Ideology: unknown. Another Russian private military company. Like the Wagner Group, it is also active in Ukraine and has links with the far right.

• Interbrigades

Ideology: National Bolshevism. A Russian volunteer group affiliated with the National Bolshevik Party. Primarily known for its involvement in Ukraine, but the group has also sent fighters to Syria.

• Turan Group

Ideology: Shia Islamism, Turanism. Founded in 2017. A private military company made up of central Asians and Russians who promote Turanism, a cultural-political movement that developed in the 1800s to unite various peoples of central and Inner Asian origin.

• Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas

Ideology: Shia Islamism. Established to defend Shia holy sites and Shi’ite civilians. Most members are from Iraq. Heavy links and overlaps with Hezbollah and the Special Groups. Not to be confused with the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces. Close to the Republican Guard.

• Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar

Ideology: Shia Islamism. Split from Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas over finances; another possible issue in the split was whether to go beyond the “shrine defense” narrative and fight rebels in other areas. If this is true, Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar represented those who favored expanding the fight. In any case, it is part of the Sadrist movement (see below). It was close to Rami Makhlouf’s al-Bustan Association until that organization was dissolved by the government (see Republican Guard affiliates).

• Iranian Revolutionary Guard

Ideology: Shia Islamism. Iran’s influential paramilitary.

• Basij (security force)
• Quds Force (foreign ops)
• Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thiqfi

Operates in Latakia governorate. Also known as Fawj Qamr Bani Hashim. Made up of Syrians. Also affiliated with the Local Defense Forces

• Katibat Ali Sultan

Operates across the country. Made up of Syrians and Iraqis. Includes a number of non-Shia.

• Hezbollah

Ideology: Shia Islamism, anti-Zionism. A powerful Lebanese political-military organization.

• Special Groups (semi-legal Iranian-backed Shia jihadist insurgents from Iraq)

• Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq

A split from the Peace Companies. Currently the largest of the three main special groups (the others being Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Peace Companies) and the closest of the three to former Iraqi prime minister Nour al-Maliki.

• Peace Companies

The most independent from Iran of the three main Special Groups. Derived from the Mahdi Army, an insurgent force led by popular cleric Muqtadā al-Ṣadr. From 2008-2014 it was known as the Promised Day Brigade (see the second logo). Ṣadr renounced violence and anti-Sunni sectarianism in 2008, but there are still many Sadrist armed groups in Iraq and Syria.

• Kata’ib Hezbollah

The smallest of the three main Special Groups and the closest to Iran.

• Sariyya al-Tali’a al-Khurasani

Also known as Saraya al-Khorasani. Its political wing is called Harakat al-Talia al-Islamiyah (see fourth logo). Possibly connected with the Badr Organization.

• Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein

A pro-Iranian split from the Sadrist Movement. Affiliated with the SAA’s 4th Armored Division. Its wing in Syria is known as the Death Battalion (see second logo).

• Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces

Split from Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas. Part of the Sadrist movement, though also close to Nour al-Maliki and more pro-Iranian militias. Its leader has been implicated in war crimes and has called for ethnic cleansing in certain areas of Iraq. By 2019 he had grown critical of Iran and was arrested after making anti-Iranian statements (he was later released).

• Faylak Wa’ad al-Sadiq

Possibly connected to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

• Liwa al-Hamza Sayyid al-Shuhada

The Syrian continent of the Iraq-based Kata’ib A’imat al-Baqi, whose logo is the one shown.

• Liwa Hujr ibn ‘Adi/Quds Regiment

The Syrian continent of the Iraq-based Quwat Zayanab al-Kubra, whose logo is the one shown.

• Saraya al-Jihad

Affiliated with the Jihad and Construction Movement, a more pro-Iranian split from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.

• Kata’ib al-Sabirun

Not much is known about this group.

• Ansar Allah al-Awfiya

        Its political wing is the Group of Honesty and Caring.

• Jaysh al-Mu’ammal

Another Sadrist splinter group, possibly connected to Nour al-Maliki. Also known as Liwa al-Mu’ammal; possibly a continuation of an older Liwa al-Mu’ammal (see second logo) that was originally a front group for the now-defunct Rapid Intervention Regiment.

• Assad Allah al-Ghalib Forces in Iraq and al-Sham

Originally known as Katai’b Assad Allah al-Ghalib. Formed as a split from Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar. It merged with Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar in 2017 but re-separated sometime after. Not to be confused with Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib.

• Others: these brands overlap with other Iraqi Shia groups too much to be listed as factions of their own. Some of them are listed below with the groups they are most closely linked to in parentheses:

• Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (Badr Organization)
• Harakat al-Nujaba (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah)

• Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq in particular)
• Liwa al-Hamad
• Liwa’a al-Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtaba 

• Liwa’a  Kafeel Zaynab (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq)
• Haidar al-Karar Brigades (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq)
• Quwat al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr (Badr Organization)
• Harakat al-Abdal (Badr Organization)
• Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq)

• Badr Organization

Ideology: Shia Islamism. An Iraqi political-military force. Unlike the above Special Groups, the Badr Organization is completely legal and has a heavy presence in the intelligence and (in more recent years) defense sectors. Responsible for much anti-Sunni violence in Iraq along with the Special Groups. It split from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq in 2012 after ISCI somewhat moderated its pro-Iran rhetoric.

• Brigade of the Fatimids

Ideology: Shia Islamism. Operates in Daraa, Idlib, Aleppo, and Homs governorates. Also known as Hezbollah Afghanistan (see fourth logo). A group of Hazara (a traditionally Shi’ite ethnic group in Afghanistan). Many of its fighters had previously fought against the Soviets in the Soviet-Afghan war and/or for the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war. Formed and commanded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

• People of Zainab Brigade

Ideology: Shia Islamism. From Pakistan. Close to the Brigade of the Fatimids. Formed and commanded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

• Ansar Allah (Houthis)

Ideology: Shia jihadism. Specifically the Saada Brigade of this group. A Yemeni militia that’s also fighting in Yemen.

• Russian Armed Forces

Russia became directly involved in the military conflict in September-October 2015.

• weapons and financial support from:

• North Korea
• Iraq
• Venezuela
• Egypt
• Belarus
• China

• Opposition

• Free Syrian Army

A loose, often informal coalition of mostly moderate groups. Originally established in July 2011 by a group of defecting Syrian military officers led by Col. Riad al-Asaad. The actual leadership of the “Army” is disputed and has become irrelevant. Note that this section includes both pro-YPG (and thus aligned with the Federation of Northern Syria/Rojava) and anti-YPG brigades; these two groups have often come into conflict with each other since 2015. Notable subgroups:

• Liwa al-Aadiyat (Hama)

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operates in Hama governorate; not to be confused with the Rif Dimashq-based group of the same name, nor the Latakia-based Liwa al-Aadiyat (“Brigade of the Chargers”) which became the 1st Coastal Division. May have joined Ahrar ash-Sham.

• Free Palestine Liberation Army

Ideology: Palestinian nationalism, secularism. Defected from the original Palestine Liberation Army in 2015 after the Assad regime executed five PLA soldiers for insubordination. Possibly connected with a September 2014 formation of the same name, whose logos are shown here. Possibly defunct.

• 60th Infantry Division

Ideology: mixed. Operates mainly in Idlib governorate. Originally formed as the Free Idlib Army (second through  fourth logos) by three prominent Idlib-based FSA groups in September 2016. All three were among the first nine groups to receive TOW missiles and had been part of a similar, larger merger called the 5th Corps in 2014, which fell apart. The Free Idlib Army sided with other FSA groups along with Ahrar ash-Sham in the early 2017 clashes with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. Later that year, one of its members, the 13th Division, was forcibly dissolved. The remainder absorbed remnants of the 23rd Division in November 2023 and the group adopted its current name. Subgroups:

• Northern Division (Knights of Justice Brigade)

Operates in Idlib governorate. One of the original 9 groups to receive Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. The Knights of Justice Brigade merged with the 101st Infantry Division (now known as the 21st Combined Force) in December 2015 to create the Northern Division, but that fell apart in June 2016; Knights of Justice continue to use the Northern Division name and brand. The Knights of Justice were an original part of the 13th Division (see defunct section)

• Mountain Hawks Brigade

Formerly known as the Falcons of Mt. Zawiya Brigade. Was an affiliate of the defunct Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades and, briefly, the Syria Revolutionaries Front. One of the original 9 groups to receive Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Close to the now-defunct Idlib Military Council.

• 23rd Division/Rapid Intervention Force

Formerly known as the 16th Infantry Division (see second logo). The 16th Infantry Division had received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Its initial leader, Khaled Hayani (see Liwa Shuhada Badr in the defunct section), was one of the most infamously corrupt rebel warlords until his death in 2015. The group was also well-known for constantly and indiscriminately shelling civilians in regime- and YPG-held territory. In July 2016 the group was among several rebel groups accused of war crimes by Amnesty International. By the end of that month the group had been decimated by battlefield losses to the regime. Some remnants eventually regrouped and formed the 23rd Division. It was later provided with more TOWs. In August 2020 the group was badly defeated by the Levant Front during inter-rebel clashes and formally dissolved itself. Many members joined the Sultan Murad Division; a few fighters remain active in Idlib.

• 21st Combined Force  

Ideology: secularism. Operates in Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama governorates. Formerly known as the 101st Infantry Division (see last two logos). One of the original 9 groups to receive Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Has clashed with al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. Was a member of the 5th Corps and the Northern Division.

• 1st Infantry Brigade (Idlib)

Ideology: unknown, possibly secularism. Operates in Idlib governorate. Was a member of the 5th Corps. Possibly defunct.

• Jaysh al-Nasr

A union of brigades operating mainly in Hama governorate that formed out of a larger operations room of the same name.

• Falcons of al-Ghab

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Has received Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Has come into conflict with al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham on at least one occasion.

• 5th Infantry Division

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Possibly related in some way to the now-defunct 111th Regiment.

• Liwa Ahrar Darayya

Ideology: unknown. Originally known as Liwa Ahrar (see second logo); split from the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union in 2014. Based in the Rif Dimashq city of Darayya. It was accused of criminality and sympathy for IS. In September the group helped to form the Martyrs of Freedom Division, part of the South Front’s 1st Corps. By October the other rebels in the city had effectively dissolved Liwa Ahrar Darayya. After its former fighters accepted the regime’s offer of free passage to the north, it joined Jaysh al-Nasr in September 2016.

• Farouq Army

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Hama governorate. Split from the Sham Front (not to be confused with the Levant Front) sometime in spring 2016. It joined HTS in March 2017. In February 2018 it left HTS and joined Jaysh al-Nasr.

• Fighting Salvation Front

Ideology: unknown. Alongside the now-defunct 111th Regiment, it split from Jaysh al-Nasr in February 2018, accusing the Falcons of al-Ghab of dominating the group.

• 1st Infantry Division (Idlib)

Ideology: unknown. Operated mainly in Hama governorate until being pushed into Idlib and Latakia. Originally formed in 2012 as Katibat al-Zubair bin al-Awam; it later renamed to Liwa Jund al-Rahman, then the 6th Brigade (see second logo). It adopted its current name in 2016. Split from Jaysh al-Nasr in January 2017. Not to be confused with the group of the same name which was part of the southern branch of the Syria Revolutionaries Front. Since 2021 it has suffered from infighting. In April 2022 the National Front for Liberation (see operations room section) ordered the group dissolved, but many of its fighters refused and announced they were leaving the NFL.

• Jaysh al-Izza

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Previously known as the Gathering of Dignity. Operated mainly in Hama governorate until it was largely decimated and driven out by the government in 2019; now it operates mainly in Idlib. Has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Its leader is reportedly close to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.

• 1st Division Umawiyeen

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo and Hama governorate.

• Coastal Division

Ideology: mixed. Operates in Latakia and Idlib governorates. Formed in September 2023 by the merger of two Latakia-based groups:

• 1st Coastal Division 

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, secularism. Formerly known as the Brigade of the Chargers. Before that, it was affiliated with the defunct Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. One of the original 9 groups to receive Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• 2nd Coastal Division

Ideology: Islamism, Turkish nationalism. A Turkmen group linked to the Grey Wolves. One of its commanders, also a Grey Wolves member, claimed responsibility for the mid-air shooting of one of the two Russian pilots who ejected over Latakia after Turkey shot down their fighter jet. Despite this, it has received US-made TOW anti-tank missiles.

• Revolutionary Deterrence Forces

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Latakia governorate.

• Al-Mu’tasem Division

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Known until June 2018 as Liwa al-Mu’tasem (see second logo). Part of the US Train and Equip Program. Its core formed from Jabhat al-Akrad fighters who had been forced from Latakia by al-Nusra. One its commanders was part of the now-defunct Wolves of al-Ghab Brigade, an SRF affiliate; another was a former Liwa al-Tawhid member.

• Tofeshat Brigades

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Helpers of Sunna Brigade (Aleppo)

Ideology: unknown. Not to be confused with the now-defunct Daraa-based group of the same name.

• Steadfastness Front

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Hama governorate. Possibly part of Jaysh al-Nasr.

• Free Alawite Brigade

Ideology: unknown; presumably Alawite interests. Operates in Rif Dimashq and Damascus governorates. Has conducted a number of assassinations against the government.

• Syrian Turkmen Brigades

Ideology: Turkmen interests. Military wing of Syrian Turkmen Assembly. Backed by Turkey. Its affiliates are only very loosely connected, much like the FSA as a whole. Some of the notable constituent groups:

• Sultan Murad Division  

Operates mainly in Aleppo governorate. Somewhat Islamist; especially close to Turkey. Has received Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. It has clashed with the Hamza Division (Aleppo) on at least one occasion, although the two groups have since grown very close. It has been accused of a variety of abuses over the years. Some of the notable subgroups:

• Ashabul Yemin Brigade

Originally formed in 2012 in Jarabulus. It was a member of the Authenticity and Development Front (see second logo). The group disappeared sometime in 2014-2015 and reactivated in June 2018 as a subgroup of the Sultan Murad Division.

• Martyr Mashaal Tammo Brigade

Named after the founder of the Kurdish Future Movement (see Kurdish political section), who was assassinated in November 2011. Its leader was dismissed from the Sultan Murad Division, then joined the Revolutionary Knights Brigade before leading the Martyr Mashaal Tammo Brigade as part of Sultan Murad. It may have changed its name to the 213th Brigade in July 2018.

• Hasakah Shield Brigade

Formed to fight the SDF by fighters who had been expelled from al-Hasakah governorate by the YPG. Close to the Hasakah Martyrs Brigade (part of Ahrar al-Sharqiya), which is similar in origin and purpose.

• Sultan Suleiman Shah Division

Operates in Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with the now-defunct Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade. Originally formed in 2011 as the Line of Fire Brigade (see fourth logo logo) and based in Hama; led by Muhammad Hussein al-Jasim, aka “Abu Amsha”. The group and its leader were notorious for their corruption and abuses against civilians and other rebel groups. In 2016 it relocated to Aleppo, renamed to the Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade (see second and third logos), and was reformed as a police unit affiliated with the Sultan Murad Division in the newly liberated city of Jarabulus. Later it began deploying as an offensive military unit and separated from Sultan Murad. In August 2018 Abu Amsha was accused of rape; he refused to turn himself in, so other pro-Turkish FSA groups disarmed the group temporarily. Nevertheless, Abu Amsha has apparently not faced any long-term punishment and the group remains powerful. In 2020 it changed the “Brigade” in its name to “Division”.

• Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror Division

Operates in Aleppo governorate. Originally known as the Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror Brigade (see second and third logos). It merged into the Sultan Murad Division in 2015 but left some time later. Reportedly responsible for the torture of a man trying to flee to YPG-held territory. At one point in 2014 it cooperated with Jabhat al-Akrad against IS.

• 1st Commando Brigade

Split from the Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror Division in April 2017. Not to be confused with the 1st Commando Brigade of Homs. Possibly defunct.

• Sultan Abdul al-Hamid Brigade

        Operates in Latakia governorate. Somewhat Islamist.

• Sultan Abdul Hamid II Division

Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed in June 2018 with the main objective of taking Tell Rifaat and Manbij from the YPG/SDF. Its leader was a commander in the now-defunct Ghuraba al-Sham Front.

• Sultan Selim I Brigade (Latakia)

Not to be confused with the now-defunct Hama-based group of the same name.

• 1st Murat Brigade

Operates in Latakia governorate. Formerly part of the 2nd Coastal Division; possibly still part of it.

• Muntasir Billah Division

Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formerly known as the Muntasir Billah Brigade. In May 2018 it clashed briefly with the Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror Division.

• Syrian Turkmen Front

Operates in Aleppo governorate. Split from the Sultan Murad Division. In April 2016 it tortured a hospital employee to death for allegedly working with the YPG; it has been accused of other abuses as well.

• Samarkand Brigade

Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formerly part of the Hamza Division.

• Sultan Othman Brigade (see 50th Division entry)
• Liwa Usoud al-Fatihin

        Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Liwa al-Waqas

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Founded by Turkmen formerly affiliated with the Samarkand Brigade, but primarily made up of Arabs.

• Sultan Malik Shah Division

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Split from the Sultan Murad Division in August 2020; made up mostly of Arab fighters from Homs city, with some from eastern Syria. It was originally called the Khalid ibn al-Walid Division (many of the fighters had originally been affiliated with the Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade) but reportedly Turkey forced it to change its name. In December 2020 it arrested some Sultan Murad fighters for allegedly harassing a displaced woman in Afrin, resulting in clashes between the two factions.

• 93rd Regiment

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Idlib and Hama governorates.

• 56th Special Forces Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates mainly in Aleppo governorate; it sent a battalion to participate in the SDF’s Tall Abyad offensive in Raqqa governorate with the long-term goal of retaking Deir ez-Zor governorate (original home for many of them) from IS.

• Idlib Military Council (2017)

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Idlib governorate. Formed from several small groups in November 2017. Not to be confused with the defunct group of the same name that was part of the Syria Revolutionaries Front.

• Katibat Suqour al-Raqqa

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa.

• 51st Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Part of the US Train and Equip Program. Mostly made up of fighters originally from Deir ez-Zor; also includes some Kurdish members. Led by the leader of the now-defunct 7th Division. It may have been a member of the Hamza Division briefly. One of the notable subgroups:

• Revolutionaries of Syrian Jazira

Originally formed as Liwa al-Haqq al-Hashemi in 2012 (see third logo), which became part of Jaysh al-Haqq of the Eastern Region in 2014 (fourth logo). The group in its current incarnation formed in September 2016 to fight both IS and the YPG-led SDF. At the time it was active in Hasakah governorate; it is unclear if it still has a presence there. Its senior commander has praised the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris.

• 1st Regiment

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Split from Liwa al-Tawhid, which is now known as the Levant Front. Close to the Al-Safwa Division and Ahrar ash-Sham. Has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles, despite the fact that one of its subcommanders, Hakim Anza, is known to be close to al-Qaeda and orchestrated the 2014 kidnapping and (non-fatal) shooting of an American journalist. In June 2017 a split from the 1st Regiment and Ahrar ash-Sham on one side clashed with the Hamza Division and Sultan Murad Division on the other side.

• Al-Safwa Division 

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sufi Islam? Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formerly known as the Elite Islamic Battalions. Split from Liwa al-Tawhid (now known as the Levant Front) in 2013 and from the Army of Mujahideen sometime later. Has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Split from the Army of Mujahideen in April 2015. Has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. It merged into the Levant Front in January 2016 but left some time before joining Jabhat Ahl al-Sham. In January 2017 it joined Ahrar ash-Sham as a result of clashes with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. In January 2018 it joined Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. In January 2019 it was defeated by JFS’ successor HTS and joined the Sham Legion. By 2020 it was independent again.

• Levant Front  

Ideology: varied; mainly Sunni Islamism. Operates mainly in Aleppo governorate. Originally an operations room including several Islamist groups, it is now basically a re-branded Liwa al-Tawhid (see the third logo), one of the original seven members of the Islamic Front. Liwa al-Tawhid was originally part of the FSA, then left to join the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front in 2012. It joined the Islamic Front along with most of the SILF in 2013. It was one of the more “moderate” Islamic Front groups. In 2016 the Levant Front began deploying US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles and has identified as part of the FSA. In July 2016 it was among several northern rebel groups accused of war crimes by Amnesty International. Later that month it clashed with al-Nusra, now known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. It sided with other FSA groups along with Ahrar ash-Sham in the early 2017 clashes with JFS, with its western Aleppo branch merging into Ahrar ash-Sham. A few of the notable subgroups:

• Northern Storm Brigade

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Founded as a secular smuggling group in the FSA. Has been accused of many abuses, including kidnapping and extrajudicial killings. Lost most of its members to fighting with IS and to defections; the remainder joined Liwa al-Tawhid. It instigated the July 2016 clashes with al-Nusra, accusing Nusra of collaborating with IS. It was initially reluctant to fight the YPG-led SDF, due to Northern Storm’s cooperation with YPG-allied Jabhat al-Akrad in retaking Azaz from IS. The Northern Army may have split from Northern Storm Brigade for this reason.

• Ahrar ash-Sham (northern Aleppo sector)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. This group of Ahrar fighters joined the Levant Front in late 2017 but still use their old name and flag.

• Katibat Ahfad Salah al-Din

Ideology: Kurdish interests, conservatism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed by a former member of the Yusuf al-’Azma Brigade. Originally part of the US Train & Equip Program. Mostly composed of Kurdish fighters. Initially connected to the Iraqi KDP and its Syrian counterpart (see Kurdish political section).  It was part of the 99th Division. Briefly fought the YPG after the latter’s assault on rebel positions in 2016. It also experienced tensions with Ahrar ash-Sham. In July 2017 the brigade announced that it would not take part in an anticipated Turkish-led offensive on the SDF-held Afrin canton in Aleppo governorate; Turkey and the Levant Front subsequently forced the brigade to disband. The leader, who was tortured in custody, has said they will try to create a political party. However, some fighters remained active and joined the Levant Front. The group currently uses the names “Katibat Ahfad Salah al-Din” and “Kata’ib Ahfad Salah al-Din” interchangeably.

• 37th Division - Special Forces

Ideology: unknown. Formed in August 2023 by several small groups, including some already part of the Levant Front.

• 50th Division

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed in December 2022 by several groups close to or affiliated with the Levant Front. Most fighters are originally from the Tell Rifaat area. Notable subgroups:

• Liwa al-Fatah

One of the more long-lived rebel groups in Aleppo. Originally formed in July 2012, it joined Liwa al-Tawhid in 2013 but left some time later. It joined Ahrar ash-Sham in 2015 but left in early 2016. It eventually adopted the FSA identity and joined the Levant Front in March 2017, before helping to form the 50th Division.

• 5th Regiment

Formerly part of Liwa al-Tawhid.

• Sultan Othman Brigade

Also affiliated with the Syrian Turkmen Brigades. Possibly part of the 1st Regiment at some point.

• Liwa Seif al-Sham

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with the similarly-named Sword of al-Sham Brigades. Created in 2012. It joined Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki in late 2016, then the Levant Front in January 2017 before becoming independent again in March.

• 9th Division Special Forces

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formerly part of the now-defunct Hazzm Movement. In May 2020 it was the main group opposing Ahrar al-Sharqiya’s attempt to take over the city of Jarabulus.

• 132nd Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Also called “Ghazal Base” after the Turkish Army base where its fighters were trained.

• Resolute Storm Division

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate; formerly based in Latakia.

• Jaysh al-Haramon

Ideology: unknown, possibly Sunni Islamism. Operates in Rif Dimashq governorate. Possibly defunct.

• Elite Forces (Aleppo)

Ideology: unknown; Sunni Islamism? moderate Sunni Islamism?. Operates mainly Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with the Syrian Elite Forces in Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor governorates. I originally found this group to be openly anti-Alawite and possibly anti-Shia, but I can’t find that evidence anymore. Possibly defunct.

• Eastern Shield Army

Ideology: unknown. Set up in April 2017 with the stated aim of capturing Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Hasakah governorates from IS and the SDF.

• Harakat al-Qayyam

Ideology: unknown. Formed in October 2017 to target members of the YPG and SDF for assassination.

• Ertuğrul Resistance Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Similar to Harakat al-Qayyam, it works behind SDF lines to assassinate YPG figures.

• Revolutionary Council of Clans

Ideology: Arab nationalism? Operates mainly in Hama governorate. Formed in August 2017 to unite pro-rebel tribal groups.

• Hamza Division (Aleppo)

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with the Daraa-based Hamza Division. Part of the US Train and Equip Program. Its leader is a former member of the Hazzm Movement. It has come into conflict with the Sultan Murad Division on at least one occasion. Since then, though, it has grown closer to Turkey and away from US influence. In January 2017 both Hamza and Sultan Murad were accused of torturing an alleged thief to death. In June 2017, the Hamza Division and Sultan Murad Division clashed with a split from the 1st Regiment and Ahrar ash-Sham. Some of the notable subgroups:

• Hamza Brigade

The central component of the Hamza Division. Originally formed as the Hamza Revolutionary Brigade in Hasakah governorate in 2013. By early 2015 it was known as the Gathering of Mujahideen Companies and was part of Liwa al-Tawhid/Levant Front. It left the Levant Front and adopted its current name in December 2015.

• Northern Thunder Brigade

It has been supplied with TOW anti-tank missiles. Formerly part of the 99th Division.

• Dhi Qar Brigade

Formerly part of the now-defunct 99th Division.

• Kurdish Falcons Brigade

        Made up mostly of Kurds. Formed in February 2018.

• Northern Hawks Division 

Split from the Mountain Hawks Brigade in 2016. Known as the Northern Hawks Brigade until 2022.

• Liwa Nour al-Din al-Shahid

Based in and around the town of Qabasin and the city of al-Bab. It was hostile to Kurds and cooperated with Islamist and jihadi groups, including ISIS, to push Jabhat al-Akrad out of Qabasin in mid-2013. The group was accused of secretly joining ISIS, but in May 2014 ISIS ousted it from Qabasin. The group reemerged two years later as Katibat Nour al-Din al-Shahid and established its own military council in Qabasin (which had been liberated from ISIS by Turkish-allied rebels); it was widely criticized for its past collaboration with ISIS. Nevertheless, the group’s leader later attained a prominent position in the Hamza Division, which Liwa Nour al-Din al-Shahid had joined sometime by 2016.

• Mustafa Regiment

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. It may have been part of the US Train & Equip Program.

• 1st Squad of Aleppo

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Jaysh Halab al-Shuhaba

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Its main purpose seems to be shelling the regime in Aleppo city.

• 10th Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with the defunct 10th Coastal Brigade.

• Bayan Movement

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Formerly known as Liwa Ahrar al-Shamal and later Kataeb Ahrar al-Shamal (see second and third logos). Operates mainly in Aleppo governorate. Originally part of Liwa al-Tawhid and later the Syria Revolutionaries Front. It invented the “hell cannon” improvised artillery device.

• Northern Army

Ideology: Sunni Islamism? Operates in Aleppo governorate. Set up in the city of Azaz by locals as a response to the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces’ capture of the city from pro-Turkish and Islamist rebels. It may have formed as a split from the Northern Storm Brigade because Northern Storm was reluctant to fight the SDF. In May 2016 it claimed responsibility for the execution of two women working for the YPG’s public relations campaign. Later that same month it created an all-female battalion called Katibat Ahrar al-Shamal (not to be confused with Kataeb Ahrar al-Shamal, now known as the Bayan Movement - see above; or with Liwa Ahrar al-Shamal). In November 2016 it joined Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, possibly after trying to join Ahrar ash-Sham and being rejected. In January 2017 it left Zenki.

• Al-Akhtarin Military Council

Ideology: unknown. Operates in the city of al-Akhtarin in Aleppo governorate.

• 1st Umayyad Division

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo and Hama (and possibly Idlib) governorates.

• Liwa al-Salam

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. It was one of the original components of the now-defunct Fastaqim Kama Umirt Union.

• Atarib Martyrs Brigade

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed in March 2012 as the Atarib Martyrs Battalion as part of the Shields of the Revolution Brigade. At various points it joined the Farouq Battalions, Jaysh al-Islam, the 101st Infantry Division (now known as the 21st Combined Force), the Hazzm Movement, and Jaysh al-Thuwar. By May 2016 it was part of the Army of Mujahideen. Some of its members later joined the Free Idlib Army. The Army of Mujahideen joined Ahrar ash-Sham in January 2017; the Atarib Martyrs Brigade left sometime after and became independent again. It may have joined Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. In January 2019 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham captured Atarib, and the Atari Martyrs Brigade transferred to Turkish-controlled Afrin.

• Hama Shield Brigade

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Hama governorate.

• Fighting Vanguard Brigade

Ideology: unknown, likely Sunni Islamism. Operates in Hama governorate. Formerly part of the Syria Revolutionaries Front and Jaysh al-Nasr. Named after the infamous Fighting Vanguard, a radical offshoot from the Muslim Brotherhood which fought alongside the Brotherhood in the Islamist uprising of the late 70s and early 80s.

• Sons of Hama Division

        Ideology: unknown

• Popular Army

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Hama governorate. Not to be confused pro-government militias loosely known by the same name early in the war.

• Freemen of Hilafaya Brigade

        Ideology: unknown, Sunni Islamism? Operates in Hama governorate.

• Fastaqim Kama Umirt Union

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, moderate Sunni Islamism? Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formerly part of the now-defunct Army of Mujahideen. Possibly close to the Muslim Brotherhood. It has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. In November 2016 it came into conflict with Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, leading to defeat at the hands of Zenki and Kataeb Abu Amara. Most of its fighters then dispersed,  many joining Ahrar ash-Sham for protection. Most of the remnants merged into Ahrar ash-Sham in January 2017 for protection against Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, but the group still maintains a tiny presence in Turkey’s Syrian National Army.

• Ahrar al-Sharqiya

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Includes some former Ahrar ash-Sham and al-Nusra members. Its leader was one of the founding members of the Eastern Ghouta-based Habib Mustafa Brigades (now defunct). It was involved in a much publicized verbal confrontation with US Special Forces embedded with the Hamza Division (Aleppo) in September 2016. It has been accused of corruption and cruelty, including the rape of a young girl by one of its commanders and the summary execution of a leader of the Syrian Future Party (a Kurdish political party). It has also been involved in several spats with other rebel groups. In May 2020 major clashes broke out in Jarabulus as Ahrar al-Sharqiya and other groups from eastern Syria allegedly tried to wrest control of the city from the control of the official Turkish-sponsored authorities. The United States designated Ahrar al-Sharqiya as a terrorist organization in July 2021; the group immediately adopted a new logo and changed its full name from Tajammu Ahrar al-Sharqiya to Furat Ahrar al-Sharqiya.

• Jaysh Shuhada Badr

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed in January 2019 as a split from Ahrar al-Sharqiya.

• Saraya Farouq Hama

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Hama and Latakia governorates. Formed in March 2019 by fighters who had been part of the Farouq Battalions and later the Hazzm Movement, both defunct.

• Syrian Liberation Front  

Ideology: Sunni Islamism? Formed by six small groups that defected from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in October 2017. Not to be confused with the group of the same name formed in February 2018 (see Jabhat Tahrir al-Souriya).

• 2nd Division

Ideology: mixed. Operates mainly in Idlib governorate. Formed in November 2023 by the merger of two groups, later expanded to three:

• 2nd Army

Split from Jaysh al-Tahrir in August 2016 and soon joined the Army of Conquerors in the Land of al-Sham, but became independent again when the Army of Conquerors joined Ahrar ash-Sham in March 2017. Three subgroups:

• 46th Division

Operates in Aleppo and Hama governorates. Not to be confused with the Daraa-based 46th Infantry Division. Has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Its founder was a former member of the Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades and Ahfad al-Rasul.

• 312th Division

                Operates in Hama governorate.

• Saraya al-Haqq Union 314

Not to be confused with the Homs-based Saraya al-Haqq. Possibly a former component of the 46th Division.

• Islamic Freedom Brigade

Operates in Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia governorates. Originally known as the Freedom Battalion, one of the original components of the Free Syrian Army when the FSA was announced in July 2011. Part of the Authenticity and Development Front from 2013-2014. It began deploying US-provided TOW anti-tank missiles in November 2016. Some of its fighters were reported to have sided with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in the early 2017 clashes with Ahrar ash-Sham and the FSA. It clashed with the Sham Legion in Latakia in July 2017. By 2018 it had sided with Turkish-backed groups against the JFS-led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

• Jaysh al-Nukhba

Formerly known as Jaysh al-Tahrir (see 2nd-4th logos). Originally formed from five groups based in Hama governorate, while also operating in Idlib and Aleppo. In July 2016, al-Nusra (now known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) raided its headquarters and detained its leader. A month later, the group split, with three of the five groups establishing the 2nd Army. Jaysh al-Nukhba joined the 2nd Division in December 2023.

• Sham Front

Not to be confused with the Aleppo-based Levant Front, which has a nearly identical name in Arabic. It was composed mostly of former members of the Hama branch of the Farouq Battalions; its leader had also been in the Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades at some point. In spring 2016 its leader and many of its members left to form the Farouq Army.

• 9th Brigade

                Possibly defunct.

• Elite Battalion

Originally formed as the Azadi Battalion in November 2012 by members of Mustafa Cumma’s faction of the Kurdish Freedom Party. They had previously fought with Liwa Jund al-Haramain. The Azadi Battalion later joined the Army of Mujahideen’s 19th Division. It clashed with the YPG several times and was accused of working with hardline Islamists and jihadis. When the Army of Mujahideen collapsed and merged into Ahrar ash-Sham in January 2017, the Azadi Battalion’s leader fled to Turkey, later returning to lead his fighters as the Elite Battalion under Jaysh al-Nukhba (which itself means “Elite Army”). The Elite Battalion is formally organized under Jaysh al-Nukhba’s 14th Division alongside the 141st and 145th Brigades, but since I cannot find much info concerning these groups they are not listed here.

• Renaissance and Liberation Movement

Ideology: mixed. Operates mainly in Aleppo governorate. Formed in June 2024 as the merger of three groups:

• Faylaq al-Majd

Formed in September 2017, partly by former members of Jaysh al-Islam. It has been accused of abuses against civilians on multiple occasions. In March 2019 the remnants of Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki joined it.

• 112th Brigade

Originally known as Jaysh al-Ahfad (whose logo is presented here; the group’s current logo is unknown). It was created in late 2016 by former members of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades, which had disintegrated years earlier. In November 2018, as part of a reorganization process within the Syrian National Army, the group separated into the 112th Brigade and 113th Brigade (the latter has no entry on this list).

• Samarkand Brigade (see Syrian Turkmen Brigades)

• Jaysh al-Majd

Ideology: unknown. Operates mainly in Aleppo governorate. Split from Faylaq al-Majd.

• Jaysh al-Sharqiya

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo and Idlib governorates. Formed in September 2017 with the intention to liberate Deir ez-Zor governorate. Includes many former Ahrar al-Sharqiya fighters. It has clashed with other Turkish-backed rebel groups on occasion. In May 2020 it backed Ahrar al-Sharqiya’s attempt to take over Jarabulus.

• Martyrs of the East Gathering

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate; also claimed an attack on SDF positions in Deir ez-Zor. Split from Ahrar al-Sharqiya. In November 2018 it clashed with several other pro-Turkish rebel groups in the Afrin area who accused it of abuses against civilians. In May 2019 it tried to send fighters to defend rebel territory in Hama governorate from a government offensive, leading Turkey to arrest the group’s leader. The group also implied that it had joined Jaysh al-Izza, but the latter denied this.

• Kata’ib al-Majd

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed in June 2018 with the objective of taking Aleppo city from the government. Its leader had established the short-lived Victory Brigades (see defunct section) in 2016 before being arrested by the Levant Front for alleged collaboration with Russia.

• Jaysh Talia al-Nasr

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Al-Nasr Union

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Popular Revolutionary Resistance

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. One of its founders was arrested by JFS/HTS in August 2018.

• Shields of the Revolution Company

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Idlib governorate. A small anti-HTS force formed in June 2023; it called on HTS to release its detainees and cease the oppression of women and launched an RPG attack against a local HQ. Not to be confused with the defunct Shields of the Revolution Council.

• Northern Brigade

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Formerly part of the Sham Legion. It came under attack by other rebel groups in May 2017 for alleged corruption and alignment with HTS. The Sham Legion expelled the brigade on May 30, but subsequently allowed some of its members to stay. Others defected to HTS. The group eventually became separated from the Sham Legion, though at what exact point is unclear.

• Liwa Ahrar Hayyan

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed in August 2018.

• Liwa Rijal al-Harb

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Split from the Al-Safwa Division. It has possibly joined the Mu’tasem Division.

• Liberation Brigade of Deir ez-Zor

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Deir ez-Zor governorate.

• Sons of the East Gathering

Ideology: unknown. Made up of fighters originally from Deir ez-Zor but based in Idlib governorate. In May 2020 it backed Ahrar al-Sharqiya’s attempt to take over Jarabulus.

• Syrian Military Council

Ideology: unknown. Also known as the Syrian Transitional Military Council and occasionally as the Syrian National Liberation Movement; not to be confused with the Syriac Military Council. Formed in January 2021 by Manaf Tlass, a high-ranking Republican Guard general who defected in 2012. Active primarily in exile, but it reportedly has some presence in northwestern Syria. It proclaims itself independent of both the Turkish-backed rebels and the US-backed SDF.

• Jaysh Souriya al-Hurra

Ideology: unknown. Formerly known as Jaysh Maghawhir al-Thawra (see second logo) and before that the New Syrian Army (third and fourth logos). Made up of Deir ez-Zor natives and fights IS exclusively. Part of the US-train and equip program. It was affiliated with the Authenticity and Development Front until the ADF dropped it in August 2016 after the disastrous July attempt to retake the town of Abu Kamal from IS. By December the remnants of the group reformed as the “Army of the Commandos of the Revolution”, or Jaysh Maghawir al-Thawra. It worked alongside the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo and Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya in US-controlled al-Tanf pocket on the Syrian-Jordanian border. In October 2022 a new commander (formerly of Liwa Shuhada al-Qaryatayn) was appointed and the group adopted its current name.

• Popular Resistance (Daraa)

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Daraa governorate. Not to be confused with the pro-government group of the same name in Raqqa. An underground assassination group formed in November 2018 presumably by FSA fighters who had accepted the government reconciliation process but grew dissatisfied with the government’s alleged broken promises. It targets figures associated with the reconciliation deal that ended rebel presence in the south.

• Saraya al-Janoub

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Daraa governorate. Another underground assassination unit formed in February 2019.

• FSA-SDF groups

These are brigades which use the FSA label but are part of the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (see Operations Rooms section), putting them at odds with most other rebels.

• Jabhat al-Akrad

Ideology: Kurdish interests. Operates in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates. Originally part of Liwa Ahrar Souriya. Formally expelled from the FSA by the nominal FSA leadership in 2013 due to closeness to the Democratic Union Party/People’s Protection Committees. It was briefly part of the now-defunct Dawn of Freedom Brigades. It later helped to form Jaysh al-Thuwar (see below). Two notable subunits:

• Shahba Front for the Defense of Women

The more prominent of Jabhat al-Akrad’s two all-female units, operating in Afrin canton and the “Shahba” region between Afrin and Kobane in Aleppo governorate.

• Idlib Revolutionaries Brigade

Operates in Aleppo governorate. Split from the Northern Democratic Brigade  in June 2018 with the aim of taking Idlib governorate.

• Jaysh al-Thuwar

An alliance of FSA groups that work closely with the YPG. Has often clashed with Islamist groups. Not to be confused with the Daraa- and Quneitra-based Revolutionary Army (“Jaysh al-Thawra”). Notable subgroups:

• Northern Sun Battalion

Ideology: secularism. Formed by Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen to fight IS. It was the main FSA group in Kobane, the Kurdish town that famously fought off a siege by IS. It was part of the now-defunct Dawn of Freedom Brigades. Its celebrated leader Abu Layla was killed in the battle to liberate his hometown of Manbij from IS. Layla had previously been a member of Liwa Ahrar Souriya and later a leader in Jabhat al-Akrad.

• Special Operations Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Sometimes known as Special Operations Brigade 455. It was a member of the Syria Revolutionaries Front and the Dawn of Freedom Brigades. Its leader, who started his rebel career under the Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades and Battalions, currently commands Jaysh al-Thuwar.

• 99th Infantry Brigade

Ideology: unknown. It was a member of the Syria Revolutionaries Front. Operates in Idlib governorate. It may have left Jaysh al-Thuwar.

• 1st Commando Brigade of Homs

Ideology: unknown. Originally operated in Homs governorate, then Idlib, then Aleppo. Formerly part of the Syria Revolutionaries Front. Not to be confused with the Turkmen 1st Commando Brigade.

• Seljuks Brigade

Ideology: Turkmen interests. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Unlike most other Turkmen brigades, the Seljuks Brigade supports the SDF and is thus viewed with hostility by Turkey and the pro-Turkish FSA. Formerly part of the now-defunct Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade (no relation to the active Sultan Suleiman Shah Division). Its leader, Talal Silo, had defected from the SAA in 2014. He served as spokesman for the SDF until he defected to Turkey in November 2017. The brigade may no longer exist.

• Tribal Forces

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Afrin canton and the “Shahba” region between Afrin and Kobane in Aleppo governorate, as well as Raqqa governorate. Includes many Arabized Kurds.

• Manbij Turkmen Battalion

Ideology: Turkmen interests. Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Liberation Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Formed to fight IS in Raqqa. Formerly part of the Farouq Battalions. In September 2016 its leader and a few dozen troops defected from the SDF and regrouped with Turkish-backed rebels following clashes with the YPG.

• Revolutionaries of Tal Abyad Front

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operates in Raqqa governorate. Mostly made up of former Farouq Battalions members. Possibly related to the now-defunct Liwa Harun al-Rashid.

• Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates. Close to the Muwatana pro-democratic political movement, at least at one point. Briefly part of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. Assimilated into al-Nusra for a time before re-asserting its FSA orientation. Has received occasional US weapons and training. Works closely with the YPG, although tensions have flared at times. In June 2018 clashes broke out, resulting in the YPG and Raqqa Internal Security Forces (the Raqqa branch of the Asayish) capturing all Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa’s weapons and fighters. The future of the group is uncertain.

• Liwa Shuhada al-Raqqa

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Raqqa governorate. A former Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa battalion that was upgraded to brigade status for the Raqqa offensive.

• Knights of the Euphrates Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formerly part of the now-defunct Dawn of Freedom Brigades, and before that, the Suqour al-Sham Brigades.

• Tajammu Kataeb Furat Jarabulus

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formerly part of (in chronological order): Liwa al-Tawhid, the Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front, and the Dawn of Freedom Brigades.

• Revolutionaries of Manbij Brigades

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Possibly a former affiliate of Liwa al-Tawhid. In March 2017 one of its leaders apparently defected to the Assad regime during the transfer of the Western Manbij countryside to government control.

• Hawks of Jarabulus Battalion

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Northern Democratic Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Sometimes known as the Northern Democratic Forces. Formerly known as Liwa al-Qaqaa and based in Idlib (see last logo); it was first part of Liwa Ahrar Souriya, then the Syrian Salvation Front, then the Syria Revolutionaries Front, then Jaysh al-Thuwar. Possibly part of Liwa Ahrar al-Zawiya at first.

• Brigade for the Liberation of Idlib and Afrin

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates. Formed in June 2018 with the aim of taking Idlib and also retaking Afrin from Turkish-led forces. May include former members of the Northern Democratic Brigade.

• Liwa al-Qawsi

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Liwa Tahrir al-Furat

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Led by a former member of the Northern Sun Battalion.

• Gathering of the Euphrates Brigades

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates. Two of the notable subgroups:

• Liwa Ahrar ar-Raqqa

Formerly known as the Jihad in the Path of God Brigade (see second logo). It works closely with Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, of which it was once a subunit. One of the few brigades officially linked to the Syrian National Council/Coalition not to receive US-supplied TOW missiles. It was part of the now-defunct Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front. By March of 2016 the brigade had rebranded and joined the SDF, presumably dropping ties to the exiled opposition. There were reports of clashes between the YPG and Liwa Ahrar ar-Raqqa in September 2016.

• Freemen of Jarabulus Battalion

Formed in 2013 as the Martyr Hamza Battalion, part of Jabhat al-Akrad. Has possibly joined the Northern Sun Battalion.

• Lions of the Euphrates Movement

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Possibly defunct.

• Syrian Elite Forces

Ideology: Kurdish-Arab unity. Operates in Raqqa, Hasakah, and Deir ez-Zor governorates. The armed wing of the Syria’s Tomorrow Current (see political section). Not to be confused with the Aleppo-based Elite Forces. Not formally a member of the SDF. In July 2017 some of its units reportedly displayed cowardice and caused problems during the SDF offensive on Raqqa city. The next month, some of its fighters left and joined the SDF’s Deir ez-Zor Military Council, citing corruption as the reason. By February 2021 most of its fighters had reportedly defected to Turkey and the group was more or less defunct.

• Deir ez-Zor Military Council

Ideology: unknown. Formed in December 2016 ahead of an SDF offensive in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Its original leader, Abu Kawla, had been a smuggler before the war. He led a rebel group that was widely accused of corruption and avoiding frontline combat. In early 2014 he defected to IS and his group dissolved, but he later left IS and joined the SDF. In November 2017 he was fired from his position as DeZMC leader due to charges of corruption.

• Anti-Terror Force

Ideology: democracy, Druze interests. Operates in Suweida governorate. Not to be confused with the AANES’ Anti-Terror Units. Formed in 2021 as the armed wing of the Syrian Legion Party (see political section). As noted in its party’s entry, it has proved unpopular with locals. Largely moribund after it was attacked by pro-government forces in June 2022.

• Gathering of Kurdish Sons

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, Sunni Islamism? Operates in the Afrin area of Aleppo governorate. Formed in March 2018 after the Turkish-led operation to push the YPG/SDF out of Afrin. It declared it will fight “the [Assad] regime and all its allies”, including the SDF.

• Tajammu Saraya Darayya

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Idlib governorate. Formed by fighters originally from the Damascene suburb of Darayya.

• Bara bin Malik al-Ansari Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in the besieged town of al-Hamah in Rif Dimashq governorate until al-Hamah surrendered to the regime and the brigade moved to Idlib. Possibly part of the FSA. Possibly defunct.

• Jund al-Tawhid Battalion

Ideology: Sunni Islamism? Operates in Rif Dimashq governorate. Possibly defunct.

• Liwa Bilad al-Sham

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Hama governorate. Possibly part of the FSA.

• Hawks of Jihad Battalion

        Ideology: unknown. Operates in Hama governorate.

• Salah al-Din Ayyubi Battalion

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Kurdish interests. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed in May 2012.

• Harakat Salah al-Din al-Kurdi

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism?, Kurdish interests. Operates mainly in Latakia governorate; formerly in Idlib, Hama, and Raqqa. Formed in 2015, although its fighters have been active since 2012. Includes many Kurds from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

• Promised Company

        Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo governorate.

• Miqdad ibn Amir Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Idlib and Latakia governorates. Formed in July 2012 in Damascus as the Miqdad ibn Amir Battalion (see second logo), part of the FSA’s Sahaba Brigades and Battalions (see third logo). By 2014 it was based primarily in Darayya and its ultimate parent group was the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union. It evacuated to Idlib with the other rebels in Darayya in late 2016. Possibly a member of the 16th Infantry Division (now known as the 23rd Division) during this period. In January 2017 it merged into Ahrar ash-Sham. By April 2018 it was independent again.

• Saraya Jaljalat

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Former member of Liwa al-Tawhid.

• Suqour al-Sham Brigades

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. Originally part of the FSA; leading member of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. Its founder originally expressed support for a relatively moderate Islamic state with protection for minorities; that position seemed to have been forgotten in the Islamic Front merger, although Suqour al-Sham was still more “moderate” than Ahrar ash-Sham. Nevertheless, it merged with Ahrar ash-Sham in March 2015 after a long period of decline. It re-emerged in September 2016 after rejecting the idea (then being discussed) that Ahrar ash-Sham should merge with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly al-Nusra). In January 2017 it merged back into Ahrar ash-Sham amidst clashes with JFS. By February 2018 the group had become independent again, though it is still closely allied with Ahrar. Some sources describe it as an autonomous faction of Ahrar.

• 77th Division

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. Formed in February 2024 by the merger of two groups. Not to be confused with the defunct group of the same name operating in Aleppo and Deir-ez Zor governorates.

• Suqour al-Sham - Division 40

Split from the Suqour al-Sham Brigades in December 2023 when the latter left the National Front for Liberation.

• Damascus Gathering

Made up of Ahrar ash-Sham fighters who were evacuated from the Damascus area. Sometime between February and August 2018, the group left Ahrar. Two subgroups (a third, the Miqdad ibn Amir Brigade, had left by April):

• Kata’ib al-Hamza

One of the main Ahrar al-Sham units in the Damascus region. Its HQ was in Zabadani, where it was the main rebel group before the town reached an evacuation deal with the government.

• Unification of the Capital Brigades and Battalions

Based in the town of Khan Shih. Part of the FSA before it became an independent Islamist group. It joined Ahrar ash-Sham in October 2015.

• Jabhat Tahrir al-Souriya

A merger formed in February 2018 between Ahrar ash-Sham and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki in anticipation of clashes with HTS. Not to be confused with the group of the same name formed in October 2017 as a split from HTS (see Syrian Liberation Front). Zenki has since collapsed and joined Faylaq al-Majd.

• Ahrar ash-Sham

Ideology: Sunni jihadism, Sunni Islamism. Possibly the single largest rebel group in Syria, at least until the formation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in January 2017. Leader of the former Syrian Islamic Front and the dominant member of the Islamic Front. Ideologically similar to al-Qaeda, but more moderate in tactics and less internationally-focused. Since 2015 it has begun reaching out to the West. In 2014-2015, three of the original seven Islamic Front members merged into Ahrar ash-Sham: Liwa al-Haqq (Homs), the Kurdish Islamic Front, and Suqour al-Sham Brigades. In late 2016 tensions between Ahrar ash-Sham and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra) began to increase as a result of AaS’s willingness to work with Turkey and other governments. In October, clashes erupted between Jund al-Aqsa and AaS, with many other rebel groups declaring support for AaS; AaS vowed to eradicate Jund al-Aqsa, but Jund al-Aqsa joined Jabhat Fatah al-Sham for protection, further worsening relations between AaS and JFS. In January 2017 clashes between former Jund al-Aqsa members and AaS again erupted, this time prompting AaS and JFS to engage in open warfare with each other. Several other rebel groups have sided with AaS, and many fighters have begun joining AaS to avoid being defeated by JFS/HTS. At the same time, although many of its more radical members have defected, AaS nevertheless remains divided on its relationship with the international community and al-Qaeda. In July 2017 clashes again broke out between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar ash-Sham, this time resulting in a HTS victory, leaving them in decisive control of Idlib governorate. Ahrar’s internal divisions sharpened in late 2020, coming to a head in October when ex-leader Hassan Soufan and military commander Anad Darwish, allegedly backed by HTS, captured several headquarters of Ahrar units loyal to formal leader Jaber Ali Pasha.

• Imam Bukhari Battalion

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo and Idlib governorates. Made up of Uzbeks. Pledged loyalty to the Afghan Taliban in November 2014; since 2016 it has also been involved in fighting in that country. Works very closely with Ahrar ash-Sham.

• Jaysh al-Islam

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Rif Dimashq governorate until April 2018. Not to be confused with the Palestinian Army of Islam. Not jihadist, but fiercely sectarian, especially in regard to Alawites - though in 2015 it toned down its rhetoric in hope of receiving Western funds. An effective fighting force, but widely considered corrupt and tyrannical. Its central brigade was part of the Partisans of Islam Front and later the SILF. Also part of the Islamic Front. Considered a rival of Ahrar ash-Sham, it nevertheless sided with AaS in the early 2017 clashes with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, with its Idlib branch merging into AaS. Jaysh al-Islam dominated the Unified Military Command of Eastern Ghouta (see the pennant logo) from its creation in August 2014 to its effective collapse in spring 2016 amid infighting. In 2018 the Eastern Ghouta rebel pocket finally collapsed under government pressure, and the bulk of Jaysh al-Islam’s forces were relocated to Jarabulus, Aleppo.

• Glory to God Battalion

        Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Latakia governorate. Possibly defunct.

• 13th Battalion

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Espouses particularly vitriolic anti-Kurdish views. Expelled from Jaysh al-Sunna for threatening Kurdish civilians. Possibly defunct.

• Kataeb al-Fatah

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism? Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed sometime in 2019.

• Liwa al-Sham

        Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Hama governorate.

• Ahl al-Sham Gathering

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Hama governorate. Formerly known as the Hama Liberation Front. Possibly merged into the Sham Liberation Army.

• Tribal Youth Movement

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Hama governorate. Close to Ahrar ash-Sham.

• Omar Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism? Operates in Hama governorate. Formerly part of the now-defunct Muhajirin wa-Ansar Alliance.

• Conquest Brigades

        Ideology: Sunni Islamism

• Rijal al-Malahim

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Rif Dimashq governorate. Possibly defunct.

• Battalion of Mujahideen of the Steppes

        Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism?

• Liwa Ramah al-Shamal

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Possibly part of the FSA.

• Al-Rahman Legion

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate; formerly in Rif Dimashq and Damascus governorates until 2018. Has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. May have been part of the FSA in its early days. Most of its fighters had left by October 2016, possibly dissatisfied with the infighting with Jaysh al-Islam; many coalesced into Alwiyat al-Majd, which was formed after al-Rahman violently dispersed a crowd of protesters demanding an end to infighting. Alwiyat al-Majd rejoined al-Rahman in May 2017 after the latter surrounded its HQ. In 2018 the Eastern Ghouta rebel pocket finally collapsed under government pressure, and the bulk of al-Rahman’s fighters were relocated to northwestern Syria, with some others choosing to stay and accept the government’s victory.

• Sham Legion

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates mainly in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. Many members split from the Shields of the Revolution Council, although the Sham Legion is still close to the Muslim Brotherhood. It was a founding member of the Jaysh al-Fatah operations room that conquered Idlib in 2015, though it temporarily left that Islamist coalition after clashes with Jund al-Aqsa (also a founding member; it had left earlier). It later began deploying US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles, though that supply may have ceased now that the Sham Legion has rejoined Jaysh al-Fatah. It sided with Ahrar ash-Sham in the early 2017 clashes with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, although the Sham Legion had initially stated its wish to remain neutral. Since then it has played an increasingly central role in organizing pro-Turkish rebel coalitions in the north. Some of the notable subgroups:

• Revolutionary Knights Brigade

Formed by Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki fighters who defected to the Sham Legion in January 2017. It considers itself part of the FSA. In May 2017 its fighters came under attack by the Levant Front, the Sultan Murad Division, and the Hamza Division (Aleppo), who accused it of looting, extortion, and other crimes as well as being a tool of HTS. Some of the brigade’s members defected to HTS; the group’s current status is unclear.

• Liwa Ahrar al-Shamal

Founded in August 2012 as the Anadan Martyrs Brigade, a split from Liwa al-Tawhid. It renamed to Liwa Ahrar Souriya later that month. Liwa Ahrar Souriya was one of the more infamously corrupt FSA groups. It was one of the founding members of the 16th Infantry Division but left soon after, partly due to tensions with Liwa Shuhada Badr and partly due to Liwa Ahrar Souriya’s initial refusal to fight ISIS. Along with the Liwa Shuhada Badr/16th Infantry Division, it cooperated with the YPG against IS until some point in 2014; it later became responsible for the second highest death toll of civilians in the Kurdish neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsood (second after the 16th Infantry Division). It was more or less forced into joining Liwa al-Tawhid in 2014. Briefly affiliated with the al-Mu’tasem Division (then known as Liwa al-Mu’tasem) and the Hamza Division (Aleppo) in 2016. In November 2016 it joined Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. Amidst massive rebel-infighting in January 2017, the part of Zenki that had been active in the Turkish-sponsored Hawar Kilis operations room defected, including Liwa Ahrar Souriya, which joined the Northern Brigade. It split from the Northern Brigade in May 2017 after latter was expelled from the Sham Legion. It then rejoined the Sham Legion. By this time it had renamed to Liwa Ahrar al-Shamal; the logo presented here is its old Liwa Ahrar Souriya logo.

• Martyrs of Islam Brigade

Another FSA group. Has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Originally operated in the city of Darayya, Rif Dimashq governorate, which was famous for surviving four years of regime siege while still maintaining an administration consistent with the ideals of the original Syrian Revolution. During this time, the Martyrs of Islam Brigade was affiliated with the Southern Front. After Darayya finally fell in August 2016, the brigade moved to Idlib governorate as part of a deal with the government and denounced the Southern Front for “abandoning” Darayya. In June 2018 it joined the Sham Legion. The group’s longtime commander has since joined Faylaq al-Majd, so the Martyrs of Islam’s current status is unclear.

• Central Division

Another FSA group. Operates mainly in Hama governorate. Has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• 20th Division

A group of fighters originally from Deir ez-Zor governorate and the eastern Qalamoun region of Rif Dimashq governorate. Formed in October 2018 and led by a former officer of Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya. Certain other rebel groups have accused the 20th Division of leaking information to the SDF. In January 2020 the group was attacked by Ahrar al-Sharqiya, who accused it of being complicit in a bombing attack on the latter’s headquarters. Despite these clashes, the 20th Division sided with Ahrar al-Sharqiya in major clashes in Jarabulus in May.

• Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Raqqa

Based in the Tal Abyad area of northern Raqqa governorate. A member of Ahrar al-Sharqiya from Sep. 2019 - Dec. 2020. In Oct. 2019 it murdered two medical workers who were accompaning an SDF soldier in the town of Suluk. Since leaving Ahrar al-Sharqiya it has clashed with the latter several times.

• Special Forces Division

Operates in Aleppo governorate. It was originally part of the Hamza Division.

• Liwa Duha al-Islam

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Rif Dimashq governorate. Possibly joined Ahrar ash-Sham briefly. Possibly defunct.

• Sons of al-Hasakah Gathering

Ideology: Sunni Islamism? Arab nationalism? Operates in Hasakah governorate. Formed in February 2017 to fight the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Possibly part of the FSA. One of the notable subgroups:

• Ajnad al-Hasakah

Formed in late August 2016 for the above purpose.

• Kurdish Salvation Movement

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism; Sunni Islamism? Formerly known as the Kurdish Revolutionary Brigades (see third logo) and was one of the founding members of the Sons of al-Hasakah Gathering; renamed and became independent in March 2017. Formed to fight the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces as well as the Assad government and the Islamic State. Possibly close to Ahrar ash-Sham. It is possible the Kurdish Revolutionary Brigades may have become a separate organization from the Kurdish Salvation Movement sometime in early 2018.

• Saraya al-Qadisiya

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates. It has announced its intent to attack the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces from behind its own lines.

• Liwa al-Aadiyat (Rif Dimashq)

Ideology: unknown, likely Sunni Islamism. Operates in the Damascus area. Specializes in assassinations of regime officers and officials. Not to be confused with the Hama-based group of the same name, nor the Latakia-based Liwa al-Aadiyat (“Brigade of the Chargers”) which became the 1st Coastal Division. Possibly part of the FSA.

• Deterring the Oppressors Company

Ideology: unknown, likely Sunni Islamism. Operates in the Damascus area. Specializes in assassinations of regime officers and officials.

• Security Forces Battalions

Ideology: unknown. Operates in the Damascus area. Similar to the above two groups.

• Islamic Revenge Movement

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formed in early 2019 as the Revenge Movement (see 3rd-5th logos); it originally lacked any clear ideology other than opposition to the Turkish intervention. Over the course of the year it became jihadist as well as anti-Kurdish. It proclaims support for IS and focuses on bombings and assassinations targeting Turkish-backed rebels.

• Authenticity and Development Front

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Part of a “quietist” Salafi trend that is conservative but distinctly anti-jihadist. It has received US support, at least at one point. One or more of its affiliates may be part of the FSA’s Southern Front. It may now consider itself part of the FSA.

• Ghosts of the Desert

Ideology: unknown. An anti-IS force in Deir ez-Zor governorate, also operating in Iraq. Close to the Authenticity and Development Front and the now-defunct New Syrian Army.

• Suqour al-Mayadin

Ideology: unknown. An anti-IS assassination group in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Possibly defunct.

• Saraya al-Kawatem

Ideology: unknown. Another anti-IS assassination group from Deir ez-Zor. Possibly defunct.

• Harakat Abna al-Sham

Ideology: unknown. Operates in the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus. Purely an anti-IS force; its stance towards the government is unclear. Includes some former members of Aknaf Bait al-Maqdis.

• Islamic Tawhid Brigades

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. A remnant of the original Liwa al-Tawhid. Has possibly joined Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki.

• Saraya al-Mourabitoun

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Joined the Sham Legion sometime in late 2016-early 2017; left again in June 2017. Possibly defunct.

• Supporters of Islamic Justice Brigade

        Ideology: Sunni Islamism

• Jabal al-Islam Battalion

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism. Operates in Latakia governorate. Mostly made up of Turkmen.

• Suleiman Shah League

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism? Operates in Latakia governorate. Made up of Turkmen. Possibly part of the Sultan Abdul Hamid Brigade.

• Fursan al-Iman

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Latakia governorate. Made up of Turkmen. Possibly a split from the Jabal al-Islam Battalion. It may have joined HTS or the Ansar al-Deen Front in August 2018.

• Islamic Punishment Brigade

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Hama governorate. Possibly defunct; may

have joined IS.

• Covert Special Tasks Force

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. It was Kataeb Abu Amara’s assassination battalion but became independent when the latter joined Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in May 2017.

• Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

A union of several jihadist and hardline Islamist factions formed amidst the inter-rebel fighting in January 2017. Often in conflict with more moderate rebel groups.

• Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (al-Nusra)

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Known until July 2016 as Jabhat al-Nusra, an affiliate of al-Qaeda. With the approval of al-Qaeda, it rebranded itself and declared an end to its al-Qaeda affiliation, though many links between the group and the international network still exist. Al-Nusra was always more focused on fighting the regime than enforcing Sharia law - at least compared to IS. As a result, as well as the fact that it is seen as more home-grown than the Iraq-based IS, al-Nusra/JFaS is vastly more popular among the Syrian rebel population than IS. Despite its better reputation, Nusra/JFaS has still participated in some sectarian massacres and is still very much an extremist organization. It is also decidedly more reluctant than the former Islamic Front and the FSA to fight IS. In 2014 it started intensifying crackdowns on Western-backed moderates like the Syria Revolutionaries Front and the Hazzm Movement. Although it has always been close to Ahrar ash-Sham, tensions between the two groups increased in late 2016 as a result of JFS absorbing the troublesome Jund al-Aqsa (see defunct section) and disagreements over the peace process. In January 2017 these tensions erupted into open warfare between JFS and a few allies on the one hand and Ahrar ash-Sham and several FSA groups on the other. HTS was then formed. Having defeated Ahrar in more clashes in July 2017, HTS (with JFS at its helm) became the decisively dominant player in Idlib governorate. Some notable subgroups (some of which may no longer operate as distinguishable groups):

• Suqour al-Ezz

Operates in Latakia governorate. Mostly made up of Saudi jihadis. Operated as an independent jihadist group, neutral in the IS-rebel conflict, until joining al-Nusra in 2014. It remains neutral in the IS-rebel conflict.

• Liwa al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar

Operates in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. Not to be confused with FSA groups of the same name. Mostly made up of Uzbeks.

• Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad

Operates in Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, and Idlib governorates. Another Uzbek group. Split from al-Nusra but later rejoined. Close to the Imam Bukhari Battalion and other Uzbek groups.

• Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar  

Operates in Aleppo and Latakia governorates. Originally its fighters were mostly from Chechnya, Russia, where its parent organization, the Caucasus Emirate (an al-Qaeda affiliate, though many of its leaders have defected to IS), is waging an insurgency. Originally formed part of IS, but left IS after IS was expelled from al-Qaeda. It was the dominant force behind the Ansar al-Deen Front. In September 2015, by which point its Chechen character had largely given way to Arab membership, it joined al-Nusra. It may now be part of the Liwa al-Mujahirin wal-Ansar listed above.

• Ansar al-Jihad/Islamic Jihad Union

Operates mainly in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. The Islamic Jihad Union was formed in 2002 as a split from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; both groups are made up primarily of Uzbeks and were (until 2014, when the IMU defected to the Islamic State) affiliated with al-Qaeda. Like the IMU, the IJU is based mainly in Afghanistan, but it has sent fighters to Syria, operating under the name Ansar al-Jihad. This group may have merged into Jaysh/Liwa al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar.

• Jaysh Muhammad in Bilad al-Sham

Operates mainly in Aleppo governorate. Close to both al-Nusra and IS; it was initially neutral in the rebel-IS conflict, but later it sided with al-Nusra. It pledged allegiance to Nusra in June 2016.

• Jamaat al-Mourabitoun

Operates in Hama governorate. It joined Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in October 2016.

• House of the Kyrgyz

Operates in Idlib governorate. Formed in December 2016. Made up of Kyrgyz fighters.

• Nogai Jamaat

Made up of Nogais, a Turkic ethnic group found in the Caucasus region of Russia.

• Movement of Immigrants from Sunni Iran

Made up of Iranians, mostly Kurds and Baluchis. Formed in 2016 as a split from the Ansar al-Islam faction that rejected the Iraq-based organization’s pledge of allegiance to IS.

• Kataeb Jund al-Sham

Operates in Hama governorate. Made up of former Jaysh al-Sunna and Ahrar ash-Sham affiliates. In early 2017 it joined Ahrar ash-Sham. It joined HTS in August 2018.

• Jaysh al-Khorasan

Made up of Central Asians.

• Jaysh al-Sunna

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Includes many former members of the Farouq Battalions. Its Hama branch merged into Ahrar ash-Sham in February 2016. Jaysh al-Sunna reportedly joined HTS in January 2017, but some of its leaders denied joining. The part that didn’t join continued to operate in pro-Turkish rebel areas. One of its commanders was killed in June 2019 clashes that erupted in the town of Mare after a militia car ran over and killed an elderly man.

• Liwa al-Haqq (Idlib)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism? Not to be confused with the defunct Homs-based group of the same name. Former member of the now-defunct Muhajirin wa-Ansar Alliance.

• Ashidaa Mujahideen

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Split from Ahrar ash-Sham in 2016 after Ahrar’s leadership put out a statement declaring it acceptable for rebels to participate in Turkey’s Euphrates Shield operations room. One of its leaders was later sacked from HTS and defected to form Tanziqiyat al-Jihad.

• Martyrs of the Levant Front

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in the western Qalamoun region of Rif Dimashq governorate. Made up of small former FSA groups. Joined HTS in February 2017. Possibly defunct.

• Kataeb Seif al-Omari

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Rif Dimashq governorate. Formerly part of the Hold onto God Union. Joined HTS in February 2017.

• Jamaat Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Daraa governorate. IS once claimed that this group was one of its affiliates, and although there may have been some sympathy for IS within the group, they were ultimately closer to Nusra/JFS. Joined HTS in March 2017. Possibly defunct.

• Kataeb Abu Amara

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates mainly in Idlib governorate. Was neutral towards IS until late 2015, shortly after which it joined Ahrar ash-Sham. It re-emerged as an independent group some time in spring of 2016, and in May 2017 it joined HTS. Its Aleppo branch, the Covert Special Tasks Force, remained independent.

• Ajnad al-Sham

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism. Operates in Hama governorate. Not to be confused with Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union. It was formerly part of the now-defunct Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. In March 2017 its Idlib branch joined Ahrar ash-Sham. The rest joined HTS in November 2017.

• Katibat al-Ghuraba

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Idlib and Latakia governorates. Formed in mid-2017. Made up mostly of Uyghurs (a Turkic ethnic group in western China). Included a group of Palestinians called Saraya Ghuraba Filastin, which was led by members of the Abddullah Azzam Brigades. In early 2018 this subgroup dissolved after the death of its leader, with its remaining members returning to their homes in Lebanon.

• Harakat Sham al-Islam

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo and Latakia governorate. Mostly made up of Moroccans. Neutral in the IS-rebel conflict until 2015. It was part of the Ansar al-Deen Front until the other remaining subgroup, Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya, defected from HTS in February 2018. Harakat Sham al-Islam eventually declared its loyalty for HTS.

• Sham Liberation Army

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate before evacuating to Idlib. Not to be confused with the Southern Front’s Tahrir al-Sham Division. It was initially neutral in the rebel-IS conflict; it has betrayed other FSA groups to IS on one occasion. It came into conflict with Jaysh al-Islam over purportedly being part of IS, but later it declared war on IS and stopped one of its constituent brigades from joining IS. Formerly part of the Western Qalamoun Gathering. It joined HTS in November 2021.

• Popular Resistance Company

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates mainly in Idlib governorate. Formed by HTS in May 2019 to recruit locals to fight the government offensive in Hama and southern Idlib.

• Malhama Tactical

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates mainly in Idlib and Hama governorates. A small private military company that trains jihadis and sometimes participates in commando-style operations. Close to JFS and HTS.

• East Turkestan Islamic Movement/Turkestan Islamic Party

Ideology: Sunni jihadism, Uyghur nationalism. Operates in Syria as Katibat Turkistani (see the third logo) in Idlib and Hama governorates. Based in Xinjiang (“East Turkestan”), China, where it is involved in an insurgency. Al-Qaeda affiliate. It sided with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in the early 2017 clashes with Ahrar ash-Sham and the FSA. As with Malhama Tactical, it is very closely aligned with JFS and HTS.

• Xhemati Alban

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Idlib governorate. A group of Albanians closely allied with JFS and HTS.

• Tanzim Hurras al-Din

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Formed in February 2018 as a merger of several splits from HTS that have declared their loyalty to al-Qaeda. Notable subgroups:

• Jaysh al-Badia

Formed in late 2017.

• Jaysh al-Malahim

Formed in November 2017. Has always worked closely with Jaysh al-Badia.

• Jund al-Sharia

Formed in February 2018.

• Ansar al-Tawhid

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Formed in March 2018 by former members of Jund al-Aqsa who did not join IS.

• Ghuraba Division

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates mainly in Idlib governorate. Formed in 2012-2013 by Senegalese jihadi Omar Omsen. Consists of French and French-speaking African fighters. Formerly part of al-Nusra; close to the Turkestan Islamic Party. Another pro-al-Qaeda group. In August 2018 Omar Omsen was briefly arrested by HTS, who accused him of trying to lure French-speaking HTS fighters away from HTS to join his Ghuraba Division.

• Jaysh al-Ahrar

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates mainly in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. Formed as a subgroup of Ahrar ash-Sham in December 2016 by Abu Jaber, a rival to AaS’s leaders at the time. Jaysh al-Ahrar accused Ahrar ash-Sham’s leadership of being too close to Turkey and other international rebel backers. In contrast, Jaysh al-Ahrar is considered closer to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly al-Nusra). Though Jaysh al-Ahrar claimed to be a subgroup of Ahrar ash-Sham, not a split, the move was seen as a threat to secede if Ahrar ash-Sham continued to work with Turkey. Nevertheless, after tensions between AaS and JFS erupted into open warfare in January 2017, Jaysh al-Ahrar dissolved back into AaS, though Abu Jaber defected to lead the new Hayat Tahrir al-Sham days later. Some parts of Jaysh al-Ahrar followed him, while others stuck with AaS. In September 2017, some of the fighters who had joined HTS left (Abu Jaber was not among them) and became an independent group. They are closely allied with Ahrar ash-Sham.

• Ansar al-Deen Front

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. One of the original five members of HTS; it left HTS in February 2018, citing unhappiness with HTS’ occasional dealings with Turkey. Originally made up of four independent jihadi groups that were largely neutral in the rebel-IS conflict. Only one group remains:

• Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Neutral towards IS until 2015. The only one of the original four Ansar al-Deen constituent groups to be made up primarily of native Syrians.

• Liwa Ansar al-Khilafa

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Originally formed by a fighter from Ahrar ash-Sham. Formerly part of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar and the Army of Mujahideen’s 19th Division at different times. Known to be close to al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Junud al-Sham, and IS (at least in the past). Connected to Hizb-ut-Tahrir, an international organization that is mostly non-violent but advocates the eventual conquest of the world by fundamentalist Islam; it’s illegal in many countries. Possibly defunct.

• Caucasus Emirate in Syria

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Split from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar before JMWA joined al-Nusra; it retains loyalty to the Caucasus Emirate. In 2017, the group splintered into several different factions each using the same name. Some of them may be part of HTS.

• Ajnad al-Kavkaz

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Latakia, Hama, and Quneitra governorates. Formed by two groups that split from Ansar al-Sham; one was known as Jamaat Jund al-Qawqaz (see second logo) and was originally an FSA group named Free Circassians. It is connected, though not affiliated, to the Caucasus Emirate in Russia, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate (though most of its fighters have switched allegiance to IS). Neutral in both the rebel-IS conflict and the HTS-Ahrar conflict. In October 2017 it announced the suspension of its activities, vaguely citing the “situation in the area”. Nevertheless, it participated in a rebel counter-offensive in January 2018. It has also deployed in Ukraine against Russia.

• Jaysh al-Usra

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo and Hama governorates. Made up of North Caucasians as well as native Syrians. Led by the former leader of the Caucasus Emirate in Syria until his death in January 2018.

• Junud al-Sham

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo, Latakia, and Hama governorates. Not to be confused with Jund al-Sham. Made up of Chechen fighters. Close to the Group of the One and Only and to Liwa Ansar al-Khilafa. Neutral in the rebel-IS conflict. By November 2016 its activity had greatly diminished and most of its fighters joined Ajnad al-Kavkaz. Nevertheless, the group is still active.

• Katibat Ibad al-Rahman

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Hama governorate (formerly Latakia and then Aleppo). Made up of Chechens loyal to Tarkhan Gaziev, who split from the Caucasus Emirate in 2010. Close to Junud al-Sham.

• Katibat Junud al-Makhdi

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Latakia governorate. Formed in July 2016 from a merger of two small groups, one of which had been active in Afghanistan for years. Members are mostly Tatars and Bashkirs from Russia.

• Kata’ib Fursan al-Din

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Latakia and Hama governorates. Formed in 2014 by Turkish jihadis. Also includes Central Asians and native Syrians.

• Tansiqiyat al-Jihad

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Idlib governorate. Formed in February 2020 by a former HTS commander who had been imprisoned for several months for criticizing his superiors for relying on Turkey. He had previously been involved with Suqour al-Sham, the Ashidaa Mujahideen, and Ahrar ash-Sham.

• Liwa al-Muqatileen al-Ansar

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Idlib governorate. Another split from HTS. Its leader was arrested by HTS in June 2020 amid clashes between HTS and pro-al-Qaeda jihadis.

• Jaysh al Khilafatu Islamiya

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Expelled from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar for allegedly alienating the populace; has fought with JMWA. Possibly defunct.

• Kateeba al-Kawthar

        Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Possibly linked to al-Qaeda. Possibly defunct.

• Taliban Movement

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Formerly known as the Taliban Battalion. Made up of Turkmen. Many of its fighters have fought in Afghanistan; despite this, the group allegedly works with Turkish intelligence operatives.

• Knights of Sunna Brigade

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates mainly in Rif Dimashq governorate. Possibly defunct.

• Kataeb Fajr al-Khilafa

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Originally part of Liwa Ahrar Souriya.

• Saraya ash-Sham

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Hama and Homs governorate. Neutral in the rebel-IS conflict. Not to be confused with the Rif Dimashq-based Saraya al-Sham. Possibly defunct.

• Group of the One and Only

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operates in Latakia governorate. Notable for its secretive nature - its fighters believe promoting themselves would be sinful. Neutral in the rebel-IS conflict. In early 2016 its leader and some of its fighters defected to IS; it is unknown if the rest of the group is still active.

• Kataeb al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Hama governorate. Not to be confused with the Southern Front-affiliated Emigrants and Helpers Brigade, which has a similar Arabic name. Originally set up as an FSA brigade called Liwa al-Umma by a Libyan veteran of the war against Colonel Gaddafi, Mahdi al-Harati; it had a moderately Islamist agenda (see second logo). Sometime after al-Harati returned to Libya, the group turned jihadist and was part of the Muhajirin wa-Ansar Alliance (see third logo and flag). After the collapse of the Muhajirin wa-Ansar Alliance, the brigade reverted to a more moderate form of Islamism and adopted the current name and logo. Possibly part of the FSA again.

• Fatah al-Islam

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Unrelated to the more well-known Fatah. A Lebanese Palestinian al-Qaeda affiliate. Split from Fatah al-Intifada in 2006.

• Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Based in Pakistan. Close to, but not officially affiliated with, al-Qaeda. At least one faction has declared loyalty to IS.

• Ansar al-Islam

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Based in Iraq. Close to, but not affiliated with, al-Qaeda. Most of its members defected to IS in August 2014; the remainder disbanded. It had a Syrian contingent named Ansar al-Sham (not to be confused with the Latakia-based faction of the same name) in Aleppo governorate, which was close to the Ansar al-Deen Front and remains active and independent of IS.

• Army of Islam (Gaza Strip)

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Based in the Gaza Strip. Not to be confused with the Syrian Jaysh al-Islam. Close to, but not affiliated with, al-Qaeda, although it has at times expressed support for IS. It has sent fighters to Syria; unclear whether it is still active in the country.

• weapons and financial support (remember, this is for the entire opposition) from:

• Qatar
• Saudi Arabia
• Turkey
• USA
• France

• Islamic State

(originally Islamic State of Iraq; from April 2013 to June 2014, known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/ISIL or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/ISIS)

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Based in Iraq. Merger of various jihadist groups; has been the main Iraqi insurgent group since 2006. Originally one of two al-Qaeda affiliates active in Syria (the other being al-Nusra, see Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in the opposition section), IS was expelled from al-Qaeda in 2014 due to conflict with other jihadist groups in the Syrian opposition. IS is known for enforcing strict Sharia law and insisting that it alone, as a self-proclaimed caliphate, is the sole legitimate Islamic organization. It currently controls significant portions of Syria and Iraq and a few towns in Libya, and has received pledges of allegiance in Algeria, Egypt, Gaza, Nigeria, Yemen, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon, the Philippines, and the northern Caucasus. Some of the notable subgroups:

• Al-Khansaa Brigade

Composed of women. They specialize in enforcing Sharia laws that apply to women.

• Liwa Dawoud

Operated in Idlib governorate; possibly defunct, as IS was pushed from Idlib. Defected first from the Suqour al-Sham Brigade, and then from Jaysh al-Sham (the Idlib-based group, not the Hama-based group).

• Khalid ibn al-Walid Army

Operated in Daraa governorate. A union of two pro-IS groups that have yet to formally pledge allegiance to the IS. Not to be confused with the defunct Homs-based Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade.

• Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade

Previously part of the FSA’s Southern Front. Kidnapped 21 UN soldiers in 2013 for delivering aid to the Assad regime; they were subsequently released due to immense pressure on the brigade from the international community and from other rebel units. The brigade has also executed captured government soldiers on at least one occasion. It officially denies the widely-held view that it has pledged allegiance to IS.

• Islamic Muthanna Movement

It was originally close to al-Nusra, but it later declared its support for IS and eventually formed a close alliance with the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade in April 2016. The two groups formally unified in May 2016.

• Liwa al-Aqsa

Operates mainly in Hama governorate. When Jund al-Aqsa disintegrated in February 2017, this branch openly pledged to join IS. It captured over a hundred FSA fighters (mainly from Jaysh al-Nasr) and executed at least 70 of them before leaving for Raqqa governorate as part of a deal with other rebels.

• Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava)

Note that some FSA factions listed in the Opposition section are also part of Rojava (see “FSA-SDF groups”). Rojava’s official military is the Syrian Democratic Forces (see Operations rooms section)

• People’s Protection Committees (YPG)

Ideology: Democratic Confederalism, Kurdish nationalism. Operates in Aleppo, Raqqa, and Hasakah governorates. Nominally the armed forces of Syrian Kurdistan; effectively the armed wing of the dominant Democratic Union Party (PYD).

• Women’s Protection Units (YPJ)

        The all-female wing of the YPG.

• Anti-Terror Units (YAT)

        The elite special forces wing of the YPG/YPJ.

• International Freedom Battalion

Ideology: leftism. A conglomeration of communists and anarchists from various countries volunteering to fight for the YPG. Based in Turkey and connected to the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, among other leftist groups (see political section). Three components are not part of any specific leftist group:

• Bob Crow Brigade

        British and Irish fighters. Named after a trade union leader.

• Henri Krasucki Brigade

        French fighters. Named after a trade union leader.

• Antifascist Forces in Afrin

Formed to defend Afrin canton from the Turkish-led campaign in 2018. Its main armed component is the Martyr Michael Israel Brigade (see second logo), named after an American who was killed in a Turkish airstrike in November 2016. It joined the IFB in October 2019.

• YPG International

Ideology: leftism. Formerly known as Antifascist Internationalist Battalion (see second logo). Another group of foreign fighters, this time more directly inspired by the International Brigades that fought against Franco’s Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War.

• Commando Forces

Ideology: Kurdish interests, Democratic Confederalism (presumably). An elite counter-insurgency force trained and equipped by the US.

• Self-Defense Units (HXP)

Ideology: Democratic Confederalism. The national guard-type counterpart militia to the YPG.

• Syriac Military Council (MFS)

Ideology: Syriac interests. Operates mainly in Hasakah governorate. Affiliated with the Syriac Union Party.

• Bethnahrin Women’s Defense Forces

        The female wing of the MFS.

• Sutoro

Ideology: Syriac interests. The security/police counterpart of the Syriac Military Council. Also affiliated with the Syriac Union Party.

• Sanadid Forces

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Hasakah governorate. The militia of the local Shammar tribe in Hasakah governorate. The Arab tribe previously had an FSA brigade called Liwa Ahrar al-Jazira (see defunct section) allied with jihadist anti-Kurdish groups including Ahrar ash-Sham, Ghuraba al-Sham, al-Nusra, and IS. The Shammar were also aligned with the regime at one point.

• Gathering of the Jazira Brigades

Ideology: unknown. Appears to be an umbrella group for non-Shammar Arab tribal groups. Possibly defunct.

• Qabasin Martyrs Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates around the Kurdish-majority town of Qabasin in Aleppo governorate.

• Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Raqqa governorate. Not to be confused with Katibat Suqour al-Raqqa. Split from Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa in late 2016 after the latter apparently refused to participate in the SDF’s Raqqa offensive. It has been accused of being close to the Assad regime. In late December some leaders of LTR accused LSR of kidnapping them, trying to bribe them into joining LSR, and torturing them until they did so. In February 2017 part of LSR reportedly pledged allegiance to the Assad regime, prompting LTR to raid their positions.

• Knights of Jazira Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Raqqa governorate. Formed in April 2017 by Arab tribesmen.

• Shahba Forces

Ideology: unknown. Operates in Aleppo governorate. Made up of Arabs and Kurds from Azaz and al-Bab. Its commander was a former fighter in Jabhat al-Akrad.

• Revolutionary Forces

Ideology: unknown. Operates in the “Shahba” region of Aleppo governorate. Formed in August 2017 to oppose Turkish and pro-Turkish rebel attacks. Largely composed of members of Jabhat al-Akrad; possibly a subgroup.

• Khabour Guards

Ideology: Syriac/Assyrian interests. Created in 2012 to defend the Khabour valley region in Hasakah governorate from attackers. It was part of the Sutoro for a time. Although it was tied to the regime-leaning Assyrian Democratic Party, it was officially neutral in regards to the rebellion and only fought IS. After a long period of tension with the Kurdish-led Rojava government, the Guards joined the SDF in February 2017. In December 2018 it severed its ties with the ADP, leading to accusations that it had been unduly influenced by the PYD.

• Nattoreh

Ideology: Syriac/Assyrian interests. Also linked to the Assyrian Democratic Party and closely allied with the Khabour Guards (at least until December 2018); it appears to be slightly more regime-leaning than the latter and its relationship with the Syriac Military Council (MFS) is colder than the Khabour Guards-MFS relationship. Also known as the Assyrian People’s Guards.

• Martyr Nubar Ozanyan Brigade

Ideology: Armenian interests. Formed in April 2019. Named after the Armenian commander of TiKKO (see Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist in the political section) who was killed in Raqqa in 2017. States that the current Turkish government continues the legacy of the WWI-era Committee for Union and Progress-led government, which perpetrated the Armenian Genocide.

• Afrin Liberation Forces

Ideology: Kurdish interests, Democratic Confederalism (presumably). An underground insurgent group created by the PYD/YPG in December 2018 to undermine the Turkish/FSA occupation of the Afrin region.

• Asayiş

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism. Name for the intelligence/security service of Rojava. Has been used by the PYD to stifle dissent. Also the name of Iraqi Kurdistan’s intelligence/security service (see final logo).

• Raqqa Internal Security Forces

Ideology: Democratic Confederalism? A police unit set up in May 2017 in Raqqa governorate. Although the group’s creation was in part due to pressure by the SDF’s foreign backers to work to change the perception that the PYD/YPG dominates the SDF, the RISF is still closely tied to the YPG. It functions as a semi-autonomous unit of the Asayish.

• People’s Defense Force

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, Democratic Confederalism (Leninism and Maoism historically). The military wing of the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party.

• Free Women’s Units

The female wing of the People’s Defense Force.

• weapons and financial support from:

• Iraqi Kurdistan
• France
• United States
• Russia
• Czech Republic
• Australia
• Denmark
• Netherlands

Notable former groups

• Syrian National Resistance

Ideology: Kurdish-Arab unity, anti-Turkish sentiment. A political party formed in September 2016 to oppose the Turkish military intervention. Essentially a “midway” group between Rojava and the Assad government. The Kafr Saghir Martyrs Brigade was an affiliate. In February 2017 the SNR dissolved itself, citing lack of understanding between Assad and the SDF.

• Ba’ath Brigades

Ideology: Ba’athism. Operated across Syria. A volunteer militia mostly made up of Sunnis and/or members of the Ba’ath Party. In mid-2018 it was disbanded and its fighters incorporated into various SAA units as part of a Russian-sponsored effort to bring pro-government militias more firmly under control. Some fighters continue as the Ba’ath Brigade in the Russian-sponsored 5th Corps.

• Dir’ al-Watan

Ideology: Druze interests. Operated in Suweida governorate. Close to Burkan al-Jabal al-Na’im and al-Zaghaba, two other pro-government Druze militias. Not to be confused with Liwa Dir’ al-Watan or Quwat Dir’ al-Watan.

• Liwa Khaybar

Ideology: unknown, possibly Shia Islamism. Operated in Homs and Hama governorates. Close to the Leopards of Homs.

• Rapid Intervention Regiment/Rapid Intervention Forces

Ideology: Shia Islamism. An Iraqi militia that deployed troops to the Damascus area, originally as part of the National Defense Forces. Formed as a split from Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas in 2013. Part of the Sadrist movement. It dissolved in 2016, partly due to lack of funding, with its fighters joining other groups.

• Suqour al-Sahara

Ideology: unknown. An elite pro-government militia created in 2013 for a similar purpose as that of the Tiger Forces. Whereas the Tiger Forces were subordinate to the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, Suqour al-Sahara was subordinate to the Military Intelligence Directorate. Infamous for its corruption. It dissolved in 2017, with its remaining members dispersing to other pro-government units.

• Naval Commandos Regiment

Ideology: unknown. Operated mainly in Latakia governorate. Subordinate to the Republican Guard. Also known as the Navy Seals or the Syrian Marines. Founded in 2016; largely made up of former Suqour al-Sahara fighters. Led by Aymen Jaber, brother of Suqour al-Sahara’s Mohammad Jaber. It got into fights with other militias and was disbanded and absorbed by other groups by early 2018.

• Quwat Dir’ al-Qalamoun

Ideology: unknown. Operated mainly in Rif Dimashq governorate. Also known by its English name - Qalamoun Shield Forces. Originally affiliated with the Republican Guard; it drifted closer to the Syrian Arab Army’s 3rd Division in late 2015. Included many former rebel fighters; other, more solidly loyalist units viewed Quwat Dir’ al-Qalamoun with suspicion, occasionally resulting in spats. Reconciled rebel fighters were often deployed beyond their home regions, despite regime promises to let them serve close to home. In mid-2018 it was disbanded and its fighters incorporated into the 3rd Division as part of a Russian-sponsored effort to bring pro-government militias more firmly under control. Many of its officers were arrested.

• Hermon Regiment

Ideology: unknown. Formed in January 2017; affiliated with both the Military Intelligence Directorate and the al-Bustan Association. mostly made up of former rebels from the Jabal al-Sheikh (aka Mt. Hermon) area in the Western Ghouta region of Rif Dimashq. Its commander was the former leader of the Southern Front’s Omar ibn al-Khattab Brigade; before that he was a fighter with the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union. According to him, local Military Intelligence officials falsely accused him of many crimes, leading him to flee to Turkey. The regiment was dismantled and integrated into the SAA.

• Liwa Ansar al-Mahdi

Ideology: Shia Islamism. Made up mainly of Iraqis and very close to the IRGC; possibly affiliated with it like Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thiqfi and Katibat Ali Sultan. It was also close to the now-defunct Suqour al-Sahara. It experienced internal problems and became defunct by 2018. Not to be confused with the rebel group Ansar al-Mahdi.

• Haydari Force

Ideology: Shia Islamism. A low-profile network of Iraqi fighters from Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. They operated in Syria in the early years of the war; unlike the other Iraqi Shia group of the time (Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas), they saw action on many fronts and were not just focused on defending Shia areas. The Iraqi parent groups would go on to create several different networks in Syria.

• Slavonic Corps

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Latakia and Deir ez-Zor governorates. A Hong Kong-based private military company that sent Russian mercenaries to fight for the Syrian government. The mercenaries ended up being provided with much less than they had been promised, and when they returned to Russia after being defeated, they were arrested along with the owners of the company (mercenaries are illegal in Russia, though government-tied groups like the Wagner Group are not prosecuted).

• Mavros Krinos

Ideology: Strasserism (left-wing Nazism). A tiny group of Greek volunteers for the Assad government. It’s unlikely they’re still in Syria.

• Scandinavian League

Ideology: neo-Nazism. A primarily Sweden-based group that sent a few volunteers to fight for the Assad government in 2017-2018.

• Syrian Revolution General Commission

Ideology: liberal democracy, human rights. Originally known as the Syrian Revolution Coordinators Union. One of the three main opposition bodies in the first few months of the war, the SRGC was the most aggressive and had poor relations with the Syrian National Council. It contained a number of armed groups, especially those led by former civilians (such as the Farouq Battalions) as well as civilian activist councils (see Local Coordination Committees). It was defunct by 2016.

• Supreme Council of the Syrian Revolution

Ideology: liberal democracy, human rights; emphasis on non-sectarianism and reconciliation. One of the three main opposition bodies in the first few months of the war. It took a middle position between the nonviolence of the LCCs and the armed rebellion of the SRGC. As the war escalated, it worked closely with armed groups led by military defectors. By 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists began to dominate the organization. It was moribund by 2014.

• Coalition of Secular and Democratic Syrians

Ideology: secularism, liberal democracy. Called for Kosovo-style intervention (no-fly zone, safe zones, etc.). Defunct by 2014.

• Syrian Christians for Democracy

Ideology: Christian interests, liberal democracy. One of the original seven member groups in the Syrian National Council. Based in the US. Defunct by 2015.

• Syrian Islamic Liberation Front

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, moderate Sunni Islamism. One of the main rebel groups from late 2012-2013. Was generally more moderate than the Syrian Islamic Front and retained some ties to the Free Syrian Army. Most of its members joined the Islamic Front.

• Syrian Islamic Front

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism. One of the main rebel groups from late 2012-2013. Generally more radical than the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. Most of its members joined the Islamic Front.

• Islamic Front

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism. Formed in late 2013 as a merger of two major Islamist coalitions – the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front and Syrian Islamic Front. One of the main rebel factions alongside the FSA and al-Nusra from 2014-2015, although in 2015 its cohesion began to fall apart, with each group effectively going its own way. Of the original seven members, only Ahrar ash-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam are still active (Liwa al-Tawhid has become the Levant Front). Ahrar ash-Sham continued to use Islamic Front imagery for a few years.

• Free Officers’ Movement

Ideology: secularism. Formed by defected officers led by Lt. Col. Hussein Harmoush in June 2011 in Idlib governorate; it was the first attempt to form an organized military opposition. Harmoush was kidnapped in Turkey by Syrian intelligence services in September; he was forced to “confess” to the opposition being a Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored plot and was later executed. Following this, the Free Officers’ Movement merged with Col. Riad al-Asaad’s FSA.

• Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade (Homs)

Ideology: unknown; likely secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate, especially the city of Rastan. Not to be confused with the Daraa-based Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade or the pro-IS Khalid ibn al-Walid Army. One of the first Free Syrian Army units, originally formed in July 2011 as the Khalid ibn al-Walid Battalion of the Free Officers’ Movement. The group was accused of several abuses. It eventually became part of the Syria Revolutionaries Front; after the SRF came under attack by al-Nusra in late 2014, the Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade tried to distance itself from the SRF, but al-Nusra attacked it anyway. In July 2017, remnants of the brigade joined Jaysh al-Tawhid, but left a month later. Some of these fighters would go on to join the Sultan Murad Division after being pushed out of Homs by the government; they would split in 2020 to form the Sultan Malik Shah Division.

• Martyr Hamza al-Khatib Brigade

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Operated in Aleppo and Latakia governorates. Originally formed as the Martyr Hamza al-Khatib Battalion; it was one of the first FSA brigades ever formed. It became inactive in late 2013.

• Suleiman Fighting Group

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Hama and Idlib governorates. An independent (non-FSA) Islamist group formed in 2011. Close to the Muslim Brotherhood and endorsed by Hamas. Notable for a spring 2012 massacre of captured seven SAA soldiers.

• Free Syrian Union

Ideology: secularism, social justice. A conglomeration of tiny FSA units across the country proclaimed in 2013; it went defunct a few months later.

• Soldiers of God Battalion

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Quneitra governorate. An FSA unit notable for assisting with the defection of Zubaida al-Meeki, an Alawite and the first female officer to publicly defect from the regime.

• Farouq Battalions

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Originally an affiliate of the Homs-based Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade. Had left the FSA in 2012 to join the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, but when SILF dissolved in 2013 (most of its members joined the Islamic Front), the Farouq Battalions returned to the FSA. Once a prominent group, but support dwindled and expired due to splits, battlefield losses, and a generally poor reputation.

• Omar al-Farouq Battalion

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate. One of several splits from the original Farouq Battalions. This FSA unit was the one behind the infamous video of a rebel commander eating a government soldier’s lung (widely reported as the heart). That commander later joined al-Nusra and died in 2016 in an incident with Ahrar ash-Sham.

• Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Originally the largest rebel faction independent of either the FSA or more solidly Islamist groups. Joined the Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front in its later days. Most of its remaining members by the time of its dissolution joined the Syria Revolutionaries Front. In late 2016 some of its fighters who had fled to Turkey returned and formed Jaysh al-Ahfad (now known as the 113th Brigade).

• 13th Division

Ideology: secularism. Operated mainly in Idlib governorate. Not to be confused with the Azm Unified Operations Command subgroup of the same name. One of the original 9 groups to receive Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Was a member of the 5th Corps. It came into conflict with al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham multiple times. The town of Maarrat al-Nu’man in Idlib, where the 13th Division was based, became a flashpoint of tension, with the locals protesting the constant harassment of the 13th Division and other moderate groups. June 2017, after clashing with the 13th Division and the Sham Legion, HTS pressured the Free Idlib Army into ordering the 13th Division to dissolve. The Division’s leader denied that the group would disband, but he was exiled to Turkey for some time before moving to Aleppo and joining the Hamza Division.

• Ghuraba al-Sham Front (Aleppo)

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Originally formed as Kata’ib Ghuraba al-Sham in 2012 as part of Liwa al-Fatah; it was a spin-off of the older jihadist group Ghuraba al-Sham. Although it claimed at one point it wanted a non-religious state and had an all-female battalion, the group had a reputation for corruption, including looting and torture. It was crushed in 2013 by Islamist groups including Liwa al-Tawhid and IS (then still known as ISIS). One of its fighters later went on to establish the Dawn of Freedom Brigades. Another established the Sultan Abdul Hamid II Division.

• Hazzm Movement

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. The most prominent of the original 9 FSA groups to receive US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Included many former members of the Farouq Battalions. Original head of the FSA Salim Idris was a founding member. After conflict with al-Nusra during Nusra’s war against the Syria Revolutionaries Front, it joined the Levant Front operations room to seek protection. Nevertheless, it came into conflict with Nusra again and was forced to dissolve itself in February-March 2015, its remaining members joining other factions of the Levant Front (especially the Authenticity and Development Front, Army of Mujahideen, and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki), and later Jaysh al-Thuwar. In December 2016 some former members were among several rebels previously defeated and disbanded by al-Nusra to announce their intention to return to the battlefield.

• National Unity Brigades

Ideology: secularism. Operated mainly in the Jisr al-Shughur region of Idlib and the southern Damascus countryside. An FSA group notable for including large numbers of minorities and for having stringent requirements (aimed at excluding radicals) for joining. Political branch is/was known as the National Unity Movement (not to be confused with the National Unity Movement for the Liberation of Syria).

• 5th Corps

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. A merger of the 13th Division, the 101st Infantry Division (now known as the 21st Combined Force), the 1st Infantry Brigade (Idlib), the Knights of Justice Brigade (now known as the Northern Division), and the Mountain Hawks Brigade; four of these (the 1st Infantry Brigade being excluded) have received Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Although it is defunct, the four TOW-equipped constituent groups are still active.

• Dawn of Freedom Brigades

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates. An FSA group set up to cooperate with the YPG to fight IS. Its original core unit was formerly known as the Descendants of the Messengers Brigade (see second logo), which itself was a remnant of the Ghuraba al-Sham Front. Many affiliates were ex-Liwa al-Tawhid (now known as the Levant Front). Some of its affiliates, notably including the Northern Sun Battalion, are still active.

• Saraya Jarabulus

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Established by former members of Tajammu Kataeb Furat Jarabulus. It was one of the original members of the Euphrates Volcano operations room. Presumably merged back into Furat Jarabulus at some point.

• Jaysh al-Qasas

Ideology: unknown. Originally operated in Deir ez-Zor governorate before fleeing IS to Aleppo governorate. It was one of the original members of the Euphrates Volcano operations room and had a tiny contingent in Kobane during that city’s siege by IS. After the liberation of Tal Abyad from IS, Jaysh al-Qasas had a dispute with the YPG (possibly involving use of the FSA flag) and left for Turkey, where it ceased to exist.

• Revolutionary Fedayeen Movement

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Idlib and Hama governorates. An FSA group that was part of Jaysh al-Thuwar before joining the Jaysh al-Nasr operations room and finally dissolving into the Central Division. It may have left the Central Division and become independent again.

• Homs Revolutionary Union

Ideology: unknown. Former member of Jaysh al-Thuwar. It eventually joined the Sultan Murad Division.

• Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Not to be confused with the Idlib-based al-Fatah al-Mubin operations room. Operated in Deir ez-Zor governorate. An FSA group. Possibly a former affiliate of the Authenticity and Development Front. Was an affiliate of the defunct Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front. Its territory was taken by IS and it is presumably defunct. It may have joined Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya.

• Descendants of the Sultans Front

Ideology: Turkmen interests. A subunit of the Syrian Turkmen Brigades. This particular affiliate helped to hold the front against IS. It had three subgroups - Sultan Murad Brigade (now known as Sultan Murad Division), Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror Brigade (also now known as a Division), and Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade (see below).

• Sultan Suleiman Shah Brigade

Ideology: Turkmen interests. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with the still-active Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, which was known as a Brigade for many years.

• Sultan Selim I Brigade (Hama)

Ideology: Turkmen interests. Operated in Hama governorate. Part of Jaysh al-Thuwar. Not to be confused with the active Latakia-based group of the same name.

• 111th Regiment

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Operated in Hama governorate. Former member of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. It was one of the three main constituents of Jaysh al-Nasr but the 111th Regiment and the Fighting Salvation Front split away in February 2018, citing the dominance of the Falcons of al-Ghab. Some of its fighters may have stayed with Jaysh al-Nasr. At some point afterward it joined the Sham Legion. In January 2019 the Sham Legion announced that it was disbanding the 111th Regiment for trying to avoid fighting HTS.

• Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Raqqa, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zor governorates. An FSA outfit formed to fight IS in early 2014. It cooperated with the Kurdish YPG and Jabhat al-Akrad, making the Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front a sort of precursor to the Euphrates Volcano operations room. Presumably defeated and dispersed by IS.

• Salvation and Liberation Movement

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Originally formed in early 2014 in eastern Syria, mainly Deir ez-Zor governorate, as the Islamic Revolutionary Salvation Front (see third and fourth logos). Like the Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front, it was an FSA outfit formed to fight IS; it may have been part of the EILF. After being expelled from Deir ez-Zor, it moved to Hama and renamed. It disappeared in early 2015.

• Movement of the Free Sufi Muslims

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, Sufi Islam. Operated mainly in Hama governorate. An affiliate of the Movement for Building Civilization (see political section). Its founder fled to Turkey in August 2014 after his brother was arrested by al-Nusra. He later became a spokesman for Jaysh al-Thuwar and eventually reconciled with the government.

• Liwa Shuhada Badr

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Led by Khaled Hayani; one of the more infamously corrupt FSA groups. It was part of the 16th Infantry Division (later known as the 23rd Division).

• 19th Division

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Originally formed as an independent Islamist movement; it later both adopted the FSA label and joined the Army of Mujahideen, which at the time was an independent Islamist movement. Accused of cracking down on dissent in its early years. Some of its substituent brigades are still active.

• Shields of the Revolution Council

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Idlib governorate. Affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of its fighters left to form the Sham Legion. Not to be confused with the Shields of the Revolution Company.

• Knights of the Levant Alawite Battalion

Ideology: Alawite interests. An FSA outfit. Defected from pro-regime forces in 2012. Presumably defunct.

• Free Alawite Front

Ideology: Alawite interests. Another 2012 defection to the FSA. Presumably defunct.

• Battalion of the Free Men of Haḍr

Ideology: Druze interests. Operated in Quneitra governorate. One of a handful of tiny Druze FSA units.

• Sultan Pasha al-Atrash Battalion

Ideology: Druze interests. Operated in Suweida governorate. Formed by the first Druze army officer to defect to the FSA. Forced to disband in 2014 after persecution by al-Nusra.

• Battalion of the Martyr Kamal Jumblatt

Ideology: Druze interests, democratic socialism/social democracy? Operated in Aleppo governorate. Another tiny Druze FSA unit. Named after the founder of the Progressive Socialist Party in Lebanon (see political section above).

• Yusuf al-’Azma Battalion

Ideology: secularism, Druze interests. Operated mostly in Rif Dimashq governorate. Founded as the Bani Maarouf Battalion in 2012 (the logo above reflects this original name). Reportedly contained fighters from many different faiths. By April 2014 it was forced to disband, mainly due to lack of funding. Not to be confused with several other FSA groups bearing Yusuf al-’Azma’s name.

• Salamiya Youth Brigade

Ideology: secularism, Ismaili Shia interests. Operated in Hama governorate. Formed in 2013 as the Salamiya Youth Battalion (see third logo).

• Syrian Kurdish Revolutionary Council - Komele

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism. Formed in 2013 as a pro-rebel Kurdish movement. Its armed wing was the Kurdish Military Council (see below). It dissolved itself in 2015 after internal squabbles and harassment by Islamist rebels and the PYD/YPG.

• Kurdish Military Council

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism. Operated in Aleppo and Hasakah governorates. The armed wing of the Syrian Kurdish Revolutionary Council - Komele (see above). It was briefly part of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front; it later joined the Syria Revolutionaries Front but left after the SRF failed to provide assistance in the fight against IS in Kobane . It clashed several times with the YPG. Notable subunits:

• Salah al-Din Ayyubi Brigade

Operated in Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with the pro-regime group of the same name. An FSA unit with mostly Kurdish members but also had Turkmen and Arabs. Linked to the wing of the Kurdish Freedom Party/”Azadi” led by Mustafa Cumma, which merged into the KDPS in 2014; possibly also linked to the Kurdish Union Party in Syria/”Yekiti”. It split from the Salah al-Din Ayyubi Battalion in mid-late 2012 after a leadership dispute which ultimately stemmed from conflict over the Battalion’s position towards the PYD/YPG; this faction was more stridently anti-PYD. Before becoming part of the Kurdish Military Council, it was briefly part of Liwa al-Tawhid and also part of the 16th Infantry Division at one point. It clashed with the YPG several times and became inactive in 2015. Despite this, in 2018 the group’s former leader condemned the Turkish-led attack on YPG-held Afrin.

• Yusuf al-’Azma Brigade

Operated in Aleppo (specifically the al-Bab countryside). Not to be confused with the Daraa-based Martyrs of Yusuf al-’Azma Brigade; probably not the same group as the Yusuf al-’Azma Brigade operating in Idlib (not featured on this list). An FSA group formed in 2012; named after an early Syrian independence figure. Like the Salah al-Din Ayyubi Brigade, it was part of the 16th Infantry Division at one point. It dissolved in late 2013, with its leader joining Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. Another of its fighters later formed Liwa Ahfad Salah al-Din (see “Katibat Ahfad Salah al-Din” under the Levant Front entry).

• Gathering of Kurdish Rebels

Operated in Aleppo governorate. Based in the countryside around Kobane. It appears to have tried to stay neutral in rebel-YPG fighting.

• Martyr Tahseen Mammo Battalion

Operated around the city of Amuda in Hasakah governorate. Formed in 2012 by members of the Kurdish Unity Party/Yekiti. It proclaimed allegiance to the Kurdish Supreme Committee (the PYD-KNC coalition government in Syrian Kurdistan from 2012-2013) and denounced rebel movement into Kurdish areas. It was defunct by June 2013 after continued harassment by the PYD.

• Kurdistan Freedom Hawks

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism, secularism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Not to be confused with the similarly-named Kurdistan Freedom Falcons in Turkey. Affiliated with the Kurdish Youth Movement (see political section) and proclaimed allegiance to the Kurdish Supreme Committee. Unlike much of the Kurdish Military Council, this Kurdish FSA group condemned rebel attacks on the YPG.

• Kurdish Intervention Forces

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism. Operated in Hasakah governorate. Strongly supported the Iraqi KDP and was linked to the now-defunct KDPS faction led by Abdulrahman Alluji; conversely, it strongly opposed the PYD, though it avoided clashes and proclaimed allegiance to the Kurdish Supreme Committee. Several of its members were arrested by the PYD’s security apparatus or assassinated by unknown parties. It was effectively defunct by 2014.

• Liwa al-Mashaal

Ideology: Kurdish nationalism. Operated in Hasakah governorate. Named after slain Kurdish activist Mashaal Tammo. Formed and led by former activist and member of the Tammo’s Kurdish Future Movement, Osama Hilali. The group clashed with the YPG in Ras al-Ayn in 2013 before being pushed out of the city along with all other anti-YPG groups. The group disappeared sometime after; Hilali moved to Raqqa and was arrested and tortured by ISIS on more than one occasion.

• Liwa Jund al-Haramain

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Formerly part of Liwa al-Tawhid, then the Army of Mujahideen’s 19th Division, then Jaysh al-Salam. Also affiliated with Ahrar ash-Sham at one point. It joined the Northern Sun Battalion in March 2016. It may have since left Northern Sun. During its time in the 19th Division it was accused of corruption.

• Martyrs of the Euphrates Battalion

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Originally formed as the Quba Martyrs Battalion (the logos shown reflect its time as the Quba Martyrs Brigade). It was part of Liwa al-Tawhid and later Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa. Possibly part of the Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front at some point. The group joined the Northern Sun Battalion in January 2016.

• 30th Division

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism? Operated in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. The first deployment of the 2015 US-Turkey effort to train rebels to exclusively fight IS. It came into conflict with al-Nusra as soon as it crossed into Syria, with several of its members killed or defected. It dissolved some time later; some remnants joined Jaysh al-Thuwar.

• 99th Division

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Sometimes known as the 31st Division; not to be confused with the Daraa-based 99th Infantry Division. Part of the US Train and Equip Program. Consisted of Liwa Ahfad Salah al-Din, the Northern Thunder Brigade, and the Dhi Qar Brigade.  It expressed particular opposition to the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces. It fell apart soon after its formation because the Ahfad Salah al-Din commander responsible for agreeing to the creation of the 99th Division had apparently not consulted other Ahfad Salah al-Din members. Another Ahfad Salah al-Din leader defected, accusing the newly-formed 99th Division of corruption and closeness to the YPG/SDF. That leader rejoined Ahfad Salah al-Din when the 99th Division subsequently collapsed.

• Damascus Headbands

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate.

• Front for the Liberation of Syria

Ideology: unknown. Not to be confused with the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. Some of the notable affiliates:

• Movement for the Liberation of Syria

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Hama, Idlib, Aleppo, and al-Hasakah governorates. Formerly part of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades and known as the Syrian Liberation Brigade, not to be confused with another defunct group of the same name.

• 77th Division

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor governorates. Formerly an affiliate of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. Not to be confused with the group of the same name formed in 2024.

• Syria Revolutionaries Front (northern branch)

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. An alliance of moderate groups declared in reaction to the Islamic Front merger in late 2013 to early 2014. Its members began receiving Western aid. The SRF’s leader Jamal Maarouf, who headed the Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades and Battalions, is widely seen as a humble revolutionary-turned corrupt warlord. Al-Nusra used the SRF’s unpopularity as an excuse to drive it and other moderates like the Hazzm Movement out of Idlib governorate in October/November 2014, which was where the SRF had its most support. As a result, the SRF in the north became defunct, though its affiliates in the south, who were only loosely tied to the northern command, remained active until the collapse of the southern rebels in 2018. In December 2016 former members of the northern SRF were among several rebel groups who had been defeated and disbanded by al-Nusra to declare their intention to return to the battlefield. Some of the notable subgroups in the north (excluding those who may still be active):

• Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades and Battalions

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism? Operated in Idlib governorate. Lead group of the Syria Revolutionaries Front. Possibly a former member of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. Had received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Once a prominent FSA group, but support dwindled, partly due to charges of corruption, defeats at the hands of al-Nusra, and defections to Islamist factions.

• Helpers Brigades

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Idlib and Hama governorate. An FSA group that received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Formerly part of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. One of the first SRF brigades to be defeated by al-Nusra in late 2014. In December 2016 it was among a number of rebel groups to declare their intention to return to the battlefield.

• Idlib Military Council

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Close to the Mountain Hawks Brigade. Its commander later became involved in the Free Idlib Army. Not to be confused with the group of the same name formed in November 2017.

• Idlib Martyrs’ Brigade

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Originally known as the Syrian Liberation Army. Former member of the now-defunct Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. Possibly reformed as a one of the Syrian Democratic Forces’ token battalions in Idlib.

• Wolves of al-Ghab Brigade

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Formerly part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Commission for the Protection of Civilians. Operated in Idlib and Hama governorates. It was known for both its conflict with al-Nusra and its lawlessness. It split from the SRF in June 2014 and formed Jabhat al-Izz, which lasted a month before being dismantled by al-Nusra.

• Liwa Ahrar al-Zawiya

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Idlib governorate. Formed in 2012 by a naval officer who had defected in June 2011. Formerly part of Liwa Ahrar Souriya. Possibly a member of the National Unity Brigades before being part of the SRF. Left the SRF to help form the Syrian Salvation Front (see below), but the SSF was attacked and disbanded by al-Nusra alongside the SRF. One of its subunits, Liwa al-Qaqaa, later joined the Syrian Democratic Forces and eventually became the Northern Democratic Brigade.

• Immigrants of Mt. Zawiya Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Idlib governorate. Originally a subgroup of the Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades and Battalions. Expressed anti-Shia and anti-Alawite sentiment.

• 7th Division

        Ideology: unknown. Its leader would go on to command the 51st Brigade.

• Liwa Sawa’iq ar-Rahman

Ideology: unknown. An anti-Nusra force formed by former Syria Revolutionaries Front members and other FSA elements forced from Idlib by al-Nusra. It launched a few attacks and assassinations against Nusra before disappearing.

• Jabhat al-Izz

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Idlib governorate. Split from the Syria Revolutionaries Front in mid-2014 and was attacked and defeated by al-Nusra the next month. At one point its leader claimed it was a candidate for US aid but was reluctant to accept the condition that they only fight IS and not the regime; the US denied contact with Jabhat al-Izz. Its leading (and perhaps only) subunit was the Wolves of al-Ghab Brigade.

• Martyrs of al-Sham Islamic Movement

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, moderate Sunni Islamism? Operated mainly in Rif Dimashq governorate. Claimed to be nonsectarian and “respectful of science”. Linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. In January 2018 it joined the the pro-government Hermon Regiment alongside the Omar ibn al-Khattab Brigade and Alwiya Jabal al-Sheikh.

• Free Syria Front

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama governorates. Led by the founder and former leader of Liwa Rijal Allah. It included the National Unity Brigades, the St. George Battalion, Liwa Ahfad Othman, and several other groups. It was founded in 2012 and disappeared by the end of 2013.

• St. George Battalion

Ideology: Christian interests. Operated in Hama governorate. Formed in March 2013 by residents of the Eastern Orthodox-majority town of Suqalaybia who were forced from the town by pro-government forces. A member of the Free Syrian Front, it was close to the Farouq Battalions and opposed to al-Nusra. Years after the group’s disappearance, its founder later joined the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division.

• Syrian Salvation Front

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Idlib governorate. Formed in May 2014. Some of its members, including Liwa Ahrar al-Zawiya (see above), had left the Syria Revolutionaries Front. It was attacked and disbanded by al-Nusra and its allies during the anti-SRF offensive in October 2014. Some of its members later joined the Syrian Democratic Forces, specifically as part of the Northern Democratic Brigade.

• 111th Infantry Division

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Idlib and Hama governorate. Close to the Mountain Hawks Brigade. Formed by a former Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades commander. Last activity was in 2016.

• Liwa Allahu Akbar

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Part of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. It dissolved after its leader defected to IS in 2014.

• Kata’ib al-Hijra ila Allah

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Latakia governorate. Anti-Alawite and anti-Shia. It joined the 1st Coastal Division sometime before 2015.

• Liwa Ahfad Othman

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs and Hama governorates. It was part of Jaysh al-Thuwar for a time. It merged into the National Liberation Movement later in 2015.

• Alwiyat al-Majd

Ideology: Sunni Islamism (moderate Sunni Islamism?). Operated in the Eastern Ghouta region of Rif Dimashq governorate. Formed in October 2016 from various splits from the al-Rahman Legion after al-Rahman violently dispersed a crowd of protesters calling for an end to infighting with Jaysh al-Islam. After clashes between al-Rahman and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham on one side and Jaysh al-Islam on the other (Alwiyat al-Majd was neutral) in April-May 2017, Alwiyat al-Majd rejoined al-Rahman, saying differences had been resolved; in reality al-Rahman had surrounded its HQ and likely forced the re-merger.

• Liwa Rijal Allah

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate. One of the first FSA brigades, formed in December 2011. It merged with the Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade to form the Homs Military Council, which later fell apart. Remnants of the brigade joined the National Liberation Movement (see below) in 2016. It is unclear if there was still an independent Liwa Rijal Allah in operation by the time the last pocket of rebels in Homs governorate were defeated in 2018.

• National Liberation Movement

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate. Known from 2014-2016 as the Homs Liberation Movement (see second logo). Formed by military defectors in 2012. It was part of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. In May 2018 it evacuated to Idlib as part of a Russian-sponsored deal. It joined the Syrian Military Council in July 2023.

• Syrian Liberation Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Aleppo governorate. It was known for its corruption and intimidation of civilians; it was also one of the few FSA brigades that did not turn against the YPG after capturing Sheikh Maqsood from the regime in 2013. Some of its commanders later joined the Dawn of Freedom Brigades.

• Jaysh al-Salam

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo and Raqqa governorates. A group of FSA brigades that favored tacit cooperation with the YPG. Formed in June 2015 and disappeared some time after. Many of its affiliates are still active. Other notable subgroups:

• Liwa Harun al-Rashid

Presumably defunct. It was known for extortion.

• Liwa Umana ar-Raqqa

Originally an affiliate of Ahrar ash-Sham, drawing from locals to give Ahrar a local face, as most Ahrar ash-Sham fighters in Raqqa were from other parts of the country. It served as a police force in Raqqa city once captured by the rebels in 2013. Like most other rebel groups in Raqqa, it was chased out of the governorate by IS; it later left Ahrar and became an independent FSA group in very loose alliance with the YPG. Defunct by 2016.

• Jaysh al-Ashaer

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Raqqa governorate. A FSA group of tribesmen set up by Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa after the town of Tall Abyad had been liberated from IS. Together with Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, it formed Jabhat Thuwar al-Raqqa until the Liwa dissolved it, citing a lack of success in mobilizing the tribesmen against IS. Not to be confused with the pro-government group of the same name (see Tribal Army).

• Lions of Ghouta Brigade

Ideology: secularism? Operated in the Eastern Ghouta region of Rif Dimashq, especially in the city of Douma. Formed in mid-2012 by several activists, many of whom were members of various left-wing opposition parties, such as the Democratic Arab Socialist Union (see political section). It advocated democracy but did not oppose jihadists like al-Nusra. It helped form Jaysh al-Umma (see below) in 2014. During Jaysh al-Umma’s clashes with Jaysh al-Islam in 2015, the Lions of Ghouta Brigade surrendered to Jaysh al-Islam and was absorbed into its ranks, though its leader was imprisoned until the evaluation of Jaysh al-Islam and other Ghouta rebels to the north in 2018. In July 2023 he and some of his old fighters joined the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division.

• Jaysh al-Umma

Ideology: unknown. An FSA group formed in Rif Dimashq in late 2014. It immediately encountered tensions with Jaysh al-Islam. Eventually, after several clashes, those Jaysh al-Umma fighters who had not been killed surrendered to Jaysh al-Islam or defected to the government.

• Desert Commandos Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate. Not to be confused with the Desert Commandos Regiment. Part of Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya, and before that, the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo. In April 2018 it defected to the government.

• Saraya Ahl al-Sham  

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. It was originally based in Western Qalamoun near the border with Lebanon but it evacuated to the east as part of an August 2017 deal with regime forces. In April 2018, rebel groups in eastern Qalamoun accepted a transfer deal with the government and relocated to Jarabulus, Aleppo. Notable subgroups:

• Hold onto God Union

Possibly a split from Jaysh al-Haramon. Merger of four groups; three appear to have left. The remaining member was the Damascus Eagles Brigade (see third logo).

• Men of Qalamoun

Former member of the Hold onto God Union, and before that, the Western Qalamoun Gathering.

• Strangers Brigade

Former member of the Hold onto God Union, and before that, the Western Qalamoun Gathering.

• Martyr Ali Diyab Battalion
• Qalamoun Shield Battalion

• Western Qalamoun Gathering

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate. A group of several small FSA factions. It helped to form Saraya Ahl al-Sham. After a long period of inactivity it reformed in December 2017, but presumably went defunct again after the Assad government cleared rebels from the area. Some former affiliates include the Sham Liberation Army, the now-defunct 11th Special Forces Division, and many current members of Saraya Ahl al-Sham.

• Damascus Operations Room

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate. Supported the government in exile and claimed to be moderate enough to have been courted by the Russians.

• Martyrs of the Capital Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in the besieged town of al-Hamah in Rif Dimashq governorate until al-Hamah surrendered to the regime and the brigade’s fighters moved to Idlib.

• Guards of the Levant Movement

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Rif Dimashq and Hama governorates; formerly also active in Homs.

• Soarm Battalion

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate.

• Free Arab Ahwaz Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated mainly in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Formed in March 2011. It contained some Kurdish fighters and tried to get the YPG to join the rebels, but it ended up fighting the YPG at times. The group’s commander joined the SDF at some point (and may have joined Turkish-backed rebels before that). He was killed fighting IS in January 2019.

• 40th Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Aleppo and Hama governorates. Formerly known as the 40th Battalions (see second logo). It disbanded in February 2018.

• Jabhat Haqq al-Muqatalia

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, secularism. Operated in Hama governorate. An FSA group that was possibly a member of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades at some point. Reportedly considered for US aid at one point; unsure if it received aid. It was accused of corruption and of bombarding Christian and Alawite villages. It was among the FSA groups attacked and forcibly disbanded by al-Nusra. In December 2016 Jabhat Haqq al-Muqatalia was among a number of these groups to declare their intentions to return to the battlefield.

• Alwiya al-Nasr

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, moderate Sunni Islamism? Operated in Aleppo governorate. Part of the FSA. Formed in May 2016, it was immediately accused by the Levant Front of working with Russia. It then came under attack and disappeared. Its leader later went on to form Kata’ib al-Majd in 2018.

• Liwa Ahrar al-Jazira

Ideology: unknown, likely Arab nationalism. Operated in Hasakah governorate. An FSA group that came into conflict with the YPG, alongside Ahrar ash-Sham and al-Nusra, before being defeated. Remnants were later incorporated into Ahmad Jarba’s Syrian Elite Forces.

• León Sedov Brigade

Ideology: secularism, Trotskyism. A tiny rebel group operated in Aleppo governorate. Named after the son of exiled Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky. Connected to a small Trotskyist international called the International Trotskyist Leninist Fraction. Founded in 2012 in Libya by a few Argentinians. It had poor relations with other rebel groups and clashed with Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Ahrar ash-Sham, and al-Nusra. In 2015 it joined the Levant Front, only to leave a year later. The group disbanded after the fall of rebel-held eastern Aleppo, with some fighters evacuating to Idlib and others fleeing the country.

• 1st Infantry Brigade (Homs)

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate.

• Homs Army

        Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate. Formed in November 2017.

• Gathering of the Free Officers of Rastan

        Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate.

• Artillery Corps

        Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate.

• 114th Special Operations Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate.

• Liwa Alab al-Deen Arsalan

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate.

• Saad bin Moaz Battalion

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate. It may have joined Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; if so, it left HTS and helped form the Syrian Liberation Front (see below) in October 2017.

• First Division for Palmyra and the Desert

        Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate.

• 777th Regiment

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs and Aleppo governorates, though it used to also fight in Idlib and Hama. Originally part of the Farouq Battalions, then the Hazzm Movement, then Jaysh al-Thuwar. Presumably defunct, as is the case with many small Homs-based rebel groups.

• Saraya al-Haqq

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate. Not to be confused with Saraya al-Haqq Union 314.

• Quwat al-Badia

Ideology: unknown. Operated in and around the Rukban refugee camp in Jordan, on the border with Homs governorate. Made up of fighters from the city of Palmyra.

• Jaysh Tahrir al-Sharqiyah

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Formed to fight IS in 2015 but quickly disappeared.

• Saraya al-Sham

Ideology: unknown. Operated in the Eastern Ghouta region of Rif Dimashq. Formed in the aftermath of infighting between Jaysh al-islam and the al-Rahman Legion. Not to be confused with the jihadist Saraya  ash-Sham.

• Qalamoun Commando Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate.

• Alpaslan Special Forces

Ideology: Turkish nationalism, Turkish ultranationalism? Operated in Aleppo governorate. Part of the Sultan Murad Division. Its logo incorporated the Grey Wolves logo; this may indicate ultranationalist ideology. In June 2017 many of its members were accused of extortion in the city of Jarabulus and evaded arrest by fleeing first to SDF-held territory and then to the regime. The group became defunct following this incident.

• Knights of the Golan Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism? Operated in Quneitra governorate. Split from the Quneitra Military Council in 2015. Included some former members of the Partisans of Islam Front and the Syria Revolutionaries Front’s southern sector. Notable for being directly supplied by Israel.

• Army of the Free Tribes

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism? Operated in Daraa and Quneitra governorates. Formerly known as the Southern Command (see third logo), and later as the Gathering of the Free Men of the South (see second logo). Close to the Southern Front and the Jordanian government. In June 2018 it clashed with the Ashaar Division (see that entry).

• Southern Front

Ideology: mixed. An alliance of mostly moderate groups mainly from Daraa governorate, with some groups active in Quneitra and/or Rif Dimashq governorates; assume each group was active primarily in Daraa unless otherwise stated. Several constituent groups received Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. It nominally discontinued all cooperation with al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, although in practice limited cooperation continued. By late July 2018, all rebel territory in the south had been captured by the government, with most Southern Front fighters reconciling with the regime. Notable subgroups at the time of the surrender:

• Revolutionary Army

A union of groups created in December 2016. The Arabic name is “Jaysh al-Thawra”; not to be confused with Jaysh al-Thuwar (“Army of Revolutionaries”).

• Yarmouk Army

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, secularism. The leading affiliate of the Southern Front. One of the original 9 groups to receive Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. It was a member of the Hawks of the South Alliance.

• Emigrants and Helpers Brigade

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Not to be confused with the Hama-based Kataeb al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar, which has a similar English name. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• Mutaaz Billah Army

Ideology: unknown. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. One of its commanders later reconciled with the regime and became commander of the Russian-backed 5th Corps. One of its later commanders, Haytham al-Hariri, was notorious for selling stolen antiques. He reconciled with the government but was arrested in 2019, prompting many of his former subordinates to take control of a government outpost and holding several officers hostage, demanding his release.

• Liwa al-Hassan ibn Ali

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Formerly part of the Sword of al-Sham Brigades.

• Alwiya al-Qasioun

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. In June 2018 it expelled one of its subgroups for allowing civilians in its area of control to reconcile with the regime.

• Dawn of Islam Division

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. One of a number of Southern Front groups to firmly attempt to distance itself from al-Nusra in 2015.

• Haqq Division

Ideology: unknown. Created as part of a series of mergers in April 2016. Part of the Southern Forces Coalition until March 2018. Five subgroups:

• Brigade of the Two Holy Mosques

Possibly a former member of the 1st Corps.

• Southern Storm Brigade

Former member of the 1st Corps. Unrelated to the Northern Storm Brigade, despite copying their logo.

• Special Tasks Brigade

Former member of the 1st Corps.

• 99th Infantry Division

Former member of the 1st Corps. Not to be confused with the 99th Division in Aleppo.

• Harra Martyrs Brigade

Former member of the 1st Corps.

• Southern Forces Coalition

A union of several groups created in February 2017.

• March 18 Division

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. It was part of the Hawks of the South Alliance. Some of the notable subgroups:

• Engineering and Rocket Regiment

Ideology: unknown. Split from the March 18 Division but rejoined at a later date. Its leader, Adham al-Karrad, became one of the leading figures in the Russian-sponsored reconciliation agreement in the south. He was assassinated in October 2020.

• Southern Unity Brigade

Not connected to Aleppo-based Liwa al-Tawhid (now known as the Levant Front), which has a similar name in Arabic. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. It split from the March 18 Division in July 2013 and rejoined it in February 2016. It was part of the Hawks of the South Alliance. One of the notable subgroups:

• Sons of al-Aqsa Battalion

A group of Palestinians from a local Palestinian refugee camp.

• Omari Brigades

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Possibly a former affiliate of the defunct Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. Was one of the southern SRF affiliates until the creation of the 1st Army (see below). One of the original 9 groups to receive US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. In June 2018 a rogue Omari Brigades commander surrendered three villages under his control to the government amid their ongoing advance in eastern Daraa. The rest of the group would eventually surrender as well.

• Salah al-Din Division

Ideology: unknown. Former member of the 1st Corps. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles while part of the 1st Corps. One of a number of Southern Front groups to attempt to firmly distance itself from al-Nusra in 2015.

• 46th Infantry Division

Ideology: unknown. Created as part of a series of mergers in April 2016. Not to be confused with the Hama-based 46th Division. Six subgroups:

• 24th Infantry Division
• 69th Special Forces Division

It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• 1st Special Operations Brigade

Former member of the Dawn of Unity Division.

• Liwa Fursan Horan

It joined the 46th Infantry Division sometime before March 2017. Part of the Decisiveness Division before that.

• Mujahideen of Sanamayn Brigade

Formerly part of the Hamza Division (Daraa). It joined the 46th Infantry Division sometime before March 2017.

• Osama bin Zeid Brigade

Joined the Partisans of Islam Front in April 2014 but left sometime after.

• Decisiveness Division

Ideology: unknown. Sometimes known as the Forces of Decisiveness. Created as part of a series of mergers in April 2016. Three subgroups:

• Dawn of Unity Division

Former member of the 1st Corps. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles while part of the 1st Corps.

• Amoud Horan Division

It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• Martyrs of Freedom Division

Former member of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades and the 1st Corps. Also known as the Martyrs of Freedom Brigade and the Freedom Division. One of its commanders later became a commander in the Assad government 5th Corps, which includes many former rebels. In March 2019 he was arrested and possibly killed by the secret police.

• Dignity Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Led by the leader of the 1st Corps. It received American-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• Army of Salvation

Ideology: unknown. Formed in May 2018 ahead of an anticipated regime offensive in Daraa. Its most prominent subgroup, the Ahrar Nawa Division, was a member of the Southern Forces Coalition, so presumably the Army of Salvation was as well, but this is uncertain. Notable subgroups:

• Ahrar Nawa Division

        Received Israeli aid.

• Martyr Jamil Abu al-Zayn Division

Formerly a member of the Union of the Martyr Captain Abu Hamza al-Naimi.

• Southern Alliance

A union of two Southern Front groups formed in August 2017.

• Jaysh al-Ababil

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operates in Rif Dimashq, Damascus, and Daraa governorates. Has come into conflict with al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. While it was known as the Ababil Houran Brigade, it was responsible for the imprisonment and torture of a journalist in Damascus. It was seen with a TOW anti-tank missile in May 2016, possibly a sign of US vetting.

• Syria Revolutionaries Front - Southern Branch

The southern SRF affiliates were always effectively independent from the northern command, which was unpopular and was defeated by al-Nusra (now known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham). Formerly part of the 1st Army. One of its leaders, Muhammad al-Masalma, came into conflict with other rebel groups repeatedly, a pattern which continued after the government’s 2018 victory over the Southern Front and the reformation of many former rebel groups into (nominally) pro-government militias. He has been accused of harboring IS militants. Prominent subgroups include:

• Damascus Division

Ideology: unknown. Formed in 2017.

• Saraya al-Murabiteen

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Formerly a member of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades.

• Lions of the Southern Region Brigade

Ideology: unknown

• 1st Infantry Brigade (Quneitra)

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Not to be confused with numerous other groups of the same name based in other areas of Syria. Possibly joined the 1st Infantry Division (see below).

• Southern Swords Division

Ideology: unknown

• Union of the Martyr Captain Abu Hamza al-Naimi

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. It was provided with TOW anti-tank missiles.

• 1st Infantry Division

Ideology: unknown. Formed by several SRF subgroups in July 2017. Not to be confused with the Idlib-based 1st Infantry Division.

• 63rd Division

Ideology: unknown. Formed by several SRF subgroups in Quneitra in August 2017.

• 16th Special Forces Division

Ideology: unknown

• Lions of Sunna Division

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. It was a member of the Hawks of the South Alliance.

• Fallujah of Houran Division  

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Close to the 1st Corps. One of a number of Southern Front groups to firmly attempt to distance itself from al-Nusra in 2015. It was a member of the Hawks of the South. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• Quneitra Military Council

Ideology: unknown. Its former leader was the nominal head of the FSA for a few months. Close to the Army of the Free Tribes. It was accused of corruption at times. One of the notable subgroups:

• Liwa al-Sabiteen

Split from the Quneitra Military Council in January 2016 and renamed itself Jaysh al-Sabiteen (see second logo). It rejoined the QMC in December 2016. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• Liwa al-Sabireen

Ideology: unknown. Not to be confused with Liwa al-Sabiteen. Former member of the 1st Corps.

• 406th Infantry Division

Ideology: unknown

• Brigade of the Martyr Majd al-Khatib

Ideology: unknown

• Sword of al-Sham Brigades

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, secularism. Not to be confused with the similarly-named Liwa Seif al-Sham in Aleppo. Parts of it received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. One of a number of Southern Front groups to attempt to firmly distance itself from al-Nusra in 2015.

• 1st Army

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. One of a number of Southern Front groups to attempt to firmly distance itself from al-Nusra in 2015.

• Hamza Division (Daraa)  

Ideology: secularism, moderate Sunni Islamism. Not to be confused with the Aleppo-based Hamza Division. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. One of the notable subgroups:

• Mujahideen of Horan Brigades

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. It split from the Hamza Division shortly after the 1st Artillery Regiment and the southern SRF left the 1st Army, but it had rejoined Hamza by mid-2017. In August 2017 its commander killed a 62-year-old man for refusing to allow the commander to marry his daughter. In January 2018 the group clashed with another Hamza Division subfaction, the Inkhil Martyrs Brigade (which has since left the Hamza Division). The Mujahideen of Horan Brigades may have left the Hamza Division again after that.

• 1st Gathering

Ideology: unknown

• 1st Artillery Regiment

Ideology: unknown, likely secularism. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Formerly part of the 1st Army.

• Helpers of Sunna Brigade

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Not to be confused with the Aleppo-based group of the same name. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Formerly part of the Syria Revolutionaries Front.

• Youth of Sunna Forces

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Originally formed in late 2011 as the Youth of Sunna Battalion; its later names included Youth of Sunna Brigade and Youth of Sunna Division. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. In February 2016 it kidnapped and tortured to death an FSA colonel for attempting to negotiate with the regime; in August it was beset by infighting amid charges of corruption. Later that month it absorbed several other groups and adopted its latest name. In July 2018 the Youth of Sunna Forces accepted a Russian-brokered surrender deal amid the government’s advances in Daraa. Its leader at the time, Ahmad al-Oda, became the leader of the eastern Daraa section of the Russian-backed 5th Corps. He and many other 5th Corps fighters became involved in protests in Daraa in mid-2020 after the regime allegedly failed to live up to many of its reconciliation promises. After the disbandment of the 5th Corps, Oda’s fighters became affiliated with the Military Intelligence Directorate (see 8th Brigade). Notable subgroups:

• Unity Battalions of Horan

Had also received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• Martyrs of Yusuf al-’Azma Brigade

Not to be confused with the Aleppo-based Yusuf al-’Azma Brigade.

• Liwa Jisr Horan

Former member of the 1st Corps.

• Caliph Omar bin Abdul Aziz Brigade
• Sahl Horan Commandos Brigade

Possibly linked to the 1st Commando Division at one point.

• Shield of Lajat Brigade

Formed in October 2012.

• Zaidi Cavalry Division

Sunni Islamist.

• Inkhil Martyrs Division

Formed in June 2018. Four subgroups:

• Caliph Omar Brigade

Formerly part of the Jaydur Horan Brigades.

• Inkhil Martyrs Brigade

Formerly part of the Hamza Division.

• Descendants of Omar ibn al-Khattab Brigade

Formerly part of the Hamza Division.        Also known as the Descendants of Omar Brigade.

• Lions of Islam Brigade (Daraa)

Not to be confused with the Lions of Sunna Division or the Homs-based Lions of Islam Brigade which joined IS. Formerly part of the 69th Special Forces Division.

• Hawks of the South Alliance

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, secularism. Not to be confused with the Southern Hawks Brigade. A merger of the Yarmouk Army, Lions of Sunna Division, Fallujah of Houran Division, Southern Unity Brigade, and March 18 Division. It collapsed in the wake of the failed Daraa city offensive in summer 2015.

• Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Rif Dimashq and Homs governorates. Formed in August 2014 by fighters from Deir ez-Zor after IS had conquered most of that governorate. Originally part of the Authenticity and Development Front, it later joined the FSA’s Southern Front. It has received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. In late August 2017 it announced that it would merge with the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo, with which it had worked closely for some time; but a few days later the brigades disagreed about whether to remain in the Badia desert region fighting Assad or retreat to Jordan, suggesting the merger was cancelled. Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya chose to remain. In April 2018 the group’s fighters accepted a transfer deal with the government and relocated to Jarabulus in Aleppo.

• Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo

Ideology: secularism. Operated in n Rif Dimashq governorate. One of the original 9 groups to receive Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. In late August 2017 it announced that it would merge with fellow Southern Front member Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya, with which it had worked closely for some time; but a few days later the brigades disagreed about whether to remain in the Badia desert region fighting Assad or retreat to Jordan, suggesting the merger was canceled. In April 2018 rebel groups in the eastern Qalamoun region accepted a transfer deal with the government and relocated to Jarabulus in Aleppo. Many of the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo’s fighters reportedly chose to reconcile with the government.

• Liwa Shuhada al-Qaryatayn

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate. Formerly part of the Farouq Battalions, the Sham Legion, and possibly the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo at one point. It was part of the US Train & Equip program until the brigade defied US advice to stop the fighting the advancing Assad regime. Like other rebel groups in eastern Qalamoun, it accepted an April 2018 transfer deal with the government and relocated to Jarabulus in Aleppo; many of its fighters reportedly chose to reconcile with the regime instead.

• Tahrir al-Sham Division

Ideology: unknown. Not to be confused with the Sham Liberation Army.

• 1st Commando Division

Ideology: unknown

• Division of the Martyr Raed al-Masree

Ideology: unknown.

• Liwa Khaled Seif Allah

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism

• Liwa al-Mu’tasem Billah  

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism

• 90th Division

Ideology:  unknown

• Mujahideen of Farouq Brigade

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Formerly part of the Southern Brigades. Possibly part of Jaysh al-Tawhid (the Quneitra-based one).

• Ashaar Division

Ideology: unknown. A tribal force. In June 2018 it was accused of trying to surrender to the government by the Army of the Free Tribes and was subsequently attacked; the territory affected fell to the government shortly after.

• Saraya bani Khalid

Ideology: unknown. Connected to the Subaihi tribe.

• Freemen of the South Brigade

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism

• Jaydur Horan Brigades

Ideology: unknown. Formed in August 2012.

• Liwa Saraya al-Karama

Ideology: unknown. Former member of the 1st Corps.

• Horan Martyrs Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Possibly a former member of the March 18 Division.

• Qadisiya Division

Ideology: unknown. Not to be confused with the Latakia-based Sons of Qadisiya Division.

• Ghuraba Horan

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism

• Ahfad al-Rasul Brigade (Daraa)

Ideology: unknown. A remnant of the original Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades.

• Ghariya Shield Battalion

Ideology: unknown

• Liwa al-Haqq (Rif Dimashq)

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism? It has been accused of stealing hospital equipment and posing with it in order to dupe humanitarian organizations into sending them money. Possibly left the Southern Front long before the latter’s dissolution. Not to be confused with the Idlib- or Homs-based groups of the same name.

• Habib Mustafa Brigade

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Not to be confused with the now defunct Rif Dimashq-based Habib Mustafa Brigades. Clashed at least once with al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.

• Lions of Jedoor Brigade

Ideology: unknown

• Brigade of the Martyr Nabil al-Amayan

Ideology: unknown

• Homs al-Walid Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Possibly a former member of the Army of the Free Tribes.

• Jihad Brigades

Ideology: Sunni Islamism

• Syrian Dawn Brigade

Ideology: unknown

• Freemen of the Golan Brigade

Ideology: unknown

• Al-Harra Volcano Alliance

Ideology: unknown. Formed in May 2018 in the town of al-Harra, Daraa governorate. Formerly known as the Ahrar al-Harra Division (see second logo).

• Ghadir al-Bustan Martyrs’ Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Formerly part of the SRF.

• Mualaqa Martyrs’ Brigade

Ideology: unknown

• Martyrs’ Brigade of Quneitra and the Golan

Ideology: unknown. Formerly part of the Quneitra Military Council.

• Banyan al-Marsus Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Not to be confused with the Banyan al-Marsus operations room.

• 401st Infantry Division

Ideology: unknown. Formed in September 2017.

• 17th Infantry Division

Ideology: unknown. Formed in June 2018 in Daraa city.

• Tasil Military Council

Ideology: unknown

• Swords of Truth Battalion

Ideology: unknown. Appears to have been founded in 2011 or 2012.

• Liwa Ahrar Qita

Ideology: unknown. Formerly part of the 46th Infantry Division.

• Al-Jiza Revolutionaries Alliance

Ideology: unknown

• 404th Division - Lions of the Golan

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Quneitra governorate. Formed in October 2017.

• Mseifra Martyrs Battalion

Ideology: unknown

• Al-Anfal Brigade

Ideology: unknown, possibly moderate Sunni Islamism, at least at one point. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate. An FSA group that was a member of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades and then the Syria Revolutionaries Front and the Southern Front’s 1st Army before defecting to the regime’s National Defense Force in March 2015. It received US-supplied TOW missiles while still fighting for the rebels.

• Special Tasks Regiment

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate. Part of the southern SRF. Notable for including a battalion of Armenians. Defunct by 2015.

• Omar ibn al-Khattab Brigade

Ideology: unknown, likely moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in the southern Rif Dimashq town of Beit Jinn. Part of the southern SRF. Possibly a former affiliate of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. Its leader, formerly a fighter with the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union, worked closely with Israel. The group surrendered to the government in January 2018 and and helped to form the Hermon Regiment, with the brigade’s leader in command of the regiment.

• Alwiya Jabal al-Sheikh

Ideology: unknown, possibly moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in the southern Rif Dimashq town of Beit Jinn. Part of the southern SRF. Also known as Liwa Jabal al-Sheikh. Former affiliate of the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades. In January 2018 it joined the the pro-government Hermon Regiment alongside the Omar ibn al-Khattab Brigade.

• 1st Corps

Ideology: unknown, possibly secularism. Operated in Daraa governorate. One of a number of Southern Front groups to attempt to firmly distance itself from al-Nusra in 2015. Close to the Fallujah of Houran Division. Many of its affiliated subgroups left after the failed offensive in Daraa city in the summer of 2015, and the 1st Corps as a whole became defunct sometime in 2016.

• Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade (Daraa)

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Daraa governorate. Not to be confused with the Homs-based Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade. Originally known as the Knights of Islam Battalion (see second logo) and affiliated with the larger Horan Storm Brigade (see third logo). Based in Sheikh Maskin and led by Manaf Fahad al-Deiri, the group was infamous for its criminality, including looting, rape, and beheading of prisoners. In October 2014, Manaf merged his battalion with the Battalion of the Martyr Aseel al-Jabar (led by his cousin; see fourth logo) to form the Khalid ibn al-Walid Brigade. This group later became affiliated with the 1st Corps (see above). After his men attacked al-Nusra fighters, Nusra attempted to capture Manaf, which prompted him to flee to territory controlled by the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade. He later joined this IS-affiliated group, though he lacked any jihadi sentiments himself. During this time he remained in contact with an American agent in the MOC (Military Operations Command) in Jordan whom he had gotten to know as a member of the 1st Corps. Manaf provided the MOC with intelligence on the Islamic State pocket in southwestern Syria in return for the promise of safe passage for him and his family once IS had been driven out of the area. However, he apparently tried to sell his info to more than one source, prompting the MOC to hand over his responsibility to the CIA, who abandoned him when the Syrian government defeated Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid in 2018. He subsequently seems to have escaped Syria.

• United Sham Front

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism. Operated in Daraa, Quneitra, Rif Dimashq, and Damascus governorates. Part of the FSA’s Southern Front. Had received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. It joined the Yarmouk Army in January 2016.

• Martyr Imad Nasrallah Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Daraa governorate. Part of the Southern Front. Split from the 1st Commando Division. In July 2017 it joined the Army of the Free Tribes.

• Southern Hawks Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Daraa governorate. Part of the Southern Front. Not to be confused with the defunct Hawks of the South Alliance. Possibly split from the Southern Unity Brigade. In June 2018 it joined the Army of the Free Tribes.

• 1st Brigade of Damascus

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Damascus. Part of the Southern Front. It received US-supplied TOW missiles. It merged into the al-Rahman Legion in April 2016 but left some time later. It was accused of being led by profiteers and collaborating with the government. The group quietly dissolved amid a government offensive in late 2017; several members were later spotted fighting for the government in Hama governorate.

• Rukn al-Din Martyrs’ Battalion

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Damascus. Formed in 2012 in the primarily Kurdish neighborhood of Rukn al-Din. In September of that year the group helped to form the 1st Brigade of Damascus. It left the 1st Brigade in March 2017 in the midst of rebel losses; in May it accepted evacuation to northern Syria.

• 2nd Infantry Division

Ideology: unknown. Operated in the Eastern Qalamoun region of Rif Dimashq governorate. Part of the Southern Front. Some of its components appear to have split from the Forces of the Martyr Ahmad al-Abdo and brought at least one TOW missile with them; they may also have been vetted to receive a TOW.

• 11th Special Forces Division

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate. Received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Part of the Southern Front and the Western Qalamoun Gathering. Defunct by mid-2015.

• Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate. Wanted a solidly Islamic state, but in favor of protection of minorities and supported the Geneva II talks. Led by Damascus-area religious scholars, as opposed to the more Gulf-inspired Islamists of the Jaysh al-Islam, and close to the Syrian Islamic Council (see political section). Not to be confused with the Ajnad al-Sham based in Idlib and Hama (see below). Its Eastern Ghouta-based branch merged into the al-Rahman Legion in February 2016; many later split from al-Rahman and joined Alwiyat al-Majd (which returned to al-Rahman in May 2017). Most of the rest of its fighters were in Darayya and left for Idlib as part of the Darayya surrender deal in August-October 2016, and many of these fighters joined the Sham Legion in March 2017. The group’s final remaining presence was in a rebel pocket south of Damascus, which accepted a May 2018 deal with the government to transfer to Idlib. This contingent dispersed into other Idlib-based factions.

• Tajammu al-Qaqaa

Ideology: Sunni Islamism? Operated in Aleppo governorate; originally from Deir ez-Zor governorate. In June 2019 it joined the Sham Legion’s 20th Division.

• Qadisiya Battalions

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Hama and Homs governorates. Split from Ahrar ash-Sham in early 2016. It was briefly affiliated with Jaysh al-Thuwar.

• Jabhat Ahl al-Sham

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. A union of three Aleppo-based groups formed in late 2016: the Army of Mujahideen, Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham, and the Banners of Islam Movement. It ceased to exist after Jabhat Fatah al-Sham attacked it and its members joined stronger groups for protection; the Army of Mujahideen and Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham joined Ahrar ash-Sham, while the Banners of Islam Movement joined the Sham Legion.

• Army of Mujahideen

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Aleppo governorate. Formed in 2014; faced accusations of cracking down on dissent in its early days. Close to the Syrian Islamic Council. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles and in 2016 started identifying as part of the FSA, originally having been an independent Islamist group. In January 2017 it came under attack by Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and was defeated and driven out from its headquarters. The brigade then joined Ahrar ash-Sham for protection alongside fellow Jabhat Ahl al-Sham member Kataeb Thuwar al-Sham.

• Abna al-Sham

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Aleppo governorate. It had joined Faylaq al-Majd sometime by August 2020.

• Sahaba Brigades and Battalions

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Damascus and Rif Dimashq governorates. Formed in March 2012 as part of the FSA. In August 2012 it helped to form the Partisans of Islam Gathering (see Partisans of Islam Front). The group disappeared sometime in late 2013-early 2014.

• Jaysh al-Tawhid (Quneitra)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Quneitra governorate. Not to be confused with the Homs-based Jaysh al-Tawhid, which joined the Authenticity and Development Front. Included some former members of the short-lived Southern Brigades. It joined the 404th Division - Lions of the Golan in October 2017.

• Kernaz Commando Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Hama governorate. It joined Junud al-Sham in November 2016.

• Aisha Mother of the Believers Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Daraa governorate. It was part of the short-lived Southern Brigades. Possibly part of the FSA. It joined Jaysh al-Islam in July 2017. Possibly joined the 404th Division - Lions of the Golan in October.

• Ibn Taymiyyah Brigades

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Idlib governorate. It was part of the Authenticity and Development Front before joining Ahrar ash-Sham in January 2017. Later it joined HTS but defected in September 2017 and took control of the town of Darat Izza, which had seen anti-HTS protests. HTS promptly retook the town. In January 2018 the Ibn Taymiyyah Brigades rejoined Ahrar ash-Sham, and Ahrar’s parent group, Jabhat Tahrir al-Souriya, is in control of Darat Izza as of April 2018.

• Sham Commandos Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Idlib and Hama governorates. Formerly part of the Hama-based Jaysh al-Sham. Joined Ahrar ash-Sham in April 2017.

• Harakat Mujahideen al-Islam

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Formed in 2015 by the Banners of Islam Movement, the Ibn Taymiyyah Brigades, and a minor group called the Elite Brigade (not detailed in this document). The constituent groups had gone their own separate ways by late 2016.

• Ansar al-Sham

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Latakia governorate. It was part of the SIF and later the Islamic Front. It merged into Jaysh al-Islam in December 2016. Jaysh al-Islam’s greater Idlib branch merged into Ahrar ash-Sham in January 2017, presumably taking Ansar al-Sham with them, but in February Ansar al-Sham defected to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. In August 2018 the group’s leadership announced their intention to split from HTS, prompting HTS and the Turkestan Islamic Party to raid the group’s positions and confiscate its weapons. Little resistance was offered, and many Ansar al-Sham fighters voiced their opposition to their leadership’s decision. By October the group’s last HQ was captured, presumably meaning Ansar al-Sham is defunct.

• People’s Liberation Faction

Ideology: leftism; mainly Trotskyism and anarchism. Operated mainly in Hama governorate. A rebel group formed by the Revolutionary Left Current, which has links with the Trotskyist Fourth International. It dissolved due to harassment by Islamist and jihadist factions, including al-Nusra.

• International Revolutionary People’s Guerrilla Forces

Ideology: anarcho-communism. A unit of the International Freedom Battalion consisting of volunteers from various countries. Formed in March 2017 and disbanded in September 2018. A notable subunit:

• The Queer Insurrection and Liberation Army

Focused on LGBT issues. Its formation in July 2017 caused controversy in an area of the world where LGBT people are still largely considered perverts.

• Wrath of Olives

Ideology: Kurdish interests, Democratic Confederalism (presumably). A pro-YPG and anti-Turkish/FSA insurgent group in Afrin canton, Aleppo governorate. The Wrath of Olives’ modus operandi was more extreme than the similarly-purposed Afrin Liberation Forces, often showing disregard for civilian casualties. Defunct since 2021.

• White Shroud

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in and around the city of Abu Kamal in Deir ez-Zor governorate. A guerrilla resistance force to IS. It was closely connected to the Authenticity and Development Front and the New Syrian Army. It activated during the NSyA’s offensive on Abu Kamal and was crushed by IS when that offensive failed.

• Glories of Islam Brigade (Aleppo)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Idlib and Aleppo governorates. Formed in 2012. It was affiliated with a subgroup of the Free Syria Front until it left to help form the 19th Division in June 2013. It later left to join IS.

• Lions of Islam Brigade (Homs)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Not to be confused with the Daraa-based Lions of Islam Brigade. Defected from the Sham Legion to join IS. At one point it was linked to the Commission for the Protection of Civilians.

• Uwais al-Qarani Brigade

Ideology: Sunni islamism. Operated in Raqqa governorate. Possibly part of the FSA. Affiliated with the Nasser tribe. Reportedly the main rebel group in the Tabqa area until being overrun by ISIS. Its former leader and some of its remaining fighters joined the Syrian Democratic Forces in November 2016.

• Hasakah Martyrs Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Formed to fight the SDF by fighters who had been expelled from al-Hasakah governorate by the YPG. At some point before February 2021 it joined Ahrar al-Sharqiya.

• Liwa Jund al-Aziz

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Deir ez-Zor governorate. An FSA group that pledged allegiance to IS rather than fight it (see the second logo), but IS ended up destroying it anyway.

• Saddam Hussein Martyrs Brigade

        Ideology: unknown. Operated in Deir ez-Zor governorate.

• Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Deir ez-Zor governorate until being driven out by IS. At times it expressed closeness with Ahrar ash-Sham and referred to the regime with the common anti-Alawite nickname “Nusayri”; was also an early opponent of IS. It helped form Jaysh Usoud al-Sharqiya in August 2014.

• Ansar al-Mahdi

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated mainly in Aleppo governorate. Close to al-Nusra. Not to be confused with the pro-government Liwa Ansar al-Mahdi.

• Kataeb Sham al-Umma

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Idlib governorate. It appears to have joined Jabhat al-Nusra sometime in 2015.

• Lions of the Caliphate

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. An IS affiliate led by an Egyptian. Operated in Latakia governorate; presumably defunct, as IS was pushed from Latakia.

• Sons of Qadisiya Division

Ideology: unknown, likely Sunni Islamism. Operated in Latakia governorate. Not to be confused with the Daraa-based Qadisiya Division. It used to be part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Commission for the Protection of Civilians. It merged into the Resolute Storm Division in 2015.

• Kata’ib Junud al-Haq

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Deir ez-Zor governorate. Originally part of the FSA. It wavered between al-Nusra and IS. It either joined IS as it took over the governorate or fled and dissolved.

• Islamic Repentance Brigade

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. It was part of Jaish al-Mujahireen wal Ansar briefly. It defected to IS in March 2016.

• Jund al-Aqsa

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated mainly in Idlib and Hama governorates. It contained many foreign fighters and was closely linked to al-Qaeda. Often viewed as the most extreme of the non-IS opposition, even more radical than al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. Originally part of al-Nusra or possibly IS at one point. It was part of the Muhajirin wa-Ansar Alliance during that group’s existence. For the most part it had been closer to al-Nusra, but many IS sleeper cells have been linked to Jund al-Aqsa. Along with al-Nusra, it clashed with moderate groups on more than one occasion. In October 2015, Jund al-Aqsa left the much-celebrated Jaysh al-Fatah operations room, of which it was one of the original founders, accusing Jaysh al-Fatah of being insufficiently Islamic; Jund al-Aqsa also refused to fight IS more than defensively. In October 2016, clashes between Jund al-Aqsa and Ahrar ash-Sham pushed Ahrar to declare war on Jund and vowed to eradicate it, with the support of most other rebel factions. Jund al-Aqsa dissolved itself into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham to avoid persecution, a move which deepened the divide between JFS and other rebel groups. In January 2017 these tensions erupted again; JFS has disavowed Jund al-Aqsa in hopes of ending the fighting, but the clashes remain ongoing. Part Jund al-Aqsa in Hama split off as Liwa al-Aqsa and openly declared affiliation with IS. A few others may have joined the Turkestan Islamic Party, while the rest have likely fully integrated into JFS. In March 2018 a group of former Jund al-Aqsa fighters formed the pro-al-Qaeda Ansar al-Tawhid.

• Jaysh al-Jihad

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. A pro-IS group in Quneitra and Daraa governorates. Reportedly made up mostly of fighters who left al-Nusra after its first attack on the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade. It was attacked and defeated by the FSA’s Southern Front and its Islamist allies; remnants later joined the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army.

• Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. An IS battalion made up of Libyan volunteers. Its fighters returned to Libya in 2014 and placed the city of Derna under IS control, starting a new conflict within the ongoing Second Libyan Civil War.

• Ansar al-Furqan

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Idlib governorate. Formed in September/October 2017 as a split from JFS, openly declaring its allegiance to al-Qaeda. It appears to have been formed by al-Qaeda hardliners as a reaction to the direction that JFS/HTS has taken. However, al-Qaeda leadership denied any connection with the group. HTS arrested its leaders in November and dissolved the group. One of the arrested leaders, who had been released, later went on to form Tanzim Hurras al-Din.

• Jund al-Sham

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Homs governorate. Lebanese Palestinian group. Neutral in the rebel-IS conflict. Its fighters returned to Lebanon after defeat by the regime.

• Sayfuddin Uzbek Jamaat

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. A group of Uzbeks connected to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a jihadist group active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sometime after the IMU switched allegiance from al-Qaeda to IS, Sayfuddin Uzbek Jamaat joined JFS’s Liwa al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar.

• Army of Conquerors in the Land of al-Sham

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Hama governorate. Based on tribes in the area. It was briefly affiliated with the Central Division. In March 2017 it joined Ahrar ash-Sham.

• Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya (Deir ez-Zor)

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. It was close to al-Nusra and fought IS before being driven away and presumably disbanded. It did not appear to be connected to the Daraa-based group of the same name.

• Homs Legion

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate. It joined Ahrar ash-Sham in May 2017. It may have become independent again before the government retook its area of operations; if so, it relocated to the north and joined the Sham Legion.

• Bayada Martyrs Battalion

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate. It was led by former soccer star-turned activist-turned militant Abdul Baset al-Sarout. It was part of the Homs Legion briefly. It came under attack by al-Nusra at one point for purportedly being affiliated with IS. By 2017 Sarout had relocated to Idlib, possibly bringing some of his fighters with him. He declared his support for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham amidst the ongoing rebel infighting, but HTS distrusted him and arrested him at least once. He eventually joined Jaysh al-Izza and died amid fighting in Hama in June 2019.

• Southern Brigades

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Daraa and Quneitra governorates. Included some former FSA groups. It announced itself in March 2016 but has not been heard from since. Some of its members went on to join Jaysh al-Tawhid (the Quneitra-based one).

• 10th Coastal Brigade

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Latakia governorate. Occasionally called the 10th Coastal Division. It contained many Turkmen. Along with the 2nd Coastal Division, it fired on the ejected pilots of the Russian fighter shot down by Turkey in 2015. It later merged into the Sham Legion.

• Aknaf Bait al-Maqdis

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Formed by Hamas supporters in the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus. After losing most of the camp to IS, many fighters defected to the government, but there was still a remnant active as a rebel force until the 2018 defeat of all rebels in the Damascus area.

• Liwa Fajr al-Umma

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in the city of Harasta in the Eastern Ghouta region of Rif Dimashq governorate, where it controlled a highly profitable trade tunnel. Former member of the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union and before that the FSA. It had little regard for ideology, instead aligning itself out of convenience. For a time it operated in an alliance with Jabhat al-Nusra called Jaysh al-Fustat (see third logo), but it later started coordinating with Jaysh al-Islam (Nusra’s rival). In May 2017 it joined Ahrar ash-Sham.

• Banners of Islam Movement

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Formerly a member of Ahrar ash-Sham; its commander was also the commander of Liwa Ansar al-Khilafa at some point. It helped to create Harakat Mujuahideen al-Islam in 2015 and Jabhat Ahl al-Sham in late 2016. When Jabhat Ahl al-Sham was defeated by JFS in January 2017, the Banners of Islam joined the Sham Legion. In January 2018 it joined Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. In January 2019 it was defeated by JFS’s successor HTS and joined Faylaq al-Majd along with other Zenki remnants. In 2021 it rejoined the Sham Legion.

• Jabhat Thuwar Saraqib

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Idlib governorate. It dissolved into the Free Idlib Army in January 2018.

• Partisans of Islam Front

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Quneitra and Daraa governorates. Formed in August 2012 as a merger of several groups in the Damascus area; it was initially known as the Partisans of Islam Gathering (see second logo). It was a member of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front at one point. In November 2013 it helped to form the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union. Around the same time, most of its member groups left. It reformed in March 2014 as the Partisans of Islam Front. Reportedly the most Islamist group to receive Western-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles. Close to the FSA’s Southern Front. Not connected to Ansar al-Islam of Iraq (whose full Arabic name, “Jamaat Ansar al-Islam”, sounds like the Partisans’ Arabic name, “Jabhat Ansar al-Islam”). In May 2018 one of its commanders was arrested by other rebel groups after allegedly trying to defect to the government. The group’s HQs subsequently fell to the other groups without conflict. One of its subgroups in Quneitra, which had been supplied by Israel, managed to hold out a bit longer.

• Sham al-Rasul Brigade

Ideology: moderate Sunni Islamism, Sufi Islam? Operated in Rif Dimashq and Damascus governorates. Came into conflict with al-Nusra on at least one occasion. Possibly part of the FSA. Possibly close to the Muslim Brotherhood.

• Independent Mutaaz Billah Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism? Operated in Daraa governorate. Split from the Southern Front’s Mutaaz Billah Army in February 2016 and abandoned the FSA label.

• Jund al-Malahim

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Daraa governorate. Split from Jabhat al-Nusra in 2015, denouncing al-Qaeda and accusing Nusra’s commander in the south of extremism and tyranny. The group claimed to fight for freedom for Syrians of all religions and that it was not against Alawites or Druze, but it appeared to be anti-Shia nonetheless. Also known as Jund al-Thawra. Not to be confused with the Rif Dimashq-based operations room of the same name.

• Liwa al-Haqq (Homs)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate. One of the seven original members of the Islamic Front and probably the least hardline member of the Syrian Islamic Front before the Islamic Front merger; it had been close to the Farouq Battalions. Folded into Ahrar ash-Sham in December 2014. Not to be confused with the Idlib- or Rif Dimashq-based groups of the same name.

• Gathering of the Tribal Freemen

        Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs governorate.

• Mujahideen of Tell Dahab Gathering

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate.

• Huda Islamic Brigades

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate. Possibly part of the FSA.

• Jafar Sadeq Brigade

Ideology: unknown, likely Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate.

• Soldiers of Homs Brigade

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate.

• Glories of Islam Brigade (Homs)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operates in Homs governorate. Possibly defunct. Not to be confused with the Idlib/Aleppo-based group of the same name.

• Kurdish Islamic Front

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo and Hasakah governorate. It was part of the Syrian Islamic Front and later became one of the seven original members of the Islamic Front (not to be confused with the SIF). Essentially a puppet set up by Ahrar ash-Sham to make the SIF and IF seem less sectarian. Folded into Ahrar ash-Sham in December 2014. It was part of the formation of the Jaysh al-Ahrar subgroup in December 2016. In January 2017 conflicting reports emerged about whether or not the former Kurdish Islamic Front defected to the newly-formed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham amidst massive rebel infighting. By 2018 it appeared clear that most fighters remained part of Ahrar.

• Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. Former member of (at various times) Liwa al-Tawhid, the Army of Mujahideen, the Authenticity and Development Front, and Fastaqim Kama Umirt Union. Contained a significant portion of Turkmen. In the past it had been known to kidnap people for ransom. In 2015, however, it started courting the West and has started receiving US assistance, including TOW anti-tank missiles. Nevertheless, in July 2016 it was among several northern rebel groups accused of war crimes by Amnesty International. Later that month it beheaded a child, alleged to be a fighter for the pro-government Liwa al-Quds. US assistance has stopped, possibly as early as February 2016 or late summer 2015. It has come into conflict with al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in the past, but in 2016 it drew closer to JFS. Zenki was one of the initial components of the JFS-led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham but left in July 2017 after becoming dissatisfied with HTS’ attacks on Ahrar ash-Sham. In January 2019 it clashed with HTS and was nearly completely destroyed; its remaining fighters were transferred to Turkish-controlled Afrin. In March 2019 these fighters joined Faylaq al-Majd, forming the “3rd Brigade” within that group.

• Jaysh al-Tawhid (Homs)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate. Originally formed as the Faith in God Brigade, a 2012 split from the Farouq Battalions. It helped to form the Hazzm Movement in 2014. In 2015 it merged with some former members of the Sham Legion and Islamic Front and adopted the name Jaysh al-Tawhid. It merged into the Authenticity and Development Front in March 2016. Not to be confused with the Quneitra-based Jaysh al-Tawhid. In May 2018 its fighters chose to reconcile with the regime as part of a Russian-sponsored deal rather than evacuate to Idlib as many other rebels in the area chose.

• 313th Brigade/Freemen of Aqrab

Ideology: unknown. Operated in Homs and Hama governorates. Possibly a former member of the 111th Infantry Division. It was part of Jaysh al-Thuwar for a time. Not to be confused with the pro-government 313th Battalion or the 313th Special Forces Brigade. It joined Jaysh al-Tawhid in August 2017.

• Habib Mustafa Brigades

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sufism? Not to be confused with the Southern Front-affiliated Habib Mustafa Brigade. Operated in Rif Dimashq governorate. Split from the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union. At one point it was part of the Partisans of Islam Front. It eventually joined the al-Rahman Legion; many of the same fighters left and joined Alwiyat al-Majd in October 2016 (Alwiyat al-Majd rejoined al-Rahman in May 2017).

• Jund al-Islam

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. It used to be a subunit of a faction of the Syrian Islamic Front that eventually merged into Ahrar ash-Sham; this faction may have been related to the still-active Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya. In October 2016 Jund al-Islam joined the Levant Front.

• Ghuraba al-Sham (jihadist group)

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated mainly in Hasakah governorate. Linked to the Aleppo-based Ghuraba al-Sham Front. Mostly made up of Turks. It was formed in 2003 to send recruits to fight the Americans in Iraq and had ties to Syria’s Military Intelligence Directorate until the government cracked down on it. Close to Fatah al-Islam.

• Revolutionaries of Atarib Gathering

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Aleppo governorate. An FSA group originally formed as the Islamic Revolutionaries of Atarib Gathering - an anti-ISIS front in the city of Atarib; it played a major role in keeping the city out of ISIS’ grip. It later became part of the Hazzm Movement. It joined the Army of Mujahideen in May 2016. Not to be confused with the Revolutionaries of Atarib operations room.

• Jund Badr

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Homs governorate. Sometimes known as the 313th Brigade (not to be confused with the FSA’s 313th Brigade, aka Freemen of Aqreb). Originally formed as the 313th Special Forces Brigade (see second and third logos), which was active across Syria. Early in the war it was affiliated with the Syrian Revolution General Commission. Its leader had been involved in the short-lived Free Officers’ Movement and the group that later became the Syrian Martyrs’ Brigades and Battalions. Known for claiming responsibility for a 2013 car bomb in Beirut, Lebanon. The group became steadily more Islamist as time went on. It was briefly part of Jaysh al-Tawhid, which later became part of the Authenticity and Development Front. In 2018 it surrendered to the government. Two of its leaders were later arrested by the Air Force Intelligence Directorate.

• Jaysh al-Sham (Idlib)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism, Sunni jihadism. Operated in Idlib governorate. Not to be confused with the Hama-based group of the same name. It split from the Suqour al-Sham Brigades because Jaysh al-Sham didn’t want to fight IS. After one of its constituent brigades, Liwa Dawoud (see above), defected to IS, the group disbanded.

• Jaysh al-Sham (Hama)

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Hama governorate. Not to be confused with the Idlib-based group of the same name. Many of its leaders split from Ahrar ash-Sham, perhaps seeing it as too radical. It also contained former Farouq Battalions members. Possibly part of the FSA. It merged back into Ahrar ash-Sham in June 2016.

• Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Deir ez-Zor governorate. It was neutral in the rebel-IS conflict and dissolved itself shortly before its territory was overrun by IS.

• Muhajirin wa-Ansar Alliance

Ideology: Sunni jihadism, Sunni Islamism. An alliance formed in January 2014 between Liwa al-Umma (now Kataeb al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar), Liwa al-Haqq (Idlib), Jund al-Aqsa, and the Omar Brigade. It fell apart sometime during 2015, possibly due to the widening divide between Jund al-Aqsa and other rebels.

• Green Battalion

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Rif Dimashq and Homs governorates. Mostly made up of Saudis. Neutral in the IS-rebel conflict. One of the four founding members of the Ansar al-Deen Front, it was absorbed into Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar in October 2014.

• Abdullah Azzam Brigades

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Formed in 2004 and operated in various Middle Eastern countries. Closely connected with al-Qaeda. Its branch in Syria was known as the Marwan Hadid Battalions, named after one of the most infamous Islamist militants in Syria during the 60s and 70s. In 2012 the group discouraged the use of suicide bombs and car bombs in urban areas for fear of harming civilians. However, it has since engaged in several such bombings itself. It may have joined HTS at some point; if so, it later left HTS for Tanzim Hurras al-Din. In any case, the Marwan Hadid Battalions dissolved themselves in November 2019. It is unclear if the group’s branches in other countries are still active.

• Mourabitoun Battalion

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Daraa governorate. Split from Islamic Muthanna Movement in March 2016 after the IMM and the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade clashed with other rebels.

• Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya (Daraa)

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Close to al-Nusra/Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, but also displayed IS imagery. Not to be confused with the above Deir ez-Zor based group.

• Fatah al-Sham Alliance

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Daraa governorate. Not to be confused with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.

• Jama’at Ansar al-Huda

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Daraa governorate. Close to the Fatah al-Sham Alliance.

• Liwa Usoud al-Tawhid

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Daraa governorate.

• Jamaat al-Ansar

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in the Damascus area. Formed by former al-Nusra commanders after Nusra’s leadership demoted them for cooperating with IS in the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp. Neutral in the rebel-IS conflict.

• Gathering of Faith

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated in Daraa governorate.

• Alwiya al-Furqan

Ideology: Sunni Islamism. Operated mainly in Daraa and Quneitra governorates. Like Liwa al-Tawhid (now known as the Levant Front), it enjoyed good relations with moderates and hardliners alike. Its leader had hoped to be a part of the Islamic Front and was disappointed when his group wasn’t included. Since then, it seemed to be leaning towards the moderates, and it was very close to the FSA’s Southern Front. It received US-supplied TOW anti-tank missiles.

• Al-Fatah al-Mubin

Ideology: mixed. Not to be confused with Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin. A rebel operations room based primarily in Idlib; established in June 2019 to defend against a government offensive. It was restructured in October 2020 and succeeded (minus Jaysh al-Izza) by the Unified Military Council.

• National Front for Liberation
• Jaysh al-Izza
• Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

• Halif Nusrat al-Islam

Ideology: Sunni jihadism. Operated in Idlib and Hama governorates. Formed in April 2018 as an alliance of two jihadi groups: Tanzim Hurras al-Din and Ansar al-Tawhid. The alliance collapsed sometime before May 2020; Ansar al-Tawhid said Tanzim Hurras al-Din failed to consult with them before engaging in clashes with HTS and the National Front for Liberation.

• Daraa Military Council

Ideology: mixed. Operated in Daraa city and the surrounding area in Daraa governorate. Along with most other local military councils set up early in the war, it faded into obscurity as its member factions went their separate ways.

• Hamza Division (Daraa)
• Emigrants and Helpers Brigade
• Dawn of Islam Division
• 1st Artillery Regiment
• others

• Lions of War Operations Room

Ideology: mainly moderate Sunni Islamism. Made up of four Southern Front factions in eastern Daraa.

• Mutaaz Billah Army
• Omari Brigades
• Youth of Sunna Division (see Youth of Sunna Forces)
• Unity Battalions of Horan

• Ashur Forces

Ideology: Assyrian/Syriac interests. Formed in September 2018 to unify two Assyrian units in the Khabour valley region of Hasakah governorate: the Khabour Guards and the Nattoreh. Both groups were close to the Assyrian Democratic Party (see political section). The Khabour Guards withdrew in December, leaving the Ashur Forces defunct.

Notable regional alliances (operations rooms)

[Note: this section is heavily outdated at the moment]

• Syrian Democratic Forces

Ideology: federalism, democracy. The military arm of the Federation of Northern Syria - Rojava. An alliance between the YPG/YPJ, various FSA brigades, and non-Kurdish ethnic or tribal militias. A larger successor to the Euphrates Volcano operations room (see third and fourth logos). It has come into conflict with Turkey and Turkish-backed rebel factions.

• People’s Protection Units (including Women’s Protection Units)
• Syriac Military Council
• Sanadid Forces
• Gathering of the Jazira Brigades
• Qabasin Martyrs Brigade
• Shahba Forces
• FSA-affiliated brigades:

• Jaysh al-Thuwar
• Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa
• Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa
• Liwa Shuhada al-Raqqa
• Revolutionaries of Tal Abyad Front
• Saraya Jarabulus
• Liwa al-Qawsi
• Lions of the Euphrates Movement
• Knights of the Euphrates Brigade
• Tajammu Kataeb Furat Jarabulus
• Hawks of Jarabulus Battalion
• Martyrs of the Euphrates Battalion
• Gathering of the Euphrates Brigades
• Liwa Ahrar ar-Raqqa
• Liberation Brigade
• Northern Democratic Brigade
• Syrian Elite Forces
• Liwa Tahrir al-Furat
• Manbij Turkmen Battalion
• Revolutionaries of Manbij Brigades

• Manbij Military Council

        Ideology: mixed. Affiliated with the larger Syrian Democratic Forces operations room.

• Northern Sun Battalion
• Revolutionaries of Manbij Brigades
• Gathering of the Euphrates Brigades
• Liwa al-Qawsi
• Martyrs of the Euphrates Battalion
• Manbij Turkmen Battalion
• Liwa Tahrir al-Furat

• Al-Bab Military Council

Ideology: mixed. Affiliated with the larger Syrian Democratic Forces operations room. Not to be confused with a pro-Turkish FSA operations room of the same name.

• Seljuks Brigade
• Qabasin Martyrs Brigade
• others

• Jarabulus Military Council

Ideology: mixed. Affiliated with the larger Syrian Democratic Forces operations room. Its leader, also the leader of Tajammu Kataeb Furat Jarabulus, was assassinated by currently unknown agents less than a day after the council’s formation.

• Tajammu Kataeb Furat Jarabulus
• Freemen of Jarabulus Battalion
• Hawks of Jarabulus Battalion
• Revolutionaries of Manbij Brigades
• Saraya Jarabulus (possibly)

• Tal Abyad Military Council