

PUBLIC OUTCRY FROM SERBIA

EVIDENCE BRIEF

Conditions Undermining Free and Fair Elections in Serbia

Early parliamentary elections • 25 October 2026

Evidence cut-off: 18 October 2026

Who documents what

Source / mandate	Use in this brief
Civic Initiatives (CI)	Three evidence streams used for different purposes: Tri slobode pod lupom / Izbori pod lupom (Three Freedoms Under the Magnifying Glass / Elections Under the Magnifying Glass) for current civic-space and campaign-environment monitoring; AVtokratija/AUTLAS as the long-term Serbia case study of authoritarian consolidation; REMontuj for public oversight of REM and media-regulatory safeguards.
CRTA	Technical election administration and long-term election observation; candidate registration; voter register; voting abroad; field observation; public-resource misuse; voter pressure; quantitative TV monitoring.
Transparency Serbia (TS)	Political integrity, functionary campaigning, misuse of public resources, campaign-finance and anti-corruption oversight, and compliance by public bodies.
SHARE Foundation	Digital rights and forensic findings; online-media/social-network monitoring; mapping of coordinated propaganda and smear patterns; spyware and cyber incidents.
MLADI / Media Diversity Institute WB	Systematic monitoring of political targeting, labelling and harmful narratives during the election campaign, with the MLADI prate archive used as the main anchor source.
NUNS	NUNS database of attacks and pressures on journalists and media; used as the primary source for journalist-safety patterns and documented campaign-period incidents.
YUCOM	Corroborating incident documentation on physical, legal and digital attacks affecting activists, students and civil society.
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCBP)	Security of the electoral process; police and prosecution; prior documented patterns of selective police conduct; state-capture context relevant to election-day institutional safeguards.
Vreme investigation	Investigative analysis of the leaked progress.rs database and interactive dataset. Used only for what the leaked records and Vreme's analysis establish; not treated as a substitute for election-monitoring methodology.
ODIHR / PACE	Independent international assessment against election standards and corroboration of systemic risks.
BIRN Serbia	Investigative reporting (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network) on party-linked funding and abuse mechanisms. Used as investigative and witness-based material, labelled as such, not as systematic monitoring.
BIRODI	The Bureau for Social Research (BIRODI) conducts continuous monitoring of media coverage during election campaigns, using a fixed sample of flagship news programmes and political affairs shows broadcast by RTS 1, Pink, Prva, Happy, B92, and N1. The monitoring findings are submitted to the relevant institutions in relation to violations of media reporting standards during the pre-election period, the campaigning by officials and the misuse of public resources, discrimination and hate speech, violations of citizens' rights and the failure of public authorities to act, and the withholding of information of public importance and the unlawful use of voters' personal data.
YIHR	Monitoring of denial of 1990s war crimes and glorification of convicted war criminals by authorities and institutions (annual "State of Denial" report). Used as pre-campaign baseline evidence on the public and political use of war-crimes denial and glorification, not as campaign-period election monitoring.
CEPRIS	Analysis of Republic Electoral Commission (REC) and Administrative Court decisions on complaints and appeals during the electoral procedure. Used for electoral dispute resolution and access to legal remedies; findings are preliminary.

Executive summary

- ODIHR and PACE identify unresolved priority concerns involving voter pressure, misuse of state resources, campaign-finance enforcement, media-regulator independence, journalist safety, surveillance and the level playing field (equal conditions).
- The domestic evidence is convergent across organisations with different mandates. CRTA documents technical and field-observation problems; Civic Initiatives contributes current civic-space monitoring, the long-term AVtokratija Serbia case study and REMontuj oversight of the media regulator; Transparency Serbia documents continuing functionary campaigning and public-integrity failures; SHARE and MLADI document systematic digital/media targeting; the NUNS database documents repeated attacks and pressures on journalists; and BCBP analyses election-day security, police and prosecution through its research on institutional capture and prior election-related conduct.
- Transparency Serbia's current monitoring finds that campaigning by public officials continues at full intensity despite recent legal changes. Published findings showed more than 50 promotional activities of the agriculture minister and 73 of the mayor of Niš in the final campaign period.
- SHARE's quantitative research shows anonymous social-media accounts being incorporated into tabloid news production at scale, while MLADI / Media Diversity Institute Western Balkans finds sustained political targeting and harmful narratives directed primarily at the Student List and, increasingly, at CRTA and other critics.
- Vreme's 17 October investigation of a leaked SNS-linked progress.rs database adds a distinct state-resource and digital-propaganda dimension: 1.241 platform users (so called bot accounts) had logged in through networks of 231 public institutions, and 94% of those logins in the detailed data occurred on working days between 07:00 and 16:00. The detailed login records mainly cover 2022-2024, so they do not by themselves prove current public-sector use; however, October 2026 screenshots cited by Vreme indicate that the coordination platform remained operational during the present campaign. The task of these bots is to post comments on articles published by independent media outlets, praising the ruling party and insulting its political opponents, as well as to respond to critics of the regime on social media. According to findings published by Vreme, some of these activities were carried out during working hours at public institutions, meaning that public resources were being used to serve the interests of the ruling party.
- BIRODI has filed as many as 22 complaints with the REM over suspected violations of media laws and secondary legislation identified during the election campaign. REM has received more than 80 complaints to date (so far, Civic Initiatives filed a total of six complaints). Although its professional services have determined that certain complaints contain grounds for initiating proceedings against media that violated the relevant regulations, the REM Council has yet to issue a single decision. Thus, while REM formally exists as a regulatory body, it is effectively deadlocked, as the required quorum of five votes to initiate proceedings cannot be secured, with members earlier connected with the ruling party blocking decisions against media that violate regulations.
- The cumulative effect matters more than any single incident: state-party conflation, unequal access to information, pressure, intimidation and attacks on scrutiny mechanisms all operate before election day and affect whether political preferences can be formed freely and contestants can compete on sufficiently equal terms.
- Long-term systemic context. Civic Initiatives' AVtokratija, the Serbia case study within AUTLAS, compiles longitudinal evidence from civil society, academic research papers, independent institutions, professional associations and investigative media on Serbia's authoritarian consolidation. In this brief it is used as cumulative background evidence about the political system in which the 2026 campaign takes place, not as a substitute for campaign-period monitoring or as proof of individual incidents.

1. Legal framework: late changes and unresolved priority recommendations

Serbia entered the campaign after multiple rounds of election-law changes in 2025 and 2026. ODIHR notes amendments to election legislation, political-finance rules and anti-corruption law, including several adopted under urgent procedure. Some reforms addressed earlier recommendations, but priority recommendations remained unresolved when the campaign began.

- PACE states that amendments to four electoral laws were adopted shortly before the election and did not sufficiently resolve persistent problems, raising concerns about the stability of electoral law.
- ODIHR/PACE identify unresolved issues involving voter pressure, misuse of state resources, effective campaign-finance enforcement, the independence and effectiveness of REM, journalist safety and implementation of safeguards for fundamental freedoms.
- Transparency Serbia concluded before the campaign that key ODIHR recommendations on political finance, state resources and functionary campaigning had not been effectively addressed in law or practice.

2. Candidate registration and support signatures

CRTA monitored more than 170 signature-collection points in over 60 municipalities. Transparency Serbia separately examined the legal duties of municipal administrations and public notaries. Together, the findings show a registration phase affected by unequal channels of access and unresolved legality concerns.

- CRTA documented accounts that signatures for the governing list were prepared or certified without the voter being personally present. These are allegations requiring investigation, not judicial findings.
- Certification channels were highly unequal: 81% of the governing "United Serbia" list's signatures were certified through municipal/city administrations, while 78% of the Student List's signatures were certified before public notaries.
- Transparency Serbia found that many municipal administrations had failed to comply with the statutory obligation to adopt and publish rules governing services provided to political subjects. TS called for publication of records needed to establish whether political actors were treated equally.
- CRTA and PACE also raised concerns about the authenticity or role of some candidate lists and possible abuse of preferential rules for national-minority lists.

3. Voter register: CRTA-established findings only

Scope rule. This section does not reproduce CI, media or political claims about “phantom voters”, identity-card issuance, demographic ratios or unexplained addresses. It contains only conclusions explicitly established and published by CRTA.

- CRTA’s processing of official public snapshots found that the number of registered voters outside Kosovo rose by 6.994 between February and 28 September 2026; more than 6.400 of that net increase was in Belgrade municipalities.
- CRTA expressly states that these public data do not establish that the changes were unlawful. Its conclusion is narrower: the change calls for an explanation and no adequate public explanation had been provided at the time of publication.
- CRTA’s members of the Commission for the Audit of the Unified Voter Register assessed that a comprehensive audit capable of establishing the register’s overall accuracy, completeness and integrity could not be completed before the election under the conditions available.
- The register was closed on 9 October before the audit was completed; the Commission’s first statutory report is due on 28 October, three days after election day.

4. Voting abroad: documented risk of effective disenfranchisement

- Registrations to vote abroad rose to roughly 2,7 times the 2023 level, while the network of polling stations abroad expanded by only about 15% (the largest number of polling stations is in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
- CRTA estimates that around 22.000 registered voters were not covered by the decision establishing polling stations abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not publish clear criteria explaining where stations would or would not open.
- A REC (Republic Electoral Commission) decision requires voting abroad according to Belgrade time, departing from previous practice and forcing some voters on other continents to vote at night or in the early morning.
- PACE described the arrangements as a serious risk of disenfranchising a significant number of Serbian voters abroad and questioned the lack of clear and predictable criteria.
- KRIK’s 21 October investigation, based on recordings, documents and a reporter visit to Vienna, reports that a local association was registering voters for the 25 October elections and handing out SNS-branded gifts, and that callers were told it helps only Vučić supporters. Several citizens also described problems with their applications at the Serbian Embassy, the only body authorised to register voters.

5. State resources and campaigning by public officials

This is one of the strongest areas of cross-source convergence: CRTA, Transparency Serbia, CI and ODIHR document or assess the blurring of state and party activity, though each does so through a different methodology. Vreme’s new investigation adds evidence about the historic use of public-institution networks for organised party propaganda.

- CRTA recorded 321 cases with elements of misuse of public office or public resources in the first three weeks of the campaign; the number increased by 70% from the first to the third week. Every third recorded activity of the governing list contained elements of a possible breach or manipulation of law.
- Transparency Serbia’s monitoring, published 14 October, concluded that campaigning by public officials was continuing “with undiminished intensity” despite recent legal changes. While regulations allow such activities if planned way earlier, the norms are extensively misused for campaigning. Published plans included more than 50 promotional activities by the agriculture minister for the campaign period and 73 activities by the mayor of Niš between 5 and 25 October.
- TS also identified promotional activities outside the published plans and filed complaints with the Agency for Prevention of Corruption. A complaint is not treated here as proof of a violation; the documented point is the observed activity and the filing of an oversight request.
- CI’s first “Elections Under the Magnifying Glass” report documented a letter distributed to pensioners through the PIO Fund in which the then president, also the governing party’s prime-ministerial candidate, promoted government achievements and attacked the opposing side. CI treated the use of the institutional distribution channel as an early example of functionary campaigning.
- ODIHR and CRTA highlight almost EUR 1 billion in one-off public payments to adult citizens, pensioners and other groups around and during the campaign. The concern is the scale, timing and promotional use, not the proposition that social payments are inherently unlawful.
- Vreme’s analysis of the leaked ruling party bot platform progress.rs database found 1.241 users who had logged in through networks belonging to 231 public institutions. In the detailed data, 94% of such logins occurred on working days between 07:00 and 16:00. Vreme reports that the detailed records mainly cover 2022–2024; this establishes a documented historical overlap between public-sector infrastructure/working time and organised party propaganda.
- Vreme also cites screenshots from the progress.rs administration panel dated October 2026 indicating that the centrally coordinated system itself remains operational during the current campaign, including tasks directed at students, opposition actors and independent media.
- BIRN’s 17 October investigation reports that the Directorate for Diaspora within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid at least EUR 250.000 over three years to diaspora associations in North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia that publicly support the SNS or promote right-wing narratives. One association received EUR 3.400 thirty-eight days before a rally supporting Aleksandar Vučić; members of another were filmed working in an SNS call centre during the 2024 local elections. BIRN does not show that the funds were used for political purposes; the Ministry did not respond and one association head denied any political purpose. This is investigative reporting on public spending, included as context only.

6. Pressure, civic freedoms and freedom of political participation

The evidence here comes from both election observation and civic-space monitoring. GI is treated as a primary source for documented restrictions on expression, assembly and association; CRTA remains the source for election-observation patterns such as voter pressure and clientelism.

- CRTA recorded 122 cases containing suspicions of pressure, clientelism, buying support or misuse of personal data. Many rely on witness accounts and therefore require institutional investigation, but the recurrence of similar patterns across locations is relevant to the freedom of political choice.
- CI's "Elections Under the Magnifying Glass" monitoring recorded recurring reports of political pressure on employees, particularly in public enterprises, pressure and threats directed at journalists and candidates, and a campaign environment increasingly marked by tension and violence as election day approached.
- CI's "Three Freedoms Under the Magnifying Glass" reports immediately before and at the start of the campaign documented continued targeting of journalists, students, academics and activists, dismissals and pressures in education, and obstacles to public assembly. These findings provide a pre-campaign baseline showing that the restrictive environment did not begin on the formal first day of campaigning.
- YUCOM's incident-monitoring platform provides supplementary documentation of physical, legal and digital attacks affecting activists, students and civil society in 2026.
- In a 13 October interview (updated 15 October), BIRN published the account of a named former SNS activist who says he organised paid enforcers and was paid to pressure "safe voters" to turn out. This is the uncorroborated account of a single, self-implicated witness; the individuals he named declined to comment or denied knowing him. The Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime has launched a pre-investigation procedure in connection with this interview with a former member of the SNS.

7. Violence, intimidation, surveillance and journalist safety

- CI documented 29 cases of violations of freedom of expression, five violations of freedom of assembly, and nine violations of freedom of association during the pre-election period, as of 16 October. The individuals associated with the Student List were the primary victims of these violations.
- CRTA recorded 49 reports of physical or verbal violence across at least 16 cities and municipalities during the first three campaign weeks, alongside a broader category of obstruction, negative campaigning and violence.
- SHARE Foundation confirmed that at least 14 people in Serbia had been targeted with advanced spyware since the start of 2026, including members of the student movement, activists, an MP and a local opposition councillor. SHARE described this as the largest documented wave of such targeting in Serbia to date.
- On 6 October, SHARE reported that forensic analysis by Citizen Lab had confirmed a successful Pegasus infection on student Jelena Kontić's phone; her lawyers filed a criminal complaint seeking investigation of unidentified BIA and police personnel and NSO Group representatives. The criminal complaint itself is an allegation; the infection is a technical finding.
- The NUNS database of attacks and pressures on journalists documents repeated campaign-period threats, physical attacks, obstruction and intimidation affecting journalists and media workers. It is used here as the primary journalist-safety source rather than individual organisational reactions to particular incidents.
- FemPlatz database on violent incidents against women in relation to their right to freedom of assembly and association shows that the attack on women activists and politicians doubled since the announcement of snap parliamentary elections - 23 incidents were recorded (physical violence, sexual, digital) and 30% of those were perpetrated by local officials or civil servants close to the ruling party.

8. Security of the electoral process: police and prosecution

BCBP's 29 September election-security analysis does not claim that police or prosecutors have already acted unlawfully in the current parliamentary campaign.

- BCBP's Dnevnik zarobljene države documents a prior pattern of selective police conduct during local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić, including failures to react to intimidation, violence and obstruction of journalists, alongside interventions against citizens reporting irregularities. These are findings about earlier elections and are used here as documented background risk, which points to a systematic pattern of institutional inaction.
- In its 29 September 2026 analysis, BCBP assesses that previous electoral experience and current political tensions create a risk of manipulation and violence on election day. It recommends clear local channels of communication with police and prosecutors and insistence on individual and institutional responsibility as practical safeguards.

9. Media inequality, political targeting and digital propaganda

The media problem is documented through multiple independent methodologies: broadcast airtime monitoring, online-media corpus analysis, harmful-narrative coding, digital-forensics research and investigative analysis of a leaked party-coordination database.

- CRTA's national-TV monitoring for 5-11 October found that the ruling majority received 77% of political airtime compared with 23% for the opposition; Aleksandar Vučić alone received 29%, more than the entire opposition. CRTA also reported that 98% of paid political advertising on monitored national television went to the ruling majority.

- SHARE's case study on CRTA identified 130 articles referring to the election observer in a markedly negative context from 1 September to 4 October. The study found that attacks focused on identity, motives and legitimacy rather than reasoned methodological criticism, and traced escalation from delegitimisation to calls for criminalisation and arrest.
- SHARE analysed 19.768 political articles published by 25 online media outlets between 10 September and 11 October. Eleven anonymous X accounts were embedded or referenced 791 times. One anonymous account was embedded by Pink 360 times and was the sole named source in 294 articles; in 16 cases, the Pink article was timestamped before the tweet it purported to cite. SHARE states that the data do not establish who controlled the account, but they document a highly unusual production pattern.
- MLADI / Media Diversity Institute Western Balkans recorded 133 items containing political targeting or harmful narratives on four portals from 25 September to 1 October. From 2 to 8 October it recorded 126 cases across the same portals plus the main news programmes of Pink, Prva and RTS; in 112 of the 126 cases the media outlet itself was the initiator of the targeting discourse.
- YIHR's annual "State of Denial" report (22 June 2026, covering 2025) records at least 110 cases of denial of 1990s war crimes by Serbian authorities and institutions, including at least 60 cases of glorification of ten convicted war criminals; it describes the 2025 state-honoured burial of Nebojša Pavković as a "dangerous precedent". The report does not itself cover the 2026 campaign and is cited as a baseline for the political climate in which the campaign takes place. YIHR will publish a report covering 2026 after elections.

Leaked progress.rs data: organised amplification and foreign political accounts

Vreme's 17 October investigation describes progress.rs (ruling party bot platform) as a centrally managed system with more than 7.300 registered users and more than 32.000 registered X accounts in the leaked database, with shifts, tasks, scoring and supervision. The detailed historical records analysed by Vreme cover earlier periods, while screenshots from October 2026 indicate that the system remained active during the current campaign.

The interactive Vreme database also shows that the system was used not only for attacks but for coordinated positive engagement with selected foreign political accounts. The chart reports the following confirmed likes and reposts:

Account	Confirmed likes/reposts
Milorad Dodik (@miloraddodik)	3.240
Viktor Orbán (@pm_viktororban)	2.993
Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	2.913
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (@rterdogan)	2.650
Antony Blinken (@SecBlinken)	1.509
Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (@RobertKennedyJr)	1.111
Dimitar Kovačevski (@dkovachevski)	945
Council of the EU – TV (@eucounciltvnews)	937
Olivér Várhelyi (@OliverVarhelyi)	715
Tucker Carlson (@TuckerCarlson)	611

10. Weak or delayed institutional oversight

- Civic Initiatives' REMontuj public oversight platform records that, as of 10 October, the REM Council was operating with eight of nine members; the first monitoring report covering 9-23 September had not been adopted; and at the 9 October session the Council did not decide key complaints involving Informer, Prva, B92 and K1. REMontuj also records that election monitoring covered 11 television programmes and that a proposal to expand the sample did not receive a majority.
- CRTA independently reported that fifteen days into the campaign REM had not published its first monitoring report and criticised continued reliance on the 2023 monitoring sample, including the exclusion of Informer TV despite its prominent role in the current campaign. The REMontuj record and CRTA monitoring therefore converge on delayed and incomplete media-regulatory safeguards during the campaign.
- ODIHR reported that the Agency for Prevention of Corruption had deployed monitors and issued guidance but had not yet initiated timely enforcement measures during the campaign.
- CRTA filed 19 complaints with the Agency during the first half of the campaign and reported no response by the time its interim report was finalised. Transparency Serbia has also filed a series of campaign-related complaints; these are evidence of activated oversight mechanisms, not proof that every alleged violation occurred.
- By contrast, ODIHR notes that the Republic Electoral Commission has generally met legal deadlines and holds public, streamed sessions. The problem documented here is therefore not blanket institutional collapse, but weak or delayed enforcement in several safeguards that matter most for incumbency advantage, media conduct and pressure.
- CEPRIS's preliminary analysis, presented on 20 October, found 61 complaints to the REC in the observed period, about three times more than in the same phase of the last parliamentary elections. The REC dismissed 6, rejected 17 and upheld 2; the rest were withdrawn or pending. Of 13 appeals to the Administrative Court, 12 were rejected and one dismissed. CEPRIS noted a pronounced tendency towards a formalistic approach, a narrow reading of the REC's own competence, and that the Court decided appeals in non-public sessions, which it says conflicts with earlier ODIHR recommendations. The complaints concerned the proclamation of lists, the composition of polling boards, voting abroad, and whether the list leader could run while serving as President.

11. Evidence matrix: major integrity risks and source convergence

Area	Established problem / risk	Main sources	Evidence type
Legal framework	Late changes; priority recommendations unresolved	ODIHR / PACE / TS	International assessment + legal analysis
Candidate registration	Unequal certification channels; legality/equality concerns	CRTA / TS / PACE	Systematic observation + statutory-compliance analysis
Voter register	CRTA-established findings only; audit incomplete before election	CRTA	Systematic analysis of official data
Voting abroad	Polling network and timing rules create disenfranchisement risk	CRTA / PACE	Administrative decisions + observer analysis
State resources	Functionary campaign, official/party overlap, public benefits; historic use of public-institution networks for party propaganda	CRTA / TS / CI / ODIHR / Vreme	Field monitoring + integrity monitoring + investigative database analysis
Voter/employee pressure	Recurring pressure/clientelism patterns and employee testimony	CRTA / CI	Field observation + civic-space monitoring
Surveillance	14 people confirmed targeted with advanced spyware; one confirmed Pegasus infection	SHARE	Technical / forensic findings
Media inequality	77/23 TV airtime split; propaganda/targeting patterns across digital and broadcast media	CRTA / SHARE / MLADI / BIRODI	Quantitative and qualitative media monitoring
Coordinated digital manipulation	Centralised bot infrastructure, public-sector-network logins in historic data, and coordinated amplification of selected foreign accounts	Vreme / SHARE / MLADI	Investigative leaked-data analysis + digital/media monitoring
Journalist safety	Repeated threats, obstruction, cyber attacks and campaign-event interference	NUNS / CI	NUNS database + civic-space monitoring
Observer/civil society safety	Smear and criminalisation campaigns targeting election scrutiny	SHARE / ODIHR / CI	Systematic media monitoring + observer assessment
Election-day security	Impartial police/prosecution response is a critical safeguard; prior elections provide documented evidence of selective police conduct and non-response to intimidation/violence	BCBP	Election-security analysis + state-capture chronology
Oversight	Delayed/weak REM and anti-corruption enforcement	ODIHR / CRTA / TS / REMontuj / CEPRIS	Institutional record + monitoring

12. What can still be done before election day

The problems above are not all remediable before 25 October, but several safeguards can still reduce harm and demonstrate that documented violations will have consequences:

- REM should publish complete monitoring data without delay, monitor all relevant national-impact broadcasters and act on documented breaches of election-coverage rules.
- The Agency for Prevention of Corruption should publish reasoned decisions on pending complaints and take timely enforcement action on misuse of public resources, public office and political finance.
- The Interior Ministry and prosecutors should report publicly on action taken in cases involving campaign violence, threats to journalists and observers, and documented spyware targeting.
- Public institutions and officials should cease using official events, institutional distribution channels, public works, public-sector infrastructure and discretionary benefits for party promotion during the remaining campaign.
- Authorities should ensure that journalists, accredited observers, civil-society monitors and campaign activists can operate without obstruction, threats or retaliatory investigations.
- The EU, its Member States, the European Parliament, ODIHR/PACE partners and democratic governments should maintain visible political attention through election day and immediately afterwards and make clear that documented breaches of electoral standards will have political consequences.

The evidence is no longer dependent on one observer, one dataset or one category of abuse. Independent organisations using different methods are documenting overlapping problems in state-party separation, public integrity, media pluralism, civic freedoms, digital safety, journalist safety, security-sector impartiality and institutional enforcement. The Vreme investigation adds evidence of a long-standing organised digital infrastructure that has intersected with public-sector networks and has been used for centrally coordinated amplification. The question is not whether any single irregularity proves the election result; it is whether the cumulative conditions allow citizens to choose freely and contestants to compete on sufficiently equal terms.

Primary Sources

OSCE/ODIHR — Interim Report, 9 October 2026: <https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/668547>

PACE — Pre-electoral delegation assessment, 14 October 2026:

<https://pace.coe.int/en/news/10465/a-pace-pre-electoral-delegation-highlights-a-highly-polarised-campaign-ahead-of-serbia-s-early-parliamentary-elections>

CRTA — First interim report / long-term election observation: <https://cрта.plus/updates/eom-ir-first-interim-report/>

CRTA — Course of the election campaign: <https://cрта.plus/updates/eom-ir-course-of-the-campaign/>

CRTA — Candidate registration / support signatures:

<https://cрта.plus/updates/signatures-certified-without-the-voter-present-crtas-findings-from-the-candidacy-process/>

CRTA — Voter register (the only source used here for voter-register findings): <https://cрта.plus/updates/eom-ir-voter-register/>

CRTA — Polling stations / voting abroad: <https://cрта.plus/updates/eom-ir-polling-stations/>

CRTA — Media and information: <https://cрта.plus/updates/eom-ir-media-and-information/>

Civic Initiatives — Tri slobode pod lupom / Izbori pod lupom monitoring archive:

<https://www.gradjanske.org/category/vesti/tri-slobode-pod-lupom/>

Civic Initiatives — AUTLAS / AVtokratija, Serbia case study and research base: <https://autlas.net/>

Civic Initiatives — REMontuj, public oversight of REM and 2026 election monitoring: <https://www.remontuj.tv/>

Transparency Serbia — Monitoring izbornih procesa portal (reports, monitoring and documentation): <https://izbori.transparentnost.org.rs/>

Transparency Serbia — Functionary-campaign methodology and archive: <https://izbori.transparentnost.org.rs/funkcionerska-kampanja/>

SHARE Foundation — Elections 2026: Between Online Media and the Feed (monitoring methodology and weekly findings):

<https://sharefoundation.info/en/elections-2026-between-online-media-and-the-feed/>

SHARE Foundation — CRTA in the Crosshairs (case study): <https://sharefoundation.info/en/cрта-in-the-crosshairs/>

SHARE Foundation — Social networks as a source: from post to news and back (data study):

<https://sharefoundation.info/mreze-kao-izvor-od-objave-do-vesti-i-nazad/>

SHARE Foundation — Advanced-spyware targeting (technical/digital-forensics documentation):

<https://sharefoundation.info/en/share-foundation-students-and-opposition-politicians-targeted-by-spyware/>

MLADI / Media Diversity Institute Western Balkans — MLADI prate monitoring archive: <https://www.mladi.org.rs/category/mladi-prate/>

NUNS — Database of attacks and pressures on journalists and media: <https://nuns.rs/baza-nuns/>

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy — How citizens can wake up the police and judiciary on election day? (election-security analysis, 29 September 2026): <https://bezbednost.org/publikacija/kako-gradjani-mogu-da-probude-policiju-i-pravosudje-na-izborni-dan/>

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy — Dnevnik zarobljene države (state-capture chronology and documented institutional conduct): <https://zarobljavanje.bezbednost.org/>

Belgrade Centre for Security Policy — Selective police conduct during local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić:

<https://zarobljavanje.bezbednost.org/selektivno-postupanje-policije-tokom-lokalnih-izbora-u-zajecaru-i-kosjericu/>

YUCOM — Incident map / monitoring platform (supplementary): <https://yucom.org.rs/inmap/>

Vreme — Paid with public money, they work for SNS (investigative leaked-data analysis, English):

<https://vreme.com/en/vesti/sns-botovi-javne-institucije-radno-vreme-drzavna-plata/>

Vreme — Interactive database: public institutions used by SNS bot accounts (English):

<https://vreme.com/en/vesti/baza-podataka-pogledajte-iz-kojih-javnih-ustanova-tvituju-botovi-sns/>

Vreme — SNS Bot Factory: shifts, tasks and points (English): <https://vreme.com/en/vesti/sns-botovi-aleksandar-vucic-radni-dan-zadaci/>

BIRN — Confession of an SNS member (13 Oct 2026, updated 15 Oct):

<https://birn.rs/ispovest-clana-sns-a-kako-se-organizuju-i-placaju-sns-batinasi-i-kupuju-glasovi/>

BIRN — MFA funds to associations supporting the SNS (17 Oct 2026): <https://birn.rs/novac-od-msp-udruzenijima-koja-podrzavaju-sns/>

KRIK — Secret recordings prove manipulation of voter registration in Vienna (21 Oct 2026):

<https://www.krik.rs/tajni-snimci-dokazuju-manipulacije-u-vezi-sa-prijavlivanjem-za-glasanje-u-becu/>

FemPlatz - Women and Elections 2026 (Lists, quotas, election campaigns) <https://femplatz.org/index.php?n140> and Media monitoring: Representation and Role of Women in the Election process [2026-09-26_Media_monitoring_Report_1.pdf](https://femplatz.org/index.php?n140)

YIHR — State of Denial, Serbia 2025: War criminals as distinguished citizens (annual report, 22 June 2026):

<https://yihr.rs/bhs/vlasti-u-srbiji-tokom-2025-godine-najmanje-110-puta-poricali-ratne-zloceine-iz-devedesetih/>

CEPRIS — Analysis of REC and Administrative Court decisions on complaints and appeals (presented 20 Oct 2026):

<https://www.cepris.org/istrazivanja-i-analize/predstavljena-cepris-ova-analiza-odluka-republike-izborne-komisije-i-upravnog-suda-po-prigovoru-ima-i-zalbama-tokom-izbornog-postupka/>