Q. Evaluate the impact of the mobilization of human and economic resources upon the outcome of one 20th-century war.

Introduction:

> War is a fight of back and front. > Human: conscription/during the war. > Economic: foreign/internal.

Paragraph 1: Production.

Paragraph 2: Morale.

Paragraph 3: Internal economy.

Paragraph 4: Conscription

From the surface, it often seems as though wars are only fought on the front lines^[a]. While the physical fighting of the soldiers is undoubtedly a key element to victory, however, the mental ^[b]and economic war^[c] that goes on behind the front lines is also incredibly important. This is particularly the case in modern times as countries grows interdependent on human resources and economic power. This is shown, for example, in the Allied victory in World War I over the Central Powers^[d]. Through their successful mobilization of human and economic resources^[e], which was more effective than the policies of the Central Powers, the Allies succeeded in presenting a more united and sustainable home front which also supported their front lines^[f].

Arguably, one of the most important ‘human resource’ mobilization the Allies succeeded in was their ‘mental mobilization^[g]’ of morale from its citizens. Hitler argues in Mein Kempf ^[h]that Britains’ superior propaganda efforts were one of the key reasons behind German defeat of WW1. He claims that while British propaganda^[i] gave soldiers an accurate idea of the brutality of German soldiers, German propaganda lowered the German soldiers’ expectations and therefore led to shock and disheartenment. This is not entirely true; indeed, there were several propagandistic, British cartoons belittling Germans (e.g., the Steamroller comic^[j]). However, it undeniable that the British were arguably more efficient in raising internal morale. For example, they created a Ministry of Information that carefully regulated the propaganda produced by the government. This organization not only fabricated tales of German barbarism (particularly against French and Belgium soldiers near the start of the War) but also enforced strict censorship through the Defense of the Realm Act (DORA). The German government made similar efforts; for example, they also created a new propaganda department called the ‘War Press office’. However, they also had separate Reichsamter offices under regional governments as well as censorship offices under civilian authorities.^[k] This hindered effective propaganda efforts of Germany. Moreover, it could be argued that the British were more inclusive in their propaganda. An interesting difference that can be identified between the British and German propaganda posters are that while British posters often portray women taking an active role in the war effort (examples are ‘Queen Mary’s Army Auxiliary Corps’ and ‘National Service Women’s Land Army’), German propaganda often portray women as passive or being protected by men. However, the home front was mostly run by women^[l] as the men were on the front lines; thus, by including them in their target audience for propaganda, the British succeeded in mobilizing a greater percentage of their home population into supporting the^[m] conflict. This effective mobilization of the entire country was significant as it the raised morale allowed Britain to persevere through the attrition-conflict of WW1.^[n]

Moreover, the heightened morale at the home front was directly reflected in the internal economy^[o] that played an instrumental role in supporting the front lines. As historian Susan Grayzel argues, women were inspired by the propaganda to take up key functions behind the front lines that the now-soldiers had previously occupied. For example, by 1918 over 1/3 of the industry workforce had been filled up by British women and more than 40% of British women were employed by 1918.^[p] General __ ^[q]even said that if women were to vacate their factories for 20 minutes, Britain would lose the war. Despite the obvious exaggeration in his statement, that the conservative General talked so highly of the female workforce clearly suggests the extent of their input in the industry. Their support also came from within houses, too. For example, in the ‘Save the Wheat, Eat Less Fleet’^[r] campaign, run in both the UK and US, thousands of the British population switched their diet to ‘war bread’ of which 40% were filled with other, cheaper ingredients such as corn. Due to this effort, over 90million bushels of wheat were saved for the soldiers up front. On the other hand, the Central Powers were less effective in mobilizing their home front to provide economic resources. In fact, the trade unions in Germany tried to stop women from joining the workforce, afraid they would undercut the mens’ jobs. The law passed by the German government — Auxiliary Service for the Fatherland law — was only focused for men 17-60 years old^[s]. As a result, the German economy was more strained in providing the army with the needed resources. Thus, this shows that through effective mobilization of human resources by the government in the home front, the Allies were able to produce and conserve more economic resources.^[t]

This effective economic production ^[u]by the Allies domestically allowed their governments to regulate economy more effectively as well. As Niall Ferguson argues, WW1 was a highly industrialized war^[v] — it was no longer simply the number of men that mattered^[w]. The British government in particular were highly aware of this; in fact, one of the first things they did was nationalize key industries such as coal mining and shipping^[x]. This allowed them to delegate their workforce to needed areas; for example, when 3,000 coal miners volunteered for the army the government stopped them and asked them to return to the mines, as they were needed more there. According to Ian Cawood, by 1918 the Ministry of Munitions owned over 250 factories^[y] and the government had employed over 5 million workers. On the other hand, the Germans were once again less able to mobilize their economic resources. Although in 1914 they were producing more military equipment than the Allies, the government was prevented from organizing the economy properly due to interference from the army. In fact, Walter Rathenau (an industrialist) failed to take control over the economy under the War Boards due to resistance from the army. ^[z]This limited effective production, and although the KAR was established in 1916 to expedite production, due to their refusal to employ women they were forced to balance men between working in industry and fighting up at the front. Thus, they were also forced to dedicate 98% of their industry on military goods while the Allies only dedicated 80%; this further lowered morale in Germany. ^[aa]From another perspective, it could be said that the entry of the United States and their enormous economic resources was what tipped the scale^[ab]. However, the Americans only joined the war in 1917, and they too employe similar economic policies like the British (Wheat), thus arguably the economic mobilization efforts were critical in supporting the troops. The Central Powers ultimately were unable to win the war of attrition and continue supporting their troops.^[ac]

This support from home front further allowed effective human mobilization by the Allies for the front lines.^[ad] One aspect was that they had a larger population. For example, although the Central Powers had a combined population of 115million people, the Allies had 265million in ^[ae]1914, allowing them to gather forces much quickly. While the Central Powers had mobilized only 18 million men by 1918, the Allies had mobilized a massive 42 million men. They were able to galvanize more forces due to their policy of conscription, later input by the Americans and support from foreign colonies such as Canada (200,000 troops),^[af] and effective organization of the economy which freed more men to volunteer. It is true that the Germans had a better military system and more advanced weapons. For example, while the Germans had an excellent, flexible system of command, the Russian army were hindered by their confused system and lack of resources.^[ag] However, the war was one of attrition. Arguably near the beginning of the war the Germans had the better tactic of Schlieffen Plan; however the failure of this tactic led to trench warfare.^[ah] This shows that it was less the tactics or quality of military — although still immensely important — that determined the victory of WW1 for the Allies. This is partially why the German army were never directly defeated, but Hindenburg called for an armistice because the war was no longer ‘sustainable’ for Germany.^[ai]

Ultimately, it is seen that both economic and human mobilization were crucial in leading to victory for the Allies during World War One^[aj]. The war was one of attrition^[ak], and therefore the governments had to maintain morale and economic production — two things that were closely interlinked. Through their inclusive propaganda and effective control of the economy^[al], the Allies were able to support themselves better than the Central Powers, whose mobilization were hindered by social constructs and lack of an effective system.^[am] These factors also had a major impact on the home front, as seen in the different numbers of soldiers either side could mobilize. It is undeniable that military tactics ^[an]and the home front were still extremely important to the conflict; however, it was the support from the home front that made it possible^[ao]. Thus, it is arguable that this was an extremely important factor in allowing the Allies to defeat the Central Powers.^[ap]

From the markbands

Feedback:

The student clearly has good knowledge and understanding of the topic. Critical analysis and evaluation of other perspectives should be developed/worked on. With a more coherent approach, the strong evidence could have been used to create an outstanding answer. 10/15 – just