


Evacuation of BAAG Headquarters Kweilin 1944

[Editor's note: This is only a small selection of the documents which concern this evacuation operation; further information regarding the evacuation of BAAG HQ Kweilin may be found in Australian War Memorial PR82/068 (Papers of Sir Lindsay Tasman Ride), Series 2 (BAAG HQ Correspondence).]

June 1944

A full nominal roll was drawn up of personnel at BAAG HQ at the beginning of June – (see Post 2a of this website).

5.6.44 AWM 1/3/25,6 (Chinese staff)



16.6.44 AWM/2 (Families) 1/3/27

No.	MISSION	TYPE	DATE	CHURCH	OTHERS.
No.	Area.	Area.	Area.	Area.	Area.
33000058	CHOW KEE TENG	NO REL CHUR	1 am	(page 4)	
33000104	CHONG TAI.	NO REL CHUR	1 daughter (page 1)		
33000170	POH CHIN.	NO REL CHUR	1 daughter (page 1)		
33000481	PUE CHONG LING.	NO REL CHUR			Widower.
33000574	NO REL.	NO REL CHUR.	1 son	(page 6)	
33000591	NO REL.	NO REL CHUR			
33001560	NO REL.	NO REL CHUR	1 daughter (page 8)		
33001561	NO REL.	NO REL CHUR	1 daughter (page 8)		
33001670	LEE CHOW HO.	NO REL CHUR	1 son	(page 6)	Widower.
33001800	LEE HO.	NO REL CHUR			
33002000	LEUNG CHOW.	27 JAN 1941	1 son	(page 5)	
33002210	LEE KAY KWE.	NO REL CHUR.	1 son	(page 1)	
33002397	LO CHOW KIT.	NO REL CHUR.			
33002404	LO CHOW KIT.	PURE CHUR	2 daughters (page 4, 1)		Widower.
33002609	LOO TAI.	CHONG CHOW KEE.			1 brother of page 10
33003000	THONG HO.	NO REL.	1 daughter (page 1)		
33003008	LOO KAY.	NO REL CHUR.			

NAME		GRADE	STATUS	REMARKS
No. 1 PLATOON	Platoon Commander:	WILL R. SOWERS,		-
No. 1 Section	Section Commander:	WILLIAM ROBERT PAUL SMITH,		-
		WPA. SMITH,		1
		WPA. SMITH,		2
		WPA. F. SMITH,		3
		WPA. ADOLPHUS LEE, D		4
		WPA. SMITH,		5
		WPA. SMITH,		6
		WPA. SMITH,		7
		WPA. SMITH,		8
		WPA. SMITH,		9
		WPA. SMITH,		10
		WPA. SMITH,		11
		WPA. SMITH,		12
		WPA. SMITH,		13
		WPA. SMITH,		14
		WPA. SMITH,		15
		WPA. SMITH,		16
		WPA. SMITH,		17
		WPA. SMITH,		18
		WPA. SMITH,		19
		WPA. SMITH,		20
		WPA. SMITH,		21
		WPA. SMITH,		22
		WPA. SMITH,		23
		WPA. SMITH,		24
		WPA. SMITH,		25
		WPA. SMITH,		26
		WPA. SMITH,		27
		WPA. SMITH,		28
		WPA. SMITH,		29
		WPA. SMITH,		30
		WPA. SMITH,		31
		WPA. SMITH,		32
		WPA. SMITH,		33
		WPA. SMITH,		34
		WPA. SMITH,		35
		WPA. SMITH,		36
		WPA. SMITH,		37
		WPA. SMITH,		38
		WPA. SMITH,		39
		WPA. SMITH,		40
		WPA. SMITH,		41
		WPA. SMITH,		42
		WPA. SMITH,		43
		WPA. SMITH,		44
		WPA. SMITH,		45
		WPA. SMITH,		46
		WPA. SMITH,		47
		WPA. SMITH,		48
		WPA. SMITH,		49
		WPA. SMITH,		50
		WPA. SMITH,		51
		WPA. SMITH,		52
		WPA. SMITH,		53
		WPA. SMITH,		54
		WPA. SMITH,		55
		WPA. SMITH,		56
		WPA. SMITH,		57
		WPA. SMITH,		58
		WPA. SMITH,		59
		WPA. SMITH,		60
		WPA. SMITH,		61
		WPA. SMITH,		62
		WPA. SMITH,		63
		WPA. SMITH,		64
		WPA. SMITH,		65
		WPA. SMITH,		66
		WPA. SMITH,		67
		WPA. SMITH,		68
		WPA. SMITH,		69
		WPA. SMITH,		70
		WPA. SMITH,		71
		WPA. SMITH,		72
		WPA. SMITH,		73
		WPA. SMITH,		74
		WPA. SMITH,		75
		WPA. SMITH,		76
		WPA. SMITH,		77
		WPA. SMITH,		78
		WPA. SMITH,		79
		WPA. SMITH,		80
		WPA. SMITH,		81
		WPA. SMITH,		82
		WPA. SMITH,		83
		WPA. SMITH,		84
		WPA. SMITH,		85
		WPA. SMITH,		86
		WPA. SMITH,		87
		WPA. SMITH,		88
		WPA. SMITH,		89
		WPA. SMITH,		90
		WPA. SMITH,		91
		WPA. SMITH,		92
		WPA. SMITH,		93
		WPA. SMITH,		94
		WPA. SMITH,		95
		WPA. SMITH,		96

[illegible][illegible]

[illegible]

7.9.44 WO Evacuation order

[illegible]

From LTR Report 1946: "Early in September 1944 the crisis came. The enemy advance from Hengyang was continued in a South-westerly direction towards Lingling (110/35E, 26/13N); even if the enemy's main intention was to strike south from Hengyang to Canton, Lingling would have to be occupied to guard their right flank; a continuation of their advance Southwest of Lingling would reveal immediately the enemy intention of investing Kweilin.

With Lingling occupied, there was a danger that the enemy patrols might make raids in the vicinity of Kweilin. The Commandant decided on the immediate evacuation of H.Q. to Ishan (108/38E, 29/37N).

B.A.A.G. plans were to establish H.Q. back at Ishan to ensure continuity of all the work, and from Ishan to re-establish overland communications with our forward posts as soon as the enemy position clarified.

A small party consisting of the Commandant, 4 officers and 1 O.R. should remain at Kweilin and put their services at the disposal of the Chinese Garrison Commander.

Thus the continued efficient working of the organization was assured, all its records, stores, and archives and transport saved. The intention of the "hard party" was to stay with the Garrison.

(Kweilin H.Q. retained their W/T, and thus up till the last was able to pass back accurate information as to movements of the encircling enemy columns)."

=====