Contents

Russia Aggression DA

Negative

1NC Shell

A. Uniqueness: Putin is pushing back against increasing NATO's imperial ambitions now. He will respond to increases in NATO's power and control by force.

Al Jazeera on June 29, 2022

("Putin condemns NATO's 'imperial ambitions', warns Finland, Sweden," Al Jazeera, 29 Jun 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/29/putin-condemns-natos-imperial-ambitions-warns-finland-sweden, VY)

Russian President Vladimir Putin has condemned NATO's "imperial ambitions", accusing the military alliance of seeking to assert its "supremacy" through the Ukraine conflict. The Russian leader also said on Wednesday that he would respond in kind if NATO deployed troops and infrastructure in Finland and Sweden after the two Nordic countries join the military alliance. Putin made his comment a day after NATO member Turkey lifted its veto over the bid by Finland and Sweden to join the alliance when the three nations agreed to protect each other's security. Helsinki and Stockholm joining NATO marks one of the biggest shifts in European security in decades. "With Sweden and Finland, we don't have the problems that we have with Ukraine. They want to join NATO, go ahead," Putin told Russian state television after talks with regional leaders in the central Asian ex-Soviet state of Turkmenistan. "But they must understand there was no threat before, while now, if military contingents and infrastructure are deployed there, we will have to respond in kind and create the same threats for the territories from which threats towards us are created," he said. Moscow's relations with Helsinki and Stockholm would inevitably sour over their NATO membership, he added. **"Everything was fine between us, but now there might be some tensions, there certainly will,"** Putin said. "It's inevitable if there is a threat to us." 'Shattered peace in Europe' Putin also denied that Moscow's forces were responsible for a missile raid on a crowded shopping centre in the Ukrainian town of Kremenchuk earlier this week, in which at least 18 people were killed and many remain missing in the rubble. "Our army does not attack any civilian infrastructure sites. We have every capability of knowing what is situated where," Putin told a news conference in the Turkmenistan capital of Ashgabat. "I am convinced that this time, everything was done in this exact manner," Putin said. Ukraine accuses Russia of targeting the shopping centre and civilian shoppers. **Putin made his comment as NATO on Wednesday branded Russia the biggest "direct threat" to Western security after its invasion of Ukraine.** The military alliance also agreed on plans to modernise Kyiv's beleaguered armed forces, saying it stood fully behind Ukrainians' "heroic defence of their country". "President Putin's war against Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and has created the biggest security crisis in Europe since the Second World War," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference. **"NATO has responded with strength and unity,"** he said.

B. Link: An increase in NATO cooperation is what causes escalation in Ukraine. O'Connor and Jamali 2022

("Russia Could Launch Cyber Attacks Against U.S. if Biden Sends Wrong Signals, Intel Warns," Tom O'Connor And Naveed Jamali, 1/24/22, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-could-launch-cyber-attacks-against-us-if-biden-sends-wrong-signals-intel-warns-1672280, VY, **2 page card**)

In a new memo obtained by Newsweek, **the Department of Homeland Security has warned of Russia's potential to launch cyberattacks against the United States in response to a possible escalation of the crisis unfolding at the border with Ukraine. "We assess that Russia would consider initiating a cyber attack against the Homeland if it perceived a US or NATO response to a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine threatened its long-term national security,"** the memo, dated January 23 and attributed to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, reads in bold text. The warning came as President Joe Biden sent additional weapons to Ukrainian forces and reportedly weighed the option of sending thousands of U.S. troops to the Baltic states bordering Russia over concerns that Moscow was planning imminent military action against Ukraine. Kyiv has defied the Kremlin's protests by seeking membership in the NATO Western military alliance, something that Russian officials have said threatened their country's national security. The bloc has expanded eastward since the fall of the Soviet Union three decades ago and has refused to rule out including Ukraine as well. **The memo detailed a range of ways in which Russia may choose to unleash its cyber arsenal in the event of a flare-up** while noting such an action would be unprecedented. "Russia maintains a range of offensive cyber tools that it could employ against US networks — from low-level denials-of-service to destructive attacks targeting critical infrastructure," the memo read. "However, we assess that Russia's threshold for conducting disruptive or destructive cyber attacks in the Homeland probably remains very high and we have not observed Moscow directly employ these types of cyber attacks against US critical infrastructure — notwithstanding cyber espionage and potential prepositioning operations in the past." Reached for comment, a spokesperson for the Department of Homeland Security told Newsweek said it "regularly shares information with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials and the private sector to ensure the safety and security of all communities across the country." "We have increased operational partnerships between private sector companies and the federal government to strengthen our nation's cyber defenses, including through CISA's newly established Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC)," the spokesperson said. "The JCDC brings these partners together to help us understand the full threat landscape and enable real-time collaboration to empower our private sector partners to gain information and take action against the most significant threats to the nation." The memo, which was first reported on by CNN, has already generated reactions from experts and former officials, some of whom expressed concern that a wider conflagration could erupt. Alexander Vindman, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served as director for European Affairs at the National Security Council under former President Donald Trump, said the Biden administration has tried to "keep the U.S. out of bilateral confrontation" with Russia, and "that's why they kind of took this approach limited to diplomacy" as the U.S. leader ruled out the deployment of U.S. soldiers to Ukraine itself. "Already we see that's eroding," Vindman, who was reassigned from his position in early 2020 following his testimony to lawmakers regarding a controversial call between Trump and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky, told Newsweek. "Already we see the risks in a full-spectrum type of scenario, starting out kind of low-end with regards to cyber operations, those risks are increasing." **And if these risks turn kinetic, he warned such an escalation could pass the point of no return.** "Once the shots are fired, there is no putting the genie back in the bottle," Vindman said. One former U.S. intelligence analyst said Russian President Vladimir Putin was likely calculating these risks as he planned his next moves vis-à-vis the situation in Ukraine and deterring U.S. actions. "Russia certainly has the ability to carry out cyber attacks against U.S. systems, but also very much wants to avoid direct confrontation with the United States through deliberate acts that might result in their loss of 'escalation control,'" the former intelligence analyst told Newsweek. "Attacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure systems would almost certainly prompt more serious reprisals from the Biden administration, something Putin wants to avoid, as he'll likely seek to keep conflict confined to Ukraine." Given past cyber attacks Washington has attributed to Moscow and the current level of escalation, however, others emphasized a need to reinforce digital defenses. "Russia has telegraphed that they are willing to attack critical infrastructure here in the U.S.," Brian Harrell, who served as former Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection before his resignation in August 2020, told Newsweek. "The private sector should work to understand enemy tactics, including spear-phishing and brute force attacks while conducting proactive threat hunting efforts," he added. "We have absolutely entered a heightened period of awareness given the threats that have been made and the demonstrated attacks we've seen from the Russian GRU and Foreign Intelligence Service." Mike McNerney, who serves as senior vice president of security at Resilience Insurance, a San Francisco-based firm that offers cybersecurity and insurance services, commended the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency for having set out to prepare the private sector for such attacks, regardless of their origin. "CISA is absolutely doing the right thing by telling US companies to be prepared against cyber threats," McNerney told Newsweek. "While Russia is unlikely to escalate tensions with the U.S. right now by launching cyber attacks here, there is also the possibility of opportunistic attacks from criminal groups." Kyiv has already accused Moscow of employing covert cyber tactics throughout the course of the current dispute, which first began to grab global attention in March of last year and then again in November as up to 100,000 Russian troops amassed near the country's restive border with Ukraine, where Russia-aligned separatists have been active since 2014. An apparent cyber attack gripped the post-Soviet Eastern European state earlier this month, but Russian officials have dismissed any allegations their government was behind the incident. "We are nearly accustomed to the fact that Ukrainians are blaming everything on Russia, even their bad weather," Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters last week, according to the state-run Tass Russian News Agency. As Washington and Moscow struggle to find common ground in talks,

the Biden administration has also publicly the likelihood of Russia waging cyberwarfare, though often in the context of actions that would target Ukraine itself. In an interview with NBC News on Sunday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that "in the event that there is a renewed Russian incursion, Russian forces going into Ukraine, there is going to be a swift, a severe, and united response" and also threatened such a reaction in response to other things "Russia could do short of sending forces into Ukraine again to try to destabilize or topple the government – cyber attacks, hybrid means, et cetera." In Ukraine, officials have sought to downplay the threat of any major escalation on the horizon, even as three embassies in Kyiv, those of Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S., sent diplomats out of the country. On Monday, Ukrainian National Security Council Secretary Alexey Danilov called on those in the media "to turn down the heat." That same day, Peskov too criticized what he called "information hysteria" when it came to the situation between Russia and Ukraine. **He placed the blame on the U.S. and NATO,** however, **and said Western powers were also responsible for real-world provocations as well. "As for concrete actions, we see the statements published by NATO about the increase of the contingent and relocations of forces and means to the eastern flank,"** Peskov said. **"All this leads to an escalation of tensions."**

C. Internal Link and Impact: Escalation in Ukraine leads to nuclear war between NATO and Russia. Russia nuclear weapons are already on high-alert and would lead to escalation by NATO countries.
Hill 2022

("Is Russia increasingly likely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine?," Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History, University of Calgary, May 9, 2022, https://theconversation.com/is-russia-increasingly-likely-to-use-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-182368, VY)

At the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin reminded the West that Russia had nuclear weapons by putting them on "special combat readiness." Putin's actions suggested that Russia was considering their use, even though actually launching them was a remote possibility. In precisely what circumstances Russia might use nuclear weapons was left vague — Putin's intent was presumably to frighten NATO and discourage its intervention on behalf of Ukraine. Since then, much has changed — and not for the better in terms of the risk of nuclear war. Although NATO hasn't sent troops to fight in Ukraine, the West has implemented increasingly tough economic sanctions against Russia and provided Ukraine with military equipment like tanks. **NATO is now involved in what is, in essence, a full-fledged proxy war against Russia.** Not only have NATO nations — particularly the United States — provided Ukraine with an array of different weapons, but they are clearly helping Ukraine with other elements of its war effort, including intelligence — some of which has been used to target Russian generals. Ukraine emboldened From the failure to take Kyiv to the plodding pace of Soviet gains in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, the war has not gone according to plan. Russia has taken heavy losses due to the intense Ukrainian resistance. Russian troops will likely dig in and seek to consolidate their gains in the east. Reasserting independence from Ukraine for the separatist regions — backed up by troops on the ground — could be presented by Putin as a Russian win. He could then declare his "special military operation" over. Ukraine could subsequently reach some sort of peace agreement with Russia involving loss of territory — one that probably wouldn't be much different from the sort of agreement that could be negotiated today. Currently there is no sign of Ukrainian inclination to negotiate over the Donbas region. Nor is Ukraine willing to formally give up Crimea, seized by Russia in 2014 after the pro-western and anti-Russian Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made clear his war aim is to liberate all Ukrainian territory in Russian hands, including Crimea. His NATO backers — most vocally the U.S., the U.K. and Canada — are willing to provide Ukraine with the means to do so. These countries hope to see Russia come out of this war significantly weakened as a regional power. The Russian nuclear threat While committing NATO forces directly to Ukraine is unlikely, some hawkish western commentators have suggested NATO could do so without Russia retaliating with nuclear weapons. Even though Russia raised the spectre of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the war, as it progressed, Russian sources suggested that nuclear weapons would only be used in the event of an existential threat to Russia. Recent Russian nuclear sabre-rattling — such as the testing and deployment of more advanced missiles or Russian TV segments showing the impact of a nuclear attack on the U.K. — is undoubtedly cause for concern, but it doesn't make the use of nuclear weapons significantly more likely in the short term. What would? If the war was to turn in Ukraine's favour and Ukrainian forces started not only to recapture swaths of territory in the east, but to threaten the separatist regions — or Crimea. **Some western observers have suggested that Russia might employ an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy in such circumstances, using tactical nuclear weapons.** Launching them in territory likely to be held by the enemy, instead of where Russia hopes to retain control, makes a lot more sense. **If the war escalates to the point where a western-backed Ukraine threatens territory Putin considers to be Russian, then the chances of nuclear weapons being employed would increase dramatically.** The problem of Crimea Zelenskyy has suggested that Ukraine will not stop fighting until Crimea is in Ukrainian hands. But for Putin and many Russians, Crimea is Russian. Crimea's incorporation into Ukraine in 1954 is often seen as a historical accident, rather than an expression of Crimea being ethnically Ukrainian. Crimea's Tatar population was largely displaced by ethnic Russians — not Ukrainians — and it has a long history as Russian. From Leo Tolstoy's Sevastpol Sketches, for example, to Vasily Aksyonov's 1970s novel The Island of Crimea, Crimea is widely represented in Russian literature. A credible western-backed threat to Crimea would undoubtedly constitute the sort of existential threat to Russian territory that would dramatically increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used. A distant but increased nuclear threat **Putin's frustration over Ukrainian resilience and western support is clearly increasing — recent nuclear posturing is evidence of that. The nuclear threat has been increasing** since February, even if the use of nuclear weapons probably isn't imminent. **Even the use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons by Russia would likely provoke some sort of western response. Such a response would then increase the likelihood of further escalation. Informed estimates suggest Russia has more than 1,900 non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The threshold for their use is lower than for larger nuclear weapons. The sort of scenarios that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons are outside the immediate confines Putin's war in Ukraine.** It would require a significant deterioration in Russian fortunes — and greater western involvement in the conflict. Nonetheless, **not since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 or nuclear tensions in the early 1980s has the spectre of potential nuclear war loomed so large in the future.** Back in 1962, politicians on all sides ultimately showed their statesman-like qualities and stepped back from their threat to employ nuclear weapons. We can only hope that their successors will do the same over Ukraine.

2NC/1NR Uniqueness Extension

Putin is warning against increased NATO forces now. He will respond with force. Smith 2022

("Defiant Putin goes to war in Ukraine with a warning for U.S., NATO," Alexander Smith, Feb. 24, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin-war-warning-us-nato-rcna17497 , VY)

When war came to Europe on Thursday, it was delivered with terrifying force and a blunt warning. **After months of military buildup, thinly veiled threats and frenzied speculation, the scale of Russian President Vladimir Putin's plans was finally made clear.** In a pre-dawn address on Russian television, Putin announced that he was attacking Ukraine, a sovereign democracy on his doorstep. The barrage started minutes later — a moment the United States and its have allies have predicted for weeks, but which nonetheless reverberated throughout the international order. Putin's speech contained a chilling warning to any countries thinking of leaping to Ukraine's defense in the face of a Russian invasion: Intervene and you will face the full force of the Kremlin's nuclear arsenal. **"I decided to conduct a special military operation," Putin said,** wearing a suit and a red tie and sitting behind his now-familiar desk, flanked by two Russian flags and a cluster of retro-looking telephones. **Russia "is today one of the most powerful nuclear powers in the world," he added, as if Washington, London and Paris needed reminding of his world-largest arsenal. "No one should have any doubts that a direct attack on our country will lead to defeat and dire consequences for any potential aggressor."**

2NC/1NR Generic Link Extension

The expansion of NATO risks destabilizing Russia, not taming them.

Ellyatt and Macias on June 29, 2022

("Russia calls NATO expansion deal 'destabilizing'; Ukraine releases footage of deadly mall strike," Holly Ellyatt and Amanda Macias, Jun 29, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/29/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html, VY)

The Western military organization NATO has officially invited Sweden and Finland to join the alliance in a historic move on Wednesday. The development comes after the alliance reached a deal with Turkey to accept the membership bids from both countries after initial objections from Ankara. **The summit** — arguably the most important meeting of the alliance in recent months, and perhaps years — **has also seen the alliance reiterate its condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, pledge to beef up its defenses in Europe, and slam China as posing a "challenge" to its interests.** NATO's Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced earlier in the week that the Western military organization would increase the number of troops within its rapid response force — which comprises land, air, sea and special forces units that are capable of being deployed quickly — to 300,000 from about 40,000 personnel. **Russia has issued an initial reaction to the NATO deal that allows its expansion to go ahead, roughly doubling the land border Russia will have to share with NATO members, with one official calling it "a purely destabilizing factor."**

2NC/1NR Disinformation Link Extension

If United States increases cyber protections, Russia will attack.

Melendez 2022

("What a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. could look like and how it could affect you," Steven Melendez, Fast Company February 25, 2022, https://www.fastcompany.com/90725292/what-a-russian-cyberattack-on-the-u-s-could-look-like-and-how-it-could-affect-you, NAUDL)

As President Biden intensifies sanctions against Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine, experts warn that cyberattacks against public and private targets in the United States are a possibility. The Department of Homeland Security this week warned U.S. organizations to be prepaBCred for a cyberattack, though DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said there is no "specific credible cyber threat" against the U.S. homeland. **Officials in the U.K. issued a similar warning.** Government and banking sites in Ukraine are believed to have already been hit by Russian digital attacks. Exactly what form any hacks in the U.S. may take remains to be seen: CNN reports that the **FBI warned local governments and companies to be on the watch for ransomware. Ransomware attacks, like the one that crippled the Colonial Pipeline last year—causing sporadic gasoline shortages—are typically launched by independent hackers in Russia trying to make money, not by government agents. But ransomware groups typically operate with some tacit approval from the regime of Vladimir Putin, and the Russian government may be more tolerant of hacks on major Western targets if tensions continue to ramp up.** Since so much infrastructure is tied to networked computers that can be deliberately or unintentionally targeted by ransomware, such attacks in the past have disrupted everything from the fuel pipeline to shipping to schools and hospitals. **Even attacks on Ukrainian targets could unintentionally spread malware to computers in the U.S. and other countries as happened with the NotPetya ransomware attack in 2017, which chiefly targeted Ukrainian computers but caused havoc around the world.**

2NC/1NR Space Link Extension

The affirmative will strengthen the alliance and give NATO more cohesion around space policy. This triggers the link. (*Also in the Space Aff)
Silverstein 2020

("NATO's Return To Space," Benjamin Silverstein, a researcher with experience in the National Laboratory network conducting research on the use of counterspace technologies to support deterrence goals, August 3, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/natos-return-to-space/, VY)

The potential for space-based conflict has never been more apparent. Indeed some view it as inevitable, and in preparation states are adopting policies and doctrine to guide military space activities. Multinational security organizations like NATO are beginning to follow this trend as their adversaries act on intent to weaponize space. Last year, NATO took steps forward by launching a new space policy and recognizing space as an operational domain. The policy itself remains classified, blunting its ability to support NATO security goals. Unfortunately, the core security benefits of the new space policy are diminished as classification levels prevent open discourse about allied resolve to protect satellites from hostilities. By not releasing the terms of the policy, the alliance does not clearly outline if and how Article 5 protections apply to space assets. **Even if NATO issued unambiguous classified guidance or allies privately share an understanding of how to apply collective defense in space, a classified internal policy cannot communicate credible resolve to an adversary. NATO has yet to concretely affirm the allliance's commitment to collective defense in outer space. NATO needs to signal that the alliance has the resolve to adequately fulfil Article 5 commitments in all domains, including outer space.** Most importantly, NATO needs to address the incongruence between self-imposed geographic limitations of the NATO Charter and the outer space domain. Article 6 of the alliance's foundational text affirms that allies may only invoke collective defense in response to armed attacks against territory, vessels, forces, or aircraft stationed on allied territory, in the Mediterranean Sea, or in the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer. Even the most creative interpretations fail to include satellites within this demarcation. After this is resolved, **NATO can move forward by issuing declaratory policies that clearly indicate alliance resolve in responding to attacks on space systems.** This classified policy should not be treated as a substitute for an overarching space strategy that defines NATO objectives in space and outlines how to achieve these goals — something the alliance should communicate after establishing declaratory policies. **A space strategy, in parallel to its maritime or airpower plans, would help NATO align member states on key tactics, tools, and procedures that can be used in space conflict. At the operational level, this strategy can guide space-centric exercises that signal collective intent to protect space assets.**

Russia cares a lot about space and weaponizing space. This means the affirmative is seen as an act of NATO aggression against Russia. Roushan 2021

("Russia Threatens To Destroy NATO Satellites; US Expresses 'severe Concerns': Report," Anurag Roushan, 23rd November, 2021, https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/russia-threatens-to-destroy-nato-satellites-us-expresses-severe -concerns-report.html, VY)

In the latest provocation in its standoff with Ukraine, Russia threatened that its new 'Star Warrior' technology can demolish NATO satellites, rendering the West's GPS-guided missiles unusable. Moscow's anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles have the capability to destroy 32 NATO satellites and blind all of their missiles, planes, and ships, including the ground forces, claimed Russian State TV on Monday, as reported by Daily Mail. Last week, **the ASAT technology was tested on a decommissioned Soviet satellite, sending debris flying towards the International Space Station (ISS) and infuriating NASA and the US government. This was reportedly a warning shot to the West.** The ominous threat comes after Russian President Vladimir Putin dispatched around 94,000 troops to the Ukrainian border, raising worries of a three-pronged attack that would dwarf the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Meanwhile, the White House also expressed "severe concerns" about Moscow's military buildup along the border, including tanks and missile systems, as well as its continued threats to Kyiv. "We continue to have serious concerns about Russian military activity and strong rhetoric against Ukraine. We call on Moscow to deescalate tensions," President Biden's Press Secretary Jen Psaki was quoted as saying by Daily Mail.

2NC/1NR LAWs Link Extension

The affirmative leads to more NATO cohesion which triggers the link.

Michelson 2021

("Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards," Colonel (Retired) Brian M. Michelson is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with CEPA's Transatlantic Defense Tech Initiative and previously served as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, February 23, 2021, https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards/, VY)

Lethal autonomous weapon systems will come to dominate warfare in the coming years. NATO needs to harmonize its approach to their development and use, or risk being left behind. The rapid weaponization of artificial intelligence, "big data," social media, robotics, and a host of other technologies **presents a clear competitive challenge to NATO, an alliance with members that exist on a wide spectrum of military-technological capabilities. The future effectiveness of NATO will be driven in large part by how it handles these challenges from hobbling its ability both to act in unison and to prevail in a contest of wills.** While there are numerous potential technology gaps, one that will likely only increase is partner nations' ability and willingness to employ lethal autonomous weapon systems. These systems will inevitably grow more capable, and more necessary, in the coming decade. Technological gaps are inevitable considering the disparities in GDP and military budgets. The United States accounts for over 70 percent of NATO's overall military spending, while the next three largest contributors (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) provide approximately half of the remaining 30 percent. And with most NATO nations continuing to fund their militaries at under the 2 percent GDP goal, **technological gaps will continue to grow.** For perspective, the 2021 United States Department of Defense research and development budget is approximately equal to the entire defense outlay of France and Germany combined. With such a large differential, what can be done to help enable effective investments in autonomous weapons by smaller nations? Even more specifically, how can smaller nations provide capabilities that can integrate into, and contribute to the alliance? To better invest limited funds, **now is the time to look at a NATO standard for lethal autonomous weapons and their ethical use.** While there is no agreed-upon international definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the U.S. Department of Defense defines them as "weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." While these are not Schwarzenegger-style Terminators and still have a degree of human control over them, the technology enabling these systems is maturing rapidly, and military necessity will increasingly demand that these systems gain broader parameters of autonomous action. Yet despite the complexity of these systems and the inevitability of their proliferation, NATO does not currently have a common standard for their use or development. In fact, some NATO countries even have opposing views of how to handle them. NATO standards are designed to ensure compatibility among weapon systems, communication architecture, and a host of other warfighting systems. The 7.62mm small arms round is a good example of this. But what is the 7.62mm equivalent standard for the development and employment of autonomous weapon systems? This opens a host of related questions regarding the employment of these systems: What Identification – Friend – Foe (IFF) capability should ground and air units require to prevent fratricide? What degree of certainty does a lethal autonomous weapon system require before final engagement? What level of collateral damage is acceptable? What degree of compatibility between systems is required? Should all these parameters (and others) be adjustable, and if so, at what command level? The attendant ethics also need to be addressed. NATO's experience in Afghanistan was a case study in the challenges of coalition warfare. Differing risk tolerances, legal requirements, ethical views, domestic political concerns, and at times simply combat capability, all combined into to complex policy cocktail that impeded the effectiveness of combat operations. While modern militaries have accountability, legal, and ethical systems incorporated into their command structures, they are not uniform and leaders in differing militaries have varying degrees of authority. The key questions hinge on two issues: Who gets to decide to employ an autonomous weapon, and who is responsible should things go wrong? The Kunduz hospital strike in October of 2015 was driven primarily by human error. Responsibility was fixed on the chain of command and 16 leaders were disciplined. Who will be responsible if a member nation conducts a NATO-authorized strike and it goes terribly wrong? If this framework is not thoroughly established ahead of time, not only is it likely that commanders may hesitate to use this capability, the risk-aversion inherent in bureaucracies may limit the development of autonomous weapons that will be needed in future conflicts. **In the emerging field of lethal autonomous weapons, establishing a common NATO standard for the development and use of autonomous weapons will help address the gap in capabilities among NATO member nations. By establishing these standards, nations can ensure that their defense expenditures on autonomous weapons will create systems that are interoperable, able to contribute to NATO's capability, and can be employed within defensible ethical guidelines.**

2NC/1NR Biotech Link Extension

The affirmative increases NATO cooperation on biotechnology which is important to keeping the alliance strong in the coming decades*. (Also in Aff solvency)

Jankowski 2021

("NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge," Dominik P. Jankowski, Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO, 2021, https://ies.lublin.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/nato-in-the-era-of-unpeace_calosc-2.pdf, VY)

Moreover, according to Jim Thomas, four broad inter-related trends will impact our understanding of EDTs in the coming years: The continued adoption of precision-strike warfare; The intensification of the battle network competitions; The expansion of military activities in frontier domains (e.g. space or cyberspace); The supplanting of human forces by highly autonomous machines.8 **To properly understand the impact of EDTs, one also needs a solid theoretical framework. The NATO Science and Technology Organization defines technologies as emerging, disruptive, or convergent. Emerging technologies are expected to reach maturity in the period 2020-2040.** They are currently not in wide use, and their effects on defence and security are not entirely clear.9 Disruptive technologies are expected to have a major effect on defence and security in the period 2020-2040.10 Finally, convergent technologies are based on novel combinations to create a disruptive effect.11 For Philip Breedlove and Margaret E. Kosal, "to be disruptive, technologies do need not be radical or novel from an engineering or technical perspective. In fact, another class of disruptive technology is important to acknowledge – innovative use of existing technology. Using a combination of existing technologies in ways that are novel can result in a capability that is disruptive."12 Not all emerging technologies will be disruptive and not all disruptive technologies are emergent. In fact, technological development is distinctly cyclical. As the NATO Science and Technology Organization suggests, "the most well-known of these cycles is the Gartner Hype Cycle."13 Yet, technologies do not always follow the sequence of such a cycle. In fact, most technologies fail. Numerous technologies disappear from public or even expert consciousness after initial hype when they prove unproductive. At the same time, when the limitations of technology become clear and one has a better understanding of what is practical and where such a technology can be best applied, the next generation of products starts to occur. **The Alliance currently concentrates on eight EDTs that are considered to be major disruptors until 2040:** Data Artificial intelligence Autonomy Space Hypersonics Quantum technologies **Biotechnology and human enhancement** Novel material and manufacturing They are all in some shape or form intelligent, interconnected, distributed, and digital (I2D2) in nature. **What is important for NATO is that each of the above identified technology characteristics combine to drive a specific military trend**: Intelligent + distributed = autonomous system and agents Interconnected + digital = battle networks Interconnected + distributed = expending domains Intelligent + digital = precision warfare14 **Preparing for the future security of NATO requires anticipating the types of threats that may emerge as technology advances, the potential consequences of those threats, the probability that new and more disperse types of enemies will obtain or pursue them, and the impact they will have on the future of armed conflict.**

2NC/1NR Impact Extensions

Escalation in Russia's invasion of Ukraine goes nuclear. The risk of nuclear war over Ukraine is the biggest risk since the Cold War.
Bender 2022

("How the Ukraine war could go nuclear," Bryan Bender, senior national correspondent for POLITICO and adjunct professor at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism at Arizona State University , 3/24/2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/24/how-ukraine-war-could-go-nuclear-00019899, VY, ***2 page card***)

Not since the Cold War has the specter of nuclear war hung so heavily over a president's crisis diplomacy. As President Joe Biden meets with fellow NATO leaders, calls for a ceasefire in Ukraine are growing more urgent than ever — to alleviate the widespread human suffering but also to dial back what **veterans of nuclear planning consider an alarming potential for it to spiral into a clash of atomic superpowers. The nuclear brinkmanship from Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks is unprecedented:** He ordered a snap nuclear war game before the invasion and days later put his nuclear forces on high alert. And **the Kremlin has repeatedly signaled it could resort to nuclear weapons — an option explicitly reserved in Russian military doctrine — if it determines the West's intervention in the conflict goes too far.** Again on Tuesday, in an interview with CNN, Putin's chief spokesperson refused to rule out the use of nuclear arms in the conflict. So far, Biden has sought to dial down the tensions. The Pentagon has not changed the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces and military leaders have publicly said they have not detected Russian actions suggesting they are preparing to use nuclear weapons. The Pentagon also took the unusual step early in the conflict of putting off a regularly scheduled test of an intercontinental ballistic missile to avoid fueling nuclear tensions. Yet as the conflict drags on, and Russia's conventional forces suffer surprisingly heavy losses while its economy reels, the prospect that Putin might resort to using weapons of mass destruction is increasing. Moscow has already demonstrated that it's willing to use hypersonic missiles for the first time in a war. With limited contact between the Kremlin and Western capitals, **the risk that Moscow's intentions could be misread with catastrophic consequences will only grow more acute,** according to numerous specialists. **"There has always been a chance of mistakes, but I think the chances are much higher,"** said former Sen. Sam Nunn, the longtime chair of the Armed Services Committee and now co-chair of the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative. "I think **we are in a different era in terms of blunders."** It is a high-wire act confronting Biden as he tries to stiffen the spines of NATO countries for what is expected to be a long struggle. Allies are helping Ukraine fend off its bigger aggressor — including sending more arms and U.S. troops to defend NATO's eastern borders — while not pushing Putin over the edge. **Russia invaded Ukraine as cooperation between Washington and Moscow on nuclear arms control has been unraveling in recent years.** The two countries have walked away from several treaties to control the deadliest weapons, including one that outlawed intermediate-range nuclear missiles that could threaten Europe. The only remaining nuclear pact between the two sides is the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits deployed strategic weapons to 1,550 each. Biden and Putin agreed last year to extend it until 2026. But the treaty does not cover any of the thousands of smaller, or "battlefield," nuclear weapons in their respective arsenals, including at least 2,000 in Russian stockpiles, according to public estimates. Two Defense Department officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, say they are vigilantly gathering intelligence on Russian military moves for any sign that it might be taking such weapons out of storage or preparing for deployment units trained in nuclear or chemical warfare. 'Raising the ante' Longtime observers of Russian nuclear policy have been startled at how reckless the Putin regime has been with its nuclear threats compared to leaders in Moscow during the Cold War. "The communist party of the Soviet Union was incredibly disciplined about this," said Rose Gottemoeller, a former undersecretary of state for arms control who has negotiated treaties with Russians and served as NATO deputy secretary general from 2016 to 2019. "There were only a few Soviet leaders who were allowed to speak about nuclear doctrine and strategy, and they did so in a very carefully scripted way. "We are in a more difficult crisis than anyone could have predicted with this constant nuclear saber-rattling that has been going on," she added. "We have to take what [Putin's] people say seriously, because he was serious about invading Ukraine when many of us hoped he would turn away at the last minute." The dearth of diplomacy and growing distrust only fuels the risk of "mushroom clouds appearing on the battlefield," Izumi Nakamitsu, United Nations high representative for disarmament affairs, warned on Tuesday. She hearkened back to the numerous instances during the decades-long standoff between the United States and then-Soviet Union when the two sides nearly came to nuclear blows. But diplomacy — and a good bit of luck — prevailed. "We are all aware of the close calls and near-misses," she said at an event hosted by The Stimson Center. "Unfortunately, I fear we have forgotten many of those difficult lessons. A simple glance at a headline today can point to how acute nuclear risks have become." Those concerns are shared across the spectrum by advocates for nuclear disarmament and those who believe a more robust U.S. nuclear arsenal is needed to deter adversaries. "I really am worried here that the war is going so badly for Putin … it raises the possibility of Putin feeling like he needs to escalate to win his way out of this conflict," said Tim Morrison, a former Trump White House nuclear policy adviser who is now a researcher at the Hudson Institute, a hawkish think tank. That, he continued, "is right in the wheelhouse of Russian [military] doctrine for a low-yield nuclear or even chemical [weapons] use." Morrison added that he fears the situation could unravel to the point where Putin is "raising the ante, climbing the rungs of the escalation ladder to make the point to NATO 'hey, you guys really need to knock it off with arming the Ukrainians, I will no longer tolerate this.'" Russia has already ratcheted up the war with its hypersonic missile launch in Ukraine last

week, and it has also been accused of dropping phosphorus bombs, which are banned under the Geneva Convention (though using the chemical to obscure troop movements or illuminate targets is not). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Wednesday the alliance will be assisting Ukraine with specialized equipment in the event of a Russian attack with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Gottemoeller said she fears that Moscow's use of a tactical nuclear weapon is a serious possibility. "Putin is capable of anything," she said. "He could declare there is an existential threat from a NATO ally resupplying the Ukrainians.' 'You're not going to necessarily know' Others worry less about Putin ordering a nuclear attack and more about a miscalculation leading to the use of nuclear weapons. **Nunn has been sounding the alarm about the threat of an accidental nuclear exchange as a result of a cyber attack on nuclear command-and-control systems — including by malign actors not directly involved in the conflict who could be confused for a nuclear adversary.** "Third parties, third countries, might interfere in terms of command-and-control or warning systems," he said of potential hackers. "Interference in command-and-control could be taken in this kind of atmosphere as probably a deliberate act." Nunn successfully lobbied Congress last year to require the Pentagon to conduct a "failsafe review" of the U.S. nuclear arsenal "to prevent cyber-related and other risks that could lead to the unauthorized or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons as the result of an accident, misinterpretation, miscalculation, terrorism, unexpected technological breakthrough, or deliberate act." Further complicating the task of U.S. and allied commanders to decipher Russian intentions, said Morrison, is the fact that so many Russian battlefield systems are also designed to unleash both conventional and nuclear or chemical warheads. In other words, **it could be exceedingly difficult to know when the Russian military has decided to pursue a nuclear option.** "One of the problems with Russian nuclear forces is how many of their systems are dual-capable," Morrison said. "So you're not going to necessarily know if the S-300 or that long-range [missile or artillery] battery is packing a conventional warhead or a nuclear one." If U.S. military leaders detected Russian nuclear maneuvers, Nunn said, **Biden may have no choice but to act more aggressively to deter Moscow, including putting American nuclear forces on alert.** "If you'd seen bombers in the air, all sorts of activities in the nuclear forces, it would have been a different proposition," Nunn said. "The risk of nuclear use is in my view higher through a mistake or blunder than through intent. But nevertheless blunders get more likely when nuclear weapons are put on alert." **The Nuclear Threat Initiative last week outlined a hypothetical but horrific scenario to underscore how the war in Ukraine could go wrong.** In a simulation based on historical examples, **the current conflict escalated with the detonation of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine and quickly spiraled into** a **nuclear** holocaust. **The scenario lays out a chain of events — the downing of an American spy plane by accident, the misreading of counter actions, cyber attacks that further sow confusion, and leaders with very little time to react — that result in the unthinkable: an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia.** "Over the course of the next hour," it chillingly details, "82 million Americans are killed with allied countries faring similarly. Most die instantly, while more will die of radiation poisoning over the coming days and weeks."

NATO-Russia escalation would "leap-frog" into nuclear war.
Kulesa 2018

("Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict:: Implications for Deterrence Stability," Łukasz Kulesa, European Leadership Network, February 2018, http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437, VY)

Escalation: **Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed? Once a conflict was under way, the "fog of war" and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation,** deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decisionmaking processes and interactions. Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, **Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further.** It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks. **Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts,** but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as "escalate to de-escalate" or "escalate to win" there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A "false flag" attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO's responses. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. **It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.** The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO's operations: **the Russian regime's stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve,** and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO's resolve. Moreover, **individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia's actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.** With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of "P3" dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use. Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia -NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover**, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing "leap frog" escalation,** possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.