

War and state formation The case of Post-2014 Ukraine
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Like other countries in the post-Soviet space, since 2014 the Ukrainian state has been facing a "frozen conflict" on its territory. Indeed, since the early 1990s, several post-Soviet states have been or are still facing armed conflicts on their territory. Mainly referred to as "frozen conflicts", this term refers to a certain type of secessionist conflict used by Russia to preserve its geopolitical positions on its southern borders considered as its "near abroad". Thus, in Ukrainian context, two dynamics are taking place: on the one hand a "revolutionary moment" which leads to a change in the political elites in power, and on the other hand a civil war which is taking shape in the East of the country following the armed aggression of the Russian Federation that then turned in a "frozen conflict". If the 'revolutionary moments' (Tilly: 1978) in the post-soviet space have sometimes been analyzed as moments of 'democratic transition' they also need to be understood through the prism of the historical trajectory of states, practices and power struggles of various groups and factions within the state. This presentation will focus on the effects of the Euromaidan "revolutionary moment" and of the Donbass War on the Ukrainian central state, with particular attention to the system of elites.

In the post-Soviet space, since the early 1990s some states have developed an 'oligarchic-patrimonial' regime and have found themselves confronted with a 'capture of the state' (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann: 2000), by the private accumulation logics of the economic elites, in alliance with the neo-patrimonial bureaucracy. Indeed, as Alexandre Fisun points out, the political systems of post-Soviet states can be classified into two types, 'sultanist' and 'oligarchic-patrimonial', according to the balance of power between the neo-patrimonial bureaucracy, profit-seeking economic and political actors, and political power controlling the means of coercion through the use of military forces (Fisun, 2007). The common acceptance of the concept of oligarchy refers to a type of regime and neo-patrimonialism (Eisenstadt, 1973) to a distinction between public and private property that is not respected in practice, contrary to the patrimonialism described by Max Weber (1971), for whom certain forms of "traditional" legitimacy, which predate "rational-bureaucratic" legitimacy such as Sultanism, testify to a lack of distinction between state property and princely property, thus establishing as a norm the indistinction, as far as political authorities are concerned, between public and private property (and between public and private function, public and private interest).

In 2013, the Euromaidan mobilizations taking place in the Ukrainian "oligarchic-patrimonial" regime, led to the departure of President Yanukovich, then part of Donetsk's "oligarchic clan", and, more generally, to a change of power. This change of power is most often analyzed as the result of a mobilization of the civil society in the context of a democratic transition process. However, as in 2004, some of the economic elites in favor of a pro-European orientation played a decisive role in this context where civil society has not been the main bottom-up force in Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko's rise to power after the revolutionary moment of 2014 is therefore part of a renewed

competition between oligarchic clans for the access to the center's administrative resources. For some oligarchs, the pro-European orientation leads to the preservation of their economic interests by securing their property rights and access to world markets within the framework of an oligopoly economy whose main sectors have been monopolized since the semi-privatizations of the 1990s.

President Yanukovych's departure from power leaves the country drained and almost at bankruptcy. The signing of the Association Agreement with the EU and the change in power led to a stronger presence of international organizations, particularly international donors who condition their loans on the implementation of reforms for the "democratization" of the political system and the "liberalization" of the economy in this former Soviet republic. Systemic corruption in this post-Soviet republic is the result of the lack of strict partition between the political and the economic spheres since the introduction of reforms aimed at liberalizing the economy after the fall of the USSR. After the introduction of schemes for the capture of national resources through the effect of semi-privatization of state industries by regional economic networks, a rentier economy was established, operating through the subordination of the political class to the economic interests of a group of actors designated as "oligarchs".

The war and the support of Western actors, led the national political elites to develop new mechanisms articulating the discourse of "democratization", strategy for the construction of the historicity of the state, and adaptation of political and economic practices, the reforms of the state apparatus inducing a repositioning of the elites in new economic networks and reinforcing rent-seeking practices. Constituting the cornerstone of the Ukrainian post-Soviet system, the oligarchs form an elite system whose individual strategies for the defense of their private interests constrain a process of reform of the state apparatus that has been underway with the support of international actors since 2014. Indeed, despite the "revolutionary moment" and the war, the logic of the rent-seeking system in place since the 1990s has been maintained.

In the light of the theories on the construction of the state in war (Tilly: 1990) and on 'civil wars' defined as the coexistence on the same national territory of different social orders maintaining a violent relationship (Baczko, Dorronsoro : 2017), we propose to analyze the relationship between the trajectory of the Ukrainian state and the place of "civil war" in it through a reflection on the one hand on the exogenous factors, and in particular the effects of this internationalization of the governance, which enable the restructuring of state apparatus in this context of armed conflict, and, on the other hand, the configurations of this elite system interfering with the reform agenda because of the maintenance of the "néopatrimonial" logics and "republic of clans" (Minakov, 2019) in the post-Maidan period.

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