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Higher-priority proposals for the AGM needing PLA endorsements that would regulate the Constitution Committee: 6

### **Notice of non-consensual title changes in Constitution Committee Reports**

This constitutional amendment requires that the Constitution Committee report include a statement if the title of an amendment was changed without the consent of the amendment author(s).

[Notice of non-consenting amendment title changes in Constitution Committee Reports - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: Constitution Committee members have been contacted to express their concerns and have not articulated an objection.

Endorsing PLAs: 3 needed

### **Mandating proposer name-disclosure for constitutional amendments**

This proposal would require the Constitution Committee's report to identify at least one individual member proposer for every tabled constitutional amendment, thus increasing accountability and predictability prior to and during plenary debates.

<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1gsEs064Anhm8yl2JNaM1fOd3XGwTJK8AEKJOiaDBT5k/edit>

Criticisms by others: None so far. Days before the 2024 AGM the Constitution Committee Chair was asked by email, “is it a secret which person will be presenting the jointly sponsored Committee & Council amendments on the convention floor?” He never answered the question.

Endorsing PLAs: 3 needed

### **Moving ahead Constitution Committee Report publishing**

This proposal would require the Constitution Committee's report to be published by no sooner than 22 days prior to an AGM, instead of the current requirement of 15 days beforehand. To avoid rushing the work of the Constitution Committee, the amendment

submission deadline would also be moved ahead from 42 days beforehand to 49 days beforehand.

#### [Moving ahead Constitution Committee Report publishing - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: None so far despite all Constitution Committee members being consulted.

Endorsing PLAs: 3 needed

### **Vetting amendment proposals based upon association with controversy**

This proposal would abolish the active-support requirements for constitutional amendment submission (like 20 explicit member endorsements), requirements which exclude unexciting but reasonable proposals from low-income or disadvantaged members who lack personal resources or pre-established membership connections. The proposal would instead vet amendment submissions based upon their association with controversy, by allowing members to petition against the tabling of certain amendments, thereby proportionately increasing the required number of member endorsements to qualify for submission.

[https://docs.google.com/document/d/18USHP6fwPMpp2AGwVvUHeI\\_xDpiZ4aloIKN43QHvL1g/edit](https://docs.google.com/document/d/18USHP6fwPMpp2AGwVvUHeI_xDpiZ4aloIKN43QHvL1g/edit)

Criticisms by others:

Despite the opposing-signature soliciting powers that the Constitution Committee would be afforded by my proposal, the Committee rejected my proposal without dialogue when suggested as a friendly amendment to their own 2023 amendment.

A member has argued to me in print, “Under your proposal, there are fewer checks against a well-organized group either proposing or petitioning against a malicious amendment.” I responded, “you can only petition against the tabling of a proposal if you find out that the proposal exists 3 weeks before the AGM. And you would only know that a proposal exists if you requested access to the list of drafts (the wording does not promise that such a request will be obliged), or if the Constitution Committee specifically brought the proposal to your attention.

One supportive PLA raised to myself, “concerns were raised over the additional work created for volunteer members of the OLP Constitution Committee to receive, manage, distribute, and track every proposal from every party member.” I do not know if this is an objection in principle to the OLP conventions receiving more amendments, or if this was intended as an objection that members would inundate the Committee with amendments - logically, this process would have blocked some of the amendments submitted for the 2023 AGM.

The various interest groups whose formal powers would be removed were all consulted without objection.

Endorsing PLAs: Markham-Thornhill PLA?

### **Declaration of Constitution Committee neutrality or lack thereof towards amendments**

Constitution Committee members have unpredictably pivoted between activist and vetting purposes with respect to select amendments, mixing interpretation and opposition to amendments without warning select amendment authors of said opposition. This amendment proposes a modest baseline for transparency, committing the Constitution Committee to pre-emptively declare in Constitution Committee Reports which constitutional amendments it will not discuss with neutrality.

[Declaration of Constitution Committee neutrality or lack thereof towards amendments - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: See the above weblink for the (mis)-representation of the amendment by one of the former Constitution Committee Chairs.

### **Publishing consenting amendment authors' emails in Constitution Committee Reports**

This constitutional amendment proposes a discretionary right for constitutional amendment authors to have an email address published in the Constitution Committee Reports. The purpose of this right is to facilitate potential exchange between amendment authors and other members who may wish to contact the former, including critics of proposals.

[Publishing consenting amendment authors' emails in Constitution Committee Reports - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: Constitution Committee members have been contacted to express their concerns and have not articulated an objection. Nonetheless, the Committee refused the suggestion of their optional adoption of this practice.

### Constitutional amendments with recent confirmed PLA endorsement(s): 2

#### **Remote voting in AGMs, subject to Executive Council veto**

This constitutional amendment affirms the provision of online attendance options for OLP Annual General Meetings, while cleaning up the time-specific language.

### Remote voting in AGMs

Criticisms by others: An earlier incarnation of this proposal submitted by former Executive Councillor Fadi El-Masry was defeated in the 2023 plenary after allegations by Eric Davis that said proposal would “force” authorities to impose online attendance in all AGMs regardless of circumstance. A 2024 version of this amendment was formulated to address that specific criticism.

The same defeated 2024 proposal also attempted to address the “in person votes are superior” argument by allowing Executive Council and plenary to designate remote votes as inferior in value. Eric Davis spurned countless efforts at outreach by myself towards him, and cynically condemned this text without acknowledging its purpose. This version removes those provisions.

At the 2025 AGM a constitutional amendment was passed to adopt remote participation methods for future AGMs – but with a catch. The catch is that sub-amendment text was added to delay implementation of the amendment to “[Upon the close of the 2026 annual meeting](#)” – conveniently buying time for someone to submit an amendment for its repeal by the next AGM, before there is any change in the AGM format whatsoever.

Endorsing PLAs: Carleton, Niagara Falls,

### **Leader calling of overdue policy resolutions processes**

The OLP Executive Council has refused to call policy debates and votes at any conference for over a dozen years. This amendment would authorise the Leader to bypass Council and declare policy resolutions processes for an upcoming Annual General Meeting wherever no such process has existed within the past 4 years.

#### [Leader call of overdue policy resolutions - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: One member once told me that the Leader should not have unilateral spending powers.

I have every expectation that an insider of some stature would be speaking against the amendment to grovel to the Leader’s desire for full policy control. Passing this amendment would take away the manipulated ambiguity of the Leader’s sway over policy resolutions outcomes, by making clear that the perpetual absence of policy resolutions processes can be ended at the whim of the Leader.

By ironically giving the Leader an unsolicited new power, this ironically takes away the disguised power of the Leader to deflect responsibility to submissive sycophants.

Endorsing PLAs: Carleton, Niagara Falls,

## Lower-priority proposals for the AGM needing PLA endorsements: 6

### **Vetting Executive Council candidates by controversy**

This proposal would screen Executive Council candidates according to petitions of member support versus member opposition, such that those with more opposition than support would be screened out of candidacy prior to the commencement of an Annual General Meeting.

#### [Vetting Executive Council candidates - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: None, consultations are just beginning.

### **Membership, Leader, and Policy Committee vetting of policy resolutions**

This proposal would vet policy resolutions submitted for Annual Policy Development Conferences based upon their association with controversy, by allowing OLP members to petition against the tabling of certain policies, thereby proportionately increasing the required number of member endorsements to qualify for submission. The Leader's Office and the Policy Committee would be authorized to share submitted resolutions with the membership to make such petitioning possible.

#### [Membership, Leader, and Policy Committee vetting of policy convention submissions - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: A former member wrote to me, "I find this concerning due to democratic implications. The party needs to open up, not close doors and the leader's office should have no direct influence at policy conventions otherwise it's a waste of time to have them... I think policy conventions should be an opportunity for policy minds like yourself to present and debate ideas. Whether policies make it into the platform or not, that's the leader's decision."

I wrote in response, "I'm actually writing this proposal because I suspect that the Executive Council would be inclined to draft more restrictive controls on resolution submissions than this one, i.e. arbitrary requirements for active/vocal support. As someone who used to submit many policy resolutions to the Green Parties of Canada/Ontario contradicting the Leaders' preferences, some of my own controversial ideas would plausibly get screened out of this process. However, I would rather have the Leader be allowed to rally petitions against my proposals than be pre-emptively compelled to signatures for the more boring/abstract ideas. And plenary should get some early measure of depth of controversy."

"There's always going to be sycophants at policy conventions speaking on behalf of the Leaders' preferences. What I like about my proposal is that it forces them out in the open at an early stage, rather than ambushing last-minute as they tend to do in plenary."

## **Creation and Maintenance of a Membership Discussion Forum**

An online all-members' discussion forum would allow for a free-flowing internal party discussion that would be accessible to the general membership on a perpetual basis, but there are technical and monetary issues that can potentially complicate the immediate establishment or perpetual maintenance of such a forum. Thus this amendment proposes that for every full year that there is the absence of an official members' forum, a notice is to be sent to the membership reminding them of Executive Council inaction, so that voting members may judge the Executive Council accordingly.

### [Creation and Maintenance of a Membership Discussion Forum - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: One member vaguely criticised the proposal as "complicated" without substantiation nor acknowledgement of the proposal's purpose.

The Niagara Falls PLA was reluctant to endorse the proposal after review due to concerns with administering civility, though the amendment has provisions to address such circumstances and I was not left with the impression that the PLA members would necessarily vote against the proposal. The Bay of Quinte PLA also declined to achieve consensus support.

Another member told me, "This would require too many resources from the Party staff to maintain, especially now with only 6 staff at the Party office." However, the Executive Director would have discretion to pick unpaid volunteers to monitor the forum.

This amendment was voted down without any public criticism at the 2024 AGM. (No PLA-endorsed constitutional amendments have been yet defeated without debate; this one had qualified through 20+ member endorsements.)

## **Mandating Straw Polls of the Membership regarding Policy and Constitutional Motions**

The proposed amendment does not fundamentally alter the authority of in-person delegates at an Annual General Meeting to make binding decisions. However, this amendment proposes to compel straw polls of the membership, thereby informing voting delegates about the perspectives of the full membership on particular proposed policies or constitutional amendments.

<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1LuY-ghQjBTRdwipwgg4Q29pwrNBO4qa939LeJ4b17gI/edit?tab=t.0>

Criticisms by others: My pro-grassroots constitutional amendment to take straw polls of the membership was defeated after opposition in the 2025 plenary by a certain Matthew Slatt, whom I was completely unfamiliar with, and by the Constitution Committee member Eric Davis, who has a long history of spurning attempts at outreach. There was nothing that I could have done to anticipate these two individuals nor to prep speakers to address them

accordingly – they used the tactic of expressing emotion to intimidate potential would-be supporting speakers from stepping forward.

### **Guaranteeing overdue Annual Policy Conferences**

The OLP Constitution promises that there will be "Annual Policy Development Conferences" approved by the Executive Council, yet inertia within the Executive Council had caused the OLP to persist over a decade without a policy conference. This amendment proposes a mechanism to ensure that such an outcome cannot be repeated: a coming Annual General Meeting of the Ontario Liberal Party shall be jointly designated as an Annual Policy Development Conference, in cases where no such conference has been scheduled in between two prior Annual General Meetings.

#### [Guaranteeing overdue Annual Policy Conferences - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: This amendment was defeated at the 2024 AGM after public surprise opposition from then Executive Vice-President Damien O'Brien and Jack Siegel (the latter of whom was rewarded for his activism with an appointment as Constitution Committee Co-Chair).

### **Executive Council accounting for an absence of member policy submissions for Policy Conferences**

The OLP Constitution promises that there are to be "Annual Policy Development Conferences"; however, the Executive Council has the constitutional discretion to perpetually decline formal policy resolutions processes for said conferences in favour of alternative specified "forms" such as workshops. This amendment would require an explanation from Officers of the Executive Council via a report every four years wherever policy resolutions are perpetually not accepted at Annual Policy Development Conferences.

#### [Executive Council accounting for an absence of member policy submissions for Policy Conferences - Google Docs](#)

Criticisms by others: This amendment was voted down without any public criticism at the 2024 AGM. (No PLA-endorsed constitutional amendments have been yet defeated without debate; this one had qualified through 20+ member endorsements.)