Name:	Pd
AP GOPO - Federalist 51 Notes Chart	
Excerpt from <i>Federalist 51</i> :	Notes:
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which, to a certain extent, is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted, that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.	Everyone agrees that, in order to maintain liberty, government power must be divided. Each department (branch) must have as little influence as possible over the selection of the members of the other departments.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments [salaries] annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other, would be merely nominal.	Each branch must have as little influence as possible over the pay that members of the other branches receive.
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.	If people could be trusted to always be good to one another, government would not be needed. Those human beings who are elected to serve in government do not always behave righteously. Government must be structured so that it is powerful enough to control the people. Government must also control itself.

In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each other, as the nature of their common functions, and their common dependence on the society, will admit.	The legislature can be prevented from gaining too much power by dividing it into two chambers, or houses (Senate and House of Representatives.) The two chambers keep an eye on each other.
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.	Government power in America is divided between a central (national) government and state governments. Power is further divided at each level among several branches. State and national levels of government control each other.At each level, government officials are responsible for controlling themselves and their proper powers.
The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from, and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.	A second way to protect those with minority opinions is for the society itself to have so many different groups that no one is likely to be in the majority opinion on every issue.
In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects, which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place upon any other principles, than those of justice and the general good	In a large, free republic, there are so many issues, groups, and opinions that the main principle on which they unite is that everyone's rights should be secure.

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