

Rhetorical Subjectivities and Objectivities - Nov. 15, 2016

Cultural Dis/Identification and Cultural Dis/Location Working Space - Nov. 3 and Nov. 10, 2016

Terms

Alterity - Closely related to difference and other. Identity politics, subaltern. “Alterity,” defined by the OED as “The state of being other or different; diversity, ‘otherness,’” defies a simple definition because it contains concepts like difference and otherness within itself. Difference and otherness must be unpacked to begin understanding alterity and the cluster of meanings associated with otherness.” -- U of Chicago *Guide to New Media Terms*

Related term: Subaltern Counterpublics - There is a need to study non liberal, non-bourgeois, competing public spheres that might be described as subaltern counterpublics. These could also be understood as nested public spheres or enclaves publics.

-- Jasinski’s *Sourcebook on Rhetoric*

Dr. G adds: from Latin *alter* (“being the other of the two”). In critical theory, “alterity” often signifies the process of (people) becoming altern, either as a result of perception (i.e., perceived as being different from the dominant group) or as a result of disciplinarity or historicization (i.e., being historically or disciplinarily situated as non-hegemonic). The former concept is what we see in much of rhetorical criticism, while the latter concept is what we see in much of Gayatri Spivak’s postcolonial criticism.

Dialectical Materialism

Dr. G adds: In some respects, this is a theory derived from cultural materialism and cultural studies that tries to account for what drives change in literary criticism and critical theory. A possible response to the question: *What does it mean that the text is historical and history is textual?* In terms of how we tend to inherit this term in rhetorical studies: A theory that helps explain change in the natural world through the reinterpretation of Hegel’s “dialectical method” from a materialist -- rather than an idealist -- position. Change in human history and society is due to conflicts among material forces, not only due to conflicts among ideal/ideological forces. Definitely rooted in Marxist criticism for its emphasis on how material forces may influence economic movement.

Diaspora

Dr. G adds: Often discussed in terms of both roots and linkages. While this commonly describes the movement or dislocation of a

hegemonized (or non-dominant) culture or group, “diaspora” doesn’t only refer to their movement -- it can also refer to what occurs as a result of that dislocation. So, rhetorical practices can be considered “diasporic” if they occur as a result of some disenfranchisement, and diaspora can be ongoing.

Écriture Feminine: Cixous” the concepts of women’s writing that is rooted in the ways women experience their bodies and sexualities” (B/H, 1200). The concept explains *Écriture Feminine* writing that is sensually expressive, i.e., fluidity because of inherent female sexuality (B/H, 16). But not ultimately limited to women.

Dr. G adds: This term is central to Lynn Worsham’s “Writing against Writing” essay, and well discussed in our B/H anthology (as Mandy and Angela already discovered above!). As a critical practice, *écriture féminine* (“women/s writing”) is no less ideological or epistemological than other kinds of criticism, but it does advocate giving meaning without “neutraliz[ing a text’s] radical potential” in order to go beyond a text’s meaning in the postmodern sense (Worsham 84). It is also the “performance of style”--a “spectacular discourse subculture” that holds within it the possibility of change (Worsham 85), disrupting dominant orders of “meaning” by expressing forbidden ways, at times denying communication and consensus altogether (Worsham 99).

Emic/Etic

Dr. G adds: This concept pair resonates with some of what we discussed when we read Haraway’s “Situating Knowledges.” There was that idea of “discursive third space” that we took from LuMing Mao in order to try to figure out where Haraway felt we should position ourselves in order to reason differently. Emic/Etic is a tension between insider and outsider perspective, i.e., which one is most dominant in naming a rhetorical tradition. So, it is a kind of third space. Deb Hawhee’s “invention in the middle” (see below!) could also be a reflection of this emic/etic tension.

Hypermediacy:

Identity Politics

Dr. G adds: Generally speaking, this describes a wide range of political activity and theorizing that is founded or established in the shared experiences of the injustice of members of certain social groups. Typically “identity politics” aim to secure the political freedom

of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context.

Kairos-- Hawhee defines it as “rhetoric’s time” (18) and as an “in(ter)vention” (25). Kairos was defined as “necessitate[ing] the thought will always be on the move to resist freezing” (Hawhee 18). “The opportune moment” (EoR 413) based on the ancient Greek deity *Kairos*. Became important with move from Aristotelian rhetoric to Isocratean (EoR 413). “...absorbed in part of a comprehensive system of rhetoric and emerges through moderation, the appropriate, and the good” (EoR 413). There is no one specific definition (EoR 413). There is no perfect translation for this word (EoR 413). First, kairos calls for decisive action; second, it refers to the right moment to speak; third, it expresses what is appropriate (EoR 413).

Dr. G adds: Good points! This may help to explain why even similar attempts to recover kairos are motivated differently. For example, Hawhee’s “invention in the middle” tries to reconceive subjectivity and the subject’s relation to language and the world. Even though we didn’t read her, Michelle Ballif does the same thing through “*métis*” but definitely promotes dissensus more than Hawhee. So one sees it as more of a moment for action, while the other sees it as more of a catalyst for action (or an exigence or reason).

Liminal

Dr. G adds: The more I reflect on this term, the more I see “emic/etic” above. So, how about we claim that discussion above for “liminal” as well? The important thing for us to remember -- given the work you have all done in your exploratories and given some of the specific discussions we have had in class -- is that “liminal” need not be a resolved state of being, nor is it a “border” in the sense of hard lines or boundaries or thresholds. It reminds me of *mestiza consciousness* -- it implies that kind of suspension.

Marxism / Marxist Criticism Traditionally, generated by the works of Karl Marx, Marxism represents ideology taking a “pejorative connection” where ideology “is likened to a mental infection that distorts a person’s ability to think and perceive the world around him or her” (312-3 Sourcebook on Rhet) Deals with class consciousness and the representational concepts of the public at large. In **Marxist criticism**, the critic is focusing on how texts are “subversive” “or otherwise politically charged function[ally]” through multiple historic eras (89 Bedford Glossary)

Dr. G adds: For sure! And we might consider how this critical stance is motivated by recasting the material/physical as discourse. It is often preceded by the assumption that the economic/base conditions in a society are directly influencing that society’s ideologies/superstructure. (In way too reductive terms, I suppose it’s like saying that whatever happens on the ground in terms of

what we have and who has access to what will act as a constraint on what we think we can uphold as our highest ideals ...) Marxist dialectical materialism promoted this idea: that what drives historical change are the material realities of the society's economic base, not its ideological superstructure (e.g., law, politics, philosophy, religion, art, etc.).

Master Trope

Dr. G adds: Gates embodied this for us. And historicized it.

Materiality

Memory “The fourth of the five canons of rhetoric. In classical rhetoric, memory pertained to the memorization of a completed discourse or set of prompts....Because people could retrieve ideas from the ordered places within memory and reorganize and expand on them, memory became a means of invention as well” (B/H 1633)

Dr. G adds: We might also consider this as a re/canonized or extra-canonical construct (i.e., public memory, private memory, collective memory, national memory, etc.).

Polyvalent Voice (see B/H 1583 for *a start* ...)

Dr. G adds: Thank you!

Presence

Public sphere

Signifying/Signifyin' Gates refers to this as the master trope of black rhetoric (B/H 1547) “Signifying is the general term for several forms of persuasion, insult, boasting, or lying, all by innuendo or indirection. This trope may be verbal, in prose or verse, or nonverbal in gesture” (1547).

Dr. G adds: And perhaps it is the general term for an intertextual rhetorical act playing on both standard English and black English, which in turn means the trope signifies not only the words in their present context, but also the linguistic (and cultural) assumptions or traditions that contextualize the words. As “the trope of all tropes” (i.e., the master trope), Gates’s signifyin’ subsumes other rhetorical strategies like “loud talking and testifyin’.” Master trope/signifyin’ points to the fact that two (or more) realms of language can co-exist in a perpendicular relationship within the same discourse. Ultimately, Black English becomes a comment on the standard English that it supposedly responds to. In this way, signifyin’ relies on its ability to invoke an absent signified that is also ambiguously present.

Standpoint Theory

Tools

- InPho (see blog “Resources for Study”)
- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (see blog “Resources for Study”)
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (see blog “Resources for Study”)
- Glossary of Classical Rhetorical Terms (see blog “Resources for Study”)
- Silva Rhetoricae (see blog “Resources for Study”)
- Siegel’s (boutique) Introduction to Literary Theory (can Google this)
- Wikipedia Glossary of Rhetorical Terms (on Wikipedia)
- Jasinski’s *Sourcebook on Rhetoric* (see blog “Resources for Study”)
- Bizzell and Herzberg *Rhetorical Tradition* (check both index and glossary)
- Enos, ed., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition* (hard-copy brick, I’ll bring to class)

Your clearest moment while reading it? Share?	You shared so many during class discussion -- they are likely in your notes!
What seems to be his agenda?	
What is the problem? (And how does he resolve it?)	
How does he define "resistance"?	"Resistance, then, is simply the convergence of multiple and conflicting powers" (Mucklebauer 79)
How does this inform reading and writing (discourse), power, culture?	
How does this inform rhetorical theory? Rhetoric and Composition?	• Coming in contact with power can be a way into invention--method by which invention happens (M 79) • Emphasizes the role of history in developing rhetorical shifts • Provides a notion of invention beyond the traditional definition--"not as one part (or even several parts) of argument formation" but "the <i>telos</i> of an encounter with a text--invention of both concepts and subjects" (M 92).

	Foucault	Gates	McGee
Conceptions of postmodern(ity)			Not sure I could figure this out directly, but indirectly, "post"-Modernity! It seems McGee is historicizing the <i>ad populum</i> fallacy so as to reveal the various attachments "The People" has had to British

			Empiricism, Fascism, Communism -- i.e., what he calls the major 20th century ideologies. Perhaps setting us up to see how Hegelian and Marxist dialectics <i>have</i> functioned or <i>could</i> function for rhetorical criticism? - Dr. G
Identity politics		Afro centric view: subversion through the use of troping in black English/vernacular vs. standard English	The arbitrary construction of the people: “‘The people’, therefore, are not objectively real in the sense that they exist as a collective entity in nature; rather, they are a fiction dreamed by an advocate and infused with an artificial, rhetorical reality by the agreement of an audience to participate in a collective fantasy” (240). Gives example of Hitler’s “people”: trying to create a collective “people” through focus on the Leader, which will establish a group identity--this still fails (241) Nice finds! Below, someone found McGee’s claim that “The People” are more process than phenomenon, which means they materialize or become “conjured into objective reality” only so long as they are delivered through a rhetoric that has force. Once delivered, or once the rhetoric is no longer forceful, “The People” dissolve. Classic example: Tea Party rhetoric. They are a kind of “false consciousness.” -Dr. G

Meaning of reading, writing, or authoring	Have to separate marx from Marx (Muckelbauer); The function of the author has grown stronger (i.e. author function); author function as a process (ideas of Shakespeare vs who Shakespeare was in the real world); rejects capital Author for author-function (closer to the idea of a “writer”) (1465)		I don't think this essay attends to it that much. However, in McGee's critique of P&O-T's <i>The New Rhetoric</i>, I see an expectation that P&O-T could have appealed to the masses better than they did. I'm still uncertain where the “elitism” charge comes from, simply because I can't piece it together from rereading <i>TNR</i> or from McGee's footnotes, and I don't know McGee's orientation. (I'm sure there is some evidence I do not have.) But I sense that McGee thinks <i>TNR</i> should have been a more public kind of treatise, rather than arguing as theoretically as it did. I also sense that McGee thinks P&O-T's notion of “audience” should have been more liberated from conceptualizations of the modern (he calls “literary”) reader. So, maybe I can conjecture that he is a reader-response critic, and sees reading, writing, and authoring as very similar practices to one another. -Dr. G
Place of knowledge or knowledge-making	Through discourse: “discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (1461)		McGee locates knowledge/making in rhetorical analysis and in rhetorical criticism. After proposing “the people” as a cultural myth that requires a different analysis, he thus promotes a kind of criticism that doesn't look “inward” at rhetoric's “techniques,” but rather looks “outward” at its “functions.”

			"I suggest that we use [the concept "audience"] to explore serious Hegelian and Marxist dialogues of the previous two centuries which have so greatly affected life in our own time" (McGee 350 -- or, his final sentence). -Dr. G
Power and control	Hypothesis: production of discourse is controlled (1461). Relationship between discourse, institutional influence, and "power of constraint" (1463). Three systems of exclusion: prohibition/forbidden speech (sexuality and politics), division of madness (reason and madness binary), and will to truth (historically based but has come to rest on institutional support: pedagogy, systems of books, learned societies in the past and laboratories now) (1463).		Here's some conjecture on how power and control might be discussed in his text, based on McGee's treatment of "the people." "The people" is a rhetorically useful and critically productive construct because: • It warrants a whole political system, but its identification varies from system to system • It is a (primarily) linguistic phenomenon • It does not exist as a collective entity in nature but rather is "dreamed by an advocate and infused with an artificial, rhetorical reality by the agreement of an audience to participate in collective fantasy" • It can function as a rhetorically useful myth (a means of providing social unity and collective identity) • It reminds us that a single construct (perhaps a cultural construct) is comprised of several dominant myths, new and old.

			Seems Foucauldian to me, yet one of his primary influences is Edmund Burke. He didn't have access to Foucault's <i>Order of Discourse</i> ... -Dr. G
Relationship of language to communication and truth	Critiques the "will to truth" that positions discourse as a conveyor of meaning (1462) "the commentary must say for the first time what had, nonetheless, already been said, and must tirelessly repeat what had, however, never been said" (1465) Must be "in the true" before it can be called true or false (1467); truth is constructed and controlled.	The communicators need to understand the particularities of the language, the particularities of troping (in this case), in order to get at the underlying "truth"	
Sovereignty	"And if we want to--I would not say, efface this fear, but--analyze it in its conditions, its action, and its effects, we must, I believe, resolve to take three decisions which our thinking today tends to resist and which correspond to the three groups of functions which I have just mentioned: we must call into question our will to truth, restore to discourse its character as an event, and finally throw off the sovereignty of the signifier" (1470). I think one reason we have to "throw this off" is that, for Foucault in this essay, "signification" is that "primordial complicity with the world" that is "supposed to be the foundation of our possibility of	"All along, however, black people were merely Signifyin(g) through a motivated repetition" (1564) "Unmeaning jargon" to standard English speakers were "full of meaning" to the blacks, who were literally defining themselves in language" (1565)--through the oppressions that the blacks faced, they created their own kind of sovereignty, or have become sovereign to English speakers who do not have an understanding of the language and Significations they invented.	

	speaking of it, in it, or indicating it and naming it, or judging it and ultimately of knowing it in the form of truth" (1470). Foucault is obviously <i>against</i> the idea that discourse should only be signification, i.e., deciphering, i.e., "a discrete reading" (1470). He presents discourse as a more intertextual phenomenon, something that should not be "put at the disposal of the signifier" (1470). -Dr. G		
Positioning of the "other" or of "otherness"	This isn't from Foucault (I am cheating), but it's worthwhile to know that Foucault has been criticized by Gayatri Spivak and perhaps other postcolonial feminist theorists for basing his theories of subject and power on a certain kind of arena of production, i.e., on an <i>institution</i>. For Spivak, developing and defining an institutional notion of power is not all that different from being complacent about repression, because the subaltern subject doesn't have access to the same institutions (or arenas of production) as the culturally dominant subject. They can't just partake in some universalist project by joining an institution. This raises a problem of other-ing: How to make sense of a western modernist subject – including the student in the classroom – without promoting a dominant ideology or promoting a	"Confrontation between parallel discursive universes" (1552) "Argues strongly that the most poignant level of black-white differences is that of meaning, of 'signification' in the most literal sense" (1555).	

	pedagogy of “otherness”? At the same time, it seems to me that your examination of Foucault’s essay in this grid has led you to find passages where he says power is located in the interactions between individuals, and not necessarily <i>in</i> the institutions. - Dr. G		
Teaching writing	Need to examine teaching of writing so we can understand what discourses we are including/excluding (1463). “Any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and powers which they carry.” “The problem for teachers, then, is not how to remove power from a classroom, but how to deploy power in a fashion that provokes an alteration in the student’s actions. Further, because thought is an effect of power, Foucault is extremely suspicious of theories that, in a certain humanist tradition, treat consciousness as the primary axis through which to study the social field” (Muckelbauer 77).	Let people have their own language. Part of that is understanding how they produce that discourse (1573). // 1977(?) CCCC’s “Students’ Rights to their Own Language.” (Yes, quite possibly so! -Dr. G)	You have to invent your audience. “The people exist in objective reality and social fantasies at the same time. ‘The people’ are more <i>process</i> than phenomenon” (242). Potentially gives us another reason to teach (students how to examine) logical argumentation and logical fallacies. Given that “the people” is a logical fallacy (<i>argumentum ad populum</i>), McGee suggests it is particularly rich for examination of various dominant cultural myths. Reasons why he takes up the fallacy definition: • It doesn’t imply a seamless translation from individual to audience, or person to people • It isn’t a stable construct (therefore, how does one appeal to it?) • The spirit of the people cannot be captured arithmetically (like, through the electoral college system ...) • Treating “the people” as an

			appeal may shortchange the reasoning process (this is true of most logical fallacies, i.e., they end up becoming appeals rather than reasoning processes) -Dr. G
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	Master Trope	<i>Mestiza</i> consciousness/Border	Difference
Gates	Signifyin[g] monkey--encompasses vertical signification, re-doubling, linguistic play, black vernacular (1557) Repetition?	Could Signifyin' point to a kind of border? Liminal space? Different spiritual identities and concepts across multiple cultures with a carryover of how they are seen through different aspects of how a signifier is understood by listeners/different audiences. (ie; slave songs that were initially coded protest that also became the seed for next generation's music)	Difference of discourse between Signifyin' and signifying (1555). "It also seems apparent that retaining the identical signifier argues strongly that the most poignant level of black-white differences is that of meaning, of 'signification' in the most literal sense" (1555)
Anzaldúa	<i>La Mestiza</i>--it can stand in for so many other things (and not) at the same time. Can be	"Through a source of intense pain, [the consciousness'] energy comes from continual	Anzaldúa talks about difference in the way in which she discusses multiplicities in

	defined on its own or can be defined by association (“divergent thinking,” “She learns to juggle cultures. She has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode.” “The new mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity” (79).	creative motion that keeps breaking down the unitary aspect of each new paradigm” (p. 80)	which “As a mestiza I have no country, my homeland cast me out; yet all countries are mine because I am every woman’s sister or potential lover. (As a lesbian I have no race, my own people disclaim me; but I am all races because there is queer of me in all races)...” (Anzaldua, 80). We can be both with and without (culture, race, sexuality), and that ties in with ambiguity. That’s a performance of difference in different ways.
Trinh T. Minh-ha	I/i--decentering/complicating of subject; represents division and plurality of subjectivity Third world woman--how other scholars have classified the third world woman (trope, not necessarily master trope) (“Given the permanent status of ‘foreign workers’” 83) Language to identify and establish identity	Mestiza consciousness for Trinh deals with the pain of “keeping traditional law and tribal customs among yourselves, as long as you....are careful not to step beyond the assigned limits” So the individual is straddling the border between his/her/other ethnicity and culture. Trinh talks about borders, but not the same way Anzaldua talks about borderlands. Anzaldua talks about this as	“difference is essentially ‘division’ in the understanding of many. It is no more than a tool of defense and conquest.” (Trinh, 82). Enacts difference within a plurality of subjects. Difference within: “<i>infinite layers</i>” of “I” (94). Differences between (You and me) and within (I and i) (90). Different selves have the ability to create multiple identities or

		an amalgam/collision/meetingplace, but Trinh talks about them more as thresholds to be crossed rather than spaces to be occupied. Ex: Male hegemony vs. spoken woman.	layers of identities. “Difference as uniqueness or special identity is both limiting and deceiving” (95).
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