

Dear IMC-CAN Team Action recipient - Feel free to print/share this sheet with your action group and friends.

## Here's How To Get Flock Out of Our Communities

Flock Safety's automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras are quietly spreading across Massachusetts. Often approved through routine contracts with little public debate, they create a powerful, always-on tracking system that records where we drive, when, and how often, regardless of whether we are suspected of any wrongdoing. This dragnet surveillance amounts to a form of warrantless tracking that erodes the expectation of privacy in our daily movements. They allow a private, for-profit company to store and control sensitive location data that can be widely shared across law enforcement networks. The risks of misuse, whether targeting immigrants, protesters, healthcare patients, or political activists, are not hypothetical, especially in a moment of heightened federal enforcement and data-sharing. These systems are being used to monitor and track immigrants and activists alike.

Because these systems are often adopted quietly and normalized before the public fully understands their implications, we should all urge our local governments to reject Flock contracts or commit never to adopt them, ensuring that community safety does not come at the expense of basic civil liberties and democratic oversight.

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## [ACTION SUMMARY](#)

**Estimated time:** 5-10 minutes, depending on whether you send an email or call.

- **Read** as much of the [background information](#) below as you wish.
- **Use the links** below to email your municipal government, either through the ACLU of MA link or by looking up your local government email addresses on your own.
- Take 5 minutes to email your municipal government to ask whether it uses Flock Safety ALPRs.
- Use our script below or personalize your own.
- Ask those you know to do the same.

## [SOURCES](#)

[ACLU of Massachusetts](#)

## [ACTION DETAILS](#)

1. Use this [ACLU Action Network Link](#) to send a letter to your municipal leaders here.

2. If the ACLU link does not have your community's information in their database, use the instructions below to do it via email:

**a. Look up how to contact your municipal government.**

Most Town and City websites have an email address for sending written comments to your Select Board or City/Town Council, depending on how your municipal government is structured. You can search your town/city website for the email addresses, or call your City or Town Hall (Town Clerk or Town Manager) to request them.

[Instructions for locating your municipal government email addresses.](#)

**b. Email Your Municipal Leaders:**

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*Subject: Unregulated license plate readers threaten our privacy and safety*

See the script below and personalize it.

Dear *(Select Board/City Council)*,

*Automated License plate readers (ALPRs) are a common police surveillance technology that threaten our privacy and safety.*

*With LPRs, law enforcement can track drivers' real-time and historical location information. In other words, they can see exactly where you've been and where you're going. And they don't even need a warrant. All too often, law enforcement dumps this highly personal information into a nationwide database that other state and federal agencies, including ICE, can access. That puts immigrants, people seeking healthcare, political protesters, victims of domestic violence, and others at risk.*

*Other states have regulated LPRs. Massachusetts has not — and that's a problem. Local police departments are deploying LPRs at an unprecedented scale: At least 80 departments in Massachusetts have contracts with one vendor, Flock Safety, often combining them with other powerful surveillance tools. Massachusetts needs statewide driver privacy protections NOW.*

*I would like to know whether our local police department is using Flock's LPR technology or LPR technology from a different provider, and, if so, whether they share LPR data with agencies outside your community. If our local police department is using Flock Safety's system, can you commit to ending their contract to safeguard our community from this privacy breach?*

Thank you,

*Your Name and address*

**For an added bonus, consider copying the Chief of Police on your email or reading your email aloud during the public comment period of a Select Board meeting.**

## **BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

The ACLU and ACLU of Massachusetts are urging local police departments to end their contracts with Flock, citing serious privacy, civil liberties, and unchecked surveillance concerns associated with the company's automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems.

Flock Safety's automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras, increasingly installed by police departments without question, enable law enforcement to collect and store massive amounts of data on people's movements in real time and historically, **without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion**, amounting to near-constant vehicle surveillance. This data includes license plates, timestamps, and location information that, when aggregated, creates a detailed record of where individuals have been and where they are going, often *in perpetuity* and *without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing*. Massachusetts currently lacks statewide limits on how police use these systems, meaning departments deploy them at scale with minimal legal guardrails, effectively engaging in dragnet tracking of all drivers rather than targeting specific criminal suspects.

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The ACLU notes that courts have recognized that such technologies, when widespread and interconnected, invade reasonable expectations of privacy in ways analogous to cellphone tracking, raising Fourth Amendment concerns about *warrantless searches* of people's movements.

Beyond the privacy implications of pervasive tracking, critics warn that Flock's **nationwide data-sharing model significantly increases the risk of misuse, especially because it is operated by a private corporation rather than** by government agencies.

Local departments that contract with Flock can opt to share their license plate data with broader networks of agencies, effectively giving small-town police chiefs access to a powerful nationwide surveillance database and enabling other local, state, and federal agencies, including immigration enforcement, to query where vehicles have been, often without transparency or strict oversight.

Investigations and audits have surfaced instances of data being accessed by federal and state agencies *without clear authorization* and concerns that vulnerable groups, such as immigrants, protesters, or people seeking lawful healthcare, could be disproportionately targeted.

Flock has resisted independent third-party evaluation of its systems, leaving unresolved questions about security vulnerabilities and operational transparency. The concentration of such extensive surveillance capability in the hands of a private company with commercial incentives, paired with weak legal limits on access and sharing, deepens fears that these systems can be misused or expand far beyond their stated public safety purpose, eroding civil liberties.

<https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/flock-massachusetts-and-updates>

<https://eyesoffma.com/>

<https://www.aclum.org/campaigns-initiatives/get-the-flock-out-resource-guide/>

[EFF's Investigations Expose Flock Safety's Surveillance Abuses: 2025 in Review](#)

[Georgia police chief, arrested for using Flock cameras for stalking and harassment, searched Capitola data earlier this year](#)

[de-Flock](#)

## [BONUS ACTIONS](#)

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