

John Miller
Memoirs of General Miller
in the service of the Republic of Peru

William Miller served in the British army in the war against Napoleon. Later he offered his services to the Argentinian patriots and joined up with General San Martín's army in Chile. He was placed in command of the Chilean naval squadron's marines and as such served with Lord Cochrane throughout the latter's time in the Pacific. Afterwards he rose through the ranks of the Peruvian army, having the distinction of being involved from start to finish in the campaign for Peru's independence and of taking part in the major battles that secured it.

Strictly speaking, Miller's Memoirs are not an eyewitness record, since the book was authored by his brother. However, John claims to be merely an editor of material provided by William, stating that he compiled the work 'chiefly from the private letters, journals and recollections of my brother', and the latter is known to have regarded the book as his own.

The soldiers were next trans-shipped to two small schooners (prizes) and sent to the Morro de Sama, a miserable port ten leagues to the northward of Arica.¹ The schooners had temporary rudders only and were steered, even before the wind, with difficulty. Provisions and water for twenty-four hours were put on board, but it was forty-eight hours before the commanding officer of the troops could make out the Morro de Sama and get his men on shore. They had then to march eight

¹ This is Miller's account of the expedition to Intermedios set in motion by Cochrane in May 1821.

leagues before a good draught of water could be obtained. There was a small well at the Morro, but the water was brackish and there was scarcely enough to quench the thirst of half a dozen men. Upon landing, the knees of the men trembled under them, as they had not entirely regained their strength from the effects of ague, and they could not walk more than half an hour at a time without lying down on the sand to recover themselves.

Upon reaching the top of the mountain (Morro de Sama, too steep to ride a horse up or down, and three miles to the summit by the winding path), a delightful breeze fanned their faces, refreshed the exhausted men and each felt his strength increase as he went along. The only guide was a soldier who had travelled the road a few times. He was frequently alarmed by doubts as to being in the right direction. The anxieties of this night were rendered perfectly agonising. Tormented by thirst, knowing that no water could be obtained in the line of road they had passed over, and uncertain whether the route they had taken was the right one, their situation was aggravated by the knowledge that men's lives were frequently lost in those extensive deserts, where for many square leagues nothing is to be seen but a barren sea of sand. Nothing could exceed their joy when the guide discovered, by some remembered hillock, that he was still in the right track.

A fatiguing march of thirteen hours brought the patriots to the entrance of the valley of Sama (at 9 a.m.) in a very distressed state. The sun, which shone scorchingly and reflected upon a deep, loose sand, had deprived them of the invigorating effects of the previous night breeze. So soon as the party caught sight of vegetation, every man rushed forward in search of water. Some who could with difficulty but creep till this moment, now ran with the celerity of greyhounds to the valley.

At Sama horses were procured for the commanding officer and a few others. On the next day the party advanced to Tacna, a distance of twelve or fourteen leagues and about twenty from their place of landing. Tacna contains a population of four thousand souls. Lieutenant-Colonel Miller rode on with ten or

a dozen soldiers mounted and was enthusiastically received by the clergy, municipality and inhabitants, who met him outside the town.

Major Soler had marched from the Morro de Sama by the coast to Arica, which was abandoned at his approach. He overtook the fugitive garrison in the valley of Azapa and made about one hundred prisoners, most of whom, with four royalist officers, were admitted into the patriot service by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, whom Major Soler rejoined at Tacna. Arica was left in possession of the navy and many houses were plundered.

One hundred and twenty thousand dollars in specie were taken near Locumba by a detachment sent by Major Soler. This sum, with four thousand dollars found in the custom house and about three hundred thousand dollars' worth of merchandise, Spanish property, were all embarked. Original documents, sufficient to condemn the cargoes of the *Lord Cathcart*, *Colombia* and *Joseph*, lying in the harbour, were found in the archives at Tacna; so that the false papers furnished by British merchants in Rio de Janeiro to cover these cargoes became unavailable and the fraudulent system of cloaking Spanish property sent to the Pacific was thus exposed.

During these operations of the patriots General Ramírez had ordered three detachments to march against them. One, of three hundred and eighty men, proceeded from Arequipa by the way of Moquegua, where it was augmented by one hundred rank and file; another from Puno of two hundred and eighty and another from La Paz, both by way of Tarata. All three were to form a junction in Tacna and then 'to drive the insurgents into the sea'. But, contrary to the calculations of General Ramírez, the patriots had advanced from Arica into the interior, as already stated.

So soon as Lieutenant-Colonel Miller ascertained the movements of the royalist detachments, he determined to attack them separately, for which purpose he advanced from Tacna to meet the party of Colonel La Hera, sent from Arequipa. Miller's force consisted of three hundred and ten infantry, seventy

cavalry and about sixty well mounted volunteer peasantry, with which, on the 20th of May, he arrived at the hamlet of Buenavista, situated in a romantic spot at the foot of the Cordillera, which a little higher up is covered with snow. The bracing and almost wintry feeling of the weather was delightful to men who had so lately been traversing scorching sands. Here the patriot commander, having learnt during the night that Colonel La Hera had changed his direction from Locumba and marched towards Ticapampa, determined to direct his own course with all possible speed to Mirave, in order to prevent the royalist parties from La Paz and Oruro forming a junction with that from Arequipa.

The march from Buenavista to Mirave, a distance of fifteen leagues, is across a stony desert entirely destitute of water and vegetation. The last two leagues, which form one continued descent amidst precipices and projecting rocks, is called the *Mal Paso*, or bad pass, and is so narrow as to admit of advancing in single files only and on foot. After a toilsome march of eighteen hours, the patriots reached, at midnight, the rugged bank of a stream which rushes through the valley of Mirave. The royalists had, on the preceding afternoon, possessed themselves of the mud wall enclosures around the cultivated grounds of the little hamlet of Mirave, situated in a hollow of the opposite or right bank, where they awaited the arrival of their expected reinforcements, which at that time had halted, only three miles distant from them, up the valley and on the left bank of the river.

As the route from Sama to Mirave was considered impassable for troops, the royalists had not the most distant idea of the proximity of their enemies, but the indiscreet zeal of a patriot officer in front first announced to the Spaniards their unexpected approach.

The patriot cavalry crossed the torrent, but, upon advancing on the royalists, were driven back. They were not permitted to repass, but made to form above the ford. A rocket party, under the direction of Captain Hind, was detached to an eminence on the left, from which it occupied the attention of the

enemy; for the same object another small party was sent to the right. Lieutenant-Colonel Miller remained below with the rest of his men, who sat down in line on the bank of the torrent, unperceived and unheard by the enemy, who were not more than at pistol shot distance, but the intervening space was covered with wood.

Whilst the royalists kept up an unceasing fire upon the rocket parties, Miller conveyed his infantry to the other side of the torrent by mounting a foot soldier behind each dragoon, who went and returned until the whole of the troops had effected the passage. Having gained the opposite side of the valley, divided by the river into unequal parts, Captain Plaza was sent with a detachment to fire down upon the enemy, who, not having stirred from their parapeted position, were not aware that the patriots had crossed the river. The royalists, finding themselves unexpectedly assailed, withdrew to a short distance. A good deal of random firing took place during the night and the patriots lost an officer and seventeen men.

The first peep of dawn of the 22nd of May discovered the hostile parties in front of each other at two musket shots distance, in a sort of mountain level about half a mile wide. Miller ordered an immediate charge. The celerity with which it was executed frustrated an attempt on the part of the royalists to gain an adjoining ridge on their left. Their retreat, by the track they had ascended from the cultivated enclosures in the valley below, was also cut off. Driven to the edge of a precipitous ridge, the royalists fought with desperate valour for fifteen minutes. Ninety-six were killed on the spot and one hundred and fifty-seven taken prisoners, most of them wounded; four hundred mules were also taken; about sixty infantry and eighty cavalry escaped. Immediately after the royalists had given way, the expected reinforcement from Puno and La Paz, mounted upon mules, appeared in sight, upon which the patriots were recalled to face a fresh enemy. A few rockets were discharged at this party as it began to cross the river, where during the night it had been passed by the patriots. The royalist reinforcement, perceiving that it had arrived too late, instantly countermarched.

In the affair of Mirave Mr. Welsh, private surgeon to Lord Cochrane and who had volunteered his services to accompany Miller on this occasion, was amongst the slain. The loss of this fine young man was very much deplored. There was a liveliness of manners and a kindness of heart perceptible in his assiduous attentions to the sick and wounded, which won for him more than the esteem of all. The soldiers wept over his remains, and such was the idea of his worth in the minds of the inhabitants of Tacna that the news of his fall produced in the principal families sensations of regret, to an extent unusual upon so short an acquaintance. Lord Cochrane wrote that he would sooner have lost his right arm and Miller had to lament a friend whose constant attendance had beguiled the irksome hours of a sick bed and long suffering from severe wounds. Welsh was mourned alike by the soldiers and by the sailors, by his countrymen and by South Americans, and his early death was a severe loss to the patriot service.

On the afternoon of the 22nd Miller continued the pursuit of the few cavalry and infantry of La Hera's division to Moquegua (thirty leagues to the northward) and entered the town at 9 a.m. on the 24th of May. The runaway royalists had arrived a few hours before and Colonel La Hera had made the best of his way to Puno, leaving the remains of his detachment at Moquegua. A royalist officer and thirteen rank and file were killed in a skirmish which took place. The rest were made prisoners, with the exception of an adjutant and his servant, who escaped the vigilance of their pursuers by disguising themselves in the poncho and clothes of a peasant, whom they met accidentally on the road and murdered for the sake of obtaining his dress. Colonel Portocarrera, governor of the province of Moquegua, passed over to the patriots.

The town of Moquegua contains nearly ten thousand inhabitants. They received the patriots with every expression of unbounded satisfaction and, as a proof of their sincere attachment to the cause of independence, voluntarily and cheerfully contributed the means to strengthen and give full efficiency to the little division.

On the 25th of May Lieutenant-Colonel Miller learned that from two to three hundred Spaniards were passing the heights of Torata, about five leagues distant. This was the detachment which appeared in the rear of the patriots at the conclusion of the affair of Mirave and was now proceeding to Arequipa. The Lieutenant-Colonel, with a hundred and forty of his infantry upon mules and a few cavalry, set out in pursuit. A march of fourteen leagues to the eastward brought them, at 9 a.m. on the 26th of May, to Calera (sixty-five leagues from Arica) soon after the royalist party had arrived by a shorter road, without being aware that their pursuers were at hand. They had scarcely time to saddle and fly from the place when the patriots entered. In the course of a further pursuit, of three leagues, all were taken prisoners or dispersed. Of above six hundred royalists who composed the two detachments sent from Arequipa and Puno, perhaps not above twenty rejoined the Spanish army. About four hundred men, composing the garrison of Arica, had also been annihilated or taken prisoners, so that in less than a fortnight, after the few patriots landed, they had killed, made prisoners or put hors de combat upwards of a thousand of the royalist army. This success was the result of long, difficult and forced marches, which the patriots underwent with a cheerfulness and patience worthy the highest admiration. Hunger and thirst in the desert and in the mountain wilds were borne with uncomplaining resignation; but irresistible sleep often overpowered the soldier, who fell as if in a trance from his mule as he rode along and was sometimes left to follow as he could.

During the march of the patriots, whenever they fell in with Indians they immediately engaged them to scour the country and bring in the straggling royalists, who, for the most part having thrown away their arms, quietly submitted. To encourage the Indians in this service, money was given to them and now and then a jaded mule, which they were permitted to retain on their delivering a Spanish prisoner at Moquegua.

The Indians were assured that neither tribute nor sacrifices were required of them, that the patriots, their brethren in arms, came to liberate them from tyranny and oppression. Such assurances and conduct towards them produced an extraordinary and enthusiastic feeling of patriotism in these long outraged and oppressed aborigines. Lieutenant-Colonel Miller organised a guerrilla party and, having waited for a moonlight night that he might cross the desert with greater facility, he retired from Calera, leaving there an officer and six regulars. This place being situated near the regions of perpetual snow, his men had begun to suffer greatly from cold and difficulty of respiration.

After a most fatiguing march, he reached Torata, an agreeable Indian village prettily situated at the foot of high mountains, over which the road to Calera winds. On the next day, the 29th, the patriot party, worn out with fatigue, re-entered Moquegua, hailed by the enthusiastic greetings of the inhabitants.

Moquegua is surrounded by high hills. Ague is very prevalent. The position was objectionable as a defensive one and Miller, considering his force too weak to attack General Ramírez, who held Arequipa with seven hundred and fifty-four royalists, fell back on the 4th of June with the cavalry to Santo Domingo, two leagues from Moquegua. The infantry were ordered to La Rinconada, five leagues in the rear.

On the same day it was ascertained that La Hera was advancing from Santiago de Machaca, with new reinforcements, towards Tacna to cut off the retreat of the patriots. The patriot sick were sent to Ilo. The inhabitants of Moquegua became a little alarmed at these preparations to retreat, but were reassured by seeing a guerrilla party and a few regulars dispatched to approach as near to Arequipa as the commanding officer, Lieutenant La Tapia, judged it prudent.

On the 7th of June the patriot infantry marched from La Rinconada. On the 8th Lieutenant-Colonel Miller overtook them at Sitana, a place consisting of half a dozen huts, two leagues west of Locumba. On the 9th the cavalry arrived from

Santo Domingo and the whole division bivouacked on a commodious estate near Sitana.

On the 10th Lieutenant-Colonel Miller set out for Ilo. After a tiresome ride of fourteen leagues over hills of sand, he reached the town, which, like many others on the sea coast, is mud-built and miserable. Miller went on board three small brigs which Lord Cochrane had sent to Ilo to remain there as a resource in case of emergency. He then visited about thirty sick men and, having left some orders with the alcalde, he set out on his return to Sitana on the 11th, whence his division had been ordered to march and which he came up with at Sama the same evening.

His guide on this journey was a captain of militia who had been brought up by a missionary. He spoke several Indian dialects with fluency and was master of some curious acquirements: one of the most useful was that of imitating the different voices of animals. He was often employed to go into the woods and enclosures of the valleys, where he would neigh like a mare, when, if any horses were hidden there by the royalists, they would neigh in answer and soon became patriot property.

On the 12th Lieutenant-Colonel Miller rode to Tacna, eight leagues, where he received intercepted correspondence (announcing the armistice of Punchauca) from General Ramírez to Colonel La Hera, who was supposed by Ramírez to have advanced to the coast; but having approached within four leagues of Tacna with eight hundred men, La Hera returned to Santiago de Machaca, believing the patriot force to be superior to his own.

On the 14th of June Miller concentrated his small force at Tacna, excepting the small party in advance of Moquegua. He sent an officer and a party of guerrillas to summon the governor of Tarapacá.

Hostilities ceased in consequence of the intelligence of the armistice of Punchauca. Lord Cochrane sailed from Ilo for Chorrillos and Ancón on the 2nd of July to have an interview with General San Martín. Miller had, at this time,

pushed his advanced posts to within fourteen leagues of Arequipa, to within twelve leagues of Santiago de Machaca and to within a few miles of Iquique: so that the patriots held possession of the principal points of one hundred leagues of country from north to south and thirty leagues from east to west.

He had augmented his force as far as the supply of arms taken from the enemy would allow. It consisted of nearly nine hundred rank and file, well clothed and equipped. Besides this, several montonero parties had been formed and spread over the country. A communication had been opened with Colonel Lanza, a celebrated guerrilla chief in Upper Peru.

In the course of these operations the spirit of patriotism had been awakened and it spread with enthusiastic rapidity. Even such of the inhabitants as were Spaniards, or attached to the Spanish cause, behaved in a manner the most friendly. Such was the orderly conduct of the patriot soldiers that they acquired universal esteem; and such was their intrepidity and good fortune in the field that the royalists, with double numbers, ceased to act upon the offensive.

The communications from the Spanish commanders to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller contained expressions of personal esteem not common between opposing chiefs in that country. Colonel La Hera, who was beaten at Mirave, always spoke of his successful opponent in terms of respect and regard.

Amongst other interesting incidents which occurred at this time, we select the following.

Miller, upon his first landing, learned that many Negroes and mulattoes formerly belonging to the Buenos Airean army, and who had been made prisoners at Sipe-Sipe and other battles in Upper Peru, still existed in a state of slavery on the plantations in the Intermedios. It seems that these unfortunate soldiers had been sold by order of the Spanish general. Miller immediately ordered them to be released and about thirty of them, all that could be found, were restored to freedom. Amongst these were two young men of colour who had risen in the patriot service to the rank of commissioned officers in consequence of their good

conduct and bravery. But, having been confined for eight years in slave huts, worked like beasts of burden and associating only with outdoor slaves, their minds had sunk under the debasing servitude and they gave themselves up to drunkenness and all the vices inseparable from a state of slavery. They were found to be so utterly irreclaimable that they could not be employed again. Thus were two brave and naturally well-disposed men lost to the service, to society and to themselves.

Amongst the Spanish prisoners taken at Moquegua was Captain Suárez, who was severely wounded. The royalist chiefs at Arequipa requested that their wounded friend might be permitted to go there for surgical treatment, engaging, at the same time, that he should return as a prisoner when cured of his wounds. Lieutenant-Colonel Miller released the Spaniard *unconditionally* and supplied him with the means of going to his friends. This trifling occurrence produced a remarkable effect amongst the royalists, for when Miller sent a flag of truce, some time afterwards, into Arequipa, the Spanish officers, discovering that the bearer was commissioned to make some little purchases, kindly undertook to procure the articles and such as were not to be bought in Arequipa they sent for expressly to Lima; but, unluckily, before they were received, Miller had left the coast. With Old Castilian delicacy the wounded officer did not again take arms upon his recovery, but accepted a civil employment in the custom house.

When Lord Cochrane approached Arica in May, his views were far more comprehensive than merely to cause a diversion in favour of San Martín. His Lordship had previously importuned the Chileno government to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Miller with a thousand or at least five hundred men and to furnish a thousand stand of spare arms from the ample stores of Santiago. No part of the requisition was ever attended to and Miller, thus unsupported, was unable to avail himself of excellent opportunities, arising out of the goodwill of the natives, to recruit. It may easily be imagined with what feelings of disappointment he relinquished the advantages already obtained and at a time, too, when the

fairest prospect appeared, not only of being able to maintain his ground, but also of taking possession of Arequipa, whose inhabitants were warmly disposed in his favour. He might have augmented and organised his forces in that rich and populous city and have marched towards Cuzco, and thereby placed the royalist army under the Viceroy at Huancayo and Jauja in an embarrassing situation. That this is not an extravagant assumption will probably be granted, if it be remembered that Miller enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the inhabitants of the Puertos Intermedios, that they unanimously pressed forward and made unsolicited sacrifices to assist him, and that the soldiery entertained an idea that he could not be beaten.

During this time General Ramírez had drawn from distant garrisons nearly two thousand men to act against Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, who could now only master four hundred effective men, about the same number being placed hors de combat by ague.

Previous to the expiration of the armistice, Colonel La Hera advanced from Santiago de Machaca with one thousand royalists and took possession of Moquegua on the 10th of July. This breach of faith he alleged to be in retaliation for Lord Cochrane's having taken, from the port of Ilo, a quantity of wheat, Spanish property, during the suspension of hostilities; and upon the unfounded pretext of not having a sufficiency of provisions for the support of his soldiers at Santiago de Machaca, the position he occupied.

On the 15th of July Colonel La Hera announced officially the recommencement of hostilities. Colonel Miller drew in his scattered detachments. His sick and stores were sent to Arica. The three miserable craft left at Ilo were also ordered to proceed to the same place. They made the attempt but, being unable to beat to windward, ran down to leeward and were seen no more at the Puertos Intermedios.

On the evening of the 19th Miller sent off his infantry from Tacna towards Arica. Ten of the patriots could not be removed from the hospital. When he went

to take leave of them and to supply them with a few dollars, the poor fellows wept bitterly and assured their commander they would die faithful to the cause.

At two a.m. on the 20th Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, with the cavalry, followed the infantry. Three hours afterwards the royalists entered Tacna. The inhabitants felt deeply the departure of the patriots. They continued their kind offices to the last and every soldier was shaken by the hand at least twenty times as they filed out of the town on the Arica road.

The tradesmen who had been employed by the patriots shouted their vivas and proceeded to hide themselves in the valley, in order not to be embargoed to work for the royalists. The expectation was that Miller would fight; and he kept up this necessary illusion so completely that the officer next to him in command was not aware of the real intention to embark.

The patriot division, after a harassing march of eleven leagues in thirteen hours over a hot desert of sand, arrived at Chacalluta and bivouacked on the bank of a rivulet.

Colonel La Hera, fully persuaded that Lieutenant-Colonel Miller intended to make a resolute stand, halted for twenty-four hours at Tacna to refresh his men. This delay gave time to the patriots to secure the means of retreat by sea. Arrangements had been secretly made for a retreat to the Sierra in case an embarkation could not be accomplished. The hopes entertained by the patriots of a retreat by sea were founded upon the casual presence of four merchant vessels in the roadstead of Arica, which they calculated upon getting possession of either by persuasion or force.

The manner in which transports were obtained will show how the course of events may sometimes be changed by a trifling incident. Previous to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller's arrival, the governor of Arica had, with very good intentions, sent two or three soldiers aboard a very fine North American schooner, of three hundred tons, to secure her. The master, disliking the embargo, got ready to slip his cable and put out to sea, intending to land the soldiers when and where

it suited his convenience. Being informed of the circumstance upon entering Arica, Miller instantly went on board unaccompanied. He offered the most liberal terms, which were pertinaciously rejected. This refusal rendered the services of the other three vessels unavailable, as they could not have taken off the whole of the troops. During an animated conversation, Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, as he paced the quarterdeck, recognised some men amongst the ship's company who had formerly served with him in the Chileno squadron and who were evidently attending with deep concern to what was passing. It happened that the seamen in the Pacific, whether British or North American, whether serving in men-of-war or in merchant vessels, had always evinced the liveliest interest in the successes of the English leader. It was a feeling which produced an important effect at the present critical juncture. He turned round to them and made a short address, which proved sufficient. They all answered his appeal by an animated declaration that 'a countryman hard pushed should not be forsaken'. After some unavailing remonstrances on the part of the master, he indignantly threw up the command and went on shore. The chief mate prepared to follow, but was prevailed upon to take charge of the vessel. Thus were the patriots fortunately relieved from the necessity of contending with the most fearful odds.

When the patriots landed at Arica in May, the inhabitants were decided royalists. The pillage of the town by the sailors of the squadron augmented the political feeling into a deadly hatred. Amongst the most violent was the young and beautiful wife of the late royalist governor, Colonel Gago. Her house had been stripped, even her pianoforte was taken on board and she herself left without a change of apparel. She was subsequently often heard to say that she should only die happy if she could soak her handkerchief in the blood of an insurgent. However, the general good conduct of the officers and men of the division of the patriot army produced in time a complete revolution of opinion. Notwithstanding the unfavourable circumstances under which they re-entered Arica, the inhabitants came forward with the greatest goodwill and assisted in the

embarkation. They sent a thousand loaves of bread and a proportionate quantity of fresh meat for the use of the sick. Some of the most steadfast adherents to the King sent refreshments of coffee, chocolate, etc. to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller during the night, whilst, knee-deep in surf, he superintended the difficult embarkation. Only three or four men could be conveyed at a time upon each raft to the launches, which could not with safety approach nearer to the beach than twenty or thirty fathoms. At five p.m. on the 21st, the royalists were reported to have arrived within four leagues.

The shipment of the troops was retarded and rendered more difficult by a hundred emigrants with their baggage. The latter, as well as all those who had recently adopted the patriot cause, were particularly anxious to be the first on board. The operation became more complicated by the necessity of sending wood, water and provisions on board at the same time. Fifty bullocks were killed, skinned, cut up on the beach and shipped before morning. This was another night of very hard work; but, with the valuable assistance of Mr. William Cochran, an eminent English merchant, and the cordial cooperation of the inhabitants, every difficulty was overcome and the last launch pushed off only a few minutes before the royalists appeared and formed upon the beach. [...]

Several months before the resignation of the Protector, secret arrangements had been made for the sailing of fifteen hundred men, under the orders of Colonel Miller, to the Puertos Intermedios. The plan proposed was to land at Iquique and from thence to march suddenly and rapidly upon General Olañeta, whose division of three or four thousand men was so scattered in the department of Potosí that it was supposed Colonel Miller would be able to defeat it in detail, especially as it was known that the natives would willingly cooperate with the patriot commander, who was to take an ample supply of spare arms to facilitate the raising of new corps. In the event of success Upper Peru would have been occupied. In the case of Miller being hard pressed, a retreat to the coast was out of the question; but his division was to cut its way to Salta, which would have

been no difficult matter and where he would have found ample resources in the patriotic assistance of the gauchos. When the proposed time of embarkation approached, the plan was communicated by the Protector to the General-in-Chief, Alvarado, who considered the expedition of so much importance that he offered to proceed himself with four thousand men. The Protector acceded to Alvarado's suggestion, but many months elapsed before the increased number could be got ready, so slowly were the preparations conducted. In the meanwhile the deposition of the active Monteagudo took place and the Protector retired from public life. The Governing Council which succeeded, agreeing in the propriety of removing the seat of war to the south, kept on the transports which San Martín had already engaged and victualled and continued the preparations for the projected expedition.² On the 25th of September 1822 the whole of the Peruvian corps at Lima took the oath of fidelity and obedience to Congress. They formed on the road to Callao and a feu de joie was fired on the occasion. The appearance of the men and officers was excellent; all were well clothed and equipped. The infantry of the Legion under Colonel Miller was the only Peruvian corps destined to embark in the expedition to Puertos Intermedios and it marched from the reviewing ground to Callao for that purpose.³ One hundred and fifty men, with Lieutenant-Colonel Videla and a few officers, were left in Lima to form the second battalion.

The Governing Council, finding much difficulty in procuring the necessary funds to send off the expedition and to supply the military chest as required by General Alvarado, ordered a forced contribution of four hundred thousand dollars upon the commerce of Lima, nearly one half of which was attempted to be levied upon the British merchants, who refused to contribute on the plea that foreigners residing in the different independent states of South

² The Governing Council was the executive body that Proctor calls the Supreme Junta.

³ After the declaration of Peru's independence, San Martín set out to create a national army, called the Peruvian Legion. Miller was charged with the task of training it.

America had hitherto been exempted from similar exactions. They set forth, at the same time, the arbitrary manner in which the loan had been apportioned: many English merchants were required to contribute very large sums, while natives, known to be extremely wealthy, were put down for very trifling amounts. The government, however, insisted upon compliance and severe measures were taken to enforce it. The English residents addressed themselves to Captain Prescott of HMS *Aurora*, then commanding the British naval forces in the Pacific. They complained of the hardship and injustice of the case and expressed their determination to leave the country rather than submit to such an imposition. This officer accordingly entered into correspondence with the Minister of Marine, who notified to Captain Prescott the acquiescence of the government to the proposed departure of his countrymen; but he was subsequently addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in explanation, as he stated, of the former communication, and Captain Prescott was then given to understand that the English merchants would receive no passports until their just debts should be paid, in which it was pretended to include their proportion of the contribution. The injustice of this proceeding was combated by Captain Prescott, who, finding that redress was not to be obtained by a farther correspondence, got the *Aurora* under weigh on the 9th of October 1822 and, taking his station off the port, prevented the ingress of any British vessel. The executive, much perplexed by this decided step but unwilling to undergo the mortification of rescinding their former order, referred the correspondence with Captain Prescott to the Congress, which, anxious to prevent any misunderstanding with the British naval commander, issued a decree on the 10th, authorising the executive to withdraw the claim. On the 11th the *Aurora* returned into port and all hostile feelings subsided.

The English merchants then agreed to supply the government with a small loan, bearing no interest, to be repaid by specified instalments. They also voted fifteen hundred dollars for the purchase of a piece of plate, to be presented to Captain Prescott in testimony of his valuable services during the critical period he

was the senior British naval officer on the station. The firmness, temper and perfect knowledge of international rights which Captain Prescott displayed, whenever he was obliged to interfere in questions of delicacy and difficulty, acquired for him the respect and deference of contending Spaniards and Peruvians, as well as the grateful esteem of his own countrymen. The very high state of discipline and fine condition of the *Aurora*, the good conduct of the ship's company and the harmony which prevailed amongst them reflected equal credit upon the commander and upon his officers. The Governing Council now directed their sole attention to the sailing of the long talked of expedition to the Puertos Intermedios. After much further delay, and some altercation between the General and the executive, the troops embarked on board the transports in the bay of Callao. [...] The first battalion of the Legion, the battalions Nos. 5 and 11, with three hundred and fifty Mounted Grenadiers and a company of No. 4, in all about two thousand men under the command of Colonel Miller, sailed on the 10th of October from Callao in the transports *O'Higgins*, *Independencia*, *Perla*, *Mackenna*, *Olive Branch*, *Dardo* and *Nancy*. The rest of the expedition, with the General-in-Chief and staff, followed a few days afterwards, together with the frigate *O'Higgins*, Admiral Blanco. The first place of rendezvous was to be off Iquique and the second thirty miles SW of Arica.

About four thousand troops, including twelve hundred Colombians, remained in the department of Lima, under the orders of General Arenales, who was to advance upon Jauja and threaten the royalists in that valley, so as to prevent them from detaching troops to the southward against Alvarado, who, it was thought, would have no difficulty in taking possession of the important provinces of Upper Peru.

The royalists had at this time about five thousand troops in the valley of Jauja, under General Canterac; about three thousand with Valdés, on or near the coast of the Puertos Intermedios; and three thousand or thereabouts with Olañeta,

in the vicinity of Potosí; besides a few detachments and skeletons of battalions in Cuzco, La Paz and other garrisons.

The plan of operations of the Independents for the ensuing campaign was considered good. The royalist divisions were very distant from each other and so separated in one of the most mountainous countries in the world that it appeared to be an easy matter to attack them separately. The hopes of the patriots brightened and everything seemed to promise a speedy termination of the struggle in Peru. The royalists became alarmed by the threatening aspect of affairs. The Viceroy La Serna wrote from Cuzco to the Minister of War in Spain that unless he were speedily succoured by reinforcements of troops from the Peninsula, it would be impossible to continue much longer the unequal contest; for whilst his troops were harassed by being obliged to march almost incredible distances, the patriots, possessing the dominion of the Pacific, could easily transport their armies from one point to another, either to attack in detail his forces, necessarily scattered over a vast extent of territory, or to retire opportunely whenever they found themselves too much pressed. His Excellency complained bitterly of the neglect which his repeated applications for succour had hitherto met with at the Court of Madrid and concluded by stating that his health had suffered so severely under such trying and harassing circumstances that he found himself unable to fulfil the arduous duties of viceroy and therefore tendered his resignation for a second time, begging that His Majesty would be pleased to name his successor.

But notwithstanding it was evident that the royalist generals were often divided in council and that much enmity existed amongst some of them, they all made every exertion to overcome the disadvantages of their position. Generals Canterac and Loriga were indefatigable in the north. Valdés, on the coast of the Intermedios, was the soul of the Spanish army: his activity, self-denial of every comfort and the exemplary manner in which he shared the fatigues and privations of his soldiers, combined with his uncompromising severity towards all delinquents, produced the most beneficial effects amongst his followers and

obtained for him the respect and admiration of even those opposed to him. Olañeta spared no means in Potosí to augment his forces. He was a general of the old school and had been the companion of Pezuela; he was consequently unfriendly to La Serna, Canterac, Valdés and other chiefs who had served in the Peninsular War. The mass of the population, however, was decidedly against the royalists, so that, in spite of their efforts, the aspect of affairs seemed to indicate their speedy downfall.

In the meantime the Governing Council had issued orders to enforce levies of recruits in the department of Trujillo and the northern provinces to augment the division of Arenales; but such was the apathy pervading every department of the government that the casualties caused by sickness and desertion were scarcely filled up.

Eight-and-forty hours after the first division of patriots had sailed from Callao under Colonel Miller, one of the largest transports, the *Independencia*, having four hundred of his own battalion on board, sprang a leak and was soon reported to have six feet of water in the hold. Boats were dispatched from the other transports and in less than six hours, notwithstanding a rough sea, the men were removed from the leaky ship. One hundred of them were received by Colonel Miller on board his own vessel, the *O'Higgins*, of three hundred and forty tons, which increased the number embarked in that transport to four hundred and ten. The rest were sent back to Callao in two small transports, accompanied by the *Independencia*. The convoy then proceeded on its voyage.

On the night of the 30th, when sailing on a wind at the rate of five knots, with a stiff breeze, the *Mackenna*, of four hundred tons, through the neglect of the mate of the watch, ran athwart the *O'Higgins*. The concussion was severe. The mainmast of the latter ship was carried away close by the board. The *Mackenna* lost her jib boom and both vessels were otherwise materially injured in the rigging. They got clear of each other more by good fortune than skill, as the decks were crowded with soldiers and all was, of course, uproar and confusion. When

daylight appeared, the *O'Higgins* looked like a floating wreck, but fortunately the weather was moderate and in the course of two days a jury mast was rigged. The damages of the *Mackenna* were also repaired and the convoy again continued its course.

The crews of the transports were a medley of English, North Americans, French, Dutch and Creoles. Many of the masters were natives, who could with difficulty make themselves understood by the majority of their crew. The vessels had been well provisioned and watered for fifty days and it was supposed that the voyage would hardly last half that time.

The men behaved exceedingly well on the passage and an air of contentment pervaded the performance of all their duties. They were devotedly attached to their officers, extremely subordinate, cleanly in their persons and berths, and sensibly alive to the smallest act of kindness or attention. Three-fourths of the Legion were aborigines and many of them could not speak any language but their own, Quechua, when they joined the corps; but they soon learned the words of command in Spanish and their duty as soldiers, all of which was taught agreeably to the Spanish regulations. They are generally of rather low stature, robust and beardless, with a bright brown complexion. The rest of the men were mulattoes, some blacks and a few white Creoles, who were generally non-commissioned officers. The band was excellent and consisted of twenty-two; twelve of them played by note. The salary of the master of the band was fifty-four dollars per month. The music beguiled many a tedious hour and in the evenings and the moonlight nights the Indians would chant their plaintive melodies, while the loquacious mulattoes related stories or, with the whites, sang the favorite airs of Lima, for which dissipated city the natives cherish an enthusiastic attachment. The officers on the quarterdeck sang patriotic and national songs, most of them having good voices and great taste for music. That stern distance and reserve maintained, perhaps usefully, towards the men in some European armies did not exist amongst the patriots. They would often converse with their officers and

speak of their native villages and the pleasures they had left behind; yet on this account no undue freedom was ever taken. On the contrary, the condescending familiarity of the officers heightened the affection of the soldiers without decreasing their respect. These ties of regard between officers and men are often found to be in time of peril more strong and effective than the deference produced by cold severity, which, if once allowed to relax, is not replaced by any equivalent result from mere respect and obedience.

Light and contrary winds prevailed, the transports were dull sailers and there was every appearance of a protracted voyage. The allowance of water was decreased to three pints a day per man. Thoughts of deep anxiety began to intrude. There was no skilful navigator or practical naval officer in the convoy to give advice. On the 23rd of November the transports were ordered to make the best of their way to the first rendezvous. The commanding officers of the troops in two of the transports came on board the headquarter ship to beg some water, but the number of men in the *O'Higgins* having been augmented, not a drop of that invaluable liquid could be spared.

On the last day of November the *O'Higgins* and two of the smaller transports which were still in company were two hundred miles from their destination. The allowance of water was further reduced to a quart per day. Colonel Miller superintended the serving it out himself. He had fortunately taken this precaution from the commencement of the voyage to prevent waste. The soldiers continued to display the greatest good conduct under the torment of thirst. When the bung of the cask was taken out, it was eagerly caught at and the man who could get hold of the rag round it considered the moisture he extracted from it as no unimportant addition to his scanty allowance. Upon drinking it at the gangway, the poor fellows sometimes lifted up their clasped hands and exclaimed with fervency, 'Thank God!' Such was their desperate situation, when a breeze sprang up which infused hope and consolation. All thoughts of attempting to reach the first, but the most distant, rendezvous at Iquique were abandoned and

the vessels were steered towards Arica, which enabled them to sail with the wind two points free. On the 2nd of December land was happily discovered and on the 3rd vessels were seen in the port of Arica, where the *O'Higgins* anchored at noon on the same day, having less than two casks of water remaining. Of four hundred and ten men, not one had died during the passage and there were only seventeen on the sick list. The feelings and rejoicings of all can be more easily conceived than described, on finding themselves again on shore in the midst of their former comrades.

Part of the expedition had landed at Arica on the 27th of November and the remainder arrived in succession, with the exception of one hundred and fifty men landed at Iquique and sent to Tarapacá to operate in the adjoining provinces and to observe the movements of Olañeta in Upper Peru.

The patriots landed at Arica formed about three thousand five hundred effective men, but as they remained inactive, the royalists had ample time to withdraw all supplies from Tacna and the adjoining country, except such as were concealed by the patriotic natives. Four or five patriot soldiers were made prisoners within a mile of Arica by a party of the royalists, which had the temerity to advance to almost within pistol shot of the whole Independent army; they retired unmolested. Colonel Pinto commanded at Arica until General Alvarado arrived there from Iquique.

On the 9th of December the Legion, the regiment of Río de la Plata and the Mounted Grenadiers advanced three leagues in front to the valley of Lluta, a position in every point of view preferable to Arica. From Lluta to Tacna the distance is eleven leagues over a sandy desert. On the 14th, a report having reached the patriot general that Valdés was in the vicinity of Sama and about to advance, the patriot forces were concentrated at Chacalluta, which is at the mouth of the valley of Lluta next to the sea. Although no enemy appeared, General Alvarado thought it prudent to withdraw his troops to Azapa, a wide and open valley a league east of Arica. From these cautious measures, if indeed they could

be termed merely cautious, the royalists began to acquire confidence and to cherish a hope of being enabled to resist the timid liberators. Some of the directing men of the latter entertained, it would appear, the most awful respect for Valdés, who was at first believed to have at least four thousand men with him, whereas he had only the battalions Gerona, Centro, five squadrons of cavalry, four field-pieces and a company of sappers, being one thousand seven hundred and sixty-five infantry and seven hundred and fifty-seven cavalry, making a total of two thousand five hundred and twenty-two men. These troops occupied en échelon the valleys of Moquegua, Locumba and Sama, having an advanced piquet at Tacna. But what mainly contributed to embolden the royalists was the knowledge that Canterac was on the march from Huancayo to succour Valdés with one battalion of Cantabria and one of Infante, each eight hundred strong, and eight hundred cavalry; and that Carratalá with the battalion Partidarios, eight hundred and seventy-one strong, and Burgos, five hundred and forty-eight, was also in the vicinity of Puno and marching to the same point. Thus by further procrastination Alvarado would have to contend with the united divisions of these three generals, amounting to four thousand eight hundred and seventy-four infantry and one thousand five hundred and fifty-seven cavalry; but even yet there was a good opportunity of attacking Valdés or Olañeta in isolated positions.

On the arrival of the Independent troops upon the coast, the natives came forward with their mules, having with difficulty and risk escaped through the country held by the royalists. But their enthusiasm cooled upon perceiving the extraordinary inactivity of the patriots, many of whom now fell sick from the effects of the unhealthy climate of Arica and Azapa. Murmurs also began to break out amongst the chiefs.

During this state of unfortunate listlessness, the discipline of the army was most woefully deteriorating. Acts of extortion were practised upon the country people, whose commodities which they brought to market were frequently taken from them without payment.

The patriot troops had already remained inactive three weeks and the General-in-Chief was still undecided as to his future movements. He consulted many of the chiefs, but followed the opinion of none. Colonel Miller was called to hold a conference with him and in order that it might be undisturbed, it took place at midnight in the General's apartments. He requested the opinion of Colonel Miller as to the best plan of operations. The latter had up to this time carefully abstained from making known his sentiments, but now that his advice was formally asked, he unhesitatingly gave it. He stated his opinion to be that the enemy's divisions being so widely scattered and the situation of the patriots so favourable in every point of view that any plan the General chose to adopt would ensure success, provided it was an offensive one, either in the direction of Arequipa, La Paz or Potosí; that no more time ought to be lost and that, having once determined upon a plan, nothing should divert him from his purpose. The General acquiesced but, unfortunately, he appeared to be too sensitively alive to every species of responsibility, excepting the greatest of all, which was inaction on an unhealthy coast.

Valdés, with less than three thousand men, was in front of Alvarado, whilst Canterac and Olañeta were separated from him on either side, each at the distance of upwards of one hundred and fifty leagues. The course which should have been adopted was most obvious. Even to secure supplies it was evidently necessary to advance.

The General-in-Chief, vexed at the importunities of Colonel Miller and of other commanding officers of corps to advance, which importunities were perhaps improperly urged, told the former that if he were not satisfied he might return to Lima. Miller took him at his word and re-embarked, but before he could obtain his passport the General sent repeated messages to request him to come on shore. An interview again took place and it was finally agreed that Colonel Miller should be employed on a detached service.

General Alvarado is an amiable, well-informed gentleman and of highly

polished and prepossessing address. From the commencement of the revolution he has always been employed, but although animated with the purest patriotism, this really worthy man has been singularly unfortunate as a soldier.

Colonel Miller embarked on the evening of the 21st with the light company of his battalion and sailed to the northward, with orders to disembark on the coast of Camaná and to divert the attention of Canterac and Carratalá or, at all events, to draw off a division of their forces. The natives were patriots. Much was expected from them, especially as Miller's name, owing to his previous operations on the coast, was well known to them.

At length, on the 23rd, the regiment of Río de la Plata and that of the Mounted Grenadiers marched, under the orders of Colonel Correa, to Tacna, where he arrived on the following day.

The active Valdés was in the valley of Sama with four hundred cavalry, four hundred infantry mounted on mules and two field-pieces. His men were devoted to him and he knew he could rely upon their valour under any circumstance. His object was to watch for a favourable opportunity to make a coup de main. He was positively assured that the patriots in Tacna did not exceed one thousand men. With his flying division he therefore set out from Sama at four p.m. on the 31st, in order that night to surprise the Independents in Tacna. The royalists lost their way for upwards of five hours in the desert and, having wandered about and marched nearly double the necessary distance, did not arrive in sight of Tacna until broad daylight on the 1st of January 1823. Instead of finding the town occupied by one thousand patriots, as he anticipated, Valdés saw not only the brigade of Correa drawn up to receive him, but also the battalion of the Legion and of No. 11 advancing within a league of the town on the Arica side. With the patriot reinforcement came General Don Enrique Martínez, who had followed the expedition from Trujillo and who, on joining Correa's brigade, took the command. The situation of Valdés was most critical. His men and horses were too much fatigued to recross the desert, he was too weak to

venture upon an attack and he could not remain on the burning sand. He therefore adopted the only alternative left him, of obliquing to his left, and posted himself in Calana, a hamlet two leagues east of Tacna and in the valley. At ten a.m. General Martínez with his troops marched up the valley towards Calana. Valdés at first did not show any disposition to retreat and some skirmishing took place. Martinez detached a battalion and some cavalry to the heights, on the right of the enemy. Upon perceiving this movement, Valdés retired two leagues higher up the valley, to Pachía, almost unmolested by the pursuing patriots. It appears that Martínez made so sure of capturing Valdés that he did not think it necessary to make a serious attack upon the exhausted enemies, who halted eight hours to recover from their fatigues and then continued their march to Tarata, fourteen leagues from Tacna. The General-in-Chief Alvarado had not, up to this time, moved from Arica. Valdés, who afterwards acknowledged that he considered all was lost, stated that his casualties amounted to only thirteen killed, wounded and missing.

General Alvarado at last united his forces in Tacna and, placing himself at their head, advanced on the road leading to Arequipa and on the evening of the 13th of January reached the valley of Locumba. Colonel Ameller, commanding the advance of the royalists near Moquegua, having reason to suppose that Locumba was occupied by merely two or three hundred patriots, advanced with four hundred royalists in the hope of taking them by surprise. In order to effect this the more completely, he crossed the valley and placed himself on the Tacna side of Locumba. At daybreak on the 14th, to his great surprise, Ameller found himself within cannon shot, not of two or three hundred men only, as he expected, but of the whole of Alvarado's army. He immediately made the best of his way to the heights of Candarave. A battalion of infantry and a squadron of cavalry were sent in pursuit by Alvarado, but did no serious mischief, for Ameller made good his retreat by a circuitous route to Moquegua. He behaved with the utmost firmness and sangfroid and his escape was equally honourable to his talents and to his

courage. It is singular that he should have made a false and rash movement upon Locumba, precisely similar to that of Valdés upon Tacna. Both originated from want of correct information and nothing can more clearly prove the incorruptible patriotism of the inhabitants of these districts. It is not less singular that both should have been so strangely permitted to escape, for although they might be called, with great justice, the two best and most enterprising officers in the royalist service, the odds were so much against them that nothing but the inertness and irresolution of Martínez and Alvarado could have saved them.

The army under Alvarado arrived in the vicinity of Moquegua on the 18th and halted almost within range of the division of Valdés, now reunited and which bivouacked on some adjoining heights. On the morning of the 19th the patriots advanced. Valdés fell back, disputing every inch of rising ground, to the heights of Torata. There he was joined at half past three p.m. by General Canterac, who had that moment arrived, having made forced marches from Puno. Canterac was accompanied only by a small detachment of cavalry, the rest of his division being a few miles in the rear.

Valdés had chosen his position with so much judgment that every attempt made by Alvarado to dislodge him from the heights proved unavailing. Valdés, or rather Canterac, part of whose division had now arrived, became in turn the assailant. The action was sharp. The regiment of Río de la Plata showed a great want of discipline; No. 4 of Chile and the Legion behaved well. The conduct of the latter, which Colonel Miller had left under the command of the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel de la Rosa, drew forth praise from the enemy in their official report. But the patriots were worsted and Alvarado fell back upon Moquegua (five leagues) in the course of the night. He halted there in a state of great indecision until the 21st, when the battalions Cantabria and Burgos, the cavalry and artillery of Canterac, joined to the divisions of Valdés and advanced to Moquegua, where they found Alvarado strongly posted. A second action ensued. The patriots had the advantage of position and were not perhaps inferior in numbers to the

royalists; but unhappily dissensions had broken out amongst the chiefs, the soldiers had become dispirited and insubordination prevailed in every grade. A total defeat was the consequence. The royalist official accounts state their own losses in the affairs of Torata and Moquegua at one hundred and fifty killed and two hundred and fifty wounded, which statement is considered underrated. General Valdés was wounded and had two horses shot under him. He, as well as the brave Ameller, was continually seen in the front. Alvarado, Martínez, Correa and Pinto fled to Ilo and embarked with something short of one thousand fugitives. Alvarado could only prevail upon about three hundred of these men to accompany him to Iquique (sixty leagues south of Arica), where the skeleton battalion No. 2 had been left and whither some dispersed soldiers had directed their course. Upon arriving at Iquique, Alvarado discovered that the battalion had been compelled to embark on the 13th of February by the troops under General Olañeta, who had marched from Potosí to the coast. Alvarado sent the greater part of his men on shore in the supposition that Olañeta had retired from Iquique, but who, it turned out, had concealed his men in the village. Upon the patriots arriving, they rushed from their ambushade and killed or made prisoners the entire party. Alvarado, unsuccessful at all points, made sail for Lima.

Colonel Miller, on learning the fate of his Legion, wrote the following letter to the author of these memoirs:

‘My first battalion, which cost me so much pains to form, and which occupied all my thoughts for a year, was cut to pieces at the affair of Torata. But it fought nobly, is spoken of by the rest of the army in terms of admiration of its conduct and of sorrow for its loss, for all agreed that the corps had acquired fame in the midst of misfortune. The firmness with which two cavalry charges were repulsed, after the rest of our army had given way, and the accuracy and sangfroid with which the battalion manoeuvred under a heavy fire, drew forth expressions of applause from Canterac; and yet my brave fellows were almost all recruits: but there was so much esprit de corps, and such a bond of

union between officers and men, that I always anticipated they would do something brilliant whenever they met the enemy. The high-souled ambition of its youthful commandant, Don Pedro de la Rosa, did not a little tend to raise my expectations. He and Captains Tarramona (who acted as major) and Escobar and six subalterns were killed. They were all from seventeen to twenty-four years of age, my very best officers, and would have done honour to any European service. Besides these, two captains and seven subalterns were taken prisoners, all excepting three severely wounded. Only one hundred and thirty rank and file escaped, exclusive of the light company detached with me.

‘I mourn with a feeling beyond the power of expression for the loss of so many fine, brave and promising young men who have fallen during this short campaign. My first visits of condolence to the families of my departed friends have been indescribably distressing.’ [...]

General Miller, upon his arrival at Huaraz, had the satisfaction of seeing General Bolívar for the first time, and on the following day he was named Commander General of the Peruvian cavalry.

The beautiful, extensive and thickly peopled valley of Huaraz had become the scene of active preparations for the ensuing campaign, which was expected to commence, by the march of the army, in about six weeks.

In the meanwhile Miller was ordered to cross the Andes and on the 13th of June 1824 he set out to take the command of fifteen hundred montoneros occupying the country round Pasco.

The montoneros in Peru, like the guerrillas in the Peninsular War, were of incalculable service as an auxiliary force. They were principally composed of men of some respectability, whose habitations had been razed by the unrelenting vindictiveness of the royal party, which had often turned into wildernesses spots where towns and villages formerly stood. Every montonero had to avenge parents, children, relatives or neighbours who had been butchered by the Spaniards. To the above class of once substantial yeomen were added many idle and profligate

characters, which are always to be met with in turbulent times. The montoneros were cruel and unrelenting towards their foes, but although they served without pay, they generally conducted themselves well towards the unoffending inhabitants; from this praise must be excepted those parties which were formed principally from the dregs of the populace of Lima. But even the latter frequently behaved with more forbearance than might have been expected from men of their previous habits; and their lighter irregularities were counterbalanced by the important services they rendered.

In the year 1821 the town of Reyes contained a population of four thousand souls. It was pillaged and burnt by the Spaniards and many of the inhabitants cruelly put to death. Three hundred men survived to avenge the fate of their slaughtered families; they formed themselves into montonero parties and performed prodigies of valour against the royalists, neither giving nor taking quarter. When overpowered by the enemy, they were accustomed to flee to some small island, which they kept provisioned for the purpose, upon the lake near which Reyes was situated. This magnificent lake, one of the sources of the river of the Amazons, thirty leagues in circumference, is skirted by a broad border of morass, through which the montoneros could penetrate by devious tracks, winding amongst quagmires, known only to themselves. At every favourable opportunity they would sally forth from their islet fastnesses and, vanquishers or vanquished, they always inflicted tremendous losses on their enemies. Torrents of blood were shed in this exterminating system of warfare.

General Miller, having at various periods had the command of montoneros, had become personally known to many of them. They hailed his new appointment with rejoicings. These guerrillas were divided into parties of from fifty to a hundred men each. They encircled the royalist army under Canterac, then in cantonments in the valley of Jauja, so as to enable General Miller not only to reconnoitre the country sixty leagues in advance of the Liberating Army, but also to cover its operations preparatory to crossing the Andes. The royalists were

kept continually on the alert. General Miller was often closely pursued, but he invariably succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the enemy, though not always without experiencing some loss. By persevering in this system of warfare, General Miller effectually protected the mining district of Pasco. The mines were kept continually at work, although the advanced posts of the enemy were within sixteen leagues. The royalists occasionally approached much nearer to the mines, but it was not often that they ventured to advance beyond the lake of Reyes, lest their parties might be cut off by the montoneros issuing from their island or mountain holds. If the royalists continued inactive for a time, the patriot parties would advance to some point to induce the royalists to send a superior force to rid themselves of the annoyance. The montoneros then dispersed, but before their pursuers could regain the main body, the pursued would reunite and, turning round upon the enemy, would cut off a number of stragglers. The communication between the Spanish stations was often interrupted and they were most fatally harassed without being able to come to close quarters with their tormentors.

The distance from Huaraz to Pasco is more than fifty leagues of mountain passes. Reyes is fourteen leagues further in advance. The last two places, as well as the intervening country, are totally destitute of wood. Peat was cut as a substitute, but instead of being piled up in stacks, it was scattered over the country to dry, so that if the royalists attempted to burn it, the destruction would be a work of time and of difficulty. The peats are not fit for fuel until they have been cut fifteen days.

Depots of provisions and forage were secreted in mountain caverns formed by the galleries of exhausted mines. Some of these depots were established within the line of country nominally possessed by the royalists. That near Pachia, and on the same bank of the Río Grande, was only eight leagues from Tarma. The entrance of the cave was in the perpendicular side of a cliff fifty or sixty feet from the ground and as many from the top. The only way to get up was by the assistance of a rope fixed in the cave and by notches cut in the

rock to give foothold. Indian corn, salt, jerked beef, potatoes and barley were hoisted up by means of the rope. A few men were sufficient to defend these cavern depots against any numbers. It often happened that when the montoneros advanced, these depots were left exposed, but the royalists were not always aware of the exact situation and entertained no suspicion that supplies had been accumulated in that way to any considerable extent.

The Liberating Army, commanded by General Bolívar in person, after having concentrated in the vicinity of Huaraz, advanced towards Pasco in the month of July 1824. It was tolerably well clothed and armed and was formed into three divisions of infantry. Two of these, being Colombian troops, were commanded by Generals Lara and Córdoba. The third, Peruvian, by General La Mar. The cavalry of Peru by General Miller, that of Colombia by Colonel Caravajal, the Mounted Grenadiers of Buenos Aires by Colonel Bruiz. General Necochea, as the senior officer, commanded the united cavalry forces. Each division had its chief of staff. General Sucre was chief of staff of the whole army and Dr. Sánchez Carrión, as Minister General for the affairs of Peru, accompanied the Dictator.

Each division had its field depot of small arm ammunition. The grand reserve depot of the army was conveyed by three hundred mules. The commissariat had its depot of rice, tobacco, salt and cocoa, which articles were only occasionally issued. To each depot was attached a number of spare mules to replace those that strayed or became unserviceable.

Previous to the commencement of the campaign, General Sucre displayed the greatest skill and judgment in his preparatory dispositions to facilitate the passage of the army to Pasco, a distance not far short of two hundred leagues from Cajamarca, over the most rugged districts of the most mountainous country in the world. It presents at every step difficulties which in Europe would be considered perfectly insurmountable. It was on these terrible marches that the inherent subordination of the South American soldier was fully and signally

displayed. No hardships or privations can diminish their respect for their officers and the few instances which occurred of manifest discontent at Callao etc. originated in a suspicion of treachery or cowardice, or in the experience of unprincipled treatment relative to pay.

Although the Peruvian government had expended enormous sums in the army department, such was the mismanagement and want of system that until 1824 the soldiers were generally irregularly paid. There was no sufficient check, no real responsibility attaching to anyone. The small pittance they did actually receive from time to time depended more upon the personal character of the commanding officer than upon adherence to any fixed regulations.

To remedy this abuse General Bolívar ordered that the paymasters should pay the men personally, that is to say, actually *put into the hands of the soldier* once a week the net pay due to such soldier, this payment being made in the presence of the general of division and commanding officer of the regiment. The full pay of a soldier was ten dollars per month. Four dollars were deducted on account of rations and two dollars on account of clothing etc., so that he was entitled to receive one dollar weekly. So scarce, however, was money in the military chest in 1824 that the soldier was paid only half a dollar per week, but as he regularly received that sum, he became better satisfied with the punctuality of reduced allowance than with the previous uncertainty and chicanery of nominal full pay.

The officers were placed upon one-fourth of their pay and the subaltern found it very difficult to subsist upon such scanty means. He was reduced to the necessity of living upon his rations: the eight or ten dollars he received monthly were barely sufficient for the purchase of his cigars and such articles of wearing apparel as were absolutely indispensable.

The expenditure of the army was therefore greatly diminished and, at the same time, the soldiers, instead of murmuring on account of part of their pay being withheld, became happy and contented. It also gave an effective lesson to

many officers who had previously been too inattentive to the welfare of their brave soldiers.

The many excellent regulations enforced by General Bolívar produced also the additional benefit of weeding the Liberating Army of many officers who felt as much disinclination to conform to severe discipline as they did to cross the Andes for the purpose of assisting to carry on the war in earnest. Under various pretexts they remained behind or quitted on the march. Some of these worthies obtained commands in the provinces, where they issued bombastic proclamations in which they spoke of shedding the last drop of their blood and threatened the royalists with vengeance in terms truly ridiculous.

The labour of rendering roads, or rather tracks, passable over such abrupt ridges and along such tremendous precipices can only be estimated by those who have traversed the more than majestic Andes. The erection of sheds at intervals in the long, barren and uninhabited tracts of country, with the collection and transport of the materials for their construction, besides wood for fuel and the formation of magazines of barley and Indian corn for the cavalry, required the exertion of all General Sucre's talent and activity. The divisions of the Liberating Army crossed the Cordillera generally at the intervening distance of one day's march from each other. But the cavalry, and indeed many of the battalions, often diverged from the general line of march. The shelving ledges, which afforded the only foothold on the rugged sides of the Andes, are so narrow as to render the passage indescribably harassing. The troops could advance only one by one. The single file was sometimes lengthened out to an amazing extent by the awkward spots formed by deep gullies or breaks in the tracks, by projecting rocks or by numerous waterfalls, all of which required great caution and much time to pass in safety. To the cavalry such obstructions were particularly formidable, as each man had, besides the mule on which he rode, a led horse, to be mounted only in sight of the enemy. The agility and dexterity with which they managed to drag their animals after them were astonishing. The lasso was used, as upon every other

occasion, with great adroitness. Fastened round the neck of the led horse, it was lengthened or shortened as the tortuous windings of the ascent or descent required. The men were frequently obliged to dismount at the awkward spots and on such occasions their sabres and lances added greatly to their embarrassments. It often occurred during the campaign of 1824 that the cavalry, being in the rear, were, by a succession of various obstructions, prevented from accomplishing the day's march before nightfall. It then became necessary for every man to dismount and to lead the two animals in his charge to avoid going astray or tumbling headlong down the most frightful precipices. But the utmost precaution did not always prevent the corps from losing their way. Sometimes men at the head of a battalion would continue to follow the windings of a deafening torrent, instead of turning abruptly to the right or left up some rocky acclivity over which lay their proper course, whilst others, who chanced to be right, would pursue the proper track. The line was so drawn out that there were unavoidably many intervals and it was easy for such mistakes to occur, although trumpeters were placed at regular distances expressly to prevent separation. One party was frequently heard hallooing from an apparently fathomless ravine to their comrades passing over some high projecting summit, to know if they were going right. These would answer with their trumpets, but it often occurred that both parties had lost their road. The frequent sound of trumpets along the broken line, the shouting of officers to their men at a distance, the neighing of horses and the braying of mules, both men and animals being alike anxious to reach a place of rest, produced a strange and fearful concert, echoed in the darkness of the night from the horrid solitudes of the Andes. After many fruitless attempts to discover the proper route, a halt until daybreak was usually the last resource. The sufferings of the men and animals on those occasions were extreme. The thermometer was generally below the freezing point, amidst which they were sometimes overtaken by terrific snowstorms.

These difficulties and hardships were not so severely felt by the infantry,

for, unencumbered with the charge of horses, it was an easy matter for them to turn back, whereas it was often impossible for the cavalry to do so, the path on the mountainside being generally too narrow to admit of horses turning round. It happened more than once that the squadron in front, having ascertained that it had taken a wrong direction, was nevertheless compelled to advance until it reached some open spot, where the men were enabled to assemble and wait for the hindmost of their comrades, and then retrace their steps. After having pursued this plan, the troops have met another squadron following the same track and, under such circumstances, it has required hours for either to effect a countermarch. In this complicated operation many an animal was hurled down the precipice and dashed to pieces, nor did their riders always escape a similar fate!

The little care taken of the horses having proved, on previous occasions, a severe drawback upon the successes of the patriots, General Bolívar determined to remedy the evil and, accordingly, previous to the breaking up from cantonments, issued strong orders making commanding officers of cavalry regiments responsible for the slightest inattention, and enforced those orders by the dismissal or suspension of several chiefs for neglect of duty or want of zeal. Such examples produced a salutary effect and Bolívar established a branch of discipline before unobserved in the patriot service.

Each horseman was armed with a sword, a lance and sometimes with a carbine, or a brace of pistols; but such was the scarcity of iron that most of their firearms had been converted into nails and horseshoes in the course of the campaign. The horses were shod on all fours (not commonly done in South America) and were kept well clothed in blankets during the nights passed in the Cordillera, by which means they effected the passage without serious loss. In fact, they were found scarcely inferior to the horses of the Spanish cavalry, which had been, for more than a year, fed upon the lucerne and Indian corn in the rich valley of Jauja, with all the care bestowed upon the best horses in England. Most of them were of the Chileno breed, taken by the royalists in the victories they had gained;

few were worth less than a hundred and fifty Spanish dollars each in Peru and many were more valuable.

The patriot cavalry was composed of perhaps the best horsemen in the world. The gauchos of the Pampas, the *guasos* of Chile and the llaneros of Colombia are all accustomed to ride from early childhood and such is their habitual command over their horses and such their dexterity that a narrative of their equestrian feats would not meet with ready belief. The gaucho who could not pick up a dollar from the ground at full gallop would be considered an indifferent horseman. The way they do this is to stick one spur into the padding of the saddle, throw themselves (rather forward) down on the opposite side and, after having picked up the dollar, they recover their seat with the grace and agility of a rope-dancer. They often guide their horses without using the reins and if one should fall, even when at full speed, such is the position of the rider that he comes down on his feet and seldom sustains the slightest injury. The Peruvians on the coast and on the mountain plain are scarcely less skilful. It is surprising to see them gallop down steep rugged hills with as much nonchalance and apparent ease as if they were cantering upon a racecourse. The llaneros, born in the plains of Colombia, are perhaps not less skilful in the management of the horse, but they are not such graceful riders as the gauchos of Buenos Aires or *guasos* of Chile. The llanero seldom holds himself erect, indeed he considers it the height of perfection, in riding, to sit on one side or in a lolling attitude.

The manner in which the Liberating Army was provisioned in the campaign of 1824 was this: about six thousand head of horned cattle, collected from Cajamarca and adjoining provinces, followed the army at the distance of two or three days' march, in charge of a commissary, who supplied the division whenever provisions could not be procured where they halted.

The cattle required for an army during a campaign was generally taken from large grazing estates, according to the means of each. Receipts were given to the proprietors, but during the war they were very irregularly paid, if at all. Very

little ceremony was observed in taking cattle found upon estates which had been abandoned by the owners who emigrated with the royalists to serve in a civil or military capacity. It was not uncommon to meet with generous men among the wealthy patriots who came forward with one or two hundred head of cattle as a donation, so that, in general, the difficulty of procuring provisions was not great in proportion to other obstacles.

Misled by the facility with which they conquered at Ica, Torata, Moquegua and on the Desaguadero, the royalist chiefs erroneously attributed their successes solely to consummate skill on their own part; and, undervaluing the capabilities of the Liberating Army, they neglected assembling the whole of their disposable forces in the north. Valdés, with his division, was sent to Potosí against the ultraroyalist Olañeta, whose hostility to the Viceroy became every day more openly avowed. General Canterac considered himself quite adequate to repel every attack from the patriots, nor indeed was this opinion formed upon slight grounds. His army was efficient in every respect. It was in the highest state of discipline and went through every evolution with admirable accuracy. Its equipments were superior and complete; the artillery and cavalry particularly well appointed; the whole of the troops were paid with the greatest regularity.

It appears inexplicable how General Canterac could remain inactive in his cantonments of Jauja, whilst the patriot commissaries, protected only by the montoneros, were spread over an immense extent of country and constantly employed in collecting provisions, forage and fuel. Why Canterac did not prevent the formation of these depots on the eastern side of the Andes and why he allowed the patriot army to pass unmolested through the horrible defiles of the mountains is not easily accounted for. The advanced post of the Spaniards was at Cacas, a village three leagues from Reyes.

On the 2nd of August, Bolívar reviewed his forces, nine thousand strong, on the plain between Rancas and Pasco. The troops were well appointed and made a really brilliant appearance. An energetic address from the Liberator was

read to each corps at the same moment and produced indescribable enthusiasm. Nothing could exceed the excitement felt upon that occasion. Every circumstance tended to impart a most romantic interest to the scene. Near the same spot, four years before, the royalists had been defeated by General Arenales. The view from the tableland upon which the troops were reviewed, and which is at an elevation of more than twelve thousand feet above the level of the sea, is perhaps the most magnificent in the world. On the west arose the Andes, which had been just surmounted with so much toil. On the east were enormous ramifications of the Cordillera stretching towards the Brazils. North and south, the view was bounded by mountains whose tops were hidden in the clouds. On that plain, surrounded by such sublime scenery and on the margin of the magnificent lake of Reyes, the principal source of the Amazon, the mightiest of rivers, were now assembled men from Caracas, Panama, Quito, Lima, Chile and Buenos Aires; men who had fought at Maipú, in Chile; at San Lorenzo, on the banks of the Paraná; at Carabobo in Venezuela; and at Pichincha at the foot of the Chimborazo. Amidst those devoted Americans were a few foreigners, still firm and faithful to the cause, in support of which so many of their countrymen had fallen. Amongst those few survivors were men who had fought on the banks of the Guadiana and of the Rhine; who had witnessed the conflagration of Moscow and the capitulation of Paris. Such were the men assembled at what might be considered a fresh starting point in the career of glory. American or European, they were all animated by one sole spirit, that of assuring the political existence of a vast continent. The exhilarating vivas of the troops filled every breast with ardour and prophetic hope.

Awakening at length from his slumber, General Canterac determined to attack the patriot army, which it would appear he hoped to effect in detail by falling upon the several divisions as they debouched in succession upon the tableland. With this view he united his forces at Jauja and marched on the 1st of August for Reyes, where he arrived on the evening of the 4th.

On the 3rd seven hundred montoneros from the western side of the Andes were added to those under the command of General Miller. On the 4th he was with some of his parties at La Oroya, a few leagues west of Jauja. He dispatched reports to General Bolívar, advising His Excellency of Canterac's advance. Upon learning the movements of the royalists, Bolívar quickened his march from Rancas, along the western bank of the great lake, to Conacancha, where General Miller joined the Liberating Army on the night of the 5th and was ordered to place himself at the head of the Peruvian cavalry.

On the morning of the 5th General Canterac had advanced to Carhuamayo and pushed on with his cavalry to Pasco. Instead of meeting with an isolated division on those great plains, as he probably expected, he learned that the Liberating Army was in full march on the opposite side of the great lake. Canterac fell back that night upon his infantry. On the 6th he continued his retreat, whilst the Independents pursued their march along the southern extremity of the lake in order to intercept the royalists. After a march of five leagues through a mountainous district, at 2 p.m. the patriots, from the elevated ground, obtained a sudden view of the enemy, who at the distance of two leagues was marching over the plains of Junín, a little to the southward of Reyes. An enthusiastic and simultaneous viva was heard throughout the line. It is impossible to convey an adequate idea of the effect which the sudden appearance of the enemy produced. The countenances of the patriots were animated with a wild ferocious expression and they gazed with eyes full of fire upon the hostile columns moving majestically beneath their feet. The predominant feeling was a fear that the royalists would escape. The cavalry, in particular, quivered with impatience. They always considered themselves superior to the enemy's cavalry, which, in fact, they were. It was the work of a moment to remove the saddle from the mules on which they rode to their led horses. The nature of the ground below ensured them an opportunity of taking an active part in the impending fight.

At 4 p.m. nine hundred of the patriot horse, having left the infantry and

two squadrons a league in the rear, came up to within a short distance of the whole royalist forces, consisting of eight thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry and a proportionate number of field artillery. Canterac, finding his farther retreat in danger, put himself at the head of his cavalry, formed them in line, with a squadron in column in the immediate rear of each flank, and ordered a charge. The royalist infantry continued their retreat.

It is but justice to say that Canterac not only made a masterly charge but succeeded in attacking under circumstances very unfavourable to the patriots, whose enthusiasm had impelled them perhaps too near the main body of the enemy and too far across a defile formed by a rivulet and swampy ground on one side and an abrupt line of hills on the other, which prevented their deploying so quickly as circumstances required. The squadron forming the head of the column was the only one that was able to deploy.

General Miller with two hundred and fifty of the Peruvian cavalry was ordered by General Bolívar to outflank the right of the advancing royalists, but as the latter came on at a gallop, this manoeuvre could not be carried into effect and he was compelled to wheel to his right and attack in front. His men, together with the right of the patriots under General Necochea, were charged at the same instant. The shock was tremendous and the natural consequence, under the disadvantages just mentioned, was a total rout, with the exception of a few mounted grenadiers of Colombia under the brave Major Braun, who cut his way through the assailants, and excepting a Peruvian squadron, which, being at the first onset a few hundred yards in the rear, fortunately escaped the effects of the first concussion.

With the first movement all praise of the Spanish cavalry must terminate, because, instead of preserving their original order or maintaining a reserve, they divided and dispersed. One party pursued the patriot cavalry sent to outflank the royalist right under General Miller, who attempted to gain the road leading to Cacas. The other royalist party pursued the rest of the patriots to the defile.

Lieutenant-Colonel Suárez, who commanded the unbroken Peruvian squadron, had in the meantime advanced unopposed in the wide interval left by the pursuing royalists and, getting completely into their rear, began to charge those who were pursuing the left of the patriots under General Miller, who, embarrassed by the swampy nature of the ground, faced about. The royalists, now in an extended and disorderly state, perceiving themselves threatened in front and rear, began to waver and fled in their turn. The seasonable succour of Suárez enabled the routed patriot squadrons on the right as well as those on the left to rally. General Miller, Colonels Caravajal, Silva and Bruiz and Major Braun, with as many of their men as it was possible to collect together, supported Suárez. The patriots now used their lances with such effect that the boasted cavalry of the Spaniards were soon in a state of total and disgraceful flight and pursued to the very bayonets of their infantry by comparatively a handful of their opponents. General Necochea received, early in the action, seven wounds and was made a prisoner. His life was spared at the intercession of a royalist soldier, who had formerly served under Necochea in the Army of the Andes. He had the General placed on horseback behind him, but, as he was carrying him off the field, a Colombian party, under the gallant Captain Sandoval, rescued Necochea. It is, with regret, to be stated, that the humane preserver of the General was killed before the patriots were aware of the service he had performed. Upon General Necochea being wounded, the command of the whole of the cavalry devolved upon General Miller.

The action lasted about three-quarters of an hour. The Spaniards lost nineteen officers and three hundred and forty-five rank and file killed and eighty prisoners. The patriots had three officers and forty-two rank and file killed and eight officers and ninety-one rank and file wounded. Not a shot was fired; the lance and the sabre alone were used. The Colombian lance, twelve or fourteen feet long, is formed of a strong tough sapling, headed in the usual manner. The lancers fix the reins of their bridles above the knee, so as to be able to guide their

horses and at the same time leave both hands at liberty to wield the lance. They frequently struck their opponents with such force when at a gallop as to lift them two or three feet above the saddle. The pole of the Peruvian lance is, like that of the English, heavier and not so tough as the Colombian, but the Peruvians also used theirs with great dexterity and effect. From the great elevation of the plain of Junín the cold at night was so intense that nearly all the wounded on both sides perished.

The officers who most distinguished themselves and who principally contributed to the successes of the day were Lieutenant-Colonel Suárez and Major Braun. The first regiment of cavalry of Peru (formerly the Hussars of the Legion) was denominated the Hussars of Junín by order of General Bolívar in testimony of his approbation of their gallant conduct. [...]

Quinua, an Indian village, is on the western extremity of the plain of Ayacucho, the shape of which is nearly square, about a league in circumference and flanked right and left by deep rugged ravines. In the rear of the plain, or towards the west, is a gradual descent of two leagues to the main road from Huamanga to Huanta, which runs along the base of a mountain range that rises like a wall with no apparent outlet. The eastern boundary of the plain is formed by the abrupt and rugged ridge of Condorcanqui, which gigantic bulwark, running north and south, overlooks the field of Ayacucho. A little below the summit of this ridge was perched the royalist army.

The Liberating Army was drawn up on the plain, in front of the Spaniards, at the distance of about a mile, having Quinua in the rear, each corps formed in close column and awaiting the attack of the royalists. [...]

During the night of the 8th a brisk fire was maintained between the royalist and patriot outposts. It was the object of Sucre to prevent the royalists descending in the night. For this purpose the bands of two battalions were sent with a company near to the foot of the ridge and continued playing for some time whilst a sharp fire was kept up. This feint had the desired effect, for the royalists did not

stir from their lines.

The Viceroy's position in the night of the 8th was very much exposed: his infantry, occupying the front of the ridge of Condorcanqui, was within musket range of the foot of the hill. The fire from two or three battalions, deployed into line, might have obliged the royalists to abandon their position. As it was, a lieutenant-colonel and two or three men within the Spanish encampment were killed as they sat round their fires by chance balls from the patriot company at the foot of the hill.

The night of the 8th was one of deep and anxious interest. A battle was inevitable on the following day and that battle was to decide the destinies of South America. The patriots were aware that they had to contend with twice their own numbers and that nothing but a decisive victory could save them and their country from ignominious servitude. The patriot soldier might indeed expect to escape with life, reduced to the condition of a slave; but with the patriot generals and officers, it was only a choice between death and victory. They knew full well what would be the cruel policy of the Spaniards if they proved victorious. The Viceroy was, it is true, a man of humane disposition, but the individual who counselled General Juan Antonio Monet to shoot two patriot officers in the pass of San Mateo and the other man (if such he may be called) who ran his sword through the wounded and defenceless Major Gumer on the field at Ica were, with others of a character equally sanguinary, amongst the advisers of La Serna, and it is extremely probable that unsparing executions would have been resorted to in the hope of destroying the very germ of future insurrection. Everyone felt that the approaching battle was to have no common result.

The morning of the 9th dawned particularly fine. At first there was a dullness in the air which seemed to influence the minds of the men, but when the sun arose above the mountain, the effects of its genial warmth became manifest in the raised spirits of the soldiers. The men on both sides were observed rubbing their hands and exhibiting every token of content and satisfaction.

At nine a.m. the division Villalobos began to descend. The Viceroy on foot placed himself at its head and the files wound down the craggy side of Condorcanqui, obliquing a little to their left.

The division Monet, forming the royalist right, commenced at the same time to defile directly into the plain. The cavalry, leading their horses, made the same movement, though with greater difficulty, at intervals between the infantry of each division. As the files arrived on the plain, they formed into column. This was a moment of extraordinary interest. It appeared as though respiration were suspended by feelings of anxiety, mingled with doubts and hope.

It was during this operation, which had an imposing effect, that General Sucre rode along his own line and, addressing a few emphatic words to each corps, recalled to memory its former achievements. He then placed himself in a central point in front of his line and, in an inspiring tone of voice, said, 'That upon the efforts of that day depended the fate of South America.' Then, pointing to the descending columns, he assured his men 'that another day of glory was about to crown their admirable constancy'. This animating address of the General produced an electric effect and was answered by enthusiastic vivas.

By the time that rather more than half the royalist divisions, Monet and Villalobos, had reached and formed upon the arena, General Sucre ordered the division Córdoba and two regiments of cavalry to advance to the charge. The gallant Córdoba dismounted and placed himself about fifteen yards in front of his division, formed into four parallel columns with the cavalry in the interval. Holding his hat with his left hand above his head, he exclaimed, 'Onwards with the step of conquerors.' These words, pronounced with dignified animation, were heard distinctly throughout the columns, which, inspired by the gallant bearing of their leader, moved to the attack in the finest possible order. The Spaniards stood firmly and full of apparent confidence. The Viceroy, Monet and Villalobos were seen at the head of their divisions, superintending the formation of their columns as they reached the plain. The hostile bayonets crossed and for three or four

minutes the two parties were seen struggling together, so as to leave it doubtful which would give way. At this moment the Colombian cavalry, headed by Colonel Silva, charged. This brave officer fell covered with wounds, but the intrepidity of the onset was irresistible. The royalists lost ground and were driven to the heights of Condorcanqui with great slaughter. The Viceroy was wounded and taken prisoner. As the fugitives climbed the sides of Condorcanqui, the patriots kept up a well-directed fire and numbers of the enemy were seen to drop and roll down, till their progress was arrested by the brushwood or some jutting crag.

General Miller, who had accompanied Córdoba's division, perceiving its complete success, returned to the regiment of Hussars of Junin, which fortunately, as it subsequently turned out, had been left in reserve.

At dawn of day, the royalist division, Valdés, had commenced a detour of nearly a league. Descending the sides of Condorcanqui on the north, Valdés placed himself on the left of the patriots at musket shot distance, separated by a ravine. At the important moment of the battle just described, he opened a heavy fire from four field-pieces and a battalion in extended files. By this he obliged two battalions of the Peruvian division, La Mar, to fall back. The Colombian battalion, Vargas, sent to support the Peruvian division, also began to give way. Two royalist battalions crossed the deep ravine, already spoken of on the left, and advanced in double quick time in pursuit of the retiring patriots. At this critical juncture General Miller led the Hussars of Junín against the victorious Spaniards and by a timely charge drove them back and followed them across the ravine, being farther supported by the Mounted Grenadiers and by the division La Mar, which had rallied. The artillery of Valdés was taken, his cavalry retired and his infantry dispersed.

The royalists had now lost the battle and fled to the ridge from which they had descended in the morning with so much confidence. The action lasted an hour.

Fourteen hundred royalists were killed and seven hundred wounded, and they lost fifteen pieces of artillery.

The loss on the part of the patriots was three hundred and seventy killed and six hundred and nine wounded.

The single piece of artillery belonging to the patriots did considerable execution in the royalist columns and was of service also in attracting a heavy fire from the royalist artillery, which, if it had been directed upon the patriot columns, would have occasioned the loss to be more considerable.

The plan of the royalists was to wait until Valdés had outflanked the left of Sucre's position, from which having driven the patriots, the Viceroy was to advance and complete the victory. The mistake of the Viceroy in attacking at all originated in suffering himself to be impelled to it by the eagerness of his troops. Their patience had been worn out by the terrible marches, which appeared to them to be endless. At Huamanguilla a system of pasquinading had been adopted. The tents of the Viceroy, of Canterac and others had various lampoons pasted on them and it may be fairly said that they were goaded into a general action contrary to their own judgment.

The royalists, upon regaining the height of Condorcanqui, rallied as many they possibly could. The patriot divisions La Mar and Lara gained the summit of the heights at about 1 p.m. Shortly before sunset General Canterac sued for terms and within an hour rode down himself to the tent of Sucre, where a capitulation was agreed upon. Generals La Serna, Canterac, Valdés, Carratalá, Monet, Villalobos, Ferraz, Bedoya, Somocurcio, Cacho, Atero, Landazuri, García-Camba, Pardo, Vigil and Tur, 16 colonels, 68 lieutenant-colonels, 484 officers, 3,200 rank and file became prisoners of war. The rest had dispersed.

The battle of Ayacucho was the most brilliant ever fought in South America. The troops on both sides were in a state of discipline which would have been creditable to the best European armies. The ablest generals and chiefs of either party were present. And it is difficult to say which army most panted for an

appeal to the sword and every man fought with undaunted bravery. What the patriots wanted in numbers was made up by enthusiasm and by a perfect knowledge that, if beaten, retreat was utterly impracticable. It was not a victory of mere chance, but the result of the most determined bravery and an irresistible onset conceived and executed at the proper moment.