Chicken and Waffles[1]

and a Happy New Year

I received a note on the 22nd of December. It was entitled "Nothing exists", and was a proposed rebuttal of my argument of 7 years. You see, it came at 10:41– and breakfast with my mom and sister was at 11! But it was dead on arrival. I intensely scanned the work, and responded quickly one past. Alas, I thanked the man and arrived only 15 minutes late, ready to enjoy our holiday. If you are wondering what I got, I can say this: I ate the chicken and waffles– and they were Good.

The rebuttal[2] to this "rebuttal" of the EP Conjecture is summarized (tldr: the debunker[3] got a little too bunky and themselves got *debunked!*):

1. Absolute Nothing ("Nothing") cannot be formally defined (it's a contradiction in terms), and therefore neither can "nothing exists". The author's proposed definition of "nothing exists" fails at the level of concept (i.e. in principle with no-thing else assumed other than itself) and then likewise fails again through counterexample (i.e. the always existor, which is something, satisfies the author's proposed definition of *Nothing*, a clear contradiction). In short: the author is materially misunderstanding Nothing. There is a real and important difference between us discussing and modeling absolute Nothing *as Something*, and Absolute Nothing (non-existence/no existence). Absolute Nothing (the latter) doesn't have a formal definition: encoding or representing Nothing is a farce because it's self-contradictory. Nothing (no existors because non-existence) does not exist!
2. The author's proposed definition of existence, and more specifically for all existors ("x exists" IF), is that all existors are "x" and for all "x" that exist, then "x=x". This just is the classic identity axiom (not a new idea). *As an exhaustive definition for all Something this fails*; for the base case of all existence (Nature), the always existor, is *undefined*. It exists (has an instance of itself), but it does not satisfy the standard identity axiom because it's not a mathematical object (need "x" for "x=x" to hold, and you only have "x" if that something is formally definable). Therefore, the rebutter's claimed definition for existence or existors is clearly countered: *the original existor (base case) need not and does not satisfy x=x.* Remember, it is all differences that must be encoded (thanks SA), and we find that there is exceptional possibility and actuality and necessity of an existor without an explicit identity: the always existor is un-caused, undefined, and unique: the un-encoded/uncoded/not encoded inherent original "identity".
3. The author's proposed definition of necessity— or of a 'necessarily existent'— fails exactly because necessity comes from the base case existor which is *undefined*, and therefore

[1] Author: Andrew Downing Hartford. This work relates to the EP Conjecture. Written: Jan 4, 2025.
[2] See the full response here (#97).
[3] The author which I am playfully mentioning is actually a good person and scholar worthy of respect. I credit our correspondence in footnotes (I.e. me more properly explaining my ideas in response to his comments was helpful). Thank you, Peter. Though, we did not appreciate him saying the EP Conjecture was not a "serious philosophical work" (though indirectly, without even the dignity of a citation).

similarly cannot be given a formal definition. Understanding why defining necessity in terms of possible worlds is fraudulent is discussed in #86.

4. The author's proposed answer to why Absolute Nothing is logically impossible *in principle* (I.e. IF there ever is anything actual then it is possible, with an additional *unexplained jump* of 'if ever possible then necessarily necessary') *does not take seriously the potential counterfactual of absolute nothing*. It is textbook circular and fails (fallacy). Subtly, it is not that it has the wrong conclusion, but it is insufficient to a serious natural philosopher interested in Leibniz's question. That's because it doesn't understand where the conclusion comes from (I.e. does not *itself* answer the key question, *where does necessity come from?*) and therefore relies on other assumptions that do the *essential* work which it does not[4].
5. Lastly, the author's assertion of "what good philosophy is" is contrived and uninteresting. The mean jeers were not appreciated, but we remain smiling and unphased, as these comments have been dismantled dispositively. We remain ready as your lawyer to serve the class in Something v. Nothing (which that author ironically, but thankfully, remains a part of). The words of the ep conjecture do not matter, but the concept does (the always existor): Nature's base case is un-caused, un-beginning, and before all time and that realization is not some invention, but a natural discovery. Affirmatively, we go on offense when we say the field of philosophy needs a "dead reckoning": "you won't find the right apples in the wrong orchards" (J. Appleseed) and good foundations necessarily recognize the base case which they rely on.

[4] Namely, the unnamed assumption that there is never an Nothing to Something jump, and therefore "always", including the a priori "definition"/description of the concept. The always existor is the explanation to the reason why there is any existence, possibility, actuality or necessity.