

**U.S. COVERT INTERVENTION IN IRAQ 1958-1963:
THE ORIGINS OF U.S. SUPPORTED REGIME CHANGE IN MODERN IRAQ**

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SIGNATURE PAGE

THESIS: U.S. COVERT INTERVENTION IN IRAQ 1958-1963: THE
ORIGINS OF U.S. SUPPORTED REGIME CHANGE IN MODERN IRAQ

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ABSTRACT

This paper is the result of a three-year research and oral history project intended to document U.S. covert intervention in Iraq from the the Iraqi revolution of July 14, 1958 through the Ba'ath Party coup that overthrew of the Qassem government on February 8, 1963, and its aftermath. The focus is primarily on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and its assistance to the Ba'ath party and to other anti-regime elements including Nasser and the United Arab Republic. This paper provides strong evidence of significant CIA involvement, but with less totality than in Iran in 1953 or Chile in 1973.

The historiography evaluates many of the authors who mention CIA involvement in early modern Iraq, and others who probably should have. The narrative that follows was constructed from published books, newspaper accounts and journal articles, also relying heavily on U.S. government documents, especially "Foreign Relations of the United States" and papers in presidential libraries. When these documents contain pertinent unpublished data, copies are included. The paper also documents the CIA's ongoing effort to suppress knowledge of its activities against Qassem's government. The oral history project unearthed new information about the coup, including previously unpublished information about retired Foreign Service Officers Bill Lakeland and James Akins; former CIA officials Ed Kane, Archibald Roosevelt, and Art Callahan; and coup participant and Ba'ath party cabinet member Hani Fkaiki.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

On July 14, 1958, the Iraqi Brigadier Abdel Karim Qassem led a military coup that overthrew the British satellite government that had ruled Iraq since the end of WWI. Washington was stunned. For a week, the revolution was the dominant story of the *New York Times*. Earlier that year the wildly popular Arab leader Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who had bought weapons from the Soviet Union, had succeeded in uniting his country with Syria into the United Arab Republic (UAR). Pan-Arabism was at its height, and to many in the U.S. intelligence establishment the coup was a disastrous development.

The CIA's concern increased in March 1959 when Qassem used communist forces to put down a nationalist pan-Arabist revolt in Mosul. In April, Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the situation in Iraq was "the most dangerous in the world today," and that communist forces were close to a "complete takeover."[\[1\]](#) Discussions about Iraq in the CIA and National Security Council (NSC) reached a fever pitch. For the next four years many measures including

invading Iraq were proposed. This much at least is in the official published record. What remains in dispute is whether or not the CIA assisted the Ba'ath party in their successful coup against Qassem on February 8, 1963. This paper aims to show that the Ba'ath party received material support from the CIA both before and after the coup, and that at various times during the five years of Qassem's rule, the agency also conducted covert operations against Iraq.

William Blum, a former official in the State Department published in 1986 his expose *The CIA, A Forgotten History*. It was later revised and expanded in 1995 and published under the title of *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*. Blum left the State Department in 1967 in protest over U.S. policy in Vietnam. His book is encyclopedic in nature, seeming to list and detail in a scholarly fashion every major CIA operation since 1945. Curiously absent from his list of 55 countries where the U.S. intervened was Iraq from 1958 to 1963. Blum is thorough and he seems to have left no stone unturned. Was this omission because there is no "there" there, or was the evidence just too hidden, difficult, or sparse to warrant a chapter in his book? This project intends to answer this question. Is there sound historical documentation to support the assertion that Americans intervened in Iraq in its first five years of true independence or are these groundless rumors? With U.S. troops and other personnel now in Iraq for what may be many years to come, the time could never be more urgent to examine the history of the origin of covert U.S. intervention in modern Iraq.

There have been, of course, many books and articles written about Saddam Hussein, the Ba'ath party and modern Iraqi history since 1958, but only a few of these mention covert U.S. intervention from 1958 to 1963. The obscurity of material regarding the CIA activity in early modern Iraq is largely due to its publication being inconvenient both to Ba'athist Iraq and the United States from 1963 until the present. The Ba'ath party portrayed itself as a pan-Arabist, nationalist, anti-western, anti-Israel party. Its secret alliance of convenience with the infamous CIA would be very damaging to their domestic image as well as to their image throughout the Arab world. The CIA was directly involved in assassination attempts on Qassem in 1960 and possibly even in 1959^[2] and the Ba'ath party rode to power on what one of its cabinet ministers called "an American train" in 1963.^[3] The Iraqi rulers could not afford to let the public know these facts nor of their cooperation with the U.S.

The United States also had no reason to publicly admit their complicity in bringing the Ba'ath party to power. Covert operations, especially assassinations, are highly secret operations and many CIA agents and high-ranking government officials do not know or believe that the agency was involved in these operations.^[4] Purposeful misdirection at official meetings for the purposes of secrecy are routinely employed to skew the minutes and mislead high ranking officials into believing that the CIA does not employ assassination or other rough activities.^[5] As intended, this routine of thorough "white propaganda" has made it much more difficult to reconstruct this history.

An examination of the early histories of the Iraqi Ba'ath party show that officials in Iraq and in the United States went to great lengths to deny and cover up the American involvement in early modern Iraq. Early histories of the Iraqi Ba'ath party by both American and Iraqi authors tended to toe the official lines of their governments. In fact, prominent Iraq scholars Marion and Peter Sluglett went as far as to say that the

“effectiveness [of these early histories] in obstructing a clear understanding of what was going on should not be underestimated, because of the close connections of some of their authors with the US intelligence establishment.” [6] This study will start with an analysis of the histories that completely avoided details of U.S. involvement and will propose possible reasons for this obfuscation. Next, this paper will detail the histories that help us to reconstruct the narrative, and will outline their contributions in this endeavor. Finally, I will provide a narrative of the events of U.S. covert intervention in Iraq from 1958 to 1963 including explanations of the confusion and contradictions that exist in the historiography.

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF U.S. COVERT INTERVENTION IN IRAQ, 1958-1963

One of the early histories the Slugletts were referring to is Kamel Abu Jaber's *The Arab Baath Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization*. [7] Dr. Jaber did not mention the involvement of the CIA in the 1963 coup, widely suspected in the aftermath. [8] Plans for the coup were known by many and debates raged between Syrian Ba'athis and Iraqi Ba'athis over the reliance upon the Americans, [9] yet Jaber excludes any mention of U.S. involvement and does not even recount the torture and slaughter of the communists perpetrated by the Ba'ath in 1963, activities also widely reported to be aided by the CIA. The purge started in February after the coup and continued during the entire nine months that the Ba'ath temporarily held power in 1963. According to one estimate approximately 5000 people were killed. [10] No mention of this is made at all by Jaber. The closest Dr. Jaber comes to describing it was to write that they had “alienated many people” whom the Guard “sometimes treated badly.” [11] He presents the coup as a purely indigenous Iraqi event without detailing most of the violence. [12] Jaber went on to become the Foreign Minister of Jordan, and is, as of 2004, President of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy in Amman. Jordan's King Hussein was on the CIA payroll from 1957 to his death in 1999. [13] Jaber's aspirations for high office in the Jordanian government would have precluded him from mentioning CIA collaboration with an Arab government in his history book.

John F. Devlin also wrote a book about the Ba'ath party entitled *The Ba'ath Party: A History from its Origins to 1966*. [14] His book does not mention U.S. involvement in the coup, presenting it as a strictly Iraqi affair. Devlin is clearly one of the authors the Slugletts were referring to because he has “years of experience as a CIA analyst.” [15] It is therefore likely that Devlin overlooks the CIA involvement in the 1963 coup either through pure misdirection or through being in the dark himself due to the extensive culture of secrecy at the CIA. [16]

In her book, *Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World*, [17] Christine Helms Moss also fails to mention anything about the rather intimate U.S. involvement in the origins of modern Iraq. Helms is a scholar for the Brookings Institution, and she advised the White House and the Pentagon during the Gulf War crisis of 1990 and 1991. According to the New

York Times she was one of those who erroneously advised the administration to let Saddam Hussein put down the Shi'a and Kurdish popular rebellions with the understanding that afterwards the military would be able to overthrow him in a coup.^[18] Since in her capacity as a scholarly advisor to the executive branch of the United States she officially advocated the removal of Saddam Hussein by military coup in 1991, it is easy to understand why she might be reluctant in 1984, already an aspiring imperial advisor, to publish U.S. complicity in the 1963 military coup that put his party in power. According to Peter Sluglett, "Helms has benefited from interviews with senior members of the [U.S.] government and has tended to reproduce, sometimes rather uncritically what she has been told."^[19]

Another author like Helms is Phebe Marr who wrote *The Modern History of Iraq* published in 1985.^[20] She writes three hundred pages about only sixty-five years of Iraqi history without any mention of U.S. involvement in the 1963 coup. She quotes extensively from Hanna Batatu's *Old Social Classes*, which mentions two different sources for American involvement. Marr is a "specialist" for the pro-American United States Institute of Peace of recent infamy for the recess appointment of Daniel Pipes. Well known for having an over abundance of extremely pro-Zionist scholars, the U.S. Institute of Peace is not in the habit of appointing specialists who expose CIA intervention.

Some of the Arab scholars are no more forthcoming. Amir Iskander published *Saddam Hussein: the Fighter, the Thinker, the Man*^[21] in 1980 at the height of Hussein's popularity in the Arab world. It was the officially authorized biography and therefore gained some exclusive access to information but reads as a propaganda piece. The excessively flattering picture of Hussein stretches credibility and of course his besmirching ties to the CIA are left out.

Another Arab author is the late Majid Khadduri who wrote in great detail of the 1963 coup in his book, *Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968*^[22], but with no mention of even a suspicion of American involvement. He also presented the plotting and the coup as only an Iraqi affair. According to the Slugletts his books "rely heavily on official [Iraqi] publications and interviews," and "his interviews are normally with the members of the regime of the day rather than the opposition" so "a certain bias is inevitable."^[23] Khadduri was professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University where he was a specialist on Iraq and Islamic law. With his reliance upon the benevolence of both of the governments whose official stance is that the Americans had nothing to do with the Ba'athi rise to power, it is not surprising that he avoided the history of CIA activity in early Iraq.

Clarity began to emerge in 1978 when Hanna Batatu published his classic tome, *Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*. This is the earliest historical study in English that mentions the CIA involvement in the 1963 coup.^[24] Batatu shames the previously mentioned early contemporary writers by citing a public record that they all had access to. The September 1963 *Al-Ahram* (Egypt's very popular paper) cited Jordan's King Hussein's assertions that the CIA met repeatedly with the Ba'ath party before the coup and supplied them with the lists of "communists" whom the Ba'ath party brutally purged after the takeover. Batatu cites this and qualifies it by

informing the reader of Hussein's CIA connections, but then adds personal knowledge of surreptitious pre-coup contact between Ba'th party members and Americans. What little Hanna Batatu knew, even with some uncertainty, he wrote "in the interest of truth," and thus distinguishes himself as a thorough scholar.

Edith and E. F. Penrose published *Iraq: International Relations and National Development* in 1978. They interviewed "well informed Iraqi Baathists" who stated that the CIA had collaborated with the Ba'ath in 1963. "Hashim Jawad, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, told us later that the Iraqi Foreign Ministry had information of complicity between the Baath and the CIA."[\[25\]](#) *Iraq* is another thorough and scholarly work and taken in tandem with *Old Social Classes*, provides historical documentation regarding U.S. involvement in the 1963 Iraqi coup.

In 1987, Marion and Peter Sluglett published *Iraq Since 1958*. This is another complete history and it was updated in 2001. The Slugletts summarize the U.S. involvement in the coup, including information about the CIA collaboration gained from their own interview with a "high ranking former member of the U.S. State Department."[\[26\]](#) This was probably James Akins, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and 2nd Secretary of Politics in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad at the time of the Ba'athi coup. Akins has a reputation for being helpful with information about the CIA involvement in the coup, but he recently declined to go "on the record" about 1963.[\[27\]](#)

In 1991, David Wise published "A People Betrayed" in the *Los Angeles Times*. In this story, he describes the testimony of CIA agents confessing to a failed assassination attempt of their own in 1960 against Qassem.[\[28\]](#) This made public and clear an obscure footnote in the Church Commission's large 1975 report on Assassination.[\[29\]](#) This is not to be confused with the failed Iraqi assassination attempt in 1959 involving Saddam Hussein.

In 1991, Adel Darwish and Gregory Alexander published *Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam's War*. This book contains the only published claim of a plotted 1964 Ba'athi-CIA coup in Iraq that never came into fruition. Darwish does not footnote this and he has not responded to my inquiries. Aburish wrote, "there was no attempted coup in 1964."[\[30\]](#) Darwish is also the only named source in an article by Richard Sale (discussed later) that asserts CIA involvement in the 1959 assassination attempt. Since he has produced no evidence to support these operations their historicity remain uncertain.

In 1996, Malik Mufti published *Sovereign Creations*. Chapter nine, entitled "Renewed Unionism: 1963-1964,"[\[31\]](#) is most informative. Mufti summarizes information printed in Batatu's *Old Social Classes*, the Penrose's *Iraq* and then adds information about Ba'thist arguments between Syrian and Iraqi elements that he gained from a personal interview with Jamal Atasi, former member of the Syrian cabinet.[\[32\]](#) This provides further documentation of U.S. collaboration in the 1963 coup.

Said K. Aburish is perhaps the most complete writer on the topic of U.S. intervention in Iraq from 1958 to 1963. His books, *A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite*, 1997 and *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge*, 2000 acknowledge the research of previous writers such as Malik Mufti, Hanna Batatu, Muhammad Heikal, and the Slugletts but go much further. Aburish's great contribution is that he adds detailed information gained from personal experience as well as numerous interviews with key

figures in the 1963 coup such as James Critchfield, CIA chief of the Middle East during 1963; Hani Fkaiki, member of the Ba'ath Party Command during 1963; and many other Americans and Iraqis both named and confidential. *A Brutal Friendship* cites 58 named interviews and 29 off-the-record interviews;[\[33\]](#) *Saddam Hussein* cites 67 named interviews and 46 off-the-record interviews.[\[34\]](#) He also brings personal insight into covert Iraqi-American relations through his career as a Middle Eastern journalist in the 1950s and 1960s and an East-West liaison for procurement of arms and strategic materials for Iraq from 1974 to 1977 and 1981 to 1984.

Aburish is of Palestinian origin and in the 1950s and 1960s he was a journalist and writer working in the Middle East. In the 1970s, Aburish was an admirer of Saddam Hussein and so he went to work for the Iraqi government. Hussein had not killed too many people yet and he was still very popular in the Arab world, his more violent and irrational tendencies being held in check because he was the Vice-President of Iraq and thus still subordinate to President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, his Tikriti relative. Bakr's and Hussein's Ba'athist government used their oil wealth to greatly increase the standard of living for average Iraqis. Like many Arabs, Aburish saw Ba'athist Iraq as a chance for Arabs to gain parity with Israel and the West by modernizing and developing nuclear weapons. In 1984, when it became apparent to Aburish that Hussein was using chemical weapons, his moral aversion to this led him to resign as a strategic arms and materials and relations liaison at great personal cost.[\[35\]](#) He went back to his career of journalism, disillusioned over the changes in Iraq since Hussein had come to full power, leading his country into the disastrous Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. Since then, Aburish has become a prolific writer about the Middle East and his books give valuable insight into this topic.

In 2003, Richard Sale of United Press International (UPI) published a report entitled "Exclusive: Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot."[\[36\]](#) Based on interviews with "a dozen former U.S. diplomats, British scholars and former U.S. intelligence officials,"[\[37\]](#) Sale's account, widely disseminated on the Internet, provides the only detail extant on CIA authorization and involvement in the famous October 1959 assassination attempt against Qassem. According to Sale, the botched gunfight involved Saddam Hussein as a paid CIA agent who was subsequently evacuated, trained and supported by the CIA in exile. This story confirms suspicions only hinted at in previous histories,[\[38\]](#) but others have cast doubt on Sale's account. Aburish thinks the CIA connection with Hussein before his Egyptian exile is not possible.[\[39\]](#) Bill Lakeland, 1st Political Secretary in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad in 1963, also believes early CIA collaboration in the 1959 assassination attempt fictional;[\[40\]](#) Akins likewise discounted Sale's version: "Richard Sale is very good and is, I would say, unusually reliable but if he said, wrote or believed that the CIA was behind this attack on Qassem, he's just wrong."[\[41\]](#) Without confirmation Sale's claims cannot be considered historical.

In 2005, Middle East author and news correspondent, John K. Cooley published *An Alliance Against Babylon: The U.S., Israel and Iraq*. In this book he covers the CIA involvement in the 1963 coup. He relies heavily on Aburish but adds new material regarding James Critchfield, the CIA's head of Near East Operations in the early 1960s. Cooley highlights an Arlington National Cemetery obituary that characterizes Critchfield as admitting that he recommended the CIA support the Ba'ath party in the early 1960s

and that “we knew perhaps six months beforehand that it [the coup] was going to happen.”^[42] Cooley supplies a brief history of Critchfield’s military and CIA record and outlines some of his activities in the early months of 1963.^[43] Also in 2005, William Blum published an updated edition of *Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower*, first published in 2000. In this book, Blum provides one long chapter where he summarizes all the U.S. interventions. Included in this chapter is a section on Iraq, 1958-63, in which Blum adds significantly to the historiography by reporting news about British government documents that disclose British backing for the new Ba’athi government in 1963 and summarizing a revealing conversation that Qassem had in early 1963 with a reporter from *LeMonde*. By 2000, when *Rogue State* first came out, Blum had gathered plenty of material to include the Iraqi coup of 1963 in his list of interventions.

This study of covert U.S. intervention in early modern Iraq incorporates previous work, adds information gained from the study of U.S. government documents, and fills out the narrative using oral history interviews with Aburish, retired Foreign Service Officers William Lakeland and James Akins, and retired CIA Case Officer Ed Kane. Lakeland and Akins were the First and Second Secretaries of the Political Section in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad during the time before and after the coup in 1963. Ed Kane was the head of the Iraq Desk in Washington for the CIA at the time. More publications on this topic may be forthcoming in the future.^[44]

CHAPTER 3 U.S. REACTION TO THE 1958 COUP

In 1917, the British occupied the three provinces of the Ottoman Empire that later became Iraq. After the end of World War I, Britain continued to control the region and eventually took a mandate to govern Iraq, a territory that emerged from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which divided the Middle East into spheres of influence between the British and the French. In 1920, the British lost 450 soldiers and killed 10,000 Iraqis, resorting to mustard gas, in suppressing a rebellion against their rule. Afterwards, they hastily installed a monarchy of their choice under Amir Faysal. In 1922, Britain began to issue a series of treaties that gradually granted Iraq nominal independence in 1932, but which allowed Britain to retain military basing rights, the right to “defend” Iraq, and other privileges. During the period of government by treaties, in 1925, Britain had managed to wrest a seventy-five year oil concession from Faysal that later became the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC).^[45]

Faysal died in 1933 and was succeeded by his twenty-one year old son Ghazi (1933 to 1939). Though the anti-British Ghazi was king, Iraq was actually ruled in the thirties by a narrow clique of graduates of the Istanbul War College who rose to prominence by supporting their British sponsors. Anti-Western Iraqis staged a coup bringing General Bakr Sidki to power in 1936, but he was assassinated in 1937 and the pro-British General Nuri al-Said took power as Prime Minister. Nuri stayed around, usually at or near the top through several more military coups until the anti-British rebellion of 1941 under General Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. The British responded with a military occupation that lasted until the end of WWII. After the war, pro-British governments, often under

the ubiquitous Nuri al-Said, ruled until the late 1950s. In 1952, inspired by the military coup in Egypt, some Iraqi soldiers started their own group of "Free Officers." In 1956, the leader of the Free Officers, Brigadier Abdel Karim Qassem, wrote Nasser, asking for air cover for a military coup; Nasser turned him down.[\[46\]](#)

Two years later, on the night of July 13, 1958 General Abd al-Salam Arif marched the 20th Brigade of the Iraqi army on Baghdad. Some of the soldiers occupied strategic points in and around Baghdad while the remainder besieged the Royal Palace and the house of Nuri al-Said. Brigadier Abdel Karim Qassem stayed at Camp Al-Mansur in command of the 19th Brigade outside Baghdad. Some brief fighting occurred with loyalist troops but on the morning of July 14, the citizens of Iraq heard General Arif on the radio reading a proclamation of the new regime, stating that the army had liberated "the beloved homeland from the corrupt crew that imperialism had installed." Later that morning both Qassem and Arif appeared on television declaring a popular government and calling for the maintenance of "order and unity." Later that afternoon they announced a cabinet. The streets of Baghdad were filled with wild celebration and the crowds were manifestly anti-Western. A few British and Americans were killed but the numbers were low considering the pent up rage of forty years of broken promises and imperial domination.[\[47\]](#)

Suddenly, the government of the United States became fully focused on the Middle East. On the day of the coup, CIA director Allen Dulles penned some briefing notes in which he concluded, "if the Iraq coup succeeds it seems almost inevitable that it will set up a chain reaction which will doom the pro-West governments of Lebanon and Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and raise grave problems for Turkey and Iran."[\[48\]](#)

In order to appreciate his alarm, the context of those days must be understood. Nasser, the leader of the Egypt, became tremendously popular across the region by surviving the joint British-French-Israeli invasion of 1956. Nasser's pan-Arab vision culminated in February of 1958 with the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR): a political alliance of Egypt and Syria. There was a lot of popular pan-Arab sentiment in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq too. Lebanon in particular was experiencing a period of instability involving rebellion against its pro-Western government. The last French troops had left in 1946 but Lebanon's census-based parliamentary system was fraying at the edges with pan-Arab Muslims edging toward civil war because of the controversial policies of the Christian president Camille Camoun.[\[49\]](#)

Nasserism was a threat to the U.S. government because he resisted cooperating with them in the Cold War. He refused to sign the Baghdad Pact and actively propagandized against it, and was an active participant in the non-aligned Bandung Conference of 1955. Also in the same year he bought weapons from the Soviet Union after the United States had refused to sell them to him, and when the U.S. withdrew its support for Egypt's Aswan Dam project, Nasser brought in Soviet financing and technicians. Learned observers in the U.S. knew pan-Arabism was not communism and that Nasser was just playing both superpowers against each other for his own gain, but Nasser's speeches and some of his policies had socialist overtones and this certainly troubled Allen Dulles and his powerful brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. John Dulles and his brother shared a religious view of the Cold War as part of "the constant struggle between good and evil...which has no limits in space or time."[\[50\]](#) Neutrality

was not an option and made the non-aligned nation either the witting or unwitting pawn of immorality.

At a briefing of Congressional leaders in the White House on July 14, 1958,^[51] Secretary Dulles argued that “the Soviet Union” was “undoubtedly behind the whole operation” in Lebanon.^[52] Eisenhower was apparently persuaded because he went from ambivalence in this meeting to telling some generals the next day that Nasser was “a puppet, even though he probably doesn’t think so.”^[53] Allen Dulles’ notes for the meeting described the situation in Lebanon and communicated Chamoun’s urgent request for “U.S. military intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours. He would interpret our intentions by our deeds. He wanted the Sixth Fleet here within 48 hours, or else he would at last know where he stood so far as assurances from the West were concerned.” The report goes on to include all the other major nations in the Middle East. The report on Saudi Arabia was so compromising and embarrassing that it was not declassified until 1979. In this section King Saud’s demands were delineated: American and British troops should be sent to Iraq and Jordan and if not, “Saudi Arabia will go along with UAR foreign policy.”^[54]

On July 15, the day after the Iraqi coup, the U.S. Sixth Fleet landed troops in Lebanon at the request of Chamoun. On the 16th the British moved into Jordan. With this background it is easy to see why the Eisenhower administration took the decision to occupy Lebanon. It was a way of reacting to the Iraqi coup and creating some kind of stabilizing effect, a stopgap measure accomplished by going somewhere they were welcome without actually invading Iraq where they were not. The NSC began discussing the possibility of invading Iraq the day of the Free Officer’s coup. The section of Allen Dulles’ briefing paper that discussed this was classified for 21 years after. Later in 1958, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted a top-secret plan to invade Iraq through Turkey, code-named Operation Cannonbone.^[55] This no doubt was the contingency planning necessitated by the continued discussion in late 1958 and early 1959 about the possibility of the need for invasion. The other parts of Dulles’s paper that were classified for so long were the sentences or paragraphs that named the CIA’s intelligence sources. This gives us insight into the Baghdad Station’s existing sources at the time of the coup.

They had “an American oil employee” who was intimate enough with the Iraqi government to report, “That machine guns and mortar fire are being directed on the Palace; [and] that four large tanks and a civilian mob was approaching Nuri’s house.” They also had extensive liaison with British intelligence who would have had more extensive assets in country.^[56] The advent of the Qassem government would have intensified the activity of the Baghdad Station as Iraq went from a pro-Western government to one more revolutionary in appearance.

We know from CIA exposes such as Phillip Agee’s *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* and Joseph Burkholder Smith’s *Portrait of a Cold Warrior* the basic process that the CIA of the late fifties and sixties followed from country to country. The standard procedure was to hide CIA case operators with cover in military positions, embassy positions or other U.S. agencies or businesses. Case operators would recruit agents who were usually nationals who were sympathetic to the U.S. or pro-Western ideals. They would most of the time be paid for their information or operations after a vetting process that included

extensive background checks and even sometimes lie detector tests. The most common way to gain recruits was through walk-ins: people who would approach U.S. embassy staff or other known U.S. citizens with offers of help or suggestions of alliance. After referral to the CIA in country they could become intelligence assets.^[57]

This process would have to be started all over again in Iraq after the coup.

In 1958, Secretary Dulles admitted, "After the fall of the government of Nuri Said, the U.S. had relatively few remaining assets in Iraq."^[58] The CIA lost many of their sources with the exit of the *ancien regime*. The American oilmen would be gone, and so too the extensive British assets. These losses would have created urgency for new sources. According to Aburish, in the days following the coup, the CIA began cooperating with King Hussein of Jordan and the Shah of Iran and their intelligence agencies to try to find ways to topple Qassem.^[59]

On the day of the coup, Nasser was visiting with his friend, Yugoslavia's nationalist leader Tito. He put the forces of the UAR on maximum alert and ordered Special Forces and air force units to the Syrian-Iraqi border. He extended recognition to the new government and stated, "Any attack on Iraq was tantamount to an attack on the UAR in accordance with the security agreement of the Arab League." On Tito's advice Nasser flew secretly to the Soviet Union for an emergency meeting with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. The Soviets would not give Nasser a clear indication of their position. The pictures in the streets of Iraq were not of Qassem, who was unknown, but of Nasser. The entire world expected Nasser to fly into Baghdad from Moscow on July 18, but Qassem would not give him permission to land and he had to divert to Damascus. Qassem described his arrival as "untimely."^[60] Among other reasons, it is possible that Nasser's refusal to help the Iraqi Free Officers in 1956 had caused Qassem to grow independent of Nasser's Egypt even if they were seemingly of the same ideology. The confluence of all the events of these three days combined to defuse the situation. There was no need for the U.S. to invade Iraq because the Soviets were not getting actively involved and Qassem did not cut the oil pipelines or move to merge with the UAR. The new Iraqi government made friendly overtures to U.S. diplomats. They were particularly interested in retaining U.S. oil services technicians. On July 30, the U.S. extended recognition to the government and the initial crisis was over.

CHAPTER 4 GROWING CONCERN ABOUT COMMUNISM IN IRAQ

In the next couple of months the new regime increased its anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. rhetoric while at the same time expressing a desire to maintain relations with the United States. The government of Iraq (GOI) was distracted by internal disputes between a faction that wanted unity with the UAR, led by Arif, and a faction calling for a more independent line led by Qassem. Later in the fall of 1958, Arif was banished to the ambassadorship to West Germany. During these convulsions Qassem's intelligence assets reported on many intrigues against his government, sometimes involving Americans. Either the GOI had noticed some early covert U.S. cooperation with Iran or it was falling victim to anti-U.S. rumors. According to U.S. records of October 11th 1959,

the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Jabbar Jomard said:

They had “learned” of large numbers of American agents going into Iran and elsewhere in the area to work toward a counter-revolution in Iraq. Reports of these activities appeared to have been given substance by the fact that the US “long delayed” its recognition of the regime and, together with the British, dispatched forces to the area. The Iraqi authorities felt it necessary to take strong measures for protection against possible hostile acts.

Jomard goes on to list these measures and then ends with an assurance that, “Most of the difficulties of this nature had ended, however, and it was the desire of the government to re-establish as soon as possible good relations with the US and its representatives.”[\[61\]](#)

Also in October of 1958, the CIA noticed that the Kurds could be used to undermine the GOI, not by themselves as they did in later years, rather they feared the Soviet Union would meddle in Kurdistan. During a memorandum of discussion (classified until recently) regarding the 383rd Meeting of the NSC on October 16 CIA Director Dulles was worried about “the possibility of a separatist movement among the Kurdish population of Iraq. Mr. Dulles indicated that this possibility greatly concerned the Central Intelligence Agency because the Soviet Union would find it so easy to control an autonomous Kurdish state made up of Kurdish elements in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and possibly the USSR.”[\[62\]](#) The CIA eventually employed this strategy themselves in the early 1970s in conjunction with the Shah’s Iranian intelligence, SAVAK. [\[63\]](#) During the next few weeks the GOI repeatedly accused the U.S. of undermining it, only to hear consecutive denials from American diplomats. It does not seem likely that Americans themselves actually began any covert activities at this time, but that the Iranians and the Turks were already beginning intrigues and that the U.S. took the blame among Iraqis because these nations were known U.S. satellites.

At this time, the Iraqis shut down most U.S. facilities including the United States Information Service (USIS), the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) and the consulates. They were also subjecting the U.S. embassy to repeated searches and security inquiries and made travel for U.S. personnel almost impossible.[\[64\]](#) This the Iraqis were clearly doing because all of these agencies were well known as the standard places to hide CIA officers and because they had many reports of U.S. personnel meddling in Iraq. No doubt this made CIA operations virtually non-existent. Even intelligence gathering would be severely limited because of these restrictions. For the rest of October and November Qassem relied more upon the communists as he cracked down on the pan-Arabists. This alarmed U.S. policy makers and they wrote much about the dangers of a communist takeover in Iraq.

On December 4, 1958 the U.S. embassy in Baghdad reported to Washington a request for funding from the leader of an anti-Communist group of plotters. His name is still classified and he was told “it would not be appropriate nor desirable for [an] outside power such as [the] U.S. to intervene in internal affairs of Iraq.” Most likely this was a request from the pan-Arabist plotters who were somewhat openly planning an UAR backed coup led by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, which was planned for a week later. The U.S. refused because they believed the “chances are very good that [the] approach is [a]

provocation.” They were understandably cautious because the British had reported that Qassem had told Sir Michael Wright of the Foreign Office that “he had absolute knowledge that [a] very short while ago Americans [had] arranged [a] journey of three individuals from Iran to work there against [the] Iraq regime, and that there was [a] similar activity on [the] part of American Agents in [the] south of Iraq.”[\[65\]](#)

In any event, this attempt to overthrow Qassem failed. On December 8th, Rashid Ali’s plot was exposed and its coincidence with the reports about American activity initially caused the U.S. to be blamed by the Iraqi press and government and radio Cairo. Ali was the veteran statesman and hero of the anti-British movement of 1941. He and a number of civilians and army officers funded by Nasser were arrested on the 7th.

Qassem’s security forces had infiltrated the plotters in prior weeks, and so knew that they planned to overthrow the government on the 9th and 10th. The plotters had been concerned about the growing influence of the communists and had planned to install a pan-Arabist government under Rashid Ali.[\[66\]](#) It is likely that someone from this group was the one who had approached the U.S. embassy, because shortly after this U.S. records are full of talk about a rapprochement with Nasser.[\[67\]](#) Despite the limitations the Iraqis were putting on U.S. personnel, the CIA had good intelligence about this plot. According to the December 11th Memorandum of Discussion of the 390th Meeting of the NSC, CIA Director Dulles said, “we knew a good deal about this particular plot.” He was very annoyed because “both Qasim and the Cairo radio held us responsible for the plot despite the fact that we had indirectly warned Qasim of the attempt.”[\[68\]](#)

In a meeting between Waldemar J. Gallman and Qassem on the same day, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq convinced Qassem that he knew nothing about “reports of American activities to undermine his government.” Qassem was sure that Americans were involved though perhaps in a “private capacity.” The Iraqi leader told Gallman that “Kurds in the Sulimaniyah area were being incited against his government. There had been movements of individuals back and forth across the frontier with Iran...Americans and other nationalities, according to his information were involved.”[\[69\]](#) CIA cooperation with the Iranian SAVAK during the time of the American satellite government of Iran is well known. It is hard to believe that Qassem’s intelligence would have always been wrong when it constantly kept reporting that Americans were cooperated with Iranians and infiltrating Iraq. A couple of writers assert that the U.S. did begin funding the Kurds in 1960, so it is possible that Dulles and the CIA began assisting the Kurds even in the late 1950s.[\[70\]](#) Qassem’s astute judgment of character was displayed when he recognized that Gallman did not know of any of this. If there were CIA operations in Iraq, Gallman would not have known because of the tremendous level of secrecy in the agency, often keeping even the State Department in the dark.[\[71\]](#) Therefore Gallman was a convincing witness and this is likely the reason Qassem suggested that the Americans were “private.”

A telegram on December 12th from the Embassy in Egypt to Washington contains a further hint that covert U.S. activity may have been afoot in Iraq. Under-Secretary of State for Near-East Asian Affairs William M. Rountree was writing to advise against extending his tour of the Middle East to Iraq. He concludes by saying, “Finally, we must recognize that current anti-government activities in Iraq have by no means ended, and it is quite possible that there will be further developments along these lines in [the] next

few days.” At this point one line in the source text is still classified. Then he wrote, “Situation would be immeasurably complicated if these developments should occur either just before, during, or after my presence there.”^[72] The exposure of the “developments” Rountree was worried about may shed light on the covert activity the U.S. was conducting in December of 1958. We will not know for sure if the U.S. was covertly undermining Qassem’s regime this early until American documents are more fully declassified.

Starting on December 23, 1958, U.S. planners began talking a lot about the possibility of a rapprochement with Nasser and supporting him in future attempts to overthrow Qassem and install an anti-communist government. Nasser had approached their people in Cairo and it looked like he wanted to explore the issue. Over the next two months, memos flew back and forth, meetings were held with Nasser and it appears that some kind of understanding was reached. The Americans were willing to work with Nasser because they “believe[d] that Nasser will seek by all means at his disposal to bring about a counterrevolutionary move in Iraq, even if it involves serious risk of damaging his relations with the Soviets, and that he will be prepared to accept at least provisionally an independent Iraqi nationalist regime.”^[73] The U.S. policy formulated in early 1959 was to “counsel against provocative measures by our friends, particularly the Turks and Iranians” and “within our limited capabilities to do so, we should cultivate discreetly individual and group friendships with the objective of creating a more favorable climate for U.S.-Iraq relations. This should include personnel both in and out of government.”^[74] This they began to do while continuing to reinvigorate relations with Nasser.

U.S. intelligence knew ahead of time of the March, 1959 Mosul rebellion in Iraq. John S. D. Eisenhower sent a report to Washington on February 28 that “indicates that a coup by Iraqi army elements backed by Nasir is scheduled between 2-5 March.”^[75] During the March 5 meeting of the National Security Council, Director Dulles said, “Reports continue to be received of plots against Prime Minister Qasim. Whether true or not, the situation in Iraq requires the closest attention of the U.S. and perhaps dictates some U.S. contact with Nasser in the face of the likely eventualities. We seem to be confronted, continued Mr. Allen Dulles, with a choice between Communism or Nasserism and the latter seems to be the lesser of two evils.”^[76]

This coup went very badly for Nasser. Colonel Abdul Wahhab al-Shawwaf, the commander of the Fifth Brigade stationed outside of Mosul began the attempt at a bad time. Qassem knew about the plot and took extensive measures to foil it. The UAR supplied the nationalists with ammunition and radio equipment. On the morning of March 8, Shawwaf broadcast a manifesto declaring a new government led by him. Unfortunately for Shawwaf, only about half his troops stayed loyal when Qassem broadcast a condemnation of the plotters for “having cooperated with foreigners against the interests of the state....” Shawwaf was killed and most of his top supporters fled or were captured or killed. There was a violent communist backlash including a revolutionary court that lasted in Mosul throughout March, which the GOI tried to end twice unsuccessfully. The communist militia, the People’s Revolutionary Front (PRF) began mass arrests around the country of known Arab nationalist sympathizers. All non-leftist newspapers in Baghdad were closed. The famous Special Supreme Military

Court of Colonel Fadil Abbas al-Mahdawi began its trial of plotters for many months after.^[77] A relevant upshot of this was that many Ba'athis were tried and acquitted themselves nicely before the public on the radio during the court sessions. They spoke back to Mahdawi and condemned the GOI for not being true to the July 14 pan-Arab revolution. This process made martyrs out of them and this set the stage for a general acceptance of the Ba'ath later in 1963.

CHAPTER 5

THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AND CIA CONTACTS WITH THE BA'ATH

As the Communists gained politically in the aftermath of Mosul, the Americans became extremely worried. In the March 12 National Security Council (NSC) meeting, CIA Director Dulles said,

All in all, the situation is one of great gravity. This gravity is emphasized by the proximity of Kuwait to Iraq. Indeed, Nasser may be even now considering a counter coup in Kuwait. At this point Mr. Dulles called attention to a map and chart dealing with the oil reserves in the Middle East. After citing the statistics of the potentialities of the various fields, Mr. Dulles repeated his warning that we were facing a situation which should be a matter of grave concern to us and which should have early and urgent consideration.^[78]

The communists in Iraq reached the height of their influence in April and May of 1959. This caused no small amount of consternation among American policy makers. There was an open debate about whether or not Iraq should be invaded to "save it from communism." The NSC discussed the possibility of covert regime change as was done with "Mossadegh" and "Iran."^[79] It was at this time that Allen Dulles made his incendiary speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.^[80] Cooler heads prevailed and it was decided that Nasser should be given as much support as possible without alienating U.S. allies in the Middle East, Qassem should be courted as a possible counterweight to the communists (although many doubted if he could resist them), otherwise the U.S. would lie low and continue whatever business and cultural programs could function with the hope of being the ones to help Iraq rather than the Soviet Union.^[81] Nonetheless, concern about Iraq "going communist" was so strong that the NSC passed Action number 2068 to form a "Special Committee on Iraq" that met and reported possible plans of action to address this concern for the next few years.^[82]

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) tried to press its advantage, but Qassem finally stood up to them when he resisted their heavy political pressure to appoint more communist cabinet ministers. Nasser noticed this and in May he ceased his personal attacks on Qassem that he had been launching over the radio and limited his polemics to anti-communism. The Americans also took note and continued their policy of working through Nasser.^[83] They may have begun to covertly fund Egyptian Intelligence at this time. UPI Intelligence Correspondent Richard Sale asserts that the CIA cooperated with Egyptian Intelligence before the failed assassination attempt of Qassem in October of 1959. This and the rest of Sale's information has not been confirmed by other

sources, but does fit with what is revealed in government documents concerning rapprochement with Nasser and the U.S. policy of discreetly assisting Egypt in their efforts to destroy communism in Iraq. If the U.S. had been assisting the Kurds earlier during Qassem's reign through the Iranians or the Turks, by June of 1959, they appeared to have ceased. In a meeting of the Special Committee on Iraq, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Parker Hart reported on conversations he had with Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlou and the Iranian deputy head of SAVAK, General Paklavan. The Turks considered "the Kurds a factor to be held in reserve for possible use if the Iraq situation deteriorates," and "the Iranians were also attempting to hold back the Kurds and keep them in reserve."[\[84\]](#)

During a celebration parade for the revolution of July 14 in Kirkuk, violence broke out between the communist-leaning Kurds and the more traditional ruling class of Turkomans. Dozens were slaughtered, mostly Turkomans. This inflamed public opinion against the communists and Qassem continued his crack down on the ICP, but on September 20 he executed thirteen Mosul conspirators, which outraged the Arab nationalists and he killed four members of the *ancien regime*, which outraged the United States. Since the failed Mosul coup in March the Ba'ath party had come to the conclusion that they must assassinate Qassem. During the middle of 1959 they worked to widen their contacts and establish ties with officers in the military sympathetic to them. After the executions they felt the time was ripe.[\[85\]](#)

The U.S. was aware of the assassination and coup plot as early as September 24.[\[86\]](#) According to Richard Sale, America was more than just aware; the CIA cooperated with the Egyptians in funding and organizing the assassination attempt on October 7th, 1959. In Sale's account, the CIA "authorized" a six man hit team from the Ba'ath party, including a young associate, Saddam Hussein. "Saddam was installed in an apartment in Baghdad on al-Rashid Street directly opposite Qasim's office in Iraq's Ministry of Defense, to observe Qasim's movements." Saddam's CIA handler was an Iraqi dentist working for Egyptian intelligence, which was cooperating with the Americans to remove Qassem because he was resisting popular pan-Arab desires of the Iraqi people to join the UAR. "Saddam's paymaster was Capt. Abdel Maquid Farid, the assistant military attaché at the Egyptian Embassy who paid for the apartment from his own personal account."[\[87\]](#)

The assassination was set for October 7, but it was botched. Most historians agree that Saddam got excited or lost his nerve and began firing too soon. He was not supposed to fire the first shot but was to act in a supporting role.[\[88\]](#) Qassem's driver was killed, but Qassem escaped death by hiding on the floor. According to Sale, Saddam escaped to Tikrit with the help of the CIA and Egyptian intelligence. "Saddam then crossed into Syria and was transferred by Egyptian intelligence agents to Beirut... While Saddam was in Beirut, the CIA paid for Saddam's apartment and put him through a brief training course... The agency then helped him get to Cairo."[\[89\]](#)

As mentioned before, nobody and no documents have been found to corroborate Sale's story. Neither Sale nor his only named source Adel Darwish have answered my inquiries. Sale does say that his news piece was based on interviews with "a dozen former U.S. diplomats, British scholars and former U.S. intelligence officials," so it must be included as a possibility here. It certainly fits with the revealed U.S. government

documents, which speak of rapprochement with Nasser and of searching for ways to help him discreetly. But until some of these diplomats or intelligence officials go “on the record,” this simply cannot be counted as part of the historical record.

After the assassination attempt, Qassem tilted toward the Communists again for a brief time. Because of this and mounting fears of a successful assassination and doubt as to who would come out on top, the CIA made contingency plans for “action.” The fact of the contingency planning was recently revealed in a partially redacted NSC meeting memo from November of 1959, but the details are still classified.^[90] For now we cannot know what the remaining undisclosed line says, but their reason for keeping it from the public may be because it tells of plans to support the Ba’ath.

The Americans noticed the Ba’ath party for its manifest anti-communist tendencies. They began to see them as the middle road alternative to either Qassem and the communists or Nasser and the radical pan-Arabists. It is well established that Saddam Hussein and other Ba’ath party members became intimately acquainted with the CIA at least after the assassination attempt while they were in exile in Damascus, Beirut, or Cairo.^[91] Former NSC staff member and author Roger Morris recently told *Reuters* that “It was there in Cairo that (Saddam) and others were first contacted by the agency.”^[92] An anonymous, former high-ranking official of the State Department told the *Slugletts* that Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athis made contact with American authorities in the late 1950s. The Ba’ath were thought to be the “political force of the future,” deserving American support against “Qassem and the communists.”^[93] On December 10th 1959, when speaking of a “third way” in Iraq, and talking about possible UAR intervention, the CIA’s Richard Bissell reported to the NSC that “Nasser was in close communication with the Baath party.”^[94] Since the Americans were working in collaboration with Nasser by then it is sure that they also had some contact with the Ba’ath. James Critchfield admitted to the Associated Press that he had recommended the Ba’ath to the U.S. government in the early 1960s.^[95]

After the failed assassination attempt, Allen Dulles sent James Critchfield to run the agency’s operations in the Middle East and south Asia in early 1960. The main focus was Iraq.^[96] Said K. Aburish writes that Critchfield was to use his “expertise in fighting communist infiltration and apply it to the Middle East, [and he] was entrusted with the secondary job of injecting more professionalism into the situation.”^[97] The need for more “professionalism” was acute. After dizzying off-the-cuff success in the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s Mossadegh, the CIA had launched two failed coup attempts in Syria in 1956 and 1957;^[98] between July 1957 and October 1958, the Egyptian and Syrian governments and media announced and exposed over half a dozen plots by the U.S. and others to overthrow one of the governments or assassinate Nasser;^[99] foolish bluffs were made against Saudi Arabia;^[100] and the CIA rather openly rigged the elections in Lebanon in 1957,^[101] causing large-scale fighting during the voting and lasting anti-American feelings. It is no wonder that Dulles wanted to “professionalize” the agency’s Middle East operations. Critchfield described the CIA’s 1950s activities as “the cowboy era.”^[102] The action was open and crazy.^[103] The GOI was aware of much of this history and consequently, whenever the plotting of dissidents within Iraq increased, the United States was always under suspicion, with good reason.

The U.S. military and the CIA are institutions that respond to Congress and the

President when needed. Because of this, they are always working on contingency plans such as Operation Cannonbone – the plan to invade Iraq from Turkey. One such plan of the CIA was the sinister scheme to “incapacitate” Qassem. The 1975 U.S. Senate investigation of the Church Committee reported the following:

In February 1960, CIA’s Near East Division sought the endorsement of what the Division Chief called the “Health Alteration Committee” for its proposal for a “special operation” to “incapacitate” an Iraqi Colonel [Qassem] believed to be “promoting Soviet Bloc political interests in Iraq.” The Division sought the Committee’s advice on a technique, “which while not likely to result in total disablement would be certain to prevent the target from pursuing his usual activities for a minimum of three months...We do not consciously seek subject’s permanent removal from the scene; we also do not object should this complication develop.”

In April, the Committee unanimously recommended to the DDP that a “disabling operation” be undertaken, noting that Chief of Operations advised that it would be “highly desirable.”

The approved operation was to mail a monogrammed handkerchief “treated with some kind of material for the purpose of harassing that person who received it.”[\[104\]](#)

The CIA further stated in this investigation that the handkerchief was “in fact never received, if indeed, sent.”[\[105\]](#) This may not be true. Sidney Gottlieb, the head of the Technical Services Division in 1960 described his role in a lawsuit brought against the CIA during the 1980s. “I was going on an overseas trip and I mailed it from somewhere in the Far East.”[\[106\]](#) This escapade seems to be a hangover from the “cowboy era.” Government documents from January and February are full of classified deletions and although there is not enough available to the public to show the covert planning that is described in the Church Committee, the papers say the NSC’s “contingency plans relating to Iraq had been updated and coordinated with U.K. in deep secrecy.” On January 14th, Livingston T. Merchant told the committee “the situation in Iraq compared to six months ago was worse, in that the Nationalist stock had gone down and Kasem’s dependence on the Communists was greater.”[\[107\]](#) It is clear from this evidence that by at least February of 1960 the CIA was actively trying to hurt Qassem. Because of this, Sale’s assertion that the CIA was funding and cooperating with Egyptian intelligence in the failed assassination attempt of October of 1959 does not seem too far a field.

CHAPTER 6

U.S. COVERT INTERVENTION BEFORE THE COUP

Starting in March of 1960 relations between Iraq and the U.S. relaxed as the American foreign policy establishment looked on with favor while Qassem continued to purge the military of communists and refused them the right to be a legal party. During 1960, the overt branch of the U.S. government competed with the Soviets for influence in Iraq,[\[108\]](#) but the Soviet bloc still gave much more aid to Iraq than the West. Qassem became increasingly eccentric after his assassination attempt and lost popularity and support, but maintained power by a delicate balancing act between the Arab nationalists

and the communists. He ruled almost completely through the military whose officers were loyal to him because they held most cabinet and provincial positions, had received early promotions when they replaced the purged communists and pan-Arabists, and were well paid with oil revenues. On balance, U.S. relations with Iraq improved during most of 1960; much of the restrictions on American agencies in Iraq relaxed, Iraqi accusations of U.S. intervention dwindled, and some small amounts of American assistance and cultural exchange were allowed. It appears that besides CIA relations with Iraqi exiles, U.S. covert intervention in Iraq slowed to a trickle in 1960.[\[109\]](#)

Starting in mid 1960, the Ba'ath began a serious effort led by army Colonel Salih Mahdi Ammash to organize and expand the party in Iraq. By the end of the year it was recognized by the American government that the Ba'ath rivaled the ICP "in terms of leadership, organization and capacity for street action."[\[110\]](#)

1961 brought continued disinterest in Washington regarding Iraq as the American government changed from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration. Iraq did not really get on the U.S. foreign policy radar again until Qassem resurrected the Iraqi claim to Kuwait on June 25, 1961. On July 1st, the British occupied Kuwait, not to leave until September 29th. On December 18th, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Phillips Talbot expressed new alarm over Iraq:

...Since...Kuwait...Iraq has moved increasingly toward the Soviet Bloc...During this process, until recently, the Iraqi Government gradually increased its repressive measures against domestic communists, to the point that we came to believe that communist ability to threaten the security of the Iraqi state had been neutralized. Now, however, we believe a new phase has been opened...the Iraqi government in the past two weeks has taken several steps which appear to permit the internal communists to strengthen considerably their internal position. In addition, Iraq has taken the drastic step of expropriating all of the IPC (and affiliates) concessionary areas except for fields now in production...

As a result of Iraqi action against IPC, we consider it possible the Department will be urged to retaliate against and place other pressures on Iraq. Likewise, as the Iraqi communists regain an important role in Iraq and appear to threaten Iraqi independence, there is likely to develop within the U.S. a strong feeling that we should intervene in Iraqi affairs.[\[111\]](#)

National Security Council Staffer Robert Komer manifested "Strong feelings" in a memo eleven days later. The better part of two paragraphs describing CIA intelligence or plans of action are still classified and the next thing he wrote was:

However, our tendency has been to sit back and regard IPC, Kuwait and even Iraq as a UK baby. But we own 23.75% of IPC [owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil] and Gulf has 50% of Kuwait Oil Company. Moreover, what happens in Iraq will directly affect events in Syria and Iran, not to mention Jordan, the UAR and Saudi Arabia. British tried originally to play ball with Kassim, but I gather they are disillusioned with his fanatical unpredictability.[\[112\]](#)

Like Dulles, Komer knew a lot about Iraqi oil. A month later a National Intelligence

Estimate stated that they could not “identify any particular individuals or groups likely to bring off a successful coup,”[\[113\]](#) but by May of 1962 the Ba’ath party was the only group discussed by the State Department as a possibility for overthrowing Qassem and they recommended recognition once “the group is actually in full control.”[\[114\]](#) On June 4th, Bob Komer wrote to Talbot in the State Department to suggest a revision of its “wait and see” policy on Iraq. “But why not at least review ways in which we might more positively influence the course of events? Would CIA have any ideas; how about another talk with the British; indeed it might be worthwhile to solicit UAR views,” he wrote.[\[115\]](#)

According to Aburish, the imminent collapse of the UAR in 1961 eased the concern about collaborating with Egyptian intelligence, and in 1961, the Americans introduced to Nasser a plan to overthrow Qassem with a Ba’athi coup; Nasser accepted the plan. “From 1961 until the overthrow of Kassem in February 1963, the Iraqi Section of Egyptian intelligence facilitated contacts between the CIA and Iraqi exiles in Cairo...The Americans augmented these contacts by developing links between the Beirut and Damascus CIA stations and former Iraqi police officers under the monarchy and Lebanese and Syrian Christian elements of the same pan-Arabist and anti-Kassem Ba’ath Party.” [\[116\]](#) According to Jordan’s King Hussein, “many meetings were held between the Ba’ath Party and American intelligence—the most critical ones in Kuwait.”[\[117\]](#)

Saddam Hussein was one of the CIA’s contacts in Cairo. He came to Cairo in February of 1960. According to Sale, Saddam was “installed in an apartment in the upper class neighborhood of Dukki and spent his time playing dominos in the Indiana Café, watched over by CIA and Egyptian intelligence operatives... But during this time Saddam was making frequent visits to the American Embassy where CIA specialists such as Miles Copeland and CIA station chief Jim Eichelberger were in residence and knew Saddam... Saddam’s U.S. handlers even pushed to get his Egyptian handlers to raise his monthly allowance.”[\[118\]](#) Whether or not this is true, other authors report that he had contact with the Americans, and this is well established.[\[119\]](#) Egyptian intelligence kept a very close eye on Saddam. They searched his apartment frequently and once detained him in jail during his three-year stay in Cairo. Though the Egyptians collaborated with the CIA, they were also very suspicious of the Americans and consequently of Ba’athi exiles who visited them. Despite all the CIA contacts with Iraqi expatriates, the Iraqi exiles were not central to the plans to depose Qassem.

CHAPTER 7

THE 1963 BA’ATH – CIA COUP

Within Iraq, 1962 saw a great increase in plotting against Qassem. According to a U.S. Baghdad Embassy document of June 25th, the British were approached by a group of “nationalist, anti-communist “ army officers who planned to overthrow the GOI. “They sought assurances [of] quick recognition and supply [of] military equipment to permit [the] army [to] cut loose from [the] Soviets as [a] source [of] supply.” This was not the only group of army plotters the embassy knew about because the telegram continues, “[The] officers involved are not these in [the] movement reported [in the] reference

telegram.” This document refers to at least two other telegrams that describe embassy contact with Iraqi army plotters. The telegram also describes three other groups of plotters “aside from the Ba’ath,” who pose an “actual threat to Qassim,” and gives a political analysis of the situation. It also relates the British response to the query: “HMG could not involve itself in international politics but that any Iraqi Government could expect friendly relations to [the] extent Iraq is [sic] desired.”^[120] The MacMillan cabinet papers show that less than two months after the coup Britain did agree “to train a number of Iraqi officers in the country and to supply substantial quantities of arms and equipment, including Saracen armoured personnel carriers, [and] Hunter aircraft and ammunition.”^[121] It seems likely that the army officers who queried the British regarding post-coup accommodations were the same ones who made the request afterwards. In this sense, the British gave some support to the plotters before the coup by promising that they would be “friendly...to [the] extent...desired.” By September 26th the embassy reported “the government and the press are becoming even more hostile to the United States and friendlier toward [the] Soviet Bloc.”^[122] According to Aburish, Qassem discovered the plots against him in December.^[123] Others knew of the plot ahead of time. Through one of their informers, the Yugoslav embassy in Beirut^[124] discovered the plot and also informed Qassem in Baghdad.^[125] Sometime after this, Iraqi employees of the U.S. embassy were arrested, doubtless on charges of espionage.^[126] The GOI began repeatedly accusing the U.S. of conspiring against it. It seems clear that Qassem’s intelligence had discovered evidence of U.S. assistance to the plotters. The Americans did not publicly respond to the accusations, but rigorously denied them to the GOI.^[127] The Department of State sent a telegram from Secretary Rusk to its embassy in Iraq to discuss the situation on 5 February 1963. The second paragraph reveals an important secret asset that might be threatened by possible Qassem expulsions.

Qasim’s latest remarks perhaps deliberately designed provoke US reaction which could then be used as “proof” US hostility to Iraq and serve as basis for increased level of attacks which, having reacted once, we could not well ignore. US statements cannot be disseminated without distortion within Iraq, and shortwave broadcasts would not have impact on wide group. Qasim would have freedom within Iraq to twist US representations to provide basis for increasing tempo of anti-US campaign and intensifying harassment of Embassy and Consulate Basra. We cannot be sure Qasim might not proceed to length of expelling various officers of our mission, thus threatening reduce “presence” which constitutes important US asset [*1 line of source text not declassified*].^[128]

This “important US asset” in the embassy could well have been a CIA operative working undercover in a low level position in the embassy. After having discussed this document with Lakeland he offered, “We had a cultural attaché who ran a library and cultural center who was a spook.” Perhaps this is the ‘important asset,’ in the February 5th telegram.

Qassem gave an interview to the French newspaper *LeMonde*, published also on February 5th, 1963. The statements Qassem makes regarding the Americans and the British imply that Washington had threatened him.

I will not say as much of the British or the Americans. What have they not done to subjugate Iraq, to maintain their grip on our resources? And look, some days back I received a note in terms scarcely veiled warning me to change my attitude, on pain of sanctions that Washington would lay on Iraq. How can we put up with such language? All our trouble with the imperialists began the day we asserted our legitimate rights concerning Kuwait. Look at this map." (*He gives me an brochure titled "The Truth about Kuwait" and a map of the emirate*) . . . "Observe this tiny green spot south of Iraq. That's Kuwait, the portion usurped from our country. Tell me, please, what are the historical, ideological, or economic elements that make this emirate a kingdom? It doesn't even have drinking water!"[\[129\]](#)

Details of the plot to overthrow the Iraqi leader are murky. Aburish asserts that the plot was led by William Lakeland, a CIA agent undercover stationed as an attaché at the Baghdad embassy,[\[130\]](#) but this is wrong.[\[131\]](#) Bill Lakeland was a career Foreign Service Officer. At the time of the coup, he worked for the State Department in the embassy in Baghdad as the First Political Secretary. The Political Section is where the CIA frequently hid its operatives and this was true in the case of Baghdad in 1963, so it would be natural for people to assume that Lakeland, being the head of this department, was the CIA Station Chief. In fact, the Station Chief was Art Callahan who had cover as a low level employee in the Political Section of the embassy.[\[132\]](#) There was a whole separate office for the CIA, with multiple staff, off to the side of the Political Section but ostensibly still part of it, though they rarely worked together.[\[133\]](#)

In 1963, James Akins (another career Foreign Service Officer) was next to Lakeland in rank in Baghdad as the Second Political Secretary. Lakeland said that he did not know any Ba'athis before the coup, but "Akins himself had some Ba'ath contacts, not paid agents, typical FSO stuff. He had a pro-Ba'athi orientation."[\[134\]](#) It is possible that Akins facilitated contact between Iraqi Ba'athis and the CIA. He may have been more involved than this. He has hinted through the years that America was involved in the Ba'ath coup of 1963[\[135\]](#) but will not go on the record with what he knows.[\[136\]](#) He is most probably one of the "former diplomats" that the Slugletts, Sale and the Penroses write about as having told them (off the record) of U.S. involvement with the Ba'ath before 1963. Many people have told me that he has a reputation for being helpful with this topic.

Archibald Roosevelt was probably involved with Ba'ath party members before the coup. In my correspondence with Aburish, he told me, "One of the people involved in the preparations for '63 was Archie Roosevelt. He had been station chief in Beirut and returned to Beirut a few months before the coup. Archie spoke 14 languages, including Arabic and Kurdish. Archie knew many people in Iraq from when he served there after WWII. Years before, while station chief in Beirut, he was involved in intercepting moves towards Iraqi-Syrian unity."[\[137\]](#) Later he wrote, "The two roles I uncovered personally are those of McHale and Archie Roosevelt. I cannot tell you how but I knew both men."[\[138\]](#) This fits with Roger Morris' statement that, "C.I.A. officers -- including Archibald Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and a ranking C.I.A. official for the Near East and Africa at the time -- speak openly about their close relations with the Iraqi Ba'athists."[\[139\]](#) More needs to be learned to know exactly how Archie Roosevelt

assisted the coup.

No matter how the CIA hooked up with the Iraqi Ba'athis, word of their meetings reached Ba'athi leaders in Damascus and arguments broke out between the Syrian Ba'ath and the Iraqi Ba'ath. Jamal Atasi, a member of the Syrian cabinet at the time related the tenor of the discussions:

When we discovered this thing we began to argue with them. They would assert that their cooperation with the CIA and the US to overthrow 'Abd al-Karim Qasim and take over power—they would compare this to how Lenin arrived in a German train to carry out his revolution, saying they had arrived in an American train. But in reality—and even in the case of the takeover in Syria—there was a push from the West and in particular from the United States for the Ba'th to seize power and monopolize it and push away all the other elements and forces [i.e., both the communists and the Nasserists].[\[140\]](#)

The reference to Lenin's train means that the Iraqis took money from the U.S. in the same way that Lenin and the communists purportedly took a train full of gold from Germany during WWI to assist them in their Bolshevik Revolution. This is the way the U.S. assisted this coup - financially. Writing in his memoirs of the 1963 coup, long time OSS and CIA intelligence analyst Harry Rositzke presented it as an example of one on which they had good intelligence in contrast to others that caught the agency by surprise. The Ba'ath overthrow "was forecast in exact detail by CIA agents."

Agents in the Ba'th Party headquarters in Baghdad had for years kept Washington au courant on the party's personnel and organization, its secret communications and sources of funds, and its penetrations of military and civilian hierarchies in several countries...

CIA sources were in a perfect position to follow each step of Ba'th preparations for the Iraqi coup, which focused on making contacts with military and civilian leaders in Baghdad. The CIA's major source, in an ideal catbird seat, reported the exact time of the coup and provided a list of the new cabinet members.

...To call an upcoming coup requires the CIA to have sources within the group of plotters. Yet, from a diplomatic point of view, having secret contacts with plotters implies at least unofficial complicity in the plot.[\[141\]](#)

"Unofficial complicity in the plot" indeed. The CIA would have paid a lot of money for this steady supply of information, especially because American planners had determined that the Ba'ath Party would be the best for U.S. policy in Iraq going forward and they wanted to support the coup. Lakeland has admitted that CIA officer Ed Kane told him that the U.S. "had people who informed us about things...The CIA was kept aware of what was happening...[The CIA] had paid informants within the Ba'ath, but had no control of any operational...It was ultra secret...."[\[142\]](#) Lakeland voiced these things and repeated this information on four different occasions, but every time, when reminded of Kane's written position, he insisted that all contact was after the coup and he firmly believes Ed Kane's story that "the coup...was a complete surprise to the agency and, I am certain, to the entire US Government."[\[143\]](#) From the Iraqi side, Aburish has heard from post-coup Ba'ath cabinet member Hani Fkaiki and many Iraqis

that the CIA worked with the Ba'ath before the coup^[144], and Qassem's' Foreign Minister Hashim Jawad told the Penroses that his ministry had "information of complicity between the Ba'ath and the CIA."^[145] The best direct evidence that the U.S. was complicit is the memo from NSC staff member Bob Komer to President John F. Kennedy on the night of the coup, February 8, 1963. The last paragraph reads,

We will make informal friendly noises as soon as we can find out whom to talk with, and ought to recognize as soon as we're sure these guys are firmly in the saddle. _____excellent reports on the plotting, but I doubt either they or UK should claim much credit for it.^[146]

Eight typewritten spaces are still classified just before the word "excellent." "CIA had," would fit in here perfectly and is most likely in the original. This is consistent with Rositzke's memoir that writes of the CIA having a "major source in an ideal catbird seat." They would have had to pay money for this, but probably did not do too much more than fund the coup and this is why Komer wrote, "I doubt whether they [CIA] or UK [British Intelligence] should claim much credit for it." They can claim some but not much credit for it. At least they helped fund it and gave assurances that the Ba'ath would be well received in Washington. They may have provided more assistance that Komer either did not know or discounted.

Before the revolt could get underway, on February 3, 1963, Qassem ordered the arrest of Colonel Saleh Mahdi Ammash, a leader of the planned coup and a holder of all its secrets. Ammash was a former military attaché at the Iraqi embassy in Washington (where he was likely recruited) and was one of the Ba'ath's contact men with the CIA. The next day Qassem arrested the civilian leader of the Ba'ath Party, Ali Saleh al-Sa'adi. The arrest of Ammash and Al Sa'adi along with a number of others prompted the emergency start lest too many details of the plan be leaked in interrogations.^[147] Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr, the military leader of the Ba'ath gave the order to begin the rebellion two weeks early on 8 February.

The plan involved military actions to isolate army units loyal to Qassem, occupy radio and television stations, eliminate Qassem's key supporters such as Jallal Al Awkati and Wasif Taher, and capture Qassem and his headquarters, the Ministry of Defence building. The Ba'ath army officers who led the coup were General Al Bakr, Adnan Khairallah (both Saddam's Tikriti relatives), Munther Al Windawi, Hardan al-Tikriti, Abd al-Sattar Abd al-latif and Khalid Shawi^[148]. The Ba'ath had broad popular support for their active role in the nationalist rebellions, for fighting the communists, and for their courage at the ensuing trials. Many soldiers remained loyal to Qassem, however, and this caused considerable fighting. According to Jordan's King Hussein, the CIA, via an electronic command center in Kuwait, directed the Ba'ath fighters,^[149] but this cannot be verified yet with U.S. government documents or "on the record" statements. Aburish wrote, "The electronic command center in Kuwait...gave the rebel units direction, including Munzer Mandawi the only pilot to join the rebels, and later head of the National Guard."^[150]

After two days of fierce fighting within the Ministry of Defence, besieged by ground and bombed by air, Qassem surrendered.^[151] Aburish wrote,

To his lasting honour, Qassem refused to arm the tens of thousands of Communists,

peasants and workers who had trekked to his headquarters to offer to defend him, while the Ba'athists did arm and use their civilians in a support capacity. When he eventually surrendered...it was to save the country from further bloodshed. After his request to keep his sidearm and to be tried openly was refused, he no longer answered the questions of his captors. Rejecting a blindfold, he died like a gentleman officer, shouting: 'Long live the Iraqi people' In hindsight, because of his work for the poor, his austere ways and the first-ever recognition of Kurdish rights in Iraq...Qassem retains more of the affection of the Iraqi people than any leader this century.[\[152\]](#)

CHAPTER 8 AFTER THE COUP

The Ba'athis mutilated and desecrated Qassem's body, continually parading it before the public.[\[153\]](#) In the weeks following the coup, the armed civilians (the National Guard, Haras al-Qawmi) rounded up, imprisoned, tortured and shot communists and leftists, and their sympathizers. The bloodletting went on for several months. Estimates of those eliminated go from seven hundred to thirty-five thousand[\[154\]](#), with approximately five thousand being the general consensus.[\[155\]](#) Innocent Iraqis were killed,[\[156\]](#) and old men and pregnant women were tortured to death in the sight of their children.[\[157\]](#) All writers and witnesses agree that much of the elite of Iraqi society including doctors, lawyers, professors, and students were among those killed.[\[158\]](#) Thousands were also detained, and torture was commonplace in the makeshift prisons. *Daily Telegraph* journalist and Saddam historian Con Coughlin wrote:

One of the most notorious torture chambers was located at the aptly named Palace of the End...One of the most notorious practitioners of the torturer's art was Nadhim Kazzar, who would later become Saddam's head of national security...Kazzar's reputation for indulging in gratuitous violence was such that he even succeeded in terrorizing members of his own party. He had a particular liking for conducting interrogations personally and for extinguishing his cigarette inside the eyeballs of his victims.[\[159\]](#)

The Iraqi government's own description of the Palace of the End is horrific.

In the cellars of an-Nihayah Palace [the Palace of the End], which the Bureau used as its headquarters, were found all sorts of loathsome instruments of torture, including electric wires with pincers, pointed iron stakes on which prisoners were made to sit, and a machine which still bore traces of chopped-off fingers. Small heaps of blooded clothing were scattered about, and there were pools on the floor and stains over the walls.[\[160\]](#)

Many writers have reported that the CIA provided the lists of the names of the leftists to be killed.[\[161\]](#) According to Aburish,

Their primary source was one William McHale, a CIA agent operating under the

cover of [a] *Time* magazine correspondent and the brother of Don McHale, then a senior CIA officer in Washington. McHale obtained his names in Beirut from an ex-security officer under the monarchy, a former deputy of Bahjat Attiyah, the monarchist security supreme who was hanged in 1958, and the information was out of date. But McHale, though he provided the longest list, was not alone, and a senior Egyptian intelligence officer, Christian Ba'athists in Lebanon, Saddam's small group in Cairo and other individuals and groups contributed to this shameful exercise.[\[162\]](#)

According to author Malik Mufti, the names of those to be killed were also beamed in via the electronic command center from Kuwait.[\[163\]](#) According to Con Coughlin, "the Ba'athists had given [assurances] to the CIA that all those detained would be given a fair trial. The U.S. exposed their complicity in the coup by breaking diplomatic protocol and instructing their charge d'affaires at Baghdad to contact the rebels only hours after the coup and promise them recognition."[\[164\]](#) CIA involvement was well known from early on. *L'Express* wrote "The Iraqi coup was inspired by the CIA. The British government and Nasser himself were aware of the putsch preparations."[\[165\]](#) Seven months after the coup, Jordan's King Hussein was quoted in *Al-Ahram*:

You tell me that American Intelligence was behind the 1957 events in Jordan. Permit me to tell you that I know for a certainty that what happened in Iraq on 8 February had the support of American Intelligence. Some of those who now rule in Baghdad do not know of this thing but I am aware of the truth. Numerous meetings were held between the Ba'th party and American Intelligence, the more important in Kuwait. Do you know that ... on 8 February a secret radio beamed to Iraq was supplying the men who pulled the coup with the names and addresses of the Communist there so that they could be arrested and executed?[\[166\]](#)

Ali Saleh al-Sa'adi admitted, "We came to power on a CIA train."[\[167\]](#) In a 1991 interview with Alexander Cockburn, the CIA head of the Middle East and South Asia in the early 1960s, James Critchfield, admitted it was the CIA's favorite coup. "We really had the *ts* crossed on what was happening...we regarded it as a great victory."[\[168\]](#) In recent years, Roger Morris wrote about the CIA complicity in the coup for the *New York Times*. From personal experience he relates:

Serving on the staff of the National Security Council under Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in the late 1960's, I often heard C.I.A. officers — including Archibald Roosevelt, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and a ranking C.I.A. official for the Near East and Africa at the time — speak openly about their close relations with the Iraqi Baathists.[\[169\]](#)

Far-reaching cooperation between the Ba'ath and the CIA were revealed by actions after the coup. Aburish writes that within 24 hours the Americans gave the Iraqis "military hardware and began building an air-bridge between Turkey and Iran and Kirkuk in northern Iraq. The arms supplied by America to the Iraqi army were used to fight the Kurds."[\[170\]](#) They even "openly advised the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani to end the rebellion."[\[171\]](#) Bill Lakeland says he has never heard of this and believes it to be

fictional[172] but Boston Globe writer Jeff McConnell corroborates Aburish's information about an air-bridge. McConnell interviewed Bruce T. Odell who "headed the CIA airlift under the cover of special assistant to the US ambassador to Iraq. In an interview last week [September 1990] he called the airlift successful." According to McConnell, "The CIA soon undertook an airlift of arms into Iraq to help give credibility to...the Ba'ath party." [173]

Also, according to Aburish, Colonel Saleh Mahdi Ammash was released from prison and made Minister of Defence. "One of the first requests made to him by his American mentor and friend, William Lakeland, was to exchange much-needed American arms for Russian-made MiG-21s, T54 tanks and Sam missiles. The Americans wanted to assess the effectiveness of Soviet arms, particularly their aircraft." [174] This was supposed to have been accomplished within 48 hours after the success of the coup. Lakeland says he knows nothing of this. He has never heard of Ammash and believes reports of a weapons exchange to be fictional. [175] I have not been able to verify this with government documents, interviews or any other written sources so more needs to be learned to establish the truth about this.

Telltale commercial relationships also developed between American and British companies and the Iraqi Ba'ath. Shell, BP, Bechtel, Parson, Mobil and others were allowed back into Iraq. [176] Former Secretary of Treasury, Robert Anderson became the lead in Iraqi-American business relations while operating a corporation called Interser, basically a CIA front whose directors, all but one, were CIA operatives. [177] He also began to negotiate a sulfur concession for the Pan American Sulfur Company, and American companies began negotiations to build Basra dry-dock facilities. [178] The official American documents generated after the 8 February 1963 coup are revealing. First, there is Robert Komer's Secret Memorandum for the President written on February 8th, 1963 to brief him on the coup.

While it's still early, Iraqi revolution seems to have succeeded. It is almost certainly a net gain for our side.

Primary moving forces in this well-organized affair is Ba'th Party, a moderate left but anti-communist group with good military ties. Not clear yet whether Ba'th politicians or army nationalists will end up on top but in either case the regime will be preferable to Qasim's. Our guess is that it will: (1) seek to balance heavy Soviet investment by better relations with US and UK; (2) be more reasonable with oil companies; (3) be pro-Nasser, but opposed to union; (4) compromise with the Kurds and lay off Kuwait.

Nasser is trying to embrace the new crew, but we suspect he's whistling in the wind. We will make informal friendly noises as soon as we can find out whom to talk with, and ought to recognize as soon as we're sure these guys are firmly in the saddle. [2 *words of source text not declassified*] excellent reports on the plotting, but I doubt either they or UK should claim much credit for it. [179]

This is the smoking gun document discussed before (see page 51-52). It may be that Komer was not aware of the extent of the CIA involvement in the plotting and implementation of the coup. He "doubted" whether they "should claim much credit for it." The use of the word "doubt" indicates he was not sure. The culture of secrecy at the

CIA accounts for this.^[180] Komer would not have been told of all the details unless he had asked for them. Apparently he was only briefed with reports of the plotting. Based on Rositzke's presentation of the coup in his memoirs^[181], this seems to have been the paradigm in which intelligence on the coup was reported to whichever of the few government officials who were briefed. The last sentence is also a tacit admission of at least some direct U.S. involvement in the coup. For this reason the entire sentence was classified until June 2002 when all but the first two words of it were desanitized by a Mandatory Review request to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), which administers the Kennedy Library.^[182]

Komer did know that the UK was also involved. That would be British Intelligence - MI-5, MI-6 or SIS - and little is known about their part besides their promise to plotters that they would be friendly and the keeping of their promise later. Apparently Komer used the catchall "UK" to describe the overlapping British intelligence services that were all operating in the Middle East at the time. MI-6 did turn over agents to the CIA in the 1953 coup in Iran because the British intelligence operatives were all *persona non-grata* as with all British in Iran at the time.^[183] The British had a puppet government in both countries for decades and so the situation in Iraq was similar. Turning over agents to the CIA may be another way the UK assisted in Iraq in 1963 and the meaning that lies behind Komer's use of "UK."

Also on 8 February, an inter-departmental memorandum of the Defense Department had some revealing lines.

The coup appears to be in the hands of the Bath Party. Rumors have been widespread that that party had been planning a coup for several months. It is believed by members of CIA that the coup was triggered by Qasim's recent arrest of a large number of Bath Party members. The remaining members still at large felt that if they were ever going to attempt such a coup it would have to be done now.^[184]

This is evidence of Rositzke's "forecast in exact detail," seen here again in the reference to CIA analysis. This is additional corroboration of Aburish's assertion that the coup was launched because of the arrest of Ammash and other conspirators, and the Defence Department knew this already on the day of the coup! How else could they know it if there was not Komer's "excellent reports on the plotting?"

In the days after the coup, government documents warn against showing too open of a relationship with the new government. A memorandum from State Executive Secretary Brubeck to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy says,

Within the framework of non-alignment, Iraq is likely to wish to conduct friendly relations with the United States. Our posture should be that of a friend whose presence is known and appreciated but is not overshadowing. Any indication of interference in Iraqi internal affairs must be avoided. We must also be careful to avoid creating the impression that we sired the regime or are now trying to father it.^[185]

Bundy's concern over "creating the impression that we sired the regime" is telling. He

probably knew that the U.S. did sire it or more properly midwifed it.

These documents show an awareness that the U.S. had been involved with the coup, and possibly that the open *quid pro quo* that followed was putting a strain on Iraqi and Arab public perception, and that discretion would be most advisable. Despite its meticulous planning and “posture,” the United States, with its continuing support for Israel and pro-Western Muslim dictators considered corrupt by the people, found itself falling further out of favor with the Arab street.

CHAPTER 9 AFTERMATH

By November of 1963, the Ba’ath Party found itself out of power. The civilian branch of the Ba’ath party struggled with the military branch (of which Saddam Hussein was part) from the day of the coup. During the continuing arrest and purges of the leftists, the military branch also split between the more radical who wanted to pursue the communists more ruthlessly and those who wanted moderation. Arif was the leader of the civilian branch and he took advantage of this split to force the Ba’athis out of power in November. From this point on the military Ba’ath struggled to get back into power all the way to their success in 1968 after the second Arif’s death in 1967. Adel Darwish and Gregory Alexander wrote about an attempted coup by the Ba’athis again in 1964 but this is the only source I have found that mentions it.^[186] Aburish denies that there was any plot in 1964.^[187] Darwish and Alexander have not answered my inquiries. Until more evidence is forthcoming a 1964 CIA coup plot cannot be considered historical.

After the Ba’ath lost power in November 1963, Saddam Hussein concentrated on building up the strength of the Jihaz Haneen, a secret Ba’ath intelligence and security force. From 1964 to the second Ba’ath coup in July of 1968 they occupied themselves with assassinating communists, students, and union workers. They used violence on just about anyone whose ideas or activities posed a threat to the Ba’ath, even some Ba’athis. “Former Ba’ath party members have claimed that the agency [CIA] had been supplying the Jihaz Haneen with the names of left-wing activists whom Saddam then had systematically executed.”^[188]

According to Aburish, in 1966, Saddam wrote a letter to the U.S. consulate in Basra asking for their help in overthrowing the government.^[189] This also I cannot verify with any other source or interview. Aburish, and Darwish and Alexander provide many details about U.S. and CIA involvement in the second coup of 1968.^[190] After the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War there was a pervasive anti-American feeling in Iraq, because of its support for the Israelis. This would have made any kind of American-Ba’athi cooperation difficult, but according to Aburish and Darwish, most of the American assistance provided occurred before the war.

The Ba’ath took power once again for the final time in July 1968. Many other writers have indicated U.S. involvement in this coup also. Nayyef wrote in his memoirs years later, “...For the 1968 coup you must look to Washington.”^[191] The reputable French newspaper *Le Monde* wrote, “The change in Iraq was not for internal reasons only.”^[192] Hanna Batatu quotes President Abdel Rahman Arif as speaking of the

involvement of 'non-Iraqi hands'.[\[193\]](#) More research is needed to confirm the U.S. or CIA involvement in 1968, particularly from U.S. archives.

Relations were strained between the United States and Iraq after 1968. The 1973 Oil Shock caused a radical shift in U.S. policy. Until this time the famed "Seven Sisters" had insured that the world's oil supply remained in Western-friendly hands at consistently engineered low prices. After 1973, the U.S. adopted an unquestioned assumption: Middle Eastern oil must remain in pro-Western hands. Throughout 1974 the U.S. tried to persuade their European allies and Japan to form a cartel that would present a united front against OPEC and threaten economic or military invasion to gain consent.[\[194\]](#)

The U.S. could not go it alone at this time because of the "Vietnam Syndrome;" that is the American public would not stand for another foreign war in a strange country that they did not understand. So, U.S. planners developed a policy called the "Twin Pillars." America would project hegemony through surrogates, the two strong U.S. allies, Saudi Arabia and Iran. America greatly accelerated the build up of their surrogate's militaries with the hope that they could project power in the region through these satellites. When the heavily anti-American Iranian Revolution occurred in 1979 the U.S. lost one of its pillars. Immediately it formed the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The purpose of the RDF was to be able to quickly land troops in the Middle East in case governments unfriendly to the West threatened oil supplies. America began to aggressively acquire military bases in the Indian Ocean, East Africa and the Persian Gulf. The RDF became what is today Central Command. Since the purpose of its creation was to put U.S. troops in the region with the most of the world's oil, it was only a matter of time before they ended up there.[\[195\]](#)

Because of the pending problems on the horizon in Iran, starting in 1975, the United States began to support Iraq again with security and military assistance. Military assistance and the supplying of strategic materials to Iraq grew larger until the end of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980 to 1989. The U.S. supported both sides in this war, clearly showing a policy (though not publicly stated) of prolonging the war with the hopes of maximum damage to both sides because both regimes were a threat to U.S. hegemony in the region. They provided more support to Iraq and Iran might have won the war if the U.S. and other Western powers had not aided Iraq so much.

After the war, a financially strapped and desperate Iraq disputed with Kuwait. Kuwait had historically been a part of became Iraq until the British broke it off in the 1890s to weaken the Ottoman Empire and gain an oil rich base on the route to India. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait had been conducting horizontal drilling into Iraq's portion of the Rumelia Oil Field, overproducing oil and driving prices down and denying Iraq a Persian Gulf port. After the war, Kuwaiti ambassadors were obstinate in negotiations with Iraq through the Arab League. Meanwhile the Central Command was conducting military operations to simulate an amphibious invasion of Kuwait. As a result of the inability to negotiate a solution with Kuwait to Iraq's postwar crisis, Saddam Hussein invaded. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gave the U.S. the opportunity to get what they had wanted since 1973; troops in the Middle East. America has had significant forces there since Operation Desert storm in 1991.

The 2003 occupation of Iraq and capture of Saddam brought the story full circle.

Saddam Hussein's party went into power with U.S. assistance; they lost power by U.S. force thirty years and two months later. The 2003 overthrow of Saddam mirrors the U.S. assisted overthrow of Qassem in 1963. From the moment the British lost hegemony in Iraq U.S. policy makers have always been concerned with gaining influence and control in the land of Mesopotamia.

It is a hard historical fact that the U.S. tried to incapacitate Qassem in 1960 and at least helped finance his overthrow with the Ba'ath in 1963. It seems likely that they intervened at other times during Qassem's five-year reign, and supplied more than financial assistance for the coup such as providing intelligence from Kuwait and giving assurances of post coup support. They may have come through with this support after the coup by supplying a hit list of communists and a military air bridge but this still needs to be verified with government documents.

One important lesson to be learned from the study of America's first years in dealing with Iraq is that the U.S. policy of the time (anti-communism) led America to back the wrong leaders. Qassem and his successors would probably have been better than the Ba'ath for Iraq, the whole region and U.S. interests. Now with reports of Shi'a death squads and torture chambers in the news[\[196\]](#), and a latent civil war brewing in Iraq, it seems as though the policy of anti-terrorism has caused the U.S. to back bad leaders again. As it was under the Ba'ath, after the 2003 invasion, Iraq became a huge problem for America. Therefore this study supports a future U.S. policy of non-intervention in Iraq.

APPENDIX 1 THE SECRECY OF U.S. COVERT INTERVENTION

This project was greatly hindered by the fact that the U.S. government has denied and still denies involvement in the 1963 coup. Former CIA officer Ed Kane vehemently denies that the CIA had anything to do with it.[\[197\]](#) In a letter to the current Public Relations Director of the CIA, he stated "that the coup of February 8th, 1963 was a complete surprise to the agency and, I am certain, to the entire US government."[\[198\]](#) In 2005, I presented the document "Komer to Kennedy" to Kane via FAX. When I asked him, "who is the "they" Komer is referring to?" He replied,

I have ABSOLUTELY no idea. I saw NO reporting, from any source, including overhead and communications intercepts, while I was Iraqi desk officer even HINTING at a coup in the making. Neither did anybody in State. When I phoned my Agency superiors from HQS about midnight on February 8th, they all expressed astonishment that a coup had taken place.[\[199\]](#)

On the phone, I asked him for clarification. What then was Komer talking about? "I think he was talking through his hat," Kane replied.[\[200\]](#) Kane would have us believe that he is telling the truth, but Bob Komer was lying to the President of the United States in a Top Secret memo. Kane is actively promoting what the agency calls "white propaganda:" lies are told to the public to make your side look good. This octogenarian is still practicing "tradecraft."

I am not the only one who had problems interviewing old CIA hands that are still working in the interests of "the company." Critchfield denied involvement in the coup in his 1994 interview with Aburish.[\[201\]](#) Richard Sale wrote in 2003 that recently, a former "very senior CIA official" strongly denied that they were co-conspirators [in the 1963 coup]. "We were absolutely stunned. We had guys running around asking what the hell had happened," he said.[\[202\]](#)

These contradictions and obfuscations can be explained by the deep culture of secrecy cultivated at the CIA. CIA researcher Thomas Powers illustrates this. Armin Meyer was the director of the State Department's Office of Near Eastern Affairs in 1959. As such he was called in whenever the CIA contemplated covert operations in Iraq. Meyer was present at a meeting to discuss how the U.S. might remove Qassem.

During the meeting one of those present suggested that Qassem was the problem, and maybe the best way to get rid of him was to *get rid of him*. Wait a minute, Dulles [CIA director] said. An awful silence followed. Dulles was a man of great personal authority, and his words on this occasion had a cold and deliberate emphasis, which Meyer never forgot. Dulles wanted one thing to be understood: it is not in the American character to assassinate opponents; murder was not to be discussed in his office, now or ever again; he did not ever want to hear another such suggestion by a servant of the United States government; that is not the way Americans do things.

Dulles was so clear on this point, and spoke with such evident passion and conviction, that Meyer simply could not understand how Dulles ever could have been party to an assassination plot no matter who gave the orders. Meyer knew what was in the Church Committee's reports, but he simply did not believe it, there must be some error, it was beyond Meyer's capacity to conceive that he could have been mistaken on this point, Dulles had left no room for doubt: *he would not be a party to assassination*.[\[203\]](#)

As the *Alleged Assassination Report* of the Church Committee make abundantly clear, Allen Dulles and the CIA were very much involved in assassination plots by 1959, and specifically against Iraq! This performance was a deliberate attempt to misdirect and deceive for the obvious purpose of secrecy. This explains the confusion and lack of knowledge even among very senior CIA officials. In this way, "plausible deniability" is obtained with high-level U.S. officials convincingly denying covert operations that in fact did take place.

Either retired CIA like Kane are lying or they were deceived like Armin Meyer. Kane insists that there is no way he would have not known about CIA operations with the Ba'ath because he ran the Iraq Desk in Washington at the time of the coup. Everything had to go through him from Baghdad, yet there are cases of the normal chain of command and flow of information being bypassed in the history of the CIA. George Aurell told Joseph Burkholder Smith that he was bypassed while he was a Division Chief in the Pacific region.

Do you know what I found out they [the infamous Colonel Landsdale and company] were doing to me when I was division chief? They were sending in cables in their own secret code and getting approval for things and for spending money that I

would never have approved of, if I had known.

They used to send I admin cables instead of operational cables when they wanted approval of new operational expenses. They'd call money for political funding, propaganda schemes...Of course, they got these approved without any staff review or my review...I didn't learn about this damned trick until I got out here and looked at some things in the records.[\[204\]](#)

With the extensive evidence showing such "excellent" intelligence on the 1963 coup it seems highly improbable that Kane could have been bypassed and has not been able to find anybody to straighten him out yet all these years, but Aurell's experience may explain a significant amount of the denial that researchers encounter. The CIA has a habit of lying and deceiving even each other! When Joseph Smith went to the agency's building in Washington for his first interview (an all day affair) as a prospect for hire, they moved his car to the other side of the Lincoln Memorial, out of sight from the building's exit, parking it on the sidewalk. Smith used good sense, circling the memorial, which led him to find his Jeepster on the sidewalk. As Smith drove away he wondered if it had been the work of "some hold-over psychologist from OSS who was now working for the CIA and still up to his old tricks for testing potential employees?"[\[205\]](#)

With this kind of culture for researchers to deal with it is amazing that we can figure out anything. Complicating the task, government documents routinely classify any mention of the CIA, covert operations, military intervention, and other sensitive material. The *Foreign Relations of the United States* regarding Iraq from 1958 through 1963 have well over one hundred sections that are still classified, sometimes whole documents. They always seem to blank out just when the topic is about to be discussed. The researcher can make Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests but they can take months to be answered and often documents come back with no changes or only changes that leave the material regarding the CIA or covert operations classified.

While the CIA has gone to great lengths to cover up its complicity in the coup that materialized in 1963, even until the present, the Iraqis have also "cleansed the record."

For thirty years, it was not in the best interest of the GOI to have these details known.

"Three of Saddam's closest friends in Cairo have since perished—Abdul Karim al-Shaikhly (assassinated 1980), Medhat Ibrahim Juma'a (murdered 1986), and Naim al-Azami (killed early 1980s). His only known surviving contemporary, Farouk al-Nuaimi lives in Baghdad."[\[206\]](#) Perhaps Nuaimi could shed some light if he can still be found. Saddam has killed many people, including most of those who could compromise him, so it is not likely that we will get much help from the Iraqi side.

APPENDIX 2

WHY BILL LAKELAND IS NOT CIA AND WHY MOST OF THE ARAB WORLD THINKS HE IS

Said K. Aburish, the most prolific writer on the topic of U.S. intervention in early modern

Iraq, writes that William Lakeland led the coup.[\[207\]](#) Why Aburish, who is so well informed and has done so much research, got this wrong demands some explanation. His strength in this case turns out to be his weakness. Aburish has a long distinguished career working in the Middle East, dealing with prominent people. His strength is that he knows a lot of Arabs. He is able to command interviews with everyone from the man on the street to Nasser's children and government and former government leaders of all types. This then is the problem; most Arabs that are familiar with the CIA involvement in the 1963 coup think Lakeland was the leader of it.

Lakeland was not CIA though. He was a career Foreign Service Officer; his government record indicates this. The Foreign Service Officer position (FSO) was never used as cover for the CIA; the State Department would not allow it. When it was made to give cover to the CIA it gave them the titles of Foreign Service Reserve (FSR) or Foreign Service Staff (FSS). During the 1950s, the State Department gradually eliminated the FSR designation for its own people so all these titles could be used for CIA. It was a problem for the CIA because in "every country abroad there existed the anomaly of embassy personnel dealing with high-ranking local officials and moving in significant circles of local society who did not have the official designations that could explain such activity."[\[208\]](#)

Lakeland, like many career Foreign Service, resented having the CIA use diplomatic positions as cover. He didn't like having "to pretend that Art Callahan and all of his people were my staff." In addition, Lakeland like other diplomats, disagreed with many of the policies of the CIA. Bill Lakeland is outraged that Aburish has written so many things about him that are simply not true, but he is still good-natured. His attitude is that he knows the truth and the rest really doesn't matter too much to him, but if the record can be corrected he is all for it. He has been very forthcoming and helpful to this project.[\[209\]](#) This is in stark contrast to the image of him portrayed in Aburish's writings. Aburish seemed to try to discourage me from interviewing Bill, writing, "Lakeland, if he is alive, doesn't give interviews."[\[210\]](#) I thought this was odd because Aburish had listed a 2001 interview with Lakeland in his book on Nasser and quoted him.[\[211\]](#) After my interviews with Lakeland and other former U.S. officials and having reviewed records, I shared my findings with Aburish, specifically regarding Lakeland. Aburish conceded that Lakeland "was probably State Department," but still thought he was the "coup expert." Aburish conceded that he did not "personally uncover" anything about Lakeland, but as proof he reminded me that Nasser had brought up his name as CIA in the 1964 Egyptian-Iraqi-Syrian unity meetings. Aburish asserts that in these meetings Nasser warned the Iraqis about Lakeland and caused him to be expelled from Iraq. He knows this because he says that the Egyptians secretly recorded the contents of this meeting and later broadcast it.[\[212\]](#) I have not been able to verify this with radio logs; Lakeland does not believe it ever happened. He did leave Iraq for a position in Washington in 1964 but denies that he was expelled. Lakeland points out that he and his wife met informally with Nasser in Cairo on their way home in 1964.[\[213\]](#) Both men are probably telling the truth that they know, and on the evidence, Nasser was perfectly reasonable to think that Lakeland was CIA.

It is certain that Nasser did believe Lakeland was in American intelligence by 1964. His close advisor and confidant, Mohamed Heikal, wrote about the "American diplomatic

presence in Cairo” in the early 1950s. “William Lakeland, a shrewd young diplomat, was already there, and may already have been working for the CIA, as he certainly was later, though this was not suspected at the time.”[\[214\]](#) The long time editor of Egypt’s most prestigious newspaper, *al-Ahram*, Heikal was one of a few Nasser insiders.

Lakeland knew Nasser through Heikal. If Heikal came to eventually believe that Lakeland was CIA it is sure that Nasser did, but not at the beginning.

In 1952, Lakeland was the Second Secretary in the Political Section of the embassy in Cairo. As a part of his routine he became acquainted with Heikal. Heikal used to slip him tips to watch Nasser and the Free Officers. Lakeland passed the information on to his superiors. Heikal even gave Lakeland an early notice on the night of the coup. After Nasser came to power the job fell on Lakeland to be the main contact with him because he was the only trained Arabist in Cairo and Ambassador Jefferson Caffrey was at the end of a long distinguished Foreign Service career, spending part of the summers in Alexandria. In the early post-coup period, General Mohamed Naguib was the figurehead Prime Minister while Nasser was slowly established as the real power, so it was appropriate for Caffrey to interact with Naguib and Lakeland with Nasser.

As time went on and it became clear that Nasser was the real power in Egypt, Lakeland’s job gained more significance. Bill and his wife Mary Jo frequently entertained him in their home. Mary Jo was the only Western woman to know Gamal Nasser on a first name basis. As the relationship with the United States became more strained, and events in Egypt gained world significance, the CIA gradually pushed the State Department out of the position of conducting direct negotiations with Nasser. Nasser became familiar with Archibald Roosevelt, Jim Eichelberger and Miles Copeland of the agency. Lakeland was moved to a post in Aden in 1955 and was posted in Iraq in 1960 as the First Secretary heading the Political section. With all the intrigue concerning Qassem it was natural for people to assume that Lakeland was the head of the CIA because many understood that the agency operated out of the Political Section of the embassy. “I’m sure that the general rumor around Baghdad was that I was CIA,” Lakeland told me.[\[215\]](#)

After Nasser had dealt so extensively with the CIA over the years, it probably became hard for him to believe that the Americans had ever allowed a junior State Department officer to be his contact for so long without his being connected to the intelligence establishment. With Lakeland heading the Political Section in the embassy in Baghdad during the CIA-backed coup, Lakeland’s CIA ties seemed no longer in doubt. The Lakelands were aware that many Iraqis thought of Bill as CIA. On one occasion, Mary-Jo was refused invitation to a party because “her husband was CIA.”[\[216\]](#)

Aburish asserts that most Iraqis use the “circumstantial evidence of constant meetings between Ammash and Lakeland” to prove that Ammash “was recruited by the CIA.”[\[217\]](#) This circumstantial evidence may be that Ammash was seen with embassy personnel frequently. Again, Lakeland would be assumed to be in charge of whatever was happening with Ba’athi-CIA plotters. Ammash assuredly did know many Americans, but Lakeland says he has never heard of him.[\[218\]](#) Art Callahan and other CIA officers probably knew him well.

Aburish’s main source for Lakeland’s CIA status was one time Ba’ath cabinet member Hanni Fkaiki.[\[219\]](#) Fkaiki had no direct contact with the CIA himself but apparently

knew of many details of cooperation with the CIA from his fellow Ba'athis. He gave Aburish the names of a few of the Iraqis who worked with the agency. The names and identities of the CIA who worked with the Ba'athis were probably obscure to Fkaiki and that may be why the only name he gave Aburish was the only name he knew, the most well known name, the Chief of the Political Section, William Lakeland.

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- [3] Malik Mufti, *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq* (Ithaca, New York, 1996), 144.
- [4] Interview with retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer Bill Lakeland, June 2005.
- [5] The diversionary denials are labeled "the regular spiel." See Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA* (New York: 1979), 127-130. See Appendix 1: The Secrecy of U.S. Covert Intervention in Iraq, page 69.
- [6] Marion-Farouk and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958* (London: 2001), 330.
- [7] Kamel S. Abu Jaber, *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology and Organization* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966), passim.
- [8] Just seven months after the coup, Jordan's King Hussein asserted the certainty of American intelligence coordination and collaboration in the 1963 coup to Muhammad Hasanein Heikal, chief editor of *Al-Ahram*. This was published in *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 27 September 1963. This he did to deflect criticism targeted at him, that he himself was a CIA agent. See Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements Of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1978), 985-986.
- [9] Mufti, *Sovereign Creations*, 144.
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- [29] United States, Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate: Together with Additional, Supplemental, and Separate Views*. Foreword by Clark R. Mollenhoff, Introduction by Senator Frank Church, 1st Ed. (New York: Norton, 1976), 181n.
- [30] Correspondence with Author Said K. Aburish, May 2005.
- [31] Mufti, *Sovereign Creations*, 143-167.
- [32] Ibid, 144.
- [33] Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 394.
- [34] Aburish, *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge* (New York: 2000), 388-390.
- [35] Ibid, 226-227.
- [36] Sale, "Exclusive: Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot," *op. cit.*
- [37] Ibid.
- [38] Edith and E. F. Penrose, *Iraq*, 272n.
- [39] Correspondence with Aburish, May 2005.
- [40] Interview with Lakeland, June 2005.
- [41] Correspondence with Akins, June 2005.
- [42] Arlington National Cemetery Website, "Ex-CIA Official James Critchfield Dies," 23 April 2003 available on-line at <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jhcritchfield.htm>, accessed May 17, 2006.
- [43] John K. Cooley, *An Alliance Against Babylon: The U.S., Israel and Iraq* (London: 2005), 96-100.
- [44] James Atkins wrote me that he has been writing a "memoir...for several years. He has not "decided whether to include the 1963 coup." If he does, he may soon provide us with quite a bit more information, Correspondence with Akins, June 2005; On February 8 2005, *New York Times* columnist and author Roger Morris wrote Ed Kane that he has "a book forthcoming later this year." See Appendix 3: Documents: Letter from Ed Kane to CIA Director of Public Relations, page 98. Morris served "on the staff of the National Security Council under Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in the late 1960's, [and he] often heard C.I.A. officers -- including Archibald Roosevelt, grandson of

Theodore Roosevelt and a ranking C.I.A. official for the Near East and Africa at the time -- speak openly about their close relations with the Iraqi Ba'athists," See Robert Morris, "A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making," *New York Times*, 14 March 2003.

[45] William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: 2000), 201-205.

[46] Abdel Latif Boghdadi, *Diaries* (Arabic) (Cairo, 1982), 35 in Said K. Aburish, *Nasser: The Last Arab* (New York: 2004), 149.

[47] Marion and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, 47-49.

[48] Eisenhower Library, "Briefing Notes by Allen W. Dulles," White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, International File, 1958, Iraqi Coup, Effects in the Middle East, more fully declassified, originally published in part in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula* (Washington: 1993), 308-311. To view this document, see Appendix 3: Documents: Briefing Notes by Allen Dulles, page 79.

[49] William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: 2000), 326-327.

[50] John Foster Dulles, "The Korean Experiment in Representative Government," *Department of State Bulletin* 23 (3 July 1950): 12-13 in Mark G. Toulouse, *The Transformation of John Foster Dulles: From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism*, (Mercer, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985), 230.

[51] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1959-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 308n.

[52] United States, Department of State, John P. Glennon and Louis J. Smith eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XI: Lebanon and Jordan* (Washington: 1992), 219.

[53] *Ibid*, 245.

[54] "Briefing Notes by Allen W. Dulles," *op. cit.* To read the full text of the previously classified demands of Saudi Arabia see Appendix 3, page 82.

[55] Claudia Wright, "Generals' Assembly: The Secrets of US-Turkish Military Planning," *New Statesmen* (15 July 1983): 20.

[56] "Briefing Notes by Allen W. Dulles *op. cit.*"

[57] For discussions on agent recruitment and arrangements see Joseph Burkholder Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior: Second Thoughts of a Top CIA Agent* (New York: 1976), 114-118; Philip Agee *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (New York, 1975), 84-88.

[58] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1959-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 376.

[59] This cooperation continued until ordered to stop in late 1962. This is based on interviews in 1969 and 1982 with former Jordanian intelligence chief Radi Abdallah. See Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 140. The Shah was a U.S. puppet restored to his crown by a CIA coup in 1953; see M.J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup D'Etat." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 3 (1987): 261-286. King Hussein owed his crown to imperial Britain and was a paid CIA agent from 1957 to his death in 1999; see Blum, *Killing Hope*, 90. See also, *Boomerang!*, Zepezauer, 60-66.

[60] Aburish, *Nasser: The Last Arab*, 168-172.

[61] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 342-343.

[62] Eisenhower Library, "Memorandum of Discussion by Gleason, October 17," Whitman File, NSC Records, fully declassified, originally published in part in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula* (Washington: 1993), 348.

[63] The CIA supported the Kurd's insurgency against the GOI with 16 million dollars between 1972 and 1975. See Blum, *Killing Hope*, 242-244; Gerard Chaliand ed., *A People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan* (New York: 1993), 167-177; Edgar O' Balance, *The Kurdish Struggle 1920-1994* (New York: 1996), 93-101.

[64] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula* (Washington: 1993), 390.

[65] *Ibid*, 355-356.

- [66] Uriel Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963* (New York: 1969), 127-135.
- [67] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 363-422.
- [68] Eisenhower Library, "Memorandum of Discussion, December 11," Whitman File, NSC Records, fully declassified, originally noted as entirely classified in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula* (Washington: 1993), 356. To view this document, see Appendix 3: Documents: Memorandum of Discussion at the 390th Meeting of the National Security Council on December 11, 1958, page 87.
- [69] Ibid, 357-358.
- [70] Interview with Hani Fkaiki, member of the Ba'ath Party Command at the time, London, October 1995 in Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 141; Claudia Wright, "Generals' Assembly: The Secrets of US-Turkish Military Planning," *op. cit.*
- [71] See Appendix 1: The Secrecy of U.S. Covert Intervention in Iraq, page 69.
- [72] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie Eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 358-359.
- [73] Ibid, 382.
- [74] Ibid, 391-392.
- [75] Ibid, 385n.
- [76] Eisenhower Library, "Memorandum of Discussion at the 398th Meeting of the National Security Council on March 5," Whitman File, NSC Records, fully declassified by Mandatory Review August 19, 1996, originally noted as entirely classified in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula* (Washington: 1993), 394. To view this document, see Appendix 3: Documents: 398th National Security Council Memo of March 5, 1959, page 89.
- [77] For a history of the Shawwaf Revolt see Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, 164-177.
- [78] Eisenhower Library, "Memorandum of Discussion at the 399th Meeting of the National Security Council on March 12," Whitman File, NSC Records, fully declassified, originally noted as entirely classified in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula* (Washington: 1993), 394. To view this document, see Appendix 3: Documents: 399th National Security Council Memo of March 12, 1959, page 91.
- [79] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie Eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 434.
- [80] Dana Adams Schmidt, "CIA Head Warns of Danger in Iraq," *op. cit.*
- [81] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 395-449.
- [82] Ibid, 437.
- [83] Ibid, 456.
- [84] Ibid, 461.
- [85] Marion and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1959*, 72-73.
- [86] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 482.
- [87] Richard Sale, "Exclusive: Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot," *op. cit.* I have not been able to corroborate this with any other sources.
- [88] Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 47; Con Coughlin, *Saddam: King of Terror* (New York, 2002), 29; Alexander and Patrick Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein* (New York, 1999), 72.
- [89] Richard Sale, "Exclusive: Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot," *op. cit.*
- [90] Eisenhower Library, "Memorandum of Discussion at the 423rd Meeting of the National Security Council on November 5," Whitman File, NSC Records, further partially declassified, originally published partially classified in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula* (Washington: 1993), 492. To view this document, see Appendix 3: Documents: Memorandum of Discussion at the

423rd Meeting of the National Security Council on November 5, 1959, page 93.

[91] Con Coughlin, *Saddam: King of Terror*, 37-39; Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 136-137; John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, *Saddam's War: The Origins of the Kuwait Conflict and the International Response* (London, 1991), 54-55.

[92] David Morgan, "Ex-U.S. Official says CIA Aided Baathists: CIA Offers No Comment on Iraq Coup Allegations," *Reuters*, 20 April 2003 available on-line at <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0420-05.htm>, accessed May 17, 2006.

[93] Marion and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, 327n.

[94] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 495.

[95] Arlington National Cemetery Website, "Ex-CIA Official James Critchfield Dies," *op. cit.*

[96] Based on an Interview with James Critchfield, Washington D.C., September 1994 in Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 134-135.

[97] *Ibid*, 135.

[98] See Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (London: 1980) 121-231, 253-254.

[99] *New York Times*, 8, 13-15 August 1957; 21 October 1957; 24, 28 December 1957; 14 February 1958; 6-8, 14, 29 March 1958; 8 October 1958.

[100] Eveland, *Ropes of Sand*, 209-213.

[101] *Ibid*, 249-253.

[102] Interview with Critchfield in Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 134-135.

[103] Said Aburish tells this amazing story. "The Americans were so determined to overthrow Qassem that they opened their doors to everyone in sight. I myself was witness to similar American activities in Beirut, and remember being aghast at the way young Iraqi exiles spoke of their connections with the CIA openly and embarrassingly. An Iraqi by the name of Khayat used to tell everyone that he had the number of Allen Dulles's direct telephone line – just in case. Later, I discovered that the fool was indeed a CIA agent." Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 55.

[104] United States, Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 181n.

[105] *Ibid*.

[106] Jeff McConnell, "CIA's 'Mission' against Hussein has a Familiar Ring to it," *The Boston Globe*, 9 September 1990, A29.

[107] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 501.

[108] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 507.

[109] According to Hani Fkaiki, a one-time member of the Iraqi cabinet under the Ba'ath, sometime in 1960 or 1961, the Americans and the British began arming the Kurds for their rebellion, which broke out in the summer of 1961, see Interview with Hani Fkaiki, London, October 1995 in Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 141; see also Claudia Wright, "Generals' Assembly: The Secrets of US-Turkish Military Planning," *op. cit.* This claim cannot be confirmed. In fact, U.S. government documents exist which show a formal rejection of two Kurdish requests for moral support, money and arms in September of 1962. See United States, Department of State, Nina J. Noring and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XVII: Near East 1961-1962* (Washington: 1994), 746-747; United States, Department of State, Nina J. Noring and Glenn W. LaFantasie, ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. 18: Near East 1962-1963* (Washington: 1995), 116-117.

[110] United States, Department of State, Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1959-1960, vol. XII: Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula*, 526.

[111] United States, Department of State, Nina J. Noring and Glenn W. LaFantasie eds. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XVII: Near East 1961-1962*, 364-365.

[112] *Ibid*, 379.

- [113] Ibid, 455.
- [114] Ibid, 655.
- [115] Ibid, 705.
- [116] Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 137.
- [117] Interview with Jordan's King Hussein printed in *al-Ahram*, 27 September 1963 in Mufti, *Sovereign Creations*, 144.
- [118] Sale, "Exclusive: Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot."
- [119] Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 54-55; Con Coughlin, *Saddam: King of Terror*, 37; Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 54-55.
- [120] Kennedy Library, "Incoming Telegram from Baghdad to Secretary of State, June 25, 1962," National Security Files, Countries, Box no. 117, Iraq 1961-1962. To view this document, see Appendix 3: Documents: Incoming Telegram from Baghdad to Secretary of State, June 25, 1962, page 95.
- [121] MacMillan Files, "Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 4 April, 1963," CAB 128/37.
- [122] Kennedy Library, "Incoming Telegram from Baghdad to Secretary of State, September 26, 1962," National Security Files, Countries, Box no. 117, Iraq 1961-1962.
- [123] Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 138.
- [124] Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 986.
- [125] Interview with Fkaiki in Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 137.
- [126] Kennedy Library, "Incoming Telegram from Baghdad to Secretary of State, February 7, 1963," National Security Files, Countries, Box no. 117, Iraq 1/63-2/63.
- [127] Ibid; Kennedy Library, "Incoming Telegram from Baghdad to Secretary of State, February 2, 1963," National Security Files, Countries, Box no. 117, Iraq 1/63-2/63; Ibid.
- [128] United States, Department of State, Nina J. Noring and Glenn W. LaFantasie, ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. 18: Near East 1962-1963*, 334-335.
- [129] Edouard H. Saab, "Une Declaration du General Kassem Au 'Monde'," *LeMonde*, 2 February 1963, translation by Peter Attwood.
- [130] Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 55-56.
- [131] See Appendix 2: Why Bill Lakeland was not CIA and Why Most of the Arab World Thinks He was, page 74.
- [132] According to Ed Kane, all the CIA staff working under cover in the Political Section of the State Department in Baghdad during the early sixties are deceased. This includes Station Chief Art Callahan, Hugh Fleischer and Ted Atkins, Interview with retired CIA Case Officer Ed Kane, September 2005.
- [133] Interview with Lakeland, July 2005.
- [134] Interview with Lakeland, August 2005.
- [135] Ibid.
- [136] Correspondence with Akins, June 2005.
- [137] Correspondence with Aburish, August 2004.
- [138] Correspondence with Aburish, June 2005.
- [139] Robert Morris, "A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making," *op. cit.*
- [140] Interview with Jamal Atasi, Damascus 22 July 1991 in Mufti, *Sovereign Creations*, 144.
- [141] See Harry Rositzke, *The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action* (Boulder, CO: 1977), 109-110.
- [142] Interview with Lakeland, June 2005.
- [143] See Appendix 3: Documents: Letter from Ed Kane to CIA Director of Public Relations, page 98.
- [144] Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 138.
- [145] Edith and E. F. Penrose, *Iraq*, 288.
- [146] Kennedy Library, "Secret Memorandum for the President: R. W. Komer to Kennedy," National Security Files, Countries, Box no. 117, Iraq 1/63-2/63, originally partially published in United States, Department of State,

Nina J. Noring and Glenn W. LaFantasie, ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. 18: Near East 1962-1963*, 334n-335n. To view this document see Appendix 3: Documents: Komer to Kennedy, February 8, 1963, page 97.

[147] Details of Ammash in Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 138.

[148] Khadduri, *Republican Iraq*, 190n; Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 56.

[149] Based on a citation of Egyptian writer Muhammad Heikal who cited Jordan's King Hussein in Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 140.

[150] Correspondence with Aburish, August 2004.

[151] For full details of the events of the coup see Khadduri, *Republican Iraq*, 188-196.

[152] Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 57.

[153] Samir al-Khalil, *Republic of Fear: Saddam's Iraq* (Berkeley, California, 1989), 59.

[154] Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 58.

[155] Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 139.

[156] Based on the writing of Ali Karim Said, a leading Ba'athi of the time in Con Coughlin, *Saddam: King of Terror*, 42.

[157] Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 139.

[158] Ibid.

[159] Coughlin, *Saddam*, 42.

[160] Summary of Government of Iraq, *Al-Munharitun*, 30-32, 39-41, 49-51 and passim in Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 990.

[161] Marion and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958*, 86; Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 985-986; Edith and E. F. Penrose, *Iraq*, 288; Coughlin, *Saddam*, 41; Mufti, *Sovereign Creations*, 143-144; Heather Deegan, *The Middle East and Problems of Democracy* (Boulder, Colorado, 1994), 71; Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 55.

[162] Based on the testimony of an anonymous former *Times* correspondent and anonymous Iraqi exiles in Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 58-59.

[163] Interview with Jordan's King Hussein printed in *al-Ahram*, 27 September 1963 in Mufti, *Sovereign Creations*, 144.

[164] Based on Dr. Hamid Al Bayati, *The Coup of 8 February 1963 in Iraq* (London, 1966), 163 (Arabic) in Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 59.

[165] Bulloch and Morris, *Saddam's War*, 55.

[166] Cited from an Interview with Jordan's King Hussein printed in *al-Ahram*, 27 September 1963 in Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 985-986.

[167] Interview with Fkaiki in Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 59.

[168] Interview with James Critchfield, Washington D.C., 04/10/91 in the Cockburns, *Out of the Ashes*, 74.

[169] Robert Morris, "A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making."

[170] Interview with Fkaiki in Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 141.

[171] Interview with Dr. Ahmad Chalabi, London, August 1996 in Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 59.

[172] Interview with Lakeland, June 2005.

[173] Jeff McConnell, "CIA's 'Mission' against Hussein has a Familiar Ring to it."

[174] Interview with Fkaiki in Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 141.

[175] Interview with Lakeland, June 2005.

[176] Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 141.

[177] Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 60.

[178] Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 141.

[179] Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Iraq, January/February 1963.

[180] See Appendix 1: The Secrecy of U.S. Covert Intervention in Iraq, page 69.

[181] See page 51, taken from Rositzke, *The CIA's Secret Operations*, 109-110.

- [182] To view this document see Appendix 3: Documents: Komer to Kennedy, February 8, 1963, page 97.
- [183] M. J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup D'Etat."
- [184] United States, Department of State, Nina J. Noring and Glenn W. LaFantasie, ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. 18: Near East 1962-1963*, 343.
- [185] Ibid, 348.
- [186] Darwish and Alexander, *Unholy Babylon*, 203.
- [187] Correspondence with Aburish, May 2005.
- [188] Darwish and Alexander, *Unholy Babylon*, 203.
- [189] Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 74.
- [190] Darwish and Alexander, *Unholy Babylon*, 203; Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 73, 74.
- [191] Cited in Hassan Al Said, *Guards of the West: The Ba'ath and the International Game* (Beirut: 1992), 352 in Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 74.
- [192] Cited in Al Said, *Guards of the West*, 277 in Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 73.
- [193] Cited in Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 73.
- [194] Joan Edelman Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, *The Politics of International Economic Relations*, 6th ed. (Belmont, CA: 2003), 301-306.
- [195] Howard and Gayle Teicher, *Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush*, (New York: 1993), *passim*.
- [196] John Daniszewski, "Raid Seen as Boost to U.S. Troops' Image," *L.A. Times*, 17 November 2005.
- [197] Interview with Kane, June 2005.
- [198] See Appendix 3: Documents: Letter from Ed Kane to CIA Director of Public Relations, page 98.
- [199] Correspondence with Retired CIA Case Officer, Ed Kane, June 2006.
- [200] Interview with Kane, June 2005.
- [201] Correspondence with Aburish, August 2004.
- [202] Sale, "Exclusive: Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot," *op. cit.*
- [203] Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, 128.
- [204] Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, 255, 256.
- [205] Ibid, 46-47.
- [206] Con Coughlin, *Saddam*, 326, 327n.
- [207] Aburish, *Saddam Hussein*, 55-56.
- [208] Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, 146-147.
- [209] Interview with Lakeland, August 2005.
- [210] Correspondence with Aburish, May 2005.
- [211] Aburish, *Nasser*, 338, 39.
- [212] Correspondence with Aburish, June 2005.
- [213] Interview with Lakeland, July 2005
- [214] Mohamed H. Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes* (New York: 1987), 41.
- [215] Interview with Lakeland, June and August 2005.
- [216] Interview with former Foreign Service Officer William Lakeland, December 2005.
- [217] Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship*, 138.
- [218] Interview with Lakeland, June 2005.
- [219] For a history of Fkaiki see Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 1004-1005, 1019, 1021n, 1022-1023, 1218-1219.