

Online Appendix for

“The Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings: The Empirical Record”

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This online appendix provides supplementary tables to “The Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings: The Empirical Record.”

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Online Appendix 1

In the paper (ie. Table 4), we measure conflict intensity by log of the sum of battle deaths for the entire conflict. Here, we provide a robustness check substituting conflict duration for battle deaths. The results are consistent with Table 4. The pre-conflict rule of law has a positive and significant effect on post conflict rule of law for Executive Constraints (Polity and Henisz) at conventional levels and for Civil liberties at the $p < 0.10$ level.

Table OA1.1. Determinants of Post-Conflict Rule of Law

VARIABLES	Civil liberties FH	Political rights FH	Ex. Constraints Polity	Ex. Constraints Henisz
Rule of law pre-conflict avg.	0.327*	0.293	0.341**	0.605***
	(0.166)	(0.193)	(0.164)	(0.213)
Ln(GDP p.c.1 st post conflict yr)	0.299	0.296	0.205	0.0287
	(0.266)	(0.358)	(0.339)	(0.0514)
War intensity (war duration)	0.0480	0.0762*	0.0810*	0.0150**
	(0.0308)	(0.0413)	(0.0440)	(0.00627)
Constant	-0.349	-0.438	0.465	-0.126
	(1.999)	(2.680)	(2.704)	(0.401)
Number of observations	34	34	35	35
Adjusted R ²	0.270	0.234	0.250	0.326

Standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Online Appendix 2
Structural Break Analysis of Post-Conflict Rule of Law

This appendix provides the structural break analyses for each country in the dataset and provides a more detailed description than Appendix 2 found in the paper. For each variable listed, the first row provides the year of data available. The second row is the AO structural break and the year it occurs if statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. The third row is the IO structural break and the year it occurs if significant. NC means no change in the data. MD means there was either gaps in the data or insufficient data to conduct the analysis. Light gray shading means post conflict improvement (and a statistically significant break). Dark gray shading means post conflict deterioration (and a statistically significant break). The dark black vertical line separates variables that are available for long pre and post conflict periods (to the left of the line) and variables that are only available from the mid-1990s to 2008 or 2009 (to the right of the line).

Table OA.2.1. Structural Break Analysis by Country

Country name	Conflict Years	Civil liberties, FH	Political rights, FH	Ex. constraints, Polity	Ex. constraints, Henisz	Judicial indep., Henisz	Corruption, WB	Rule of Law, WB	Property rights, HF
Argentina	1975-1977	1972-2008 AO: 1982 IO: 1979	1972-2008 1982 1979	1946-2008 1984 1981	1966-2007 1985 1985	1960-2007 1990 -	MD	MD	MD
Azerbaijan	1991-1994	1991-2007 1993 1994	1991-2007 1994 -	1991-2008 1996 -	1991-2007 NC	1991-2007 NC	1996-2008 2002 2000	1996-2008 2003 2000	1995-2006 NC
Bangladesh	1974-1997	1972-2008 1988 1989	1972-2008 1988 1989	1972-2008 1990 1989	1971-2007 1988 1988	1971-2007 NC	1996-2008 2001	1996-2008 -	1995-2006 NC
Bosnia	1992-1995	1992-2008 2001 -	1992-2008 1999 2000	1992-94 MD	1993-2007 NC	MD	1996-2008 -	1996-2008 -	1995-2006 NC
Cambodia	1975-1991	1972-2008 1990 1989	1972-2008 1991 1992	MD	1960-2007 1991 1991	MD	MD	MD	MD
CAR	1996-1997	1972-2007 1991 1988	1972-2007 1988 1989	1960-2008 1990 1991	1960-2007 1991 1992	MD	1998-2008 2006 2005	1996-2008 1999 -	1995-2006 NC
Chad	1980-1997	1972-2008, 1990 1991	1972-2008, 1988 1989	1960-2008, 1993 1989	1961-2007 NC	1961-2007 MD	1998-2008 2004 2002	1996-2008 2004 2001 -	1995-2006 MD
Congo	1993-1999	1972-2008 1988 1989	1972-2008 1990 -	1960-2008 1998 1995	1961-2007 - -	1960-2009 NC	1996-2008 - -	1996-2008 2001 2001	1995-2006 - -
Croatia	1992-1995	1991-2007 2002 1998	1991-2008 2001 1997	1991-2008 2001 1997	1991-2008 1998 1997	1991-2007 1998 1997	1996-2008 1999 1998	1996-2008 1998 1998	1995-2006 - -
Djibouti	1991-1994	1977-2008, - 1979	1977-2008, - 1979	1997-2008, 2000 1996	1977-1998 NC	1999-2007 NC	1997-2008 - -	1996-2008 - -	1996-2006 2003 -
Egypt	1994-1997	1972-2008, 1992	1972-2008, 1990	1946-2008, 1949	1960-2007, 1991	1958-2007 1995	1996-2008 1999	1996-2008 -	1994-2006 --

		1989	1991	1949	1992	199	-	2004	
Country name	Conflict Years	Civil liberties, FH	Political rights, FH	Ex. constraints, Polity	Ex. constraints, Henisz	Judicial indep., Henisz	Corruption, WB	Rule of Law, WB	Property rights, HF
El Salvador	1979-1992	1972-2008, 1989 1990	1972-2008, 1986 1982	1946-2008, 1993 1980	1960-2007, 1986 1981	1960-2007 NC	MD	MD	MD
Ethiopia	1974-1991	1993-2008, - -	1993-2008, - -	1993-2008, NC	1994-2007, 1996 -	1960-2007 NC	MD	MD	MD
Georgia	1991-1994	1991-2008, 1997 1994	1991-2008, 1994 -	1991-2008, NC	1991-2007, 2000 -	1991-2007 NC	1996-2008 2004 2003	1996-2008 2005 2002	1995-2006 - -
Guatemala	1978-1994	1972-2008, - -	1972-2008, 1986 1982	1946-2008 1993 1994	1960-2007, 1965 -	1960-2007 NC	1996-2008 - -	1996-2008 2004 2001	1994-2006 - -
Guinea Bissau	1998-1999	1974-2008, 1991 1987	1974-2008, 1991 1992	1974-2008, 1991 1992	1974-2007, 1992 1993	1960-2007 NC	MD	MD	1994-2006 2002 -
Haiti	1991-1995	1972-2008, - -	1972-2008, 1991 1992	1946-2008, 1991 1992	1960-2007, 1991 1992	1960-2007	1996-2008 - -	1996-2008 - -	1994-2006 NC
Iran	1979-1984	1972-91, 1989 1990	1972-81, 1990 1987	1946-2007, 1982 1978	1960-2007, 1990 1991	1960-2007 1990 1991	MD	MD	MD
Iraq	1985-1996	1972-2008, 2000 2001	1972-2008, 2006 -	1946-2002, 1955 1955	1960-2007, NC	1960-2007 NC	1996-2008 - 2002	1996-2008 - 2002	1996-2006 NC
Jordon	1970-1971	1972-2008, 1985 1982	1972-2008, 1985 1982	1946-2008, 1956 1955	1964-2007, 1982 1983	1960-2007 1993 1989	MD	MD	MD
Kenya	1991-1993	1972-2008, 1999 2000	1972-2008, 2003 2000	1963-2008, 2003 2000	1964-2007, 1982 1983	1960-2007 1982 -	MD	MD	MD
Laos	1960-1973	1972-2008, 1987 1990	1972-2008, 1977 1987	1954-2008, 1976 1971	1960-2007, 1999 1986	1960-2007 NC	MD	MD	MD

Country name	Conflict Years	Civil liberties, FH	Political rights, FH	Ex. constraints, Polity	Ex. constraints, Henisz	Judicial indep., Henisz	Corruption, WB	Rule of Law, WB	Property rights, HF
Lebanon	1975-1991	1972-2008, 1976	1972-2008, 1982 -	MD	1960-2007, 2003 -	1960-2007 NC	MD	MD	MD
Mali	1990-1995	1972-2008 1993 1988	1972-2008 1989 1990	1960-2008, 1989 1989	1960-2007, 1990 1991	1960-2007 NC	1996-2008 - -	1996-2008 2000 2001	1994-2007 - 2001
Moldova	1991-1992	1991-2008, 1995 -	1991-2008, - -	1991-2008, 1994 -	MD	1991-2007 MD	MD	MD	MD
Morocco	1975-1991	1972-2008, - 1996	1972-2008, 1988 1989	1956-2008, 1989 1990	1960-2007, 1989 1990	1960-2007 1993 -	MD	MD	MD
Mozambique	1976-1992	1975-2008, 1992 1989	1975-2008, 1991 1992	1975-2008, 1991 1984	1976-2007, 1992 1993	1976-2007 NC	MD	MD	MD
Myanmar	1948-1995	1972-2008 1978 1979	1972-2008 1978 1977	1948-2008, 1959 1960	1960-2007 1963 -	1960-2007 NC	1996-2008 2001 2002	1996-2008 - 2000	1995-2006 2002 -
Namibia	1973-1989	1989-2008, 2002 2003	1989-2008, 1992 -	1990-2008 NC	1991-2007, 1993 2003	1992-2007 - -	MD	MD	MD
Nicaragua	1981-1990	1972-2008 1987 1988	1972-2008 1987 1988	1946-2007 1991 1979	1960-2007 1985 1982	1960-2007 1996 1992	MD	MD	MD
Nigeria	1980-1985	1972-2008, 1987 1988	1972-2008, - -	1960-2008, 2000 -	1960-2007, 1997 1998	1960-2007 NC	MD	MD	MD
Oman	1971-1975	1972-2008, 1997 1998	1972-2008 1977 -	1946-2008, 1992 1988	1960-2007 NC	1960-2007 NC	MD	MD	MD
Pakistan	1994-1999	1972-2008, - -	1972-2008 - -	1972-2008, - -	1972-2007 - -	1972-2007 - 1987	1996-2008 2002 -	1996-2008 1999 1998	1994-2006 1989 1995
Papua N.G.	1988-1998	1975-2008, 1987 1986	1975-2008, 2004 2000	1975-2008, NC	1976-2007 1991 1988	1991-1987	1996-2008 2002 -	1996-2008 1999 1998	NC

Country name	Conflict Years	Civil liberties, FH	Political rights, FH	Ex. constraints, Polity	Ex. constraints, Henisz	Judicial indep., Henisz	Corruption, WB	Rule of Law, WB	Property rights, HF
Peru	1980-1996	1972-2008, 1997 -	1972-2008, 2002 -	1946-2007, 1981 1976	1960-2007, 1981 1978	NC	1996-2008 - 2002	1996-2008 2002 2003-	1994-2006 2000 -
Rwanda	1990-1994	1972-2008, 2003 2000	1972-2008, - -	1961-2008, 1995 1992	1961-2007, 2005 2001	1960-2008 NC	1998-2006 2003 -	1996-2008 - -	1996-2006 2002 -
Senegal	1989-99	1972-2008, 2003 -	1972-2008, 1979	1960-2008 2001 1997	1960-2007, 1991 1977	1960-2008 NC	1996-2008 - -	1996-2008 - -	NC
South Africa	1976-1994	1973-2008, 1991 1987	1973-2007 1995 1992	1946-2008 NC	1960-2007 1991 1992	1960-2008 1992	1996-2008 1999 2000	1996-2008 - -	NC
Syria	1979-1982	1972-2008, 2003 -	1972-2008, 1986 1987	1946-2008, 1960 1961	1960-2007, 2002 1999	1960-2007 2002 1998	MD	MD	MD
Tajikistan	1992-1997	1991-2008, 2001 2000	1991-2008, - 1994	1991-2008, - -	1991-2007, 1993 1994	1991-2007 NC	1996-2008 2003 -	1996-2008 2002 2001	NC
Thailand	1966-1982	1972-2008, 1983 -	1972-2008, 1976 -	1946-2008, 1989 1990	1960-2007, 1977 1978	1960-2008 1985 1986	MD	MD	MD
Turkey	1984-1999	1972-2008 2005 -	1972-2000 1990 1991	1946-2008, - 1981	1960-2007, 1989 1999	1960-2007 1994 1990	1996-2008 2004 2001	1996-2008 2002 2001	1994-2006 2002 -
Vietnam	1960-1975	1976-2008, 2002 1998	1976-2008, - -	1976-2008, NC	1976-2001, 1994 1991	1976-2007 1994 1990	MD	MD	MD
Yemen	1994	1990-2008, - -	1990-2008, - -	1990-2008, NC	1990-2007 NC	1990-2007 NC	1996-2008 1999 -	1996-2008 2005 -	1994-2006 NC
Yemen PR	1986	1972-1989 NC	1972-1989, 1975 -	1967-1989, 1994 -	1967-1989, NC	1960-1989 NC	MD	MD	MD
Yugoslavia (Serbia & Monteneg)	1998-1999	2000 1997	2002 1997	MD	2001 1998	1992-2005 NC	1996-2008 2001 2001	1996-2008 2001 -	MD

Country name	Conflict Years	Civil liberties, FH	Political rights, FH	Ex. constraints, Polity	Ex. constraints, Henisz	Judicial indep., Henisz	Corruption, WB	Rule of Law, WB	Property rights, HF
Zimbabwe	1983-1987	1972-2008, 2002 1999	1972-2008, 2000 -	1970-2008, 1977 1984	1965-2007, 2001 -	1965-2007, 1990 1991	MD	MD	MD

Online Appendix 3 Civil War Settlement and Post-Conflict Rule of Law

In this appendix and the next, we explore whether the way in which a war ends affects post-conflict rule of law. The primary additional variables of interest are settlement type and UN intervention, which have both been found to affect the maintenance of the peace. To capture settlement type, we use three separate variables: *Victory by government*, *Victory by rebels*, and *Settlement or truce*. These categories are based on Doyle and Sambanis (2000), who distinguish four possible civil war outcomes: victory by the government; victory by rebels; negotiated settlement; and, settlement by truce or ceasefire. Negotiated settlements and truces differ, but we have collapsed them into one category, *Settlement or truce*, because these are cases in which no one party to the conflict can impose its will absolutely on the other party. *Victory by government* means that the government won the civil war and that the political status quo pre conflict has thus been maintained. *Victory by rebels* indicates that the insurgents have won the war and can presumably impose their preferences on the post conflict political order. We include *Victory by government* and *Settlement or truce* in our regression with *Victory by rebels* as the omitted category to which the others are compared. We expect that victory by either side would be associated with weaker rule of law outcomes than those in which the parties were forced to negotiate compromises to which both parties would subsequently be subject. The regression model is as follows:

$$\text{Rule of law post-conflict average} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{rule of law pre-conflict average} + \beta_2 \text{Ln(post conflict year 1 GDP)} + \beta_3 \text{War intensity} + \beta_4 \text{Victory by government} + \beta_5 \text{Settlement or Truce} + \varepsilon$$

We show the results by rule of law indicator. The findings show that settlement or truce positively and significantly affects post conflict political rights at conventional levels and Henisz Executive Constraints at the $p < 0.10$ level.

Table OA3.1. Post-Conflict Civil Liberties (FH)

Variables	(1)	(2)
Rule of law pre-conflict avg.	0.246 (0.168)	0.238 (0.169)
Ln(GDP p.c.1 st post conflict yr)	0.408 (0.256)	0.319 (0.265)
War intensity ln(sum of battle deaths)	-0.0929 (0.0847)	
War intensity (duration)		0.0288 (0.0319)
Government victory	0.105 (0.594)	0.322 (0.582)
Settlement or truce	0.900* (0.513)	0.949* (0.510)
Constant	-0.0989 (2.064)	-0.638 (1.962)

Observations	34	34
R-squared	0.371	0.362
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10		

Table OA3.2. Post-Conflict Political Rights (FH)

Variables	(1)	(2)
Rule of law pre-conflict avg.	0.171 (0.187)	0.183 (0.189)
Ln(GDP p.c.1 st post conflict yr)	0.458 (0.339)	0.297 (0.353)
War intensity ln(sum of battle deaths)	-0.155 (0.111)	
War intensity (duration)		0.0497 (0.0419)
Government victory	0.362 (0.763)	0.712 (0.750)
Settlement or truce	1.440** (0.657)	1.494** (0.659)
Constant	0.0321 (2.705)	-0.851 (2.578)
Observations	34	34
R-squared	0.370	0.358

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table OA.3.3. Post-conflict Executive Constraints (Polity)

Variables	(1)	(2)
Rule of law pre-conflict avg.	0.307*	0.282*
	(0.164)	(0.162)
Ln(GDP p.c.1 st post conflict yr)	0.372	0.314
	(0.364)	(0.360)
War intensity ln(sum of battle deaths)	-0.0925	
	(0.132)	
War intensity (duration)		0.0589
		(0.0440)
Government victory	-0.575	-0.282
	(0.848)	(0.817)
Settlement or truce	0.935	0.962
	(0.750)	(0.724)
Constant	0.552	-0.430
	(3.173)	(2.706)
Observations	35	35
R-squared	0.319	0.347

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table OA.3.4. Post-conflict Executive Constraints (Henisz)

Variables	(1)	(2)
Rule of law pre-conflict avg.	0.469*	0.569**
	(0.234)	(0.223)
Ln(GDP p.c.1 st post conflict yr)	0.0387	0.00537
	(0.0563)	(0.0545)
War intensity ln(average battledeaths)		
War intensity (duration)		0.0141**
		(0.00655)
Government victory	0.129	0.185
	(0.128)	(0.115)
Settlement or truce	0.212*	0.185*
	(0.113)	(0.105)
Constant	-0.0841	-0.0755
	(0.466)	(0.407)
Observations	35	35
R-squared	0.315	0.400

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Online Appendix 4

UN Intervention and Post-Conflict Rule of Law

In further exploratory regressions, we explore the effect of *UN intervention* which is coded 1 if the UN intervened in the conflict and zero if not. This variable comes from Doyle and Sambanis' (2000) data set. The expectation is that UN intervention is associated with a more robust return of rule of law, although the result could arise because of selection effects: that coalitions of major power actors choose to intervene where success in rebuilding the rule of law is deemed higher. The regression model is as follows:

$$\text{Rule of law post-conflict average} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{rule of law pre-conflict average} + \beta_2 \text{Ln}(\text{post conflict year 1 GDP}) + \beta_3 \text{War intensity} + \beta_4 \text{UN intervention} + \varepsilon$$

The results show that UN interventions positively and significantly affect Polity Executive Constraints using any measure of war intensity and Henisz Executive Constraints, but only if war intensity is measured by log of the sum of battle deaths.

Table OA.4.1. Post-conflict Civil Liberties (FH)

Variables	(1)	(2)
Rule of law pre-conflict avg.	0.306*	0.323*
	(0.170)	(0.171)
Ln(GDP p.c.1 st post conflict yr)	0.412	0.303
	(0.262)	(0.271)
War intensity ln(sum of battle deaths)	-0.138	
	(0.0882)	
War intensity (duration)		0.0463
		(0.0326)
UN intervention	0.390	0.0767
	(0.401)	(0.408)
Constant	0.490	-0.379
	(2.159)	(2.038)
Observations	34	34
R-squared	0.281	0.270

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table OA.4.2. Post-conflict Political Rights (FH)

Variables	(1)	(2)
Rule of law pre-conflict avg.	0.254	0.286
	(0.194)	(0.197)
Ln(GDP p.c.1 st post conflict yr)	0.481	0.303
	(0.349)	(0.365)
War intensity ln(sum of battle deaths)	-0.233*	
	(0.117)	
War intensity (duration)		0.0726
		(0.0436)
UN intervention	0.669	0.162
	(0.528)	(0.543)
Constant	0.971	-0.507
	(2.856)	(2.732)
Observations	34	34
R-squared	0.263	0.236

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table OA.4.3. Post-Conflict Executive Constraints (Polity)

Variables	(1)	(2)
Rule of law pre-conflict avg.	0.394** (0.154)	0.366** (0.156)
Ln(GDP p.c.1 st post conflict yr)	0.253 (0.325)	0.264 (0.323)
War intensity ln(sum of battle deaths)	-0.176 (0.128)	
War intensity (duration)		0.0628 (0.0426)
UN intervention	1.525** (0.561)	1.158** (0.550)
Constant	1.827 (3.032)	-0.311 (2.592)
Observations	35	35
R-squared	0.340	0.346

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Table OA.4.4. Post-conflict Executive Constraints (Henisz)

Variables	(1)	(2)
Rule of law pre-conflict avg.	0.521** (0.214)	0.582*** (0.210)
Ln(GDP p.c.1 st post conflict yr)	0.0533 (0.0507)	0.0340 (0.0507)
War intensity ln(sum of battle deaths)	-0.0303* (0.0178)	
War intensity (duration)		0.0130** (0.00633)
UN intervention	0.190** (0.0841)	0.115 (0.0817)
Constant	0.0469 (0.442)	-0.188 (0.398)
Observations	35	35
R-squared	0.342	0.368
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10		