



Introduction

We are often asked about the bourgeois counterrevolution in the USSR, but until now, there has been no separate article in our group dedicated to this issue. We have only discussed the coup in the context of other topics. At the same time, there is no comprehensive scientific study of the counterrevolution in Marxist literature, whereas revisionists of all kinds — from the Trotskyist "RWP" party to the Kautskian sect "Politsturm" — fear the facts of the March 1953 bourgeois counterrevolution as if they were fire. These facts have not yet been systematized into a coherent scientific picture. The reaction of the so-called "leftists" after the publication of this article is predictable. However, this article is not intended for the left but for those truly capable of scientific, Marxist understanding of reality.

When studying the history of the USSR (or any human history) using Marx's dialectical method, it is necessary to describe materialist dialectics with 1) mathematical precision and 2) logical rigor. "Constructing in the manner of Hegelianism" in this case (in methodology) can lead to nothing but an idealist understanding of history — an understanding shared by all neo-Hegelians, whether explicit (Foundation of the Workers' Academy, M. Popov, I. Yarsky & Co.) or implicit (A. Rudoy, R. Fatkullin, V. Sarmatov, P. Ponaiotov & Co.).

Until recently, Marxist researchers did not maintain precision in studying the bourgeois counterrevolution in the USSR due to historical and theoretical limitations — primarily because of a historically conditioned lack of documentary information.

The necessity of such a study is also dictated by the need to warn communists about possible mistakes in the stage of building a proletarian state, mistakes that could have fatal consequences for the future practice of organizing communism.

We will attempt to reveal the facts of the March coup using Marx's dialectical method, along with historiographical and documentary evidence.

1. Theoretical Aspect.

One of Marx's greatest discoveries is the necessity of a prolonged transitional period from capitalism to communism [1], in which the former turns into the latter and which corresponds to a politically transitional period whose state can be nothing other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat [2]. The first step of this transitional period, or this revolution, is the transformation of the proletariat into the ruling class, the conquest of democracy [3]. From this follows another discovery of Marx related to it — the proletariat cannot seize the ready-made, bourgeois state machine and put it to use for its own purposes [4]. It must break it and replace it with a new, proletarian state machine (which Marx and Engels also called the Commune). If the bourgeois state machine (or the bourgeois system of management) is the bureaucratic apparatus of state governance, then the proletarian state machine (the proletarian semi-state) is the universal, consecutive management of their state by all the workers (proletarian democracy) [5]. That is, there are two types of state that are opposites of each other, each serving opposite purposes. However, Marx did not specify exact time frames in which the proletariat, having taken power, would replace one state machine with another. Lenin did this, and his discovery is precisely an additional transitional period from the bourgeois state to the proletarian state, in which the proletariat builds a new system of management, since it cannot, due to objective reasons, immediately introduce it, immediately transition to universal management of the state. It is for this reason that during this period society is governed not by the entire proletariat, but only by its advanced, Marxist-literate part—the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat, united in the communist party [6][7]. From this follow the following dialectically connected Leninist conclusions:

Firstly, during the transitional period from capitalism to proletarian socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat is carried out by the vanguard of the proletariat (the advanced, Marxist-literate part of the proletariat), and not by the proletariat as a whole. The goal of this vanguard is to make the entire proletariat equally advanced and to involve them in the direct management of their state.

Secondly, during the transitional period from capitalism to proletarian socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat has bureaucratic distortions, which consist in the existence of a bureaucratic management system inherited from the old state, which is controlled "from above" by the vanguard of the proletariat, and "from below" by all proletarians through their mass organizations, and is gradually broken down, being replaced by a proletarian-democratic management system.

Thirdly, during the transitional period from capitalism to proletarian socialism, the proletariat must be able to defend not only its state but also itself from its state. The means of this defense are precisely these control organizations "from below" [8].

Those who did not understand these scientific truths (anti-Marxists), revealed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, always talk about "bureaucratization," "bourgeoisification" of one or another part of Soviet society, primarily of the state and party apparatuses, pointing out the gradual nature of this process. Such an idealistic picture of the world is naturally close to all revisionists. In reality, however, the bureaucratic apparatus (the bourgeois system of management) is not some "gradual process" or such nonsense, but a given fact inherited by the proletariat from the old society.

Based on the thesis of "bureaucratization" by anti-Marxists, the central problem during the period of building socialism and in socialism is considered to be the problem of bureaucracy. In science (in Marxism) there is a different picture: at the center of attention throughout the entire period from capitalism to communism is the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And only in the context of this struggle can the bureaucratic apparatus be considered. We have already expounded this extremely important position, but we will repeat:

"Marxism teaches a class approach to the subjects and phenomena of class society. It is precisely for this reason that at the center of attention throughout the transitional period from capitalism to communism is the confrontation between the overthrown bourgeoisie and the ruling proletariat. Therefore, the bureaucratic apparatus and the system of management can only be considered within the framework of this class struggle."

Not the bureaucratic apparatus can destroy the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the bourgeoisie, fighting for power, and which can only use this apparatus for the conquest of this power and the restoration of capitalism [9].

Class struggle, after the bourgeoisie is deprived of power and after the proletariat seizes power, intensifies by tens, or even by hundreds of times. This is due to the fact that, firstly, the bourgeoisie is deprived of the instrument to protect its property; secondly, the proletariat, having seized power in one country, is confronted not only by the national bourgeoisie but by the entire international bourgeoisie (of which every national bourgeoisie is a branch); and thirdly, the proletariat, by means of its dictatorship, ruthlessly suppresses the bourgeoisie and its resistance. Therefore, at the very beginning after the proletariat seizes power, class struggle can reach its highest phase, its utmost intensification, taking the form of a civil war. The victory of the proletariat in this war forces the bourgeoisie to resort to new methods of struggle — to bribing the proletariat, to organizing conspiracies, to the murder of leading workers, to espionage in favor of bourgeois intelligence, to sabotage in production, to uprisings, etc.

With the help of its dictatorship, the proletariat carries out the gradual expropriation of the bourgeoisie and thereby destroys bourgeois property. Can one, based on this, say that classes no longer exist, that class struggle has ceased? In no way. The expropriation of bourgeois property does not in any way mean that all people have thereby been deprived of bourgeois interests and have outgrown bourgeois behavior. Thus, the struggle continues between members of society, some of whom have not yet freed themselves from bourgeois remnants and are trying to do everything possible for the realization of their bourgeois interests, and those who want to overcome these remnants and these interests, standing entirely on the positions of the proletariat. That is, there remains a part of the population that has bourgeois thinking and, accordingly, bourgeois behavior. This part not only remains but is also reproduced, even in the absence of bourgeois property. The class organization of this part of the population is preserved beyond the borders of the proletarian country. The capitalist environment naturally influences (carries out the necessary agitation for itself, implanting its own agents, etc.) the population of the proletarian country, thereby reproducing bourgeois elements there. These elements are bourgeois counterrevolutionaries.

After its capital has been seized, the bourgeoisie seeps into the state apparatus, still bourgeois, where it feels like fish in water, and where it finds an excellent opportunity to realize its private interests (for all property is in the hands of the state). On the other hand, in the absence of proper Marxist education among the managers, in the state apparatus arranged in a bourgeois-bureaucratic manner, many elements with bourgeois thinking and behavior appear, and with the preservation of monetary commodity exchange, this is also expressed in corruption.

Bourgeois elements within the state apparatus assemble counterrevolutionary factions and groups for the purpose of usurping state power and taking state property into their own hands.

Let us consider all this, using the history of the Soviet Union as an example.

2. Material-Class Premises of Counterrevolution in the USSR

The Problem of Building the Proletarian State in the USSR

After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks had to establish complete control over the entire state apparatus arranged in a bourgeois-bureaucratic manner (that is, in such a way that this apparatus is managed from top to bottom) — the Bolsheviks managed this apparatus by placing “from above” their people on the most responsible posts, nominating their representatives into the representative bodies of the workers (Soviets).

This was officially affirmed at the VIII Party Congress in March 1919:

“Soviets are state organizations of the working class and the poorest peasantry, carrying out the dictatorship of the proletariat for as long as any state exists. Soviets unite in their ranks tens of millions of workers and should strive to unite in their ranks the entire working class and all the poorest and middle peasantry.

The Communist Party is an organization that unites in its ranks only the vanguard of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry — that part of these classes that consciously strives to implement the communist program. The Communist Party sets itself the task of winning decisive influence and complete leadership in all organizations of the workers: in trade unions, cooperatives, rural communes, etc. The Communist Party especially seeks to carry out its program and its complete domination in the modern state organizations, which are the Soviets.

In all Soviet organizations it is absolutely necessary to form party factions, strictly subordinated to party discipline. In these factions all members of the RCP working in the given Soviet organization must be included. Through practical, everyday, selfless work in the Soviets, by nominating its most steadfast and devoted members for all Soviet posts, the RCP must win for itself undivided political domination in the Soviets and effective control over all their work” [\[10\]](#).

The Bolsheviks, naturally, understood that this measure (the leading role of the party) was forced — until the bourgeois system of management is broken down and replaced by the proletarian one. That is, until all workers raise their level of literacy to that of their vanguard and begin to manage their state themselves and universally — by themselves, independently

nominating all workers in succession into their organs and dismissing them from any positions at any time (this is a system of management built from the bottom up, or proletarian democracy). V.I. Lenin especially emphasized that for the construction of socialism it is necessary "to unite the most active, dynamic, conscious part of the oppressed classes, their vanguard, which must educate all the working population to independent participation in the management of the state not theoretically, but practically" [10a].

It is precisely because the Communist Party was in power that from the very beginning of Soviet power bourgeois elements, eager to satisfy personal (=bourgeois) interests by means of state authority, began to infiltrate it. Therefore, the class struggle within the Bolshevik Party was the most acute [10b]. This struggle intensified even more as bourgeois property was expropriated — for the bourgeois went into the party for their career, in order to be close to the means of production (which was ensured, among other things, by the managerial and organizational skills of the bourgeoisie). Therefore, regular purges of bourgeois counterrevolutionaries were carried out in the party.

By the mid-1930s in the USSR, the bourgeoisie had been completely expropriated — both in the city and in the countryside. Accordingly, the majority of the AUCP(b), i.e. the vanguard part of the Soviet proletariat, led by Stalin, wanted to proletarianize the existing management system. Therefore, in 1936–1937 a new electoral system was introduced (by means of the adoption of the Stalin Constitution by the All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1936 and by the resolution of the USSR Central Executive Committee on elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1937). This system assumed that the workers would independently nominate their representatives in the Soviets at all levels (previously the system was multi-tiered), i.e. form them through free, equal, and direct elections (before 1936, elections were restricted, secret, and indirect). In the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, two or more candidates could be nominated [see the Appendix at the end].

It is important to keep in mind that in the entire state apparatus, key posts and the majority of deputy mandates were occupied by appointees of the Communist Party — the two apparatuses, the state and the party, were fused from top to bottom. But (!) only for the bourgeoisie (counterrevolutionaries), which constituted a smaller part of the party, was the introduction of a non-bourgeois management system class-wise (i.e. politically) disadvantageous. That is, not an abstract "nomenclature" (under which, according to some pseudo-historians, such as *the* Y.N. Zhukov, the whole party is meant and Stalin is contrasted with that party), but rather the bourgeois part of the party did not want the proletarianization of the management system. This point is of fundamental importance. The new electoral system of 1936–1937 was a major step on the path to breaking the bourgeois management system, for now the workers directly formed the Soviets at all levels. But it did not yet assume and could not assume a very important point in the matter of breaking the bourgeois management system — the demarcation of the Soviet and the party apparatuses. For the first time, it was precisely in the 1936 Constitution that the leading role of the party in the state apparatus was formalized.

The economic reason that they then could not demarcate these two apparatuses is that the productive forces of the USSR were not developed to such an extent as to implement a non-capitalist (i.e. proletarian) system of management (in which the workers themselves permanently form the Soviets). Proletarian state capitalism (which existed in the USSR and which is mentioned in the last chapter of the work) naturally corresponds to a capitalist system of management. To introduce a proletarian system of management, it is necessary first to go through the entire stage of the development of state capitalism and to introduce moneyless commodity exchange — the material basis of the new state machine: “society, even if it has set out in pursuit of the natural law of its development, cannot either skip over the natural phases of development or abolish the latter by decrees” [10c]. However, the necessity of demarcating the two apparatuses was not entirely clear even to the builders of socialism themselves — an insufficiently developed proletariat (and in general an insufficiently developed base) corresponds to an insufficiently developed worldview.

The fusion of the two apparatuses — the state and the organization of the advanced proletariat, the party — directly follows from the existence of proletarian state capitalism and its corresponding capitalist system of management. On its own, this fusion does not say anything and is not an obstacle on the path to the construction of socialism. By developing and changing the mode of production, the proletariat thereby builds its own, proletarian state. This is evident from the history of the USSR: as the productive forces developed, a gradual separation of the party from the state apparatus was carried out by the workers. This situation was most successfully formulated in Marxist theory and practice by A.B. Razlatsky:

*«The Party must be self-acting, that is, also voluntary, attracting people solely by virtue of their collectivist, public interests, and not promising any personal gains, and bound by conscious discipline and personal enthusiasm. The Party must be proletarian, for only the special attitude of the proletariat toward the aggregate product produced by society makes it possible to ensure the distribution of goods and labor in the interests of the whole society. And it must be a Party – for only a Party can ensure subordination to a unified policy, to a unified worldview, control over all links of the state mechanism; only a Party is capable of organizing and directing the actions of the masses toward the correction and alteration of this mechanism. But that is not all. Such a Party, a most powerful organization enjoying the support of the proletarian masses, will necessarily have the opportunity to take upon itself the full extent of power, all management of society. **That is what it must not do! The Party must remain in opposition to the state; it must act on the state only through the proletarian masses. In other words, every Party decision must be evaluated by the support of the entire class, by its readiness for class actions. The Party, serving the interests of the proletariat, must not link its activities with those of the state; it must remain in constant opposition to the state»** [10d].*

Alexey Borisovich writes: **«This is something the party should not do!»** and makes a mistake. The conditions of material production make it necessary for the party to take full power into its own hands.. The party steps back from the state only when the economic, moral, and intellectual level of development of the proletariat makes it necessary. Accordingly, at this

necessary level, workers begin to manage their own state without the help of the party, without the mediation of the party, which is proletarian socialism. However, **in 1936–1937, such conditions did not exist.**

As early as 1934, I.V. Stalin noted the need for the «**decentralization of people's commissariats, main administrations, and trusts, and the approximation of economic management to the enterprise.**» Accordingly, from that time on, and especially from 1939, **the decentralization of people's commissariats began.** Already in January 1939, the number of industrial people's commissariats increased from 6 to 22. Such a measure **curtailed the power** of individual people's commissariats (i.e., officials) and was a step forward in **dismantling the bourgeois state apparatus.** A minor measure also included the expansion of the composition of Deputy Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars (CPC) in 1940–1941.

At the XVIII Party Congress in March 1939, a new Charter was adopted, according to which the productive and territorial departments in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) were abolished, *with the exception of the Agricultural Department, due to the particular importance of the task of controlling and overseeing the activities of Soviet and party organizations in the field of agriculture, and the Schools Department, which was to oversee the organization of public education in all republics.* In addition to these departments, the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) retained the Organizational and Instruction Department, the Personnel Management Department, and the Propaganda and Agitation Department. **Thus, the control of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party(Bolsheviks) bodies was eliminated.** [11]

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War halted the development of Soviet production and the corresponding expansion of the capitalist management system. Until the end of the war, no reforms in this direction were carried out, except for the process of ministerial decentralization, which continued **from 1943.** Moreover, during the war, an extraconstitutional body was created (naturally, in a **legal** manner — the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet made this decision on June 30, 1941) — the State Defense Committee, which had extraordinary powers. All democratic procedures in both Soviet and party bodies were suspended.

In March 1946, at the organizational plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), all production-sector departments in the Central Committee apparatus were **finally** abolished, leaving only purely party structures.

And already at the XIX Party Congress in October 1952, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) lost the right to influence the decisions of the Government of the USSR. According to the Charter adopted at the congress, the Politburo and the Orgburo were abolished within the Central Committee and replaced by the Presidium. Whereas the Politburo was formed by the Central Committee for **political (i.e., state and managerial) work**—specifically for overseeing the Government—and the Orgburo for organizational matters, the Presidium was created purely **to manage the work of the Central Committee between**

plenums. [13] At the same time, the Presidium became broader in composition than the Politburo. While the Politburo had 9 members, the Presidium expanded to 25.

Thus, as a result of a series of reforms from 1936 to 1952:

1) **The state apparatus was significantly democratized** by reducing the authority of ministries and shifting the center of power from the Council of Ministers to the Supreme Soviet.

2) **The Communist Party was somewhat distanced from Soviet economic administration**

To fully understand the essence of the issue—that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat in its initial period, when it was mixed with the bourgeois system of governance—it is necessary to consider **which organs** in the USSR represented the dictatorship of the proletariat and which embodied the bourgeois system of administration. The organs of the proletarian dictatorship were the Soviets at all levels, primarily the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The organs of the bourgeois system of governance in the USSR included all institutions of the executive apparatus, along with its bureaucracy and army. Lenin correctly emphasized in «State and Revolution» that these two institutions—bureaucracy and a standing army—are the most characteristic features of the bourgeois system of governance. However, under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, "thousands of threads tie these institutions directly to the bourgeoisie," whereas under the dictatorship of the proletariat, these institutions—though part of the bourgeois system of administration—were entirely subordinate to the proletariat, in the case of the USSR, to the Supreme Soviet. The latter, in a joint session of both its chambers, formed its executive committee—the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet—and the Government of the USSR, the Council of Ministers. It was **through the Supreme Soviet** that the vanguard of the proletariat, united within the Communist Party, controlled the capitalist system of administration and gradually dismantled it.

Stages of Class Struggle in the USSR

First and foremost, it is essential to understand that class struggle within Soviet society was most vividly reflected in its leading force—the Communist Party. Since Russia at that time was a petty-bourgeois country, this inevitably influenced the proletariat as a whole and the Bolshevik Party in particular. Even before the October Revolution, and especially after it, the ranks of the Bolshevik Party were joined by revolutionary-minded petty bourgeoisie. As a result, the party periodically experienced significant disagreements on various issues and conducted purges. It is also important to note that all the leading figures of the bourgeois counterrevolutionary opposition of the 1930s had held petty-bourgeois positions during the October Revolution and throughout the reconstruction period. With the onset of the proletarian offensive and reconstruction, these petty-bourgeois elements ultimately shifted into the camp of the

counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie. All of this is thoroughly detailed in the remarkable book by M. Gaisinsky, [«The Struggle Against Deviations from the Party's General Line»](#) (1931, republished in 2018).

In the article ["On the Social Revolution of the Proletariat,"](#) we analyzed the class roots of Trotskyism during the period of the transformation of the bourgeois revolution into a proletarian one:

"...The February Revolution did not complete the bourgeois revolution, which is why a significant number of tasks of bourgeois-democratic transformation remained in Russia, necessary for the transition from a bourgeois revolution to a socialist one. The bourgeoisie, due to its weakness and its prior integration into the state apparatus even under the tsar, was opposed to the very transformations it was supposed to carry out. Certain petty-bourgeois groups were interested in completing the bourgeois revolution. It was they who represented the bourgeois revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks (proletarian revolutionaries), due to the circumstances, were forced to unite with the bourgeois revolutionaries, who had influence over the working masses and were interested in bringing the bourgeois-democratic revolution to its conclusion.

This is why, at the VI Congress, the Mezhraiontsy (along with L.D. Trotsky) were admitted into the party. Up until July-August 1917, they maintained a centrist position of reconciling the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, essentially expressing their petty-bourgeois nature as constantly vacillating, unstable elements. At this moment, these bourgeois revolutionaries suddenly leaned toward the Bolsheviks—and the Bolsheviks understood that an alliance with them was tactically advantageous (the Mezhraiontsy had significant influence over the workers of Petrograd) and temporary.

The diversity of petty-bourgeois production types is reflected in the variegated ideology of the petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie, due to its objective position, cannot develop its own scientific theory, so it borrows individual tenets from both bourgeois ideology and proletarian science (Marxism). The theoretical victory of Marxism, the correctness and precision of its tenets, forces the enemies of Marxism from the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois camps to dress themselves in the garb of Marxism, to use Marxist phraseology and terminology—thus giving rise to opportunism of various kinds. It is not something accidental but rather a network of agents of the bourgeois world within the communist movement..."

The petty-bourgeois faction of the party, up to 1927–1928 and for some time afterward, openly expressed its views and, by and large, conducted its activities legally. At the same time, the reconstruction period began, marked by the advance of the proletarian revolution on all fronts—both in industry and agriculture. It was precisely this advance that pushed petty-bourgeois groups **into the camp of counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie.**

At the end of 1927, Trotskyists and Zinovievists were expelled from the Bolshevik Party. At that moment, they changed their methods of struggle and turned to a policy of **duplicity and disguise**.

"To return to the party by deceitful means and carry out subversive, corrupting work from within, waiting for a favorable moment to openly act. Perhaps difficulties will help! The kulak, the saboteur, the White Guard, or perhaps an external war—these were their trump cards. It was precisely in anticipation of these trump cards that the core of the Zinoviev opposition (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Evdokimov, Bakaev, Kuklin, and others) and a significant portion of the Trotskyists (I.N. Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Ter-Vaganyan, and many others) took the path of duplicity... To acknowledge their mistakes on paper, to acknowledge the correctness of the party on paper, to secure their return to its ranks, and, under the cover of a party card, to undermine the party from within" [14] (the highlighted part quite accurately characterizes one of the components of Trotskyism).

Until 1933, the Trotskyists and Zinovievists had the **kulak class** as their social base and essentially acted as conscious (vanguard) promoters of their ideas and goals—**overthrowing Soviet power and restoring capitalism**, even though they formally broke with their previous views. During this period, the focus was on the failure and difficulties of collectivization, on resistance, and organizing kulak uprisings, as well as on sabotage. However, this strategy failed. In 1933–1934, the Trotskyist-Zinovievist counterrevolutionary opposition **lost its social base**. The kulaks were eliminated as a class, and collective farms encompassed the overwhelming majority of the peasantry. From that moment on, the opposition resorted to **individual terror** against prominent communists (among the most notable party figures killed by Trotskyists were V.R. Menzhinsky, A.M. Gorky, S.M. Kirov, and others).

The Trotskyists and Zinovievists made up only a part of the petty-bourgeois opposition. Another faction—the Bukharin group—**maintained legal opportunities until 1930**. The Bukharinites' positions remained strong until the late 1920s, and the communists had to take them into account. The Bukharin group held almost complete monopoly over the entire "ideological" and agitational-propaganda apparatus of the party. Central press organs such as Pravda, Bolshevik, Leningradskaya Pravda, and Komsomolskaya Pravda, as well as the country's higher educational institutions like the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy named after Y.M. Sverdlov, the Moscow Industrial Academy, and the Academy of Communist Education, were led by Bukharin's protégés (such as A.N. Slepkov, E.V. Zeitlin, D.P. Maresky, E.I. Goldenberg, A.I. Stetsky, A.Yu. Eichenwald, D.A. Rozit, and others). In other words, the

Bukharinites cultivated their own cadres, most of whom continued to work in newspapers and educational institutions in a two-faced (or “opportunistic”) manner and reproduced similar two-faced individuals, who later became ideologues of capitalist restoration (like E.V. Ilyenkov, K.V. Ostrovityanov, A.A. Zinoviev, V.P. Kokhanovsky, M.L. Altaisky, V.G. Georgiev, and others).

In 1927–1928, the Bukharin group, advocating for the bourgeois path of agricultural development, emerged **as the right deviation** (or rather, it was revealed as the right deviation) within the Bolshevik Party. This deviation was criticized and reprimanded by the communists, the majority of the party, and its Central Committee. During the so-called “legal struggle” of the Bukharinites (the rightists) **from 1928 to 1930**, an **illegal right-wing center** was formed, consisting of three members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)—Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky. In addition to the center, similar groups emerged throughout the USSR during this time.

Until 1930, there was a kind of construction of this **illegal organization, including and primarily using legal and open opportunities for recruiting supporters.**

Later, the Bukharinites double-dealingly declared their renunciation of the right-wing platform in connection with the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which decided that Bukharinite views were incompatible with party membership. Therefore, they completely transitioned to illegality (which also meant their complete shift to duplicity). As a result, **from 1930 to 1933**, the Bukharinites began to use different methods of struggle—the most criminal methods of work and objectives.

According to the testimony of one of the leaders of the Bukharin opposition, A.I. Rykov, at the trial:

"The platform acknowledged (as far as I remember, and I do remember because I participated in its editing) **violent methods of changing the leadership of the party and the country—terror, uprisings.** It provided such a broad formulation that it essentially served as a directive for the use of violent measures in whatever forms might be available to us. The second formulation was **the unification** of those forces, those organizations, that were fighting against the party and the government of the USSR. These two theses were the fundamental and defining elements of the Ryutin platform and, at the same time, for the entire subsequent period.

How was this program implemented? This period was characterized by intense class struggle in the countryside and significant resistance from the kulaks, the peasant bourgeoisie, against the government and the party. This imparted a specific tone to the period. Our counter-revolutionary work during this time sought to rely, and to some extent did rely, **on those counter-revolutionary forces that were becoming active at the time.**

I am referring to **kulak uprisings, kulak rebellions, and kulak sabotage**, which were quite widespread at the time. Here, we employed all forms of utilizing anti-Soviet, bourgeois forces in the countryside to fight against the party and the government: from exploiting already brewing uprisings to the deliberate organization of kulak rebellions" [15, pp. 151-152].

In 1933–1934, as already mentioned, the kulak class was eliminated, and the counterrevolutionary Bukharin opposition lost all social support. This led to the unification of the Trotskyist and Bukharinite oppositions and the creation of the **Right-Trotskyist bloc** [16]. The subsequent period of the counterrevolutionary opposition is characterized by 1) the continued use of individual terror methods and 2) a focus on a so-called «palace coup i.e., **a counterrevolutionary state coup**. The latter was driven by the opposition's transition to a purely **conspiratorial** type of organization:

«In 1933–34, the kulaks had already been defeated. The insurgent movement had ceased to be a real possibility, and therefore, within the leadership of the right-wing organization, a new period emerged when the **orientation toward a counterrevolutionary conspiratorial coup** became the **central idea**» [15, p. 197].

Evidence of the political-terrorist struggle between Trotskyism and communism is provided by the Moscow Trials—specifically the cases of the «**Trotskyist-Zinovievist Terrorist Center**» (1936), the «**Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Parallel Center**» (1937), and the «**Right-Trotskyist Anti-Soviet Bloc**» (1938). The authenticity of these trials is supported by numerous studies, particularly those by Grover Furr [15a, 15b, 15c].

How was the coup planned to be carried out, and what tasks needed to be addressed after its implementation?

1) First and foremost, it was necessary to disguise the true goals of the coup:

1. "I raised the question with Trotsky that we would issue an appropriate appeal to the population and the army, in which we would avoid all issues related to the true goals of the coup, i.e., **we would deceive the population and act under the guise of Soviet coup-plotters; we would overthrow the bad Soviet government and restore a good Soviet government...** It was then decided that in our appeals to foreign states, we **would not mention that we were also changing the entire foundation of the state and that we agreed to certain territorial concessions. Instead, in our appeals to the population, the army, and foreign states, we would state that, while pursuing a**

peaceful policy, reducing armaments, and so on, we would nevertheless stand in defense of the Soviet Union's borders and would not allow the forcible secession of any parts of the Soviet Union" (from *Krestinsky's interrogation*) [15, pp. 254-255].

2. The plan for a palace coup, which emerged among the right-wing faction in 1933-1934, *"aimed to arrest members of the government in connection with a violent coup carried out by the conspiratorial organization with the help of a special group created to execute this coup"* [15, p. 163]. Initially, the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was planned to be used to carry out the coup. The main support for the right-Trotskyist counter-revolutionaries within the state apparatus came from high-ranking officials such as **A.S. Yenukidze** (Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR), **G.G. Yagoda** (People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR), **R.A. Peterson** (Commandant of the Kremlin), **A.I. Yegorov** (Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), **M.N. Tukhachevsky** (from 1936, First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), **I.P. Uborevich** (Commander of the Belarusian Military District), and others. Thus, the apparatuses of the NKVD and the People's Commissariat of Defense were filled with appointees of the counter-revolutionaries. Later, we will see that in 1953, the orientation toward a counter-revolutionary conspiratorial coup was successfully realized.

Initially, the bloc planned to carry out a coup d'état at the **17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)**, *"when all responsible workers would gather, and simultaneously with the most prominent members of the government, it would be possible to arrest those leading figures of the republics and regions who might resist the coup."* However, this plan was rejected because the unity within the ranks of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), its connection with the broad masses, and the authority of the government among the working people made such actions adventurous and doomed to failure. It was decided to link the implementation of the "palace coup" with the help of **world imperialism**, primarily German fascism, which came to power in Germany in 1933. That is, the coup was postponed until **military intervention** by Germany. **All distinctions between Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, and fascists ultimately disappeared** due to the common goal of all these groups — the overthrow of Soviet power, the restoration of capitalism, and the dismemberment of the USSR into separate parts. However, these goals could not be realized with the help of German fascism, but they were achieved between 1953 and 1991.

The right-Trotskyist bloc became the conduit of imperialism's agent network in the USSR, a gang of spies, saboteurs, and murderers.

3. After the coup, it was planned to develop bourgeois state-monopolistic capitalism:

"If I were to practically formulate my programmatic position, then with regard to the economy it would be state capitalism, an entrepreneurial peasant-individual, a reduction of collective farms, foreign concessions, a concession of the monopoly of foreign trade,

and the result — the capitalization of the country" (from Bukharin's interrogation) [15, p. 341].

Naturally, it was intended that all these measures would be implemented not immediately, but gradually, preparing the consciousness of the population for the final implementation of these programmatic provisions. For example, regarding collective farms, the following provision was put forward:

"It seemed to me that the collective farm form had proven itself economically, in terms of labor productivity, in the eyes of collective farm peasants; I thought that it was better, for the time being, to preserve this form by having changed a few relationships within the collective farm in order to allow the elite to stand out" (from Kretsinsky's interrogation) [15, p. 255].

That is — the actual transfer of power in the collective farms to their Boards and chairmen.

4. At the same time, it was planned to carry out **the dismemberment of the USSR**, or as Rykov put it, to effect "**the separation of the national republics** under a protectorate or into dependency, formally not into dependency, but in fact into dependency" [15, p. 255].

All these strategic plans of Trotskyism were implemented in the USSR by 1991. The bourgeoisie, due to its anti-communist bias, denies the authenticity of the testimonies in the Moscow trials and therefore any statement that the plans of the Trotskyists were consciously and purposefully carried out in the USSR up until 1991 is dismissed as "conspiracy theories," etc. And people who do not possess scientific thinking are easily misled by such bourgeois speculations and believe in the fabrication of the cases against rightists and Trotskyists (i.e., ideologization). [The latest, modern studies](#) prove the authenticity and non-falsification of the Moscow trials and the testimonies given therein.

Under the guise of fighting Trotskyists, the Trotskyists themselves eliminated Communists. The fullest description of the content of Trotskyist methods was given by A. Ya. Vyshinsky:

"...Widely applying methods of double-dealing and disguise, subversives and saboteurs usually outwardly display a bubbling energy, doing everything possible to establish themselves as people loyal to Soviet power. They energetically and frequently speak at meetings, often feigning to "expose" the "enemies of the people," while at the same time unhesitatingly resorting to slander, falsification of facts, and outright forgeries in order to compromise honest and truly devoted individuals to the party and the cause of socialism. Sometimes they even sacrifice one

of their own comrades for these purposes, creating the appearance of a struggle against “subversives,” “Trotskyists,” etc.” [18]

While verbally renouncing their former views (if they had previously belonged to the right, Trotskyists, Zinovievists, etc.), the counter-revolutionaries did everything possible in the service of their bourgeois work. As the communist A. A. Zhdanov emphasized:

*“The Party, at the February–March Plenum of the Central Committee of 1937 and the January Plenum of the Central Committee of 1938, condemned the practice of a **formal and soullessly bureaucratic approach to the question of the fate of party members, concerning the expulsion from the party and the restoration of those expelled. This practice, as is known, was employed by careerist elements that had infiltrated the party, who sought to distinguish themselves and advance by means of expulsions from the party, as well as by disguised enemies within the party, who, by resorting to extensive repressions, aimed to eliminate honest party members and sow excessive suspicion within the party ranks. The enemy, having changed tactics, latched onto vigilance and speculated on it, seeking under the guise of false speeches about vigilance to eliminate as many honest communists as possible, with the aim of sowing mutual distrust and disorganizing our ranks. Slander against honest workers under the banner of “vigilance” is currently the most widespread method of cover-up, a means of disguising hostile activity.**” [11]*

It was precisely by such means (through double-dealing) that the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries excluded or eliminated honest communists and inserted into the party those people on whom they could rely — other bourgeois elements as well [19]. Thus, the party was increasingly replenished with petty-bourgeois-imperialist elements, and the vanguard of the proletariat within the party was thereby weakened.

The preparation for holding elections based on the new electoral system further exacerbated the class struggle in society and within the party. Around this issue, the sharpest debates among contemporary bourgeois historians are unfolding. In official historical science (i.e. pseudo-science), the period of 1937–1938 is called the “Great Terror,” and the policies pursued during this period are termed “mass repressions.” Various figures are provided.

What You Need to Know About Repressions!

On September 28, 1987, at the initiative of M. S. Gorbachev and A. N. Yakovlev, a Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU was established for the further study of materials related to the repressions that took place during the 1930s–1940s and the early 1950s. All documents related to the so-called “mass repressions” were created (indeed, created, compiled) by this very commission and collected in A. N. Yakovlev’s International Fund for

Democracy. As a result of the commission's work, a Note by A. N. Yakovlev, V. A. Medvedev, V. M. Chebrikov, A. I. Lukyanov, G. P. Razumovsky, B. K. Pugo, V. A. Kryuchkov, V. I. Boldin, and G. L. Smirnov to the Central Committee of the CPSU titled "On the Unconstitutional Practice of the 1930s–1940s and the Early 1950s" was published.

The well-known report note from R. A. Rudenko, S. N. Kruglov, and K. P. Gorshenin to N. S. Khrushchev dated February 1, 1954, emerged from the very womb of the Yakovlev Commission. Academician V. N. Zemskov, the darling of our left audience, was a member of the Commission for Determining the Population Losses, which worked for the Yakovlev Commission. In his articles on the scale of political repressions, Zemskov provides exactly the figure invented by the Yakovlev Commission, based on forged archival documents. All contemporary bourgeois socialism (anti-Marxism) uses Zemskov or the fabricated fake archival data concocted by the perestroika reformers. And thus begins a fierce, anti-scientific, almost religious "defense" of Stalin. **Stalinism is the exploitation and perversion of Stalin's image by the bourgeoisie and especially by Trotskyism.** This Stalinism (as well as any other variety of Trotskyism) has nothing in common with Stalin's own worldview, much less with Marxism–Leninism.

And now, in holy belief in the figure of 681,000 executed in two years (they executed 900 people a day!), domestic Stalinists (i.e., the domestic bourgeoisie) begin to invent the following: that it was not Stalin's fault but N. I. Yezhov's, that these were not Stalinist repressions but Yezhov's repressions (according to bourgeois historians E. Yu. Spitsyn, Yu. N. Zhukov, and others), or that "there was something to it" (as if, like, the same bourgeois figures such as K. A. Zhukov, R. Maisner, and other Trotskyists). Either way, Zemskov's figure remains a religious belief for this bourgeoisie, just as for them the unfalsifiability of the archives is a matter of religious faith. It is this very Yakovlev Commission that cobbled together Order No. 00447, the documents on the creation of the "troikas," and everything else related that the bourgeoisie tells us about the repressions. We are fully in solidarity with P. G. Balaev, who uncovered all this, in the assessment of all these matters, despite disagreements on a number of issues.

In the report and concluding address at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) on March 3–5, 1937, I. V. Stalin expressed an extremely important Marxist position:

"It is necessary to break up and cast aside the rotten theory that with each of our advances forward, class struggle should supposedly be increasingly subsiding, that as our successes accumulate, the class enemy becomes supposedly increasingly docile.

This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous theory, for it lulls our people to sleep, leads them into a trap, and gives the class enemy the opportunity to recover and fight against Soviet power.

On the contrary, **the more we advance forward, the more successes we achieve, the more the remnants of the defeated exploitative classes will become embittered, the sooner they will resort to more extreme forms of struggle, the more they will cause trouble for the Soviet state, the more they will resort to the most desperate means of struggle, as if these were the last means of the doomed.** It should be borne in mind that the remnants of the defeated classes in the USSR are not few. They have direct support from our enemies outside the USSR. It would be mistaken to think that the sphere of class struggle is confined within the borders of the USSR. If one end of the class struggle operates within the framework of the USSR, then its other end extends to the boundaries of the bourgeois states that surround us. The remnants of the defeated classes cannot fail to know this.

And precisely because they know this, they will continue their desperate forays in the future.

Thus history teaches us. Thus Leninism teaches us." [20]

In December 1938, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs was headed by L. P. Beria, who was also a bourgeois counter-revolutionary (as his actions from March 1953 onward will attest), but of a new order. To act by the same methods as the counter-revolutionaries did in the first half of the 1930s **was fatally dangerous for both the surviving and the new counter-revolutionaries**, for this entire methodology had been exposed. The bet on military intervention and a "palace coup" was not feasible. The latter was postponed indefinitely.

Nevertheless, **there were relatively more** communists in the party than bourgeois elements. Therefore, within the party itself, the social support base of the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries was very weak both numerically and qualitatively.

During the Great Patriotic War, between 2 to 4 million communists and as many Komsomol members perished, which speaks to **the enormous strength of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat** in the Bolshevik party and in the Soviet country.

But at the same time, this was a great loss for the party and the entire country — for it was the communists who had passed through the crucible of the development of the proletarian revolution in the USSR, who possessed firm communist principledness and Marxist literacy, who died. Many of them studied Marxism from the original sources — Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Many grew up on books and brochures of the Soviet period.

Instead of the dead communists, the party accepted a huge number of new members, predominantly for their feats on the fronts and in the rear, who were true Soviet patriots but had little class consciousness (or were even class-unconscious), were **Marxist-illiterate**, and had no idea what they should build or how. They grew up not on the works of the classics, but on their **quotes and on feuilleton and newspaper articles**. Under the conditions of a fused state and party apparatus, in **the conditions of a bourgeois system of management and Marxist illiteracy**, they became bourgeoisified (acquiring the psychology of the petty bourgeois) and

became the potential **social support for bourgeois counter-revolutionaries** in the Bolshevik party.

*It is extremely important to remember that a **communistically principled** and **Marxist-literate** person cannot become bourgeoisified and subordinate to the bourgeois system of management. On the contrary: such people (advanced workers, the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat) are meant to keep this bourgeois system of management under their control and break it apart. Hence the opposite: Marxist illiteracy or the absence of communist principledness leads to the bourgeoisization of a person in the bourgeois system of management [32].*

In the development of the class struggle in the USSR, the following stages can be identified:

1) 1922–1927 — a stage of slow development of the proletarian revolution due to the NEP. Because of this, the petty-bourgeois segment of society and the ruling party had some legal opportunities for their work, but were defeated by the communists by 1927.

2) 1927–1930 — a stage when the proletarian revolution began to gain momentum and, accordingly, the reactionary forays of the remaining petty-bourgeois elements in society and in the Bolshevik party intensified. By 1930, the reactionary groupings in the party were finally defeated. At the same time, in the period from 1928 to 1930, the right-wing counter-revolutionaries (Bukharinites) used legal opportunities to create an illegal bourgeois organization.

3) 1930–1934 — a stage of the unfolding of the proletarian revolution in the countryside and the struggle of bourgeois counter-revolutionaries (who united) against the party and the government of the USSR by means of, first and foremost, kulak uprisings and individual terror against communists. Double-dealing and disguise were the main methods of operation of the counter-revolutionaries.

4) 1934–1940 — a stage of the greatest intensification of the class struggle due to a number of proletarian reforms. By 1934, the kulaks had been completely liquidated — that is, the bourgeoisie in Soviet society was entirely expropriated. The counter-revolutionaries, due to the destruction of their social base, placed their bet on a purely conspiratorial type of organization,

oriented toward a "palace coup" and military intervention by imperialist states.

5) 1940-1953 — by 1940, all the actions and methods of the right-Trotskyist block counter-revolutionaries had been exposed, and the bet on military intervention was rejected by them. The counter-revolutionaries were extremely weakened, but thanks to the Great Patriotic War, in which many communists perished, they gained a social support within the party in the form of a class-unconscious majority.

The role of the proletarian leader in building socialism and once again regarding Marx's thesis on the materiality of the ideal

In advanced countries (those that have reached the stage of capitalism, ripened in their level of development to political organization), social classes are usually led by political parties. These, as a general rule, are directed by individuals or groups of individuals called **leaders**.

*Leaders are more or less **stable groups of individuals** who:*

1) have the greatest **experience** (knowledge) in the theoretical and practical activities of the party;

2) have the greatest **authority** in the party stemming from this experience;

3) have the greatest **influence** on the rest of their fellow party members, based on that authority;

4) and precisely for this reason, **are elected to the most responsible positions** in the party.

The leaders of the proletarian party are of particular importance, for they, thanks to their theoretical knowledge and practical experience, reflect the interests of the proletariat (i.e. the interests of the entire proletarian class are personified in the leaders). It is these leaders who form the political tactics and specify the goals of the proletariat. However, leaders by themselves are nothing. Only by relying on all the advanced workers (the vanguard of the proletariat), on the proletarian class, and only through their support and activity, can the leaders of the proletariat express the interests of the proletariat in a concentrated form.

It is important to understand that one cannot contrast the role of the leader with the role of the masses or with the role of the class. A leader is just like any other person, like all the

representatives of his class. But with one difference: a leader exerts significant influence on other people by virtue of his authority and experience. If one person (in this case, a leader) influences many others, then the multitude certainly plays the leading role here (for without the multitude “one is nothing”), yet without that one, the actions of the multitude would not exist. Here everything is materially interconnected, mutually dependent.

The leaders of the Bolshevik Party from its inception were V. I. Lenin and I. V. Stalin. Although the leadership was collective throughout the entire existence of the party, Lenin and Stalin possessed enormous political weight, authority, and influence, through which they actively influenced the life of the party.

But without the support of the party masses, without their political activity, the leaders cannot drag the party on themselves. After the war, due to the Bolshevik party being filled with class-unconscious, Marxist-illiterate elements, a decline in the political activity of the party masses is observed. Stalin, in the literal sense of the word, had to drag the dictatorship of the proletariat on his back. This moment in the history of our country demonstrates the truth of Marx’s thesis on the materiality of the ideal. Stalin’s authority and influence among the workers of the USSR and the entire world were precisely material, effective, by virtue of which even the bourgeois counterrevolutionaries who outnumbered him numerically could neither count on nor even conceive of his exclusion, arrest, and repressive measures against him. Moreover, these bourgeois counterrevolutionaries themselves possessed authority and influence among the working masses due to their closeness to Stalin.

The psychology of people is material. What does that mean? It means that the psychology of people is their concrete material actions. Therefore, class character in Marxism is not limited solely to the relation to the means of production, but is also manifested in the psychology of people, i.e., in their concrete material actions. That is precisely why Marx has terms figuratively similar to the Hegelian ones, “class-in-itself” and “class-for-itself.” The latter term characterizes the class that has acquired its class consciousness. And the latter, as is known, is material, effective.

When speaking of the materiality of the ideal, it is often meant only that consciousness reflects within itself the material world. But that is only one side of the matter. One cannot be confined only to this side. The materiality of the ideal is also the manifestation of that very material content of consciousness in the concrete material actions of the individual, of people, of classes.

3. The March Coup

Since the balance of class forces within the Bolshevik Party was in favor of bourgeois counterrevolutionaries, the post-war proletarian reforms led to the activation of the bourgeois counterrevolutionaries’ activities during 1950–1953. They were led by **L. P. Beria**, **G. M. Malenkov** (Secretary of the Central Committee of the VKP(b)) and **N. S. Khrushchev** (First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the VKP(b)). This was a new cohort of

right-Trotskyist elements, one that fully took into account the experience of their class fathers and brothers, and acted more cautiously. By February 1951, the balance of influence between the bourgeois counterrevolutionaries (in the person of L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, and N. A. Bulganin) and the proletarian revolutionaries (in the person of I. V. Stalin) in the leadership of the government (the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR) was equalized:

1) The alternate chairmanship at the meetings of the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the review and resolution of all current issues, were entrusted to N. A. Bulganin, L. P. Beria, and G. M. Malenkov;

2) All decrees and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted by this triumvirate were issued with the signature of I. V. Stalin [22].

It is precisely for this reason that Stalin hurried with the implementation of political reforms and, at the end of 1951, it was decided to convene the 19th Congress of the VKP(b) in October 1952.

But the triumvirate did not delay either. In May 1952, the head of Stalin's security, the communist **N. S. Vlasik**, was removed from his position, and in December 1952 he was arrested and expelled from the party. Around the same time, Stalin's personal assistant **A. N. Poskrebyshev** was arrested. In addition to them, a number of other individuals were arrested, though of lesser significance for Stalin's security. Naturally, various crimes were imputed to them, but the essence of all these arrests was the same — to completely control Stalin's security.

Stalin himself, it would seem, was put to death by the introduction of a poisonous substance into his body — the proletarian leader was dying for several days, from February 28 to March 5, 1953 [23, where the analysis of doctors' journal entries presented by the author is important]. This question is contentious; however — whether Stalin died a natural death (which is also likely, as the leader was quite old) or was poisoned (as were a number of other prominent communist figures of the party and state before him) **makes no essential difference in establishing the facts of the state coup**, as we shall see later.

At the beginning of March 1953, the so-called "Bureau" of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was formed. This so-called "Bureau" in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee included all the leadership of the counterrevolutionary opposition. These were L. P. Beria, N. A. Bulganin, K. E. Voroshilov, L. M. Kaganovich, G. M. Malenkov, M. G. Pervukhin, M. Z. Saburov, and N. S. Khrushchev. As can be seen from this, all the members of the Bureau were deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, except Khrushchev. It would seem to us that the counterrevolutionaries simply decided to add to this very Bureau two of the most authoritative genuine communists — V. M. Molotov and L. M. Kaganovich — so that their "sharp" moves would not arouse any suspicions in the party and among the people.

On March 3, a meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU [24] was held, at which it was decided to “convene the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow on March 4, 1953” and “prepare for the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU the necessary organizational issues.” But by the next day the plan changed and it was decided: “To convene on March 5 at 8 o’clock in the evening a **joint meeting** of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR” and “to adopt and submit for consideration at the joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Council of Ministers of the Union of SSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR the following decision:

In connection with comrade Stalin’s severe illness, which entails more or less prolonged non-participation of him in leadership activities, it is to be considered, for the duration of comrade Stalin’s absence, the most important task of the party and the government — **ensuring uninterrupted and proper management of the entire life of the country**, which in turn requires the greatest cohesion of the leadership, the prevention of any dissension and panic, so as thereby to unconditionally ensure the successful implementation into practice of the policy developed by our party and government both in the internal affairs of our country and in international affairs. Based on this and in order to prevent any disruptions in the leadership of the activities of state and party bodies, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Council of Ministers of the Union of SSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR deem it necessary to immediately carry out **a series of measures for the organization of party and state leadership**” [25].

In the same protocol it is stated:

“On the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

To merge the Ministry of State Security of the USSR and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR into one Ministry — the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

On the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

To appoint comrade Beria L. P. as Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR.”

However, the so-called “Bureau” of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU does not have any rights to merge ministries or appoint ministers. **Only the proletariat, only the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat — the Supreme Soviet — can do that!**

It is, by the way, extremely important to understand that Stalin’s illness (and his death) **in no way is the cause of** further counterrevolutionary transformations of the bourgeoisie. It was

merely a **pretext** created by the bourgeois counterrevolutionaries and used by them for the usurpation of power in the party and the government and for their reverse reuniting.

Interestingly, in the documents the dying Stalin is also listed as a member of the Bureau of the Presidium. He was observed alternately and closely by the members of the Bureau of the Presidium while on March 5 a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the Union of SSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was taking place (it began at 20:00 and ended at 20:40). At that time, Bulganin was on duty with Stalin, and at the joint meeting (by the way, such joint meetings of these three bodies were provided for nowhere, i.e. this meeting was illegal) having forgotten to remove the living Stalin from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, they appointed G. M. Malenkov as **Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR**. Thus, until Stalin's death (at 21:50), there were two chairmen in the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which is an unprecedented fact in the history of Soviet state bodies.

Malenkov, "by the order of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU," appointed as his first deputies Beria L.P., Molotov V.M., Bulganin N.A., and Kaganovich L.M. And I will remind you once again that the ***election of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and his first deputies, and of all the ministers — in short, the entire composition of the Council of Ministers of the USSR*** — is a right held ONLY by ***the organ*** of the dictatorship of the proletariat, namely, ***the SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR AT ITS SESSION***. And only this proletarian organ is entitled to form its Presidium. Thus, the so-called "joint meeting" has taken power away from the proletariat not only in the Council of Ministers of the USSR, but also in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, whose chairman was appointed as K.E. Voroshilov and whose secretary as N.M. Pegov.

Then a merger of a number of ministries (those that had been fragmented under Stalin) was carried out in order to appoint their own cronies to all key positions. Initially, the decision made as early as March 4 was announced — regarding the merger of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the MGB of the USSR into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR headed by L.P. Beria. Then the "Bureau" carried out the following changes:

"5. Appoint Comrade Molotov V. M. as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Appoint as the first deputies of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR the tts. Vyshinsky A. Y. and Malik Y. A., and as deputy of the Minister, Comrade Kuznetsov V. V.

Appoint Comrade Vyshinsky A. Y. as the permanent representative of the USSR at the UN.

Consider it necessary to have in China, as Ambassador and Representative of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Kuznetsov V. V.

6. *Appoint Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Bulganin N. A., as the Minister of Defense of the USSR, and as the first deputies of the Minister of Defense of the USSR — Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Vasilevsky A. M. and Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Zhukov G. K.*

7. *Merge the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Trade of the USSR into one Ministry — the Ministry of Internal and Foreign Trade of the USSR.*

Appoint Comrade Mikoyan A. I. as the Minister of Internal and Foreign Trade, Comrade Kabanov I. G. as the first deputy of the Minister, and the tts. Kумыкина P. N. and Zhavoronkov V. G. as deputies of the minister.

8. *Merge the Ministry of Automobile and Tractor Industry, the Ministry of Machine Building and Instrumentation, the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building, and the Ministry of Machine Tool Building into one ministry — the Ministry of Machine Building.*

Appoint Comrade Saburov M. Z. as the Minister of Machine Building, relieving him of the duties of Chairman of Gosplan of the USSR.

9. *Merge the Ministry of Transport Machine Building, the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, the Ministry of Heavy Machine Building, and the Ministry of Construction and Road Machine Building into one Ministry — the Ministry of Transport and Heavy Machine Building.*

Appoint Comrade Malyshev V. A. as the Minister of Transport and Heavy Machine Building.

10. *Merge the Ministry of Power Stations, the Ministry of Electrical Industry, and the Ministry of the Industry of Means of Communication into one Ministry — the Ministry of Power Stations and Electrical Industry.*

Appoint Comrade Pervukhin M. G. as the Minister of Power Stations and Electrical Industry.

11. *Appoint Comrade Kosyachenko G. P. as the Chairman of Gosplan of the USSR.*

12. *Recommend Comrade Shvernik N. M. as the Chairman of the VTSPS, relieving Comrade Kuznetsov V. V. of these duties.”*

Then, within the party the proletariat was deprived under the following pretext:

“13. The Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee proposes that in the Central Committee of the CPSU, instead of two bodies of the CC — the Presidium and the Bureau of

the Presidium — there be one body, namely, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as defined by the Party Charter.

For the sake of greater efficiency in leadership, determine the composition of the Presidium to consist of 11 members and four candidates.

Approve the following composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

Members of the CC Presidium — tts.: Stalin I. V., Malenkov G. M., Beria L. P., Molotov V. M., Voroshilov K. E., Khrushchev N. S., Bulganin N. A., Kaganovich L. M., Mikoyan A. I., Saburov M. Z., Pervukhin M. G.

Candidates for membership in the CC Presidium of the CPSU — tts.: Shvernik N. M., Ponomarenko P. K., Melnikov L. G., Bagirov M. D.”

I remind you that before these changes the composition of the Presidium included 25 members and 11 candidates for membership. And here, too, the still living Stalin figures in the composition.

Changes were also made in the Secretariat of the Central Committee:

“16. It is deemed necessary that comrade Khrushchev N. S. concentrate on his work in the Central Committee of the CPSU, and in connection with this, relieve him of the duties of First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU.

Approve the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, comrade Mikhailov N. A., as the First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU.

17. Relieve from the duties of Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU the tts. Ponomarenko P. K. and Ignatov N. G. in connection with their transition to leadership work in the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and comrade Brezhnev L. I. — in connection with his transition to work as the Head of the Political Directorate of the Navy Ministry.

Comrade Malenkov reports that the proposals he presented to the current meeting are being put forward unanimously and in unison by all members of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

For the consideration of the decisions of the current joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which are subject to ratification by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Bureau proposes, says comrade Malenkov, to convene a session of the Supreme Soviet.

Then comrade Malenkov reports that the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee has instructed the tts. Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev to take measures so that comrade Stalin's documents and papers, both current and archival, are brought into proper order.

In conclusion, comrade Malenkov expressed his confidence that in this difficult time for the party and the country, the Central Committee of the party, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR will ensure uninterrupted and proper leadership of the entire life of the country.

Comrade Khrushchev asks if the comrades have any questions or remarks regarding the proposals of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, if there are any other or additional proposals? (Friendly shouts from those present: "Accept, approve the proposals of the Bureau.")

Comrade Khrushchev puts the introduced proposals to a vote.

The joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR unanimously approves the proposals introduced by the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee regarding measures for the organization of party and state leadership" [26].

During the coup, the bourgeois counterrevolutionaries usurped the full extent of power in the party, the government, and the Armed Forces of the USSR. And the announcement of the joint plenum was made on March 7, as if it had been held on March 6.

Here the words of V. I. Lenin were confirmed, who said:

"In a country like Russia, the overwhelming predominance of the petty-bourgeois element and the inevitable, as a result of war, devastation, impoverishment, epidemic and crop failures,

*extreme exacerbations of need and popular miseries give rise to especially sharp manifestations of fluctuations in the mood of the petty-bourgeois and semi-proletarian masses. These fluctuations oscillate either towards strengthening the alliance of these masses with the proletariat, or **towards bourgeois restoration**, and the entire experience of all the revolutions of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries shows with the utmost clarity and conviction that **nothing other than the restoration (reestablishment) of the power and property of the capitalists and landlords from these fluctuations — provided that there is the slightest weakening of the unity, strength, and influence of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat — can succeed**” [27].*

The condition mentioned by Lenin — the weakening of the unity, strength, and influence of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat (due to objective, material-class factors) — was evident, and therefore, having created a pretext (the illness and death of the leader), the counterrevolutionaries seized state power, and thereby also appropriated state property into their own hands. Thus, the counterrevolutionary bourgeois state coup was carried out from **February 28 to March 5**. This was **the implementation of the right-Trotskyist bloc’s bet on a “palace coup,” made as early as 1933–1934**, when the counterrevolutionaries had lost their social base and had transitioned purely to a conspiratorial type of organization. The pretext for seizing power could have been anything; the right-Trotskyists could have used any other pretext. But the same 19th Congress could not be used by them to usurp power for the same reasons that these same right-Trotskyists could not use the 17th Congress of the VKP(b) — the authority of the party and the government, in particular that of I. V. Stalin, was extremely high, not only in Soviet society but also in the entire world communist movement

Thus, during the course of the bourgeois state coup, the counterrevolutionaries:

- 1) Seized key posts in the **Council of Ministers of the USSR** and carried out a merger of a number of key ministries for their control;*
- 2) Seized the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, thereby **subordinating the Supreme Soviet of the USSR** — the highest elective proletarian body of the USSR — to themselves;*
- 3) Seized the leadership **of the CPSU**, namely, subordinating the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU to themselves, having excluded the majority from it.*

4. Political-Economic Analysis

Proletarian State Capitalism

Since no one has so far studied in detail the bourgeois coup of March 1953, there is therefore no political-economic analysis of the coup at all. Meanwhile, only such an analysis allows one to scientifically examine the events that occurred throughout the entire existence of the USSR.

Moreover, since many do not know about Lenin's discoveries, no adequate (Marxist) study of the history of the USSR is possible. In addition to Lenin's revealed political transition period from capitalism to proletarian socialism (as mentioned in the "Theoretical Aspect" section), they are also unaware of Lenin's revealed economic transition period from capitalism to proletarian socialism.

Meanwhile, it was Lenin who established the dichotomy between **bourgeois state capitalism** and **proletarian state capitalism**. Which means, the character of **state** capitalism depends on the **class character of the state**.

«...state capitalism in a society where power belongs to capital, and state capitalism in a proletarian state, are two different concepts. In a capitalist state, state capitalism means that it is recognised by the state and controlled by it for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, and to the detriment of the proletariat. In the proletarian state, the same thing is done for the benefit of the working class, for the purpose of withstanding the as yet strong bourgeoisie, and of fighting it.»
[28, page 48] ()

Despite the [anti-Marxist speculations with Lenin's quote](#) that proletarian socialism is a state-capitalist monopoly, directed to the benefit of the people and therefore ceased to be a capitalist monopoly, proletarian state capitalism is not equal to proletarian socialism. Proletarian state capitalism is **economically a transitional stage from capitalism to proletarian socialism:**

*“Borne along on the crest of the wave of enthusiasm, rousing first the political enthusiasm and then the military enthusiasm of the people, we expected to accomplish economic tasks just as great as the political and military tasks we had accomplished by relying directly on this enthusiasm. We expected — or perhaps it would be truer to say that we presumed without having given it adequate consideration — to be able to organise the state production and the state distribution of products on communist lines in a small-peasant country directly as ordered by the proletarian state. Experience has proved that we were wrong. **It appears that a number***

of transitional stages were necessary — state capitalism and socialism — in order to prepare — to prepare by many years of effort — for the transition to communism. Not directly relying on enthusiasm, but aided by the enthusiasm engendered by the great revolution, and on the basis of personal interest, personal incentive and business principles, we must first set to work in this small peasant country to build solid gangways to socialism by way of state capitalism. Otherwise we shall never get to communism, we shall never bring scores of millions of people to communism. That is what experience, the objective course of the development of the revolution, has taught us” [28, p. 151].

That's why the speculations of anti-Marxists (for example, Zhumeikinities from the «Left Wing») crumble from the detailed studying of the Lenin's works, where he sends the proletarian state capitalism and the proletarian socialism as two different stages of societal development after the proletarian revolution.

We have said so [not just once](#), but we can repeat it once more:

As the owner of the means of production, the proletarian state (the proletariat as a class organized into a state) is a collective capitalist. But at the same time, the proletariat does not cease to be a proletariat when it becomes a capitalist, for each individual proletarian is deprived of property (all workers taken together are the owners of property, but not a single worker individually, as Marx says in the Critique of the Gotha Programme: *«nothing can pass to the ownership of individuals, except individual means of consumption»*), sells his labor power as a commodity to his state and receives in exchange goods for consumption according to the hours he has worked in state production. At the same time, part of the time worked (surplus time) is appropriated by the proletarian state (that is, by the entire proletariat) for its own maintenance, for the amortization of the means of production, for the expansion of production, for public consumption funds, etc.

But how does proletarian socialism (i.e. the period when communist society with two phases develops from capitalist society) differ from proletarian state capitalism? Marx answers this question as well: under socialism, between the producers themselves there is no commodity exchange, and accordingly no money circulation (which is essentially capitalist trade). Under socialism there is commodity exchange only between the state and the workers, as stated in the previous paragraph, and this commodity exchange is carried out not by means of money, but with the help of **labour vouchers**.

Proletarian state capitalism is preserved until this condition is met: the replacement of monetary commodity exchange with non-monetary commodity exchange (which Lenin and Stalin called product exchange or socialist product exchange). This condition is fulfilled only in the absence of disunity among commodity producers, i.e. with a **unified** state property over all the productive forces. As long as the productive forces are divided between different production sectors,

capitalist (monetary) trade between them is preserved, and accordingly so is proletarian state capitalism.

By the mid-1930s, in the USSR there remained two main production sectors between which the productive forces were divided: state property and collective-cooperative property. Accordingly, the monetary trade has remained between these sectors. With this form of commodity exchange, consumer goods produced within the state sector also acquire a value form and are exchanged by means of money.

Soviet economist V.P. Dyachenko writes:

*“In order to cover the costs of labor in the production process, consumer products are needed — personal consumption items. These products are produced as commodities, transferred from the sphere of production to the sphere of consumption through purchase and sale, that is, using commodity circulation, which is subject to the law of value. As a result, a socialist society must calculate and pay wages **in value (monetary) form and exercise control over the measure of labor and the measure of consumption in value form.** But wages are only one element of socialist production costs. Value accounting of this cost element requires the use of the same accounting for all other elements of production costs” [29].*

Dyachenko repeats the mistake of Stalin's team of socialist builders and confuses the period of proletarian state capitalism with proletarian socialism, but correctly points out that the presence of commodity circulation (conditioned by two forms of ownership) leads to the fact that buying and selling between the state and the workers is also carried out in value (monetary) form.

The Bolsheviks understood that in a petty-bourgeois country like Russia, the proletarian government is needed to develop capitalism — first in the NEP form, then by limiting its operation between two forms of ownership (state and collective farm-cooperative) — in order to increase the capital of the Soviet state, to enlarge the proletariat (this was also necessary in order to complete the construction of the proletarian semi-state: «...The dictatorship of the proletariat is permissible only when the proletariat constitutes the majority of the population...»), and to increase the productive forces.

In «Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.», Stalin noted:

“Of course, our present relations of production are in a period when they fully conform to the growth of the productive forces and help to advance them at seven-league strides. But it would be wrong to rest easy at that and to think that there are no contradictions between our productive forces and the relations of production. There certainly are, and will be, contradictions, seeing that the development of the relations of production lags, and will lag, behind the

development of the productive forces. **Given a correct policy on the part of the directing bodies, these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms, and there is no chance of matters coming to a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces of society.** It would be a different matter if we were to conduct a wrong policy, such as that which Comrade Yaroshenko recommends. In that case **conflict would be inevitable**, and our relations of production might become a serious brake on the further development of the productive forces.

The task of the directing bodies is therefore promptly to **discern incipient contradictions, and to take timely measures to resolve them by adapting the relations of production to the growth of the productive forces.** This, above all, concerns such economic factors as **group, or collective-farm, property and commodity circulation.** At present, of course, these factors are being successfully utilized by us for the promotion of the socialist economy, and they are of undeniable benefit to our society. It is undeniable, too, that they will be of benefit also in the near future. But it would be unpardonable blindness not to see at the same time that these factors are **already beginning to hamper the powerful development of our productive forces,** since they create obstacles to the full extension of government planning to the whole of the national economy, especially agriculture. There is no doubt that these factors will hamper the continued growth of the productive forces of our country more and more as time goes on. The task, therefore, is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective-farm property into public property, and by introducing - also gradually - **products-exchange** in place of commodity circulation" (by "public property" Stalin understands state property)

That is, in the early 1950s, Stalin outlined plans for both a political (by transferring power from the party to the Soviets) and an economic (by moving from monetary trade to product exchange) transition from proletarian state capitalism to proletarian socialism.

What kind of creature is bureaucracy?

Cooperative labor under capitalism creates a specific **function of capital in supervision and management.** By combining the means of production and the proletariat's labor force, the capitalist is freed from physical labor and is engaged in the **work of supervision and management.** However, with the production expansion, the capitalist hires special managers and endows them with his functions. Thus, the hired manager becomes a **functioning capitalist.** It is important to understand that the hired manager is in no way a proletarian (as

anti-Marxists argue), because he does not produce surplus value (and the production of surplus value is the main thing that distinguishes the proletariat), but on the contrary, receives his wages from the surplus value, appropriated from the workers. [31]

Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the capitalist-owner (rentier) and the functioning (hired) capitalist, and at the same time to keep in mind that the owner himself can also perform the work of supervision and management (i.e. be both an owner and a functioning capitalist at the same time). Since every bourgeois state is a collective capitalist (namely, the owners of the state, a handful of the largest capitalists, are this collective capitalist), all officials of this state are functioning (hired) capitalists.

Under proletarian state capitalism and proletarian socialism, the aggregate capitalist is all the workers taken together (since the worker class owns the proletarian state).

The proletariat under proletarian state capitalism, like any capitalist, hires managers for the work of supervision and management, who are also functioning capitalists. The entire Soviet bureaucratic apparatus is those very same functioning (hired) capitalists who were hired by the capitalist-owner (the proletariat) after taking power in October 1917. The Soviet proletariat carried out this hiring of officials through the Soviets (and also carried out control through them). Under proletarian socialism, the proletariat entrusts the work of supervision and management **in turn to each of its representatives** (i.e., to each proletarian). That is, during the entire period of socialism, there is a gradual transfer of the functions of supervision and management to the direct producers themselves, and thus there is a gradual withering away of the proletariat, the withering away of the proletarian semi-state, which finally ends at the communist socio-economic formation.

Or, as Marx have described it, «the stock company is a transition toward the conversion of all functions in the reproduction process which still remain linked with capitalist property, into mere functions of associated producers, into social functions».

During the March coup, the bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, who had previously been functioning capitalists hired by the Soviet proletariat, **have themselves become a collective capitalist-owner**, i.e. a handful of the largest capitalists, or the collective owner of all state property. By this very transfer of all state property from the hands of the proletariat to the hands of the counterrevolutionary organized criminal group, a **new Soviet bourgeoisie was formed**. The latter **carried out all the reforms to restore full-fledged capitalism in the USSR up until 1991**. That is, **it was not the proletariat that restored capitalism** in 1953-1991 due to the mythical «bureaucratization» or «bourgeoisification», as anti-communists of all shapes (primarily, Trotskyists) assure us, **but the bourgeoisie**, that took power during the March coup.

Since in the Lenin-Stalin period of USSR, proletariat have nationalized both industry and banks, unifying them into a single national bank, the state power overtake by the bourgeoisie also means its transformation into a **financial oligarchy**.

After the March coup, the bourgeoisie has begun to implement the right-Trotskyist bloc programme points:

*“If I were to formulate my practical programmatic position, it would be in relation to the economy — **state capitalism, the economic individual peasant, the reduction of collective farms, foreign concessions, the concession of the monopoly of foreign trade and as a result — the capitalization of the country**”. [15, p. 186]*

*“If in the circles of the «right-Trotskyist bloc» there was an ideological orientation towards the kulaks and at the same time an orientation towards a palace and state coup, towards a military conspiracy, towards the Praetorian Guard of counter-revolutionaries, then this is nothing other than **elements of fascism**” [15].*

It is noteworthy that revisionists always carefully avoid the question of the role of the proletarian vanguard, that it's precisely it who implements the dictatorship of the proletariat during the period of socialist construction. The article by the Polisturm anti-communist P. Ponaiotov, «Socialism in the USSR», says nothing about this at all, although the article itself claims to be a «scientific» disclosure of the nature of the social structure of the USSR. Ponaiotov avoided this question because it would certainly force him to tell: have the vanguard of the proletariat implemented the dictatorship of the proletariat in 1953-1991? Can the Khrushchevites (counter-revolutionaries, as the politsturmists themselves recognized them) be called the vanguard of the proletariat? What are the class roots of the counter-revolutionary Khrushchevite reforms, since «People always have been the foolish victims of deception and self-deception in politics, and they always will be until they have learnt to seek out the interests of some class or other behind all moral, religious, political and social phrases, declarations and promises»? Are interests of the proletariat grounded in 1953-1991 revisionist's phrases, tales and promises? Such questions are always walked around by the defenders of the bourgeois (sometimes going fascist) USSR in the years 1953-1991.

Soviet Marxist, A.B. Razlatsky correctly expressed the essence of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in the USSR from 1953 to 1991. He wrote:

“So, if we now formulate the organizational principles of capitalist productive administration, we must note:

- the aim of the administration is to maximize profit, which is determined by the owner of the means of production and is a vital necessity for him.
- The way to achieve this goal is the participation of all parts of the administration in the rational definition of the specific tasks of each domain of production.
- This is ensured by appropriate selection of administrative personnel from top to bottom,

control from the top on the results of activity and personal responsibility of each administrator for the assigned task.

If in the first point we replace the maximization of profit with the maximization of production efficiency in accordance with the interests of another owner of the means of production, the proletariat, then these principles would be suitable for our production, for the construction of a socialist Administration. But now (in 1979 - Shahban Mammaev) these principles in the form of requirements for the administration are not realized and cannot be realized.

Most importantly, because, **by virtue of the fictitiousness of the right of the proletariat to replace the supreme administration, the proletariat's ownership of the means of production becomes fictitious as well.**

Imagine the position of a company owner who has no right to change his administrator. Even if the administrator impertinently addresses the entire profit of the company as his salary! But it is not only that.

The administrator who has usurped the rights of the company owner, himself becomes the actual owner, himself interested in maximizing profit, hence in the prosperity of production.” The right of the proletariat to supreme power, and consequently property, has become fictitious in the course of the March bourgeois coup d'état, when all the supreme power which had hitherto been **controlled** and **could be changed** by the proletariat, through the Supreme Soviet, has been seized by the counter-revolutionary opposition, and the real right of the proletariat to make changes in power through the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, has been abrogated.

To be continued...

References - Only partially adapted to the original English quotes. Note that some quotes are only available in Russian

1. “What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production (historische Entwicklungsphasen der Production), (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society...” (Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 39, pp. 62–65)

2. "Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the *revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*" (Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 24, p. 95)

3. "...the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle of democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible." (Marx and Engels, "Communist Manifesto").

4. "...the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes" (K. Marx, "The Civil War in France").

5. There are several places in Lenin's "The State and Revolution", where he speaks about it:

"The words, "to smash the bureaucratic-military machine", briefly express the principal lesson of Marxism regarding the tasks of the proletariat during a revolution in relation to the state. And this is the lesson that has been not only completely ignored, but positively distorted by the prevailing, Kautskyite, "interpretation" of Marxism!" "The workers, after winning political power, will smash the old bureaucratic apparatus, shatter it to its very foundations, and raze it to the ground; they will replace it by a new one, consisting of the very same workers and other employees, against whose transformation into bureaucratic will at once be taken which were specified in detail by Marx and Engels: (1) not only election, but also recall at any time; (2) pay not to exceed that of a workman; (3) immediate introduction of control by all, so that all may become "bureaucrats" for a time and that, therefore, nobody may be able to become a "bureaucrat" ". "According to Kautsky, since elected functionaries will remain under socialism, so will officials, so will the bureaucracy! This is exactly where he is wrong. Marx, referring to the example of the Commune, showed that under socialism functionaries will cease to be "bureaucrats", to be "officials", they will cease to be so in proportion as—in addition to the principle of election of officials—the principle of recall at any time is also introduced, as salaries are reduced to the level of the wages of the average workman, and as parliamentary institutions are replaced by "working bodies, executive and legislative at the same time" ». «Under socialism much of "primitive" democracy will inevitably be revived, since, for the first time in the history of civilized society the mass of population will rise to taking an independent part, not only in voting and elections, but also in the everyday administration of the state. Under socialism all will govern in turn and will soon become accustomed to no one governing".

6. "In the transition to socialism the dictatorship of the proletariat is inevitable, but it is not exercised by an organisation which takes in all industrial workers... What happens is that the Party, shall we say, absorbs the vanguard of the proletariat, and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat". (Lenin, "The Trade Unions, The Present Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes")

7. “We are not utopians. We know that an unskilled labourer or a cook cannot immediately get on with the job of state administration. In this we agree with the Cadets, with Breshkovskaya, and with Tsereteli. We differ, however, from these citizens in that we demand an immediate break with the prejudiced view that only the rich, or officials chosen from rich families, are capable of administering the state, of performing the ordinary, everyday work of administration. We demand that training in the work of state administration be conducted by class-conscious workers and soldiers and that this training be begun at once, i.e., that a beginning be made at once in training all the working people, all the poor, for this work” (Lenin, “Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?”)

8. See our article [”The trade union debate and socialism”](#)

9. See our article [”What is Soviet power?”](#).

10. See the [Protocols of the VIII Congress of the RPC\(b\)](#).

10a. V.I. Lenin. Collected Works. 5th ed., v. 36, p. 72.

10b. The content of this struggle is discussed in more detail in our article “ **What is Soviet Power?** ”

10c. K. Marx, F. Engels. Works. v. 23, pp. 9-10.

10d. A.B. Razlatsky. Second Communist Manifesto.

11. See **the verbatim report of the XVIII Congress of the CPSU(b)**

12. See **Pravda No. 64 of March 16, 1946** , information report on the joint meeting of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities on March 15, 1946

13. See the changes made to the Party Charter [at the 19th Congress](#)

14. See **Pravda, No. 225 (6331), August 16, 1936.**

15. Trial Report of the Anti-Soviet “Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites,” March 2–13, 1938.

15a. Grover Furr, 2009. The Evidence of Trotsky’s Collaboration with Germany and Japan. Cultural Logic.

15b. Grover Furr, 2015. Trotsky’s “Amalgams”: Trotsky’s Lies, the Moscow Trials as Evidence, and the Dewey Commission. Erythros Press and Media, LLC.

15c. Grover Furr, 2016. Trotsky’s Lies: What They Are and What They Mean. Presentation at the 7th World Socialist Forum. World Socialist Research Center. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

16. See Ryutin's platform " **To all members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)** ".

17. See the resolutions of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR of December 1 and 3, 1934.

18. A. Ya. Vyshinsky. Methods of sabotage and subversive work of Trotskyist-fascist intelligence agents.

19. See **the speech of Comrade Zhdanov, February 26, 1937**

20. I.V. Stalin. On the shortcomings of party work and measures to eliminate Trotskyist and other double-dealers. Report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), March 3, 1937. Partizdat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Pp. 70-72.

21. ...

22. E. Yu. Spitsyn. Autumn of the Patriarch, p. 130.

23. Chigirin. White and dirty spots of history.

24. Extract from minutes No. 11 of the meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium.

25. Extract from minutes No. 13 of the meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium.

26. Minutes of the joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, March 5, 1953.

27. V.I. Lenin. PSS, v. 43, p. 96.

28. V. I. Lenin. PSS, v. 44.

29. V.P. Dyachenko. On Commodity Production and the Law of Value under Socialism. Moscow: 1953 — P. 28.

30. V.I. Lenin. PSS, v. 39, p. 453


31. See Chapter 11 of Volume I of Marx's Capital and Volume III.

32. "...Obstacle to the implementation of democracy in the Party is the **pressure of the bureaucratic state apparatus on the Party apparatus, on our Party workers**. The pressure of this unwieldy apparatus on our Party workers is not always noticeable, not always does it strike the eye, but it never relaxes for an instant. The ultimate effect of this pressure of the unwieldy bureaucratic state apparatus is that a number of our functionaries, both at the centre and in the localities, often involuntarily and quite unconsciously, deviate from inner-Party democracy, from the line which they believe to be correct, but which they are often unable to carry out completely." (Stalin, "Report on Immediate Tasks in Party Affairs, January 17")

In 1925 Stalin repeated that one of the obstacles of the Soviet and Party construction lay in "...difficulties arising from the danger that the state apparatus may become divorced from the Party, the danger that the Party's leadership of the state apparatus may be weakened. I spoke about that danger when dealing with the dangers of the Party's degeneration. It is hardly necessary to repeat what has already been said. That danger is fostered by the presence of bourgeois-bureaucratic elements in the state apparatus. It is intensified and aggravated by the growth of the state apparatus and its increased importance. The task is to reduce the state apparatus as much as possible, systematically to expel the elements of bureaucracy and bourgeois decay from it, to place leading Party forces in the key positions of the state apparatus and thus ensure the Party's leadership of it." ("Questions and Answers, June 9, 1925")

Annex

[Pravda newspaper, October 15, 1937](#)



ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ

по выборам в Верховный Совет СССР

_____ 1937 года

_____ округ № _____ по выборам в Совет Союза

Оставьте в избирательном бюллетене фамилию **ОДНОГО** кандидата, за которого Вы голосуете, остальных вычеркните

Фамилия, имя, отчество кандидата
в депутаты

Кем выставлен кандидатом
, в депутаты

Председатель _____ окружной избирательной
комиссии по выборам в Совет Союза _____

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ

по выборам в Верховный Совет СССР

.....1937 года

..... округ № по выборам в Совет Национальностей от.....

(название Автономной республики, области или нацокруга)

Оставьте в избирательном бюллетене фамилию ОДНОГО кандидата, за которого Вы голосуете, остальных вычеркните

Фамилия, имя, отчество кандидата
в депутаты

Кем выставлен кандидатом
в депутаты

Председатель..... окружной избирательной комиссии
по выборам в Совет Национальностей от.....

[Pravda newspaper, November 21, 1937](#)

Что же представляют собой эти бюллетени?

Это — лист бумаги (белый, голубой, светлозеленый), озаглавленный: «Избирательный бюллетень по выборам в Верховный Совет СССР». Под заголовком стоит дата: 12 декабря 1937 года. Лист имеет две графы: в одной отпечатаны фамилии, имена и отчества кандидатов в депутаты (их может быть один или несколько), в другой — указания на постановления общих собраний предприятий, колхозов, совхозов или обществ трудящихся, которые выставили данную кандидатуру.

Sample ballot with alternative candidates:

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ

по выборам в Верховный Совет СССР

6 марта 1937 года

Днепропетровский округ по выборам в Совет Национальностей от УССР

Оставьте в избирательном бюллетене
знак только **ОДНОГО** кандидата, за которо-
го Вы голосуете, остальных вычеркните

Фамилия, имя, отчество кандидата в депутаты	Как выставлен кандидатом в депутаты
1. ПЕТРОВ Иван Семенович	Общее собрание рабочих и служащих завода № 22
2. СЕМЕНОВ Петр Иванович	Общее собрание членов колхоза им. Ленина
3. СИВАНОВ Семен Петрович	Муравлянский Райком ВКП(б) и Райком Комсомола

Председатель Днепропетровской окружной избирательной
комиссии по выборам в Совет Национальностей www.litru.com