

RENMUN XI

REJUVINATION



March 21st & 22nd, 2026

Chair Report 1
United States Senate

**Debating the necessity and details of a
redeveloped nuclear non-proliferation deal
(JCPOA) with Iran**

Chair: Martha Ali

Chair Introduction

Greetings Senators! Welcome to RENMUN IX! We are Aastha Sethy and Martha Ali, Year 12 students from West Island School, and we are pleased to welcome you all to the United States Senate as your presiding officers!

The United States Senate serves as the upper chamber of the US Congress, with the House of Representatives serving the lower chamber. Established on March 4th, 1789, the USS is a pivotal body within the American Legislative Branch. The USS is made up of 2 elected senators from each state, who are tasked with giving their state a voice in the discussions of the socio-economic and political development of the US. As of 2026, the Senate can be mainly split into two major parties, the Democrats led by Senator Chuck Schumer, and the Republicans led by Senator John Thune.

Seeing that the USS is an intermediate committee, it is expected that delegates use the chair report as a starting point for research, as it should help by offering questions and ideas to research, and should in no way be definitive research.

Finally, on a more personal note, we hope that this conference will become a memorable learning experience for you all. We hope that RENMUN XI can become a conference where you build meaningful connections and develop skills for your future endeavors. If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to reach out to either of us! See you all soon!

Good Luck,
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Topic Introduction

The JCPOA nuclear non-proliferation deal signed between the US and Iran during the Obama administration was a significant step towards capping a nuclear arms race which could lead to exacerbated tensions in the middle east. The JCPOA promised the alleviation of US sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran's compliance with the terms set out for nuclear non-proliferation as stipulated by the JCPOA. As a result of suspicion surrounding Iran's commitment to these terms (ie, caps to uranium enrichment) and concerns over the IAEA's ability to sufficiently monitor the situation, Trump backed out of the agreement in 2018. Subsequently, Iran felt no incentive to continue restricting their nuclear activities, given that the benefit of sanctions relief was no longer in effect. Up to the present moment, no further deal has been achieved between the two parties, and tensions have recently reached a peak with the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities .

One fatal flaw of the JCPOA was the lack of ratification in the US senate, which means that the deal was susceptible to being withdrawn at whim of different presidents. It was the withdrawal from the JCPOA that most directly led to the reinitiating of Iran's nuclear program and the crisis we face today.

As delegates of the United States Senate, you will be debating the necessity and details of a new nuclear deal with Iran.

Key Terms

	Definition
NPT	Nuclear non-proliferation refers to the effort to eliminate the spread of nuclear technology
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. A deal developed specifically between the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Iran, which lasted from 2015 to 2025, when Iran terminated it in October. It aimed to place limits on Iran's nuclear program beyond the NPT.

NWS	Nuclear Weapon State - a country that has one or more nuclear weapons
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapons State - a country which does not have nuclear weapons
Fission	The process of spitting a nucleus into 2 or more smaller nuclei to produce energy.
Breakout time	Time taken for a state to produce enough enriched Uranium to support a fully functioning nuclear weapon.
Snapback mechanism	A provision under the JCPOA enabling the UN to reimpose all its sanctions on Iran if Iran were to breach the agreement.
Treaty	Formal, legally binding agreements which require $\frac{2}{3}$ of the senate to vote in favour. They are constitutionally binding under US law.
Executive agreement	An action by the president which does not require senate approval. They are not constitutionally binding and may be revoked by future presidents. The JCPOA was an executive agreement rather than a treaty.
Operation	On June 22, 2025, Operation Midnight Hammer was launched when a US submarine fired more than 12 missiles to attack key nuclear related infrastructure in Iran, including nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.

Background Information


Nuclear basics

It's important to understand the basics of nuclear power in order to later develop proposals for regulating it.

Essentially, let's explore how one would tangibly regulate nuclear capability:

1. Uranium Enrichment

A preliminary important concept is uranium enrichment. Uranium is a naturally occurring element whose isotopic form (U-235) can undergo nuclear fission to produce energy; this process is useful both in generating nuclear energy and in creating nuclear bombs. Typical uranium found in nature contains roughly 0.72% of the isotope U-235. (5) This isn't enough to sustain nuclear fission. Uranium enrichment increases the U-235 isotopic levels in naturally occurring Uranium so that it can be used for nuclear purposes. Therefore, by restricting a country's enrichment capacities, they can effectively be blocked from developing nuclear capabilities. It guarantees an extended length of 'breakout time'.



Source (6)

2. Restricting Nuclear Stockpiles

This one is simple. Limits are placed on how much enriched uranium a nation may have or can have.

3. Placing Centrifuge Limits

A centrifuge is a scientific tool that spins at high speeds to separate substances by their relative masses. It is used in the process of nuclear enrichment; limiting it thereby limits uranium enrichment.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Iran

Nuclear non-proliferation refers to efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear technology. Since the inception of the Cold War, the accelerating nuclear arms race has pushed the global order to a tipping point. The movement to disarm countries of their nuclear capacities has centered around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

the only binding multilateral treaty striving for the disarmament of nuclear weapons. (1)

With a total of 191 signatories, the treaty holds great power and significance. Only five nations are not signatories to the NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel, South Sudan, and North Korea. (2)

As a treaty, the NPT binds nations to agree to the following stipulations:

1. Countries without nuclear weapons cannot obtain them
2. Countries recognised as nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) agree not to share or receive nuclear weapons from / to other states
3. All signatories are required to work together towards nuclear disarmament through negotiations
4. All signatories are allowed to use nuclear energy

The NPT has a partner organisation called the IAEA, which is entrusted with regulatory capacity and administration as stipulated by article III of the NPT. (3) The IAEA routinely inspects nuclear facilities around the world to ensure that civilian nuclear programs do not become malign.

Considering that Iran is already a signatory of the NPT, why would an additional protocol be required for its nuclear disarmament? The reality is that the NPT alone is not sufficient to verify that a nation is using its nuclear technology exclusively for civilian purposes. The IAEA repeatedly found Iran to be in violation of the NPT's regulations in 2002, 2005, 2006, and most recently, 2025. This leads us to the exploration of some of the NPT's flaws, which were an antecedent to the creation of the JCPOA.

Flaws of the NPT

Firstly, many Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) inherently see the NPT as unjust, given the discrepancy between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) being allowed to keep their weapons, and NNWS being forced into a lack thereof. Secondly, states that have not signed the NPT undermine the universal coverage of the NPT, meaning that those who've ratified the NPT may feel like they are depriving themselves and their security without the promise of universal nuclear disarmament; creating an incentive for nations to breach the NPT regulations. Thirdly, Article 6 of the NPT, which demands that negotiations be held in 'good faith' to end the nuclear arms race has not seen the desired outcome. When negotiations finally commenced in 2017, NWS and their allies boycotted the development, and are instead spending time and money modernising their nuclear arsenals. (4) Fourthly, the 'inalienable' right that the NPT grants to the development of civilian nuclear programs have been exploited

by nations like Iran and North Korea in order to develop clandestine nuclear programs. The IAEA is unable to access 'undeclared' facilities and relies on state cooperation.

JCPOA - Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

This brings us to the deal developed specifically between the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Iran, and it lasted from 2015 to 2025, when Iran terminated it in October.

Terms of the deal

As mentioned before, the JCPOA surpassed the NPT in providing detailed restrictions for Iran with the goal of preventing it from developing clandestine nuclear programs. For example, while the NPT allowed Uranium enrichment up to 20%, the JCPOA capped it at 3.67%. While the NPT doesn't enforce a stockpile limit on its signatories, the JCPOA limited Iran to 300kg of its enriched uranium. The JCPOA also placed limits on Iran's centrifuges.

Crucially, the JCPOA aimed to strengthen the monitoring capacities of the IAEA in Iran. The IAEA had created an optional 'additional protocol' in 1997 after discovering clandestine nuclear development in Iraq. (6) The protocol aims to amend some of the security deficits within the original NPT. For example, the additional protocol allows the IAEA access to investigate even undeclared nuclear sites, which reduces the issue of a nation giving an incomplete declaration of its nuclear sites.

In return for agreeing to all these restrictions, Iran was granted relief from UN, EU, and US sanctions relating to nuclear weaponry. A further \$100 billion of Iran's frozen assets would be released for use. Iran was also granted entry into global trade markets.

Why was President Trump so eager to back out of the deal?

1. It does not guarantee that Iran stops building nukes

Trump decisively objected to the Sunset clause, a clause which stipulated that Iran would be able to escape from many of the restrictions imposed on it by the JCPOA in 2031. Strictly speaking, this meant that Iran would be able to restart its development of nuclear weapons in the future. In essence, the JCPOA seemed to be undermining itself by only guaranteeing short-term restrictions on Iran's nuclear programme while at the same time offering Iran up-front advantages which would rehabilitate Iran and give it power far into the long term.

Numerous security limitations also led Trump to believe that even the JCPOA, with its regimented restrictions, could not guarantee that Iran was not subversively developing nuclear weapons. The JCPOA did not require Iran to submit to anytime, anywhere inspections, meaning that Iran could likely hide its nuclear activity if it wanted to. Furthermore, Iran could delay inspections by up to 24 days, allowing them time to erase evidence of illicit activities if necessary.

Even from the get-go, during preliminary negotiations with Iran, the international community had an unclear picture of Iran's nuclear activities, meaning that the deal may not have been constructed with the correct picture in mind. A grave lack of knowledge meant a lack of solid foundations for the deal.

2. Uncertainty about the compensation granted to Iran.

As mentioned above, many critics agreed that the benefits granted to Iran were far greater than the restrictions they faced. Or in other words, that the deal was a one-sided transaction. While Iran got front-loaded benefits with long-term positive implications, the international community was only granted the promise of temporary guarantees. Furthermore, critics were dubious that sanctions relief was a proper thing to grant Iran. Iran has a long history with sanctions, primarily imposed in response to Iran's terrorism, regional destabilisation, anti-American activities and human rights abuses, among other things; Iran is the world's largest sponsor of terrorism, backing terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Groups such as these destabilise the Middle East as a whole. By sanctioning Iran, the international community has the ability to reduce the resources and power it has to continue these malicious affairs. So, sanction relief, though powerful in its ability to negotiate compromise, is also powerful in its implications for inciting more of the aforementioned malign activities by freeing up frozen Persian assets. These criticisms basically amounted to the belief that the international community was trading one malady (nuclear proliferation) for another (terrorism and destabilisation of the Middle East).

Understanding alternatives to sanctions relief which could possibly make a proper bargaining chip for future negotiations is a crucial aspect in the discussion of future American policy with Iran.

What now? What has happened since then?

After the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, they launched a campaign of maximum pressure to try to get Iran to agree to negotiations for a new nuclear deal. This campaign was essentially just renewing intensified sanctions on Iran to try to cripple them economically. At the same time, the remaining European sanctions relief was not enough to compensate for the sanctions imposed by America. As a result, Iran

began to breach the terms of the deal. In September 2025, the UN triggered the 'snapback' mechanism of the JCPOA, reissuing all UN sanctions against Iran. The EU soon followed course. On 18th October 2025, Iran announced formally that it would no longer comply with the JCPOA, effectively ending the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action once and for all.

Potential Clashes

Clashes regarding the future of a nuclear deal with Iran mostly fall along partisan boundaries.

Once again... Diplomacy vs Militarism

Democrats and Republicans are divided on the issue of whether pursuing a new deal is useful at all. No congressional republicans supported the JCPOA in the first place when launched by President Obama. While democrats support the diplomatic approach of striking an agreement with Iran, favoring the renewal and reapplication of the JCPOA as an ideal solution to the dilemma, Republicans, historically, have favored militaristic resolutions. On June 22, 2025, Operation Midnight Hammer was launched when a US submarine fired more than 12 missiles to attack key nuclear-related infrastructure in Iran. Including nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.

For Republicans, supervising the infliction of damage to Iran's sites of nuclear development appears to be a more sure-fire way to directly hinder Iran's nuclear programme; to them, diplomacy seems like an alternative that yields too much compromise to be considered progress.

On that note, the extent to which compromise will be tolerated is also a key clash between the two parties.

Extent of Compromise

Democratic and Republican senators have wildly differing views regarding the extent of compromise necessary from the US. Republicans are adamant that a nuclear deal should not be pursued unless it promises to completely inhibit Iran from developing a nuclear program (ie. that Iran should not be able to enrich any Uranium at all, even if it were only for civilian purposes). Republicans are most concerned about durability and amending problem areas from the JCPOA. Pursuing a deal which could, through lack of regiment, enable Iran to pursue clandestine nuclear development would be their worst-case scenario. Especially if coupled with the benefit of sanctions relief, which could fuel Iran's terrorist programs as well. However, this approach has historically yielded stalemate from Iran, with Khamenei (the supreme theocratic leader of Iran, in power since the Islamic revolution of 1979) rejecting such demands.

Democrats, on the other hand, are conscious about making progress, rather than grasping for unreachable extremes. They would prefer leniency and compromise if it promises some control over Iran's nuclear programme, rather than pushing relentlessly for hard-line demands, which only receive rejection, creating stagnation and opportunity for Iran to continue decreasing its breakout time. In essence, Democrats see the pursuit of hard bargains as stubborn and as delaying a solution to Iran's nuclear program.

Israel

The stance of senators towards Israel may influence their sentiments about a nuclear deal. Israel has been a known objector to the JCPOA. As a regional nemesis of Iran, it faces the primary impacts of the ebbs and flows of Iran's terrorism (which inevitably was strengthened under the JCPOA and its prescribed sanctions relief). It shared ideas about the discrepancies of benefit, believing that the deal was strengthening Iran too much through sanctions relief without imposing sufficient complementary restrictions.

Those senators aligning with Israel will similarly pursue permanent, verifiable restrictions on Iran, which are certain to provide stability rather than temporary, uncertain arrangements reminiscent of the JCPOA.

Formal Treaty vs Executive Agreement

Finally, Republicans feel strongly that any new deal aimed at resolving Iran's nuclear power should be a formal treaty, or in other words, be passed by $\frac{2}{3}$ majority in the Senate (67 out of 100 senators). The JCPOA was an executive agreement that didn't require this supermajority. This, however, meant that the agreement was not binding and could be reversed upon a change in presidential administrations. By making the new deal a treaty, it becomes more permanent. When the initial JCPOA was in its preliminary stages, republicans felt that the decision to maintain the JCPOA as an executive agreement rather than a treaty was undermining the Senate's constitutional role, seeing it as an assault on power on the part of the White House

Indeed, any new deal that is proposed to be a treaty will ensure greater oversight by the Senate, which will thus have greater control over the terms of the deal. Republicans also feel that by involving the Senate in any deal, bad deals can be overruled.

However, Senate ratification is often an unlikely prospect. With the aforementioned distinct variations in perspectives, it is possible that a nuclear deal that seeks Senate approval will never be passed. For Democrats, the priority is immediate results, and in this case, an executive agreement is sufficient. However, there is a nuance, as the

experience of presidential withdrawal from the JCPOA has encouraged Democrats and Republicans alike to prefer the approach of a treaty. Thus, the individual perspectives of each senator must be researched.

Key Stakeholders

Stakeholder	Involvement with the Issue
Lindsey Graham	A 'republican hawk' (aggressive leanings in foreign policy pursuits, tends to support a militaristic approach.) When the JCPOA was in its preliminary negotiations, he stressed how no matter what the terms of the deal, trusting Iran in the long term would be an uncomfortable prospect (7) He noted that intrusive inspections into Iran's nuclear facilities, only agreeing to enrichment programs which supply the needs of a single reactor, and not giving the Iranians a single dollar until they change their behavior would make the deal more agreeable. In 2025, Graham takes a harder line, militaristic stance. "There's a one in a trillion chance you'll degrade the Iranian nuclear program through diplomacy. There's a 90% chance you'll degrade it through military action." (8) Graham is very clear about his lack of trust for Iran, and he considers the prospect of a nuclear Iran to be a great threat to the world order.
Tom Cotton	Believes that Congress should decline to certify the JCPOA. In his opinion, maximum pressure through sanctions and militarism will be the better vehicle to end Iran's nuclear programme. States that his opposition to the JCPOA stems not only from its intrinsic flaws, but also from its inherent incompatibility with the Iranian regime. Iran has pursued nuclear weapons

	because there is no better tool to support its revolutionary agenda. Politicians in Iran are hardline and extremist; diplomacy, he thinks, is not their language. Feels that Obama's decision to pursue a nuclear deal with Iran was an act of appeasement, rather than one of tactics. (9) Cotton feels the JCPOA would only make sense with the assumption that Iran becomes a law-abiding, peaceful nation.
Ted Cruz	"Maximum pressure should mean maximum pressure. We must continue to vocally and unapologetically stand up to the evil Iranian regime." Cruz, like Cotton and Graham, acknowledges the JCPOA as a flawed deal that only further advantages Iran rather than contributing to control over its nuclear programme. Cruz believes that Trump's decision to pull out of the JCPOA was the most important foreign policy decision of his administration.
Jeanne Shaheen	When the JCPOA was in effect, Shaheen praised and acknowledged its successes. Highlighting how it resulted in Iran's fulfillment of commitments that would have otherwise been impossible When Trump pulled out of the JCPOA, she felt there was a loss in terms of how the US could control Iran's nuclear programme. "Under that agreement, Iran was not producing enhanced uranium. We know that we had IAEA inspectors on the ground to see what they were doing. And because former President Trump pulled us out of that agreement, none of that is happening now. Iran is closer to a nuclear weapon," (10). She supported the negotiations

	immediately subsequent to the withdrawal from the JCPOA. In 2015, she pursued an amendment (11) to make the JCPOA a treaty requiring Senate ratification. The amendment was, however, rejected.
Chris Murphy	Felt that ending the nuclear deal made Iran unquestionably more adversarial to the US, and that Trump's administration succeeded in increasing Iranian influence in places like Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Murphy feels as if the current American policy of maximum pressure on Iran has not led to any significant achievements; it has only allowed the Persians to get closer to developing a working nuclear weapon.

Possible Solutions

Beyond the Senate favourites: A comprehensive nuclear deal or militarism, there are innovative approaches that certain senators may be willing to put forward.

Establishing a 'Joint Nuclear Consortium' (12)

A joint nuclear consortium could involve nations like Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states, all working together to develop nuclear power in a remote fashion. Such states would still be able to pursue civilian nuclear programs, yet these programs would be overseen by a regional multinational organisation, safeguarded by the IAEA. Iran and other regional states would produce their own centrifuge and enrichment machinery, but they would be shipped out to the consortium enrichment plant in another country (eg, Oman).


Enriched Uranium would be transferred out of the consortium plant after initial enrichment is complete to prevent enrichment beyond the low levels required for nuclear energy.

Trump's current stance is that Iran should not be allowed to enrich even a gram of Uranium, even for civilian purposes. This is meant with outrage and opposition from Iran. A nuclear consortium may allow both parties to receive what they want: an enriched uranium free Iran, and the capacity to pursue a civilian nuclear programme.

A successful example of a nuclear consortium is Urenco (a company shared between the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands). Iran itself has been part of the historic consortium Eurodif. Despite investing over 1 billion, Iran never received its share of enriched uranium, leading to lengthy court battles. Even more strikingly, the director of Eurodif was assassinated by terrorists believed to be supported by Iran.

There are different models of nuclear consortia. The first is that members pay and receive enriched Uranium in return. The second is that consortium partners each bear responsibility for one part of the 'supply chain', which comes with making nuclear power. The third is that nuclear operations do take place fully in the country, but are completely supervised and overseen by foreign entities.

Collective Security Arrangement - For the Middle East to become a 'nuclear weapon-free zone.'



Source (13)

If the US can mediate a deal between Middle Eastern states, but most notably Israel, to implement a weapons of mass destruction-free zone, Iran may be more amenable to accepting more hard-line American demands. By deconstructing the security threat Iran faces, which drives its nuclear programme, the incentive to pursue nuclear development with fizzle. Israel is recognised as unofficially having nuclear weapons. Though its policy of 'nuclear ambiguity' means its possession or lack of nuclear weapons cannot be guaranteed, its refusal to sign the NPT is a sure sign of its nuclear possession. As a regional enemy of Iran, Israel's possession of nuclear

weapons becomes a huge incentive for Iran's development of nuclear weapons.

If the US could somehow establish an agreement with Israel and the broader Middle East to comply with the guidelines of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the US would make more progress in future deliberations with Iran regarding a nuclear deal.

Further, the perusal of a non-aggression pact between regional states in the Middle East would be a step towards collective security.

Amending the process of safeguarding nuclear non-proliferation in Iran


Rather than pursuing the hard-line perspective that Iran should not be allowed to enrich any Uranium, which may lead to a deadlock of opinions, the US Senate may consider compromising by increasing its certainty that Iran is complying with any new agreement. They can do this by reforming certain pre-existing flaws found in the IAEA's comprehensive safeguard agreement. For example, creating a new safeguarding system that enables the surveillance of undeclared nuclear sites and amends the 24-day buffer time within which Iran had to provide access to suspected undeclared nuclear sites.

These 'fatal flaws', which once undermined American trust in the JCPOA, can now be overruled at their own volition by creating a new comprehensive safeguarding plan. With this, it should follow that the US is willing to budge on its hard-line stance that Iran should not be allowed to enrich any Uranium at all. A stance unlikely to promote the negotiation and productivity required to form a new deal with Iran.

Past Actions

Operation Midnight Hammer

On the 22nd of June, 2025, Operation Midnight Hammer was launched when a US submarine fired more than 12 missiles to attack key nuclear-related infrastructure in Iran. Including nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. (14)



There were conflicting reports of the success of the strikes. While President Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegset claimed success, they refused to comment on the details of the exact nuclear capabilities destroyed. It is also speculated by Israel that Iran could have moved enriched Uranium away from the sites before the attacks.

Maximum Pressure Campaign: Feb 4, 2025 - present

Subsequent to American withdrawal from the JCPOA, President Trump launched his Maximum Pressure Campaign. The campaign sought not only to starve Iran of economic development so as to force it into considering a new deal with the US, but also to more broadly prevent Iran from having the means to fund its terroristic activities in the broader Middle East.

The Trump Administration has been able to deprive Iran of 70 billion US dollars, which would otherwise have gone to support terrorists. Hamas and Hezbollah have both needed to let go of thousands of paramilitants (15). However, the success that maximum pressure may bring in leading Iran to consider negotiations is ambiguous. Trump's first wave of maximum pressure from 2018-2021 yielded limited results. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo outlined 12 demands that Iran would have to agree to in order to remove sanctions, yet. These demands were perceived by Iran as 'national annihilation,' to no avail.

Negotiations

Iran and the US had five rounds of talks last year on the issue, but the result was primarily a stalemate as the parties could not come to an agreement about the problem of uranium enrichment.

Since the US and Israel struck Iran in June 2025, a preliminary round of negotiations took place between Iran and the US in Oman. Their aim is to avoid a major conflict between Tehran and Washington amidst growing US military buildup in the Middle East. The meeting lasted half a day and aimed mainly to assess Iran's seriousness about negotiations before determining how the negotiations might proceed.

As for the results of the negotiations, Iran has claimed that it would be willing to dilute its highly enriched uranium if the US ends sanctions. This shows their willingness to cooperate with Trump's key demand to cease Uranium enrichment in Iran.

The main issue with the ongoing negotiations is that while Trump pushes for Iran not to be allowed to enrich any uranium, Iran sticks to its position as needing to be allowed to enrich uranium. How the two parties will be able to break out of this deadlock is a question that senators must consider. Iran wants to keep its ballistic missile program and other regional activities of the country out of the negotiations, while the US seeks to include these as topics of conversation.

Israel is a key stakeholder in these negotiations. The idea is that Netanyahu may try to disrupt the negotiation process to force the US to resort to military means. Netanyahu also wants to push for Iran's ballistic missiles to be included as a negotiating topic.

It seems to be clear that for the negotiations to be profitable, some development must address the stalemate regarding perspectives on Uranium enrichment.

Guiding Questions

1. Does your senator support Trump in his hard line perspective that Iran should be prevented from enriching any Uranium at all?
 - a. Does your senator believe that Iran should be allowed a civilian nuclear programme?
2. What was your senator's stance towards the JCPOA?
 - a. Did they see it as a net gain or net loss for the US?
 - b. What did they think about the sanctions relief granted to Iran, was it a necessary concession or a grave choice resulting in dangerous increases to Iran's power?

- c. Do they believe that the JCPOA was successful in reducing Iran's nuclear program, or that it was a total failure driven by its limitations?
3. What is your senators stance on the campaign of maximum pressure
4. Does your senator support diplomacy or militarism?
 - a. Were they in favour of Operation Midnight Hammer?
5. Does your senator feel a mediocre deal would be better than no deal at all? Or do they see the value of a nuclear deal only if the complete halting of Iran's nuclear programme is guaranteed?
6. Does your senator support Israel?
7. Does your senator support a formal treaty or an executive agreement?
8. What/which features does your senator feel to be behind the failure of the JCPOA
 - a. Lack of senate ratification
 - b. IAEAs security deficits
 - c. The extent of US concessions
 - d. The fact that Iran received sanctions relief
9. Does your senator support the current negotiations going on between the US and Iran (2025-2026)?

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