NUFDI's Website

https://nufdiran.org/resources/10-things-to-know-about-the-maximum-support-act/

10 Things to know about the Maximum Support Act

1. Diplomatic flexibility remains fully intact.

- The bill defines strategic objectives and encourages coordinated interagency action without imposing constraints on executive diplomacy (Sec. 6(a)-(b), pp. 12-15).
- Congressional oversight measures are clearly defined, enhancing transparency but not restricting diplomatic flexibility

2. USAGM's role re-focuses existing resources with no major expansion; explicit safeguards address historical accountability concerns.

- The U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) is explicitly tasked with enhancing existing broadcasting efforts aimed at providing accurate and unbiased news coverage to the Iranian people, countering regime propaganda, and supporting independent journalists (Sec. 6(b)(4), p. 14).
- To directly address historical accountability and fiscal responsibility concerns, the bill explicitly requires robust oversight through annual audits conducted by the Inspectors General of the Departments of State, Treasury, and USAID, along with the Comptroller General, to ensure transparency, responsible use of funds, and to prevent misuse (Sec. 4(d), p. 8).
- Clear operational targets, structured oversight, and mandatory reporting ensure transparent evaluation explicitly designed to rectify historical operational and financial concerns (Sec. 4(d), p. 8; Sec. 6(b)(4), p. 14).

3. Treasury's role is explicitly limited—no direct vetting or distribution of funds.

- Treasury will confiscate, hold securely, and allocate regime-linked assets into specific accounts, clearly designated for specific purposes like supporting strikers, humanitarian aid, and human rights documentation (Sec. 4(a)-(c), pp. 6-7).
- The bill explicitly requires annual audits by the Comptroller General and Inspectors General (State, Treasury, USAID) to ensure full transparency and accountability (Sec. 4(d), p. 8).
- Treasury does not directly handle vetting recipients or distributing funds. The bill leaves this detail unspecified beyond the requirement that recipients be "vetted" (Sec. 4(c)(1), p. 7).

4. U.S. support explicitly respects Iranian autonomy.

- All assistance explicitly listed—such as secure internet (VPNs), cybersecurity training, humanitarian aid, and media freedom—is civilian-driven and non-intrusive (Sec. 3(b), pp. 3-6; Sec. 9(b), p. 19-20).
- Measures are structured to maintain dissident legitimacy, avoiding perceptions of external interference.

5. Explicit measures prevent misuse by the Iranian regime.

- Detailed vetting procedures for technology providers, continuous monitoring, congressional oversight, and regular audits are clearly mandated (Sec. 3(b)(4)-(6), pp. 4-5; Sec. 5(b)(2)(C), pp. 9-10).
- Technologies provided are specifically limited to civilian use—preventing diversion to the regime or affiliated groups (Sec. 9(b), pp. 19-20).

6. Asset confiscation is lawful, targeted, and transparent.

- The bill exclusively targets assets belonging to entities already sanctioned under U.S. law due to terrorism, human rights abuses, or illicit financial activities (Sec. 4(a)-(b), pp. 6-7).
- It explicitly requires transparent annual audits and reporting to Congress, ensuring accountability and preventing any misuse (Sec. 4(d), p. 8).

7. Designation of Iran's MOIS as a terrorist entity is evidence-based.

- The bill calls for evaluating and potentially designating Iran's Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, strictly based on documented criteria such as support for terrorism, assassinations, espionage, and kidnappings (Sec. 7(a)-(c), pp. 15-17).
- This designation aims explicitly at restricting MOIS's global terrorist operations, enhancing transparency and accountability.

8. It is NOT a regime change bill.

- The bill provides explicitly peaceful support to Iranians to aid their ongoing efforts to achieve a democratic government that respects human rights and rule of law (Sec. 2, p. 2; Sec. 6(a), p. 12).
- No authorization of military or covert operations aimed at regime overthrow is included anywhere in the bill.

9. Cybersecurity assistance is strictly defensive, tailored, and closely monitored.

- Assistance includes secure communications, encryption technology, and cybersecurity training exclusively for dissidents, activists, and journalists (Sec. 3(b)(7)-(8), p. 5; Sec. 9(b), pp. 19-20).
- Continuous monitoring, rapid-response technical support, and explicit oversight prevent misuse by adversaries or regime affiliates (Sec. 3(b)(9)-(10), p. 6; Sec. 9(b)(3)-(4), p. 20).

10. Defection strategies are explicitly voluntary, secure, and protected.

- The bill explicitly mandates developing a secure, voluntary strategy for Iranian officials and security personnel wishing to defect and support democratic change (Sec. 8(a)-(b), pp. 17-18).
- It explicitly includes secure communication, interagency coordination, assurances of safety, protection for defectors and families, and careful vetting of intelligence provided (Sec. 8(b)(1)-(6), p. 18).