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Nik Bostrom

Nombeno na Jenojono, Tikwando na Askafad

Onyocho bo Philosophical Quarterly (2003)

Kaikombe na 53, Dau na 211, k.n. 243-255

Al tengi chele tosko kuyo lau.


Nick Bostrom

Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University

Published in Philosophical Quarterly (2003)

Volume 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255.

Original article can be found here.


Tosko wau muluka en akwa wivule chu ajepau yanyo zenu eo ho: (1) tentom wi en shinga na yunga yomia ku deche nungi “zeyunga”; (2) tentomong vilu en janjato zeyunga kakwa ke munto dau kungile na anyansa na kwita na tono (eom awishile na aye); (3) wanyo la hai reshi fafau bo anyansa na dal. Ya zenu en ijeho en tengito kungile la en anin kwa wanyo tom uzeyunga yunyo munto  anyansa na chufa lo woisa, lelento wanyo la hai tauto bo anyansa. Dau chu  zeto yin na ajebas wa be al toska mau.


This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed.


Yuskan wi na jonokeho ai shi mau akuka si na ujanjono ai udetajono reke kuka iwi na idon na dauva denu tenchele la deta. Om sinje la sinta en akuka wau nenshi. Tente aya kwa en bengi yunyo zenu jam ya en yunyo munto anyansa sisinchau na chufa na yunyo eom na yunga shi chufa.


Many works of science fiction as well as some forecasts by serious technologists and futurologists predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct. One thing that later generations might do with their super-powerful computers is run detailed simulations of their forebears or of people like their forebears.

Chumun dal na yunyo ke don shai lo, yanyo ke tengi munto anyansa wi wamwa shai. Soi sinje yunga onyansa wau jele (shi yunyo ke shai tonto anyansa ke sisinchau wamwa yosa ai tonto ijesa be al joza wi kungile ya nenshi).

Because their computers would be so powerful, they could run a great many such simulations. Suppose that these simulated people are conscious (as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine-grained and if a certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct).

Tontoye ya ten winyombe wamwa na jea chi wanyo nong dochu shinga kuyo esto dochu yunga be ubenyo wekule na shinga kuyo nyansa yunyo. Tai ya ke ten muluka en, tonto awau shai, wanyo ke jepule en je tentom wanyo bambosko jea onyansa yompo bambosko akuyo na haijono.

Then it could be the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not belong to the original race but rather to people simulated by the advanced descendants of an original race. It is then possible to argue that, if this were the case, we would be rational to think that we are likely among the simulated minds rather than among the original biological ones.

Echu, tonto wanyo nong je wanyo hai tauto bo anyansa na dal lo, wanyo nong koikale jeho wanyo denu le ubenyo yunyo munto anyansa shai wi na chufa na yunyo. Aye jevu tiku. Achula na tosko wau denu munjebo zahea tunti.

Therefore, if we don’t think that we are currently living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled to believe that we will have descendants who will run lots of such simulations of their forebears. That is the basic idea. The rest of this paper will spell it out more carefully.

Chito ijoke be kutojevu wau lebo ya tos ukwa yunyo dembe relenka deta lo, topa kwavo tunti ana toje laila maiu. Mulu wau mule atopon eno  saren ahaka si na shirenyo ai jevayajono, ai ya jeka kaishi tokweshi yanyo ova ahenje vajanja si na nampuno, be al jesa yanyo wenye eom yanyo mun aje.

Apart form the interest this thesis may hold for those who are engaged in futuristic speculation, there are also more purely theoretical rewards. The argument provides a stimulus for formulating some methodological and metaphysical questions, and it suggests naturalistic analogies to certain traditional religious conceptions, which some may find amusing or thought-provoking.

Doshi na tosko shi akwa ya zenu. La kuta, wenyo saren asinje en tim wanyo kunjo chu jeno na jea eno nuku muluka.

The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we formulate an assumption that we need to import from the philosophy of mind in order to get the argument started.

Ana sun lo, ya en wanyo jeto amun tojuchu si eno je ana munto dau wi wamwa na anyansa na jea na yunga lo ke bo itengi na janjato na deta ya kwi jarim joshi shai wi yanyo be al tengi munyun kwi en yanyo jeluri renya na donyajono ojo ai basano na jodojono.

Second, we consider some empirical reasons for thinking that running vastly many simulations of human minds would be within the capability of a future civilization that has developed many of those technologies that can already be shown to be compatible with known physical laws and engineering constraints.

Ambe wau nong tentim ana jenojono, esto ya mule anomun en jehea achula. Tai ban na mulu zenu, ya za atoje na itentom wivang si, ai ambe ya mule revu tos jevu na ikungileng mwese be mulu jantenza ya.

This part is not philosophically necessary but it provides an incentive for paying attention to the rest. Then follows the core of the argument, which makes use of some simple probability theory, and a section providing support for a weak indifference principle that the argument employs.

La abas, wanyo totoska ajeboza si na hokwano be al cheva ya bo afauka, aye leke ajebas na mulu na nyansa.

Lastly, we discuss some interpretations of the disjunction, mentioned in the abstract, that forms the conclusion of the simulation argument.



Asinje yoza bo jenojono na jea ya ivanvang na angivu. Jevu kano en iwe na jea tengi vazevu akakwa chu shibo wilu na angivu chu yasa.

Tonto aren kwa munto shimbe nenshi na doshi ai atonu na dauva lo, al tengi mun ya vayun atoju jele. Ya nong sava kungibo na ijele en al za akwe haito ya ovuza cham bo jebeo munto ya: zatunya yanyo ovuza pidungu bo dal ke tengi jevuno jam nen kwashi aleke.


A common assumption in the philosophy of mind is that of substrate-independence. The idea is that mental states can supervene on any of a broad class of physical substrates. Provided a system implements the right sort of computational structures and processes, it can be associated with conscious experiences. It is not an essential property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon-based biological neural networks inside a cranium: silicon-based processors inside a computer could in principle do the trick as well.

Mulu yanyo revuza kutojevu be al pau bo auko, ai eye ya nong feluru kwambe lo, wanyo denu pauza ya shi rejo ojoza.

Arguments for this thesis have been given in the literature, and although it is not entirely uncontroversial, we shall here take it as a given.

Mulu be wanyo denu munyun ya nong, eye, rava shito don wi kakwa na lekesapuno eom zatumpuno.Shi tanto, wanto nong tinza sinje en kutojevu na ivavang na angivu ho tentim (tonto al jeto eom zanchau eom jevayajono)- esto sisi en, hole, dal ya la munto dan tongo ke jele.

The argument we shall present does not, however, depend on any very strong version of functionalism or computationalism. For example, we need not assume that the thesis of substrate-independence is necessarily true (either analytically or metaphysically) – just that, in fact, a computer running a suitable program would be conscious.

Yelu, tim wanyo nong sinje en, eno mula jea la dal lo, ya ke yosa en danka ya shai en ya sapu shu yunga la toshi yo, lebo ana janten zayunko na Tiring a.k.s. Wanyo tinza sisi asinje mwese tunti en ya ke yosa tos amunto na atoju lule en al shiko sisinchau tongo doshi na atonu na dauva na jeje na yunga, shi la angi na winoban na kwalo. Shito osilu wau na ivavang na angivu be al joza wi kungile.

Moreover, we need not assume that in order to create a mind on a computer it would be sufficient to program it in such a way that it behaves like a human in all situations, including passing the Turing test etc. We need only the weaker assumption that it would suffice for the generation of subjective experiences that the computational processes of a human brain are structurally replicated in suitably fine-grained detail, such as on the level of individual synapses. This attenuated version of substrate- independence is quite widely accepted.

Juchovo, mumbe na atomwan na juno, ai avo yin yanyo sin tunti winoban leke tenyunge ajo ai ana kwan  na yunga. Kutojevu na ivavang na angivunong en sin eom tauvang zeto na avo wau, esto en yanyo vato atoju lule za munya noshi eom noshing tos janyo na dauva sisi. Shi tanto, tonto iyinshi nong tengi laila tos atoju lule leleng iyinshi na doncho na winoban mau laila, tontoye sinchau telenchong na nyansa le angi na winoban (eom wan tunti).

Neurotransmitters, nerve growth factors, and other chemicals that are smaller than a synapse clearly play a role in human cognition and learning. The substrate-independence thesis is not that the effects of these chemicals are small or irrelevant, but rather that they affect subjective experience only via their direct or indirect influence on computational activities. For example, if there can be no difference in subjective experience without there also being a difference in synaptic discharges, then the requisite detail of simulation is at the synaptic level (or higher).


La nungi tauto na arim na joshi lo, wanyo mau nong le rea don yosa mau nong danyo tentim eno mula jea jele bo dal. Esto mulu tenjeho be al pau en tonto aweku na joshi kura tonsileng lo tontoye al rutum mwesela wau la abas.


At our current stage of technological development, we have neither sufficiently powerful hardware nor the requisite software to create conscious minds in computers. But persuasive arguments have been given to the effect that if technological progress continues unabated then these shortcomings will eventually be overcome.

Koko si muluka en nungi wau tente sisi  nainu niniro si. Eye ikeno taula nong tinza asinje tos vawan na ata. Mulu na nyansa teri nen kwashi tos ukwa yunyo je en ata wiza tiro wisti wi deche nungi “zeyunga” na janjato, en tai yunga jale awi wan tio chu itengi na joshi be ukwa tengi tauto munyun yanyo rato renya na donojono ai basano na yasa ai dono.

Some authors argue that this stage may be only a few decades away. Yet present purposes require no assumptions about the time-scale. The simulation argument works equally well for those who think that it will take hundreds of thousands of years to reach a “posthuman” stage of civilization, where humankind has acquired most of the technological capabilities that one can currently show to be consistent with physical laws and with material and energy constraints.

Nungi rim shai na arim na joshi denu munten en vosa tira ai zavo yin chu tilan tom dal don wamwa. Tauto lo reza ana reshi tos basano kakwa na ti na dono na dauva ya tenchele tos janjato zeyunga. Chumun wanyo rata leleng “atoje tos ayo” lo, wanyo nong tengi lechika iten en kulento henku na donojono, yanyo teneng bo atoje tauto  na donojono, al tente jantenza eno tum basano ye yanyo la ijebo tauto na wanyo munza basano na toje tos ana zatum aujo ya terento bo kos kakwa na yasa. Wanyo tengi rento za ireshi wan wi tunti basano hu tunti tos adauva na uzeyunga, za ana sinje kweren sisi be al jebo yanyo kwi.

Such a mature stage of technological development will make it possible to convert planets and other astronomical resources into enormously powerful computers. It is currently hard to be confident in any upper bound on the computing power that may be available to posthuman civilizations. As we are still lacking a “theory of everything”, we cannot rule out the possibility that novel physical phenomena, not allowed for in current physical theories, may be utilized to transcend those constraints that in our current understanding impose theoretical limits on the information processing attainable in a given lump of matter. We can with much greater confidence establish lower bounds on posthuman computation, by assuming only mechanisms that are already understood.

Shi tanto, Erik Dereskalar jantikuko asaje tos kweren le wanio na vailu chu shushum (la chibo amule na javen ai dono) ya ke munto ashika  1021 tos sinsirio. Koko yin pau ajewi na kanto 1042 tos sinsirio tos dal le awi le vawan na tira wan. (Tonto wanyo tengi mula dal na wisi, eom kwan za yasa na bambe eom aulembe jando dal, wanyo ke tengi faunu wi tunti basano na toje. Set Loid dauva basano na ti na dal le wambio 1 na kanto jeno 5*1050  be ya munto tos sinsirio za dio ~1031. Esto, ya yosa tos ikeno na wanyo en za ajewi vajanke tunti ya kusinje jevu na saje tenjo tauto sisi.)

For example, Eric Drexler has outlined a design for a system the size of a sugar cube (excluding cooling and power supply) that would perform 1021 instructions per second. Another author gives a rough estimate of 1042 operations per second for a computer with a mass on order of a large planet.[4] (If we could create quantum computers, or learn to build computers out of nuclear matter or plasma, we could push closer to the theoretical limits. Seth Lloyd calculates an upper bound for a 1 kg computer of 5*1050 logical operations per second carried out on ~1031 bits.[5] However, it suffices for our purposes to use the more conservative estimate that presupposes only currently known design-principles.)

Iwi na idon na dauva otinza wenke jea na yunga be al tengi shai jewi chauchang. Ajewi kwa, ya vuza apopa na dauva eno shiko itenchu na leke na ambe chu sesa na juno be wanyo kwi jebo ya ai itenchu na leke na ya be al kwi shiko za pidungu, wauka ana janen fera bo yumbonum, jampo amundau na kanto ~1014  tos sinsirio tos jeje kwambe na yunga. Ajewi yinza, ya vuza dau chu winoban bo jeje ai iwito na doncho na yanyo, pau amundau na ~1016-1017 tos sinsirio.

The amount of computing power needed to emulate a human mind can likewise be roughly estimated. One estimate, based on how computationally expensive it is to replicate the functionality of a piece of nervous tissue that we have already understood and whose functionality has been replicated in silico, contrast enhancement in the retina, yields a figure of ~1014 operations per second for the entire human brain. An alternative estimate, based the number of synapses in the brain and their firing frequency, gives a figure of ~1016-1017 operations per second.

Al tengi henje, amau eye ke tengi otinza tonto wanto nyansa sisinchau lekeshi na bo na winoban ai pelesu. Esto, ya tentom en junokwe na yunga na ban le valon wan na  ivitinza tos vawan vusi eno simas iterejung ai ikale na yambe na juno na ya. Echu al ke jeku awimun kungile na igezeto  eta al za zatunya haitong tereju ai witenza.

Conceivably, even more could be required if we want to simulate in detail the internal workings of synapses and dendritic trees. However, it is likely that the human central nervous system has a high degree of redundancy on the mircoscale to compensate for the unreliability and noisiness of its neuronal components. One would therefore expect a substantial efficiency gain when using more reliable and versatile non-biological processors.

Jomura yunkule basano ya nong chaubas tunti idon na zatum. Mau lo, chumun awiti na azage na yunga na senju ~108 dio tos sinsirio lo, ana nyansa ato yo na senju dele apopa tenyunung tonto al mashun ya ana nyansa janyo na jejechi. Echu wanyo tengi za idon na zatum  be al tinza eno nyansa junokwe na ban shi ajewi na apopa kwambe na dauva na nyansa jea na yunga.

Memory seems to be a no more stringent constraint than processing power. Moreover, since the maximum human sensory bandwidth is ~108 bits per second, simulating all sensory events incurs a negligible cost compared to simulating the cortical activity. We can therefore use the processing power required to simulate the central nervous system as an estimate of the total computational cost of simulating a human mind.

Tonto al jalebo arora anyansa lo, awau ke tinza idon na mau na dauva- iwi rava iwilu ai isisinchau na anyansa. Ana nyansa yoyala kwambe deche angi na wisi teneng tenyunge, lelento al henyun donojono hen vuchu. Esto eno mula anyansa teho na atoju na yunga lo, al tinza akwa si tunti wi- akakwa sisi be al tinza wa eno jareshi yunga onyansa, la wayom za ashi janjasa na yunga arora onyansa na yunyo, nong boyun janjanto kakwa.

If the environment is included in the simulation, this will require additional computing power – how much depends on the scope and granularity of the simulation. Simulating the entire universe down to the quantum level is obviously infeasible, unless radically new physics is discovered. But in order to get a realistic simulation of human experience, much less is needed – only whatever is required to ensure that the simulated humans, interacting in normal human ways with their simulated environment, don’t notice any irregularities.

Al tengi jalechi van abo sintenyun na Yula. Aya nainu na tilan tengi le jetan lonsi wi: hoyunku tinza deche atol na sava be wanyo tengi yun ya chu tira eom tilani na luninyo na wanyo.

The microscopic structure of the inside of the Earth can be safely omitted. Distant astronomical objects can have highly compressed representations: verisimilitude need extend to the narrow band of properties that we can observe from our planet or solar system spacecraft.

Tila kuchi na Yula, tim al nyansa basanung aya wantenyun la sinan odora tente, esto ato sintenyunbe al tengi kojo la  jantonsa. Akwa be al za sinsiyunya na vumembe weyun ya tim yunkule tenjekeng, esto al janja nong le ashi eno hoka irato tos ambe oyunung na yula sintenyun.

On the surface of Earth, macroscopic objects in inhabited areas may need to be continuously simulated, but microscopic phenomena could likely be filled in ad hoc. What you see through an electron microscope needs to look unsuspicious, but you usually have no way of confirming its coherence with unobserved parts of the microscopic world.

Achito de eta wanyo saje keno aren eno koiza ato sintenyun oyunung yanyo ri janoza jevu tenjo eno mule zeto be wanyo tengi hoka vavang yanyo. Aya na layom na awau dal. Tente echu anyansa tinza jalebo jetan basanung na dal deche angi na mumbe jeno na kwalo. Awau nong mun doi, chumun idon tauto na dauva tenyunsi tos wangi zeyunga.

Exceptions arise when we deliberately design systems to harness unobserved microscopic phenomena that operate in accordance with known principles to get results that we are able to independently verify. The paradigmatic case of this is a computer. The simulation may therefore need to include a continuous representation of computers down to the level of individual logic elements. This presents no problem, since our current computing power is negligible by posthuman standards.

Mau lo, nyansatal zeyunga ke le idon na dauva ya yosa eno lara vusayun iwe sisinchau na ijeho bo jeje yo na yunga la ata yo. Echu, eta ya yun yunga lum boyun yula sintenyun lo, ya ke tengi kojo sisinchau yosa bo anyansa bo nombe ya tongo le jevu na itinza na sinta. Tonto awoi kakwa to lo, kweti ke tengi gejo yintu iwe na jea kakwa yanyo tom jele janjanto ku ya jambai anyansa. Shi ayinza, kweti ke tengi jalechi wainu sinsirio si ai munto wai anyansa za ashi ya chunu doi.

Moreover, a posthuman simulator would have enough computing power to keep track of the detailed belief-states in all human brains at all times. Therefore, when it saw that a human was about to make an observation of the microscopic world, it could fill in sufficient detail in the simulation in the appropriate domain on an as-needed basis. Should any error occur, the director could easily edit the states of any brains that have become aware of an anomaly before it spoils the simulation. Alternatively, the director could skip back a few seconds and rerun the simulation in a way that avoids the problem.

Shai ya yunkule tenjeho en apopa tiku na dauva tos ana mula anyansa yanyo tensaining na iho na yasa tos jea na yunga bo anyansa tos ana nyansa jeje senshi deche angi na sesu na juno eom vu angi na sesu na juno. Eye ya nong ten en mule ajewi chau wi na apopa na anyansa teho na kwita na yunga lo, wanyo tengi za kanto ~1033 - 1036 shi ajewi chauchang.

It thus seems plausible that the main computational cost in creating simulations that are indistinguishable from physical reality for human minds in the simulation resides in simulating organic brains down to the neuronal or sub-neuronal level. While it is not possible to get a very exact estimate of the cost of a realistic simulation of human history, we can use ~1033 - 1036 operations as a rough estimate.

Tabo wanyo wimun ikwijo wo tunti tos yunyansa, wanyo denu mule ajebo nen tunti na itinza na dauva eno mun yula shau yunkule teho tos uyunde. Esto la atonto yo, eye tonto ajewi na wanyo nochu tos angi siwi na iwan lo, awau  nong kungile wi tos mulu na wanyo. Wanyo boyun en afaushi na idon na dauva na dal le wiwan na tira kanto 1042 tos sinsirio, ai aye sinje sisi asaje na vombezado be al kwi jo, yanyo tentom yoyong tentio.

As we gain more experience with virtual reality, we will get a better grasp of the computational requirements for making such worlds appear realistic to their visitors. But in any case, even if our estimate is off by several orders of magnitude, this does not matter much for our argument. We noted that a rough approximation of the computational power of a planetary-mass computer is 1042 operations per second, and that assumes only already known nanotechnological designs, which are probably far from optimal.

Dal shau kwa sisi ke tengi nyansa kwita kwambe na jea na yunga (om wanyo jansenkawau anyansa na chufa) la za asi tunti  benambe chu idon na zatum tos sinsirio kwa. Janjato zeyunga la abas tente jando dau wamwa chu dal shau. Wanyo tengi jebas en idon na dauva ya tenchele tos janjato zeyunga yosa eno munto dau wamwa chu anyansa na chufa eye tonto ya japau simbe sinsi sisi chu zavo na yunyo ikeno ye. Wanyo tengi deche ajebas wau eye tonto wanyo chula luski kungile na awoi bo ajewi yo na wanyo.

A single such a computer could simulate the entire mental history of humankind (call this an ancestor-simulation) by using less than one millionth of its processing power for one second. A posthuman civilization may eventually build an astronomical number of such computers. We can conclude that the computing power available to a posthuman civilization is sufficient to run a huge number of ancestor-simulations even it allocates only a minute fraction of its resources to that purpose. We can draw this conclusion even while leaving a substantial margin of error in all our estimates.·

Janjato zeyunga ke le idon yosa na dauva eno munto anyansa na chufa wi wamwa eye tabo la za simbe sinsi sisi chu zavo na yunyo tos ikeno ye.

Posthuman civilizations would have enough computing power to run hugely many ancestor-simulations even while using only a tiny fraction of their resources for that purpose.


Al tengi chuka jevu na tosko wau shi chauchang akwa ya zenu: Tonto tengito kungile ke laila en janjato na wanyo ata kwa denu deche angi zeyunga ai munto anyansa wi na chufa lo, tontoye hamun li nong hai bo nyansa shai?

Wanyo denu jarim jevu wau eno tom mulu rele kwa. Om boka kotanko ya zenu:


The basic idea of this paper can be expressed roughly as follows: If there were a substantial chance that our civilization will ever get to the posthuman stage and run many ancestor-simulations, then how come you are not living in such a simulation?

We shall develop this idea into a rigorous argument. Let us introduce the following notation:

 : Simbe na janjato yo na angi na yunga le joshi yanyo haira eno deche angi zeyunga

: Dau bangi na anyansa na chufa be janjato zeyunga munto ya

: Dau bangi na kwalo yunyo kwi hai bo janjato ku ya deche angi zeyunga

Simbe h na uboyun yo le atoju na shimbe na yunga yunyo hai bo anyansa echu tongi:


: Fraction of all human-level technological civilizations that survive to reach a posthuman stage

: Average number of ancestor-simulations run by a posthuman civilization

: Average number of individuals that have lived in a civilization before it reaches a posthuman stage

The actual fraction of all observers with human-type experiences that live in simulations is then:


La janko   yompo simbe na janjato zeyunga yanyo joke munto anyansa na chufa (eom yanyo lebo kwalo si wivule yunyo joke aye ai yunyo le zavo yosa eno munto dau kungile chu anyansa shai), ai yompo dau bangi na anyansa na chufa be janjato yunyo joke munyo yanyo, wanyo le

ai echu:


Writing  for the fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor-simulations (or that contain at least some individuals who are interested in that and have sufficient resources to run a significant number of such simulations), and  for the average number of ancestor-simulations run by such interested civilizations, we have

and thus:


Chumun idon wamwa na dauva na janjato zeyunga  wan vilu, shi wanyo kwi weyun bo ambe kuto. Eta wanyo sayun (*) lo wanyo tengi weyun tai en tim akwa wivule chu ajeka yem yanyo zenu ho:




Because of the immense computing power of posthuman civilizations,  is extremely large, as we saw in the previous section. By inspecting (*) we can then see that at least one of the following three propositions must be true:





Wanyo tengi jam nungi mau ai jebas en ya rava iho na (3), ijeho na ukwa tos akutoje en ukwa no anyansa tinti  fafau ikwa. Sisanto mau, tonto wanyo jo en simbe x chu uweyun le atoju na shimbe na yunga la hai bo anyansa lo, ai wanyo nong aujo kakwa yanyo totanka en atoju chau na walonyo tentom chauchang tunti atoju yin na shimbe na yunga be al munto bo ihai yompo bo tal, tontoye tinti ijeho na wanyo en wanyo bo anyansa tongi x:




We can take a further step and conclude that conditional on the truth of (3), one’s credence in the hypothesis that one is in a simulation should be close to unity. More generally, if we knew that a fraction x of all observers with human-type experiences live in simulations, and we don’t have any information that indicate that our own particular experiences are any more or less likely than other human-type experiences to have been implemented in vivo rather than in machina, then our credence that we are in a simulation should equal x:


Nungi wau be al za jevu kwa na ijulung mwese wi tuskako. Om sain tokan sun. tokan na kwa, ya agejo tio, ya ana en jea yo be ya tos yanyo shi ana lilo, kanosa yanyo shikosa sangile chau ana li: yanyo le aujo kwashi chau ai atoju kwashi be li le yanyo.

This step is sanctioned by a very weak indifference principle. Let us distinguish two cases. The first case, which is the easiest, is where all the minds in question are like your own in the sense that they are exactly qualitatively identical to yours: they have exactly the same information and the same experiences that you have.

Tokan na sun ya ana en jea “shi” noyom kanosa mwele sisi en yanyo shimbe na jea yanyo shimbeshi ana ula shi yunga, esto yanyo sainsa sangile noyom ai ayo chu asun le zanyo sainsa chu atoju. Wa mumwe en eye la tokan na ze, ana en jea yinshi sangile,

mulu na anyansa rata leke, tonto al nong le aujo ya tos ahaka en ahana chu jea wishi ye onyansa ai ahana al munto haito.

The second case is where the minds are “like” each other only in the loose sense of being the sort of minds that are typical of human creatures, but they are qualitatively distinct from one another and each has a distinct set of experiences. I maintain that even in the latter case, where the minds are qualitatively different, the simulation argument still works, provided that you have no information that bears on the question of which of the various minds are simulated and which are implemented biologically.

Awairu sisinchau na jevu ya don tio, ya siske en ajesa ya ti tos tokan sun yo ya tanto sisa kungileng be al pai bo konyo. Labo nong tuska awai na awairu wau lau, esto wanyo tengi za ana deza ijela denu toshi na kaishi na shimbe wejo eno munyun akwa chu joju yanyo la vu.

A detailed defense of a stronger principle, which implies the above stance for both cases as trivial special instances, has been given in the literature. Space does not permit a recapitulation of that defense here, but we can bring out one of the underlying intuitions by bringing to our attention to an analogous situation of a more familiar kind.

 Jeto lo % x chu doranyo le azenu kwa na senjo S bo ambe na senjo be al janja chauka ya “senjo na lenzavo”. Jeto lo mau, en atonyun na S nong laila (chito akwa ya ke tonyun bo azachau) ai en noyomova wejo nong laila tos ana le S ai sava temboyun kakwa. Tontoye, tenyun kungile, lelento li mun al zayun azenu na senjo na li lo, ya jepule en pauno itenjeho le %x akutoje en li le S.

Suppose that x% of the population has a certain genetic sequence S within the part of their DNA commonly designated as “junk DNA”. Suppose, further, that there are no manifestations of S (short of what would turn up in a gene assay) and that there are no known correlations between having S and any observable characteristic. Then, quite clearly, unless you have had your DNA sequenced, it is rational to assign a credence of x% to the hypothesis that you have S.

Ai jetong shau awau tos rejo en yunga yunyo le S le jea ai toju yinshi  tunti yunga yunyo nong le S. (Yunyo yinshi sisi chumun yunga yo le atoju yinshi tunti noyom, nong chumun ava ojo kwa tos S ai shimbe na atoju al chede yanyo.)

And this is so quite irrespective of the fact that the people who have S have qualitatively different minds and experiences from the people who don’t have S. (They are different simply because all humans have different experiences from one another, not because of any known link between S and what kind of experiences one has.)

Ajenoza kwashi kaivu tonto S nong sava na ana le azenu kwa na senjo esto yompo sava na ana bo anyansa, tonto wanyo sinje sisi en wanyo nong le aujo ya munten wanyo kuka iyinshi kakwa tos atoju na jea onyansa ai ana jea haito kuyo.

The same reasoning holds if S is not the property of having a certain genetic sequence but instead the property of being in a simulation, assuming only that we have no information that enables us to predict any differences between the experiences of simulated minds and those of the original biological minds.

Tim al loka en jevu na ijulung kungileng be al chuka ya za (#) zamun ijulung sisi tos akutoje tos uboyun shai li, eta li nong le aujo tos ukwa chu uboyun wau li. Ya nong janja zamun ijulung tos akutoje eta li nong le aujo ochauka tos akwa chu akutoje ya ho.

It should be stressed that the bland indifference principle expressed by (#) prescribes indifference only between hypotheses about which observer you are, when you have no information about which of these observers you are. It does not in general prescribe indifference between hypotheses when you lack specific information about which of the hypotheses is true.

 Fera jevu na ijulung na Laplas ai yin yanyo keti tunti lo, ya chumunye remil fekalo na Beretaran ai shibo weshi yanyo janjake vavako jevu na ijulung le itenai basanoleng

 In contrast to Laplacean and other more ambitious principles of indifference, it is therefore immune to Bertrand’s paradox and similar predicaments that tend to plague indifference principles of unrestricted scope.

Ukoyun yunyo wejo mulu na Anin na Bas tente sinyi en jevu na ijulung kungileng be al zaka lau ya asinje kwashi ya mun mulu na Anin na Bas nuku, ai en ijojushi na feno na zeto siwi chu aze tontanka eom mun ihoha tos ihova na aku.

Readers familiar with the Doomsday argument may worry that the bland principle of indifference invoked here is the same assumption that is responsible for getting the Doomsday argument off the ground, and that the counterintuitiveness of some of the implications of the latter incriminates or casts doubt on the validity of the former.

Awau nong shau. Mulu na Anin na Bas revuza jepauvu don ai feluru tunti wi, wauka tim al jenoza tontoshi al yumbe ferenchu kwa chu zanyo chu yunga yo yunyo kwiku hai (la kwita, taulata, ai deta) eye tonto wanyo jo wanyo la hai kuvi la melta na sunini kwa yompo la sinya chau kwa la taulata nainu eom la deta. Jevu na ijulung kungileng la feno, zajem sisi tokan bo yanyo wanyo nong le aujo tos wonyo chu yunga be wanyo dochu lai.

This is not so. The Doomsday argument rests on a much stronger and more controversial premiss, namely that one should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all people who will ever have lived (past, present, and future) even though we know that we are living in the early twenty-first century rather than at some point in the distant past or the future. The bland indifference principle, by contrast, applies only to cases where we have no information about which group of people we belong to.

Tonto tentomas mule aheno kakwa denu ijeho jepule, ya mau tente tempa jevi en tonto uyo ke nisku en yunyo bo anyansa eom nong, tontoye tonto yunga za jevu kungileng na ijulung lo, ai chumunye nisku apa ana bo anyansa tonto yunyo jo en lai ala en yunga yo fafau lai, tontoye uyo fafau denu fiti anisku. Tonto yunyo nisku yunyo nong bo anyansa lo. Yunkule ya nen tunti en al chunu juve na ijulung kungileng.

If betting odds provide some guidance to rational belief, it may also be worth to ponder that if everybody were to place a bet on whether they are in a simulation or not, then if people use the bland principle of indifference, and consequently place their money on being in a simulation if they know that that’s where almost all people are, then almost everyone will win their bets. If they bet on not being in a simulation, then almost everyone will lose. It seems better that the bland indifference principle be heeded.

Mau lo, al tengi jeto azenu na toshi ten bo yanyo simbe chu yunga yo hai bo anyansa: %98, %99, %99,%99.9999 ai kura shai. Tonto al faunu tokan na basano, bo ya uyo bo anyansa (chu ya al tengi jebas la tova en al yulo bo anyansa), ya tenjeho en tinza en itenjeho be al pauno ya ana bo anyansa faunu sinsimbe tokan na bas na ireshi kwambe za ashi ya shikosa.

Further, one can consider a sequence of possible situations in which an increasing fraction of all people live in simulations: 98%, 99%, 99.9%, 99.9999%, and so on. As one approaches the limiting case in which everybody is in a simulation (from which one can deductively infer that one is in a simulation oneself), it is plausible to require that the credence one assigns to being in a simulation gradually approach the limiting case of complete certainty in a matching manner.


Tengito be al za ajepau (1) jetan ya noshi kungile. Tonto (1) ho, tontoye yunganyo denu reshi fafau teneng deche angi zeyunga; chumun ya reza weyun apuyu kakwa chumunye shinga na walonyo be al denu pau vitus eom chutus tos minto la deta. Ya tontosa tos (a), echu, tim wanyo pau itenjeho wan ANIN NA BAS, akutoje en yunganyo denu yomia ku yu deche angi zeyunga:


The possibility represented by proposition (1) is fairly straightforward. If (1) is true, then humankind will almost certainly fail to reach a posthuman level; for virtually no species at our level of development become posthuman, and it is hard to see any justification for thinking that our own species will be especially privileged or protected from future disasters. Conditional on (1), therefore, we must give a high credence to DOOM, the hypothesis that humankind will go extinct before reaching a posthuman level:

Al tengi jeyun toshi na kutoje en wanyo le areyun shai ya ke tunti aujo na . Shi tanto lo, tonto wanyo ke henyun wanyo be bondu wamwa lum che lo, awau ke tengi totanka en wanyo kwi minishi chitoshi. Tontoye wanyo ke tengi pauno ANIN NA BAS itenjeho wan tunti ajeku na wanyo tos simbe na janjato le nungi na yunga yunyo teneng deche izeyunga. La atonto tauto eye, yunkule wanyo sivi areyun eno je en wanyo sisa tos lumbe wau, nonto nen nonto ming.

One can imagine hypothetical situations were we have such evidence as would trump knowledge of . For example, if we discovered that we were about to be hit by a giant meteor, this might suggest that we had been exceptionally unlucky. We could then assign a credence to DOOM larger than our expectation of the fraction of human-level civilizations that fail to reach posthumanity. In the actual case, however, we seem to lack evidence for thinking that we are special in this regard, for better or worse.

Ajepau (1) yalo nong siske wanyo tentom gela yomia, esto sisi en ya tentomong wanyo deche nungi zeyunga. Tengito wau jeluri atonto en wanyo lara la, eom ti si, angi tauto na arim na janjono tabo ata nai ku wanyo denu yomia. Ashi yin en (1) tongi ho ya en tonto ya tentom en janjato na janjono denu bombai. Ronyo kurinta chu yunga tente chula basaleng la Yula.

Proposition (1) doesn’t by itself imply that we are likely to go extinct soon, only that we are unlikely to reach a posthuman stage. This possibility is compatible with us remaining at, or somewhat above, our current level of technological development for a long time before going extinct. Another way for (1) to be true is if it is likely that technological civilization will collapse. Primitive human societies might then remain on Earth indefinitely.

Ashi wi laila en yunganyo ke tengi yomia ku deche izeyunga. Tente ajeboza tokweshi tio aya en wanyo tentom yomia chumun zeto na arim na joshi kakwa ya don esto zen. Wotenjeza kwa janjono na vombezado na vombeva, ya tonto ya le nungi rim ke munten ana jando lotal na vombezado yunyo ke wetengi kiza boi ai avo senshi - shimbe chu misu na tal. Lotal shai be al saje eno munto akeja nempung, ke tengi mun ayomia na ula yo la tira na wanyo.

There are many ways in which humanity could become extinct before reaching posthumanity. Perhaps the most natural interpretation of (1) is that we are likely to go extinct as a result of the development of some powerful but dangerous technology. One candidate is molecular nanotechnology, which in its mature stage would enable the construction of self-replicating nanobots capable of feeding on dirt and organic matter – a kind of mechanical bacteria. Such nanobots, designed for malicious ends, could cause the extinction of all life on our planet.

Ayinza na sun bo ajebas na mulu na nyansa en sin tenyunsi simbe na janjanto zeyunga yunyo joke anyansa na kufa.

Eno (2) ho lo, tim ikwanu don laila tos nonu na janjato wekule. Tonto dau chu anyansa na kufa be janjato yunyo joke mula ya wamwa wi lo, tim isito na janjato shau vilu kwasa shai.

The second alternative in the simulation argument’s conclusion is that the fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor-simulation is negligibly small. In order for (2) to be true, there must be a strong convergence among the courses of advanced civilizations. If the number of ancestor-simulations created by the interested civilizations is extremely large, the rarity of such civilizations must be correspondingly extreme.

Janjato zeyunga meng fafau jebas za zavo na yunyo munto dau wamwa chu anyansa na kufa. Mau lo, janjato zeyunga yo fafau sivi kwalo yunyo le zavo ai ijoke yosa eno munto anyansa na kufa; eom yunyo le renya be al munto tereju yanyo kubas kwalo shai en jam shi akeju.

Virtually no posthuman civilizations decide to use their resources to run large numbers of ancestor-simulations. Furthermore, virtually all posthuman civilizations lack individuals who have sufficient resources and interest to run ancestor-simulations; or else they have reliably enforced laws that prevent such individuals from acting on their desires.

Ikoi hana ke tengi maun ikwanu shai? Al tengi relenka en janjato wekule yo jarim la noza nonu ya notile deche ajoza na itusung pule ya fe amunto na anyansa na kufu chumun iyaiza be al munza udora na anyansa ya.

What force could bring about such convergence? One can speculate that advanced civilizations all develop along a trajectory that leads to the recognition of an ethical prohibition against running ancestor-simulations because of the suffering that is inflicted on the inhabitants of the simulation.

Esto lo, chu achu na ijesa taula, ya nong tenyunge en ming ana mula yunganyo kwa. Ya fe, wanyo janja jesa ilaila na shinga na wanyo tongi itempa pule wamwa. Mau lo, ikwanu na ijesa pule tos inempung na munto anyansa na kufa nong yosa: tim al ron ya lu ikwanu tos doshi na ronyo ya rora janjato kwambe ya munten al tusunka temunya janyo be al jesa yanyo nempung.

However, from our present point of view, it is not clear that creating a human race is immoral. On the contrary, we tend to view the existence of our race as constituting a great ethical value. Moreover, convergence on an ethical view of the immorality of running ancestor-simulations is not enough: it must be combined with convergence on a civilization-wide social structure that enables activities considered immoral to be effectively banned.

Ala na kwanu yin kwa ya en uzeyunga na kwalo yo fafau jarim ano be al yunyo mole ikeju na munto anyana  na kufa. Awau ke tinza ayin kungile tos anomun yanyo muno kufa na yunga na yunyo, chumun reshi yunga wi laila yunyo ke keju munto anyansa na kufa tonto yunyo ke tempo jam. Esto tenti awi chu ikeju na yunga na wanyo ukwa yo yu tom uzeyunga denu jesa yanyo sihau.

Another possible convergence point is that almost all individual posthumans in virtually all posthuman civilizations develop in a direction where they lose their desires to run ancestor-simulations. This would require significant changes to the motivations driving their human predecessors, for there are certainly many humans who would like to run ancestor-simulations if they could afford to do so. But perhaps many of our human desires will be regarded as silly by anyone who becomes a posthuman.

Tento itempa na jono na anyansa na kufa tenyunsi tos janjato zeyunga (akwa ya nong tenjehong vivi tonto al jeto itio temwanyunung na nenje), ai tente uzeyunga jesa janyo na zamil ashi gezetong wi eno jela ishushi - be al tengi topon noshi ban na topa na jeje jale ya. Ajebas kwa ya deva chu (2) en janjato zeyunga denu yinshi wi tunti janjato na yunga: yunyo nong denu bolw ujam vavang pale nyova yunyo le tenayo kwambe na ikeju yungasa ai yunyo namil jam noza yanyo.

Maybe the scientific value of ancestor-simulations to a posthuman civilization is negligible (which is not too implausible given its unfathomable intellectual superiority), and maybe posthumans regard recreational activities as merely a very inefficient way of getting pleasure – which can be obtained much more cheaply by direct stimulation of the brain’s reward centers. One conclusion that follows from (2) is that posthuman societies will be very different from human societies: they will not contain relatively wealthy independent agents who have the full gamut of human-like desires and are free to act on them.

Tengito be ayinza (3) chuka ya tevino tio tos jevu. Tonto wanyo la hai bo anyansa lo, tontoye yoyala be wanyo la weyun ya sisi ambe sinsi na ikwambe na ilaila na yasa. Donyajono bo yoyala dal lai ya la munto anyansa tente eom tente nong shi donyajono na yoyala be wanyo weyun ya. Tabo yoyala be wanyo weyun ya “ho” za ijeno kwa, ya nong la angi na jevu na iho.

The possibility expressed by alternative (3) is the conceptually most intriguing one. If we are living in a simulation, then the cosmos that we are observing is just a tiny piece of the totality of physical existence. The physics in the universe where the computer is situated that is running the simulation may or may not resemble the physics of the world that we observe. While the world we see is in some sense “real”, it is not located at the fundamental level of reality.

Tente ya ten en janjato onyansa tom zeyunga. Tente yunyo tontoye munto anyansa na kufa na yulonyo za dal don be yunyo jando yanyo bo yoyala onyansa na yunyo. Dal shai ke leke “tal bolaila”, jevu wejo la dalajono. (sindako na kweva na Javah be, shi tanto, al munto bo dal bolaila - dal onyansa- bo dodal na li.)

It may be possible for simulated civilizations to become posthuman. They may then run their own ancestor- simulations on powerful computers they build in their simulated universe. Such computers would be “virtual machines”, a familiar concept in computer science. (Java script web-applets, for instance, run on a virtual machine – a simulated computer – inside your desktop.)

Al tengi jamawen dol bolaila: ten en nyansa dal ya nyansa dal ya nyansa dal yin ai kura shai, za numbe wi kungileng na iwawaito. Tonto wanto eo kura mula anyansa na walonyo na kufa lo, awau ke leke areyun don ya fe (1) ai (2), ai echu tim wanyo jevas en walonyo hai bo anyansa. Mau eye, tim wanyo ke jeke en uzeyunga yunyo la munto anyansa na wanyo yulonyo ula onyansa; ai tente umula na yunyo, za sento na yulonyo, ula onyansa mau.

Virtual machines can be stacked: it’s possible to simulate a machine simulating another machine, and so on, in arbitrarily many steps of iteration. If we do go on to create our own ancestor-simulations, this would be strong evidence against (1) and (2), and we would therefore have to conclude that we live in a simulation. Moreover, we would have to suspect that the posthumans running our simulation are themselves simulated beings; and their creators, in turn, may also be simulated beings.

Echu tente iho bole angi wi. Eye tonto tim tos tikwe en ya vunu bas la nungi kwa lo - simboyun si nyongi na jevayajono na akare wau- tenta labo laila tos dau wamwa chu angi na iho, ai dau tente zeno ata tomwi. (Ajeto kwa ya xxx fe akutoje na angi wi en ya apopa na mundau tos nyansatal na angi na vu ke weron awamwa wi. Ana nyansa janjato zeyunga kwa sisi tengi pale shai en al ke tusunka, Tonta ya shai, tontoye tim wanyo jeku en al bas anyansa na wanyo eta wanyo lum tom zeyunga.)

Reality may thus contain many levels. Even if it is necessary for the hierarchy to bottom out at some stage – the metaphysical status of this claim is somewhat obscure – there may be room for a large number of levels of reality, and the number could be increasing over time. (One consideration that counts against the multi-level hypothesis is that the computational cost for the basement-level simulators would be very great. Simulating even a single posthuman civilization might be prohibitively expensive. If so, then we should expect our simulation to be terminated when we are about to become posthuman.)

Eye mumbe yo na aren shai tengi tokwesho lo, eye chu yasa, ya ten en saje kaishi mil siwi tos ajesa na nampuno tos yula. Za ashi si lo, uzeyunga la munto anyansa yunyo shi nam tos unyga yunyo dora bo anyansa: uzeyunga mula yula be wanyo weyun ya; yunyo le inenje tio; yokoile yunyo wauka yunyo tengi nubai lekeshi na yula na wanyo za ashi yanyo bairu renya na donyajono na ya; ai “yojo” yunyo wauka yunyo tengi wesayun ayo ya to.Esto lo, opun sumbenam yo chito ukwa yunyo la angi na vu na iho tos amimunza chu nam yunyo koile tunti ai yunyo la dora angi vu tunti.

Although all the elements of such a system can be naturalistic, even physical, it is possible to draw some loose analogies with religious conceptions of the world. In some ways, the posthumans running a simulation are like gods in relation to the people inhabiting the simulation: the posthumans created the world we see; they are of superior intelligence; they are “omnipotent” in the sense that they can interfere in the workings of our world even in ways that violate its physical laws; and they are “omniscient” in the sense that they can monitor everything that happens. However, all the demigods except those at the fundamental level of reality are subject to sanctions by the more powerful gods living at lower levels.

Ajelon wi tunti tos itos wau ke detio tom nanchuka tokweshi ya ke kwan doshi na tikwe na, ai basano be al munza udora na ya chumun tengito en ajam na yunyo la angi na yulonyo tente vato azazia yunyo pauza chu udora na angi na vu tunti.

Further rumination on these themes could climax in a naturalistic theogony that would study the structure of this hierarchy, and the constraints imposed on its inhabitants by the possibility that their actions on their own level may affect the treatment they receive from dwellers of deeper levels.

Shi tanto, tonto yuyung tengi reshi en yunyo la angi na vu tio lo, tontoye tinti uyo jeto tengito en unyansa na yunyo denu topapau eom fon ajam na yunyo, ovuza tente tontoko na ipu. Zehai ke weron tengito ho.

For example, if nobody can be sure that they are at the basement-level, then everybody would have to consider the possibility that their actions will be rewarded or punished, based perhaps on moral criteria, by their simulators. An afterlife would be a real possibility.

Chumun ireshing wau na jevu, janjato na angi na vu tio eye le amun en sapu pule. Akwa en ya le amun shai tos asapu pule lo ya ke jamau reshi amun na uyin yo tos ana sapu pule, ai kura shai, za aro na nempulu ho. Tente al pauza ashi na itim pule yoza, en ya tos nenku na kwalo na uyo en hinkeza, tontoshi ya wechu “lalang”.

Because of this fundamental uncertainty, even the basement civilization may have a reason to behave ethically. The fact that it has such a reason for moral behavior would of course add to everybody else’s reason for behaving morally, and so on, in truly virtuous circle. One might get a kind of universal ethical imperative, which it would be in everybody’s self-interest to obey, as it were “from nowhere”.

Ashi amau tos anyansa na kufa lo, tente al mau jeto tengito na anyansa sinjeza tunti yanyo lebo wonyo sin chu yunga sisi eom kwalo kwasi. Uchula chu yunganyo ke tontoye mimiang eom “yunga na vandin”- yunga al nyansa la angi sisi eno ya yosa tos yunga onyansa kwambe en nong boyun akakwa tenjeke. Ya nong tenyunge ana nyansa ke pasi hawi tunti yunga ho. Ya nong eye tenyunge en ya ten ula sapu tensaining tos yunga ho ai eye sivi atoju jele.

In addition to ancestor-simulations, one may also consider the possibility of more selective simulations that include only a small group of humans or a single individual. The rest of humanity would then be zombies or “shadow-people” – humans simulated only at a level sufficient for the fully simulated people not to notice anything suspicious. It is not clear how much cheaper shadow-people would be to simulate than real people. It is not even obvious that it is possible for an entity to behave indistinguishably from a real human and yet lack conscious experience.

Eye tonto anyansa sinjeza shai laila, tinti al nong je en bo akwa lelento al je en yanyo wi tunti anyansa kwambe. Tim “anyansa na wa” (anyansa na ihai na jea kwa sisi) wi tato nikwanya tunti anyansa na kufa eno yunga onyansa wi tio bo anyansa na wa.

Even if there are such selective simulations, you should not think that you are in one of them unless you think they are much more numerous than complete simulations. There would have to be about 100 billion times as many “me-simulations” (simulations of the life of only a single mind) as there are ancestor-simulations in order for most simulated persons to be in me-simulations.

Mau tengito laila en nyansatal yanyo faulon ambe kwa na ihai na jea na ula onyansa ai yanyo pau yunyo ajewai kom chu ashi na atoju be yunyo ke toju shimbeshi tabo banta ojalechi. Tonto shai, al tengi jeto mondoyo (nainuchu) ya zenu tos doi na iming: iyaiza nong laila yula ai konyun ajewai yo na iyaiza. Reshi, akutoje wau be al tengi kura sisi la ata al nong la yaiza tai.

There is also the possibility of simulators abridging certain parts of the mental lives of simulated beings and giving them false memories of the sort of experiences that they would typically have had during the omitted interval. If so, one can consider the following (farfetched) solution to the problem of evil: that there is no suffering in the world and all memories of suffering are illusions. Of course, this hypothesis can be seriously entertained only at those times when you are not currently suffering.

Tonto al jeto wanyo la hai bo anyansa lo, haya asiske tos wanyo yunga? Tosto atoska kuto lo, asiske nong vuchu wi. Aheno nen tio na ashi umula zeyunga na wanyo jeza sara yula na wanyo shai akwan tojuchu janjasa na yoyala be wanyo weyun ya. Awain tos ambe wi tio na akwa na jeho ke sinkungi ai chausa - nyova iwan na isivi na ireju tos iten na wanyo en jebo ashi na zeyunga.

Supposing we live in a simulation, what are the implications for us humans? The foregoing remarks notwithstanding, the implications are not all that radical. Our best guide to how our posthuman creators have chosen to set up our world is the standard empirical study of the universe we see. The revisions to most parts of our belief networks would be rather slight and subtle – in proportion to our lack of confidence in our ability to understand the ways of posthumans.

Tonto al jebo tongo lo, iho na (3) nong tinti le ajanjake en mun wanyo “tonjemi” eom kubas wanyo kura jam ajanja ai jankuren ai kuka tos zemanta. Yunkule ikungi tojuchu tiku na (3) la ata tauto tos aleke tosajebas le ambe yem be al munku ya la ti. Tus wanyo keho en (3) ho chumun aye ke jansi itentom na (1), esto tonto basano na mundau mun ya tentim en unyansa ke bas anyansa ku ya deche angi zeyunga, tontoye ikeho nen tio ke en (2) ho.

Properly understood, therefore, the truth of (3) should have no tendency to make us “go crazy” or to prevent us from going about our business and making plans and predictions for tomorrow. The chief empirical importance of (3) at the current time seems to lie in its role in the tripartite conclusion established above. We may hope that (3) is true since that would decrease the probability of (1), although if computational constraints make it likely that simulators would terminate a simulation before it reaches a posthuman level, then out best hope would be that (2) is true.

Tonto wanyo dejo akwa wi tunti tos anomun zeyunga ai basano na zavo, tente shi zeto na arim denu ana tom zeyunga na walonyo, tontye akutoje en wanyo  onyansa lo denu rim en le yono wishi wi tunti na zeto tojuchu.

If we learn more about posthuman motivations and resource constraints, maybe as a result of developing towards becoming posthumans ourselves, then the hypothesis that we are simulated will come to have a much richer set of empirical implications.


Janjato “zeyunga” ya rim tos joshike le ikoi wamwa na mundau. La revuza rejo tajuchu wau lo, mulu na anyansa munyun en akwa wivule chu ajepau yanyo zenu ho: (1) Simbe chu janjato le angi na yunga yanyo deche angi zeyunga wi ameng fafau;

(2) Simbe chu janjato zeyunga yanyo joke munto anyansa na kufa wi ameng fafau; (3) Simbe chu yunga yo le ashi na atoju na wanyo yunyo la hai bo anyanso fafau wi akwa.


A technologically mature “posthuman” civilization would have enormous computing power. Based on this empirical fact, the simulation argument shows that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) The fraction of human-level civilizations that reach a posthuman stage is very close to zero; (2) The fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor-simulations is very close to zero; (3) The fraction of all people with our kind of experiences that are living in a simulation is very close to one.

Tonto (1) ho lo, tontoye wanyo denu yomia fafau reshi ku deche izeyunga. Tonto (2) ho lo, tontoye tim akwanu don laila bambosko nonu na janjato deku eno ameng fafau lebo kwalo pale nyova kakwa yunyo keju munta anyansa na kufa ai yunyo namil jam shau.

If (1) is true, then we will almost certainly go extinct before reaching posthumanity. If (2) is true, then there must be a strong convergence among the courses of advanced civilizations so that virtually none contains any relatively wealthy individuals who desire to run ancestor-simulations and are free to do so.

Tonto (3) ho lo, tontoye wanyo reshi fafau la hai bo anyansa. La penyo sol na ijoleng tauto na wanyo, yunkule ya jeno en jambe jangi chauchang itenjeho na akwa bambosko (1), (2) ai (3).

If (3) is true, then we almost certainly live in a simulation. In the dark forest of our current ignorance, it seems sensible to apportion one’s credence roughly evenly between (1), (2), and (3).

Lelento wanyo tau la hai bo anyansa lo, ubenyo na wanyo reshi fafau tatang denu munto anyansa na kufa.

Unless we are now living in a simulation, our descendants will almost certainly never run an ancestor-simulation.