Noology

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Corollary

1. Whether it is necessary to use terms other than those employed by Scripture in theological mysteries? Not absolutely, but hypothetically—namely, for the sake of greater clarity, better disputation, more convenient treatment, and a fuller elicitation or refutation of an opposing position, or for some similar reason. Otherwise, faith is prior to these terms; it was handed down by the Apostles, retained and confessed by the Fathers without them, and rightly so. Thus Mentzer rightly cleanses away the slanders (*Against Calumnies*, disputation 2, thesis 16 and following). Concerning these matters he asks: Where, in prophetic and apostolic doctrine, are those metaphysical terms found without which the mystery of the Trinity cannot be taught and defended against heretics? Are they rules of truth, or rather terms to be accommodated to the realities? A pious mind rests in the doctrine of Scripture, and judges logical and metaphysical terms to be posterior to the things themselves, not constituting the things, nor producing their truth. Mysteries, as regards their truth in themselves, cannot be exhausted, and the concept is far inferior to the divine mysteries, insofar as it grasps them by reason. Thus Ludwig Crocius says in his *Apology* (disputation 1, thesis 56):

> "Leaving aside metaphysical contentions concerning "person"—about which even philosophers could not agree—it is far better and safer, more lawful and more fitting for religion, and more pleasant for consciences, to hasten to the source of divine revelation and from it to show that God is not other than one."

Hilary says that no other word concerning God has been left to us than God's own word; all other things are narrow, enclosed, and obstructive (*On the Trinity*, book 7). Luther says that even if he should refuse to use the word *homoousios*, he would not for that reason be a heretic (*Against Latomus*, Tom. A, Latin ed., p. 407). Philip Melanchthon says that the Scholastics have become vain in their questions and their terms (*Hypotyposes of the Commonplaces*, p. 4). Himmelius reproaches Marxius the Jesuit for saying that the Incarnation and the Trinity are matters most properly metaphysical and are best explained by such terms, and he asserts that faith is placed in the power of God, not in the wisdom of men (*Antibellum*, disputation 1, thesis 4). The same terms are attacked by Meldenius (*Parænesis*, p. 24), Major (in his epistolary disputation appended on Galatians 5:7–6), Hutter (*Loci Communes*, *On Scandal*, p. 913), and others. Calov, however, says that whether such terms ought to be used or cannot be used, this contributes nothing to our faith, that there are three Persons in one Essence (*Praefatio Parascenica*, chapter 4, against Crellius; and pp. 14, 20, 36; also *Against Crellius*, book 2, theses 725, 747 and following). Many similar statements can be gathered from other authors, and the matter will be treated more fully elsewhere. Since, then, the doctrine concerning scholastic terms is necessary, and various questions can be raised about it, the discussion proceeds.

2. Whether from a simple and unlearned person (*simplex et idiota*) all articles of faith are to be required, or rather only the principal and more fundamental ones, if he is found not capable of the more diffuse doctrines? We posit and affirm the latter.

3. Which, and how many, are those fundamental articles that are to be required from absolutely every believer, and must be known by none to be ignorant of them, unless he wishes to be excluded from salvation? We doubt. We say that this has not been sufficiently decided by theologians. Although we see very many appealing to the Apostles' Creed—Papists, Lutherans, and the Reformed alike, as well as Photinians, Anabaptists, and Fanatics—and although the common consensus of the Christian Church testifies to the antiquity of the Creed, as is proven in books *On the Christian Faith* and has already been shown by others, who will there be cited.

4. Whether disagreement in non-fundamental matters, when held by fairly moderate minds, ought to be tolerated, and yet at the same time may rightly be refuted, and ought to be refuted, from Scripture? Affirmed. And we judge it foolish to say the contrary.

Noology

1. Philosophy in its nature, having been sufficiently set forth as a precognition, the disciplines of philosophy themselves, both theoretical and practical, are now to be represented in the order that follows. Of the theoretical disciplines, there are two general ones: noology and metaphysics. The former must set before the human intellect the highest principles of knowing, grasped from the affinity of things; the latter must adequately explain being as being to the human intellect. The former considers the affinity of things; the latter, beingness and quiddity. The general object of both is general, and each constitutes a most general *habitus*. To make intelligence a peculiar *habitus*, with a peculiar object liberally knowable, nowhere else distinctly represented, as the first principle of knowing and a peculiar mode of consideration—inasmuch as formally as such it remains under the aspect of a first principle—and to teach a peculiar end flowing from such consideration, namely the theoretical perfection of the human intellect with respect to such an object, not to be expected from any other *habitus*; and since the object is worthy of being treated in itself, is a real being, has principles of knowing, attributes, and species or more contracted modes, and is not merely a bare precognition of some other *habitus*, as is the nature of philosophy or of theology—all these things customarily require a peculiar discipline (Disputation I, thesis 3), even if many authors do not represent it in their course of philosophy, such as Keckermann, Timpler, Scheibler, Reiger (who is in part opposed to himself: disputation 16, theses 72 and 77), Freigius, and others. For here one must attend not to what is done, but to what ought to be done. By others it is denied that a peculiar habitus is required here, since the faculty of understanding alone is sufficient—as held by Morisanus, Durandus, Soto, Medina, concerning whom something has been discussed in the *Corona Logica*, chapter 21. But the faculty is connatural, whereas a *habitus* properly so called is not, as was stated in *On Natural Knowledge*, chapter 2. And a certain ease and promptness in knowing first principles may be required of man, which is more than mere faculty. For *habitus* gives promptness, whereas faculty only makes one capable and apt (Disputation I, thesis 5). Intelligence is also a subtle and difficult *habitus*, and therefore demands to be acquired or infused, not merely to be innate, as a faculty is. Disposition and the power of understanding are connatural; *habitus* is acquired or infused. By others again, a *habitus* distinct from Intelligence is constituted in the species of *synderesis*, as by Alsted (*Hexastichon*, chapter 1). This, however, errs by excess, since practical principles are well comprehended under first principles in general (theses 7 and following). It is also called noology, and by Alsted, archelogy. And by the more eminent authors of today it is distinctly proposed or acknowledged, such as Gutke, Eiffler, Scharff, Horneius, Wendelin, Alsted, Suárez.

2. Intelligence is a *habitus* of the theoretical intellect, simple, which represents to the intellect, for contemplation, the first and indemonstrable principles of knowing, arising from the affinity of things, distinctly, without strict demonstration. It is a *habitus* of the intellect, not of the will, as a moral virtue is. It is theoretical, because it proposes its object only under the formal aspect of the speculative, and does not directly require action itself, nor direct the will in execution, as Ethics and Politics do. It is simple, because it does not prove principles by demonstrative discourse, but rests content with simple assent. They are first principles, because

they do not depend on other prior principles, unlike secondary principles, which are left to inferior disciplines, such as physics, ethics, and arithmetic. They are indemonstrable, because they are not demonstrated from causes or principles really prior to them, but are shown to be true by mere explication of terms, by induction, by sensible ostension, by reduction to absurdity, or from what is posterior—effects, signs, indications, and conformities. They arise from the affinity of things, for it is this affinity observed in things that supplies the intellect with these first principles. They are for contemplation, for here the intellect rests under the formal aspect of contemplation: action itself is not intended, directed, or prescribed, as in the prudential disciplines. Even practical principles are here known only insofar as they are known and acknowledged to be true. In ethics and politics, by contrast, action and execution are required after cognition, and praxis itself is proposed and represented in its specific form, as virtue or vice—which does not occur here. They are known without demonstration, namely from causes that are really prior; for secondary demonstrations and any kind of explication can indeed have a place here, as was said above.

3. Its adequate object is the first principle itself. For this is here deduced, its species and modes are adequately enumerated, its nature is explained throughout the whole discipline, and its attributes and affections are treated (§6–7 and following), which is what is customary for a proper object in a discipline. It is not the affinity of things, which is the foundation of the object (§4), nor subtlety, as Gutke wishes, since subtlety is some affection, mode, and relation in the first principle or in the intelligence explaining it, insofar as such things are subtle; but this cannot constitute a proper object. Thus spirit is something subtle, not gross like body, yet the object of pneumatics is spirit itself, not its subtlety. Nor is it an objection that this object is a complex or integral enunciation, for number as sounding, line as visible, body as weighty, man as curable, supernatural knowable, are all complex, yet they are the objects of music, optics, statics, medicine, and theology. Nor is the object here the enunciation precisely as enunciated, but insofar as some truth, apprehended by the intellect from the most general affinity of things, is extracted and represented from it, abstracting from the enunciation and the term (which here may be taken and understood as a complex term). Thus “good as appetible” and “evil as avoidable” are complex terms.

4. The causes of intelligence are internal and external. The internal material cause is the affinity of things; the formal cause is the distinct representation of that affinity in the first principles themselves. The external efficient causes are God, nature, the intellect, the order of things, observation, and inquiry; the ultimate end is the glory of God, the proximate end is the perfection of the intellect and theoretical contemplation distinctly exercised in the first principles (§2). Its attributes are dignity, delight, usefulness, and ultimate specialness, by which it is a lowest species of habit, having no inferior habits under it, as wisdom has first and second, discipline theoretical and practical, habit liberal and illiberal; it is multiplied only in individuals, as this or that intelligence in Aristotle, Gutke, Eisler, and others. Its care and cultivation may be seen from §2, thesis 9.

5. It has two parts, general and special. The general part represents the first principle in general and discusses its foundations and attributes. First principles are principles of knowing, derived by the intellect from the affinity of things considered in the abstraction of being; they are clear, evident, and indemonstable a priori, from which the principles and conclusions of the lower disciplines are deduced and proved. They are called principles because other things take their origin from them; for in this consists what is formal in principles, as is taught in metaphysics. They are principles of knowing, that is, reasons informing and perfecting us in better and more distinct knowledge of things, not strictly of being, which is not here explained. The affinity of things is a certain agreement in some respects (§6). They are considered in the abstraction of being, so that abstraction is made from finite and infinite, created and uncreated, natural and supernatural, and principles are supplied that are indifferent to both and applicable to both. They are deduced, not idly fabricated, resting on no foundation, nor requiring proof by mere assertion or induction; for the intellect, rightly disposed, is measured by things themselves and must have its foundation in them. From these all else is deduced, as is evident in metaphysics, pneumatics, physics, mathematics, and the practical disciplines, where many things are proved and shown by being reduced to first principles, such as that the whole is greater than its proper part, and that it is impossible for something to be and at the same time in the same respect not to be.

6. The material foundation of the first principle is the being and affinity of things; its formal foundation is the knowability of that affinity, from which, by instituting a comparison of things either with God, or with themselves, or with the intellect, it deduces principles for the intellect and confirms their truth. Its attributes are truth, universality, perspicuity, immediacy, firmness, and priority in distinct cognition. For immediate, general, and first principles must be presupposed before secondary ones, even if in what is easier they are sometimes compelled to follow after other things, because they are lofty, supreme, and independent, the cognition of which is sometimes more difficult than that of lower things. Thus a natural body or a sound is more easily known than being; yet being is superior and more general, and therefore must be prior.

7. The special part deduces the species and more contracted modes of the first principle. These are either theoretical, or practical, or organic and poetic, for so many are the modes of things from which, by abstraction, they can be deduced: speculable, doable, and organically producible. See §2, thesis 10. The theoretical modes arise from the observation of things that are necessary by nature and not operable, by which the intellect is directed in the contemplation of objects and acquires the most distinct and firm principles of knowing. Some of these are primary, which are nowhere adduced as conclusions, such as: true contradictories are eternally repugnant and cannot be true at the same time; it is impossible for the same thing to be and at the same time, in the same respect preserved, not to be; whatever is, either is or is not, is either being or non-being, concerning which the treatise on contradiction has spoken. In this respect this principle is the same as the former; in respect of its formal concept it expresses the same thing in another way than before, for this speaks of the immediacy of opposites, being and non-being,

while that speaks of repugnance, namely that something cannot simultaneously be and not be. Others are secondary, which are reduced somewhere as conclusions, such as: it is impossible for something to be and at the same time to be confused with other things; God, nature, and the intellect rightly disposed abhor all confusion; being is one, true, good, and located; the whole is greater than its proper part and not changed by an alien part; there is a first one, true, good, perfect; a cause as such is prior to its effect, and the effect is posterior to the cause in nature and in the order of acting; spirit lacks matter and material consequences. Some of these occur in metaphysics, pneumatics, and other disciplines.

8. The practical part concerns the goodness and perfection of things that are operable by their nature, in which the will must be directed in some action within particular disciplines. These are active and effective. Active, in that they direct the will in the appetite for good and the avoidance of moral evil, and they concern the inclination of the will toward some good: for all things desire good, and whatever is desired is desired under some aspect of good; evil, under the aspect of evil, is not desirable, but under the species and aspect of some good. One must live honorably: good is communicable or advantageous to something in some way, or by the comparison of a good with an uncreated or created good. Thus, the highest good is given, and whatever is good and perfect in itself cannot be the author, supporter, instigator, exactor, or desirer of evil, though it may permit, direct, govern, or observe it; the highest and most loving of the order is averse to disorder. What is left for the creature alone perishes; parents are to be good, not evil-doing; God is to be loved above all with sincere mind, and obedience to God outweighs obedience to men. Honesty and public utility are the norm of human action. No innocent person is to be slain; what you do not want done to yourself, do not do to another, and conversely, what you want done to yourself, do it for another. Man rules rightly over beasts; the nobler may justly command the lawful pleasure of the inferior. In human deficiencies, the invention of arts provides assistance. A creature may be taken in by the nobility of its object or deceived externally, and thus fall short of its natural perfection. From the highest good, if left to itself, it cannot satisfy itself by any means, nor can it return or rejoin itself to it. Conscience dictates that God necessarily acts as an angry judge.

9. The effective or organic aspects are those that, through the intellect in a reflective act, are observed to aid and promote the intellect in knowing. The former concern the knowledge of things in themselves, whether speculable or actionable; the latter concern the manner of knowing, directing the intellect in the act of cognition. A reflective or collative act occurs when the intellect, in reflecting, compares its own knowledge with something else, thereby giving a new denomination of the thing that does not conflict with what is already known, and thus aids the intellect in learning. For example, when a man calls a species logically, a masculine noun grammatically, a case the nominative, and poetically Pyrrhichius or similarly. From this arise secondary notions, from which the organic principles are derived, by which the intellect is to be assisted. These may be with respect to words, as in grammar, rhetoric, or poetry: the rules of grammar are not to be violated, but introduced into schools and use, not relegated or added only through spoken language, and always referred to approved classical authors rather than rigidly

constrained by them. One may study the cultivation of words, but not to the neglect or overthrow of the study of things. Eloquence consists in speaking appropriately, as custom dictates, but attention must be given to the understanding of things without harm. Or they may be with respect to concepts, by which things are to be known or retained, as in logic and mnemonics. In reasoning, the precepts of reasoning must not be violated but observed, just as Grammar is in speaking. The intellect must truly, distinctly, and competently grasp things, not falsely or confusedly. The fertile notions, skillfully applied to the relevant things, change, remove, or place nothing in the things themselves but speak only of the rational relations among them. Thus, nothing is added to God that is logically called a masculine noun, nominative case, synonym, or paronym. Similarly, it is right and useful to cultivate, assist, facilitate, and exercise memory, so that it may retain firmly and recall easily. In this way, tables, verses, rhythms, analyses, pictures, locations, images, temperance, and the moderation of affections greatly aid memory. Gutke and Eisler particularly elaborated all these points in their treatment of intelligence.