

**THE WILLIAMSON COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION AUDIT OF THE AUGUST 6,
2026 ELECTION**
August 13, 2026

**WHEN THE FOUNDATION IS POOR,
THE HOUSE WILL COLLAPSE UNDER ITS OWN WEIGHT**

In 2024, the Tennessee legislature enacted the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act (Chapter 20 of the Tennessee book of laws), which implemented steps they considered improvements to elections.

One step was the inclusion of several post-election audits that counties would need to occasionally go through. One is a performance audit where election commissions work through a checklist to be sure they did everything in the election they were supposed to do. And the second was a Risk Limiting Audit, a protocol that checks a random sample of ballots chosen by the Williamson County Election Commission (WCEC) and checking them against the number on a random few tabulator tapes that track the votes.

On Thursday, August 13, 2026, the Williamson County Election Commission (WCEC) went through a Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) of the August 6, 2026 election. Specifically looking at the county mayor's race.

The audit process performed by the four Williamson County Election Commission members and ten citizen "auditors" went smoothly. It was very well organized, quick and very easy to follow from a citizen's standpoint. The result? All the numbers of ballots matched the numbers the audited tabulator tapes showed post-election. So, the WCEC will claim a 100% match, which was correct. **(If interested in the specific steps of the audit, check after the end of this op-ed.)*

But there's a problem.

If one wanted to feel confident that after performing this audit there were no issues in the election, they would be wrong. And here's why.

The audit only looked at .03% of the ballots voted...1,267 out of 47,646 total ballots. Plus, because the audit is based on a foundation of problems -- such as voting machines that can't be inspected, vote centers that pipe the internet into each vote center right next to the tabulators that can't be inspected, non-verifiable ballots and other processes that are not considered at all in the audit -- the entire process does nothing but give citizens a false sense of confidence in the election's result.

It doesn't confirm that the election was secure, accurate and transparent. And it certainly doesn't confirm that Tennessee is #1 in election integrity as legislators and bureaucrats like to shout.

You can thank Tennessee legislators, Secretary of State Tre Hargett, Tennessee Coordinator of Elections Mark Goins and the Tennessee State Election Commission for building an audit – and an election system – that is fraught with issues. And then refuse to pay attention to any research that presents the truth about the process and machinery.

Here's what the audit does NOT consider that could dramatically affect the security of the election and the accuracy of an audit:

- The voting machine/tabulators can't be inspected by cyber experts – or anyone -- before, during or after an election for [nefarious components](#) that could change how the machines operate when counting ballots.
- The WCEC refuses to implement a hash validation process on the tabulators so there is no way they can confirm if there has been any in-process changes to how the tabulator functions following Logic & Accuracy testing. We've been requesting [hash validations](#) be added since 2022.
- Precincts that are no longer used as voting locations because more and more voters have been squeezed into fewer voting locations/vote centers that [haven't increased voter turnout](#) or decreased election expenses and, instead, piped in the internet into the vote centers right next to those voting machines we can't inspect.
- Is the WCEC aware that the registrar Dell laptops contain Qualcomm chips that can conduct wireless activity? The WCEC claims their VPNs can keep machines safe, but they certainly haven't looked at [some recent research about VPNs](#).
- Did the ballot accurately reflect the choices of the voter? Since the voter's selections are [encased in a bar code](#) and it is the bar code – not the ballot's text -- that is read by the tabulator, how does the voter know his selections are truly in the bar code since no one can read bar code? That ballot is not voter-verifiable. But it's supposed to be.
- Scientists and lawyers have proven the [unreliability of the ballot marking devices](#) and [tabulators on which we're forced to vote](#). But the state and WCEC ignore these revelations. Why?
- The WCEC and the State Election Commission have refused to answer citizen questions about a small computer repair shop (Embry Consulting) that sits in the middle of a Crockett County cornfield that [manages the software and voter registration rolls and processes of 91 of 95 Tennessee counties](#). No one at the firm, the state or county will tell us what cyber expertise they have in place (or if they have any...) to protect all voter rolls from hacks nor if they are even certified to do such highly sensitive work.

In essence, while the audit may be okay in how it is conducted, the foundation underneath the audit – the system of machines and other complications created by Tennessee bureaucrats and legislators – is completely fallible. And no number of audits will improve that foundation. It's cracked, broken and one day will crumble.

And the blame for that rests with Secretary of State Hargett, Coordinator Goins, the State Election Commission and legislators.

Frank Limpus

[Tennessee Voters for Election Integrity](#)

**The audit process they used:*

- *They planned for 16 "Auditors," 10 arrived and were grouped at three tables of 4 or 3.*
- *WCEC Commissioners Rod Williamson & Donna Choate pitched in at 2 tables.*
- *One person is the designated witness at each table; the other three handle/count the ballots.*
- *First: WCEC officials checked the security tags on the chosen ballot boxes.*
- *The absentee collection of ballots had only three ballots.*
 - *When the absentee board counted those ballots on election day, they compiled the 711 ballots into districts/precincts. One precinct was chosen via a drawing; and as it ended up, there were only 3 ballots in that group.*
- *Second: Parrish Presbyterian tabulator B was counted with 164 ballots.*
 - *All ballots were pulled out of the ballot box and sorted by who it was voted for -- Marshall, Muvvala or other (no choice or write-in).*
 - *They were collated into stacks of 25 ballots and then bulk counted.*
 - *The stacks were re-counted by other teams/auditors and the tally compared to the tabulator tape numbers. Check.*
 - *The ballots were returned to, locked and sealed in the blue ballot box.*
- *Third: The Columbia State early voting tabulator A with 1100 ballots.*
 - *Same process.*
- *The 1,267 ballots were counted in approximately 60 minutes.*

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 - When the absentee board counted those ballots on election day, they compiled the 711 ballots into districts/precincts. One precinct was chosen via a drawing; and as it ended up, there were only 3 ballots in that group.
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 - The stacks were re-counted by other teams/auditors and the tally compared to the tabulator tape numbers. Check.
 - The ballots were returned to, locked and sealed in the blue ballot box.
- Third: The Columbia State early voting tabulator A with 1100 ballots.
 - Same process.
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