

## Appendix F. State Policy and Oversight Contexts

*Note: the following information more deeply details the relevant historical background for the three states in the study than was possible in the published text.*

### California

#### *State Oversight Structures in California*

In California, statewide coordination for public higher education has been notoriously weak. In 1974, statewide coordination was legislatively delegated to the California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC), an *advisory* board with the authority to establish a statewide database, review institutional budgets, advise on the need for and locations of new campuses, and review academic programs. Because this legislation really has no teeth, CPEC has mostly just produced reports for the edification of policymakers, which have largely been ignored. Legislators see CPEC as captive to the campuses, which have little interest in outside coordination. To allay these problems, the California Higher Education Policy Center has pressed for the creation of a stronger coordinating or governing board in California to increase system responsiveness and coordination (Bowen et al. 1997; Healy 1997). Negligible coordination occurs through the California Education Round Table, a voluntary group consisting of the three segments' systems heads, a private college representative, the superintendent of schools, and the head of CPEC. The Round Table provides an arena to discuss concerns—issues like transfer, articulation, and teacher preparation—and to anticipate enrollment trends (Richardson 1997). The Intersegmental Coordinating Committee (ICC) was established by the Round Table to assist, advise, and coordinate in accomplishing its goals for intersegmental activities and programs. Membership includes two administrative and one faculty representative from each of the

segments as well as a CPEC representative and three students. The ICC has four sub-committees: K–16 Curricular Issues; Outreach, Admissions and Transfer; Intersegmental Applications of Information Technologies; and Intersegmental Budget Proposals. While the structure and purposes are laudable, these bodies have functioned mainly as forums for deliberation.

The head of the university system is its president, who has three main functions: to provide a minimal level of coordination among the campuses; to address systemwide issues such as academic personnel, admissions, and the curriculum; and to negotiate the annual budget with the legislature and the governor. Each campus has a chancellor and an academic senate, with numerous committees that generate and oversee implementation of policy. There is a UC–wide Academic Senate, with an academic council serving as an executive committee. Also, a statewide Academic Assembly meets annually. This multifold structure thus incorporates many units that can initiate organizational and academic changes—or resist them.

The UC system is governed by a Board of Regents with twenty-six members: eighteen are appointed by the governor to twelve-year terms, subject to confirmation by the State Senate, and one voting student member is appointed by the regents. There are seven ex-officio members. Despite the 1990s controversies over affirmative action generated by the regents, their actual power is quite limited. Like most governing boards, the regents are expected to set general policy but not control day-to-day operations, which are left to management. Surprisingly, the regents receive almost no formal assessment information, either on personnel or on institutional performance (Richardson 1997). They do not review curricular matters, and only receive reports on the yearly budget negotiations. Even issues like capital projects and student fees are largely left to management. Although the 1990s saw activist blood among the regents appointed by former Governor Pete Wilson, the board is dominated by the system and the campus

administration on many issues. In fact, concern has been expressed that the regents are only “rubber stamps” for the administration, but so far there has been little change.

The California State University (CSU) system is governed by a Board of Trustees appointed by the governor for eight-year terms and confirmed by the State Senate. The board’s role is to set general policy and hire and evaluate system personnel, including the chancellor and the campus presidents. In their influence on personnel, these trustees have tended to play a stronger role than the UC Regents.

The system office is headed by a chancellor whose job is to promote information-sharing, coordinate the campuses, and handle collective bargaining. Chancellor Barry Munitz (1991-98) was highly regarded on both the campus and state levels (a rare achievement), but Chancellor Charles B. Reed, appointed in 1998 (and serving through 2012), had some nasty confrontations with faculty over collective bargaining (Johnstone et al. 1997; Selingo 1999a). The system’s coordinating group, the Executive Council, consists of the campus presidents and the chancellor, and meets ten times per year, convening for two days at each session. Faculty influence is divided between parallel union and academic senate governance systems. The power and authority of each is determined by the state’s Higher Education Employee Relations Act. At the system level, these consist of the California Faculty Association (union) and a system Academic Senate. It is generally believed that tensions are far lower than they once were in the system, that contract dispute notwithstanding, but the union has been regarded as a stumbling block to change within the system (Richardson 1997).

In the late 1990s, the California State University system completed a strategic planning process that gained national visibility. Entitled *Cornerstones: Choosing Our Future* (Broad et al. 1998), the report garnered attention especially for its two planning principles: to move towards

“demonstrated learning” in awarding bachelor’s degrees, and to develop measures that would increase accountability. Although the faculty expressed agreement with these items in principle, particularly when the process was being handled by then-chancellor Barry Munitz, more conflict arose as it became clear that Chancellor Reed intended to implement them (Selingo 1999b). The proposed accountability measures included a comprehensive set of performance indicators. Demonstrated learning was identified by an assessment system for every campus program and course, to be determined by faculty. A similar move away from “seat time” assessment of degree progress was already developing at the system’s campus in Monterey Bay, founded in 1994 (Bastedo 2001).

Contrasting the California university systems, the California Community Colleges were supposed to be locally governed and financed, according to the 1960 Master Plan. This was designed to provide local accountability and responsiveness for each campus. Each community college district is governed by a local Board of Trustees; most of these have five members who serve four-year terms. As of 2000, there were 107 campuses in 71 districts, comprising the world’s largest system of higher education. The members are elected from the district and therefore must run campaigns for the position. Collective bargaining is handled at the district level, negotiated between the faculty and the local board of trustees. As a result, the faculty unions pour funds into the campaign treasuries of friendly trustee candidates, virtually assuring their election. In turn, when the time comes for collective bargaining, trustees are not inclined to bargain hard against the union that elected them. At the same time, consultation with higher-ups is required on nearly every local board decision. This is the result of Assembly Bill 1725, a legislative attempt in 1988 to reform community college governance.

Unlike for the UC system or the CSU system, a substantial portion of campus funding for the community colleges has been provided through local taxation. In 1995-96, only 44% of the community college budget was provided by state appropriation (Richardson 1997). However, due to the state's Proposition 13, which restricted the state's capacity to raise revenue through property taxes, local tax revenue was cut and capped. This meant that community colleges' funding from local taxes became extremely limited, and left them more reliant on state funding. It also had the paradoxical effect of tying the community colleges less to their local government and more with an eye to lobbying each annual budget cycle in Sacramento.<sup>1</sup>

The overall system is coordinated by a Board of Governors with sixteen members, five of whom are campus representatives (two campus trustees, two faculty members, and one student). The board has responsibility for fiscal oversight, monitoring, accountability, program review, and maintaining a management information system, but it has largely failed to exert its authority in these areas (Richardson 1997). The vice-chair of the 1996 Board of Governors, however, called that board "activist" and "hands-on" (*National Crosstalk* 1996). The system is administered by a chancellor, who works for the Board of Governors. At the end of the century, Chancellor David Mertes was forced to resign by a "Gang of Five" that found him unresponsive to board inquiries. Chancellor Thomas Nussbaum tried to increase system coordination and accountability, in part to generate increased financial support from the legislature (Archibold 1997).

### *Specific State Pressures on Public Higher Education in California*

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#### **<sup>1</sup>Endnotes Appendix F**

Unlike the other two systems, the California Community Colleges have statutory protection (along with K-12 education) that provides workload and inflation funding increases.

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, California state officials wrestled with changes in the state's economy and demographics that were pressuring the three systems to adapt, albeit in somewhat different ways. The weakened tax base in California after Proposition 13 has been a fact of life for all publicly funded services, including higher education, and increased competition for state appropriations has also resulted from cost increases in health services, prisons, and energy. Thus not only has the state revenue stream for public higher education been uncertain, at times it looked dismal. In spite of cycles of fiscal constraint, state officials have nevertheless counted on this massive public higher education system to educate the best and brightest in the state, while providing affordable education and training to a population that has grown in size and diversity. Managing growth was of utmost importance to legislators, along with the increased diversity in the population.

Reorganizing the system and differentiating campus missions were also foremost on legislators' minds. In fact they reevaluated the Master Plan at regular intervals: 1965–1966, 1972–1973, 1987, 1989, and again in 1999–2002. The remarks of two legislators in the late 1960s characterized their thinking: Compared to some of the legislative remarks cited in chapter 2, the following comments aligned more closely with what would develop:

Well, I suspect more than in the past that growth is going to have to be accommodated by larger... but also more effective campuses... I think there is going to have to be a new reorganization. I don't think we can continue to simply add new University campuses, and at each state college four or five new liberal arts programs, and junior colleges. We are going to have to reorganize this whole system, because this added new growth is getting to be absurd. (Eulau and Quinley 1970, 179)

The gist of this sentiment was echoed time and again over the next three decades.

The question of “access to what” was emerging even at that time, 1970. The following presages the willingness, if not intention, to back away from a comprehensive scope of program offerings in light of anticipated fiscal constraints. Another California legislator remarked about public higher education:

I think we’re going to have to try to teach certain curricula in certain schools, and not try to teach a little bit of everything at all the schools, and let these students, to some degree, seek out the school that they can attend advantageously. I think we have to pool our resources on this. (Eulau and Quinley 1970, 179)

Yet during this earlier period, state officials also seemed to acknowledge that they should not control the curriculum. One California assemblyman reflected:

If you start controlling the curriculum, you control the end product. I’d sort of back away from that... to a certain extent the Legislature should determine to what extent it wants to finance specialized kinds of education in the professional areas and law schools, medical schools, that sort of thing. But it should be on a basis of evaluating recommendations made by the institutions themselves and the Coordinating Council. I think the initiative ought to come there. (Eulau and Quinley 1970, 52-53)

In the mid-1970s, “vocational” education was included in CPEC lists of priorities (Education Commission of the States (ECS) 1975; 1976) but as the decade ended, access and opportunity were the focus, with barely a mention of vocational priorities (CPEC 1979).

As state officials looked to the state’s future needs, the challenges of adapting to student demographic changes were anticipated to be ongoing throughout the 1980s: “There were more dark faces, more women, older students, and more students who entered college without the skills deemed necessary for college work.” (CPEC 1980, 41). The second five-year higher

education strategic plan was issued in 1982, called *The Challenges Ahead* (ECS 1982). In a companion document, *The Challenges Ahead: Issues in Planning for California Postsecondary Education, 1982–87*, separate papers addressed faculty issues and the demographic, economic, and socio-political changes in the higher education environment, signaling their awareness of the issues, even if no solutions were forthcoming. David Saxon, on leaving the presidency of the University of California, was optimistic. “Ten years ago, higher education was regarded as the problem. Now the president of the United States, even Jerry Brown, is talking about higher education as the solution to our problems. That’s a big, big change” (*California Higher Education* 1982, 18). Reportedly he urged Governor Deukmejian to locate a national technology consortium at UC, but the governor refused to provide any additional funds. The first issue facing higher education, David Saxon said, is “bringing fully into society people who have traditionally been denied that opportunity” (19). The second is that “our society is becoming increasingly technological” (19). The demographics of access, with the all-flexible tool of technology, were clearly on his agenda.

The year 1984 saw a consolidation of the shift in values and language in the California environment towards economic priorities, with industry discourse starkly contrasting David Saxon’s vision and making that tension explicit. The report *Social and Economic Trends, 1985–2000* highlighted the needs of various industries in California, including the “trend towards an information-based economy” and “increased conservation of resources” (CPEC 1984). It is worth noting that, in the swing towards what could be termed a more politically conservative view, this report evoked the original association with the term conservative, linking it to the needs of the economy—as they imagined it would develop over the next several decades. In an information economy, the report explained, we are more likely to see new kinds of jobs, such as



“aquaculturist,” “neutrino astronomer,” and “shrimp-trout fish farmer” (11). Colleges were to stress technological education and research; and the report noted too that a recent report had concluded that a third of America’s increase in productivity from 1929 to 1969 was the result of “advances in knowledge,” almost all of which were produced in university laboratories or by university graduates (13). Changes in educational technology were recommended as well.

Economic development further emerged as a major expectation in a 1988 report prepared for an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) review commission, *Preparing for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Condren 1988). Establishing higher education’s impact on the California economy and the increasing competitiveness from the “Pacific Rim,” Condren highlighted “a sample” of ties between the higher education segments and industry (90-94). In the future, his report asserted, “higher education will be engaged in a three-way dialogue with the state and with business as each tries to be mutually supportive of efforts designed to contribute to California’s economic competitiveness” (96). “One goal of that dialogue will be greater understanding by higher education institutions of the educational needs of business and industry on a continuing basis and how those needs relate to institutional missions and goals.” At the same time, changing student demographics were again highlighted as a major issue to be addressed, with the observation that by 2000 California was anticipated to become a “majority minority” state (133)—which it did. Condren’s report recommended new attention to admissions requirements, transfer reform, and “portable” student financial aid (149). These issues were further explored in a 1989 joint legislative report, *California Faces... California’s Future: Education for Citizenship in a Multicultural Democracy* (Joint Committee 1989).

Indeed by 1993, in Joint Committee reports evaluating California higher education and the Master Plan, the economic agenda received top billing. Discussion items included a number

of possible priorities, such as “declar[ing] that the primary mission of public higher education is to meet the economic and social needs of the state” (Assembly Committee on Higher Education 1993, 5). Further items for discussion included moving more students to community colleges, even consolidating all remedial education in the community colleges. In this same report, eliminating a slew of other “sacred cows” was also up for consideration, such as to remove requirements for terminal degrees for faculty (18), to increase faculty workloads (19), and to use distance learning for community college faculty to teach lower-division courses for students in the other two university systems (44). Although the increase in part-time faculty was examined with alarm in the 1980s (CPEC 1980, 82), it was later considered a viable solution to reduce fixed costs and increase the structural flexibility of the campuses.

The battle cries against inefficiencies and indulgences within higher education continued to resound widely. Another analysis sounding the call against long-held givens in the California system was a paper authored in April 1993 by Christopher Cabaldon published by the State Assembly Office. Attacking the tradition of local autonomy, he argued: “the decentralized, collegial approach to decisionmaking and planning can lead to extensive (and expensive) program duplication” (Cabaldon 1993, 16). In addition, he noted that faculty are entrusted with a large measure of governance responsibility which “can result in severe inefficiencies as the primary missions collide with group norms and rituals resistant to change, perverse and expensive reward systems out of step with public priorities, and loyalties divided among institution, department, and discipline” (20). Cabaldon held that hiring and tenure should be based only on teaching at the Cal State Universities and the California Community Colleges, and on research at a UC campus. Faculty workloads at UC campuses should be increased to two courses per term, at Cal State Universities to four courses per term (22). Further, “primary

responsibility” for training the workforce should be in the colleges and universities, “working in tandem with employers and other public agencies” (27).

Also in the spring of 1993, some state legislators indicated their intentions to increase public scrutiny of public higher education. Three state senators set up an 800-number so that the public could call in to suggest ways for higher education to be more efficient (Almanac 1994). The continuation of this story is that after large budget decreases in the early and mid-1990s, the state provided substantial increases in the second half of the 1990s, perpetuating the state’s “boom or bust” trend in funding public higher education. This trend has been heavily criticized for producing instability and inefficiency (Martinez and Nodine 1997; Benjamin and Carroll 1997; Pickens 1997; California Citizens Commission 1998; CPEC 1998). So the century closed on the upswing, only to be met by major budget crises again in the early 2000s.<sup>2</sup>

Of the sectors, the California State University system arguably has suffered most, with the impossible expectations to cover everything—from vocational study to research. Also, its sheer magnitude has led to an unwieldiness of its own. An administrator told of a bureaucratic

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The UC system has a unified budget, coordinated by the president’s office (UCOP). The practice has been that no campus-specific information is reported to the legislature, and this is credited with reducing campus tensions over the budget. The priorities in the UC budget are the result of meetings between the chancellors and their planning and budgeting vice chancellors. The budget is then negotiated between the president’s office and the executive-branch Department of Finance, and then with the legislature. Capital improvements are submitted separately on a five-year time line (Richardson et al. 1997). Perhaps the most difficult part occurs after the budget is passed, when the legislature provides a lump-sum appropriation to the university system. The subsequent allocations to the campuses are accomplished through yelling and screaming (Richardson et al. 1997), although a formula was devised and agreed to that distributes each year’s budget increment. The formula is driven by campus enrollments, with graduate students weighted more than undergraduate students. The California State University system budget also has been unified, and an enrollment-driven formula distributes the increments to individual campuses. From 1976 to 2000, UC campuses received far more state appropriations per FTE student than the other two systems. For the three case study sites in this study, the figures at the end of the century show UC Berkeley receiving \$14,357 per FTE student, San Jose State \$6,842, and San Jose City College \$2,571 (Table 6).

snafu—that every purchase had to go through the system office, and a legislative order was required to change that:

Our campus was a pilot for what we call vendor direct pay where we could pay a vendor directly. And we had a timing on vendor pay that was something like 45 days. I mean, you didn't want to do business with us because it would take us so long to pay you. And now it's down in the low 20s. That was spearheaded through this quality improvement steering committee. And we were able to get legislative support to change that.

These are among the disadvantages of one of the country's largest university systems.

Triggered partly by concerns about the fluctuations in state appropriations to public higher education, a ream of studies have analyzed the impact of California's demographic trends, with little resulting consensus. Early work by Patrick Callan and David Breneman brought attention to "Tidal Wave II," the boom of young, largely minority Californians who would soon need access to a higher education system that already had access deficits (Breneman 1995; Callan et al. 1996). Projections were initially an additional 700,000 students seeking higher education in the state on top of 2.2 million enrolled; 76% of new enrollments were expected to begin in community colleges and then transfer (Bracco and Callan 2002). At the end of the 1990s, earlier analyses regarding Tidal Wave II were reconfirmed (Breneman 1998; Hill 1999; CPEC 1999). By the turn of the century, policy analysts posited ways to cope with enrollment growth in the context of state fiscal constraint in imperatives to facilitate more student transfer across segments as well as joint doctorates, and to explore new types of collaboration, such as joint facilities and the California Virtual University (Bracco and Callan 2002). Other solutions included moving to year-round operations to make better use of the facilities (Breedlove 1998, 1999; Selingo 1999a).

Among the most important studies in this arena was the RAND study, which reviewed all the previous studies, conducting “exploratory modeling” to determine future events based on realistic contingencies (Park and Lempert 1998). The results are charts that show the access deficits in each system contingent upon the level of state funding, improvements in efficiency, and student demand. The authors concluded that enrollment was projected to grow but not of tidal wave proportions; nor would it be unmanageable. California would avoid serious access deficits if the fraction of the state general fund allocated to higher education remained constant, and if productivity increased at faster-than-historic rates. Otherwise, maintaining access would require a high tuition/high aid system of finance. Perhaps most importantly, the authors found that the trends were *insensitive* to changes in student demand. As a result, determining the extent of student demand was not nearly as important as increasing institutional efficiency and ensuring a state commitment to stable funding during economic downturns.

In California, one example of economic considerations clearly superceding egalitarian values occurred at the UC system in the 1990s with the removal of what was designated as remedial courses from the universities to the community colleges—a move that occurred in New York in the late 1990s as well (see below). Subject A, the UC-wide basic writing requirement, was considered remedial, although for example in the 1990s at UC Santa Cruz, about one-third of each entering freshman class had not yet fulfilled Subject A (Martin 2004). Subject A was subcontracted to community colleges by UC Davis and UC San Diego in the 1990s, as were specific basic math courses also deemed remedial. These courses had always been taught at the university, but in the 1990s climate of accountability, were configured at certain campuses as purely remedial—as were, for example, the most preliminary ESL courses at some campuses—and were therefore designated *non-credit*. And by legislative statute, no non-credit courses could

receive state dollars. At UC campuses where Subject A courses were designated “non-credit,” their costs were covered by discretionary funds. Also, Subject A usually fell within the humanities, which lost favor (and funding) in the 1990s as general education became devalued. Interesting enough, inasmuch as the legislature became involved in discussions about moving basic courses from the university to the community colleges, which they mostly did not, many tended to take offence at the idea that the university was not educating its own (Martin 2004).

However, a number of UC campuses reconfigured their courses so that students fulfilled these basic requirements in math, writing, etc. (and thereby were brought up to speed) within *credit* courses, and therefore within the culture of the UC system itself. (Indeed, one significant reason for the failure of transfer in the California system has been the wide difference in cultures across the segments).<sup>3</sup> In this case, from the perspective of those opposed to moving the courses to the community colleges, economic and political pressures in the UC system were literally bumping (even busing!) the “majority minority” of bilingual, bicultural, and/or underprepared but UC-eligible and -accepted students to community colleges, for instruction that the universities had always previously considered their responsibility. Moreover, many of the same instructors (often part-time, usually untenured) who had taught these required courses for many years (at considerably lower pay than—and as much as four times the course-load of—their tenured colleagues) were then hired by the community colleges to teach the UC course material at even lower pay. This locates industry logic in full swing in prioritizing savings (albeit minor in

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In the 1990s at UC Santa Cruz, “disbarment” (expulsion) rates among upper-division students were much higher for transfers than for students who had entered as freshmen, other factors notwithstanding, linked to their having fulfilled their lower-division requirements at other institutions, usually community colleges (Martin 2004).

the big picture of the higher education state budget) over courses and programs (such as tutoring) for those UC students who were most at risk.

For its part the University of California system, with its uniquely prestigious research universities—not just Berkeley and UCLA but also Santa Barbara, Davis, and Santa Cruz—has been under pressure since the early 1990s from the UC Office of the President to move towards “one-system thinking”: inter-campus cooperation to reduce duplication and eliminate under-enrolled programs. According to our interviewees, this is “mostly wishful thinking,” and a complete non-starter at the undergraduate level. Coordination within the system and between universities is effected and effective more informally, according to this senior administrator:

There is always a tension between that kind of thinking and every campus’ ambition to be a comprehensive campus, so I don’t think the Office of the President would have an enormous programmatic influence on the campuses. I don’t think you would ever get the campuses buying into some sort of centrally directed model at all, but the campuses enter into discussions and agreements with each other based on mutual interests. It is a more informal thing, and it really has to be faculty-driven,

In other words, because of the looser oversight structures within the UC system, more informal mechanisms facilitate coordination among the campuses, as this leader explained: “There are many inter-campus groups. The chancellors meet basically twice a month. The academic vice chancellors meet regularly. The deans of the various programs meet periodically. Librarians meet regularly. There is a lot of cross-campus dialogue that goes on.” Communication among cohorts rather than top-down directions from the Office of the President allows them to “avoid the kind of duplication that doesn’t make sense.”

As for the technological imperative, throughout this period, faith and confidence in technology as a solution to extending access continued to grow, especially as it envisioned access to students in more geographically remote areas of the state. But technology was equally seen as inseparable from economic progress, of course. For in California, keeping pace with technological advancements was *de rigueur*, considering that California produced *the* cutting-edge technology just as it had generated the “high tech” movement in the 1980s. The tremendous success of Silicon Valley became a symbol of the state’s aspirations for intellectual and economic leadership in technology. For the site of the founders and leaders of computing technology—or as it later came to be known, information and communications technology—exemplified the potential of mixing the entrepreneurial spirit with investments in higher education. While Stanford University was often catapulted into the spotlight by Hewlett and Packard’s garage inventions, the San Francisco Bay region in general became known for extensive collaboration between public campuses and local industry, and for the creation of start-up companies that set the stage for the dot.com era. The pervasive attitude was that technological change is all about opportunity, economic and every other kind, and there were not only precedents but also very visible opportunities for public campuses—their administrators and faculty—to partner with industry in defining this new frontier in hardware, software, and networking.

It was perhaps no surprise, then, that in 1996, Governor Pete Wilson decided not to participate in the Western Governors University being developed by the Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education (WICHE) on behalf of thirteen western states (Blumenstyk 1996). Instead California developed its own Virtual University (CVU) that combined online courses already offered throughout the public system. When CVU opened its website in August



1998, it listed more than 1600 courses from 95 accredited California colleges, and included more than 100 certificate and degree programs. In April 1999, however, CVU abruptly ended most of its operations due to lack of funds; the three public segments balked at providing \$1 million per year for three years to cover operating shortfalls. According to a board member, Jonathan Brown, the organization would no longer have any staff, “making the entity even more virtual than it was” (Blumenstyk 1999, A30). Another factor in CVU’s failure were distance education initiatives launched by campuses in all three systems throughout the state.

The infrastructure supporting these instructional initiatives and the use of technology for administrative operations have at times become mired in controversy, much of it to do with the gray area of not-strictly-public technological collaborations between higher education and corporate giants in the new economy. For example, in 1997 the California State University system negotiated a technology deal with Microsoft, Fujitsu, GTE, and Hughes Electronics for which a new company was created called the California Education Technology Initiative (CETI), which would be responsible for administering the system’s technology infrastructure (Young 1997). The plan was designed to promote efficiency and increase user services while reducing costs to the state. Critics charged that the plan, to last for at least ten years, gave too much control to corporations, would eventually create a more business-like atmosphere on campuses, and would be perceived as turning the campuses into training grounds for these companies. Those and similar concerns were expressed in response to initiatives in the UC system, more than in the California Community College system, as the case studies for this project show.

These three decades in California thus show the state’s interest in campuses’ adaptation, specifically to unpredictable funding flows, enrollment shifts, changing demographics, and the opportunities afforded and pressures generated by new technologies. Although in different

periods the legislature was predisposed to let the campuses determine their academic practices, the trend through the 1980s and into the 1990s was for the representatives to assert more pointed demands for organizational efficiency, and to insist that the campuses demonstrate their direct strengthening of the economy or adding economic value to the state. The paradox here, as elsewhere, is in how the legislative and broader public's demands for public higher education to change escalated, and their scrutiny of academic practices became more targeted, while their support in the form of public funding became ever less certain—and this trend continued into the twenty-first century. In fact the legislature has encouraged California campuses in all three public systems to cultivate non-state sources of revenue, including stepping up their collaborations with local companies.

In California, we are left with the sense that the legislature, in reflecting the mood of the times as well as real economic downturns in the state, planted the seeds for values to shift, which were then taken under cultivation—even at times re-engineered—by the systems and their campuses. The changes were not smooth, and the turbulence and inconsistencies—and accompanying confusion and waste—are perhaps a function of the vastness of the state, including the widely dispersed, widely varying, and numerous campuses of the three public segments (only about one-eighth of students in higher education in the state attended private institutions as of 2000); the state's extremely high percentage of minority populations; and—also like New York—its extremes of wealth and poverty.<sup>4</sup> And the pressures on California higher education during this period were to absorb and accomplish it all.

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<sup>4</sup> The percentage of children living in poverty in California had been higher than the national average; and the average income of the poorest 20% of the population lower than the national average (NCPPE, *MU 2000*, 71).

From the perspective of those we interviewed in the late 1990s on the three California campuses—as the case studies make clear—funding constraints and uncertainty loomed large among their concerns. As one stated, in reference to then-current as well as anticipated enrollment demands in the state: “The current investment is not sufficient as it is.... Tidal Wave II is coming ...and there has to be an investment to this new group of students coming through the schools. If not, we are going to suffer.”

These are powerful observations because they point to the state’s investment in public higher education as essential, not only to the campuses to fulfill their missions but also to the broader citizenry—their quality of life as well as the economy, especially in such a technology-oriented economy where managerial and professional skills are needed in addition to lower-level skills, and as more citizens want higher education, while the state struggles through each economic recession. Each fiscal crisis has prompted campuses to adapt by cutting and streamlining, but also salaries fell behind the market, academic support budgets suffered (such as libraries), facilities budgets did not keep pace with higher energy costs, and deferred maintenance mounted. Also, as tuition and fees increased with less taxpayer support, expectations rose for quality to be improved.

The state legislature is but one part of the wider terrain of pressures that translated into the fact of “budget crunches,” alongside “demands for increased productivity and insufficient funds to keep equipment or scholarly and/or teaching endeavors up to snuff.” Administrators and faculty alike referred to these as “significant” pressures, especially given the state’s growing enrollment demand, major demographic shifts, and needs to accommodate an increasingly diverse student population, including generational differences (“what students want from their educational institutions has changed”).

One administrator pointed out that there is already transparency in reporting on all fronts, given the many technological changes, so their operations are clear to the system office, CPEC, and the legislature: “We’re all tied together in the computer world, so it isn’t that we can hide something from them. They can get it. We send them what we call the academic planning database, which gives them a breakdown of all faculty workloads, which tells you just about everything you need to know about the faculty and the students.”

This transparency is particularly challenging on public campuses in the state, where there are strong advocates for diversity and enrollment demand is strong in the diverse population, in an era when affirmative action is not permitted: “I think the larger question is how do we sustain diversity on a campus where we no longer have the tools available to us... Every way you try to do it and when you know that you are being watched like a hawk, it is very hard, very hard...”

Significantly, enrollment-based funding formulae impact the faculty more than legislators may realize. As state allocations are distributed to each system, they are then allocated among the system’s campuses (presumably through some negotiation between the system’s president and campus chancellors so that the funds can be allocated fairly and effectively), and then allocated internally on each campus. As one faculty member observed, resource allocation practices on each campus may be flexible but questions of fairness arise: “After funds are allocated to campuses, they are free to internally allocate them strategically to departments that have needs, despite the fact that the funding may have been ‘earned’ based on enrollment projections from another department.” Certainly in times of budget cuts, and in academic areas with declining enrollment, it becomes difficult both to justify allocating funds to underperforming departments, and to reduce the fixed costs of programs (i.e., salaries for tenured faculty). In these matters of internal resource allocation, campus leaders have some measure of

autonomy, as they manage each round of budget cuts and undertake planning initiatives that project different scenarios to enable them to prepare for an uncertain future.

## **Illinois**

### *State Oversight Structures in Illinois*

Illinois is a state with a constitutionally strong governor who has strong influence over the state budget. During the Edgar years (1991-1999), the state's lieutenant governor, Bob Kustra, was very visible on higher education issues. In the legislature, nearly all higher education issues are handled de facto by the Appropriations Committee. The Higher Education Committee, as one legislator put it, "really does not do very much" (Richardson 1997). The state has twelve public four-year universities, overseen by four public university governing boards, as well as forty-nine two-year colleges (governed by their own local boards of trustees who work with the Illinois Community College Board). It has been referred to as a state with a "system of systems," by design of Lyman Glenny, who was involved in creating the California system and preferred instead that university expansion be governed by different boards. Illinois' system was reorganized in the mid-1990s, bringing private higher education into the state's master planning. (Alexander and Layzell 2006). Out of 185 colleges and universities in Illinois, 62 are public. Illinois is one of only seven states where private higher education is integral to the state system.

The state coordinating board, in place since 1961, is the Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), which has relatively weak statutory authority. The board does not have the power to set tuition or fees, to eliminate or consolidate academic programs, nor to supervise capital construction projects. As a result, with Richard Wagner at its head until 1980, a great deal of emphasis was placed on consensus-building. This resulted in progress that some described as

“glacial,” but also in generally congenial relations between the institutions and the IBHE, as well as between the state’s elected officials and the IBHE. The major exception to this relative equanimity was the oft-mentioned board’s Priorities, Quality, and Productivity (PQP) initiative. This more aggressive accountability effort was decried to varying degrees by campuses, but it helped build credibility for the board in the legislature, particularly among Republicans (Richardson 1997).

A separate board for the community colleges, technically below the IBHE—the Illinois Community College Board (ICCB)—has a mix of governing and coordinating powers (unlike IBHE), including the statutory authority to set tuition and eliminate academic programs (Richardson 1997). The ICC Board has generally viewed its role, however, as one of setting general policy and principles and then allowing local boards to implement them, depending on the local context. The result of this is that the community colleges are widely perceived to be the most effective system of higher education in Illinois. Their reputation notwithstanding, appreciation of their effectiveness has not translated to increased funding from the legislature.

### *Specific State Pressures on Public Higher Education in Illinois*

At the state level in Illinois, interest in public higher education was to achieve both democratic and economic aims, with surprisingly little tension between these priorities before the early 1990s. From *A Master Plan for Higher Education in Illinois*, issued in July 1964:

In addition to providing direct benefit to students, higher education contributed positively to the cultural and physical well-being of all the people of the State. These goals are achieved through instruction of both youth and adults, through research aimed at the advancement of knowledge, and through public service activities which bring the special

competencies of higher education to the citizens in their home communities. (Chambers 1975, 88)

No mention of basket-weaving here, but the idealistic vision of edifying the citizenry is evident. By the end of the 1960s, this mindset shifted to fiscal priorities, although access goals remained prominent throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Signaling the state interest in resource reallocation in 1969, a new executive director was hired at the Illinois Board of Higher Education (IBHE), James Holderman, who inaugurated a more intrusive style of governance. Among the directives were instructions to make budgets by selecting “low-priority” units and academic programs for reduction or elimination, with aggregate cuts of 15%, portions of which could be reallocated to “innovative” or high-priority academic programs (Chambers 1975, 91). In other words, in Illinois—as generally across the states—the tradition of comprehensive scope began to be eroded by cost-cutting. During fiscal year 1975, the IBHE made a significant move to require accountability, developing the Resource Allocation and Management Program (RAMP), a means by which public colleges submit their annual budget requests and supporting data to the IBHE (ECS 1975). This plan specifically required: 1) mission and scope statements; 2) technical plans detailing the activities designed to meet the objectives in the mission and scope statements; and 3) a resource allocation schedule for the planned activities. All new program proposals had to be justified in terms of need, demand, and mission as reflected in their most recent RAMP documents. Doctoral programs had to demonstrate compelling need and not be duplicative of existing programs at public or private colleges (ECS 1975, 53). Nevertheless, during fiscal year 1976, the IBHE approved 46 new academic programs at public colleges (ECS 1976). At community colleges, the IBHE approved 184 new programs, including degree programs, contractual arrangements with proprietary

schools, and apprenticeship training programs. Doctoral program reviews were made less stringent as well, giving more discretion to IBHE staff. Thus the state interest in planning for higher education was to prioritize leveraging resources, as much as extending access to an increasingly diverse state population—although nowhere near as diverse as California.

Looking back, there are signs of the state's accommodating some demographic change. In 1975 IBHE adopted an affirmative action policy monitoring programs in state institutions, and they included it as part of their own statutory responsibilities (ECS 1975). A legislative proposal to require a strategic plan for the development of a statewide educational television system was considered but not adopted. In October 1975, the IBHE did a scan of existing ETV equipment in Illinois, and appointed an Educational Television Coordinating Commission (ECS 1976). In February 1976, the IBHE adopted *A Master Plan for Postsecondary Education in Illinois*, after two and half years of study by the board and citizens' commissions (ECS 1976). Faced with increasing enrollments, campuses were urged to continue internal reallocation efforts, to increase productivity, and to better utilize existing facilities. The new Master Plan also suggested some programmatic directions, including expanding certain academic areas such as health professions education, while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of affirmative action.

During the mid-70s, precedents led state officials to invest in specific fields of study on the public campuses, and the governor and legislators relied on the IBHE to carry this out. In fiscal year 1977, the IBHE was asked by the governor to address ways to increase health education in the South Side of Chicago (ECS 1977). They recommended increasing enrollment at the University of Illinois medical center, inter alia, and the legislature appropriated over \$200,000 for this program. The university submitted a plan in January 1978 to establish new primary care residencies and ambulatory care facilities in urban areas, and by 1990, to increase



minority enrollment in the medical school by 50. Chicago State University established a College of Allied Health and planned to expand its premed program as well, with the legislature planning to appropriate \$517,000 for these two programs (ECS 1978). During fiscal year 1979, statewide studies of health sciences and nursing education were conducted (ECS 1980). Revised policies for the health professions were approved in November, 1981 related to medicine, dentistry, podiatry, optometry, allied health, nursing, and veterinary medicine. Ad hoc committees were formed to study specific issues in medical and dental education, including regionalization, student retention, and resource allocation (ECS 1982).

During the mid-1980s, the IBHE master plan focused on five major goals: maintaining diversity, extending educational opportunities, assuring academic excellence, promoting economic development, and improving cost effectiveness (Richardson 1994). Here again, Illinois' goals blended fiscal conservatism with access. Accountability was also called for; allocations targeted programs that were vocational (rather than general) and that addressed social needs—by building preparations for the health professions. In 1985 the IBHE articulated goals to improve minority student preparation in high school, graduation rates, and student retention, and in 1989 the IBHE required reporting on progress towards these goals. Of particular interest was improving minority enrollments in math, science, and engineering. By 1994 all public campuses established plans to these ends, including high school articulation and summer bridge programs, remedial services, financial support, and the “creation of supportive campus environments” (Richardson 1994, 42). Efforts to improve graduation rates focused on improving transfer.

In September 1986, the IBHE adopted the recommendation of the Committee on the Study of Undergraduate Education proposing that community colleges be the principal site of remediation efforts and reaffirming the IBHE policy of no credit for remedial courses

(Richardson 1994, 45). A series of recommendations about faculty was also issued: that devotion to teaching should be recognized in promotion and tenure reviews; that the best faculty should teach undergraduates; and that campuses should ensure that faculty be prepared to teach and proficient in English. In addition, program reviews should focus on instructional improvement, a sign of what would become a pervasive interest in assessment of student learning outcomes. In 1989 this committee reconvened, reaffirming much of its earlier report, but added a section on transfer and articulation and cut the section on remediation (46).

In terms of Illinois' growing economic agenda, in the late 1980s the IBHE established an initiative on workforce preparation (Richardson 1994). Emphasizing cooperation with business and other education and training providers, their recommendations included improving basic skills through K–12 and adult education programs, establishing regional technology centers, financing consortia that served small and medium-sized industries, developing technology preparation programs, and establishing information clearinghouses on job training and employment. Performance indicators included an employer feedback system and a process that guaranteed the skills of college graduates to state employers. In 1989 the IBHE established a commission to address the “productivity” concerns of state lawmakers (Richardson 1994). “Campus leaders were asked to involve entire campus communities in broad-based efforts to align institutional goals and priorities with those articulated by the IBHE” (Richardson 1994, 43). This was later replaced by the PQP initiative, discussed in the main text.

A specific systemwide issue that emerged in 1991 was how to serve the need for graduate and professional education in the Chicago suburbs, where a number of high-technology and science companies were located (including the Argonne and Fermi laboratories). As pressure mounted to link the goals of higher education and industry, tension arose between the public and

private schools seeking an active part in that hotbed of growth. The area was primarily served by private colleges, but Northern Illinois University (NIU) and the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC) wanted to extend their presence there, asking the state to build a public facility in the area (Almanac 1991). This created intense competition between the public and private sectors, especially once the IBHE approved building a new classroom building fifteen miles from Roosevelt University (Almanac 1992). UIC was later criticized for using its clout to expand its programs, hurting others run by NIU and the Illinois Institute of Technology (Almanac 1993).

UIC also came under considerable criticism for expanding into their surrounding communities in Chicago, specifically the well-known historical Maxwell Street corridor. In characterizing pressure brought to bear, one UIC administrative leader mentioned in an interview both the IBHE and the community as complicating the university's efforts to expand the campus:

We had the south campus projects before them yesterday and had they not approved them then we couldn't sell the bonds to finance the construction. So it is another coordinating body that you have to take into account. A student advisory committee representative yesterday gave a resolution against the project on the basis of preserving Maxwell Street.

Meanwhile, the City Colleges of Chicago were notable for moving forward the agenda of democratic and demographic opportunity, garnering respect from state leaders for cutting spending and reducing the number of students taking remedial courses (Almanac 1992). At the same time, student concerns about racism on campuses led the state to require all colleges to include courses on "human relations" in their general education programs (Almanac 1992). The legislature was also concerned about addressing the impediments to student transfer and articulations, since a high proportion of minority students enter the public higher education system through community colleges (Almanac 1993).

In terms of access, the focus of efforts during the 1990s was the Illinois Articulation Initiative (IAI) (IBHE May 1997, May 1998). IAI's first move was to create a "General Education Core Curriculum," consisting of 12 to 13 courses that all institutions in Illinois could agree constituted a lower-division general education requirement. A specific articulation agreement ensures that students transferring anywhere in the system do not have to repeat these fundamental courses. Agreements were also planned for a number of common majors to increase the number of transferable courses.<sup>5</sup> Noting the relevance of financial aid, in 1999 Governor Ryan proposed creating a need-based scholarship program for students in occupational or vocational programs, but the Legislature refused to approve it (Almanac 2000). They did approve a program for students in information technology programs to help meet employer demand in that field. This divergence—and these choices—would seem to indicate that the legislature stoked IT training even while pulling the plug on financial aid.

Nevertheless opportunities afforded by technological changes were an underlying theme during the 1990s. Illinois took on a major technology assessment project for the entire state system called *The Illinois Century Project* (Illinois Higher Education Technology Task Force 1998). The task force recommended that the state invest in a \$400 million high-speed internet upgrade, connecting the university to local libraries and K–12 schools. The huge project ran into roadblocks, however, from the legislature and the Bureau of the Budget, who weren't clear on the goals and possibilities of the network, and the seed money for it was in jeopardy. Another major technology project was the Illinois Virtual Campus, funded by IBHE and the University of Illinois. The plan was for a "virtual ribbon cutting" to signal the provision of courses statewide from both public and private campuses. Fifteen "student support centers" located throughout the

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<sup>5</sup> A website detailing the program and its features is available at [www.itransfer.org](http://www.itransfer.org).

state signaled that the network would extend access to students in geographically remote areas; thirty-five were planned to be functional by 2001. By way of update: “In Spring 2008, Illinois colleges and universities reported a total of 192,277 enrollments in distance education, across 11,501 courses. Courses were delivered by internet (81%), stored media, e.g. CD/DVD (7%), interactive TV (5%), open broadcast TV (3%), and correspondence (4%). Of 192,277 enrolments, 173,140 were in courses delivered primarily or exclusively online” (Researching Virtual Initiatives in Education).

In another example of technology’s enabling extended access, “University Center” in Lake County, in the northern suburbs of Chicago, attracted much attention. University Center provided courses locally through distance education in the region, where residents previously had to travel more than forty-five minutes to attend an upper-level public college. All of the state’s public colleges were able to take part, as well as some private colleges, but the center had no faculty of its own. The center had about 100,000 square feet, housing classes for 3000 to 5000 students (Schmidt et al. 1999). The center’s operating expenses were projected to be about \$2.5 million at the time. It was to be locally governed, with residents holding six of the seats on the eleven-member board. The plan was seen as a way to provide a wide variety of educational programs at minimal additional cost to the state. Nearby residents were pleased as well, for a number of cities in Lake County competed for the right to have the site. Competition was so stiff, and the number of constituents so many, that the location proved highly controversial.

The adaptations sought by state officials and the IBHE seemed manageable despite the increased pressures on campuses to demonstrate accountability. In July 1998, the IBHE also approved the “Citizens’ Agenda,” which required surveys of students, employers, and taxpayers

to guide college planning processes. Surveys included questions about general attitudes and satisfaction, and the most pressing academic needs of students and employers (Almanac 1998).

The IBHE concluded the decade and century with another accountability initiative: *The Illinois Commitment*, part of the “Citizen’s Agenda for Illinois Higher Education” (IBHE February 1999). Each year the state’s colleges and universities must outline “best practices” programs that meet the state’s goals as stated in the *Commitment*, including promoting economic growth, improving teaching and learning at all educational levels, affordability for students and parents, expanding access and diversity, assuring graduates are prepared for work, and improving productivity. In 1999, campuses presented the first reports to the IBHE. In contrast to the PQP, this accountability initiative did not attract any local media interest.

As an interesting sidebar, at the time of our interviews, Illinois was known as a state with a high degree of exportation of college students, second to New Jersey. In 2000, it was estimated that freshman leaving the state to attend college out of state exceeded the students coming in by 10,000. The outflow of students was of concern, not only for the state’s economic competitiveness but also for the ability of the state to meet the educational needs of its diverse population (Alexander and Layzell 2006).

The perspectives from the campuses focus on IBHE’s role in policy and planning as well as budgeting. Most significant in our interviews was IBHE’s authority to send budgetary recommendations forward. Also what came to be known as “results reporting”—identifying clear performance indicators—was launched in the 1990s and formally adopted in 2003. The campuses—some for the first time, like Chicago State—were expected to do long-range planning, identifying priorities and benchmarking using quantitative measures, and the message

was that “planning would be tied to budgeting. Programs will have to prove that they are doing what they are set up to do.”

The upshot is that the IBHE has the authority to approve (or not) proposals from campuses for new programs. Both UIC and Chicago State understood that the proposals had more likelihood of success if there were jobs with that expertise. IBHE’s approval of, for example, new PhD programs, reflected clear oversight, a unity of purpose and a method, however much an individual university might long for more autonomy. One administrative leader narrated:

They just approved a PhD in art history to my great shock and to the shock of the art history department. Swiftly and with no questions asked. I think it’s because they differentiated it as we are going to focus on museum curators. Focusing on our strengths, is what IBHE likes. . . We just got a PhD in disability studies, the first disabilities studies PhD in the country. So it is not that the IBHE is anti-PhD programs, but they are anti-proliferation of PhD programs for which there are no jobs. It’s hard for me to argue that.

Indeed at the time of our interviews, UIC seemed more content with oversight from IBHE than from its university system leaders.

Thus UIC had a PhD program in Disability Studies, the first in the country, as they demonstrated there are jobs to be had with this preparation. By contrast, the proposal for a PhD in political science was held up in review progress. And they were in the process of preparing a proposal for a MA in engineering that would be offered online (“we are simply trying to be entrepreneurial”). Chicago State was in the process of preparing a proposal for a doctorate in physical therapy, which seemed unlikely, yet the accrediting association said that they would no

longer accredit baccalaureate programs. According to a senior academic leader, “I will fight that, and I might lose, but this is the way I am trying to deal with doctoral education at CSU, to start with professional doctorates.” After physical therapy, the idea was to go for clinical psychology, and then education. The contrast between the two universities in their respective relationships with IBHE is clear. While Chicago State faced challenges to show effectiveness and “raise the bar” in fulfilling its core mission of undergraduate education (as shown in Chapter 7), UIC had demonstrated success and built on that reputation for quality to make the case for distinctiveness in their advanced degree program proposals (“we’re open to having part-time students in doctoral programs and we’re low cost”). The combination of the IBHE’s authority for program approval with the expectations for reporting on performance indicators tied to budget recommendations gave them unprecedented strength in defining what these campuses were permitted to offer, and where they would have the resources to do so.

## **New York**

### *State Oversight Structures in New York*

Each SUNY and CUNY college has its own chancellor and board of trustees. SUNY has a sixteen-member Board of Trustees, fifteen appointed by the Governor. (One student member is appointed by the student body and serves ex-officio). Each of the SUNY colleges has a nine-member “campus advisory council” as well. Although CUNY was created in 1961, public higher education in New York City began with the Free Academy—later City College—founded in 1847. City College and Hunter College were under the city’s Board of Education, but in 1926 they were placed under a citywide Board of Higher Education until CUNY’s founding in 1961. The City University of New York (CUNY) Board of Trustees consists of seventeen members, ten



appointed by the governor and five appointed by the mayor of New York City. One member is a student and one is a faculty member; both serve ex-officio for a one-year term. The regular trustees serve seven-year terms.

New York's Governor has been described as the most powerful higher education leader in the state (Callan and Bowen 1997). The governor appoints many of the trustees for the system boards, which is power enough. But the governor also has line-item veto authority over budgets and oversees the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. And of course, all potential laws regarding higher education need his approval, unless his veto is overridden by the legislature. The legislature, somewhat less influential, is bicameral, with a senate and an assembly. During the Pataki years (1995-2006) the senate was dominated by Republicans and the assembly by Democrats. As a result the senate was far more influential with the executive branch; staff members of the Senate Higher Education committee attend governing board meetings to transmit legislative priorities to system trustees and to the administration (Callan and Bowen 1997).

The state's higher education coordinating agency is the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York. It was established in 1784 to govern King's College (Columbia University). The sixteen regents are elected by the legislature for five-year terms and are unpaid. The regents lead the state's Department of Education and appoint its commissioner. The Department of Education has a sub-office called the Office of Higher and Professional Education (OHP). The regents are the ultimate authority in academic program approval throughout the state. In addition the OHP coordinates the development of new campuses, accrediting "every curriculum in the state" (Callan and Bowen 1997). The regents do not have budgetary authority, however, since this rests with the governor and the Bureau of the Budget.

### *Specific State Pressures on Public Higher Education in New York*

State officials in New York have always seen public higher education as a major contributor to enhancing the economic and social well-being of the state. From the 1960s, these twin interests were often intermingled in the political ideologies playing out in the different governance arenas that oversee higher education. New York City can best be understood as a microcosm of the wider society in its aspirations as well as its problems. Poverty and racial conflict were rallying points for the opposing ideologies of both conservatives and the left. The democratic expectation of providing opportunity to the state's population had a decidedly social cast, along with its economic value. In New York City, public higher education had a legacy of upward mobility: socializing and preparing immigrants for work; cultivating citizenship; and stimulating vital economic strengths, such as the arts, design, advertising, and publishing.

Prior to 1975, a few legislators saw public higher education as becoming more practically oriented, trying to solve contemporary social problems. According to one legislator in the 1960s: "I think... higher education is going to deal more and more with social problems in our complex society, trying to meet these problems in addition to just raising the standard of the economic product, so to speak" (Eulau and Quinley 1970, 184).

State-level planning for higher education got into full swing in the 1970s. The Board of Regents started developing their quadrennial statewide plan for higher education in fall 1975. They set five goals for postsecondary education: quality education, responsiveness to societal needs, efficient use of resources, freedom of access, and freedom of choice (Education Commission of the States 1977). Efficiency made the list, but the more societal imperatives still held sway. Specific recommendations included self-assessment procedures and alternatives to

faculty tenure (85). In November 1978, a progress report was submitted to the governor reaffirming these goals, and in 1978-79 the process began of reviewing institutional missions for the 1980 Statewide Plan (ECS 1979). The 1980 Statewide Plan aimed to “redefine the mission of the whole postsecondary system, establish overall goals to guide the efforts of the entire system, set measurable objectives to be achieved by 1990, and describe activities to further those objectives to be undertaken.” (ECS 1980, 406).

Acting for the Board of Regents, beginning in 1973, the State Education Department conducted academic quality assessments of the state’s doctoral programs. A total of twenty-nine programs were closed between 1973 and 1978. This sharp move for quality and downsizing would prove contentious. In 1976, SUNY sued the Board of Regents, claiming it did not have the power to “dis-credit” academic programs that did not meet their standards (ECS 1978, 92). The State Supreme Court ruled in the Regents’ favor, and in June 1978, the lower court ruling was sustained by the state’s highest court, the Court of Appeals. Public hearings were also held on the program review standards, which had not been revised since 1971 (ECS 1979). They were ultimately revised in April 1980 (ECS 1980). These standards addressed quality issues in off-campus extension centers, which were growing extremely rapidly.

In 1977 the Regents began a project designed to locate employment in businesses for people with humanities PhDs. They received a seven-week orientation “in cooperating business schools to prepare them for jobs in cooperating corporations” (ECS 1978, 92). During 1978, 50 students participated, supported by grants from the NEH, Rockefeller Foundation, and several corporations (ECS 1979). For example, a two-year grant from the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education facilitated self-assessment of higher education, encompassing an evaluation of programs, outcomes, and graduates, and a review of industry needs (ECS 1978).

The Governor's response to the 1980 Statewide Plan for higher education "proposed significant changes in the planning process to focus it more on the needs of society, as well as on those of institutions" (ECS 1982, 121). Four issues in particular were identified in that plan: economic development; maintaining the balance among the three major sectors of higher education (SUNY, CUNY, and private); remediation; and health sciences training.

Economic development rapidly became one of the most important issues in New York, due to interest from the governor, the legislature, and the business community. The Center for Worker Education at City College enrolled more than 200 students specifically associated with labor unions in the city (ECS 1982). SUNY reported an increase in education, research, and technical assistance programs to local communities and businesses. Assistance programs were developed at SUNY as well, and in 1982, SUNY had more than twenty Development Centers for Business across the state. In 1981, the State Education Department initiated a series of manpower studies to help higher education meet future state economic needs. Studies focused on the supply and demand for physicians, dentists, engineers, and public school teachers and staff (ECS 1982). Engineering was a particularly pressing need, due to the high demand both for working engineers and for the faculty to teach them. In June 1982, the regents issued a report recommending more opportunities for working engineers to receive part-time graduate education, encouraging industry-university cooperation, and calling for state fellowships for doctoral training. In these ways the higher education decision-makers intended to meet economic needs external to the organization, as values came more to embrace economic purposes.

New York's public universities had not achieved national recognition for their academic stature before 1989, when SUNY Buffalo was invited to become a member of the Association of American Universities, known for their excellence in research and graduate education. Aspiring

to this same honor, SUNY system leaders wanted to upgrade graduate programs and research capability at other campuses: Albany, Binghamton, and Stony Brook (Almanac 1990, 181).

As the 1990s drew stronger demands for accountability by system leaders, intersections of access—democratic and demographic—with economic imperatives erupted into open confrontations within the educational system. The dual structure of New York’s higher education system reveals how accountability pressures from the state were perceived by system leaders and translated for SUNY and CUNY, respectively.

For SUNY a report, *Meeting the Productivity Challenge: System and Campus Reports*, led to the development of performance indicators for the system (Richardson 1994). These indicators included measures of trends in the dollar volume of sponsored research for all campuses and for full-time faculty at SUNY university centers; numbers of graduates by academic field; and amounts of sponsored research related to economic development, environmental studies, health care, public education, and social services (71). SUNY was to be accountable by performance indicators for research primarily, especially in specific fields related to vocational and social arenas. This is identical to the direction taken by IBHE at the same time.

Meanwhile, CUNY in the 1990s became an arena for a host of democratic imperatives: providing affordable access, serving the needs of increasingly diverse populations, extending opportunity for mobility, cultivating civic values, and rewarding merit. This way had been paved in 1990 when budgets for CUNY were especially tight. Student activists and faculty members charged that this was a sign “that the state is uninterested in a university system that has come to be dominated by needy Caribbean, Hispanic, and black students” (Almanac 1991, 195). In March 1992, about fifty students, faculty, and staff members filed a class-action lawsuit against Governor Cuomo and the state, accusing New York of “giving SUNY financial preferences

because it is ‘predominantly white’” (Almanac 1993). A state court found in favor of the state, ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to point to any specific discriminatory acts (Almanac 1996).

In 1993, a committee appointed by CUNY Chancellor W. Ann Reynolds issued a report calling for CUNY to act more like a unified system of higher education: It included recommendations that the colleges reorganize or consolidate some academic programs (Almanac 1994). Reynolds had been hired in 1990 from California State University, where she was well known for improving academic preparation for college. She brought with her a program called the College Preparatory Initiative (CPI). Beginning in 1993, students would need to have eleven academic credits on their high school transcript to be admitted to a senior college (nine for a community college). By 2001, students would need sixteen academic credits, the same as before open admissions began in 1970. This included three years of sequential math, two years of lab science, four years of English and social science, two years of foreign language, and one year of fine arts. The CPI was not mandatory, however. Students who failed to have the required academic courses could be admitted, but they had to demonstrate competence in the missing areas or take courses in those areas once they arrived. The Board of Trustees was entirely aware of its voluntary nature: it prefaced its motion on CPI with the reminder that CUNY remained committed to providing a place for every high school graduate (Traub 1994). The purpose of the program was to work collaboratively with high schools to increase academic preparation, and it seemed to work as a signal despite having no actual consequences. At California State University, the program had increased math and science enrollment at secondary schools by 20% over five years. But as Traub points out, CUNY students are far more diverse in economic circumstances and academic preparation than students at Cal State—CSU only accepts the top

third of all high school students, and many of its campuses are located in wealthier suburban areas.

The CUNY administration used CPI to signal its commitment to higher academic standards to various actors in the policy environment. Since it was not feasible for political and educational reasons to increase standards in actuality, as that would reduce student access and opportunity, CUNY needed a means to signal its commitment to standards without actually increasing them. As a signal, CPI was moderately successful in the short term, despite having no real consequences for students. The *New York Times* called the plan “a broad plan to tighten educational requirements over the next decade” (McFadden 1992, A1). The CPI, according to McFadden, demanded “tough new curriculum standards that would place a heavy onus on the city’s public high schools and their students, who make up a bulk of the student body.”

CUNY Chancellor W. Ann Reynolds had yet another program in mind when she was appointed, a plan to restructure CUNY's academic programs to improve efficiency and reduce duplication. Once she arrived, this became a high priority, in order to respond to CUNY's latest fiscal crisis. Reynolds established a committee chaired by Leon Goldstein, the president of Kingsborough Community College, with the charge to investigate possible academic restructuring efforts. The committee returned with a 160-page report urging the elimination of programs throughout the system, euphemistically called Academic Program Planning. The faculty immediately saw the report as a bureaucratic infringement upon their traditional rights to evaluate and maintain academic programs, and reacted angrily. The president of the faculty union said, "If the purpose is to give more authority to the Chancellor, then it won't work. That would amount to an academic dictator, an academic Fuhrer. I don't believe the Chancellor would want such a designation" (Newman 1992a, A1). The argument was also put forth that a college

without basic liberal arts programs is not a college at all. One history professor at Brooklyn College responded, "If French is removed from Brooklyn College, it is no longer a viable and full-fledged four-year college" (Newman 1992b, B1).

The faculty was unified in its opposition to this APP initiative. "It's been an amazing sort of thing, because it's a proposal that has unified faculties in a way that I haven't seen in a long time. The traditional left-right divisions or whatever just don't exist on this. There is a very intense sense of outrage about this," said Hunter College's faculty senate chair (Newman 1993). Faculty opposition turned out to be very effective, and Reynolds dropped the plan within six months (Weiss 1993a). The attempt was not entirely a failure, however. Forty-five programs were voluntarily eliminated by the campuses, and the CUNY Board voted to institute academic program reviews throughout the system and to give the chancellor more authority in evaluating their results (McFadden 1992). Despite the apparent retreat, the Reynolds proposal continued to be attacked by faculty and even local writers and actors, including Tony Kushner, Ruby Dee, Toni Morrison, and Susan Sontag, all of whom wrote editorials blasting the APP (McFadden 1992). Reynolds, however, later used her power of the purse to distribute an extra \$15 million to colleges that backed the new proposal and scaled back their academic programs (Weiss 1993b).

Here we see a clear example of how, when this approach is instigated—cutting out or back programs to improve efficiency or avoid duplication—resistance is generally widespread. Such a move is not just an affront to faculty governance. In their concern for protecting and extending access, faculty at CUNY saw that eliminating programs for the purpose of eliminating duplication within a statewide system would result in differential consequences for different segments of student populations.



Access was most directly challenged in the New York system when New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani called for an end to open admissions at CUNY—apparently in the name of academic standards. Throughout 1997, Giuliani had repeatedly called CUNY’s educational record “pathetic,” backed up by Governor George Pataki, who called its record “dismal.” Although Giuliani and Pataki lacked authority to move on the issue themselves, they used their powers of appointment to bend the CUNY board to their will, as the governor appoints ten of its members and the mayor appoints five. Mayor Giuliani pushed hard to end remediation entirely throughout CUNY, including at the community colleges. After much discussion and compromise, the CUNY board eventually approved a plan in June 1998 to eliminate remedial education at the four-year colleges and to establish transition programs for students to meet the new standard (Healy 1998a). The New York State Regents demanded to review the policy, which they approved in November 1999 with a number of compromises negotiated by members of Friends of CUNY, who had previously opposed any change in remedial policy (Arenson 1999) and after a favorable review by an outside panel (Zemsky et al. 1999).

In this process, the question of English proficiency was central. In May 1997, the CUNY Board of Trustees adopted a policy requiring community college students to pass an English-proficiency test to graduate (Almanac 1997). In July, a state court judge ruled that the board had moved too hastily, and ordered CUNY to award degrees to 125 students who had failed the test. In January 1998, the president of Hostos Community College resigned amid charges that Hostos students lacked adequate proficiency in English.

Mayor Giuliani subsequently established a Task Force to investigate CUNY from top to bottom. The centerpiece of the Task Force’s work was the Schmidt report, produced by the Mayor’s Advisory Task Force on the City University of New York and chaired by Benno C.

Schmidt, the former president of Yale University and president of the Edison Group, a corporation providing private solutions to public school problems. Other members of the committee included Heather MacDonald, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute who previously had called for an end to open admissions and the termination of all remedial programs in the CUNY system. It also included then-Board chairman Herman Badillo, an architect of the new policy on remedial education. The report was primarily written by Roger Benjamin of RAND, the executive director of the Mayor's Task Force and former primary author of a report calling for more accountability in higher education. This was a committee with an express mandate from the Mayor, and the report reflected his political agenda more than other RAND reports for the Mayor's Task Force, which have often been a vital source of data (e.g., Renfro and Armour-Garb 1999).

The Schmidt report claims to be “shocked by both the scale and depth of CUNY students’ remediation needs” (21), and by CUNY’s being “inundated by NYCPS graduates who lack basic academic skills” (5). The proposed solution was a more differentiated system in the name of “standards.” They advocated stratification by institution, by creating three tiers of senior colleges stratified by average SAT score; and stratification within institutions, by mandating that remedial students not be admitted to associate’s degree programs in community colleges. Thus the report recommended a five-tiered system of public higher education in New York, far more stratified than any other state system in the US. The basic mandate in the Schmidt report read: “CUNY must strive to become a unified, coherent, integrated public university system, for the first time in its history. CUNY must rethink its architecture as a university, to focus the academic mission of its various campuses, to offer a range of higher education appropriate to the needs of

New York, to encourage excellence and efficiency, to reduce redundancy, and to make the whole greater than the sum of its parts" (Schmidt et al. 1999, 102).

Addressing remediation specifically, the Schmidt report advocated allowing "at least some" (35) of the CUNY community colleges to offer remedial education, but only under certain conditions. The primary condition was that "CUNY must recognize remediation for what it is: an unfortunate necessity, thrust upon CUNY by the failure of the schools, and a distraction from the main business of the University" (35). Further, the report argued that CUNY must recognize that "some students' basic skill deficits are so deep that it is highly unlikely they will be successful in reaching levels of preparation necessary for college study" (40). "It is far better that such students get the skills need [sic] for vocational training, for general literary [sic], or for English fluency, without wasting their time and money in remediation programs that aim to teach quadratic equations or how to write at college levels of sophistication, when such outcomes are extremely unlikely" (40). Glaring errors aside, it is impossible not to scrutinize these remarks for their implicit class and race biases. The stance articulated in the report reveals how conservative political interests wrote off as unaffordable—or worse, wasteful—investment in at-risk (or non-native English speaking) students as potentially vital contributors to society.

Some effects of CUNY's new policy were immediately evident. Increasing standards for transfer students forced CUNY to reject 2,000 applications for intra-CUNY transfers from community to senior colleges (Renfro and Armour-Garb 1999). Spring 2000 was the first semester when students were barred from admission to senior colleges for failing the FSAT remedial skills assessments in reading, writing, and mathematics. Approximately 600 students in Spring 2000, or about 10% of the incoming class, failed the FSAT on their first try (Arenson 2000). An additional 350 students cleared the hurdle after participating in Prelude to Success,

CUNY's intensive workshop to prepare students to pass the FSATs. A remaining 300 students did not pass, however, and remained barred from enrolling in the senior college that had admitted them. These data may indicate that the remedial policy impacted more students than was estimated by the special panel hired by the Board of Regents to evaluate the policy (Zemsky et al. 1999), but far fewer than was estimated by Lavin and Weininger (1999a and 1999b).

In the CUNY Master Plan for 2000–2004, the Goldstein administration made evident that it embraced the (tiered) flagship idea. The plan articulated a vision that entailed “creating a flagship environment within highly selective colleges and a university-wide honors college.” In other words, the intention was to create nationally prominent flagship programs and eventually “a small number of highly selective colleges” rather than a single flagship campus. One strategy would be cluster hiring, where new full-time faculty would be hired in selected programmatic areas throughout the system. The flagship strategy was ostensibly part of “a comprehensive strategy of institutional renewal” for CUNY, tied with the goals of “high standards” and “accountability.” Whether this set of initiatives could bring about these goals as well as the elusive goal of a more integrated system was unclear. It is important to note, though, that the flagship idea was central to the new CUNY administration's strategy to improve its relationship with the city and the state by responding to the Schmidt report recommendations.

This confluence of powerful economic and political pressures undeniably reconfigured the local expectations for CUNY, via demands for improved quality, efficiency, and productivity. As in other states, vocational programs were also aligned to meet the changing needs of local industry. Of course, some may view this to be a great improvement, tying college offerings more closely to the world of work. After all, they say, isn't a college degree the ticket to social and economic mobility? Shouldn't employability be a primary outcome of a college education,

particularly since the cost is so high? Without the ability to secure steady and lucrative employment after graduation, how can students repay what they must borrow to attain their degrees? Yet others defend the innate value of a liberal arts education and its ability to produce well-rounded, well-educated individuals, citing those attributes as the “skills” necessary for success in work and in life. Limiting schooling at any level to job training, or tracking students into vocational or academic paths, risks undermining the educational process itself. The distinctive legacy of service by CUNY was to provide education that had both economic and social value to its students. Changes in the 1990s threatened to further stratify the system, designating community colleges to be the sites for remedial courses, tracking those students on a clear vocational path, and selecting others to have access to campuses with abundant resources.

The ideology of excellence held by New York neo-conservatives fueled a process of externally imposing priorities and policy changes on CUNY, significantly altering its admissions practices and academic program offerings. One result of this process was to further alienate faculty, who already suffered from low morale due to the barrage of unwelcome external demands, the scrutiny, and the charges by legislators that faculty did not teach enough. Unlike in other states, where faculty workload was the subject of scrutiny—and performance metrics were imposed—in New York the faculty (especially at CCNY) became scapegoats, taking the heat for the system’s inefficiencies, and their liberal or radical politics were seen as a major obstacle to this agenda of excellence. The faculty for the most part saw this agenda as displacing the populist legacy of welcoming and socializing immigrants.

The case study interviews back this up consistently, portraying the external agenda as “intrusive,” as administrators and faculty alike talked in extreme terms of being “under siege,” “assaulted by a hit squad that reflected the Mayor’s choices” especially as perceived by those at

CCNY. They saw an alignment between the mayor, the CUNY Chancellor, and the Board as “gunning for the university.” At BMCC senior academic leaders saw it similarly but expressed that they attempted to work together, doing what was asked but not to the point of “compromising our integrity.” The faculty at all three sites—BMCC, CCNY, and SUNY Stony Brook—at varying times perceived faculty control as having been displaced. As one put it: “The trustees own the curriculum and are not taking into consideration the types of students we are trying to educate,” including many who come with major needs for basic skills, a clear failure of the K–12 system. Administrators and faculty were in a difficult position, having to “accurately reflect what our students are doing. People are going to have to accept what is realistic.”

Across the country, members of the academy have feared that academic restructuring creates greater stratification across campuses within a system—which are as widespread as the boundaries of whichever state—that it ultimately deprives place-bound students of broad access to fields of knowledge, while other students have access to more and better academic programs. In fact it is highly likely that differential access to academic programs is not distributed equally throughout populations; quite the opposite. Academic stratification is most likely tightly linked to student characteristics such as race, class, and gender; as for example in the restructuring that moved students requiring remediation in the form of further English skills from their four-year universities to community colleges—both in California and New York (see above).

Technological advances may be one partial antidote for these stratifications. However, such restructuring severely limits the space for creative thinking in policy. For example, anyone educated is not likely to imagine that a university with no courses in French or Italian is offering its students broad and varied possibilities for exploring the history, culture, and art of western civilization. Although systemwide “academic planning” warrants greater deliberation, related

initiatives may well remain stalled in a distributive struggle where entrenched interests and entitlements are played out.

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