

My Sources For "Japan Map"

0:33

"..Japan, a formidable rival who, having embarked on modernization after 1868, began its own imperialist expansion into its neighbors' territory. Japan's aggressive policy toward Korea soon enraged China, the nominal suzerain of the hermit kingdom, and the two Asian countries went to war in 1894-1895. Japan defeated China, which was obliged to cede to the victor Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria, and to recognize Korea's independence. Japan had now acquired a foothold into the Asian continent." (p.8)

"Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan," Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

<https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674022416>

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0:38

"Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 marked a new era in international relations in the Far East. In 1932, Japan created the puppet state of Manchukuo. In 1933 it withdrew from the League of Nations. In 1934 it annulled the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty. [...] Between 1933 and 1937 international relations in the Far East were marked by uncertainty. The Japanese government under the leadership of the foreign minister and later prime minister Koki Hirota attempted to establish a new international order that recognized the gains Japan had obtained from its aggression."

"Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan," Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

<https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674022416>

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"...the Japanese leaders maintained that control of China was essential to provide raw materials and markets for the ailing Japanese economy, resettlement areas for Japan's burgeoning population, security against potential Soviet armed incursion in China, and opportunities for propagating the superior Japanese culture and values."

"American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War" by D. Clayton James from "Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age" (1986)

<https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8xnhvw.28>

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0:45

A map of Japan's territorial acquisitions from 1870-1942:

<https://cdn.britannica.com/64/105764-050-B12B5AFC/Empire-of-Japan-1942.jpg>

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0:53

"...the Japanese leaders maintained that control of China was essential to provide raw materials and markets for the ailing Japanese economy, resettlement areas for Japan's burgeoning population, security against potential Soviet armed incursion in China, and opportunities for propagating the superior Japanese culture and values."

"American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War" by D. Clayton James from "Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age" (1986)

<https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8xnhvw.28>

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"Throughout the twentieth century the Japanese, seeking access to resources lacking on the home islands, had energetically expanded their control of territory on the Asian mainland (northern China and Manchuria) and Pacific islands."

<https://mappinghistory.uoregon.edu/english/US/US34-00.html>

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0:59

"When Japan occupied southern French Indochina in July of 1941, putting her forces within striking distance of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands responded with an oil embargo. This threatened to strangle the economy of Japan, which imported 90% of its oil (domestic production being limited to small fields at Niigata and Akita.)"

<http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/O/i/Oil.htm>

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"For the United States, Japan was the third largest export market, after only Britain and Canada, and its exports to Japan was much larger than imports."

"Compound Containment: A Reigning Power's Military-Economic Countermeasures against a Challenging Power" (2022), Dong Jung Kim

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.11622137.8>

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1:05

"At the outset, U.S. officials viewed developments in China with ambivalence. On the one hand, they opposed Japanese incursions into northeast China and the rise of Japanese militarism in the area, in part because of their sense of a longstanding friendship with China. On the other hand, most U.S. officials believed that it had no vital interests in China worth going to war over with Japan. [...] U.S. likelihood of providing aid to China increased after July 7, 1937, when Chinese and Japanese forces clashed on the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, throwing the two nations into a full-scale war. As the United States watched Japanese forces sweep down the coast and then into the capital of Nanjing, popular opinion swung firmly in favor of the Chinese."

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/pearl-harbor>

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1:17

"Then in 1940 settlement of the China Incident became directly linked to events in Europe. Germany's defeat of France and the Netherlands left tiny white imperialist regimes in the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia isolated and vulnerable. In order to block one of the last supply routes into China, Japan in July 1940 forced

Vichy France to agree to Japanese occupation of northern Vietnam, while Great Britain, fighting for its survival at home, temporarily acquiesced to Japanese pressure by **closing the Burma Road**. International opinion had been outraged by brutalities committed by Japanese forces in China. The move into Vietnam, followed in November [1940] by the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy hardened American attitudes. Besides continuing public recognition of the nationalist regime and financial credits to bolster Chinese resistance, the American response to Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China was to enact trade embargoes on strategic materials, particularly oil and metals that were essential to the continued operation of the Japanese economy as well as its military machine. The Japanese occupation of southern Vietnam in July 1941 proved to be the last straw for the US. In August, President Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the US and cut off export of high-grade octane to Japan. Similar actions by the British and Dutch soon followed."

"Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?" (2007) by James B. Wood

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"First, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940 and thereby linked the conflicts in Europe and Asia. This made China a potential ally in the global fight against fascism. Then in mid-1941, Japan signed a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union, making it clear that Japan's military would be moving into Southeast Asia, where the United States had greater interests. A third agreement with Vichy France enabled Japanese forces to move into Indochina and begin their Southern Advance. The United States responded to this growing threat by temporarily halting negotiations with Japanese diplomats, instituting a full embargo on exports to Japan, freezing Japanese assets in U.S. banks, and sending supplies into China along the Burma Road. Although negotiations restarted after the United States increasingly enforced an embargo against Japan, they made little headway."

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/pearl-harbor>

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1:23

"In August, President Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the US and cut off export of high-grade octane to Japan. Similar actions by the British and Dutch soon followed."

"Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?" (2007) by James B. Wood

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"Japanese negotiations with Dutch authorities in the East Indies and with the American government to obtain the strategic materials needed to sustain operations in China were unavailing. To gain allies and protect its flanks during the conquest of Southeast Asia, which Tokyo saw as inevitably necessary but also likely to provoke war with both Britain and America, Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Axis Pact in September 1940 and concluded a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union the next spring."

"American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War" by D. Clayton James from "Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age" (1986)

<https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8xnhvw.28>

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"The Netherlands joined the American trade embargo against Japan in July 1941. In doing so, it made itself knowingly vulnerable to a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies to forcibly secure the supply of oil."

<https://www.ospreypublishing.com/uk/osprey-blog/2021/the-netherlands-east-indies-campaign-1941-42-japan-s-quest-for-oil/>

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1:31

"The embargo on oil and gasoline products, in particular, alarmed Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ), which estimated that Japan's petroleum reserves on hand could last for only another two years and then would be totally exhausted, with no source of replenishment in sight. "

"Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?" (2007) by James B. Wood

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1:36

"The attack on Pearl Harbor was only a means to an end for Japan. The primary objective of the 1941/42 Centrifugal Offensive was the Dutch East Indies and its rich oil fields that could make Japan independent for its energy needs. But an attack south towards the East Indies required securing the sea lanes, which in turn required seizing Malay and the Philippines and by extension starting a war with Britain and the United States."

https://origins.osu.edu/milestones/december-2016-pearl-harbor?language_content_entity=en#:-:text=The%20attack%20on%20Pearl%20Harbor,independent%20for%20its%20energy%20needs.

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1:48

"Particularly vital to Japanese interests were the petroleum-rich Dutch East Indies – modern-day Indonesia – and the rubber plantations and tin mines of British Malaya."

<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/japans-territorial-expansion-1931-1942>

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1:58

"It was to be Japan's ideological new order, which would amount to a self-contained empire stretching from Manchuria to the Dutch East Indies and including China, French Indochina, Thailand, and British Malaya as satellite states. Under the slogan "Asia for Asians," Japan intended to ensure its political and industrial hegemony over the region while excluding from it both European imperialism and communist influence."

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Greater-East-Asia-Co-prosperity-Sphere>

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"A major pronouncement of the Japanese during their war against the western colonial powers was that they were endeavouring to create a new order in East Asia. The culmination of this new order was to be the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. As expounded by its creators, once the war had been won, the sphere was to become self-sufficient, be freed from the suppression of the White race, and form a realm where all the countries and peoples within would coexist in co-prosperity under the aegis of Japan."

"Japan's Intentions for Its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as Indicated in Its Policy Plans for Thailand" (1996) by William L. Swan

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/20071764>

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2:00 CHAPTER 1 THE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE

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Centrifugal Offensive

"The military historians of West Point have given the name "Centrifugal Offensive" to the opening Japanese offensive of the Pacific War, which was centered in southeast Asia but also included the Pearl Harbor strike and subsidiary operations intended to secure the flanks of the main advance."

http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/C/e/Centrifugal_Offensive.htm

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2:08

In December 1941, Japan's Centrifugal Offensive was launched to gain control of the Western colonies in Southeast Asia and create a defensive perimeter to protect against an Allied offensive. It succeeded in capturing most U.S., British, and Dutch held territory. By the end of February 1942, Tokyo had secured all Western colonial possessions with the exception of part of New Guinea and Macau.

<https://amti.csis.org/2015-ww2-anniversary/>

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The attack on Pearl Harbor was only a means to an end for Japan. The primary objective of the 1941/42 Centrifugal Offensive was the Dutch East Indies and its rich oil fields that could make Japan independent for its energy needs.

https://origins.osu.edu/milestones/december-2016-pearl-harbor?language_content_entity=en#::-:text=The%20attack%20on%20Pearl%20Harbor,independent%20for%20its%20energy%20needs.

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2:25

All six of Japan's first-line aircraft carriers, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku, were assigned to the mission. With over 420 embarked planes, these ships constituted by far the most powerful carrier task force ever assembled. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, an experienced, cautious officer, would command the operation. His Pearl Harbor Striking Force also included fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers,

with tankers to fuel the ships during their passage across the Pacific. An Advance Expeditionary Force of large submarines, five of them carrying midget submarines, was sent to scout around Hawaii, dispatch the midgets into Pearl Harbor to attack ships there, and torpedo American warships that might escape to sea.

<https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/japanese-forces-in-the-pearl-harbor-attack.html>

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The Japanese strike force consisted of 353 aircraft launched from four heavy carriers. These included 40 torpedo planes, 103 level bombers, 131 dive-bombers, and 79 fighters. The attack also consisted of two heavy cruisers, 35 submarines, two light cruisers, nine oilers, two battleships, and 11 destroyers.

<https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/pearl-harbor-fact-sheet-1.pdf>

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"America's Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was dealt a severe, though not fatal blow. From forward staging areas in China, Formosa, and Vietnam, Japanese naval, air, and ground forces rapidly moved south at astonishing speed."

"Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?" (2007) by James B. Wood

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2:49

"The Japanese navy was superior to the US Navy in nearly every category of fighting ship. Most importantly, the Japanese bested the Americans in aircraft carriers, 10 to three. The naval situation worsened for the Allies as the first phase progressed because losses inflicted on their navies exceeded those of the Japanese."

"The Pacific War, 1941-45" by Sean M Judge in "Who Has the Puck?": Strategic Initiative in Modern, Conventional War" (2009)

<http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13942.9>

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2:54

"America's Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was dealt a severe, though not fatal blow."

"Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?" (2007) by James B. Wood

<https://dod.overdrive.com/media/1362599>

"Though the United States suffered a major loss of battleships at Pearl Harbor, war production offset those losses in an astonishingly short period."

<https://mappinghistory.uoregon.edu/english/US/US34-00.html>

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3:03

"The German representatives handed to Mr. Atherton a copy of a note that is being delivered this morning, December 11, to the American Charge d'Affaires in Berlin. Dr. Thomsen said that Germany considers herself in a state of war with the United States. He asked that the appropriate measures be taken for the departure of himself, the members of the German Embassy, and his staff in this country."

<https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/gerdec41.asp>

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3:40

"General Douglas MacArthur, under orders from Roosevelt, secretly left the Philippines by PT boat for Australia on March 11, 1942, leaving Major-General Wainwright in command. Upon arriving in Australia, MacArthur proclaimed: "I came through and I shall return." Despite a determined defense by the hungry and disease-ridden American and Filipino troops, Bataan was forced to surrender on April 9, 1942."

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/npswapa/extContent/wapa/guides/first/sec2.htm

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3:49

"Almost 78,000 troops were captured by the Japanese. But for the defenders of the peninsula, the ordeal was only the beginning. The "Bataan Death March" was to severely test the resolve of Allied soldiers. Many troops died of exhaustion or hunger, as well as at the hands of their merciless captors during the sixty-mile trek to the prison at Camp O'Donnell."

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/npswapa/extContent/wapa/guides/first/sec2.htm

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"The Battle of Bataan ended, April 9, 1942, when U.S. Gen. Edward P. King surrendered to Japanese Gen. Masaharu Homma. At that point, 75,000 Soldiers became prisoners of war: about 12,000 Americans and 63,000 Filipinos. What followed was one of the worst atrocities in modern wartime history – the Bataan Death March.

[...]

The Japanese guards killed between 7,000 - 10,000 men during the death march as they kept no records and no one knows the exact number. If a man fell, it was a certain death unless another could pick him up and support him. When they got to their prison camp, Camp O'Donnell, conditions were even worse. Camp O'Donnell was a former Philippine army camp designed to accommodate about 10,000 men. The Japanese crammed 60,000 survivors of the death march into the camp."

<https://www.army.mil/asianpacificamericans/bataanddeathmarch.html>

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"From the invasion of China in 1937 to the end of World War II, the Japanese military regime murdered near 3,000,000 to over 10,000,000 people, most probably almost 6,000,000 Chinese, Indonesians, Koreans, Filipinos, and Indochinese, among others, including Western prisoners of war."

"STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE" by R.J. Rummel

<https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP3.HTM#:~:text=From%20the%20invasion%20of%20China,inclusing%20Western%20prisoners%20of%20war.>

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To learn more about the war crimes committed by Japan in Asia and the Pacific, you can check out this project from the University of Hawaii at Manoa:

<https://manoa.hawaii.edu/wcdi/>

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4:10

"[Adm. Yamamoto] therefore argued for a major thrust eastwards in the Central Pacific, against Hawaii, as Japan's Second Stage Operations. However, the Combined Fleet staff opposed a thrust against Hawaii in mid-1942, because the IJN's carrier air power could not be strengthened sufficiently by then. Meanwhile, Yamamoto and his staff became increasingly concerned over the possibility of American carrier air raids against the Japanese Home Islands, and felt that the Japanese perimeter should be pushed eastwards, to Midway. "

https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series19/pdf/chapter08.pdf

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"Midway is often characterized as the decisive defeat that cost Japan the war as well as a battle that should have never been fought. It substantially negated much of Japan's early strategic advantages and would have negative repercussions on her entire military position, for the lost Japanese carrier forces were to have been the key component of the fleet-in-being rapid response force needed to contest, in combination with land-based aircraft, future American advances. It was also a perfect example of the so-called "Victory Disease" mentality that had taken hold among the more reckless officers in the navy."

"Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?" (2007) by James B. Wood

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"Some military leaders want to keep pushing East"

"Despite these interservice differences, the Southern Operation (or First Stage Operations) was executed relatively smoothly, and was successfully concluded in early to mid-March 1942 with the occupation of Java."

https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series19/pdf/chapter08.pdf

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"On March 7, 1942, the "Liaison Conference" decided on "the Outline to be Followed in the Future for Guiding the War" (hereinafter, referred to as the "Outline") as follows.

1. In order to knock down the U.K. and eliminate the U.S.'s fighting spirit, Japan should continue enhancing its existing military gains and prepare for long-term unbeaten political/military strategies while taking active measures if such opportunity should arise.
2. Japan should keep its occupied territories and main transportation lines and encourage the development/use of defense-use important resources to attain self-sufficiency and enhance Japan's military strength.
3. Japan should decide specific tactics of further aggressive grand strategies, paying due attention to its national strength, military operations' outcomes, military situations of German-Soviet war, relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union, and situation of the Chongqing government."

<https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2009/07.pdf>

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The Naval General Staff felt that the defensive perimeter should be pushed farther outwards in certain key areas, in order to maintain the initiative in the war and to keep the Americans on the defensive, which would keep them from regrouping and preparing for a counteroffensive. The Naval General Staff therefore advocated offensive operations in the South Pacific, aimed at Australia or the sea lines of communication between America and Australia. Not only was the Naval General Staff concerned about the possibility of Australia becoming a base for any Allied counteroffensive into the Southern Resources Area, but also felt that the United Kingdom would suffer a fatal blow if Australia (and India) could be knocked out of the war. In addition, the Naval General Staff hoped that by continuing the offensive in the South Pacific, the Americans might be forced to commit their battle fleet, which at that time consisted of the three aircraft carriers which had survived Pearl Harbor. If the Americans would commit their aircraft carriers to the defense of Australia or the sea lines of communication to the South Pacific, the IJN could fight the Decisive Fleet Battle, which had traditionally been the centerpiece of its war plans against America."

https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series19/pdf/chapter08.pdf

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4:14

"Perceiving their danger, the Japanese in a second phase offensive tried to sever the Allied lines of communications to Australia and to expand their perimeter in the

Pacific. In the spring of 1942 they pushed southeast from Rabaul to Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomons, and seized Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians."

<https://history.army.mil/books/amh/amh-23.htm#:~:text=Perceiving%20their%20danger%2C%20the%20Japanese,and%20Kiska%20in%20the%20Aleutians>.

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"The Battle of the Coral Sea was a series of naval engagements off the north-east coast of Australia between 4 and 8 May 1942.

[...]

For many people this was the 'battle that saved Australia'. This is an exaggerated claim, but there is some validity to it."

<https://anzacday.org.au/ww2-the-battle-of-the-coral-sea>

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4:14 CHAPTER 2: MIDWAY

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4:20

"On December 7, 1941, Japanese destroyers shelled the facilities at Naval Air Station Midway. By June 1942, PBY Catalinas and B-17s were stationed on Midway, along with 4,000 American personnel."

<https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/topics/battle-of-midway#:~:text=had%20sustained%20damage.-,The%20Battle, facilities%20only%20suffered%20minor%20damage>.

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4:31

"The November 1941 strategy called for the quick seizure of the Southern Resources Area and destruction of the American, British, and Dutch bases of operation in the area, followed by the establishment of a "Long Term, Undefeatable Posture." In other words, Japan was to shift to a defensive strategy after the conclusion of the Southern Operation. The British were to be defeated with Germany's help, and Chiang forced to capitulate. An impregnable defensive perimeter was to be established which encompassed all of Japan's newly acquired territory, and the inevitable American counteroffensive was to be thrown back somewhere along this perimeter."

[...]

"[Yamamoto] felt that the only way Japan could shorten the war was to win consecutive major battles against the Americans that would shock American public opinion into accepting some sort of settlement with Japan. Yamamoto had strongly advocated the Pearl Harbor operation against the opposition of the Naval General Staff in part because he hoped a smashing victory there would have such a "shock effect.""

https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series19/pdf/chapter08.pdf

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4:47

"At the decisive point of contact, it was four Japanese aircraft carriers (248 aircraft) and 20 escorts against three U.S. aircraft carriers (233 aircraft) and 25 escorts and an island airfield (127 aircraft = 360 total U.S. aircraft).

Although the total number of Japanese forces committed to the Midway operation (essentially, almost every operational ship in the Imperial Japanese Navy) far exceeded that of the U.S. Navy none but the four carriers were in a position to effect the outcome of the battle at the critical point and time. In terms of numbers and capabilities of the decisive weapon system of the battle, dive-bombers, the two sides were at rough parity."

<https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-006/h-006-1.html>

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"The Japanese Combined Fleet had a total of four fleet carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū; two light carriers; seven battleships; 150 cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries, including Arashi, Mogami, Mikuma and I-168; and 276 aircraft. The American fleet had three carriers: Enterprise, Yorktown and Hornet; no battleships; 50 cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries, including Hammann, Nautilus and Tambor; and 360 aircraft. The Japanese command hoped to destroy the American carriers that had been missed at the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor."

<https://johnhutchingsmuseum.org/world-war-2/the-battle-of-midway/>

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"The 4 heavy aircraft carriers Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, and Soryu were supplemented by 2 light aircraft carriers, 2 seaplane carriers, 7 battleships, 15 cruisers, 42 destroyers, 10 submarines, and various support and escort vessels. Their orders were to engage and destroy the American fleet and invade Midway."

<https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Midway>

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4:54

Interview with Dr Alexis Dudden (April 3, 2024)

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5:13

"US code breaking and radio intercept efforts were simply superb. Japanese radio traffic from the Battle of the Coral Sea enabled American codebreakers to increase the accuracy of their decryption efforts significantly. At Midway, analysts predicted the scale and timing of Yamamoto's attack, allowing Nimitz to counter his every move."

[...]

"There was also a large disparity in the execution of deception and surprise. Japan worked assiduously to achieve surprise in the Midway operation, but American intelligence foiled the effort. Instead, the US Navy baited the Japanese through a skillful deception and misinformation campaign that indicated the American carriers were operating in the southwest Pacific.¹⁵⁶ When Admiral Nagumo and his staff learned US carriers were only two hundred miles away and poised to strike, "it struck them like a bolt from the blue."

"The Pacific War, 1941-45" by Sean M. Judge in "Who Has the Puck?": Strategic Initiative in Modern, Conventional War" (2009)

<http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13942.9>

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"Led by Lieutenant Commander Joseph Rochefort, the team of cryptanalysts and linguists made up the U.S. Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit (better known as Station Hypo). By April 1942, they had gotten so good at breaking Japan's main operational code, which they dubbed JN-25b, that they were able to intercept, decrypt and translate parts of Japan's radio messages within hours of when they were sent."

"The radio traffic they intercepted that May suggested that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the mastermind behind the Pearl Harbor attack, was preparing a major invasion, involving four Japanese aircraft carriers along with many other ships, at a location designated with the initials "AF."

<https://www.history.com/news/battle-midway-codebreakers-allies-pacific-theater>

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5:25

"Midway is often characterized as the decisive defeat that cost Japan the war as well as a battle that should have never been fought. It substantially negated much of Japan's early strategic advantages and would have negative repercussions on her entire military position, for the lost Japanese carrier forces were to have been the key component of the fleet-in-being rapid response force needed to contest, in combination with land-based aircraft, future American advances."

"Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?" (2007) by James B. Wood

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"Against heavy odds, the United States sank all four of the Japanese carriers, forcing the latter to withdraw."

<https://mappinghistory.uoregon.edu/english/US/US34-02.html>

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7:41

"Against this geographical background, it is evident that the logistical difficulties of the Southwest Pacific Theater in the conduct of the war were tremendous. Not only was the line of communications from the United States to the scene of operations one of the longest the world has ever seen, but the entire route was by water at a time when the Japanese Navy was undefeated and roaming the Pacific almost at will."

<https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/ch02.htm#p12>

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8:05

<https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/ch06.htm#p163>

"The lack of adequate and suitable water transportation with which to concentrate troops in staging areas and take them into combat at times considerably hampered the planning of operations."

[...]

"The battle against enemy shipping was another significant feature of the New Guinea Campaign. The wholesale destruction by our planes, submarines, and PT boats of enemy coastal vessels, transports, barges, schooners, and sailing craft in the Southwest Pacific Area gradually paralyzed enemy efforts to supply, reinforce, or evacuate the remnants of his armies cut off in New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, and the Solomons."

<https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/ch06.htm#p163>

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"The move to the south also took Japanese forces to some of the most rugged and isolated places in the world...this enormous territory consisted entirely of impenetrable landmasses, disease-ridden coasts, and tiny and widely separated atolls and islands of the tropical sea. [...] Every bullet, can of food, pound of rice, roll of barbed wire, and drop of oil used by Japanese forces would have to come from within the empire along extraordinarily long lines of communication."

"Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?" (2007) by James B. Wood

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8:26 CHAPTER 3: ISLAND HOPPING

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8:50

"The idea was to simultaneously strike points deemed significant to Japan (and cause a reaction) and overwhelm them with Allied firepower. By presenting multiple problems at once, the US wanted to keep Japan from consolidating its gains and island holdings – thus thwarting the advance."

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/june/pacific-strategy-world-war-ii-lessons-chinas>

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"The US played "leapfrog" with the Japanese, landing their forces in areas where they could disrupt enemy supply lines and isolate thousands of Japanese. By establishing forward air bases, they

extended their ability to attack deep into enemy territory and helped lay the groundwork for their next "hop."

<https://www.macarthurmemorial.org/DocumentCenter/View/1893/Island-Hopping-Primary-Resources?bidId=>

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9:05

"As American and Allied forces "Island Hopped" through the Pacific, one of their key objectives was to cut off Japanese bases from resupply or rescue. After the initial amphibious landings of the "hop," Allied land and sea forces would gain control of the areas around the bypassed Japanese bases. Through the creation or conquest of air bases, the Allies would then gradually gain control of the skies above the Japanese bases. In the words of General MacArthur, this total envelopment caused the bypassed bases to "wither on the vine." U.S. submarines played a key role in this process, sinking more than 5 million tons of Japanese shipping and naval vessels."

<https://www.macarthurmemorial.org/DocumentCenter/View/1893/Island-Hopping-Primary-Resources?bidId=>

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".... .because Japanese lines of communication were interdicted with increasing frequency after the first year of combat, Japanese units at the front suffered from the scarcity or absence of medical facilities and supplies."

"American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War" by D. Clayton James in "Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age" (1986)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv8xnhvw?turn_away=true

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9:06- DATASET WITH ALL OF THE MERCHANT SHIPS SUNK

Brandan P. Buck, "Japanese Merchant Sinkings KML Files," Unrestricted: The Campaign to Sink the Japanese Merchant Fleet During World War II, accessed April 12, 2024,

<https://unrestricted.omeka.net/items/show/50>.

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9:13

https://docs.google.com/document/d/12FK0yd9Feo78SvLbHot4-nLJuXjWUuxy_uqgmwkl-dg/edit#bookmark=id.qr1reocd7379

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"U.S. submarines played a key role in this process, sinking more than 5 million tons of Japanese shipping and naval vessels."

<https://www.macarthurmemorial.org/DocumentCenter/View/1893/Island-Hopping-Primary-Resources?bidId=>

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9:30

"Rabaul, located on the Gazelle Peninsula on the northeast coast of New Britain, and Truk in the Carolines, were strongholds and depots that supported Japanese jungle fighters determined to hold strategic positions seized in the first six months of 1942.

[...]

"Operation Cartwheel" is the Pacific offensive that helped turn the tide of war in favor of the Allies, by neutralizing the Japanese base at Rabaul.

[...]

The general's advance into New Britain, coupled with Halsey's mauling of Japanese air and naval power at Rabaul, allowed the Allies to bypass that fabled Japanese stronghold and, following the seizure of the Admiralty Islands in February 1944, continue his advance from base to base along the north coast of New Guinea, aimed at an early return to the Philippine Islands and a step closer to the Japanese home islands."

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/npswapa/extContent/wapa/guides/offensive/sec3.htm

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"Rabaul was the most heavily defended target in the southwest Pacific, ringed by 367 anti-aircraft guns. Allied attempts to damage the base gave rise to savage sea, air, and land engagements from 1942 to 1945, claiming hundreds of planes and pilots."

<https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/more-70-years-later-rabauls-aerial-battleground-still-haunting-180973537/>

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9:48

"In this way, the Allies tightened their stranglehold on Rabaul, effectively neutralizing the 100,000 Japanese troops stationed there by the end of March 1944."

<https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/battle-of-new-britain-rabaul>

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"Rabaul was being steadily emasculated by a growing Allied air arm which slashed constantly at its vital airfields and harbor installations. Enemy thrusts from that once powerful stronghold were becoming weak and ineffectual and by the end of February 1944, Rabaul had "no air support whatsoever." In spite of replacements and reinforcements the once-powerful "Japanese air force in this area had been driven to the point of extinction."

<https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/ch05.htm#b16>

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"The birth of the "island hopping" concept occurred in the South Pacific when the Joint Chiefs of Staff prudently decided to bypass Rabaul, leaving 100,000 Japanese troops isolated and impotent."

"The Pacific War, 1941-45" by Sean M Judge

<http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep13942.9>

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" U.S. Army and Navy pilots destroyed Rabaul's five air fields and made Simpson Harbor a graveyard of Japanese ships. Subsequent bombing raids over Rabaul became known as "milk runs" because Japanese resistance was minimal. Accordingly, by 1945 missions over Rabaul primarily served as a training ground for new aircrews so that they would have some combat experience before participating in more challenging theatres. In the end, by bypassing Rabaul, the Allies trapped approximately 110,000 Japanese soldiers and airmen without having to engage them in conventional battle."

<https://www.macarthurmemorial.org/DocumentCenter/View/1893/Island-Hopping-Primary-Resources?bidId=>

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"Rabaul's encirclement was completed during February and March 1944. While MacArthur's forces occupied the Admiralty Islands, Halsey took the Green Islands and Emirau, from which Allied aircraft closed down Kavieng, Rabaul's link to Truk.

[...]

Truk and Rabaul remained in enemy hands up to the surrender of Japan. Reflecting on the vast resources poured into the development of Rabaul, Morison noted "the folly of building up a great overseas base and garrison without a navy capable of controlling the surrounding waters and air."

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2014/january/two-birds-one-hailstone>

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10:00

"MacArthur initially disagreed, but soon realized the advantage in bypassing and neutralizing a heavily entrenched enemy force. In doing so, a potentially costly land battle was avoided and tens of thousands of Japanese at Rabaul were left to die of starvation and disease."

<https://www.macarthurmemorial.org/DocumentCenter/View/1893/Island-Hopping-Primary-Resources?bidId=>

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10:28

"The assault on Leyte marked the joining of the two major advances on Japan—the central Pacific offensive commanded by Nimitz and the southern Pacific approach under MacArthur. MacArthur was given overall command of the Leyte operation, and Nimitz provided strong naval support from the U.S. Pacific Fleet."

<https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Leyte-Gulf>

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10:42

Flying combat missions first from India and China and later from the Marianas Islands, the Superfortress repeatedly demonstrated its capability for carrying bomb loads of up to 20,000 pounds against targets as far away as 1,500 miles from its base.

<https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/196652/development-of-the-boeing-b-29/>

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11:08

The sea battle of Leyte Gulf was the same story. The loss of ships and sailors was horrendous for both sides. That battle also saw the introduction of the Japanese kamikaze suicide bombers. More than 5,000 kamikaze pilots died in this gulf battle, taking down 34 ships. But the Japanese were not able to prevent the loss of their biggest and best warships, which meant the virtual end of the Japanese Imperial Fleet.

<https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/united-states-invades-luzon-in-philippines>

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Kamikaze strikes against Allied warships continued throughout World War II. Kamikaze pilots deliberately crashed specially made planes directly into enemy warships, which resulted in suicide. It was a desperate policy.

<https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/first-kamikaze-strikes/>

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11:16 CHAPTER 4: OKINAWA

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11:32

“Okinawa amounted to Japan’s front step. Anyone hoping to invade the rhetorical Japanese house must first secure and pass over that step.” (McManus, p. 196)

To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945 (2023) by John C. McManus

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11:47

"Similar to Iwo Jima, the Japanese planned to fight a subterranean battle from within expertly camouflaged tunnels, dugouts, and caves. For weeks, Ushijima's soldiers and conscripted Okinawans labored mightily to build a cobweb-like maze of powerful defensive positions. . . They built sixty miles of tunnels and untold numbers of fortified caves, pillboxes, firing pits, anti-tank trenches, bunkers, blockhouses, and limestone block tombs. [...] The troops did almost all their arduous work with picks and shovels, hacking their way through so many layers of coral that their tools commonly broke or wore down into stumps. [...] Some caves were large enough to have room for hundreds of people, and substantial amounts of ammunition and supplies. [...] Ushijima ordered

the mobilization of the local population. About 80,000 Okinawans were evacuated to Kyushu and 60,000 more, especially elderly people and children, were moved to the northern part of the island. About 39,000 men between the ages of 18 and 45 were drafted into Japanese military service. Many were used as laborers or service troops; 24,000 were organized into special Home Guard (or Boeitai) militia units. Some were armed only with spears. The Japanese appropriated 1,500 teenage boys from Okinawan schools into special "Blood and Iron for the Emperor" units where they received military indoctrination and hasty combat training, mostly to serve as runners." (p201-202)

To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945 (2023) by John C. McManus

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11:58

"Ota Masahide, a survivor and Okinawa historian, wrote in an article for the Asia-Pacific Journal in 2014 that the military distributed hand-grenades to the civilian population as the means to commit suicide with loved ones. Those that survived the grenades "worried" about being alive and found other ways to kill themselves with other weapons such as scythes, razor blades, ropes, rocks, and sticks. Military propaganda had warned the civilian population that if they were captured, the Americans would torture, rape, and murder them."

<https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/japanese-mass-suicides/>

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12:23

"The Americans suffered 49,151 battle casualties, including 12,520 fatalities."

"The Japanese lost a mind-boggling 7,800 planes and, according to Tenth Army records, 107,539 killed, some of whom were probably Okinawan militia fighters or civilians." (p284)

To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945 (2023) by John C. McManus

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Some 110,000 Japanese and conscripted Okinawan defenders were killed in action. The battle created a humanitarian disaster for civilians as well. Exact numbers are impossible to know, but some estimates claim that over 100,000 civilians or as much as one-third of the pre-war population died during the battle.

<https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/okinawa-costs-victory-last-battle#:~:text=Some%20110%2C000%20Japanese%20and%20conscripted,population%20died%20during%20the%20battle.>

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12:23 CHAPTER 5: ENDGAME

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12:55

From the text of the proclamation at the Potsdam Conference: "We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide

proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02/d1382>

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13:05

"Stalin responded quickly to what he perceived to be secret American maneuvers. At Potsdam he had told Truman that the Soviet Union would enter the war by the middle of August, but Antonov had told the American Chiefs of Staff that the Soviets would be ready to join the war in the last half of August. In all likelihood, the date of attack had remained some time between August 20 and 25, as set before the Potsdam Conference. With American possession of the atomic bomb and Truman's manipulation of the Potsdam ultimatum, however, Stalin changed the timetable for the Soviet attack. It appears that while still in Potsdam, he ordered Marshal Vasilevskii to move up the operation by ten to fourteen days."

"Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan" by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

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13:10

"In response, Japan neither overtly accepted these terms nor pursued constructive negotiations. Even though the Japanese were clearly beaten militarily by August, they were still potent enough to exercise the curious and frightening sort of power that revolved around their own choices, of the sort exerted by a grenade-wielding man who is cornered in a room by his enemies."

To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945 (2023) by John C. McManus

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"Intercepted messages between Tokyo and Moscow revealed that the Japanese wanted to surrender but felt they could not accept the terms offered in the Potsdam Proclamation. American policy makers, however, anxious to end the war without committing American servicemen to an invasion of the Japanese homeland, were not inclined to undertake revisions of the unconditional surrender formula and cause further delay. A Russian declaration of war might convince Japan to surrender, but it carried a potentially prohibitive price tag as Stalin would expect to share in the postwar administration of Japan, a situation that would threaten American plans in the Far East."

<https://www.atomicarchive.com/history/manhattan-project/p5s10.html>

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"27 July: Terms of Potsdam Declaration are rejected by Japan; Truman had already approved the schedule to employ atomic bombs on 25 July."

<https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1945/victory-in-pacific.html>

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13:25

"1 June: With the atomic bomb program nearly concluded, President Harry S. Truman's program advisers, the Interim Committee, advise use of the bomb as soon as possible. Target lists have been drawn up since April."

<https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1945/victory-in-pacific.html>

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13:32

"Fully expecting an invasion of southern Kyushu, they heavily reinforced the island from March through early August. By the second week of August, the Sixteenth Area Army, the force charged with defending Kyushu, had grown to a strength of 600,000 troops, with more scheduled to arrive in succeeding weeks. . . Hundreds of suicide boats and a disturbing 5,000 kamikaze aircraft were available." (p296)

To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945 (2023) by John C. McManus

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"In the cabinet meeting on March 23, 1945, "Matters regarding Volunteer Citizen Corps" was established and the volunteer citizen corps were scheduled to be formed. Volunteer citizen corps were responsible for the systematic enhancement of production and defense for the time being. In an emergency, members were to take up arms in preparation for combat. Except for invalids, pregnant women and nursing mothers, all citizens who had completed lower-level grades of elementary schools were subject to the formation of the volunteer citizen corps_up to age 65 for men and up to age 45 for women. Since young men were conscripted into the military in those days, most members of the volunteer citizen corps were men in their forties or older, and women."

https://hpmmuseum.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/exhibit_e/exh1007_e/exh100701_e.html

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"When 1945 began, Japanese leaders recognized their nation's dark military situation, but they rejected any form of surrender. Instead, they devised a sequenced military and political strategy called Ketsu Go (Operation Decisive.) Its fundamental premise: Americans possessed enormous material power but their morale was brittle. . . The Japanese armed forces burgeoned in 1945 under urgent mobilization from about 4.5 million men under arms to over 6 million by August. But in March, Japan mustered a vast additional body of combatants: every single male age 15 to 60 and every single female age 17 to 40. This inducted about a quarter or more of Japan's total population, about 18 to 20 million people. Japan lacked uniforms or any other visible marker to distinguish this new sea of combatants from the remaining civilian population. Multiple millions of these nearly mobilized former male and female civilians now combatants, would be in the Kyushu invasion area."

<https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-civilians-japan>

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13:43

Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan three months after Germany's surrender, and in return the Soviets would be granted a sphere of influence in Manchuria following Japan's surrender. This included the Southern part of Sakhalin as well as the Kurile Islands, which

Japan had seized during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, a lease at Port Arthur, and a share in the operation of the Manchurian railroads. [...] In April, after the death of President Roosevelt, Truman became president, and there was a marked shift in the attitude towards the Soviet entry into the war. [...] However, on 8 August 1945, two days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the day before the second bomb fell on Nagasaki, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. The news of impending war with the Soviet Union sent shockwaves through Japanese policy makers: just before he left Moscow for the Conference, Stalin had received a personal message from the Japanese Emperor, asking him to act as intermediary between Japan and the United States. The Soviet betrayal was an important factor in forcing Japan to surrender.

<https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/soviet-japan-and-the-termination-of-the-second-world-war/>

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"Many historians argue that it was necessary to end the war and that in fact it saved lives, both Japanese and American, by avoiding a land invasion of Japan that might have cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Other historians argue that Japan would have surrendered even without the use of the atomic bomb and that in fact Truman and his advisors used the bomb only in an effort to intimidate the Soviet Union."

https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945/potsdam_decision.htm#:~:text=Other%20historians%20argue%20that%20Japan,to%20intimidate%20the%20Soviet%20Union.

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"An important issue was conspicuously absent from the president's message: the possibility of Soviet entry into the war. Obviously, Soviet participation in the war would take the form of a surprise attack, and thus the president could not say anything about it. Nonetheless, Soviet entry played an important part in the American decision to speed up the dropping of the atomic bombs. Truman was in a hurry. He was aware that the race was on between the atomic bomb and Soviet entry into the war. That was why he concocted the story of Japan's "prompt rejection" of the Potsdam Proclamation as the justification for the atomic bomb, and that was also the reason he was ecstatic to receive the news of the Hiroshima bomb. The atomic bomb represented to Truman a solution to all the dilemmas he faced: unconditional surrender, the cost of Japan's homeland invasion, and Soviet entry into the war." (p.183)

Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (2005) by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

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14:26

The uranium bomb detonated over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 had an explosive yield equal to 15,000 tonnes of TNT. It razed and burnt around 70 per cent of all buildings and caused an estimated 140,000 deaths by the end of 1945, along with increased rates of cancer and chronic disease among the survivors.

https://www.icanw.org/hiroshima_and_nagasaki_bombings

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A B-29 dropped the bomb from 31,000 feet. The bomb exploded

about 1,500 feet above the city with a force of 15,000 tons of TNT.

<https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/fatman-littleboy-losalamosnatllab.pdf>

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14:32

"On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union officially declared war on Japan, flooding 1.6 million troops into Manchuria, an area of 600,000 square miles in the North-East of China."

<https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/08/otd-aug-8-ussr-war-japan-a66761>

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14:43

Map showing Soviet advances in Manchuria:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Manchuria#/media/File:Manchuria_Operation_map-en.svg

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14:58

"Even then, when the emperor himself decreed to the government's inner circle of decision makers that the war must end, and when he took the unprecedented step of recording a special Imperial Rescript message to this effect for broadcast to the entire nation, he faced a coup by midlevel officers from the 1st Imperial Guards Division, the unit dedicated to the mission of protecting his palace and his family."

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